Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: Over to you Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: We have a witness who is waiting to be called ...[inaudible]

INTERPRETER: Microphone?

MR BIZOS: A witness to be called by us is Mrs Theresa Beyers. Perhaps we could get her to sit on that side of the table there Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] be convenient.

JUDGE WILSON: Mr Bizos, if the chair is put there for her, couldn’t this other table be put in front of her and you could put the microphone on it?

CHAIRPERSON: Mrs Beyers, are you prepared to take the oath?

THERESA BEYERS: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: Mrs Beyers, where do you live Madam?

MRS BEYERS: In 3-13th Avenue, Houghton.

MR BIZOS: And where does President Mandela live?

MRS BEYERS: At number 4-13th Avenue, Houghton.

MR BIZOS: Your house must have acquired quite a lot of value?

MRS BEYERS: Hopefully.

MR BIZOS: For how long have you been living there Mrs Beyers?

MRS BEYERS: 17 years.

MR BIZOS: Speak up towards the Committee because we must all hear, the Committee and the applicants and the counsel on the other side, so please speak up.

When did Mr Mandela move over the road from you?

MRS BEYERS: In May - I can’t remember, May ‘91 - May ‘92.

MR BIZOS: May ‘92?

MRS BEYERS: May ‘92.

MR BIZOS: Yes. And is his house under guard?

MRS BEYERS: Yes, it is.

MR BIZOS: And on a particular day, do you recall the day that you saw something unusual on your street?

MRS BEYERS: Yes, it was the 12th of July 1992.

MR BIZOS: Now, how do you fix this date Mrs Beyers?

MRS BEYERS: We were going to an engagement party, so that’s how I remembered it.

MR BIZOS: And what time did you decide to set off for the engagement party?

MRS BEYERS: It was probably about 5 o’clock - 5H00/5H30.

MR BIZOS: This would be in winter, was it already dark or was there light?

MRS BEYERS: No, it was still light.

MR BIZOS: And you say that you intended going to an engagement party, who were - you or ...[intervention]

MRS BEYERS: It was me, my husband and my daughter and her boyfriend.

MR BIZOS: What did you see when you emerged from your driveway?

MRS BEYERS: My husband came out the drive and turned left and made an error, he should have turned right to go onto the motor-way, so he did a U-turn in the road and we saw a white bakkie parked on the pavement - our pavement, over the road from Mr Mandela’s house. We then drove down to Central Avenue, turned right and this ...[intervention]

MR BIZOS: What did this bakkie do when you made the U-turn?

MRS BEYERS: The bakkie pulled off straight away - as soon as we’d made a U-turn, the bakkie pulled off and drove down the road towards Central Avenue - drove down 13th Avenue, towards Central Avenue.

MR BIZOS: Drove westwards?

MRS BEYERS: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Towards Central Avenue.

MRS BEYERS: That’s correct.

MR BIZOS: And how far is your house and Mr Mandela’s house from the corner of ...[intervention]

MRS BEYERS: Two houses.

MR BIZOS: Two houses?

MRS BEYERS: Two houses from Central.

MR BIZOS: From the corner of Central and ...[intervention]

MRS BEYERS: From the corner of Central and 13th Avenue.

MR BIZOS: Did he drive off in a leisurely fashion?

MRS BEYERS: No, he wasn’t in a leisurely - he didn’t drive off in a leisurely fashion, it was quite quick. We then turned right into Central Avenue where this car was in front of us and we caught up with him again on the bridge - on the motor-way, the Glenhove Road bridge where - because of the strange behaviour, we had a look at the car and the occupants - there were three of us and my husband was obviously driving, he couldn’t see, we saw a white bakkie with a man in the bakkie talking obviously on - I presume, on a two-way radio. He had - there were no number plates at the back of the bakkie and there were bullet holes in the side - the driver’s side of the bakkie.

MR BIZOS: Did you consider this a usual or an unusual event - having regard to Mr Mandela’s position?

MRS BEYERS: We were a bit suspicious because President Mandela was living over the road and because he’d driven away - we hadn’t noticed him to start with, but because he drove away so quickly, we were suspicious and when we got to the function I phone the President’s security to say: "Please be on the alert".

MR BIZOS: When you stopped on the Central Street and...[intervention]

MRS BEYERS: Glenhove Road bridge.

MR BIZOS: Glenhove Road bridge, did you have a look at the driver?

MRS BEYERS: Yes, I did.

MR BIZOS: Did you have a good look at him?

MRS BEYERS: Yes, I did.

MR BIZOS: Is he anywhere here?

MRS BEYERS: Yes, it’s Mr Walus.

MR BIZOS: When did you connect what you saw on the 12th of July ...[intervention]

MRS BEYERS: After Mr Hani was assassinated and we saw the photographs in the newspaper, that was when we connected.

MR BIZOS: Did you report this to anyone?

MRS BEYERS: No, we just mentioned it - in passing, to the President when he came for lunch one day.

MR BIZOS: You say, from the party you telephoned ...[intervention]

MRS BEYERS: We telephoned the President’s house to alert his housekeeper and the security.

MR BIZOS: That was on the 12th of July?

MRS BEYERS: That was on the 12th of July.

MR BIZOS: Is there any doubt in your mind that the driver of that White bakkie was Mr Walus?

MRS BEYERS: No.

MR BIZOS: Thank you Mr Chairman, we have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BIZOS

CHAIRPERSON: Any cross-examination?

CROSS EXAMINATION BY MS VAN DER WALT: I would like to just have my microphone seen to, it’s not working properly.

Mrs Beyers, on the 12th of July ...[intervention]

MR BIZOS: ...[inaudible] give the witness.

MS VAN DER WALT: On the 12th of July 1992, you allegedly saw Mr Walus in this bakkie, when did you then see the photograph?

MRS BEYERS: After Mr Hani was assassinated.

MS VAN DER WALT: So, that was after the 10th of April 1993?

MRS BEYERS: That’s correct.

MS VAN DER WALT: Now, can you give a description of the bakkie?

MRS BEYERS: It was a white bakkie.

MS VAN DER WALT: What kind?

MRS BEYERS: I’ve no idea.

MS VAN DER WALT: But then how can you recall the finer details of Mr Walus but you can’t tell the Committee what type of bakkie it was?

MRS BEYERS: As I said, when the President moved over the road from us we were aware of a security risk, so when the bakkie pulled away, we didn’t see the type but we did notice it had no number plates at the back and there were bullet holes in the side but I’m afraid I didn’t get the make.

MS VAN DER WALT: It seems rather strange to me that you can recall all those other details but a statement was made by Mr Bizos that it was a Hi-Lux bakkie.

MRS BEYERS: I don’t think to here - I didn’t say it was a Hi-Lux.

MR BIZOS: ...[inaudible]

INTERPRETER: Microphone?

MS VAN DER WALT: Mrs Beyers, you say that your husband made a wrong turn as he exited your gates?

MRS BEYERS: ...[inaudible]

MS VAN DER WALT: Is your house opposite Mr Mandela’s house?

MRS BEYERS: ...[inaudible]

MS VAN DER WALT: Where exactly was the bakkie parked?

MRS BEYERS: ...[inaudible]

MS VAN DER WALT: Is it immediately in front of your house?

MRS BEYERS: No, where the bakkie was parked is part of my property, it was in front of my tennis court and the President’s house is over the road from my tennis court, it’s a sub-division.

MS VAN DER WALT: When you left your property, did you immediately see the bakkie?

MRS BEYERS: No.

MS VAN DER WALT: Why not?

MRS BEYERS: We weren’t looking for it, it was only we did - came out of the drive, turned left, did a U-turn, we were aware of the bakkie pulling off the road. If the bakkie hadn’t have moved we would have noticed it and it could have been friends of the staff.

MS VAN DER WALT: In your evidence you said that he didn’t drive off in a slow way but he actually had quite a bit of speed as he pulled away.

MRS BEYERS: It wasn’t speed but it was fast.

MS VAN DER WALT: Did your husband immediately pursue the bakkie?

MRS BEYERS: No, not at all, not at all, the bakkie happened to have been going to same way as we did and when we came upon the bakkie - when we drove next to the bakkie on the motor-way, that’s when we looked at all the details.

MS VAN DER WALT: So, you weren’t giving chase, so it would seem as if the bakkie was also not in any great hurry, it wasn’t speeding?

MRS BEYERS: It wasn’t speeding but it was going fast.

MS VAN DER WALT: And you just followed, according to your evidence?

MRS BEYERS: Yes.

MS VAN DER WALT: In a normal manner?

MRS BEYERS: Yes.

MS VAN DER WALT: Can you give a description of the bullet holes that you saw, where exactly were these holes?

MRS BEYERS: The bullet holes were on the driver’s side and no, I can’t give you a description of the bullet holes.

MS VAN DER WALT: Pardon me, you can’t do what? You can’t give any further description?

MRS BEYERS: The bullet holes were on the driver’s side - I mean, there were bullet holes in the - on the driver’s side of the door - bullet holes in the door of the bakkie.

MS VAN DER WALT: Yes, but where exactly and how many bullet holes and were they all together or were they spread out - you observed these things?

MRS BEYERS: There were more than one - I don’t know how many and - no, I don’t know where they were but there were quite a few and the bullet holes were noticed by my daughter and her boyfriend.

MS VAN DER WALT: So you didn’t even see it?

MRS BEYERS: Yes, I did.

MS VAN DER WALT: How do you know that these were bullet holes?

MRS BEYERS: Because I’ve seen pictures of cars with bullet holes in them.

MS VAN DER WALT: Yes, but you didn’t stop, you drove past - past the bakkie.

MRS BEYERS: No, we were - the robot was red, we were parked side by side.

MS VAN DER WALT: And then - according to your evidence, you observed Mr Walus and you then phone the President’s home just to inform them?

MRS BEYERS: Correct.

MS VAN DER WALT: Did you receive any further feedback from the President’s staff or guards afterwards?

MRS BEYERS: No, we didn’t.

MS VAN DER WALT: Mrs Beyers, when you saw the photograph of Mr Walus for the first time in the newspaper, why didn’t you immediately go to the police?

MRS BEYERS: I’ve no idea.

MS VAN DER WALT: Surely it was a very important matter that was being investigated, it received wide media coverage, a lot was written about a so-called greater or bigger conspiracy and to this day you never went to the police to tell them this - according to you, important information, is that correct?

MRS BEYERS: Yes, it is but I didn’t - I don’t know, I don’t know why I didn’t go to the police.

MS VAN DER WALT: Because if it was so important and it was a bakkie with bullet holes in the door and you saw this man who had killed Mr Hani, then surely you could have prevented further problems by going to the police because you were acting as somebody who was protecting the State President?

MRS BEYERS: I don’t know why I didn’t - I don’t know why I didn’t go to the police.

MS VAN DER WALT: Then, why did you come forward now?

MRS BEYERS: The President spoke to Mr Bizos and Mr Bizos asked me to come through.

MS VAN DER WALT: So the President got in touch with Mr Bizos? - I didn’t hear the answer?

MRS BEYERS: I think that’s correct.

MS VAN DER WALT: So, Mr Mandela, the President, he would also have known from the 12th of July 1992, and the whole cabinet I think or Parliament ought to have known that the Commission was investigating a bigger conspiracy but right up until this minute, no mention is made of your evidence.

MRS BEYERS: I don’t think that is correct at all, it was a while after that Mr Mandela knew and it certainly - I don’t think, was a conspiracy thing.

MS VAN DER WALT: You said it was sometimes afterwards, after what that Mr Mandela did something?

MRS BEYERS: No, I spoke to Mr Mandela a couple of months after Mr Hani had been assassinated, I don’t think Mr Mandela would have talked to - you say - I think you said cabinet or whatever, I think he just probably stored it away, I don’t know.

MS VAN DER WALT: But Mr Mandela only contacted Mr Bizos now?

MRS BEYERS: I don’t know, I’ve no idea.

MR BIZOS: I don’t know that the witness would know when the President spoke to me Mr Chairman. If counsel wants me to make a statement as to when the President spoke to me, I’m prepared to make it but I don’t think that I should ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: No, I think we just suffice because she would obviously say she doesn’t know when Mr Mandela spoke to Mr Bizos.

MS VAN DER WALT: What kind of clothing was Mr Walus wearing on that particular day?

MRS BEYERS: A camouflage top.

MS VAN DER WALT: And what else, was he wearing something on his head, was he trying to conceal his face?

MRS BEYERS: No, he was driving and as I say, he was talking on what appeared to be a two-way radio.

MS VAN DER WALT: Why do you say: "It appeared as if he was speaking on a two-way radio"?

MRS BEYERS: Well, if it was today, I would have said he was talking on a cell phone.

MS VAN DER WALT: So, you’re not even sure what exactly he was doing?

MRS BEYERS: Yes, I am, he was talking with something in his hand - he was talking into something in his hand.

MS VAN DER WALT: You’re saying: "As if it appeared"?

MRS BEYERS: It could have been a microphone, it could have been a two-way radio.

MS VAN DER WALT: You aren’t even sure?

MRS BEYERS: I am sure that he was talking on something he was - I am sure, he was holding something in his hand - I am sure and he was talking into something he was holding in his hand.

MS VAN DER WALT: What was his hairstyle like at the time?

MRS BEYERS: It was longer than it is now.

MS VAN DER WALT: Just a moment Chairperson. Thank you Chair.

You said that his hair was longer than it is today?

MRS BEYERS: That’s correct.

MS VAN DER WALT: How long, can you estimate for the Committee?

MRS BEYERS: No, I can’t.

MS VAN DER WALT: I beg your pardon, I couldn’t hear.

MRS BEYERS: No, I can’t.

MS VAN DER WALT: Thank you.

MRS BEYERS: Was there anything else which he was wearing which you could perhaps point out for the Committee’s benefit? You say he was wearing a camouflage top and his hair was longer, was there anything else?

MRS BEYERS: No, I didn’t see anything else.

MS VAN DER WALT: You’ve thought carefully about this?

MRS BEYERS: Yes, I have.

MS VAN DER WALT: Because Mr Walus wears glasses, he cannot drive without wearing his spectacles.

MRS BEYERS: I didn’t notice.

MS VAN DER WALT: But I’m putting it to you that that is the case.

MRS BEYERS: I accept that.

MS VAN DER WALT: But you didn’t tell the Commission that he was wearing glasses on that day?

MRS BEYERS: I didn’t see him wearing glasses.

MS VAN DER WALT: Mr Walus also has always worn his hair as short as it is now and that is also how it appeared on the photograph in the newspaper, he was depicted with short hair as he is now. I put it to you that Mr Walus has never driven a bakkie with bullet holes in the side and he was most definitely not - on the 12th of July 1992, at Mr Mandela’s residence, at a later stage he was there but definitely not on the 12th of July.

MRS BEYERS: I saw Mr Walus on the 12th of July.

MS VAN DER WALT: Thank you Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS VAN DER WALT

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Prinsloo, do you have any questions to put?

MR PRINSLOO: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mrs Beyers, what time did you say you saw this bakkie opposite the road from you?

