CHAIRPERSON: Good Afternoon. We want to start the proceedings. Can I - before we get into that, just indicate that we are starting later than usual this morning, due to a number of problems that had arisen in regard to the matter that is on the roll for today. The staff have endeavoured to attend to these, some have been resolved, others have not, but all of that has taken a bit more time than we anticipated and we apologise for the delay in starting.
Just for the record it is Tuesday the 2nd of May 2000, it's the sitting of the Amnesty Committee held at White River, Mpumalanga Province. The Panel is presided over by myself, my name is Denzil Potgieter. I am assisted by Adv Sandi and Mr Sibanyoni. The matter that we have before us is the application of Nyanda and two others. The Amnesty Reference numbers, the Nyanda application is AM6231/97, the second one is Shoke AM5303/97 and the third one is Mkhonto AM5304/97.
We'll first just record the appearances. Mr Berger for the applicants.
MR BERGER: Thank you Chairperson, my name is Adv Berger. I appear for the three applicants, Gen Nyanda, Gen Shoke and Sgt-Maj Mkhonto. I'm instructed by the firm Nichols Cambanis and Associates and my instructing attorney is Ms Chrystal Cambanis.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Berger. The Leader of Evidence?
MS MTANGA: Chairperson, I am Lulama Mtanga, the Evidence Leader for the Commission. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you Ms Mtanga. Ms Mtanga, perhaps you can indicate to us, what is the state of this application?
MS MTANGA: Chairperson, I will refer to the Committee to page 3 of our bundle, which is Annexure A, where the list of victims is given. These are the victims involved in the incidents that the three applicants are applying for. Summonses have been served on these individuals and I would state exactly what happened in each case.
With regard to the Ross family, we received report that they have since moved to Botswana and in that information it was not indicated where they are in Botswana, so we could not get their exact whereabouts.
Then on the second victim, Mrs van Tonder, of Pretoria, we have an address in Pretoria and we were informed that she has since relocated, or moved from that address and didn't receive a forwarding address for her.
And then we have an incident involving three policemen, Const Lundela, Const Mavunza and Sgt Rossouw. Out of those three, only one has been located, that is Sgt Rossouw. He received his notice on the 19th of April and today we received a fax from his attorney, Mr Schutte of Pretoria, indicating that they will not be able to attend the hearing on the grounds that that notification was on short notice and they haven't had ample time to prepare for this and therefore they object to the hearing continuing.
CHAIRPERSON: Have you been in contact with Mr Schutte?
MS MTANGA: Yes, Sir, I have. I was talking to Mr Schutte.
CHAIRPERSON: Where is he, what is his whereabouts?
MS MTANGA: At the time I spoke to him, he was on his way to Pretoria for another meeting that he will be appearing in.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we have a letter or fax, copy of fax from Coetzee, ...(indistinct) and Schutte.
MS MTANGA: Yes, that's the fax I'm referring to.
CHAIRPERSON: It is dated today's date.
MS MTANGA: Yes, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: It relates to their client, Sgt Albertus Rossouw and the applicant Dick Mkhonto, is that the one that you're referring to?
MS MTANGA: That is the one, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: When was that received?
MS MTANGA: We received it today, it was faxed today, as the date indicates on the letter itself.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. And from your discussion with Mr Schutte, he's aware that this application is on the roll for hearing today?
MS MTANGA: Yes, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: And the interested party, Sgt Albertus Rossouw, is he present?
MS MTANGA: No Chairperson, he has not attended.
CHAIRPERSON: And the notice was served on him?
MS MTANGA: Yes, he is the person who instructed the attorneys upon receipt of our notice.
CHAIRPERSON: Do I understand you correctly, does Mr Schutte hold the view that his client was given insufficient notice and therefore he is not present and therefore they're not able to deal with the matter?
MS MTANGA: Yes, Chairperson and they object to the hearing continuing on those grounds.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Is there anything else in regard to this particular matter?
MS MTANGA: Yes, Chairperson, and then we have victims, the Msivi family and the Motsa family and Sithole who all were in one incident, the incident at ...(indistinct)
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, so that's a different matter?
MS MTANGA: It's a different matter.
CHAIRPERSON: Okay.
MS MTANGA: The next of kin of the Msivi family and Mr Sithole is Ephraim Msivi, the address we have of Mr Msivi is where he worked at the Diepgesit mine, in Barberton. We have been informed by the mine that he no longer works there and they don't have a forwarding address, that is his forwarding address and therefore he, I would say, did not receive the notification for this hearing.
CHAIRPERSON: You were unable to locate him?
MS MTANGA: Yes, Chair.
CHAIRPERSON: And you say that this, the Msivi incident, is one of the incidents that the applicants are applying for?
MS MTANGA: Yes, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, and ...
MS MTANGA: And then the second victim who ought to have been notified is William Motsa, he was injured in the very same incident. We have received information that he is at the mine, but he was not notified. He's still working at the Diepgesit mine, but he did not receive notification.