MRS BEYERS: About 5H00 - just after 5H00, I can’t give you an exact time because I don’t know but it was after 5H00, we were going to a cocktail party.

MR PRINSLOO: You said in your evidence ...[inaudible] between half past 5H00 and 6H00.

CHAIRPERSON: No.

JUDGE WILSON: That’s not what she said, she said 5H00 to 5H30.

MR PRINSLOO: I beg your pardon, thank you Mr Chairman.

You say between 5H00 and 5H30, is that correct?

MRS BEYERS: ...[inaudible]

MR PRINSLOO: For what distance did you follow that vehicle that you saw - this bakkie?

MRS BEYERS: From Central Avenue to the motor-way.

MR PRINSLOO: How far is that?

MRS BEYERS: I’ve no idea, a couple of blocks.

MR PRINSLOO: And if I put it to you that this year - on the 12th of July 1997, the sun set at 17H32, would it be more or less the time that the sun was setting at that stage?

MRS BEYERS: I have no idea, but it was light.

MR PRINSLOO: So, if the sun did set at approximately that time on the 12th of July 1992, then would it have been just before sunset or after sunset?

MRS BEYERS: It was before sunset.

MR PRINSLOO: If you say: "Just before sunset", can you be more specific, where was the sun at that stage?

MRS BEYERS: I really have no idea, I have no idea, but it was light.

MR PRINSLOO: Did you have your vehicle lights on at that stage?

MRS BEYERS: No.

MR PRINSLOO: You do remember that?

MRS BEYERS: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: How come you remember such detail?

MRS BEYERS: Because when it’s light, I don’t put my car lights on.

CHAIRPERSON: Please.

MR PRINSLOO: Now, Mrs Beyers, you are aware that when Mr Walus and Mr Derby-Lewis and his wife were charged with the murder of Mr Chris Hani, there was also allegations made of a list of people which included the President, Mr Mandela, are you aware of that?

MRS BEYERS: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: And despite that, you didn’t go to the police and tell them you saw Mr Walus at the President’s house?

MRS BEYERS: I’ve already said that.

MR PRINSLOO: But why didn’t you go, you knew that was vital evidence?

MRS BEYERS: I don’t know why I didn’t go to the police.

MR PRINSLOO: Mrs Beyers, who did you speak to at the President’s house, to whom did you report?

MRS BEYERS: I spoke to his housekeeper who alerted the guards.

MR PRINSLOO: I beg your pardon?

MRS BEYERS: To the housekeeper who alerted the guards.

MR PRINSLOO: And what was the name of the housekeeper?

MRS BEYERS: Mrs Chrissie Fortuin.

MR PRINSLOO: Did you give her a description of the person you saw?

MRS BEYERS: No, I didn’t.

MR PRINSLOO: Did you give a description of the vehicle you saw?

MRS BEYERS: No, I didn’t - yes, I did, I said there was a white bakkie.

MR PRINSLOO: Is that all you said?

MRS BEYERS: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: No other description other than being a white bakkie?

MRS BEYERS: No.

MR PRINSLOO: Nothing about no number plates?

MRS BEYERS: It wasn’t relevant at the time, it was just a suspicious vehicle that was on the pavement.

MR PRINSLOO: The question is Mrs Beyers: "No other detail besides the fact that it was a white bakkie"?

MRS BEYERS: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: And you say you identified Mr Walus in a newspaper, is that correct?

MRS BEYERS: That’s correct, yes.

MR PRINSLOO: Which newspaper was that?

MRS BEYERS: I can’t remember.

MR PRINSLOO: You cannot recall that

MRS BEYERS: It could have been The Star, Citizen, I have no idea.

MR PRINSLOO: Did somebody point it out to you or did you see it of your accord or did you ...[intervention]

MRS BEYERS: I saw it of my own accord.

MR PRINSLOO: When was that Mrs Beyers?

MRS BEYERS: I also can’t remember a date but it was soon after Mr Hani was assassinated.

MR PRINSLOO: And have you still got that newspaper?

MRS BEYERS: No, I haven’t.

MR PRINSLOO: But you can’t - can you say what photo of Mr Walus you saw?

MRS BEYERS: No, I can’t.

MR PRINSLOO: Was it a full photo, just a face or what?

MRS BEYERS: I really can’t remember, it must have been a face for me to have recognised him.

MR PRINSLOO: Did you recognise it from the side or from the front or what Mrs Beyers?

MRS BEYERS: I really can’t remember.

MR PRINSLOO: Are there any outstanding features by which you were able to identify Mr Walus when you saw him on that particular which you allege you saw him?

MRS BEYERS: I think Mr Walus has a distinctive face.

MR PRINSLOO: Distinctive in what sense Mrs Beyers?

MRS BEYERS: ...[indistinct]

MR PRINSLOO: You’re now looking at him, at that stage ...[intervention]

MRS BEYERS: I am looking at him, yes.

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, tell the Committee please.

MRS BEYERS: Possibly his profile which is what I saw his face on - profile.

MR PRINSLOO: What you saw on the 12th of July 1992 and then you were able - in a newspaper after the 10th of April 1993, to identify the same person?

MRS BEYERS: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: And you say you spoke to the President, Mr Mandela a couple of months after Mr Hani’s death?

MRS BEYERS: Yes, I’m not exactly sure when it was but it was after Mr Hani’s death.

MR PRINSLOO: But if I recall correctly - I don’t want to misquote you, did you say it was a couple of months after Mr Hani’s death?

MRS BEYERS: That’s correct.

MR PRINSLOO: When you say: "It’s a couple of months", what do you mean by that?

MRS BEYERS: Six weeks, eight weeks, five weeks - a couple of months.

MR PRINSLOO: And what did you say to Mr Mandela?

MRS BEYERS: It was in passing that ...[intervention]

MR PRINSLOO: No, but what did you say to him?

MRS BEYERS: That there was a bakkie that was parked on his - our pavement, watching his house on the 12th of July.

MR PRINSLOO: Is that all you said to him?

MRS BEYERS: No, probably a lot more but that was the basis of the thing and that we - it was with Mr Walus.

MR PRINSLOO: Pardon?

MRS BEYERS: That it was Mr Walus.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Walus?

MRS BEYERS: In the bakkie, yes.

MR PRINSLOO: And what was the President’s reaction to you with regard to that?

MRS BEYERS: He didn’t say - oh, I see.

MR PRINSLOO: Is that all?

MRS BEYERS: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: He didn’t ask you where the bakkie was precisely parked or what the bakkie did?

MRS BEYERS: No.

MR PRINSLOO: Nothing of the sort?

MRS BEYERS: No.

MR PRINSLOO: Now, Mrs Beyers, you are aware that the trial of these three accused - at the time, took in October 1993?

MRS BEYERS: Yes, I am.

MR PRINSLOO: Was it prior or subsequent to the trial that you told the President, Mr Mandela - with regard to this incident?

MRS BEYERS: It must have been before.

MR PRINSLOO: Beforehand?

MRS BEYERS: No, no, no, I don’t know - no, it was before, it was before the trial.

MR PRINSLOO: You appear to be unsure of yourself Mrs Beyers?

MRS BEYERS: It was before the trial.

MR PRINSLOO: I beg your pardon?

MRS BEYERS: It was before the trial.

MR PRINSLOO: But why were you hesitant about this now?

MRS BEYERS: Because I had to think.

MR PRINSLOO: Was there anything that caused you not to be sure?

JUDGE WILSON: Well, is there anything that causes you to be sure it was before the trial?

...[Tape blank]

MRS BEYERS: ...[inaudible] after the trial obviously we read a lot - I read a lot more about Mr Hani and Mr Derby-Lewis.

MR PRINSLOO: ...[inaudible] - I beg your pardon, subsequent to the trial Mrs Beyers that you read a lot about them or before?

MRS BEYERS: I read about both of them before the trial and then after the trial but it certainly was before the trial that I spoke to the President.

MR PRINSLOO: When did you - for the first time, become aware that Mr Mandela’s name was linked to this particular trial of Mr Hani?

MRS BEYERS: ...[inaudible]

MR PRINSLOO: Just a moment please Mr Chairman, just one second please. Thank you Mr Chairman, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR PRINSLOO

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mpshe, are there any questions you wish to

put to this witness?

ADV MPSHE: ...[inaudible]

NO QUESTIONS BY MR MPSHE

CHAIRPERSON: Any re-examination Mr Bizos?

MR BIZOS: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS

JUDGE NGOEPE: If I may ask, I assume your husband was driving?

MRS BEYERS: Yes, that’s correct.

JUDGE NGOEPE: And I would assume that you were sitting next to him, at the time when the traffic light was red and both vehicles were stationery, were you behind the bakkie?

MRS BEYERS: No, we were next to the bakkie.

JUDGE NGOEPE: Which side?

MRS BEYERS: We were going onto the motor-way and the bakkie was in the middle lane, so were turning right onto the motor-way and the bakkie was going up towards Glenhove.

JUDGE NGOEPE: I’m not sure I have the picture, but on which side would the bakkie be - on which side?

MRS BEYERS: On my left.

JUDGE NGOEPE: I see. And how close were you to - was there another lane - empty lane in-between the two vehicles?

MRS BEYERS: Yes.

JUDGE NGOEPE: Was there another vehicle in-between the two vehicles?

MRS BEYERS: No.

JUDGE NGOEPE: Thank you .

JUDGE WILSON: I’m not quite sure if I understand you, you’ve just said there was an empty lane between you but I thought you said before that you were in the turning right lane and he was in the centre lane?

MRS BEYERS: Yes, when I say there was an empty lane - there was nothing in-between, we were going right onto the motor-way and he was in the ...[inaudible]

JUDGE WILSON: Was he in the lane next to you?

MRS BEYERS: That’s correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Any re-examination?

MR BIZOS: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

Thanks very much.

MR BIZOS: May the ...[inaudible]

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, certainly, she’s excused.

WITNESS EXCUSED

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, we have another witness ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Please! Yes, Mr Bizos?

MR BIZOS: ...[inaudible] yesterday Mr Chairman, the witness hasn’t arrived yet but he did telephone this morning Mr Chairman, to say that he would be late because he wanted to see his counsel in Johannesburg and we said that we would be waiting for him - he isn’t here ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Can we not proceed with any of your other witnesses?

MR BIZOS: There is one other witness here with whom I have not consulted and I don’t particularly want to consult with her but we can possibly take up the time because I - it’s Mrs du Randt, Mr Chairman and I want to make it clear that she’s not our witness in a sense but there are certain questions that we want to put to her for the record. And I would ask you to call her at this stage Mr Chairman, she has been in court for some time.

CHAIRPERSON: No, what am I to call her for?

MR BIZOS: We’re going to call her about the delivery of the gun and more particularly the date on which the gun was delivered Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, Mrs du Randt - will she come forward, is she here?

CHAIRPERSON: Are you prepared to take the oath?

MRS DU RANDT: Yes.

MR BIZOS: She’s Afrikaans speaking Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MRS DU RANDT: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: Mrs du Randt, you have given evidence before the Judge President in the case in which Mr Derby-Lewis and Mr Walus and Mrs Derby-Lewis were the accused, can you remember this?

MRS DU RANDT: Yes, that’s correct.

MR BIZOS: Will you please speak a bit more loudly, the members of the Committee, the applicants and their counsellors - legal counsel, would like to hear what you are saying.

You and your husband, did you deliver a pistol at the home of Mr and Mrs Derby-Lewis?

MRS DU RANDT: Yes, that is correct.

MR BIZOS: You made a statement - didn’t you, which was in the possession of the Attorney General and you testified on page ...[inaudible] that the date on which you and your husband went to the house, was the 24th of February 1993?

MRS DU RANDT: The 24th of February ‘93 was the meeting of the City Council, so it was the 25th that we went to his house.

MR BIZOS: What did you and your husband deliver there on the 25th of February?

MRS DU RANDT: It was a parcel - an OK parcel, in which I had a jersey with some mail and I gave it to Mr Clive Derby-Lewis personally in his hands.

MR BIZOS: What was in the jersey?

MRS DU RANDT: Well, after I had peeped in there, I saw that is was a gun or a pistol or whatever they call it.

MR BIZOS: Will you please describe the pistol?

MRS DU RANDT: What I had seen in the box at the police, there was something that was in the front of the drawer and I saw that it was a gun or a revolver or whatever they call it.

MR BIZOS: Now, what did the jersey have to do with the firearm which you saw or that you handed over on the 25th of February?

MRS DU RANDT: Sorry, I don’t understand you.

MR BIZOS: Why was the jersey there?

MRS DU RANDT: Well, it was the afternoon when my husband went through to the City Council meeting when a certain Mr Venter came to my house, he asked me whether Mr Durandt was there and I told him: "No, he had been in a meeting for two hours".

He said that he had a jersey to deliver to Mr Clive and I said to him: "You may give it to me, my husband isn’t here" but I invited him into the house and I twice phoned Mr Derby’s house, there was no reply but I knew they were also in the meeting and then he came into the kitchen with me after we had phoned but as I’d said there was no reply.

MR BIZOS: Was there any reason why the firearm was in the jersey?

MRS DU RANDT: At that stage I didn’t know that it was a revolver or a gun in the jersey but when he walked over to his car and he had said to me had driven up and down five times but that he couldn’t find my house number, then he came and knocked at the door and I told him that it is 022 and I asked him who he was looking for and he said he was looking for Mr Durandt, I told him he wasn’t there because he was in a meeting, then he returned to his car and he told me that he had a jersey to deliver to Clive and them or for Clive and them ...[intervention]

MR BIZOS: Sorry, have you finished?

MRS DU RANDT: And then he walked to his car and opened the boot at the back and he took out this leather bag and I thought to myself: "A jersey"?, it was a men’s jersey.

MR BIZOS: Was there any reason given to you why the firearm was not delivered directly to Mr Derby-Lewis and why it was taken to your husband?

MRS DU RANDT: Well, as I said to you, I knew that Clive and Gay were also in the City Council meeting and I phoned there twice but there was no reply, the phone just rang.

MR BIZOS: Was any reason given to you why the firearm was not delivered directly to Mr Derby-Lewis?

MRS DU RANDT: No, I don’t know.

MR BIZOS: When did you discover that it was a firearm that had been handed over to you?

MRS DU RANDT: That night after I had peeped, I saw - this was after my son had been there, he opened the thing because he thought that his dad - what do they call that now, something which you use to work with cars and he said: "Oh, had my dad got it for me"? and I said: "No, it’s not yours, it’s Clive’s" but by that time he’d already opened and that was when I saw that it was a gun.

The next morning - after we had met Clive, my husband had rang the bell and he had come out and I said to him: "I thought it was a men’s jersey but I see now it is a gun" and he said no, he had it serviced but I assumed that it was Clive’s revolver or gun which he had repaired.

MR BIZOS: Did you ask your husband why the firearm had been brought to you?

MRS DU RANDT: No.

MR BIZOS: Did your husband say anything concerning the firearm?

MRS DU RANDT: No, that night when he returned from the meeting I told him that he had to phone Clive and inform him that a jersey had been delivered for him because I’m taken it off my table and I’d put it in the laundry because my grandchildren and my son had come to have coffee with us after church that evening.

MR BIZOS: At that stage you did know that it was not just a matter of a jersey but that the more important thing that had to be handed over was the firearm and not the jersey?

MRS DU RANDT: No, I just assumed that it was Clive’s and that he had it repaired.

MR BIZOS: Did your husband have any knowledge that the firearm would be delivered at your place?

MRS DU RANDT: No, not that I’m aware of.

MR BIZOS: When the parcel was handed over to you, didn’t it feel too heavy to be just a jersey?

MRS DU RANDT: Well, it looked like a box like this and I put it on the table.

MR BIZOS: And why are you sure that it was the 25th of February?

MRS DU RANDT: Because the 29th of February was my daughter’s birthday and that Thursday morning very early we would drive through to her.

MR BIZOS: So, we can accept that you are entirely certain that this took place on the 25th of February?

MRS DU RANDT: Yes, because normally on Thursdays we go through to her because this is the first time that my daughter had moved away from us.

MR BIZOS: Thank you Mr Chairman, we have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BIZOS

CHAIRPERSON: Any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PRINSLOO: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mrs du Randt, when did you make a statement to the police with regard to this matter?

MRS DU RANDT: I was on the day of the 21st of April, I went to my attorney after I had heard that the police were looking for me.

MR PRINSLOO: And did the police speak to you before you went to your attorney?

MRS DU RANDT: I went to Advocate Jeug Prinsloo very early that morning and he phoned around and he spoke to a Colonel van

Niekerk who told him to keep me there and then I said to my daughter: "Let’s go, I’m not looking forward to this matter, let me go and see my attorney".

MR PRINSLOO: Did the police arrest you or keep you with regard to this matter?

MRS DU RANDT: They told Mr Wessel Cronje to keep me there and that they would come through to Benoni to come and pick me up because they told me that they would keep my husband locked up there until I came and made a statement.

MR PRINSLOO: Was your husband under arrest at that stage?

MRS DU RANDT: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: Did your husband say anything to you with regard to what other people had said or so and so?

MRS DU RANDT: No, nothing at all.

MR PRINSLOO: This date of the 25th of February - on which date the weapon was taken to Mr Derby-Lewis’s house, I would like to state to you that from the 22nd of February until the 4th of March, Mr Derby Lewis was at the President’s Council in Cape Town - and his programme I will submit to the Committee, and it is clear from the programme that on the 25th of February he was not at his house, are you mistaken about this date?

MRS DU RANDT: I don’t know.

MR PRINSLOO: Is it possible that you are mistaken, that it could have been in March?

MRS DU RANDT: No, I could have perhaps been in error.

MR PRINSLOO: I would further like to state to you that Mr Faan Venter - the person that you state had delivered the firearm at your house, only moved into Krugersdorp area after the end of February or at the end of February, you didn’t know about this?

MRS DU RANDT: No, I didn’t.

MR PRINSLOO: I beg your pardon Mr Chairman.

Madam, did your husband hand the firearm to Mr Derby-Lewis?

MRS DU RANDT: No, we drove up - the gates were always closed, so he opened the gate and we drove into the driveway, he got out, knocked on the door and then Clive came out. I opened my door and I gave the parcel to him because there was also mail in this because my husband is the only person who has to post box key and normally Clive or Gay come and collect the mail or we go and deliver it to them.

MR PRINSLOO: Just a moment’s patience.

Madam, you would perhaps not be aware of this - I assume that that you won’t be aware but Mr Faan Venter only saw Mr Derby-Lewis on the 10th of March and then he asked him about the firearm, you cannot dispute this - you are not aware of it?

MRS DU RANDT: No, I’m not aware.

MR PRINSLOO: But Mr Derby-Lewis returned to the President’s Council on the 22nd of March for a sitting on the 1st of April - according to the programme which I will submit to the Committee.

MRS DU RANDT: No, I’m not aware of it.

MR PRINSLOO: You’re not aware.

Thank you Your Honour, I just wish to make copies of this document as they made copies of the wrong one but I can show you the original and then I will have copies made. Unfortunately, I had the 1992 programme copied but I think this is the copy that Ms Khampepe asked for earlier as was raised during testimony. It will be Exhibit A(g) - I undertake to have copies made during the adjournment and make these available to you.

CHAIRPERSON: Are there any further questions for this witness?

MR PRINSLOO: No further questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR PRINSLOO

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

Mr Mpshe, are there any questions you would like to put to this witness?

ADV MPSHE: No, questions Mr Chairman, thank you.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: Madam, when is the birthday of your daughter?

MRS DU RANDT: The 29th of February - that would have been the Sunday.

MR BIZOS: And are you sure that it was before your daughter’s birthday that this event occurred?

MRS DU RANDT: Well, I know that on the 25th we went through to her.

JUDGE WILSON: You say that you know that on the 25th you went through to her?

MRS DU RANDT: Yes.

MR BIZOS: You stated the date of the 25th of February in the High Court in Johannesburg.

MRS DU RANDT: Yes.

MR BIZOS: And after you had testified to that effect - and this appears on page 305, that neither Mr Jordaan nor Mr de Vos nor Mrs van der Walt posed any questions to you during that hearing?

MRS DU RANDT: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: We have no further questions of the witness Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BIZOS

CHAIRPERSON: Ms van der Walt, are there any questions you wish to put to this witness?

MS VAN DER WALT: No questions.

NO QUESTIONS BY MS VAN DER WALT

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, you are excused.

WITNESS EXCUSED

MR BIZOS: We want to make a decision about Mr du Randt, in view of one or two of the matters that have been raised, we may ask him to consult with us - if you will, which will have the effect of shortening - well, first of all, I’m deciding whether to call him or not and also whether we can limit the questioning and may we ask you to the adjournment now?

CHAIRPERSON: We’ll take the adjournment now and resume at 2 o’clock.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos?

MR BIZOS: Before calling the next witness, you will recall that we put to Mr Walus that he saw a programme on the 17th of August - three or four days before he gave his evidence in chief in August, and we have the video and we would like to show the portion of the video in which Mr Max du Preez deals with a question which we say influenced Mr Walus to give the evidence that he gave - it’s very brief, it’s on three quarters of a page.

CHAIRPERSON: If you say it’s very brief, then ...[intervention]

MR BIZOS: It is - no, we don’t want the whole programme, just that bit of advice Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Then, let us proceed.

COMMITTEE WATCHES VIDEO

"At this point it seems as if Walus has a better chance of getting amnesty, than Derby-Lewis, even Walus pulled the trigger. He has a good chance of convincing the Amnesty Committee that he thought he was acting within the mandate of the Conservative Party because he thought ...[indistinct] with Derby-Lewis, represented the Party.

Derby-Lewis will have no difficulty proving that the Conservative Party sanctioned the assassination and he cannot claim ignorance because he was on the Party’s Executive. The Amnesty Committee has indicated in earlier findings that an amnesty applicant should do more than show a political motive, he has to prove that he acted under orders of a recognised political grouping or ...[indistinct] but this is just our speculation. This week, Walus will give evidence. Join us next Sunday evening ...[indistinct]"

MR BIZOS: I have a transcript Mr Chairman, which we can make a copy of for the ...[indistinct] and hand it to members of the Committee if it is wanted. We will ask for copies to be made and handed in, I don’t - shall we give it an exhibit number Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, it seems that the Committee members are quite content to deal with this matter without the transcript.

MR BIZOS: Yes, I may place on record that I informed Mr du Preez not to give free advice, lest he runs foul of the Bar Counsel or the Attorneys Association.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

 

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, we are going to call Mr Jeremy Cronin who has submitted a statement - which is R5, we do not intend that you should read the whole of it but merely to highlight certain matters and deal with some of the matters that have been dealt with by other witnesses. We call Mr Jeremy Cronin.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cronin, are you prepared to take the oath?

MR CRONIN: I prefer to affirm.

CHAIRPERSON: You refer to affirm?

JEREMY CRONIN: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: Mr Cronin, you are the Deputy General Secretary of the South African Communist Party?

MR CRONIN: That’s correct.

MR BIZOS: For how long have you held that position?

MR CRONIN: Since April 1993.

MR BIZOS: Shortly after the death of Mr Chris Hani?

MR CRONIN: That’s correct.

MR BIZOS: You signed a statement on the 7th of August 1997, which together with annexures runs to 12 pages and which is part of the record before the Committee, marked R5?

MR CRONIN: That’s correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: Please tell the Chairman and the members of the Committee, Mr Cronin, when did you first meet Mr Chris Hani?

MR CRONIN: Well, I briefly met Mr Chris Hani in exile in Lusaka in late 1988 but became more closely associated with him after he became the full time General Secretary of the Communist Party.

MR BIZOS: When did he become the General Secretary of the Communist Party?

MR CRONIN: He was elected to that position in December of ‘91 and from that period onwards he worked full-time out of the South African Communist Party head office in Johannesburg and my office was adjoining his office so we had a close association.

MR BIZOS: What was your position in the Communist Party at that time?

MR CRONIN: At that time I was with the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the South African Communist Party and those were the senior leadership collectives of the Communist Party.

MR BIZOS: Did you work in close association with the late Mr Hani?

MR CRONIN: Yes, from the time of December ‘92, we worked very closely together.

MR BIZOS: You prepared the statement and you signed it, do you affirm the correctness of the contents of this document?

MR CRONIN: Yes, I do.

MR BIZOS: In view of the numerous documents that were put in by the applicants in relation to the Soviet style communism in East Europe, can you please tell us what Mr Chris Hani’s attitude was and indeed that of the Communist Party, in relation to that Soviet style communism?

MR CRONIN: Perhaps, Mr Bizos, the best way or doing that would be to quote directly the words of Mr Hani on this matter and I would refer the Committee to page two of R5, towards the middle of that page. This would be one of countless examples giving us some sense of what Chris Hani and indeed the Communist Party thought about East European Communism at this period.

"This particular set of quotations comes from a radio show and I remember being with Chris Hani on this particular show, it was a phone in show and members of the public were free to phone in and ask either Chris or myself what our views were on a number of matters.

One particular caller Steven, said: "I would like to ask Mr Chris Hani if, by calling himself a communist he aligns himself with world communists - communists world-wide and Chris Hani says: "By calling myself a communist, I align myself with the South African Communist Party with it’s own history, a history of struggle against apartheid and oppression in this country. The Communist Party - as far back as the 20’s, was the only non-racial formation.

And then he goes on, he says - he admits that: "It is true that in the past we aligned ourselves with international communism because international communism then, was the only force which came to the assistance of the oppressed people in the world.

And then he adds a bit later: "Now I admit that there are problems with the International Communist Movement, it’s in disarray. There are serious problems, economic stagnation and only a few countries remain today which call themselves communist.

We’ve analysed those problems, we have criticised the communist movement and we have said that the South African Communist Party’s path to socialism is going to be democratic, it believes in multi-partism" ...[indistinct]

And he means socialism is not going to be prescribed to the people of South Africa. And I think he goes on and on in this vein and the interview continues in the same gist.

CHAIRPERSON: What is the date of that?

MR CRONIN: It was March 1992.

MR BIZOS: 5th of March 1992.

This was on a popular radio programme, was this a theme which Mr Hani addressed regularly?

MR CRONIN: Yes, and I think that’s implied fairly explicitly on page three. John Robby who is hosting this particular radio programme says to him - about the fourth line at the top of page three, he says

"Are you fed up answering the same questions - going to the issue of the failure of the Soviet Union and the failure of Soviet Socialism, would you like to move the debate further"? and Hani says: "Well, we certainly are not fed up, I think that the questions are typical and we must accept we are moving from a situation of rabid anti-communism in this country and there’s a lot of ignorance about communism, a lot of prejudices"

And he goes on in that vein, saying that:

"Far from being impatient, I think it is very important for us to account for our communism, to be self-critical about our past associations and to reassure the public"

And in this case the callers were White voices, judging from their accents.

"To reassure a broad public and not just one’s own constituencies of our agenda"

MR BIZOS: It has been suggested that Mr Hani continued with the armed struggle after the two important minutes that were signed between the liberation movements and the National Party Government, can you tell us what you know of Mr Hani’s activities and whether or not - as has been suggested in some document of unknown origin, that he was building up a private army and was not a bona fides participant in the negotiation and reconciliation process?

MR CRONIN: Well, I think that the first point to be made in that regard is that Chris Hani had certainly served actively and auspiciously in the ranks of Umkhonto weSizwe, he was very proud of his track record and many people in South Africa admired him for his military record in the ranks of Umkhonto weSizwe and as a consequence of that he rose to the rank of Chief of Staff.

He was the number effectively, not the number - well, number three because the President of ANC was head of MK. So, he was not actually number one in MK but he was certainly a very senior member of Umkhonto weSizwe, the armed wing of the ANC.

But he was also a very loyal member of Umkhonto weSizwe and with the opening up of the negotiations process - with the unbanning of the ANC and the South African Communist Party, the armed struggle - there was a cease-fire almost immediately. And then in August of 1990 with the signing of the Pretoria Minute, the ANC formally suspended the armed struggle and Chris Hani was part and parcel of that process.

After August 1990, he remained on - within the command structures of MK, as the Chief of Staff and his role was to assist with the integration process or the impending integration process to regularise the situation in South Africa, so his role - far from launching some separate army in exile, was to see the well-being of the returning MK cadres who were returning from exile or who were emerging from prison or exile - or from underground, and to ensure that they were readied for an integration process which we knew would come as a result of the negotiations process.

In December 1991 - as I mentioned earlier, he was elected as General Secretary of the Communist Party and this then becomes his full-time deployment within the broader ANC alliance and so from that point he ceased to be the Chief of Staff of MK. And I think again this gives an indication that his priorities at this point were not military or be it even military on route to demobilisation or reintegration into a regularised Government force.

As for the story about some new fangled notion of a new People’s Party or whatever which we heard about or some kind of renegade army, we were aware of disinformation stories circulating - as I recall, some of those stories emerged in about 1992, Chris Hani himself immediately denied them. And as far as we can tell, they were part of a STRATCOM disinformation campaign directed at Hani and other leaders within the ANC alliance.

MR BIZOS: Did everyone in the liberation movements embrace the idea of a negotiated settlement or were there groups that were sceptical about it Mr Cronin?

MR CRONIN: No, I think it would be fair to say that the broader constituency on the ground of the ANC and of the South African Communist Party - certainly large sections of them, were often extremely sceptical about the negotiations process.

I think that the scepticism had a great deal to do with the low-intensity conflict that was going on with townships in particular - many townships. I remember personally addressing meetings - SACP branch meetings of COSATU shop steward locals.

I was one of the people involved in the negotiations process and I remember having to answer repeatedly, questions from this base constituency. People would say: "You are having tea and biscuits with FW de Klerk, we are dying like flies in the townships, how can you suspend the armed struggle, how can you negotiate with the enemy" and so a great deal of our time was spent on persuading our constituency of the importance of the negotiations process.