CHAIRPERSON: Is there any particular difficulty in regard to notifying him?
MS MTANGA: The difficulty explained by the person delivering the notices was that the mine could not be reached by an ordinary vehicle, so he had a bakkie and it seems there was a miscommunication or poor communication between this person and the office, because in his report he had included that the mine could be reached by telephone and therefore contacts this Mr Motsa telephonically and this was not done.
CHAIRPERSON: The person who attempted to serve the notification, is that a member of our staff?
MS MTANGA: Yes, Chairperson, he's a member of the Witness Protection Unit, I know him by his first name, Koos.
CHAIRPERSON: So you say that his attempt to serve was aborted and he notified the office accordingly?
MS MTANGA: Yes, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: But nothing further was done.
MS MTANGA: Was done by the office.
CHAIRPERSON: Has any contact been established with, is it Mr Motsa?
MS MTANGA: Subsequent to all of this, Chairperson, the mine was called and we discovered that he's still there and we spoke to a Mr Kambule, who indicated that Mr Motsa works shifts and he'll only be working the night shift tonight.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Is there anything else in regard to the preliminary issues?
MS MTANGA: The only thing I can mention Chairperson is that we also made last attempts for Radio Igwalagwala and Barberton Radio to still make an announcement to both Mr Msivi and Mr Motsa, notifying them that the hearing is going on today.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Now from your perspective where does all of this leave us?
MS MTANGA: Chairperson, with regard to Mr Motsa, I would ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Just before you answer that, when were the applicants notified of this hearing?
MS MTANGA: When were they notified?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, the applicants.
MS MTANGA: I'll just check my file, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes please.
MS MTANGA: Thanks Chairperson.
MR BERGER: Chairperson, perhaps I can assist. We were telephonically informed on the 25th of February this year.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Berger.
MR BERGER: That today would be the day.
CHAIRPERSON: 25th of February. Do you confirm that, Ms Mtanga?
MS MTANGA: Chairperson Ms Cambanis did indicate that to me, but I don't have that on record, what I do have on record is that the actual Section 19(iv) notification went out on the 14th of April, but there may have been telephonic conversations or discussions between the analyst and the attorneys.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you accept the 25th of February 2000 as a notification date for the applicants?
MS MTANGA: Yes, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Yes, I was interrupting you, sorry, where does this leave us now?
MS MTANGA: Chairperson, in the light of the fact that the victims are not here today, the question is whether do we continue with the hearing or not. I would like to indicate to the Committee that endeavours were made by our office to contact the victims, on the information that the Commission had at its disposal. It is therefore my view that the hearing should continue because most of the victims who have not been located, we do not have evidence that a further investigation on them will eventually get hold of them, or not and in regard to Mr Rossouw, I will object to the objection raised by Mr Schutte, his attorney, on the grounds that even if we were to accommodate them, the objection was raised too late and actually on the day of the hearing.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think the question is, I mean, is there any justifiable basis for us not hearing at least the applicants?
MS MTANGA: Chairperson, I would say no.
CHAIRPERSON: Because you know, this is obviously just on the face of it, it's a most unsatisfactory situation. We, as a Committee we are very sensitive about the interest of victims, interested parties, we always endeavour to give them every opportunity to participate in the proceedings, but that is just one leg of the process. If we had notified the applicants in February that this matter is proceeding and they are here and they're legally represented, then there must be at least on the fact of it, in our view, there must be a very compelling reason not to hear them. You say that in so far as Mr Rossouw is concerned, your attitude is that this is not a sufficient basis for not proceeding with the application?
MS MTANGA: Yes, Chairperson, that's my argument.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Is there anything else that you wanted to add?
MS MTANGA: That is all Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms Mtanga. Yes, Mr Berger, I don't know if you have anything that you want to say.
MR BERGER: Well, Chairperson, we're in agreement that the matter should proceed today, that the objection raised on behalf of Sgt Rossouw, with respect, is really far too late and there are no grounds put forward at all in the fax in support of the matter being postponed, other than: "The writer is unable to attend", that's all he says and that, in our view, is not sufficient at all. His client was notified and could have been here. As far as the other victims are concerned, the way I read the Act Chairperson, it requires that victims be notified, but if there's been service and at the last known address and the victim is no longer there and there's no forwarding address, that's sufficient. It can't, in our view, have been the intention of the Legislature to hold up amnesty hearings for all victims to be located where there are no forwarding addresses. It's simply a procedure to enable them to be present to hear what has been said and to put their views across, but if steps have been taken to locate them and they are no longer there, with respect, that cannot hold up the hearing.
We are told that the radio was also used, other attempts were made to locate the victims, that's sufficient and in our view, in our submission Chairperson, not only should the applicants be heard, but the application should be dealt with and they shouldn't be postponed even after the applicants have given evidence, to some later date. If, after the applicants have testified, there is no further evidence, then we would ask that the matter be argued and completed.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR BERGER: Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Ja, it also appears to us that it does not necessarily close the door on a victim who has got good cause for not having been able to participate in the actual proceedings. I should imagine there are always further procedures that could be followed, make submissions in regard to the matter, if you're interested you can obtain a copy of the proceedings and so on and of course, I mean, we're not sure whether any of these people really want to oppose the application.