And I think that probably the leading personality in this process of trying to win over the ANC constituency to the negotiations process, was Chris Hani himself. He came with impeccable credentials as a militant, as someone that - when the armed struggle had been under way, had fought very courageously and so he used those credentials precisely to say - and there’s documentary evidence in the submission that we’ve made, to show that he’s saying to many, many audiences - diverse audiences but not least to township audiences, that we must give peace a chance, that we must take the negotiations very seriously.

And above all he kept repeating: "Do not fall into the provocation trap, those who don’t want to see majority rule - a non-racial dispensation in our country, are trying to provoke us into restarting an armed struggle, we must not allow that to happen". So, I think that was the general position of the leadership but in the face certainly, of scepticism from rank and file members.

MR BIZOS: Do you know how much of his time Mr Chris Hani spent in trying to persuade the constituencies to support the negotiation process?

MR CRONIN: I would say that this is what he spent the last three years of his life essentially doing. I mentioned that his office adjoined in the Johannesburg head office of the Communist Party but he was rarely there, he was out on the road, he was addressing village meetings, rallies, branch meetings and so on, throughout the length and breadth of the country. He was indefatigable in this respect, he was one of the most energetic leaders that we’ve had.

MR BIZOS: What was his attitude to the peace process that was being organised at the time throughout the country - ...[indistinct] to the National Peace Accord?

MR CRONIN: Well, I think he puts that rather clearly on page six, towards the bottom, the last two paragraphs of page 6 of this submission. This is the week before his assassination and he’s talking to an ANC alliance East Rand Summit of Peace and Political Tolerance and that already give a sense of the purpose of this particular meeting. And he says to his audience - I refer to the second last paragraph at page six

"With all it’s limitations, the National Peace Accord and the structures that have emerged from it have played a role in escalating the political costs of low-intensity warfare strategy. The National Peace Accord and associated structures have opened a few windows on the South African Defence Force and SAP actions and that has been crucially important"

What he’s trying to get across is that while we are negotiating we are dealing with other people across the table who have a twin track strategy, who are talking to us over the top of the table but are kicking us underneath.

And he’s arguing that the best way of countering this low-intensity conflict of disinformation, of STRATCOM operations that have been directed against him personally, of assassinations, of random violence in trains and taxis, the best way of addressing it is not to meet it with counter violence but to expose it - to open the windows and doors on what was happening.

And so he’s arguing that with it’s limitations, this is what the National Peace Accord has helped us to do, it’s given us some idea of what the SADF and SACP are doing or were doing in Boipatong and places like this.

"The limited success"

as he goes on:

"of the National Peace Accord and the introduction of international monitors and good work on the ground, have all contributed to the success of some important but still tentative steps in the last period. In particular I’m thing of the resolution dispute structures which have acquired a new impotence in Northern and Southern Natal and the Midlands and I’m also thinking of the very important hostels initiative here in the PWV.

It’s imperative that the ANC and it’s allies become ever bolder and more creative in building a major momentum for peace. We must draw in new forces across the political spectrum and in every sector, youth, women, religious formations, into the process.

We must relate energetically to Nkatha members on the ground, we must spearhead the peace process and we must ensure that no momentum is lost"

And he’s making all of these points literally a week before his assassination.

MR BIZOS: And in relation to the low-intensity conflict that was going on, did he have any views in relation to the self-defence units that were being formed?

MR CRONIN: Yes, that was a vexed issue, it was a complicated issue. The ANC led alliance had suspended the armed struggle, we were not waging an armed struggle.

But as I’ve said already, there was violence happening - a great deal of violence happening and in our perception the victims were either - or very often, ANC aligned people or just citizens you know, catching a train or catching a mini-bus.

And in the face of that violence that was being visited in that period on largely the Black community, there was a major demand from our constituency that people should be able to defend themselves and this was one of their arguments for unsuspending the armed struggle, they felt that it had been - many people felt it was wrong to have suspended the armed struggle.

And our answer to this was that we were serious about suspending the armed struggle, it remained suspended, there was no Umkhonto weSizwe functioning as an army waging an armed struggle. But clearly individuals, families, communities, congregations, had the right to self-defence and we felt as an ANC alliance, that we also had to assume some responsibility for assisting people to defend themselves.

The problem was of course, that when you help people to defend themselves there are dangers and that this can sometimes contribute to escalating the violence rather than to solving it and Chris Hani was well aware of this difficulty and again he was the leader most frequently deployed by the ANC alliance to try to instil discipline, to try to get across the political agenda that we had two self-defence units - some of which sometimes went off the rails.

And he explains why again - I think it’s - yes, it’s at this Peace Summit on the East Rand in the week before his death, where he helpfully gives us a sense of his analysis of the problems of the SDU’s. He says:

"The record of SDU’s has been uneven"

I’m quoting from the bottom of the fourth last paragraph on page seven.

CHAIRPERSON: Page seven?

MR CRONIN: Yes, it’s the paragraph that begins

"Does our Peace Campaign mean that we need to renounce the need to defence"

Somewhere in the middle he says"

"But the record of SDU’s has been uneven. It’s essential hereto that the ANC and it’s allies take the lead. It is we who must take the lead in critically examining the track record of SDU’s"

He’s saying: "We mustn’t fudge the issue, if there’s ill-discipline, we must deal with it - we’ve got responsibility for these SDU’s, we’ve encouraged their development in the face of provocation and we must also not also walk away now from our responsibility and just say: "Well, there’s some generalised violence happening", we must deal with it effectively and just say: "Well, there’s some generalised violence happening", we must deal with it effectively.

He then lists some of the reasons why there has been weakness in the SDU’s, he says:

"There’s been heavy infiltration by the enemy"

meaning the police and defence force of the time.

"We’ve often been guilty of poor selection of cadres, there’s a lack of accountability"

presumably to political structures.

"There’s an absence of a cohesive strategy on the part of the ANC allies and community organisations around this area and also because they’re unable"

he says:

"the inability to obtain legal firearms makes our SDU’s vulnerable to constant SAP harassment"

He means that because they can’t get legal firearms - licensed firearms, there’s a tendency to try and acquire them by other means and this often exposed them to infiltration - gun runners would present themselves and make guns available and so forth and this was often the route through which they were infiltrated by other forces.

MR BIZOS: Were the views of Mr Chris Hani covered throughout South African media, both print and electronic?

MR CRONIN: Well, absolutely, I mean he was one of the most high profile political leaders of the time, he was continuously talking and I think there was hardly a day that went by in this period - this three year period prior to his death, in which he was not addressing some public gathering, some public meeting of one kind or another.

Some of those meetings - because he was not a limelight seeker, some of those meetings would have happened in remote rural villages in which there would not have been public coverage but there was certainly a great deal of public coverage of Chris Hani’s views, statements and speeches.

And I remember in particular - in the month before his assassination, an initiative that he led onto the East Rand where there were problems with self defence units and this was very widely covered on the television news at the time ...[indistinct] these kinds of views which I’ve been quoting.

MR BIZOS: Did he give talks to various interest groups in the country, not only to - did he confine himself to dwellers in the townships or in the country districts or was he invited to universities and business organisations?

MR CRONIN: The range of audiences he was addressing was very wide indeed. Again, in the weeks before his assassination I remember him addressing here in Pretoria, a group of Afrikaans speaking White business people who’d invited him to come and explain his views and perspectives for South Africa.

We quote in this particular document form speeches that he gave to the Black business community and he also appeared regularly on radio news programmes and television programmes watched presumably, by the ...[indistinct] audience.

MR BIZOS: Were those sufficiently widely published for at least those having a genuine interest in the political constitutional problems of the country, to be aware of them?

MR CRONIN: Well, I can imagine that there would be people in our country whose minds were so incredibly narrow that their reading might not have gone beyond The Patriot, but I think that anyone vaguely interested in what was happening in South Africa would have engaged in reading a range of newspapers, watching news, listening to radio programmes.

This was a time of heightened political activity in South Africa and anyone with a remote interest in politics would have been overwhelmed in any case by the amount of information that was flowing through the mass media.

MR BIZOS: Was the President’s Council at this time, still in existence as part of the legislative process in the country?

MR CRONIN: I personally didn’t confess to ...[indistinct] following the career of the President’s Council too closely but my impression is that it was functioning at this time.

MR BIZOS: We have been told that next to Mr Mandela, he was probably the most popular person in the country, would you agree with that?

MR CRONIN: Well, some of the poles certainly suggested that - opinion poles suggested that Chris Hani was - after Nelson Mandela, the second most popular political figure in our country - obviously with his support drawn overwhelmingly from he Black community, one can debate the accuracy of poles but I think no-one can debate the huge popularity that he enjoyed.

MR BIZOS: We have also been told that he was assassinated in order to bring about chaos in the country -he was assassinated, do you know any steps that may have been taken to avoid the intended chaos from coming into being?

MR CRONIN: Well, the leaderships of the South African Communist Party, the ANC, COSATU and the broader mass democratic movement - apart from being hugely saddened and aghast at what had happened with the assassination, were incredibly worried about what might eventuate as a result of this assassination. There was a deep concern that those who were seeking precisely to derail the negotiations process and therefore delay the advent of non-racial democracy in our country, might succeed. The popular outcry within our constituency was huge and I think one gets some sense of it - if I could quote briefly from page eight of the document that I’ve submitted, it’s the last paragraph ...[intervention]

MR BIZOS: Just before you quote it, is this a letter which was received from a member of your Party who resigned because of your efforts to avoid the chaos?

MR CRONIN: That’s right, this is a quotation, in fact it’s - yes, it’s a quotation from a letter by a certain Theo Malherbe who - until May of 1993, had been the Secretary of the South African Communist Party’s Cape Town branch and he was one of thousand’s of people Chris Hani’s funeral here in Johannesburg and he was outraged that the leadership of the ANC led alliance, had not used this opportunity of mass anger to call for an insurrection and he wrote us this letter - I won’t read all of it, I’ll read parts of it. Theo Malherbe writes"

"In the night vigil at Hani’s funeral, all the regions were calling for revolutionary mass actions/wall with the exception of one of two regions. The leadership is out of touch with these sentiments, who are they representing, how can national ignore regions"?

And then towards - about the seventh last line:

"Chris Hani’s funeral was an occasion to prepare for insurrection but our leadership failed. Their demand for arms is not a political response but a political response to low-intensity warfare. I will not be a member of the Communist Party that sees negotiation as the only option"

We actually published this letter later in the year - in our official Party organ, the African Communist. We felt we should be should do so because it reflected - at the time we felt we should do so, open up this debate because it reflected a powerful feeling that existed within the ranks of active Party members and we believe also active ANC members as well.

We disagreed with the sentiment and the individual left the Party as a result but it was a barometer of popular feeling and I think, gives an indication of how much the work of the leadership of the alliance was cut out in this period - in the days and weeks that followed the assassination, to get control of the situation to ensure that our mass base did not give in to the provocation and that this assassination was intended to be and was in fact but it was a difficult battle.

MR BIZOS: Was Mr Mandela and Mr ...[indistinct] Sekwale given access to the electronic media to constantly call for calm and not to succumb to the provocation as a result of the murder of Mr Hani?

MR CRONIN: That’s correct, I remember hearing a comment two weeks later - not a comment, it was published in the newspaper, saying that in that period - with our country literally on the brink of spiralling back into a situation of civil war, that is was only the ANC leadership and the alliance leadership that was able to rescue the country from the calamity that was staring us all collectively in the face.

And sadly - ironically but for the first time in that period, the ANC and alliance leadership had more access to the media - to the so-called then public broadcast of the SATV, than we’d had before. And I think that was a testament to the recognition that unless the leadership of the alliance stepped into that dangerous void, the situation could indeed spin out of control.

MR BIZOS: Have you any personal knowledge as to what extent the leadership of the ANC and it’s allies put all other business aside immediately after the murder, in order to avoid the intended result of chaos?

MR CRONIN: Well, I suppose I could speak from personal experience. In the days and week following the assassination, there were spontaneous strikes throughout the country, stay-at-home’s and mass meetings in virtually every township.

And at that period I was not particularly regarded as a speaker at mass rallies as your ideal speaker Chris Hani and others were more adept to doing that but we were so stretched by the occasion that someone like myself was deployed into an unlikely place like Sebokeng township and I found myself addressing an audience of - well, I don’t know how large it was but it appeared to be some 20 or 30.000 strong and they were calling for armed action, they were calling for revenge on Whites and I was deployed into this situation.

There was - I remember, a PAC speaker agreeing with the mass sentiments at the time and it was my job as part of the collective of the ANC/SACP leadership, to

tell people not to fall into this provocation, to focus attention on the demand for one person one vote elections and to say that this needed to be the battlefield on which we fought this matter out. It was on the battlefield of elections of democracy and that we must not fall into the trap of those who were seeking to prevent and to delay that.

And indeed I think that in doing this - in making this appeal, one of the things that helped us was to precisely to be able to quote what Chris Hani himself had been saying so eloquently in the three years before his death and indeed in the days -literally, before his assassination. We were able to say: "It’s not just us making a ...[indistinct], Chris Hani himself was asking you to take this attitude and not to fall into provocation.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, the last paragraph - the conclusion, is argumentative and I do not intend asking the witness to deal with it as it’s matters that were more dealt with - more properly dealt with by us in argument ...[indistinct] rather a witness. Those are all the questions we have to put to the witness.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BIZOS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Prinsloo?

CROSS EXAMINATION MR PRINSLOO: Mr Cronin, from what you’ve told the Commission - as I understand it, there were people - even in the ranks of the ANC and the SACP, who were sceptical as to a negotiative settlement, is that correct?

MR CRONIN: Yes, that’s absolutely true.

MR PRINSLOO: And so, would it also be true - on the other side, people supporting the right-wing or Nationalist Party people were also sceptical with regard to a negotiated settlement in the country?

MR CRONIN: Yes, I accept that.

MR PRINSLOO: Now, Mr Hani - as you told the Committee, was a very popular person and the most likely person to succeed President Nelson Mandela, would it be fair comment?

MR CRONIN: I don’t want to speculate about the succession to Mandela, I think that’s pure speculation but he was certainly a very popular political leader. He himself always said that he had no interest in going anywhere near Government and that he wanted continue to be an activist on the ground - that was his self image. Whether popular pressure and the pressure of his organisations would have seen him moving into Government, is a matter of speculation - he was a strong willed person too.

MR PRINSLOO: In the minds of the people on the ground - the public at large, they perceived that Mr Hani would indeed be the successor to Mr Mandela, would that be unfair?

MR CRONIN: I’m not sure.

MR PRINSLOO: Yes. And you’ve heard the evidence of Doctor Hartzenberg this morning?

MR CRONIN: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: And yesterday, as to what he told the Committee as to how the viewed Mr Hani?

MR CRONIN: Yes, I did hear.

MR PRINSLOO: And the views, that was not disputed - as to how those people viewed Mr Hani, do you agree to that?