MR BERGER: That is so, yes.
CHAIRPERSON: If the application were not to proceed today, what would the effect be on your clients?
MR BERGER: Well, Chairperson, because we were notified in February, we've had schedules rearranged, diaries rearranged. Without wanting to put too much stress on this point, the first applicant is the chief of the South African National Defence Force, the second applicant is also a General in the SANDF, the third applicant is also a high ranking official. To have the diaries rearranged, is just going to cause problems that, bluntly put, we can do without, Chairperson. We're dealing with busy people and to get everyone here today hasn't been easy. It's going to be very difficult to convene us all again.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Yes thank you, Mr Berger. Is there anything else that you wanted to say, Ms Mtanga?
MS MTANGA: I have nothing further, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms Mtanga, has Mr Schutte given any explanation why this fax was only dispatched to us this morning?
MS MTANGA: Chairperson, he didn't explain that to me, but I have spoken to his secretary. His intention was that it should reach us by the 20th of April. However, there was a problem or miscommunication in his office and it was only sent to us today.
R U L I N G
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. We have listened to what has been put before us by Ms Mtanga in regard to the state of the application. We have had regard to the letter that was faxed to the Cape Town office of the Committee sometime today. We are as usual working under extreme time constraints, we at this stage, will simply rule that this matter should proceed and if needs be we will furnish reasons for that ruling in due course.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Berger.
MR BERGER: Thank you Chairperson. Chairperson, I call the first applicant, General Siphiwe Nyanda.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR BERGER: Chairperson, the General will affirm rather than taking the oath.
CHAIRPERSON: And he'll testify in English, I assume?
MR BERGER: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well.
SIPHIWE NYANDA: (affirmed states)
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger.
MR BERGER: Thank you Chairperson. Chairperson, before I lead Gen Nyanda, I just would like to point out that there are a few problems with the bundle. General Nyanda's amnesty application starts at page 4 of the bundle and then there is a set of Further Particulars starting at page 13, but you will see from the way the bundle has been put together that page 13 is the first page of the Further Particulars and page 14 is the fourth page.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR BERGER: Then page 18 is the second page and also in the Further Particulars there are certain annexures that are referred to and those annexures have all been left out, but to be found at other pages, and I'll just point you to them. The first, Annexure A is the amnesty application and that appears from pages 4 through to 10.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR BERGER: Then Annexure B is an extract from the second submission of the ANC to the TRC, that's the submission dated 12 May 1997 and that's to be found at page 143 of the bundle. Annexure C is to be found at page 145.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Berger, just give me a minutes. You say that Annexure B in your papers, is page 43?
MR BERGER: is page 143.
CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry. Yes, that's right. Yes, please proceed.
MR BERGER: Then Annexure C is at page 145, it's also an extract from the ANC Submissions. Annexure D is at page 144, Annexure E is at page 146, F is at 137, G is at 148. Then you have to go back a bit because Annexure H is at 139, I is at 135, J is at 136, and K is at 142 and Annexure L never found its way into the bundle.
CHAIRPERSON: And what is the, what document is that?
MR BERGER: It's an extract from an argument at a previous hearing of the Amnesty Committee and all it, the only relevance of it is a paragraph that Mr Landman, who was then appearing, said - he said the following: "Mr Chairman, you also recall that we placed on record that Gen Nyanda, the person who gave the orders, does not intend to contradict any of the evidence which was given and indeed, I'm instructed to inform you that he confirms that that is indeed the correct position, that the orders emanated from himself."
It's not something that relates to the matters under discussion at this amnesty hearing at all.
CHAIRPERSON: Is that the sum total of the annexures?
MR BERGER: Yes, that is so. Bearing that in mind, if I could then lead General Nyanda?
CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Thank you Mr Berger, we've noted all of that.
MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: We'll have to stay with the order as it is now. Yes.
EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: General Nyanda, you have made an application for amnesty. If you would turn to the bundle, pages 4 through to 10, do you confirm that that is a copy of your amnesty application?
GEN NYANDA: I do.
MR BERGER: In addition to that, General, you furnished further particulars to the Amnesty Committee after being requested to do so, those further particulars are contained in a document which runs from page 13 through to 20, page 20 of the bundle, is that correct?
GEN NYANDA: It is correct, Chairman.
MR BERGER: And you heard what I said to the Chairperson about pages being in the incorrect order and annexures being found at other places. Do you confirm that the annexures that I referred to are indeed the annexures to your further particulars?
GEN NYANDA: I confirm.
MR BERGER: Now, General, this amnesty hearing concerns only the landmine campaign which was conducted in the former Eastern Transvaal and to a lesser extent on the Witwatersrand from the end of 1985 onwards. So I'd like to limit your evidence here to that particular campaign. in 1985 when the campaign began, where were you stationed?