MR CRONIN: I can accept that those may be the perceptions of Doctor Ferdie Hartzenberg.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Cronin, in the past there’s been a lot in the media and that there was at times - prior to the assassination of Mr Hani, attempted assassinations on the life of Mr Hani?

MR CRONIN: That’s correct, there were at least three assassination attempts on him during his exile period and in our view there was also an assassination attempt against him the year before - in 1992.

MR PRINSLOO: And would it be fair to say Mr Cronin, that the people accused of that would be people that supported the Nationalist Party at the time - the Government, the police force etc., that supported the Nationalist Party?

MR CRONIN: Yes, that was certainly our conviction, we’ve not been able to - in the case of the earlier assassinations in the exile period, those were by and large defence force operations into neighbouring countries. In the case of the assassination in 1992 - assassination attempt, we’ve never been able to determine precisely who was behind it but our suspicions were and remain that it had something to do with the apartheid security forces.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Hani was viewed and regarded by many people from that side, as an enemy?

MR CRONIN: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: And the reasons behind it - although it’s not public, we don’t know but the speculation is - as to why they wanted to assassinate Mr Hani in the past, it’s because of his track record?

MR CRONIN: Yes, certainly during the armed struggle he was a leader of that - he was a leading figure in that armed struggle and he made no bones about that, and accepted that he was - in that period he accepted that he was a target of military action. After the ending of the armed struggle in 1990, our attitude was that he was no longer a legitimate target - there was no longer an armed struggle being waged, but that there were elements seeking to assassination him, I don’t dispute.

MR PRINSLOO: What I’m referring to Mr Cronin, - that’s now prior to the unbanning of the ANC, you are referring to subsequent to the events of the unbanning of the ANC and what developed thereafter, is that what you’re referring to?

MR CRONIN: I’m saying, prior to the unbanning of the ANC - between 1961 and 1990, there was an armed struggle, Chris Hani was an active participant in that armed struggle and would have seen himself as a military target within that armed struggle. After 1990 - he was an active leader within the negotiations and peace process in our country, there were still elements in our country seeking to assassinate him.

MR PRINSLOO: Up till when was Mr Hani still the leader of Umkhonto weSizwe?

MR CRONIN: He was not the leader of Umkhonto weSizwe, I think he would have ranked as number three within Umkhonto weSizwe and that was up until December 1991.

MR PRINSLOO: 1991?

MR CRONIN: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: December 1991?

MR CRONIN: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: When was it publicised that Mr Hani was no longer involved in Umkhonto weSizwe?

MR CRONIN: In December 1992, it was very, very widely publicised because that was the point at which he accepted election as General Secretary of the South African Communist Party and many political commentators put to him: "Why are you choosing this route, isn’t the fast track to ministerial office - to becoming a Minister of Defence or whatever in the future of South Africa, isn’t the fast to that particular ambition remaining on within the ANC"? and he said: "Well you know, I remain committed to the ANC but I’m choosing a different career track and that is that I’m taking on the leading position within the SACP".

So for those who were trying to watch - as you seem to imply in your ...[indistinct], where Chris Hani were heading and whether he was going to be number two or number three or whatever in a future South Africa or a future President, this was certainly of a great - there was a great deal of public speculation around this matter in December 1991 and many people said they couldn’t understand Chris Hani taking on this role, he was sidelining himself.

MR PRINSLOO: Now, Mr Hani had support on the ground from the young people and radical people, would that be a correct assumption?

MR CRONIN: He had very wide-ranging support, from old people, from young people, from White people - although not so many, and from Black people, from rural people and urban people - he had a very, very wide-ranging support.

MR PRINSLOO: But in the majority Mr Cronin, who supported Mr Hani?

MR PRINSLOO: Well, I think the poles suggested that he was very widely supported by Black people in our country, working people, rural people, poor people.

MR PRINSLOO: Would that - when you say Black people, was that young people or elderly people or what?

MR CRONIN: As far as I know - although the life expectancy of Black people in country is much lower than White people, it would also have included ageing Black people.

MR PRINSLOO: And the assumption that radical people supported Mr Hani by and large?

MR CRONIN: Well, it depends what you would mean by radicalism, certainly people who were in favour of massive transformation in our country, who saw the struggle in our country as not just replacing Black faces with White faces but saw the struggle as one for thorough going transformation in our country, including supplying water to poor rural communities from which Chris Hani had emerged, if that’s what you mean by radical then certainly, he was supported by that kind of constituency.

MR PRINSLOO: Well, people that were not in favour of a negotiated settlement, - let’s put it that way, that supported Mr Hani?

MR CRONIN: Well, those who were sceptical about the armed struggle - the suspension of the armed struggle in our country, would not fail to note that Chris Hani had had a very important and prestigious armed struggle career from the late ‘60s and through the ‘70’s and ‘80’s and therefore certainly had a credibility with those who thought that we should go back to the armed struggle because he could speak as someone who had fought that armed struggle.

And what he’d said is: "Don’t romanticise the armed struggle, the armed is a tough business, it’s not a decision to be taken lightly and we are now on a political and negotiations track" - yes, certainly he was able to reach that kind of constituency more effectively than many of us could have.

MR PRINSLOO: As I understood your evidence Mr Cronin, it was that Mr Hani attempted to persuade the people to rather follow a negotiated settlement as opposed to a revolutionary one or otherwise.

MR CRONIN: He tried to and by and large succeeded in doing this, yes. So he was able successfully to carry the mass constituency that the ANC enjoyed, into this path but it was political work that he had to do, it was against people’s inclinations often and in the face of their scepticism but that was certainly what he was doing, yes.

MR PRINSLOO: That’s the point I want to make Mr Cronin, that was his political work and he was at that stage - according to your version, trying to persuade the people.

MR CRONIN: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: At that stage he didn’t have that support and that’s why I’m asking you, did the radical people support him because you’re saying at that stage those people were still sceptical as to a negotiated settlement?

MR CRONIN: They were sceptical about a negotiated settlement and for good reason, they were suffering - they were getting killed in violence, in low intensity conflict, so they were sceptical about the path but they trusted Chris Hani and turned to him and looked to him for guidance and leadership.

And because he was tireless in doing this work, by and large he was able to succeed in persuading them. I’m sure there were cases of people who said: "He’s sold out or his forgotten", but by and large he was very, very widely respected and was therefore able - as I say in the face of people’s reluctance, to accept this - he was able to persuade people.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Cronin, you said it was widely publicised in the media with regard to Mr Hani’s position in MK, is that correct?

MR CRONIN: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: To what media are you referring to?

MR CRONIN: Well, I’m referring certainly to the print media - the major dailies all covered the SACP Congress, it was open congress and it was the first legal congress that we’d had for 41 years, so there was quite a lot of local and indeed, international attention on this congress - I remember newspapers ranging in political opinion from The Citizen to The Star, covering this kind of issue.

MR PRINSLOO: Can you refer to any particular newspaper coverage with regard to this - The Citizen for instance, that carried such a coverage?

MR CRONIN: Mr Prinsloo, we can dig up that information, I don’t have it in front of me but I certainly have a distinct recollection of there being public coverage of this matter. And as I say, the reason why I remember it is because people said: "Chris Hani seems to have moved out of the fast lane by accepting this election as General Secretary to the Communist Party", so there was quite a lot of editorial comment as well on the matter.

MR PRINSLOO: I’m asking this Mr Cronin, because you said earlier when you were asked by Mr Bizos - when you were led in chief, with regard to the President’s Counsel, you said you didn’t follow that and that’s why the media is important as to people seem read selectively - particular people support a particular view and will read certain newspapers, that’s why it’s important how it was publicised.

MR CRONIN: Yes, if I was planning to assassinate someone one, I would certainly - if I was planning to blow up the President’s Council - let’s say, I would certainly be following very closely - (1) whether - information in the press media, whether it was still in existence of not, it’s elementary. And therefore if my preoccupation was leaders whom I regarded as enemies of the volk or enemies of my political cause, I would certainly be looking at them very closely.

My attitude towards the President’s - I mean, I was neither planning to - I wasn’t planning to assassinate or blow up anyone but the political relevance of the President’s Council at the time struck me as being of pretty low importance. And indeed, I think one of the applicants also seemed to have a similar regard, he seemed to say most of the time: "doodling" in the President’s Council and drawing up "hit-lists" while he was sitting there, so his attitude towards the President’s Council seems to be pretty close to mine.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Cronin, you’ve heard the evidence as to what the perceptions of certain people are?

MR CRONIN: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: And what they perceived.

MR CRONIN: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: And that’s why I put to you that those people that read the newspapers with regard to certain events which you referred to what Mr Hani’s function was in certain areas, did not necessarily follow that they read that information.

MR CRONIN: Yes, I accept that they may well not have read the information but I mean, that tells us what kind of people they are and how serious they were in their political motivation and how serious their politics was but I accept that it is possible that they acted out of a high degree of ignorance, in fact it’s almost certain that they acted out a high degree of ignorance.

MR PRINSLOO: Just a moment please Mr Chairman.

Mr Bizos, - beg your pardon, Mr Cronin - I beg your pardon Mr Bizos ...[intervention]

MR CRONIN: It’s me that you should be apologising to.

MR PRINSLOO: R5 at page 42 in the John Robby show ...[intervention]

MR CRONIN: Sorry, I missed the reference.

MR PRINSLOO: Page 42.

MR CRONIN: 42 of?

MR PRINSLOO: R5, the last paragraph and the third line from the bottom

"I’ve been and still am a member of Umkhonto weSizwe, I have not resigned from Umkhonto weSizwe, nor from the ANC and I still play an active part in both organisations"

MR CRONIN: That’s correct, he was no longer the Chief of Staff of Umkhonto weSizwe from which he’d resigned. He says he was no longer in the leadership of Umkhonto weSizwe but he regarded himself as a rank and file member of Umkhonto weSizwe, along with all of those who’d been trained in MK and where called upon he offered his service to assist in the process the impending reintegration or integration of MK forces.

He was an MK member and he was certainly an ANC member as are most SACP members, but he no longer was a ranking member of Umkhonto weSizwe.

MR PRINSLOO: So he didn’t resign from Umkhonto weSizwe?

MR CRONIN: No, he resigned from his leadership position.

MR PRINSLOO: I may have misunderstood your evidence, didn’t you say he resigned from Umkhonto weSizwe?

MR CRONIN: Well, if I said that - what I intended to say - and I don’t think I did but if I did, what I was saying or was intending to say was that he resigned as Chief of Staff of Umkhonto weSizwe.

MR PRINSLOO: So, if that’s the position Mr Cronin, then Mr Hani was still active in the ranks of Umkhonto weSizwe?

MR CRONIN: No, he was not. Well, he contender to be an MK member but his activism was not particularly in this area after December 1991.

MR PRINSLOO: So Mr Cronin, it would be unfair for you to say that the other people viewed it differently - if that was the case, they perceived he was still involved with MK?

MR CRONIN: Well, I can’t answer for other people’s perceptions, I’m telling you the facts.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Cronin, what you told the Commission in your evidence - there was a low-intensity warfare going on and what you said is

"Negotiations were taking place over the table and underneath they were kicking you"

Is that correct - that’s now the Communist Party and the ANC?

MR CRONIN: Absolutely correct.

MR PRINSLOO: Yes. And the people you referred to were in fact the Nationalist Party at the time?

MR CRONIN: Yes, but in particular the intelligence and security structures of the apartheid State.

MR PRINSLOO: So at that stage the Nationalist Party was governing the country and this was their organs that had to keep them in Government?

MR CRONIN: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: Yes. Now, at that stage there was a lot of violence taking place - as you set out, violence perpetrated by various people on the trains, hostels, etc.?

MR CRONIN: Yes, I agree.

MR PRINSLOO: Yes. So, in the minds of the people at large, there was not peace at that stage?

MR CRONIN: No, there was certainly no peace, there was peace process, there was National Peace Accord and there was a negotiations process but parallel with those, was a twin track policy - strategy, which ultimately a political strategy - in our view, led by the National Party Government, designed to destabilise it’s opposition while at the same time negotiating with it.

MR PRINSLOO: So, it was indeed - if I may put it that way, as far as you perceived it then, it was false negotiated settlement at that stage - that it was perceived in the minds of the Nationalist Party?

MR CRONIN: No, they were serious about negotiating but they wanted to get the best deal possible across the table and felt that the best way of doing this was to weaken their principal negotiating partner, which was clearly the ANC.

MR PRINSLOO: According to your version Mr Cronin, Mr Hani was aware that the Nationalist Party was speaking to them over the table and yet kicking them under the table by killing people and derailing the process that way, is that correct?

MR CRONIN: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: So, at that stage you knew that the Government was not sincere in a settlement?

MR CRONIN: No, we believed that they were sincerely committed to a settlement but they wanted a settlement on their terms as much as possible and the only way in which they could bring about such a settlement was to try and weaken the ANC. The principal strength of the ANC was not State power - we were not in Government, our principal strength was our mass support and therefore this low-intensity conflict was principally directed at cutting the links between negotiators and the mass constituency of the ANC and the means of doing that was one, to sow confusion and terror in Black townships through random violence, to assassinate key leaders at the community level and also to assassinate key links between the negotiation process and that mass constituency and I would regard Chris Hani as one of those key links.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Cronin, this particular view that prevailed at that stage - as you summed it up on page five is

"To assassinate key ANC and alliance, second and third layer leaders"?

MR CRONIN: Yes, that’s what Chris Hani said, correctly so, yes.

MR PRINSLOO: If Mr Hani perceived that, that same perception could have prevailed among the people at large, would that be correct to say that?

MR CRONIN: Well we were trying to get that across, we were trying to say that this is a twin track policy, it’s not the old war that we were fighting up until 1991. What we’ve got now is a complicated situation, we are in a negotiations process, the regime realises it cannot continue to rule in the old way, so it’s sincere in that sense. These are not dummy talks, they are real talks and they are real negotiations but in the process of those negotiations they are seeking to bring pressure to bear upon us - to weaken our demands, to make us back down, to qualify, to moderate and to modify our demands just as we were.

We were using the weapon of mass mobilisation, of mass organisation, of protests, of demands, to bring to bear on the negotiations process our perspectives. And what Chris Hani was saying and what we were saying was: "For heaven’s sake, don’t fall into the trap of violence - that is their strong card, they’ve got an army, we have an MK that is much smaller - tiny, that has returned from exile - don’t fall into the trap.

Our strength is politics, our strength is our moral position and our moral perspective, let us play to that strength. We have to somehow deal with the violence that’s being visited against us and therefore we have the right to defend ourselves but that isn’t our strong card, so for heavens sake, don’t make the political error of thinking that a return to the bush - a return to armed struggle, is going to carry our cause forward, it’s not going to", so that was his position - that was our position.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Cronin, you believed and so did Mr Hani believe - at that stage, that they intended assassinating key leaders and members of the ANC?

MR CRONIN: He was deeply concerned about that and had escaped - narrowly escaped an assassination attempt the year before on his own life.

MR PRINSLOO: And for you to say that, you must have had good reason to believe that?

MR CRONIN: Sorry?