GEN NYANDA: I was stationed in Swaziland.
MR BERGER: And what was your position there?
GEN NYANDA: Well, I'd just been appointed to command a special project called ...(indistinct - ethnic), which was responsible for the landmine campaigning.
MR BERGER: Now "kletshwayo" was a special project that fell under the military head quarters of Umkhonto weSizwe, is that correct?
GEN NYANDA: That's correct, Chairman.
MR BERGER: ; Did it have anything to do with Special Operations or was it distinct in itself from what we know as Special Operations?
GEN NYANDA: Well, it was a special operation but it was not part of Special Operations of Umkhonto weSizwe or the ANC, Chairman.
MR BERGER: I forgot at the beginning, General, to get you to give your formal title. Presently you are the Chief of the South African National Defence Force, is that correct?
GEN NYANDA: It is correct.
MR BERGER: What was the thinking, if you know, in 1985 behind the establishment of "Kletshwayo"?
GEN NYANDA: I think the thinking was that the areas around the borders of the country were used by the South African Defence Force and the South African Police to patrol as well as accost and arrest Cadres of the African National Congress who used these routes to infiltrate into the country. The areas around the borders were also used by farmers who were part of the network of the Security establishment in the country, to assist the police to patrol and to report all the activities and movements through those areas, so as far as our thinking was concerned, those farmers constituted part of the Security network of the regime of that time, to frustrate our endeavours to intensify our military campaign. The thinking was then that we should start this campaign in order to try to advance our struggle.
MR BERGER: Would I be correct if I said that it would appear that the motive was twofold in attacking the farmers on that border area? The one was because they themselves were now part of the military establishment, but secondly also to enable routes to be opened to infiltrate cadres into the country.
GEN NYANDA: Well, we used those routes, but they were there, the routes had been opened by us, but because of the strategy of the regime at that time, to mobilise the farmers as well to try to frustrate our attempts to move either men or material into the country, they became part of the Security, or we regarded them as part of the Security network, these farmers, because they frustrated us from attempts to infiltrate into the country.
MR BERGER: Now, you were the Commander of "Kletshwayo", is that correct?
GEN NYANDA: It is correct.
MR BERGER: And you had with you a certain Command structure, is that correct?
GEN NYANDA: It is correct, Chairman.
MR BERGER: Can you recall the people who were with you on that command structure?
GEN NYANDA: One of them was Brigadier-General Shoke, another Theopholus ...(indistinct), we used to call him Viva, he is late. If I recall, another was Molefe, we used to call him Commissar, he is also late. Those that I can recall immediately, but there may have been more.
MR BERGER: Who was the person on that structure who had contact with the units, the cadres? For example, did you have contact with the unit?
GEN NYANDA: Some of them yes, but the person who had contact who was in charge of briefing people was Theopholus Dlodlo, the Viva that I mentioned, he was the Operations Chief.
MR BERGER: Can you explain to the Committee how you would go about sanctioning a particular operation? What was the general modus operandi at the time?
GEN NYANDA: The modus operandi was that we used mainly people who were familiar with the area in case people who were not familiar with the area, they would be briefed by their Commanders to go and carry out reconnaissance on a specific target, come back, report and then go and carry out the operation, lay the landmine, or landmines, whichever the case might have been. In most instances we used people who were familiar with the area, who knew the surroundings, who would then go and reconnoitre the area and then lay the landmines, after carrying out the reconnaissance.
MR BERGER: The landmines often get referred to in various documents as the hardware. Are you familiar with that term?
GEN NYANDA: I am, Chairman.
MR BERGER: Did it happen that the hardware would be infiltrated into the country at the same time that a particular cadre was doing reconnaissance, or was it already there, or was it a mixture of the two?
GEN NYANDA: It was a mixture of the two. Sometimes it would be ahead of the person so that after carrying out the reconnaissance he would know where to find his hardware which we would have infiltrated before, or it could follow the reconnaissance of the target by the operative.
MR BERGER: What sort of landmines were these? How could they have been set off? What sort of weight or pressure would have been required to set them off?
GEN NYANDA: Well, at least, I think 850 kilogrammes of weight. These were Russian-made mines which could be triggered by heavy vehicles, I think over 1000 kilogrammes.
MR BERGER: What I'm really asking is, could these landmines have been triggered by individuals walking over them?
GEN NYANDA: No, that would not be possible.
MR BERGER: And was there a reason why these particular landmines were used?
GEN NYANDA: It is because we were targeting mainly patrols of the whom we regarded as our enemy then, that is the South African National Defence Force, the South African Police and as I indicated, part of what we regarded as their support structure, farmers who would also patrol, Commandos who would also patrol the roads which we targeted with these landmines and not people walking, or even farmers walking. We targeted vehicles that were patrolling.
MR BERGER: Now you said in the main you didn't have direct contact with the soldiers. What sort of discretion, how wide was the discretion that was left to the particular cadres on the ground as to where to plant a landmine, when to plant the landmine, which particular farmer or military establishment to target? What sort of discretion were they given and how did you control that?
GEN NYANDA: Well, Chairman, in this regard, the modus operandi was no different from other activities that we engaged in as Umkhonto weSizwe, whether it was in the urban areas, or in the rural areas, we gave our operatives general guidelines, what sort of targets to attack and what targets not to attack. The cadres of the African National Congress were trained also to think strategically, they were not just trained to use the equipment that they were given and left to operate that equipment, because in many instances they operated not under guidance, no under direct supervision, so we had to rely on them because of their training, their political training, their political equipment, to be able to exercise their own minds. We gave them general guidelines about what targets to attack and what targets not to attack. In the case of the landmines, they knew too what our targets were, that our targets were mainly patrols of the military as well as the police, as well as farmers connected to the Security network. Where possible, they had to avoid also attacks on ordinary farmers and ordinary workers on the farms, although that was going to be difficult, but these were the guidelines that we gave them, Chairman, because we knew who our targets were and these people then went to carry out this reconnaissance themselves and they made the decisions on the spot, on the basis of the guidelines, the political guidelines that we had given them.
MR BERGER: ; Subsequent to an operation, would you have received a report-back?
GEN NYANDA: In some instances yes, in some, no, because I indicated earlier on Chairman that some of the people, or some of the operatives were based inside the country, that we relied on people who were in the areas where they operated and communication was not direct. We gave them the guidelines and they carried out the operation and sometimes they remained inside without coming to report and remained to carry out other operations internally, so it was not always the case that we received reports.
MR BERGER: In those instances where you did receive reports, were you satisfied that the cadres on the ground were following the guidelines of the ANC and Umkhonto weSizwe?
GEN NYANDA: Yes, Chairman.
MR BERGER: General, in your Further Particulars, you've listed certain incidents of landmine explosions in this area, but you also say in your Further Particulars that you don't purport these incidents to be a complete list, is that correct?
GEN NYANDA: This is correct, Chairman.
MR BERGER: And that even today, you say there may be incidents that you are unaware of that were carried out on the basis of your instructions, would that be correct?
GEN NYANDA: It is correct, Chairman.
MR BERGER: And is it correct that you assumed responsibility for all landmine explosions that were carried out pursuant to your instructions from 1985 onwards, all landmine explosions, I beg your pardon, in the former Eastern Transvaal?
GEN NYANDA: I do, Chairman.
MR BERGER: Now, at a point, the campaign "Kletshwayo" was called off by the military leadership in Lusaka, is that correct?
GEN NYANDA: I heard so.
MR BERGER: You were no longer involved at that stage?
GEN NYANDA: That's correct, Chairman.
MR BERGER: When did you cease being in command of "Kletshwayo"?
GEN NYANDA: I was recalled to Lusaka in early 1987 and never went back to Swaziland to continue command of the special project "Kletshwayo".
MR BERGER: Chairperson, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BERGER
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Berger. Ms Mtanga, any questions?
MS MTANGA: I just have one question, Chairperson, thank you.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS MTANGA: Mr Nyanda, as a Commander at that time, were you in a position to know the units that operated inside the country, that is the members of those units?
GEN NYANDA: Even those, I didn't know even those that operated from outside the country, I only knew people by their pseudonyms. Gen Shoke, I didn't know he was Gen Shoke until he came into the country, I knew him as Jabo and I still call him Jabo.
MS MTANGA: Were you involved in the selection of the operatives?
GEN NYANDA: Not in this instance. Yes because I had been a Commander in Umkhonto weSizwe for a long time and this was just a project that I was given, I used to go to Angola to select people for work inside the country.
MS MTANGA: So are you saying in the landmine explosions, you were not involved in the selection of operatives?
GEN NYANDA: No. No Chairman.
MS MTANGA: And was your structure involved in actually deciding the areas that must be - were you aware that you targeted the borders, let's say in those border areas, did you decide which areas were your problem areas and would you have known which areas were those?
GEN NYANDA: Well my area specifically was the area, parts of Mozambique, Southern Mozambique as well as Swaziland, the whole of Swaziland border.
MS MTANGA: Did you, or were you specifically aware of where these landmines would be placed? Would you be given the exact details?
GEN NYANDA: In most instances, no.
MS MTANGA: We have an incident here which took place between Barberton and Diepgesit, where four people were killed and one injured and from the statements given by the victims, it appears that this was very close to a residential area, so what I would like to know is, would your office or your structure, be aware of these exact locations of these landmines and I take into account the fact that there were people living around where they were placing the landmines.
GEN NYANDA: Mr Chairman, as I said, most times we relied on people who resided in those areas to take the initiative themselves, based on the general guidelines we gave them and if people who stayed in any area where people resided thought that they would target a particular army patrol or so, then I think the discretion was left to them to do so and sometimes of course, it wouldn't be the case that the landmine would be triggered by the military, but by civilians, but the discretion was left to the people based on the general guidelines we gave them about what to do and what not to do.
MS MTANGA: You also mentioned that the weight of a landmine that you used was about 850 kg. I'm not well-versed on landmines... (intervention)
MR BERGER: No. No, no, that wasn't what the General said.
MS MTANGA: I beg your pardon?
MR BERGER: That wasn't what the General said, he said that was the weight of the vehicle that had to be on top of the landmine, not the weight of the landmine.
MS MTANGA: Oh yes, alright, you're correct. In your - with this in mind, what sort of vehicles would have triggered this landmine?
GEN NYANDA: If a vehicle is over 1 000 Kg, it means it's not an ordinary sedan.
MS MTANGA: Would this include ordinary bakkies, in your knowledge?
GEN NYANDA: A bakkie, yes, it would be triggered by it sometimes.
MS MTANGA: What caution would you say was exercised in ensuring that if the bakkies could trigger landmines, then ordinary bakkies being driven by civilians, would not fall targets to the landmines? What sort of caution was taken by your structure?
GEN NYANDA: The people who were asked, were instructed to carry this, were instructed to carry out reconnaissance. We are aware that any vehicle, even a ...(indistinct) could carry ordinary workers and it would trigger such a landmine, but we relied on the people to carry out reconnaissance in order to place these mines where it was more likely that the military, the police or the farmers who were connected to this Security network, would trigger it, rather than ordinary people, that is why these landmines were planted late at night and were planted at a time when we thought the patrols were taking place.
MS MTANGA: Mr Nyanda, I understand your evidence but I also have a problem, especially with regard to this Diepgesit incident, where it really seems on the facts of the matter, that that landmine was indeed placed not too far from this residential area and in the light of the fact that your evidence is saying these landmines could be triggered by ordinary bakkies, I find it difficult to understand how would you have exercised caution for ordinary people not to be injured, what caution was there?
GEN NYANDA: Mr Chairman, I said that these mines were intended for the military largely, and just perhaps to illustrate the point which reinforces what I said about the people who were asked to do this, who were instructed to do these things, having had to carry out reconnaissance, some of them were actually planted in urban areas and I'm aware of landmines that were planted in the urban areas, in the heart of Gauteng which were triggered by military vehicles, although these are busy places and they could have been triggered by bakkies, but because people did reconnaissance, because people had to do reconnaissance, had to satisfy themselves that it is more likely that it is the military that were going to trigger these, then we had to rely on these people. In other words, we relied heavily on reconnaissance, on people doing reconnaissance, establishing for themselves that it was most likely that the mines would be triggered by military vehicles, by the actual targets.
MS MTANGA: Obviously in these incidents, your office or their structure, the people involved in planning and directing these operations must have foreseen civilians being injured in these circumstances?
GEN NYANDA: Yes, certainly, there was always a possibility that civilians were going to get injured.
MS MTANGA: How would you politically justify those incidents?
GEN NYANDA: Mr Chairman, we were involved in the struggle and we tried to choose our targets carefully. We tried to ensure that civilians don't get caught in the cross-fire, but it was not always possible for us to ensure, to guarantee that no civilians would get injured in whatever operation, whether it involved landmines, or it involved bombs, or it involved placing bombs on trains, to be triggered by trains, whether it involved shooting at policemen in police stations, whether it involved bombing Voortrekkerhoogte, there was no way that we could guarantee that civilians would not get injured and there is no war ever that has been fought which can do that.
MS MTANGA: I have no further questions, Chairperson, thank you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS MTANGA
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Ms Mtanga. Has the Panel got any questions?
ADV SANDI: Yes, thank you Chair. General, the third applicant, Mr Mkhonto, was he known to you at that time?
GEN NYANDA: He was.
ADV SANDI: Can you tell us, what did you know about him concerning these operations? Did you have any direct dealings with him by way of giving him instructions?
GEN NYANDA: I had no direct dealings with him, but I knew him even before he worked in this structure of ours, because I was the Commander, I was the Chief of Staff of the Transvaal Machinery and he worked in that Command.
ADV SANDI: Thank you for that. My next question would be on 0 you have said you relied entirely on local people, people who resided in those areas. Now if- would I be correct to understand you as follows? If there was a failure of judgment on the part of a local person who had been used for a particular operation, is there anything you would have been able to do about it?
GEN NYANDA: No, well I think, Mr Chairman, I think I would obviously have had to reprimand a person if I thought that there was a failure and this justified a reprimand.
ADV SANDI: That is after the operation, but if there has been, I'm talking about the stage before the operation is carried out, if there has been a failure of judgment on the part of this particular person you are wanting to use in that particular area, is there anything you can do about it before the operation is carried out?
GEN NYANDA: No, there is nothing I can do before the operation is carried out. I have to give him the general guidelines and to try to advise him how to avoid unnecessary casualties or injury to civilians, but there is nothing that I can do.
ADV SANDI: Yes, but you've also said some of the operations would be carried out without you knowing and you would know after an operation has been carried out.
GEN NYANDA: That is exactly why I am saying that there is nothing I can do if he exercises bad judgment.
ADV SANDI: My understanding concerning the period, this is after the Kabwe Conference Resolution of 1985.
GEN NYANDA: Yes.
ADV SANDI: My recollection, I cannot locate it in the bundle, is that the resolution where you organisation said with the intensification of the armed struggle, it would become inevitable for more and more civilians to be caught up in these operations?
GEN NYANDA: Yes, Chairman, that's exactly what I was saying, that it would be difficult for us to avoid civilian casualties, even though we were not targeting civilians, we were targeting the military and the police.
ADV SANDI: concerning the specific incidents that we are looking into today, did you receive any reports at the time, that such operations had been carried out?
GEN NYANDA: Sometimes we'd see in the press that a police van has detonated a landmine, or a military vehicle has detonated a landmine.
ADV SANDI: Sorry, you misunderstood me, I'm talking about the incidents where these specific victims whose names appear at page 3, did you know anything before those operations were carried out?
GEN NYANDA: I have no particular recollection of the incident being reported to me before it was carried out, as far as these were concerned.
ADV SANDI: Thank you General. Thank you Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Sibanyoni.
MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson. Maybe General, as a follow-up to Adv Sandi's questions, the last one, what made it difficult for the operatives inside the country to always report to you in Swaziland?
GEN NYANDA: Well, in the first place chairman, they did not report directly to me, they reported, they had people that they reported to. In this instance I've indicated that there was a Chief or Operations called Viva and they would have reported to him perhaps, depending on, of course, on the particular circumstances of individual operatives.
MR SIBANYONI: If I understand you correctly, Viva was a Commander of the unit inside the country, sort of.
GEN NYANDA: He was the Chief of Operations of the project, "kletshwayo"
MR SIBANYONI: Yes. Is it the same Viva we once had in one of the applications by the Vlakplaas operatives who was killed in Vosloorus Boksburg, when they tried to arrest him?
GEN NYANDA: No. This particular Viva Chairman was killed in Swaziland according to reports, de Kock and some of his people, they've asked for amnesty with respect to his killing and that of two others who were in the car with him.
MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson, no further questions.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Sibanyoni. Mr Nyanda, just in regard to the landmine campaign, if I understand you correctly, there was some means of monitoring how this project, this campaign was developing, you had some feedback, not of everything, but you had an idea of what was happening to the campaign. Would that be a fair summary of what your evidence is?
GEN NYANDA: Yes, I think, Mr Chairman, it would be a fair summary of my evidence, because as I said, we used to get reports in the newspapers about detonation of landmines by the South African Police, by the South African Defence Force and also sometimes by ordinary civilians, farm workers.
CHAIRPERSON: Now as the command structure for this particular campaign, in view of this feedback that you got, what was your view about the campaign itself in terms of its success, or its failure, or whether your guidelines were being roughly, largely followed and that sort of thing, what was your feeling as the Command?
GEN NYANDA: Chairman, firstly, I think the evidence has been led here and I said I was not around at that time, that the ANC decided at some point to culminate this campaign, which was a campaign countrywide, through Northern Transvaal, through structures in Zimbabwe, Botswana as well as the Eastern Transvaal. I participated from 1986 and early 87 as Commander of this project Kletshwayo. It was a brief period, then I was recalled back to Lusaka and to another task and during my carrying out of those other tasks, the ANC decided that this campaign must be stopped and it decided I think in the ...(indistinct) wisdom because oft he casualties, especially civilian casualties that were being reported. I think during the time when I was there, there were instances where civilians were injured or died as a result of the activities of the operatives that I commanded, but largely military as well as police people were also affected by the campaign. I think because of the overall effect, impact of the campaign on civilians, the ANC decided to terminate this campaign and my impression as well was that the campaign because it attracted severe casualties, had to be terminated.
CHAIRPERSON: Now if you can recall, those instances where you had knowledge of civilian casualties in the operations, what sort of idea did you form about these? Were these cases of blatant disregard for your guidelines, or would it have been cross-fire instances as you've referred to earlier where people were caught up in the war that was going on?
GEN NYANDA: Chairman, I'm convinced that there was no disregard of the guidelines by the operatives at least that were briefed under my structure and that these were genuine accidents.
CHAIRPERSON: Ms Mtanga was referring to a particular incident that is documented in the papers before us here and its not quite clear to me whether it, in fact, resulted from your operations or not, but in any case I'll give you the details and perhaps you can tell us whether you have any idea about this one. According to the papers before us, I'm just looking at one of the statements by, it appears to be an investigating officer on page 73 or the papers, this particular incident happened on the 23rd of March 1987, it seems to be about half-past five in the afternoon and it seems to have been in the vicinity of a mine on a gravel road in the vicinity of what is called the Diepgesit mine and over the page, on page 74, there is a further report by this policeman about the incident and then on top of the page, the second line, he explains where and in what circumstances the incident happened. It seems to be this gravel road which seems to be a road that is formed by cars driving, it seems to be in the veld somewhere. He says it's got two sort of - it seems to be one of those gravel roads with just the two marks that are caused by the wheels of vehicles and it seems to be in the vicinity of this Diepgesit Mine and Josefsdal Road turn-off. This is the one that Ms Mtanga referred to where some people were injured, on the fact of it civilian people. Now March 87, were you still in the operation at that stage?
GEN NYANDA: I'm not sure, I think I had left by then.
CHAIRPERSON: Would you have left by then already?
GEN NYANDA: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: You don't recall an incident of this sort of nature?
GEN NYANDA: No, I don't recall this particular incident. From the, as she put to you, there were four people killed apparently and one person injured and it appears from the surnames Msivi, Sithole, Motsa, if you look at page 3, the last group of names there, so on the face of it it appears to be civilians and the five people involved, that doesn't ring any bell? You don't recall anything of that sort of nature?
GEN NYANDA: I have no recollection, but as I said, Chairman, that it is quite possible that this thing happened under my command and that it happened, it was carried out by people who fell under Kletshwayo, but I have no personal recollection of it and it is quite possible too that I was still in Swaziland then, in charge of this project.
CHAIRPERSON: From this little bit of information that we have here, it seems to be somewhere near to a mine. It doesn't look like it's a road that's regularly used, it's a gravel road with two sort of lanes caused by wheels and so on. It looks as if it's somewhere out.
GEN NYANDA: It is quite possible that it was a road which was used to patrol, as well, by the military or the police and that the people had reconnoitred it and placed a mine in the hope that it would be triggered by those patrols, because it couldn't have been placed there for ordinary civilians to trigger.
CHAIRPERSON: And would this be, now it's very difficult because we've got very scant detail about the thing, but it looks as if it's not a regular road, it doesn't look like it's a built road, it seems to have just been formed by vehicles moving up and down on the gravel. Would that be the kind of area where you would have expected this border campaign, you were saying it was against the border, you were focusing on the role of the farmers in that particular area and the Security Forces.
GEN NYANDA: Yes, Chairman, provided that conclusion was reached by it, because we would give them general directives and guidelines about what kind of operations to carry out and where to place these landmines on roads which were used for patrol and so on and they themselves would go there, or they would know that this particular road or this gravel road is actually formed by - it's not a natural road but it is road that has been formed by vehicles on patrol and they would, if they take that decision, then place the landmine there.
CHAIRPERSON: As I say, it's not clear on what is before us, whether in fact that is beyond any doubt, an incident that resulted from the operations, but that's the sum total of what we have here. Were you - you say that it was between 1986 and early 1987 that you were involved. Now was it - when about in 1986 were you ...
GEN NYANDA: I think late 85.
CHAIRPERSON: Late 85? Late 85 to early 87?
GEN NYANDA: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: The incidents that you list on page 17 of the papers, the six incidents there, they all seem to have occurred during 1986.
GEN NYANDA: Yes, Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: And were these all within the ambit of your guidelines and your operation at that stage? In other words, these were authorised operations?
GEN NYANDA: These are incidents that we know took place while I was there as Commander of this project, Kletshwayo, the Special Operations Kletshwayo. There well may be more, but these are the ones that we know were reported at that time.
CHAIRPERSON: General Nyanda, the last incident there, number 6 on page 17, Lance Corporal le Roux killed, was this just the feedback that you got or was this an operation that was specifically authorised beforehand?
GEN NYANDA: No, this is feedback we received, Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: So this would have been within the discretion of the operatives?
GEN NYANDA: Yes, Mr Chairman.
ADV SANDI: Sorry Chair, if I can just take this one a bit further?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
ADV SANDI: General can you tell us more about the circumstances in which the feedback in regard to that particular incident was received by yourself and whoever?
GEN NYANDA: There was a report, I think, in the press about this incident and it is quite possible that the person who was commanding the operations, Viva, actually received verbal feedback from the operative who carried out the - who placed the landmine.
ADV SANDI: is that to say that you did not personally receive feedback in regard to this specific incident?
GEN NYANDA: Chairman, I have said that I had no direct contact with, or in most instances I had no direct contact with the operatives, that there was a Chief of Operations who brief operatives about what to do and gave them the hardware, the mines to plant, so I have no - very rarely did I have direct contact with the people who carried out the attacks with the mines.
ADV SANDI: ; Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you Mr Sandi. Mr Berger, any re-examination?
NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER
MR BERGER: No questions, thank you Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. General Nyanda, you're excused. Thank you.
GEN NYANDA: Thank you.
WITNESS EXCUSED
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Perhaps we should just take a brief adjournment at this stage. We are trying to catch up, but I think let's get our breath back. We'll adjourn for thirty minutes.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