MR PRINSLOO: There must have been reason for you to believe this in order for you to say this?

MR CRONIN: Well, we knew ...[intervention]

MR PRINSLOO: ...[indistinct] key leaders?

MR CRONIN: Our reasons for believing this was that we knew what those apartheid dirty tricks departments were capable of and everything that we’ve heard of since - in the TRC process and other processes, confirms absolutely that view - that there were very nasty networks in operation seeking to destabilise the negotiated settlement or to bring pressure on the ANC and it’s alliance, so yes, we had very good reason for fearing that this might happen.

MR PRINSLOO: The point you’re also making in your statement is that - ...[indistinct] describe nowadays as a kind of a third force activity that prevailed at that stage?

MR CRONIN: Yes, indeed, there’re third force activities - as we know now today even better than we did then, third force activities were rife in this period.

MR PRINSLOO: But at the time of the negotiations that was prevailing Mr Cronin?

MR CRONIN: Yes, we said that at the time and we think we’ve been confirmed in that view.

MR PRINSLOO: Now Mr Cronin, if the Nationalist Party - their supporters, believed in that, why do you disbelieve the applicants? If they believe that by taking out a key leader, it will also bring about what the Nationalist Party believed?

MR CRONIN: I accept that they believed that they would - as they have told us, that they would unleash chaos in South Africa by assassinating Chris Hani - I completely believe that and they came damn close to achieving that objective, so I have no reason to doubt that.

I think that they could not have chosen a better assassination target - if they wanted to plunge our country into a spiral of violence out of which we may not have emerged intact as a country, they could not have chose a better target. And I have no reason to doubt that that is why they chose Chris Hani, they saw how critical he was to the peace and negotiation process and by taking him out they came very close to destroying that process, so I don’t doubt that.

MR PRINSLOO: So, the climate that prevailed at the time Mr Cronin, was created not only by the Conservative Party - what they believed, but also by the Government itself at the time?

MR CRONIN: Yes, I think - I would imagine - and we need to find our more and I think we are finding out more day by day through the TRC process, but I believe that there were possibly two schools of thought, there were those - and I would imagine that the two applicants and the third person whom I believe was involved in this conspiracy, were of the view that they should try to stop at all costs the negotiated settlement - they should try to shipwreck it.

I think others were deploying violence into the situation - not in order to stop the negotiations process, but to transform the quality of it and therefore to achieve a settlement but more on their terms, so I think there would have been two schools of thought operating amongst those on the right who were involved in violence.

And I would think that the applicants would have belonged to the school of thought that believed that through using violence, they could actually shipwreck the negotiations process and prevent the evil day of non-racial democracy ever dawning on South Africa.

MR PRINSLOO: So those were very turbulent times that prevailed at that stage Mr Cronin?

MR CRONIN: Absolutely, yes.

MR PRINSLOO: And for that reason, if members of the - or let me put it this way, if agents of the then Government - the Nationalist Party, had assassinated Mr Hani, would it have achieved the same purpose or what purpose would they have achieved seeing - in view of the fact that you are saying: "To assassinate key ANC alliance and second and third layer leaders" - if they had succeeded in doing that?

MR CRONIN: Well, if they’d succeeded in doing it the outcome would have been the same, Chris Hani would have been dead, the country would have been brought to the brink of crisis but hopefully we would have succeeded - despite that crisis, in rescuing the country which I think that we have.

But the assassination of Chris Hani was the assassination of Chris Hani and the hands that pulled the gun and their motivations are a matter of speculation but we’ve heard from these applicants what their motivation was and I have no reason to doubt that motivation which was to - as they said quite explicitly, to bring about large scale violence, death and a right-wing coup-de-ta - effectively, in the face of that situation - that was their agenda.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Cronin, you will bear in mind that that was evidence given by Mr Walus and not Mr Derby-Lewis.

MR CRONIN: Yes, Mr Derby-Lewis told us that he wanted to plunge the country into crisis, he didn’t put a number - a figure on - a statistic on the number of deaths, that’s true.

MR PRINSLOO: Well, likewise, at that stage the ANC was not governing the country, the Nationalist Party was governing the country.

MR CRONIN: Correct.

MR PRINSLOO: And if the Nationalists had that view in mind - as what you set out in this paragraph on page 5, then surely the result would have been the same - it would have served the same cause and same purpose for the Nationalists as well as the Conservative Party?

MR CRONIN: Yes, I mean - but perhaps that’s why the National Party - in this case, shrunk from doing this at that particular time, I don’t know - you need to ask them not me, why they were trying at one point to assassinate Chris Hani and why - as far as we’re concerned, and why in this particular case.

And our minds - let me be quite frank, remain open as to the scope of this conspiracy and the depth of it, so I don’t want to confine myself to speculating as to ...[intervention]

MR PRINSLOO: So, Mr Cronin, will you concede to what the Nationalist Party had in mind at that stage - to assassinate key ANC alliance and second and third layer leaders, would have been a political motive to do that?

MR CRONIN: Absolutely, it was entirely for political reasons but it was - they’ve not applied for amnesty as far as I’m aware - the National Party, for Chris Hani’s assassination and nor has the Conservative Party as far as I’m aware, applied for amnesty for the assassination of Chris Hani.

So, if we’re talking to political motive, there’s no doubt that the applicants had political motive - in my view, and that this low-intensity conflict was politically motivated - the question is, was it part of formal political policy of the CP - since we’re talking about the CP.

MR PRINSLOO: I’m not asking for any legal argument on that Mr Cronin.

MR CRONIN: No, I’m telling you.

MR PRINSLOO: Just a moment please Mr Chairman.

If you look at page 43 of R5 Mr Cronin - the second paragraph:

"John Robby: Chris, the armed struggle, so often it’s held up in this referendum debate - the ANC communist alliance, they’ve still got Umkhonto, they’ve still got an armed struggle - again in the interest of moving forward, wouldn’t it be better to disband to finally declare the armed struggle over"?

Have you got that?

MR CRONIN: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: Now Mr Chris Hani’s response to that

"Ultimately the objectives of the ANC and the Communist Party, are to disband Umkhonto weSizwe and I want to proceed by saying that it is a question of time - we must a reach a period in our negotiations where we are satisfied that there will never be a reversal, there will be no going back"

What do you say to that Mr Cronin?

MR CRONIN: This very accurately and unambiguously reflects ANC and ANC alliance policy at the time, which was a staged approach towards the negotiated settlement. The first stage began at the beginning of 1990 with the unbanning of our organisations and a cease-fire, indeed after November 1989, there were no further MK actions - official MK actions whatsoever, after ‘89.

In August of 1990, we then suspended - officially suspended, the armed struggle so that - not only was there a cease-fire but there was a suspension of the armed struggle. At this point in time, when Hani is speaking we’re in a situation where Umkhonto weSizwe still exists, we’ve suspended the armed struggle but we’ve not said that we’ve renounced armed struggle for all time - we’ve suspended it because we’re uncertain about the outcome of the negotiations process.

"We dearly wanted to succeed"

Chris Hani is saying that quite explicitly:

"We wanted to succeed, we hope it will, we’ll give it our best shot but we’ve had a cease-fire, we’ve suspended the armed struggle, we’ve got a whole lot of returning MK soldiers coming back from exile or emerging from underground - they exist as an MK formation. We will assemble them, keep then in good order so that if the negotiations process goes as we hope it will, they can be integrated into a future armed force and that is exactly what has happened"

So he’s accurately reflecting both our policy and indeed what has happened in this period, so he’s saying that: "We can’t simply disband MK and leave 10.000 - whatever, MK soldiers to their own devices, we have to assume responsibility for them" - that indeed is also part of finding an effective and durable - sustainable, negotiations and peace process.

MR PRINSLOO: But Mr Cronin, ...[indistinct] what’s stated here on page 43?

MR CRONIN: Yes, let me read it to you, it says

"Ultimately"

...[intervention]

MR PRINSLOO: Here, right ...[intervention]

MR CRONIN: Let me read it very clearly and slowly so that you understand, it’s very important that you should understand Mr Prinsloo, what ...[inaudible] - he’s asked by Robby

"But why don’t you - Chris, the armed struggle"

he says:

"So often it’s held up in this referendum debate. The ANC communist alliance, they’ve still got Umkhonto weSizwe, they’ve still got an armed struggle - again in the interest of moving forward, wouldn’t it be better to disband to finally declare the armed struggle over"

Ultimately yes, he’s saying:

"The objective of the ANC and the Communist Party are to disband Umkhonto weSizwe"

He’s right and that’s what we’ve done.

"But I want to proceed by saying that it’s a question to time"

In other words:

"That’s where we’re going - we’re moving there, we’re not preparing some army in exile for some other renegade actions - we’ve got an MK, we are moving towards disbanding it. We must reach a period in our negotiations where we are satisfied that there will never be a reversal - there will be no going back, and then we shall sit down and discuss the whole issue of a future security force to serve a democratic South Africa.

That’s a correct description of our policy at the time and that in fact is a very prescient description of what has happened as well over the last period.

MR PRINSLOO: So at that stage Mr Cronin, the armed struggle in 1992 was not disbanded - according to what is stated here and nor suspended?

MR CRONIN: No, it was suspended, the armed struggle was suspended - you’re reading too much into what John Robby asking him and you’re dealing with a live radio programme - we’re not dealing with legal proceedings here and maybe John Robby - who’s not a lawyer as far as I know, might have formulated the question. What Chris is saying quite clearly is

"We retain an Umkhonto weSizwe"

That exists yes, at this point in time.

MR PRINSLOO: But how was the public to interpret what was stated here by Mr Hani and Mr Robby at the time Mr Cronin?

MR CRONIN: Well, I think that ...[intervention]

MR PRINSLOO: You say it’s not legal proceedings, but how would the public interpret it?

MR CRONIN: The public should have noted that in August of 1990, the ANC officially suspended the armed struggle - that’s the position, that’s the position that Hani’s reflecting and any member of the public who had half an interest in trying to understand what was happening, should have understood that - it was certainly for want of trying from the side of Chris Hani.

MR PRINSLOO: Just a moment please. Now, Mr Cronin, as you told the Commission that Mr Hani - he said what his perceptions are with regard to communism is what took place in the Soviet Union wasn’t the correct approach, is that correct?

MR CRONIN: Yes, he was saying that even self-critically I would add, that he felt that the South African Communist Party - although it’s principal focus had been South Africa, had indeed - and we’ve said this both as Chris but as the Party, that we had illusions about some of the aspects of communism in the Eastern European countries.

MR PRINSLOO: What did the Communist Party in South Africa have in mind at that stage as to policy?

MR CRONIN: We had in mind exactly what we’ve got now in South Africa, which is that we as a Communist Party stand for a socialist perspective but within the context of an unfolding democratic non-racial and non-sexist dispensation - and in the case of the CP, one should have a united South Africa - on other words, not one with Volkstaats and so on.

So, we believe - as a Communist Party and we believed then, that there was only way of securing an advance to socialism and that had to be democratic and there was only one - the great lesson, the overwhelming lesson of Poland, of Tjekoslavakia, of the former Soviet Union, was that unless there is deep thorough going democracy, that socialism isn’t going to work.

So if Janus Walus - as he approach Chris Hani down the driveway, had asked him what he thought about Poland, Walus might have found a willing interlocutor. Chris would have been interested to hear what Walus’s experience were in Poland and ...[indistinct] that Walus might have found that Hani was prepared to agree with some of his perspectives - not all of them, but he would certainly have engaged him in an rational and civilised discussion about the failures of so-called communism in Poland. So, it’s one of the great tragedies of this - one of the many tragedies of this assassination, that Walus chose to pull a trigger rather than to engage in discussion.

MR PRINSLOO: That’s not the question I asked you Mr Cronin. ...[intervention]

MR CRONIN: I’m sure it wasn’t.

MR PRINSLOO: But be that as it may, at page 44 of R5 - first of all I’ll put it to you this way - before I’ll be reading it to you, that ...[intervention]

MR CRONIN: I’ve lost you ...[indistinct]

MR PRINSLOO: Before reading this to you, Mr Hani was a dedicated communist, is that correct?

MR CRONIN: Absolutely.

MR PRINSLOO: He was totally opposed to any other form of Government?

MR CRONIN: No, no, that’s a false conclusion, he was a dedicated communist and he wanted to see a socialist dispensation in our country but he was certainly not so undemocratic that he was not prepared to work with and to perceive huge advances in dispensations and societies which were not necessarily socialist.

He was not a dogmatist and was someone who was prepared to live and let live and I mean that not just in an individual sense but politically. He’d lived in exile, he had a wide experience of a variety of political dispensations and saw many civilised societies outside there - outside of South Africa, so it was not that he was intolerant of alternative views but he believed that - given the kinds of poverty, the kinds of problems that we’ve got in South Africa, that the best system for South Africa would be a democratic communist dispensation, yes but he was not intolerant of alternatives.

MR PRINSLOO: Now Mr Cronin, I refer you to page 44.

At the bottom of the page Mr Chairman:

"John Robby - Again in the interest of saying a civil war"

...[intervention]

MR CRONIN: Saving.

MR PRINSLOO

"We had - Doctor Korne Mulder on Friday, sounded like a very nice reasonable educated Afrikaner man talking about Afrikaner nationalism, talking about this deep-seated desire to have their own country and yet every time we speak to someone from the ANC and we mention the possibility of a Boerestaat - immediately no, is that something that you would be prepared to negotiate at any circumstances Chris?

The reply:

"Well, I think we should discuss it but it is something that I would never support, I think that those who are hankering after a Boerestaat should come to CODESA and place that issue before the players at CODESA. Let me discuss the merits of it but let me elaborate what would be the cost of a Boerestaat in this country, where would it be situated, where in the country did you get an Afrikaner majority? The implications of a Boerestaat would mean the removal of people in their millions"

And so it carries on. So, it’s clear that Mr Hani was directly opposed to anything with regard to a Boerestaat.

MR CRONIN: Yes, but what you are leaving out in your question - if that was a question, is that he was opposed - he politically thought it was absolutely unworkable and it was an irrational proposal. But what he’s very clearly saying is: "But let’s discuss it for heaven’s sake, let’s not fight a war about it, come to CODESA, place your concerns on the table and let’s discuss them.

I, for one - he is saying, don’t believe it’s workable but let’s hear, maybe there’s a rational argument for it, maybe there’s some workability in it". So, that’s his position, he’s not saying: "I’m declaring war on those who imagine that there should be a Volkstaat, they me deluded - they are deluded, but let’s discuss the matter" - that’s his position.

MR PRINSLOO: But what is clear Mr Cronin, is that Mr Hani would not agree to a Boerestaat - should they negotiate for a Boerestaat, they wouldn’t agree to that - and this what ...[inaudible]?

MR CRONIN: I think it’s highly unlikely that he would - or any rational South African, would agree to a Boerestaat because I think it’s an irrational idea but he was certainly prepared and willing - as he is saying here, to discuss it - he’s not saying: "Over my dead body" ...[End of tape 3A, day 7 - no follow-on sound] certainly not saying that.

MR PRINSLOO: Now, Mr Cronin, Mr Hani - you’ve heard what Doctor Ferdie Hartzenberg said about him today as to how the Conservative Party viewed him, what about the Vula incident that was publicised widely in the country? - and there’s evidence that Mr Hani was involved in Vula.

MR CRONIN: What about the Vula incident, you ...[intervention]

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, that is what I’m asking you, what about Vula - that’s what the people believe - that Vula had in mind insurrection in the country, was that correct or not?

MR CRONIN: No, it was completely incorrect, Vula was an underground structure established in the late 1980’s by the ANC, not the SACP. On the eve of the December 1991 conference - no, no, sorry, on the eve of the July 1990 rally of the SACP at which the SACP announced it’s interim leadership group, there was a flurry of disinformation propaganda from the National Party regime trying to connect Vula to the South African Communist Party and trying to suggest in 1990 that Vula was a communist plot - which was denied by Joe Slovo at the time - he was the General Secretary at that point, it was denied by Chris Hani and it was denied by all of as it still is today.

It was an underground structure along with other underground structures of the ANC and people like Joe Slovo were involved in that along with Oliver Tambo and other non-communists but under the discipline and instructions of the ANC, so that’s Vula.

MR PRINSLOO: But why was it an underground structure Mr Cronin?

MR CRONIN: Because the organisations were banned, it was launched in the late 1980’s - the Communist Party you will remember, had been banned in 1950, so in order to operate inside South Africa, we had to operate in the underground.

The ANC as you will remember, was banned in 1960 - it had two choices, it either could disappear or it had to operate illegally and that meant operating in the underground, so Vula was one of many endeavours to set up underground - in this case, political structures - there were underground military structures, Vula was essentially a political structure.

MR PRINSLOO: What happened to Vula after 1990 when the ANC and the SACP was disbanned?

MR CRONIN: Well, Vula began to emerge - just as with the process of Umkhonto weSizwe, we weren’t sure in February 1990, that the unbanning was for real and again we had good reason and so, as we were beginning to emerge leaders from the underground - we were testing the waters, we didn’t know what to expect, we immediately had a cease-fire - we took it that seriously, but we weren’t sure if we could show - surface all of our leadership, those that had been in underground, those that we still in exile - we had to be careful, we had to be cautious.

There were also lunatics roaming in South Africa, who were aiming to take pot-shots at leaders - as happened in April 1993 in the case of Chris Hani, so we were quite cautious about revealing exactly - precisely in 1990, who was our leadership. As we became more assured that it was till dangerous to operate but the chances of an effect negotiated settlement were on - so those disappeared, so by 1991/1992 and certainly by April 1993, there were no longer any underground structures.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Cronin, at the time of the arrest of certain of the Vula members, were they still underground at that stage?

MR CRONIN: One or two of them were in underground, others were prominent political figures like Mac Maharaj and Ronnie Casserells - some of whom were not arrested but who had been involved in the Vula structures and who were not underground, so there’d been a partial surfacing of some but others were still - as it were, uncertain as to whether - awaiting orders from the ANC, as to whether they should fully surface or not but I stress again that this was not a military operation, it was a political structure.

MR PRINSLOO: Why were they uncertain Mr Cronin?

MR CRONIN: Well, because after 40 years of being banned in the case of the Communist Party, 30 years of being banned in the case of the ANC, massive persecution, the execution of many of our leaders, the assassination of many of our leaders, we weren’t sure whether we could take - at face value, our unbanning, we weren’t sure whether the unbanning would not be used as a way to flush out the leadership and then arrest them, so we had to naturally be cautious. But we took the negotiations seriously but at the same time we were uncertain about the safety of our leadership. In the case of Chris Hani, he was being pursued, he sheltered for a time in the Transkei because he was being pursued by the security forces.

In the end all of that pursuit - one should add, turned into nothing - I mean, there were attempts to bring people to court, trials and so on, none of it turned out to be anything more that legitimate political underground structures which had been carried through from the underground period and which in the process of surfacing. There were no trials, there was no - there’s was a great deal of disinformation and STRATCOM operations in the period of 1990/1991, but it all came to nothing.

MR PRINSLOO: But why was there any need for an underground political structure, one can understand if it’s a military structure but a political structure?

MR CRONIN: Because we were banned as - long before the Communist Party had got involved in an armed struggle, we were banned. We were banned in 1950, so being banned and therefore having to operate underground, had nothing to do with violence, it had everything to do with the distaste that the apartheid regime had for the kind of politics that we had.

And the attempt - therefore, to outlaw any legitimate opposition particularly that of expressing the views of the majority of Black people in our country. That’s why we had to operate in the - we didn’t choose to operate in the underground - it’s not pleasant operating in the underground, it’s much better being out in the open but we were forced into the circumstance - that is the short answer to your questions.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Cronin, my questions is actually directed at the time after the ANC was unbanned in 1990.

MR CRONIN: Well, as I say, we were in the process of coming - surfacing but we didn’t do it all at once - for the reasons that I’ve tried to explain, but we did it very rapidly. If you consider that we’re talking about a 40 and a 30 year period of underground - within a matter of 18 months roughly, I don’t think there were any underground structures left, so it was a pretty rapid process of surfacing and of returning people from exile and so forth.

But there was a degree of caution and perhaps we weren’t cautious enough, I mean we exposed leaders like Chris Hani to assassination, so perhaps we were not sufficiently cautious.

MR PRINSLOO: Wasn’t the ANC leadership at that stage - in particular members of Vula, already at that stage in the country?

MR CRONIN: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: Operating openly?

MR CRONIN: Yes, as I say, it was a process.

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, but why was the necessity then - if they were operating openly in the country, to operate underground - on the other hand?

MR CRONIN: Because - one, we were trying to move into an above ground situation, we had to seek amnesties, we had to get - there was an attempt to exclude some of us from the - we were coming back into the country - those who were in exile, in order to engage in the negotiations process.

There was an attempt for instance, to exclude Joe Slovo from that negotiations process and it was the instance of Mandela and Tambo that said: "The ANC is not going to negotiate with you unless you allow Slovo into the country", so it wasn’t as if we were free citizens in the post-February 1990 South Africa.

There was continuous persecution of leaders and the Vula - the anti-Vula measures, the forcing of Ronnie Casserells and others again into the - Ronnie Casserells was above ground, he was operating in the negotiations process and he was then pursued by the apartheid police because of the Vula connection and so he was forced back into the underground.

We weren’t lurking in the underground by choice, it was persecution that was - the fear of persecution and actual persecution, that led to people operating in the underground for some 18 months roughly, after the unbanning of our organisations. They were not properly unbanned - the organisations, in February 1990. That too was a process and a popular process, people in the streets unbanned those organisations.

In parts of our country - like Bisho, Ciskei, Bophutatswana, it was still not possible to operate above ground.

MR PRINSLOO: With regard to the self-defence units Mr Cronin, would it be fair to say that the self-defence units at that stage were totally undisciplined?

MR CRONIN: No, it would be very unfair to say that, as Chris Hani correctly reflects in the passages that I’ve read, there was a mixed track record with the self-defence units. In our estimation, in many situations without the self-defence units, many, many more lives in townships would have been lost. It was precisely because there were self-defence units present in townships that we were able one, to prevent huge massacres of our people and we were also able then to expose the third force activities of others.

So, they played a role but there were certainly cases, serious cases of deviation and of some self-defence units getting out of control and Chris Hani was the first to say so and was certainly the one that got deployed frequently into those situations to instil discipline, to expel people who were simply criminals posing to be self-defence members and so forth.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Cronin, in the media and the press, isn’t it correct that the self-defence units were described as being out of hand and not being properly controlled?

MR CRONIN: There were occasions in which self-defence units were so described by the press, yes.

MR PRINSLOO: So, if that was perceived by the public like that, it would have been not - on their part, as far as the media is concerned, a correct reflection?

MR CRONIN: Who is this public?

MR PRINSLOO: I beg your pardon?

MR CRONIN: You keep talking about: "The public", are you talking about White conservative opinion?

MR CRONIN: Yes.

MR CRONIN: Well, that’s not my definition of public but if you mean White conservative - a small White conservative public view, then it’s certainly possibly that they would have self-defence units as a distasteful reality and out of control - out of instinct, if for no other reason.

MR PRINSLOO: And members of the Black community, were they satisfied with self-defence units or were they afraid of them?

MR CRONIN: Well, as I’m saying, in many townships I believe that they saw them as their line of defence in the face of some horrific attacks but in other cases the communities themselves were - and our own structures, were deeply concerned about the role that some self-defence units were playing and asked us to intervene to sort the matter out, so there was a mixed record certainly.

MR PRINSLOO: And the self-defence units, were they introduced by the ANC?

MR CRONIN: They were - the alliance - so it was not just the ANC, the South African Communist Party also accepted full responsibility and involvement in helping communities to set up self-defence units. Our approach was that they must not be partisan structures, they were there to defend the community, they were not there to attack alternative political formations - people with different political views, they were there to defend communities in the face of attack.

But we felt - being an alliance, that we believed - and as the elections were to prove later, being a movement that represented an overwhelming majority of Black people, that we had a responsibility to facilitate the development of those self-defence units and also in the framework of the National Peace Accord, to legitimate that formation.

So within the National Peace Accord - if you take the trouble to read it, you will see that there was an agreement that communities should have the right to - there was an understanding within the National Peace Agreement agreed upon by a range of Political Parties - I forget if the Conservative Party was there or not, that the right to self-defence was part and parcel of bringing peace to South Africa.

So it was within that National Peace Accord framework, that we - as the South African Communist Party and the ANC, helped to facilitate self-defence units.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Cronin, what you told the Committee - that Mr Hani said - in order to defend the low-intensity warfare which prevailed at the time, would rather engage in negotiations as opposed to reacting by violence, is that correct? Will that be correct - as what you said?

MR CRONIN: Yes, he said it would be wrong to go - what he was saying was that it would be wrong to go over into offensive violence, to deploy violence for strategic purposes - that we did in 1961 without - openly, with no fudging and confusion as to whether there was a subjective view or whether there were three different views as to whether we were involved in armed violence or not.

We were involved in armed struggle from 1961, we deployed armed struggle for political purposes, it was a strategic political option we took and from 1990 we stopped that, there was no strategic deployment violence for political ends. But that people had the right to self-defence is in any case as I understand - I’m not a lawyer, but it is a common-law right that people have and therefore it was - yes, people had the right to defend ...[indistinct]

MR PRINSLOO: In as far as the targets were concerned - what the people believed, the perception of the public, the White public of South Africa, that the targets at the time was indiscriminate - whether it was soft targets or hard targets.

MR CRONIN: The targets of whom?

MR PRINSLOO: Of the ANC, they targeted soft as well as hard targets.

MR CRONIN: Again this public that you’re talking about?

MR CRONIN: Yes.

MR CRONIN: Well, let’s clarify that.

MR PRINSLOO: The public in South Africa - the White public.

MR CRONIN: Okay, that’s not the public Mr Prinsloo.

MR PRINSLOO: And a lot of the Black public as well. I can give you an examples where people were killed in land mines, for instance an incident near Davel in the Eastern Transvaal.

MR CRONIN: Yes, okay.

MR PRINSLOO: There was a land mine placed and there were people killed - Black people, only Black people.

MR CRONIN: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: They were travelling in a car.

MR CRONIN: In the course of the armed struggle which as I say lasted from 1961 to 1990, the ANC moved through a variety of strategies - it was the ANC with Umkhonto weSizwe operating under the political guidance of the ANC.

The original targets of the ANC - when it launched it’s armed struggle in 1961, were purely buildings, facilities - unoccupied buildings, unoccupied facilities and pylons. So the original wave of sabotage action launched in 1961, was directed at those targets and there were strict instructions not to injure or hurt anyone including security forces - the belief at that time was that there was a possibility still of a negotiated settlement in the early 1960’s.

Through the period of the 1970 and ‘80’s strategies changed, they were always publicly announced and cadres were always carefully instructed in those changing tactics and strategies. By the - in the course of the 1980’s the ANC, Umkhonto weSizwe, used - amongst other things, land mines which by their nature can be indiscriminate - the idea was to prevent military and security organisation on White farms particularly on the border are, that was the strategic and political objective and that had ceased by 1990.

MR PRINSLOO: But Mr Cronin, in Davel in the Eastern Transvaal - which is very far from the border, where the St Danie family members were killed - that’s very far from the border?

MR CRONIN: Well, it’s in a border - I mean, it’s the route - it was along an infiltration route but - the ANC has in it’s amnesty application and it’s submissions, has said that: "We’re involved in armed struggle, we chose that in all political seriousness and not easily, it took us many, many decades to come to that conclusion that we should launch armed struggle.

In the course of prosecuting that armed struggle people lost their lives, it was not only our own people that lost their lives but other people lost their lives as well and we regret that - I would certainly have no difficulty in reasserting that, one deeply regrets the loss of life.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Cronin, during that time - in the ‘80’s, Mr Hani was an Executive Member of MK, correct?

MR CRONIN: He was Chief of Staff of Umkhonto weSizwe in the later half of the 1980’s, correct.

MR PRINSLOO: So, the soldiers would have operated under his command at that stage?

MR CRONIN: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: So, he would have been responsible for the actions of his soldiers in his command?

MR CRONIN: Yes, yes and unlike certain other political leaders he would assume full responsibility, he would have had no - he did not delight in warfare, he did not delight in violence but as a leader he assumed full political responsibility for actions carried out under his command and would done his best to ensure that they had a political objective at all times.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Cronin, in order for you to say that Mr Hani accepted full responsibility, is that what he told you?

MR CRONIN: Did he tell me?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes.

MR CRONIN: Yes, of course - I mean, we all - as a collective leadership, we accepted responsibility for what we’re doing and that is why we treated the matter of peace and of violence very, very seriously, unlike some political leaders who feel that rhetoric is the order of the day and that you can cover up responsibility and lines of command through suggestiveness and rhetoric and creating illusions in people’s minds. We assumed responsibility for what we were doing and therefore selected our words as carefully as possible at all times.

MR PRINSLOO: Just a moment please Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, could I ask the Committee’s indulgence at this stage as it’s nearly 4 o’clock - a certain - there’s just certain documents I’d like to get hold of Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, I’ll give you a short adjournment to look for those documents but we are going to carry on.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Chairman, I would like to get these documents - I haven’t got them here, that’s the only problem - unless my colleague Ms van der Walt can then commence here cross-examination and I can then take over from her tomorrow on that basis.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, we’d like to finish with this witness Mr Prinsloo, we’d like to sit - we’ve been losing a lot of time and I’d like us to carry on and see how much we can get done.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Chairman, I don’t want to be obstructive but we’ve been co-operating, I didn’t waste any time today at all Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I’m not blaming you for the wasting of time, I’m just saying that we have lost a lot of time and so let’s see how far we can go, let’s see how much we can do.

MR PRINSLOO: Can we just have a brief adjournment then Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, certainly.

MR PRINSLOO: Thank you.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

MR CRONIN: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please proceed.

MR PRINSLOO: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr Cronin, people involved in Vula - there were certain members of Vula arrested by the police, is that correct?- like Sepiwe Njanda, Mr Mac Maharaj and there were other members arrested as well, is that correct?

MR CRONIN: Some were arrested yes, and some died in that detention process.

MR PRINSLOO: I beg your pardon, some did what?

MR CRONIN: Some actually died while in detention as has been revealed recently in the TRC process.

MR PRINSLOO: And is it correct that the police unravelled the secret code they used and brought to the fore as to what they were supposed to do and the police alleged they wanted to cause insurrection in the country, is that correct?

MR CRONIN: I was not directly involved in Vula but I certainly remember press reports at the time.

MR PRINSLOO: Those were the allegation, is that correct Mr Cronin?

MR CRONIN: There were certainly allegations to that effect in - I think, 1991, yes.

MR PRINSLOO: So, in the minds of the public, it was - as far as they were concerned, these people were not sincere in negotiations as they were planning insurrection?

MR CRONIN: In the minds of which public Mr Prinsloo?

MR PRINSLOO: And this arrest of ...[intervention]

MR CRONIN: Sorry, I’m not clear as to your question, you continuously refer to: "the public" and I have a problem with that.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Cronin, the public that reads the media.

MR CRONIN: Well, I would say that many members of the public who read the media, would have dismissed this as disinformation as they were asked to by the leadership of the ANC and SACP - who immediately reacted to these so-called police revelations by saying that: "Here again we have an example of disinformation" that: "Yes, there was and underground structure, yes it was called Vula" but that it was involved in planning insurrection was completely wrong.

That information was available to the public as well and I would say that a large number of the public - certainly those who would follow the leadership of ANC ...[indistinct], would have given credence to that interpretation and that others would have given different interpretations is of course eminently possible.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Cronin, the arrest of these people took place in July 1990, is that correct?

MR CRONIN: I haven’t come prepared for - but if you say it was in July 1990, then that is possible, yes.

MR PRINSLOO: But if that’s the date, you will not dispute it - July 1990?

MR CRONIN: No, I’m not going to dispute that.

MR PRINSLOO: So that was well after the unbanning of the ANC?

MR CRONIN: Well after the unbanning of the ANC, the police arrested elements of Vula including some people who were functioning openly in the negotiations process, yes.

MR PRINSLOO: No further questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR PRINSLOO

MS VAN DER WALT: I’m not sure Mr Chair, whether the audience wish to make further contributions but if that is not so then I have a further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Just try and ignore them.

MS VAN DER WALT: I tried very hard.

CHAIRPERSON: Do carry on please.

MS VAN DER WALT: Mr Cronin, you were referred to page 43 of R5, the last paragraph I think - if I could just get the document, I just wish to ascertain whether I have the right document - paragraph.

Just a moment please Mr Chair.

It is page 43, the second paragraph. Mr Prinsloo dealt with this paragraph with you and you have it, is that correct? - page 43. I would like to put it to you that you make a statement that during the negotiations there were negotiations above the table while under the table people were kicking at you, is that correct?

MR CRONIN: Yes, absolutely.

MS VAN DER WALT: And if one were to look at Mr Hani’s record of serving in the military wing of the ANC, a great leader who gave many instructions and commands to kill people here in the Republic or South Africa and who was trained in Russia and who even just before his death was still a member of MK - in other words, a military man, not an ordinary man in the street and with his knowledge of what could happen - you said that yourself, over 40 years the struggle was waged, how then is it possible that a man like Mr Hani who knows that they are being kicked under the table, would go and lay down arms while this is happening - that isn’t possible Mr Cronin?

MR CRONIN: Well, it might be difficult for you to get your mind around that concept but the fact is that Chris Hani joined the political struggle first and foremost, - the struggle didn’t last for 40 years, it lasted for several centuries in this country against colonial occupation - people like Chris Hani understood that it was essentially a political struggle. He took up - as he explain quite carefully in the document that I’ve submitted - and I’ll refer you so that we’re clear about this matter, he says on the bottom of page four

"When we finally launched an armed struggle we were not abandoning our quest for peace, we were pursuing that quest in the most effective way left to us by an ...[indistinct] and brutal regime. Over the decades deploying mass struggle, armed struggle, underground work and building international solidarity, we finally forced the White minority regime to negotiate with our liberation movement and that was our victory.

In the interests of speeding up the negotiations process, in August 1990 we announced that we were suspending our armed struggle. Our strategic deployment of violence was put on hold"

That I think, helps to explain to you - as difficult as you may find it to be believe, why Chris Hani had laid up his arms. The fact that he was able to be assassinated in the middle of what was basically a White suburb on a Saturday morning, I think is another indication that this was not someone pursuing a military career or a military offensive - he was engaged in normal political activity seeking a peaceful solution to our country. That may be difficult for you to imagine but that was certainly what he was doing.

MS VAN DER WALT: While he knew that he was being kicked under the table, I would like to state to you that a man like Mr Chris Hani did not lay down arms and history - since 1990 until 1994, proved that the arms of Umkhonto weSizwe had not been laid down because there was much violence which had been caused by Umkhonto weSizwe and not just by the security forces.

CHAIRPERSON: That is a political statement, it’s not a question is it?

MS VAN DER WALT: I am stating it to the witness in the same way that he made certain utterances which were also of a political nature but history proved that there was violence but I will leave my political statement there.

CHAIRPERSON: I’m not stopping you, I didn’t see what your question was that is why I asked you, I was expecting you to now put a question to him.

MS VAN DER WALT: I stated to Mr Cronin, Mr Chair, that Mr Hani did not lay down arms and I’m saying it on Mr Cronin’s own evidence that they were kicked under the table and I wish to state to him that arms had not been laid down as he submits to the Commission.

MR CRONIN: I’ll do my best to try and turn that into a question and then answer it and I think the answer lies in Hani’s own words and I refer Ms van der Walt, to the top of page six where he says that

"Until we began to understand clearly what we were up against, it was impossible"

And he’s referring to the kicking under the table if you like - the low-intensity conflict that was launched against Black communities.

"Until we understood what we were up against, it was impossible to develop an adequate counter-strategy to this low intensity warfare. It’s essentially a political strategy"

he said.

"And our counter-strategy has therefore also to be essentially political"

Now, you might think that he was a military man case in a military mould, he was a political activist, he was a communist, he was a socialist and his aspirations were moral and political. He was only secondarily a military person and I think that this quotation underlines that point as many other do as well.

"Our counter-strategy has therefore also to be essentially political, not rushing back to arms, not getting into military ...[indistinct] The key to countering low-intensity warfare in our specific situation, is to uncover it publicly, to smoke it out and in so doing raise the political price that the regime pays for deploying this strategy"

In other words, not to allow it to happen under cover, under the - ...[indistinct] to appear to be Nkatha or faction fighting or White on Black violence but to smoke it out and to show it for what it is, namely a fairly cynical strategy deployed by the regime at the time.

That was his attitude and that was why precisely he was not rushing off to arm himself or to launch an army, he was deeply committed and understood - he had the intelligence to understand that the kind of provocation that your applicants sought to unleash, was precisely to fall into the hands of those who didn’t want to see a non-racial democracy in our country - he had the intelligence to understand that.

MS VAN DER WALT: Mr Cronin, you testified and said that in particular with regard to the questions in respect of Vula, there was an uncertainty among the members of your Party regarding the unbanning of the ANC and the SACP and that is why certain people remained underground, is that correct?

MR CRONIN: For a brief period, yes.

MS VAN DER WALT: And you also could not comment when you were asked regarding how the Conservative Party could - what their feelings were regarding communism and the unbanning of the SACP and ANC because you didn’t have any knowledge thereof, is that correct.

MR CRONIN: Yes, I certainly don’t claim to be able to put myself in the shoes of the Conservative Party, so I have no ambitions to answer on behalf of the Conservative Party.

MS VAN DER WALT: And you also do not expect the broad public - and that includes everybody, to read what the Communist Party writes but you do not read what is said about the Conservative Party?

MR CRONIN: No, no, I certainly read what I’ve said about the Conservative Party, believe it or not and I from time to time read Die Patriot as punishment but the - because I accept that not everyone in South Africa reads the African Communist - the official organ of the Communist Party.

It’s for that reason that Chris Hani and other leaders of the Communist Party go out of their way to address public meetings, to address small groups of people, to address White business people, to appear on public radio, on public television, because we understand that people are often confined to ethnic and ideological kraals in our country and it’s very important to reach out beyond those.

And that’s why Chris Hani spent so much of his time doing that in his last years, he wanted to break out of these and to get his message across. As in the Robby interview - and this is one of many, many examples, he patiently listens to the questions of White listeners, seeks to answer them and Robby says: "Gosh you must be getting bored and tired with answering the same questions" and he says: "No, no, I understand why people are asking these questions". No, I accept that people live in their delusions and it’s very important to cut across them and to reach out beyond them.

MS VAN DER WALT: But don’t you think Mr Cronin, that in the same way that the Communist Party was careful with regard to the unbanning of the Party and the start of negotiations, that in a similar manner the Conservative Party was also circumspect about - and the right-wing people in this country, with regard to the negotiations or the so-called negotiations which were still in an early phase, to deal with these circumspectly because they knew that from 1961 when the ANC and SACP took the military course there were many people who were killed by that Party in South Africa - just a few Whites but many Blacks and if a Party kills it’s own people, shouldn’t they then be dealt with circumspectly?

MR CRONIN: The intelligent politicians are circumspect, my problem with politicians who confuse circumspection with principal is the chief problem that I would have.

That certainly we were concerned and uncertain as a Communist Party - I don’t want to speak for the Conservative Party, I’m not here to do that but I can speak for the South African Communist Party, certainly in a complicated transition period it’s understandable that different components of the political spectrum are going to be circumspect in their approach.

But circumspection is one thing, change of policy - unannounced, fudged, confused, is certainly a whole different matter. When the ANC and it’s alliance suspended the armed struggle, we suspended the armed struggle, there was not circumspection about that, we were clear, we were suspending it.

There was no confusion, there was no rhetoric which gave our followers - you know, a nudge and wink that they might be at liberty to do what they like and that they could then claim that they were under some illusion that they’d been ordered to do so by Chris Hani or whosoever.

So, yes, we were circumspect, yes, we were uncertain about our safety, yes, we were not sure if the negotiations would produce peace but as we changed our policy in regard - for instance to violence, we said it very clearly and we committed ourselves as a leadership to that.

When we were engaged in armed struggle, we were clear that we were engaged in armed struggle and we assumed full political responsibility for that, so if in this area of circumspection which you are trying to introduce into the question, you’re trying to fudge a number of different things then I’d advise you not to because I’m very clear in my own mind what our attitude ..[inaudible]

We were circumspect about - we were concerned about people who were in the underground who might be arrested, our circumspection proved correct. They were not waging an armed struggle - those people in that underground, they were not preparing an insurrection but they were survivors from an underground.

Some of them had not survived, some of their fellow members had died in detention - we were circumspect absolutely, we were concerned about their safety but in time and quite rapidly we were able to surface them as well.

MS VAN DER WALT: The ANC/SACP alliance - according to you, suspended the armed struggle but according to your own evidence I wish to state to you that the armed struggle continued in the self-defence unit which - as you had stated, went off the rails.

MR CRONIN: The self-defence units were self-defence units, they were there to defend people, they were not there to launch offensive violence. It is possible that renegade - in fact it’s not possible, it’s a fact that in some instances renegade self-defence units often infiltrated by a third force - in fact, in every instance that we know of it was a case of infiltration but self defence units which were not ANC but were certainly aligned to or proclaimed an alliance towards the ANC.

There were cases where these things went off the rails and took the initiative to launch offensive violence against other members of the community, something that we deeply regret, something which we don’t just deeply regret now in retrospect but which we were deeply concerned about at the time and which Chris Hani amongst others, intervened into actively in order to prevent.

MS VAN DER WALT: No further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS VAN DER WALT

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mpshe, any questions?

ADV MPSHE: No questions Mr Chairman, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Any re-examination Mr Bizos?

MR BIZOS: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS

CHAIRPERSON: Andrew?

JUDGE WILSON: ...[inaudible] I can’t speak for the rest of the country but certainly in Natal in certain instances, the SDU’s just became local gangsters and terrorised the whole community, is that one of your problems?

MR CRONIN: Absolutely, I accept that and it was certainly one of our problems at the time and remains a matter of concern - deep concern.

MS KHAMPEPE: But Mr Cronin, as you have stated - but just in passing, shouldn’t you be emphasising that the SDU’s were never an ANC formation?

MR CRONIN: Yes, no they weren’t, they were - we took responsibility as the ANC and as the alliance, to help communities where requested to launch SDU’s, so we assumed some political responsibility but you will see again in the quotations that we’ve used from Chris Hani, that in the week before his assassination he was proposing - let me just find the appropriate quotation on that issue - on page eight, the second paragraph. That follows the other paragraphs from this speech that he gave on April the 2nd on the East Rand where he says

"Look there’s this mixed track record and some have gone off the rails, it’s a huge problem"

And he lists the reasons and he says:

"We now need to debate the merits and possible problems of formally locating the township SDU’s within the structure of the National Peace Accord. We need at least to think and to debate this possibility"

In other words, what he’s saying is: "We’ve had some responsibility for their launching, we must continue to have responsibility for problems but they’re not ANC structures, they’re community defence structures and isn’t therefore the appropriate home for them - the National Peace Accord".

He was floating that idea and obviously the process overtook us but you can see where his thinking was travelling and that was in line with our conception of self-defence.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.

Mr Bizos, before we adjourn, can you indicate what is going to happen tomorrow?

MR BIZOS: The intention is to call Mr Visser whom we asked to be here at 8H30 tomorrow morning and we hope that he will be here Mr Chairman and the other is Mr Clarke. Neither our attorney nor Mr Mpshe have been able to communicate with him at the telephone number that was given to us by Mrs Derby-Lewis, we don’t know what we’re going to do but it seems unlikely that we will establish contact with him between now and then and even if we do or the information that we have that he isn’t likely to rush to the Commission tomorrow even if we get hold of him. So we will have to have some discussion in relation to that but as presently advised those are the two persons that are still outstanding as far as we are concerned Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mpshe, are you likely to call any witnesses?

ADV MPSHE: No, Mr Chairman.

JUDGE WILSON: Is de Waal no longer a potential witness?

MR BIZOS: ...[inaudible] even the contact number. We have asked the police officers to help us but we have not had any response back. We’ve asked Mr Mpshe to ask the Commissioner’s office, on the assumption that they have names - they keep contact with the people that were in the force and I’m sure that they do but don’t think that Mr Mpshe has had any response from those quarters.

It’s a matter which came to our notice - Mrs Derby-Lewis’s allegations were only made in the beginning of this week, so we couldn’t have done anything about that before.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, I’m now going to adjourn this meeting and the Committee will now resume at 9 o’clock tomorrow morning and not at 9H30, we adjourn.

WITNESS EXCUSED

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS