CHAIRPERSON: We will call our next witness to the stand, and that is Colonel Cornelius Adolf Janse Odendal.
MR NTSEBEZA: Please can we please have quiet. Can we please have some silence.
CHAIRPERSON: We would like to welcome the choir. The choir is going to sing at the end of the proceedings today. It is called the Dalingebo(?) Adult Choir, thank you and we welcome you.
Mr Odendal we will ask Mrs Mary Burton to swear you in. Before we do actually could you place yourself on record Mr Louw.
ADV LOUW: My surname is Louw, I am an advocate and I appear on behalf of Colonel Odendal ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Please Ladies and Gentlemen could we give Mr Louw a chance. Thank you. Advocate Louw.
ADV LOUW: I appear on behalf of Mr Odendal duly instructed thereto.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We will ask Mrs Burton to swear you in and Mr Ntsebeza is going to lead your questioning.
MS BURTON: Thank you Chairperson, thank you Mr Odendal. Good afternoon.
CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: (sworn states)
MR NTSEBEZA: May I please make a comment. I would like to talk to you. This thing was nice all along, we've started this well. This is the last day. This is our last witness. We will be very disappointed if this thing can be a failure at the last moment. We will be the causes of the failure. People have come to give their witnessing. The Commission made an oath that they will respect them at all costs. Each and every witness has the right not to be afraid or not to be scared to give her witnessing comfortably.
What I would like to say is that it is disturbing when we are proceeding with our meeting when people do not give respect at all times. We do understand that there are people who still have that motion of what happened during those years, but we still do have a big job to do as a Commission to see that this is done in a very decent way.
I do plead with you, please try and give us a chance to do this work and work with the witnesses properly. Please you usually listen to me when I ask you. I will be very disappointed if you don't obey with what I am trying to ask from you. Thank you very much.
Dolf good afternoon!
COL ODENDAL: Good afternoon Mr Commissioner.
MR NTSEBEZA: In the course of these deliberations your name kept on coming and I could see you were working very hard at your notes there, I don't know whether there is a statement that you are going to be reading into the record or whether you are saying, here am I, let's get on with the business!
ADV LOUW: Colonel Odendal has not prepared any prior statement for submission to you. He is ready to answer such questions as you may be advised to put to him.
MR NTSEBEZA: I am indebted to you Advocate Louw. I wish you had prepared a statement and then I would have had a basis to question him - (laughter). But maybe let me start from where I usually start. At the time that - are you still a serving member of the South African Services as they are called nowadays?
COL ODENDAL: No Mr Commissioner. For three years I have been retired.
MR NTSEBEZA: And at what rank did you retire?
COL ODENDAL: I retired as a Colonel.
MR NTSEBEZA: Would that be a full Colonel?
COL ODENDAL: That's correct a full colonel.
MR NTSEBEZA: It is now common cause but I would like you to confirm it, it is common cause that in the area that we are examining, in the period that we are examining you were in the Western Cape?
COL ODENDAL: That is correct.
MR NTSEBEZA: And in 1985, 1986 what was your position in the South African Police?
COL ODENDAL: In '85, '86 I was a Major. '85 I was a Major in the South African Police and second in charge of the Riot Squad.
MR NTSEBEZA: And you know we have been talking, I am sure you have been listening, but you know we have been talking about structures, sub Joint Committee what have you, at what level did you operate in terms of those structures? You will remember that for instance the previous witness said he was in the S-JMC in the Western Province, I am trying to place you in that order of things.
COL ODENDAL: I was on the JOC and we were situated in Manenberg. Sometimes when the commanding officer was not there the S-JMC I also attended. But that did not happen often.
MR NTSEBEZA: In other words you were, would you say you were in a Mini-JMC, structurally, were you placed in a Mini-JMC in Athlone?
COL ODENDAL: Chairperson I was part of the JOC and they operated the Riot Unit in Manenberg. You can see, referring to Odendal I was actually a Joint Operations Centre man.
MR NTSEBEZA: Oh the Joint Operations Centre, you mean in this document. Alright. So you were in the Joint Operations Centre that operated from Manenberg?
COL ODENDAL: That is correct.
MR NTSEBEZA: Right. And who was your immediate commander, in other words who did you report to in the Western Cape?
COL ODENDAL: My immediate head was in 1985 till the end of 1985 Colonel van Rensburg and in 1986 Colonel Visser.
MR NTSEBEZA: I see. And what relationship did you have with General Wandrag? In other words I am trying to see the chain of command from you, where you were to General Wandrag who we understand was now the overall national commander of the Riot Unit. In other words what was the ...(intervention)
COL ODENDAL: He was the national commander of the Riot Squad, that is correct.
MR NTSEBEZA: How did you communicate with General Wandrag for instance, was there a structure through which you communicated? Was there direct communication between you and General Wandrag?
COL ODENDAL: No I never communicated with him. I would like to explain Mr Commissioner. We went out in the field every day, we did our jobs. Every platoon had a person there who could keep records, he wrote it down, it was communicated to the operational centre in Manenberg and from Manenberg it was conveyed to the operational centre where Colonel Vermeulen received that and they took that further.
MR NTSEBEZA: I see. And in other words, as you have just indicated, there wasn't a direct link, a communication between you and General Wandrag?
COL ODENDAL: No, definitely no.
MR NTSEBEZA: Did you have any relationships with Brigadier Strydom who was in the Western Cape as well?
COL ODENDAL: He was the Head of the Security Police in the Western Cape.
MR NTSEBEZA: Was he also part of GOS in Manenberg?
COL ODENDAL: No, he was not part of JOC.
MR NTSEBEZA: There never were any joint operations between the Riot Unit and his unit?
COL ODENDAL: No sometimes there were joint operations where we cordoned off certain areas and searched areas like KTC, Old Crossroads, satellite establishments where people from Security Police did cooperate with us sometimes.
MR NTSEBEZA: Now Brigadier Swart where did he feature in all of this?
COL ODENDAL: He was the Divisional Commissioner of the whole Western Cape. He was head of the Police in the Western Cape.
MR NTSEBEZA: And the Commissioner of Police at the time was of course General Coetzee?
COL ODENDAL: Yes it could have been General Coetzee.
MR NTSEBEZA: And there was never an occasion where you personally had contact with General Coetzee either by way of a visit to find out what the unrest situation is and how you were coping?
COL ODENDAL: No, no never.
MR NTSEBEZA: Now what kind of orders or communications would you generally receive from the South African Police regarding instructions for handling unrest situations in general?
COL ODENDAL: Mr Chairman in 1976 we were trained in handling riots. The instructors showed us how you should handle riot situations, how to put up road blockades, patrols and when there were big matters how to use teargas depending on the circumstances.
CHAIRPERSON: Excuse me I prefer to be referred to as Miss Chairperson or otherwise Madam Chair, not Mr Chairman, thank you.
COL ODENDAL: That's good.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Ntsebeza.
MR NTSEBEZA: Yes. You were still describing the sort of orders or instructions that you were being given with regard to handling these unrest situations in general.
COL ODENDAL: That is right Madam Chair.
MR NTSEBEZA: Now the JMC structures in the Western Cape did you feature in that at all anywhere, the Western Cape JMC, the Western Province JMC?
COL ODENDAL: I was not part of the Western Province JMC. Sometimes when my commanding officer could not be there I went to these meetings. No I never went to the Western Province JMC but sometimes I did attend meetings of the S-JMC when the commanding officer was not available.
MR NTSEBEZA: And the meetings of the Western Province JMC itself did you ever attend any or some of them?
COL ODENDAL: It could have been that I attended some of those. I attended meetings of the S-JMC when my commanding officer was not there.
MR NTSEBEZA: Ja, yes I heard that. But what I was actually asking whether you also were able to attend meetings of the Western Province JMC? In other words a level at which Schelhase was operating according to the previous witness?
COL ODENDAL: No I never went to the Castle to attend these meetings.
MR NTSEBEZA: VEIKOM, did you ever attend ...(intervention)
COL ODENDAL: Yes I did attend VEIKOM meetings when my commanding officer was not available.
MR NTSEBEZA: Would that also be at the S-JMC level or at the level of the Western Province?
COL ODENDAL: That is correct Madam Chair.
MR NTSEBEZA: And you never attended VEIKOM meetings at the Western Province level, the WP-JMC?
COL ODENDAL: No never.
MR NTSEBEZA: Now you heard Trevor Vermeulen testifying that he was secretary to the Western Province, in other words the Peninsula S-JMC, now did you ever attend meetings at which he was secretary? Yes you did, there was one ...(intervention)
COL ODENDAL: Ja, yes I have, these are in the documents ...(intervention)
MR NTSEBEZA: Ja okay. And one of them being the one that I put to the - I am going to put that thing to you just in a moment. Now at these meetings of GOS, who did GOS report to?
COL ODENDAL: The JOC meetings?
MR NTSEBEZA: H'n. Now what came out of those meetings, where did they get to?
COL ODENDAL: During these JOC meetings information was obtained from the Security Police. Du Toit was there, they told us about possible incidents, perhaps in the whole Cape Peninsula and we planned what to do.
MR NTSEBEZA: Ja, and did JOC always inform the S-JMC when it would embark on operations like for instance the Guguletu 7, would that have been something, if it was decided at GOS, would that be something that would then be reported to the S-JMC?
COL ODENDAL: No, that operation was not discussed at the JOC.
MR NTSEBEZA: At S-JMC. It was not even discussed at GOS?
COL ODENDAL: No.
MR NTSEBEZA: Oh I see. Would there be an instance at which instances where something that was discussed at GOS would not be reported to the S-JMC?
COL ODENDAL: That is correct. General discussions should have taken place and we can't send all the minutes through every day, it could have been possible.
MR NTSEBEZA: But operations, where for instance an operation was like - let's take an operation which I think did serve before GOS, the Trojan Horse, would that sort of operation be reported to the S-JMC?
COL ODENDAL: That is correct. Madam Chair the same if you went on a foot patrol in KTC or Old Crossroads or the satellite establishment you put it on record and the operational person in Manenberg receives it and he writes a report and that is faxed through to Colonel Vermeulen in the region.
MR NTSEBEZA: Now can you look at that document on counter-mobilisation, I think you have the reference, the one that (...indistinct) - now according to the previous witness you were present when there was a discussion on that document?
COL ODENDAL: That is correct.
MR NTSEBEZA: And I am keen to get your own impressions, what did this notion of counter-mobilisation mean to you?
COL ODENDAL: Point 11, is that what you are referring to?
MR NTSEBEZA: I am referring to. What did you understand the ...(intervention)
COL ODENDAL: There should be attempted to motivate the people from the Black residential areas to rise up against the revolutionaries.
MR NTSEBEZA: Now wouldn't you in the context of Crossroads and KTC wouldn't you, in your own mind, when you read that document or when the thing was discussed, who did you identify as revolutionaries in the context of what was happening there?
COL ODENDAL: The Comrades were revolutionaries, the Makabanas as they were called.
MR NTSEBEZA: Will you please be quiet. And what did counter-mobilisation mean to you vis a vis those groups of people, what did you understand it to be?
COL ODENDAL: Which point is that?
MR NTSEBEZA: Ja we are still dealing with 11.
COL ODENDAL: 11.
MR NTSEBEZA: You see no.11 on that document deals extensively with counter-mobilisation. And for instance it seems to suggest that structures must be identified which are favourably disposed towards the counter-mobilisation strategy, did you as yourselves, I am talking now about the Riot Unit, or as yourself in the context of that particular meeting, did you have a view as to what structures you identified?
COL ODENDAL: No, no.
MR NTSEBEZA: What did you regard as, in the context of Crossroads and KTC as positive resistance movements, what did you identify?
COL ODENDAL: I do not understand the question.
MR NTSEBEZA: You see you have said in the context of Crossroads and KTC at that time your own view was that the revolutionaries were Comrades.
COL ODENDAL: That is correct.
MR NTSEBEZA: Now I am asking are you able to tell us in a similar fashion what in the context of Crossroads and KTC in that period would be positive resistance movements?
COL ODENDAL: I would think this refers to the Witdoeke.
MR NTSEBEZA: Now we now know that there was a discussion of that document at a meeting at which you were and there is a document which I think you have which Colonel Vermeulen has designated as a memo, that flowed from those sort of discussions. Now do you have a sense of what was your thinking about methods that ought to have been employed to discredit the revolutionary leaders? You see where he talks about "the clandestine operations should be launched". We are reading paragraph 5 on page 2 of that document, "Propaganda Operations", 5C.
COL ODENDAL: This is a committee which should be established, a fixed committee of clandestine operations should be established, this is what I understand by that.
MR NTSEBEZA: Yes. And if we look at 7 what are your comments with regard to that, the very first portion, where it appears that the recommendation was that this was a specialised operation of a clandestine committee in relation to which when the climate is right should go into operation, or a climate could be created, could you give us your impressions about what that memo was saying?
COL ODENDAL: This memo says that there was a specialised unit for this proposed clandestine committee when the climate is right for that or when the climate should be created.
MR NTSEBEZA: Yes. Could you expand on that, could you just tell us more about that? I take it that you were at that meeting you may be remembering something about ....
COL ODENDAL: No Madam Chair I can't explain about these things. I was working on grassroots level. I attended many meetings. I can't remember a meeting which happened 11 years ago. When you ask me about unrest situations I could explain those but I can't remember specific meetings.
MR NTSEBEZA: But I mean you were at this meeting, are you suggesting that you were just sitting there because you were itching to go into the field?
COL ODENDAL: Yes I did attend the meeting Madam Chair but I can't remember what was discussed there. Many meetings were held and this happened 11 years ago. What was discussed there I can't remember because I attended many meetings in my life.
MR NTSEBEZA: Yes, but you know what I am saying is we have now a memo by the secretary of that meeting who says that - I just want to know for instance now that you look at this, and you will recall, I mean this was a momentous occasion, it was not just like ordinary times in your "loopbaan", times were very different and there was a specific document that had come you know for your attention. You held a meeting, all the structures looked at it and it comes up with a recommendation for a specialised operation of a clandestine committee, for instance were you part of a clandestine committee that was going to mount a specialised operation when the climate was right? What was this, what was this climate and what was it that had to be right about the climate?
ADV LOUW: Sorry, I think the first question is were you part of the clandestine operation? Perhaps the witness can answer that first.
MR NTSEBEZA: Oh yes. Were you?
COL ODENDAL: No I was not.
MR NTSEBEZA: Now maybe let's look at the second leg of that section where it says,
"There is already from the Western Cape and the Defence Force are already working in this direction to make the Fathers resist the Comrades".
COL ODENDAL: This amounts to it that the South African army assisted the Fathers to resist the Comrades, that the Fathers resisted the Comrades.
MR NTSEBEZA: Now you have indicated that you were in the field most of the time, did you participate in any operation the aim of which was to assist the Fathers against the Comrades?
COL ODENDAL: No. Madam Chair where I found them I talked to them and told them they should not fight. I even went to KTC in January if that would assist you. In January 1986 there were Witdoeke in KTC and they resisted the Comrades in KTC. I even talked to them and told them they should protect their property but they should not kill people. I don't know if the previous witnesses yesterday or the day before told you that there were Witdoeke in KTC and the Fathers came, resisted the Comrades who necklaced, murdered people, set property alight, I don't know whether they mentioned that yesterday and the day before.
MR NTSEBEZA: Yes a lot of things have been mentioned here but we ask you as a person who was placed in authority or a person who had a very important role to play being a commander or somebody in the command structure, riot unit, a very important element in the control of the violent situation at the time.
Maybe let's concentrate on your field, the area in which you operated. What was your relationship with Warrant Officer Barnard?
COL ODENDAL: Barnard was the person who drove the vehicle, and we also had an Interpreter Labuschagne who could speak Xhosa.
MR NTSEBEZA: And you?
COL ODENDAL: I was the commander on the ground. There were also other policemen involved in other platoons.
MR NTSEBEZA: Now you know that there were two forms of attack. The first attack was on the satellite camps. Now what role, if any, did you play in those attacks? Or let me put the question differently. Were the police aware from reports that an attack was imminent on those camps?
COL ODENDAL: Madam Chair since January that year there were rumours that the Comrades were going to attack the Witdoeke and the Witdoeke were going to attack the Comrades. Murders took place in Old Crossroads. Petrol bombs were thrown, stones were thrown, vehicles were burnt, and fights took place between the various factions.
MR NTSEBEZA: And I would take it that after almost five days of fighting between the 17th and the 21st of May there was a case study for a riot unit like yours as to what should be done effectively to deal with the situation of that nature, is that right?
COL ODENDAL: Please repeat your question.
MR NTSEBEZA: Am I correct in assuming that after the events at the satellite camps between the 17th and the 21st of May 1986 the riot police whose duty I think it is to deal with unrest situations of a riotous nature had at least something to fall on as to what best can be done in a situation like that?
COL ODENDAL: Yes that is correct Madam Chair. They put up a fence there but when the first attack took place nothing could prevent them because if they wanted to fight, they fought.
MR NTSEBEZA: No that's not what I am asking. Because I am simply saying that are you saying that the police and the army were completely unable to do anything at all to have prevented the mayhem between the 17th and the 21st of May?
COL ODENDAL: No there was nothing we could have done, we could only patrol the area. We went on patrol by foot except when a soldier and a policeman could have been placed in front of every door, that would have prevented the whole situation.
MR NTSEBEZA: Now you were aware that as a consequence of those attacks a court order was obtained on the 26th of May 1996 which interdicted members of the South African Police Force from participating in, assisting in, encouraging, permitting or allowing any unlawful attack upon any person or property residing within or situated within the area known as KTC, are you aware of that court order?
COL ODENDAL: That is correct.
MR NTSEBEZA: Are you aware also that that order was actually directing you, on other words the security forces to take all reasonably necessary steps within your powers to prevent any member of the South African Police or of the South African Defence Force or any other person from perpetrating any of the acts mentioned in paragraph 11.1 above, namely participating in, assisting in, encouraging, permitting or allowing any unlawful attack? You are aware that that order was preventing you in fact from - it was enjoining you to prevent anyone from the police from assisting, or from participating or encouraging or permitting or allowing any unlawful act upon any person or property?
COL ODENDAL: That is correct.
MR NTSEBEZA: Yes. Now that was on the 26th of May. Now on the 9th, and this has become common cause, on the 9th of June there is evidence that suggests that on the morning of the 9th policemen were seen at meetings with Witdoeke in Crossroads at Khayelitsha where the advance on KTC was discussed. There were 34 witnesses who were called who testified to that in a court proceeding subsequent to what happened there. Now what is your attitude towards that evidence?
I will repeat the evidence. On the morning of June the 9th policemen were seen at meetings with Witdoeke in Crossroads in Khayelitsha where the advance on KTC was discussed, what is your view?
COL ODENDAL: Madam Chair I do not have any knowledge of that. That morning I was in a meeting at the region.
MR NTSEBEZA: I see. There is also evidence that when the Witdoeke gathered in their thousands on the western edge of Crossroads from early in the morning of the 9th of June 1986 your police were present, the riot police were present.
COL ODENDAL: When the people gathered, that is correct.
MR NTSEBEZA: On the western edge of Crossroads, is that true?
COL ODENDAL: Mahobi Driveway, they were there, thousands of Witdoeke were there and I even addressed them there that morning and I said, through the Interpreter, that they should not fight and they said they were tired of the attacks by the Comrades. We warned them to go away, and about 400 metres from there, from Mahobi Driveway and KTC there were about 500/600 Comrades who were dancing and I addressed them and I told them to stop the fighting. Videos are available about this.
MR NTSEBEZA: Ja, there was no fight at that stage, there was no fight at that stage. Your evidence suggests that there were Comrades there chanting and spoiling for a fight from what I hear you to be saying. On the other side there were these thousands of Witdoeke.
Now what was the size of your unit?
COL ODENDAL: We were four platoons but many more platoons were sent to the unrest areas in the Western Cape from other parts of the country. I don't know precisely how many there were but there were also army vehicles involved.
MR NTSEBEZA: I am talking about whilst you were talking to these people, how many of your people were there, at 10 o'clock on that day whilst you were saying to Witdoeke hey listen just go away, and you were saying to these Comrades hey listen don't do this, how many?
COL ODENDAL: From my section, my section accompanied me and they were six people, we were together and the other vehicles, the police vehicles were in Mahobi Driveway, those were casspirs.
MR NTSEBEZA: Are you suggesting that you were meaning effectively to deal with thousands of people being six persons? Is that how serious you regarded what was going to happen?
COL ODENDAL: No Madam Chair, you do not understand me. I addressed the people. There were other vehicles in Mahobi Driveway and where I addressed them was about 40 or 50 metres from there, I went all by myself and addressed those people and the other vehicles were in Mahobi Driveway.
MR NTSEBEZA: No, no, I just want us to quickly you know capture the mood of the moment. There was an attack that was imminent, in your view it was going to be either by the Comrades or by the Witdoeke, but there was going to be a bloodbath, it was clear to any person, not so?
COL ODENDAL: Yes that is correct.
MR NTSEBEZA: Now and there you were, as a person who is always in the field, who has a fair sense of what those situations can be like, explosive, how many men were there which you could marshall to make sure that no bloodbath takes place? I am talking about men who were there at the time.
COL ODENDAL: There were about four or five casspirs and many army vehicles.
MR NTSEBEZA: I am talking about numbers.
COL ODENDAL: There were about 60, 70 people, policemen.
MR NTSEBEZA: And in your experience would they also have been able to contain say 3,000 people with knobkieries and whatever, and pangas? Were you satisfied that if you had to prevent, as you had been ordered by the court to do, those people marching on the attack, on the KTC persons, were you satisfied that you would have been able to contain them with 60 men and six casspirs and other elements of the SADF?
COL ODENDAL: Madam Chair I would have been able to contain them if I wanted to shoot all of them I would have shot all of them then I would have been able to contain them, but that I did not want to do.
MR NTSEBEZA: What did you have to do in order to contain them without shooting them?
COL ODENDAL: There was nothing I could do. All you could have done was to patrol the area, that we were doing. In Mahobi Driveway there were already wires put up.
MR NTSEBEZA: No, no, maybe I fail to understand this, you know I am not trained in that direction, but I have always believed that we have a police force and an army whose purpose is not to throw their hands up in the air and say we cannot do anything, people who are trained to deal with riotous situations successfully with minimum loss of life, was that not the mindset of the eighties? Was the mindset of the eighties that you could only deal with a crowd like that by killing all of them or letting them loose? Are you wanting us to conclude that that was the mindset at the time? Either kill them, if you can't kill them let them loose and let them do what they want to do.
COL ODENDAL: No definitely that is not what I am saying. An unrest situation where two conflicting parties oppose one another is something different from a march, and where the police just have to act against all the people who are marching. When you have two various fighting groups it's completely a different situation.
MR NTSEBEZA: Ja, let's begin again. What, other than killing all of them, whether it was Comrades to your right and Witdoeke to your left, what would or ought you to have done? I am not persuaded that a force such as I knew the force of the Republic of South Africa as it then was, would have been unable, willing, as it wanted to be, to deal with that situation.
For instance let me ask the question directly, did you appreciate and find the situation to be such as to call for reinforcements to be called?
COL ODENDAL: Yes it was a very tense situation, we did ask for reinforcements.
MR NTSEBEZA: At the time that you were seeing that there were Comrades, on your evidence, on this side spoiling for a fight, on that side 3,000 also on the battle march, did you radio for more reinforcements?
COL ODENDAL: Yes, reinforcements were asked for.
MR NTSEBEZA: What was the purpose?
COL ODENDAL: The purpose was to try and prevent this fight.
MR NTSEBEZA: Did you get more reinforcements?
COL ODENDAL: Yes reinforcements did arrive there.
MR NTSEBEZA: Yes. Now I understand that the distance between where the Witdoeke were gathered, and where the KTC residents' houses were is about 1.5 kilometres, more-or-less, can you confirm that?
COL ODENDAL: That is right.
MR NTSEBEZA: And in order for those thousands of people to get to where the KTC residents were there to traverse an area of 1.5 kilometres, 1,500 metres more-or-less, do you agree with that?
COL ODENDAL: Is this the area on the way to KTC or where the Witdoeke were standing? It was a big area, they were standing over an area of about one kilometre, they were not all together.
MR NTSEBEZA: So it was very clear that there was going to be a bloodbath, it must have been very clear. Now you see what is disturbing with reports, and I would like your comment here, is that you are reported to have taken no action to disperse the Witdoeke or prevent them from advancing to KTC, instead you were seen to be advancing with or escorting the advancing Witdoeke and when the people of KTC attempted to resist this attack you used gunfire and teargas to drive them off, what is your comment on that?
COL ODENDAL: That is not true. We used teargas on the Witdoeke when the occasion was right.
MR NTSEBEZA: Well I don't know when the occasion was right, because according to your evidence, you, in your armed casspirs stood by when the Witdoeke went past you into KTC and houses were burnt under your very eyes.
COL ODENDAL: That Madam Chair is not the truth, we would have not allowed it. With the overseas press and our press in our areas we would not have allowed these people to attack right in front of our eyes. We knew what would have been presented in the papers. Why would we have done that?
MR NTSEBEZA: Well the local press actually ran and I've read it in your presence here whilst you were sitting there, your local press, not only the Cape Times, a number of other media persons gave eye witness accounts of what I say was happening. So - in fact as that editorial says it's either these people who were giving these horrific accounts as to what you were doing are liars or the police haven't got a clue of what was happening there.
COL ODENDAL: No that is not correct Madam Chair. It might have appeared as if the police were not doing anything. We did a lot of things, there were many things I can show you which the police did, but I wonder of the media said that on the 9th and the 10th whether the media mentioned the Comrades who gathered near KTC and only later on they marched in the direction of Old Crossroads to attack those people, I wonder whether the media or the eye witnesses mentioned that event.
MR NTSEBEZA: Do you know John Freeth? Can he stand please. Mr Freeth can you stand up please. Have you ever seen that gentleman?
COL ODENDAL: Yes I have seen him before.
MR NTSEBEZA: Did you see him on that day? Did you see him on any of the two or three days during which this mayhem was taking place at KTC?
COL ODENDAL: Yes I think I have seen him.
MR NTSEBEZA: Shhh, shhh please, you can sit down John. Are you aware that at some stage he was arrested for rescuing people? Well I don't know what he was arrested for because at the police station he was told that you know he's free to go, but were you aware that he was there trying to get the police, preventing the police from unlawful action of the nature that I have described?
COL ODENDAL: Later on I became aware that he had been there, I read it in the papers, I heard it on the radio ...(intervention)
MR NTSEBEZA: I mean ...(intervention)
COL ODENDAL: He was taken away from this area.
MR NTSEBEZA: He was taken away from what area?
COL ODENDAL: From KTC.
MR NTSEBEZA: By the police?
COL ODENDAL: By the police, yes.
MR NTSEBEZA: Now I won't recount his entire testimony but he was quite emphatic about what was happening there. Apparently he kept a diary or a pocket book. He was able to give us, as he says he was able to give the Supreme Court in a matter that came before those courts related to these events, detailed accounts of the casspir numbers, what they did, including firing at Comrades whilst the Witdoeke were being given an opportunity thereby to attack the comrades, are you contesting the veracity of his account?
COL ODENDAL: No.
MR NTSEBEZA: He in fact says there were other people like Mr Russel Michaels who say you, and W/O Barnard used to drive around in a police van in the area and that you observed and controlled the movements of the police in the area. And what was significant was that you never came under attack from the Witdoeke.
COL ODENDAL: That is correct, the Witdoeke never attacked us. The Comrades did attack us.
MR NTSEBEZA: But what was interesting was that the Witdoeke would be standing on the side of the road heavily armed but they were never arrested by you nor by Barnard, can you tell us why this was so?
COL ODENDAL: Madam Chair to arrest people there you take a policeman away from the area and those people who were killing one another you could not contain them because then the policeman would also be removed from the area.
MR NTSEBEZA: I see. Now why do you think these people would make all these allegations about you and your unit if it wasn't true?
COL ODENDAL: I don't know why they make these allegations.
MR NTSEBEZA: Is it your attitude that what took place there was that those camps that were destroyed were destroyed as a result of a faction fight which broke out between the Comrades and the Witdoeke, would that be your own version of what happened?
COL ODENDAL: That is correct Madam Chair. I want to tell you why. Because you must take this thing as from 1985, not only '86, you should see it in context. These fights started in January 1986 when the older people went up Lansdowne Road, the passed KTC and the old people were attacked. They were necklaced, their houses were torched and the old people resisted, they rose up against the Comrades and they were tired of the atrocities and nobody blamed them for that.
MR NTSEBEZA: Now is it also your evidence, and this seems to be the general trend of your evidence which you gave in the Supreme Court in the selection that came out there, that the gathering of the Witdoeke at Crossroads on the 9th, 10th and 11th was not so much for them to be wanting to take KTC, but that they had gathered there to defend their homes against the attacks by Comrades mainly from KTC, is that what you still maintain today?
COL ODENDAL: That is correct. They were tired of the Comrades.
MR NTSEBEZA: And are you still saying, and I understand that was the main tenor, or was the tenor of your evidence when you testified in the civil action in the Supreme Court some years ago, that the police were unable to put a stop to the faction fighting because all they could do was to contain the situation as best as possible until the fighting spirit of the two factions had spent itself? They must fight until they cannot fight anymore, then till they are tired, then the police can come, say oh ja now you've had enough of fighting, thank you very much.
COL ODENDAL: No, no we prevented many fights in that area. We did a lot of patrols by feet. Big operations were executed in the satellite camps. The police did a lot to try and contain the violence.
MR NTSEBEZA: Did you do that by mainly monitoring the advancing Witdoeke and the Comrades, was that the strategy that you - monitoring the advancing Witdoeke, was that the main strategy? And when the fight between them occurred or seemed imminent you would use teargas to drive them apart so as to present loss of life, was that your strategy?
COL ODENDAL: The strategy, they were warned beforehand to go away, to disperse. We could have used teargas but those thousands of people would have dispersed all through the area and we would have had greater violence than today, and there would have been a bigger massacre. All those people were armed and they dispersed in various directions.
MR NTSEBEZA: But you seem to suggest, as I understand the tenor of your evidence, that you could not use teargas as the wind was blowing in the wrong direction?
COL ODENDAL: It could have been on that specific day, I can't remember specifically.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Dumisa. Mr Odendal first I want to express my regret that you did not pick - you missed the joke about my plea that you not call me Mr Chairman, I am sorry that you missed the joke there.
Anyway you are describing a situation which suggests that one thing, as in the Witdoeke action, was a consequence of the Comrades action, I think it is common knowledge that the UDF at the time was involved in a power struggle to win political support from its membership and there was a lot of fighting, indeed, but I am not sure that you are contextualising what you are telling us, putting it in proper context. I think that one of the things that was striking about the Witdoeke attack was the apparent, because it was still apparent at the time, the apparent support by the State, or by organs of the State, people, police officers and the State's policies that seemed at the time to be supportive of the Witdoeke.
Now you have heard evidence today by Mr Schelhase, how would you describe as the reasons of the conflicts if you were to look at them in full context?
COL ODENDAL: The conflict arose from the older people, the so-called Fathers or Witdoeke who were tired of the actions of the Comrades.
CHAIRPERSON: You see Mr Odendal one of the principles of the strategy that Mr Schelhase described to us is the para-militarisation of communities by government to create that conflict. We have seen, in this case and in other cases, that there were individuals who were activists or who were known to be MK, Umkhonto weSizwe, ANC cadres, who were planted by the security department in a number of communities in the Western Cape precisely to mobilise the young activists in the communities into action and into violent action. In other words the State had appropriated these forms of violence for itself by planting these askaris in these communities. There has been evidence led to that effect.
So when you tell us that the Witdoeke were tired of being burnt out I am not sure that this is the full picture and I am a little concerned because this was the evidence you led during the trial in those years but you still seem to be holding on to that stance in spite of what we have heard was actually happening which was something more sinister than any of us could prove at that time.
ADV LOUW: Sorry Madam, that is a very long statement could you perhaps clarify the question please.
CHAIRPERSON: It's really a puzzlement, I am just puzzled that Mr Odendal, even in the light of evidence that has been led in this hearing by Mr Schelhase and by other witnesses, by people who observed, who meticulously observed and recorded what was happening, okay they were not official people, but Mr Schelhase was very well placed as a person who knew and understood what was happening, now my puzzlement is that Mr Odendal is holding on to the testimony, to what he said during the case at the time regarding the squatter camp area. Now you seem to be holding on to that even though there has been evidence to the contrary. Now what is your comment? I mean the involvement of the State you don't seem to be recognising that at all. You are just telling us that this was simply a reaction by Witdoeke to Comrades' killings.
COL ODENDAL: That is correct. Madam Chair, and I can read from the Burger, Natal violence, there the IFP and the ANC are still fighting, that was the day before yesterday.
CHAIRPERSON: You see that is exactly the point about State involvement in violence. This is exactly the point. There has been evidence, even in Natal, that the State was involved in fomenting violence. This Commission's investigating officers have been told that the State was involved. There has been evidence, conclusive evidence that there was involvement by the State, the State using its organs to create a situation of violence to militarise the communities, and I think that that is exactly at the heart of our problem in this case. And in the case that you are mentioning, yes, they are still in conflict, but what does it mean that they are still in conflict if we do not see that in the total context of how the State got involved in the first instance.
Now we must remember the strategy that Mr Schelhase described requires precisely that there is opposition between two groups. So it is not surprising in fact that there was a conflict and violence did continue, was seen to be happening, because this fits in with the description of the strategy by Mr Schelhase. So your quoting the issue in Durban does not enlighten us in any way except to confirm, at least for me, that the strategy did work.
COL ODENDAL: Please speak a bit slower I can't follow everything.
CHAIRPERSON: That's fine, I have made my point, thank you. Dr Ramashala.
DR RAMASHALA: Mr Odendal, during the months of May, June 1986 were you frequently in the company of Barnard and Hendrik Cornelius Johannes as members of the riot squad?
COL ODENDAL: That is correct.
DR RAMASHALA: In fact you frequently, at that time, patrolled Nyanga East?
COL ODENDAL: Nyanga East, yes that is correct, KTC, Nyanga, Crossroads, I patrolled New Crossroads, I patrolled all those areas.
DR RAMASHALA: If in fact there are reports that there were killings clearly identifying Barnard, Hendrik Cornelius Johannes and a third unknown member of the riot squad, would you say that that might have been you? Remember the question I asked you before and you said yes.
There are quite a number of reports where Mr Barnard, Mr Hendrik Cornelius Johannes were clearly identified but people couldn't identify the third person, going on that logic would you say that that third person might have been you?
COL ODENDAL: It depends on where it happened, where it took place, whether we were on patrol on foot, whether it happened in a vehicle.
DR RAMASHALA: Sir my last question. Yesterday Mr Sam Ndima, who was one of the chief organisers of the Witdoeke, and in the thick of it, testified that after the 24th April 1986 meeting in Pretoria that he was promised by Barnard and Captain Loocke some assistance, assistance which included ammunition, did you know anything about that?
COL ODENDAL: No, I do not know about that.
DR RAMASHALA: Sir don't you find it rather unusual that you were always in the company of Barnard but you don't know, you never discussed, I mean you don't know about these promises - don't you find it rather unusual? I am asking you to speculate if that is possible.
COL ODENDAL: I don't find it unusual. I do not say Barnard supplied the people with ammunition or weapons but I did go home sometimes like in the evenings.
DR RAMASHALA: Thank you Sir. Do you know what a Rambo is, Rambo?
COL ODENDAL: Yes, a Rambo is the name given to us by Jan van Eck and he said Odendal and Barnard are the Rambos because in the unrest areas we had to prevent the people from causing unrest, and he accused us of causing problems. But Rambo, as understood by me, are people who want to shoot wildly, this is how I understand it. And I can tell you I was, since 1976, in the unrest areas, I have never shot a person.
DR RAMASHALA: Sir, one of the definitions of a Rambo is somebody who is trigger-happy and that is not the only person who identifies you as a Rambo. Mr Schelhase also identifies you and Barnard as Rambo. So it's not somebody who goes around patrolling and preventing, a Rambo is somebody who is trigger-happy, a killer, that is what a Rambo is.
COL ODENDAL: No, I don't agree with you. Those people did not say how many lives and properties we protected, that they do not say when they call us Rambos.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Ntsebeza.
MR NTSEBEZA: Now I think I would like to ask some of the very final questions. Now was it ever your view that if you use force against the Witdoeke, in other words in an endeavour to prevent them, that that would have driven them berserk in which case they could have attacked innocent people in the nearby hostels or passing cars?
COL ODENDAL: Yes it could be, that is correct.
MR NTSEBEZA: That was your view?
COL ODENDAL: In what context.
MR NTSEBEZA: In the context of your not having been able to prevent the violence, that seemed to be the tenor of your evidence when you were being asked as to whether you could not have done anything to prevent the violence. And it seems that one of the things you said was that if you had used force against the Witdoeke, and I am taking into account the numbers in which they were, your attitude comes out to have been that that act by yourselves would have driven them berserk and they would then have attacked innocent people in the nearby hostels.
COL ODENDAL: That is correct. I just want to say on the 18th and 19th of February 1985 the Witdoeke they had information that they would be removed, the Administration Council said they would be moved, for three days they were attacking police, they were berserk, they threw petrol bombs at us, they shot at us, they put up road blockades with tree trunks, and then the Minister said, only then when the Minister said they will not be removed anymore, then only these fights stopped.
MR NTSEBEZA: Now did you - were there any helicopters that were used in this period of three days of fighting?
COL ODENDAL: Yes helicopters were used.
MR NTSEBEZA: Did you have any communications with them on the ground? Were you in radio communication with the helicopters?
COL ODENDAL: Yes we had radio communication with the helicopters.
MR NTSEBEZA: What was their role?
COL ODENDAL: They had to determine from up there where the problems were occurring.
MR NTSEBEZA: Now I would take it that after these three days, as operational head of the riot police in that area, you would have wanted to take stock and inventory of firearms and ammunition that was used in the - did you?
COL ODENDAL: Yes that is correct. I want to explain Madam Chair. Where the police acted, where teargas was used or you used a shotgun immediately every vehicle had a person who kept records and then it was recorded how, what you used, whether you used birdshot or whatever. So we have complete records of every kind of ammunition used.
MR NTSEBEZA: Ja, now yesterday there was evidence that Mr Ndima's house was used as a place where those who were fighting on the side of the Witdoeke could go and replenish ammunition, are you aware of this? That was his own evidence yesterday.
COL ODENDAL: No, I do not know anything about that.
MR NTSEBEZA: And he gave us to understand that there was no sort of ammunition that he did not have.
COL ODENDAL: No I don't agree Mr Chairman.
MR NTSEBEZA: He testified that, again, it was Mr Barnard that had brought this ammunition to him.
COL ODENDAL: Mr Chairman I do not have any knowledge of that. I can tell you another story if you want to hear it. After Mr Johnson Ngxobongwana became mayor, two, three years afterwards he came into conflict with one of his other council members, Nongwe, and they fought and Ngxobongwana was driven out of the area and they broke down his house and he's living in Sandrift at the moment.
MR NTSEBEZA: Yes, no, no, I think that is - what I am trying to get at is, whether in your ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Excuse me please be quiet.
COL ODENDAL: The point which I want to make ...(intervention)
MR NTSEBEZA: What's your point?
COL ODENDAL: Is the people continued fighting with one another, they were always fighting and disagreeing.
MR NTSEBEZA: Ja well with respect it still doesn't have anything to do with what I have been asking. What I wanted to know is whether when you were taking an inventory of ammunition and you found that there was ammunition which was unaccounted for because it was ammunition that had been given to Ndima in the manner in which he suggests by Barnard without authority?
COL ODENDAL: No there was never such information. All the ammunition we could account, all the ammunition which was used.
MR NTSEBEZA: Madam Chair I am through with this witness.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Is there anyone who wants to ask a question? Just one question Mr Odendal. You mentioned that the Witdoeke were fighting because they were being killed, or you suggested that they were being killed and their houses had been burned, I just want to understand does that imply an understanding, on your part, and an allowing of the kind of fighting back by the Witdoeke and police? Are you trying to say you understood why they were fighting back and so you kind-of accepted that it was necessary?
COL ODENDAL: That is correct. The Comrades killed people. I saw them in KTC in broad daylight. We were riding around the roads, driving around the area and then you would see some smoke, coming there you would see a Black person who was dying, who was moaning and groaning, they've necklaced him, I saw that often. Vehicles were attacked near Old Crossroads. People were killed. That is the reason why I thought that the Witdoeke were tired of their actions.
And as I have said in KTC in January there were Witdoeke - videos are available, the old people, the Fathers from KTC became angry and they resisted their own people, Ngxobongwana in KTC, because their houses were torched, they were necklaced, they were attacked. Videos are available. Those people we warned, we talked to them. Why would allow it that these old people be attacked so that the Witdoeke could come there(?) - (The interpretation does not make sense). And if they say the police joined them do you think I would be so stupid to do that in broad daylight? I won't do that, why?
CHAIRPERSON: But in a way you were also tired of the Comrades burning of people and burning of houses, it seems to me that you were also tired.
COL ODENDAL: That is correct, I was also tired. But my job was I had to maintain law and order, there were many fights, there was lots of unrest in Crossroads. We put up blockades in roads so that private vehicles could not pass there. We did many things. These people do not mention these things, like Mr Freeth.
CHAIRPERSON: So the Witdoeke in reality were really helping the police do their work?
COL ODENDAL: No, I won't say that. The Witdoeke were not against the police. They were not hostile ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: No I am not saying they were against, I am just saying they were helping the police do their work by attacking the Comrades who were destroying their community.
COL ODENDAL: No I am not saying that, they did not assist the police. The committed an offence.
CHAIRPERSON: Were they ever tried for the offences they committed?
COL ODENDAL: Many people were arrested. Who landed in courts I do not know. Dockets were opened for the other cases.
CHAIRPERSON: I really am just wondering if perhaps the State did not, at the time, abdicate its responsibility of maintaining law and order in that area.
COL ODENDAL: No, no I don't agree Madam Chair. That morning we could have stopped them if we killed lots of people. I did not want to do that.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Dr Ramashala.
DR RAMASHALA: Sir, to ensure that your theory of Black-on-Black violence is supported you made sure that there were journalists on the casspirs to have a record of Blacks fighting Blacks.
COL ODENDAL: No, no ...(intervention)
DR RAMASHALA: There were no journalists in the casspirs?
ADV LOUW: Sorry if you could just give him an opportunity to answer the question, thank you.
DR RAMASHALA: Okay, thank you.
COL ODENDAL: Please repeat your question?
DR RAMASHALA: Were there journalists in the casspirs?
COL ODENDAL: No there were no journalists in the casspirs.
DR RAMASHALA: Sir there is evidence, there has been testimony, people who have appeared before us said that there were journalists on the casspirs.
COL ODENDAL: No, not that I can recall.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Odendal. What colour uniform did you men wear, what was the colour of their uniform?
COL ODENDAL: What did we wear then, we wore camouflaged uniforms and then field uniforms, almost looking like police uniforms.
CHAIRPERSON: What colour, blue?
COL ODENDAL: The field uniforms were blue and the camouflage uniforms were those which they wore on the border, I can't remember what we wore that day.
CHAIRPERSON: Just one question more. Mr Barnard has been described by many people, including Mr Schelhase, as brutal, in fact Mr Schelhase referred to him as a killer machine in other terms. Do you agree with that perception of Mr Barnard?
COL ODENDAL: I do not agree with that. Mr Schelhase also said he did not know Mr Barnard very well. I want to tell you Mr Barnard was a brilliant policeman. Weekends, Saturdays and Sunday evenings when there was no unrest he worked in Guguletu, in Crossroads during the night. And do you know how many stolen vehicles he retrieved? And then here in Guguletu he is regarded now as a very bad person. He was a brilliant policeman.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much Mr Odendal. This completes our questioning of yourself. We really wish to express our greatest appreciation that you took the time to come here. We also should thank Mr Brand who has sort-of been part of the hearings, furniture like ourselves. Thank you Mr Brand.
We thank you very much, and thank you Advocate Louw for assisting Mr Brand, and we hope that you will continue assisting us in unravelling some of the mysteries of our past. Thank you very much.
Ladies and Gentlemen I would ask you to be quiet. I just want to thank everyone here for coming here to listen to this testimony. We came and you were the real cause of the success of this. Your tears have an impact, the pain that people have been carrying in their hearts is the cause of pain to us as well. The things that happened in those years, people were dying, lives were lost on the side of the Witdoeke and the people who supported the Comrades.
We just want to extend a word of thanks to those who have brought statements. We are very sorry that we did not hear much about people who were killed by Comrades or families whose members were once killed, but we want to make it on record that the evidence shows that there were people killed also no the other side, on the side of the Witdoeke. There is nothing more I can say now or do except to say it's been a very enlightening hearing for us. Like before when people started looking into the whole question of what is happening in the squatter areas questions were raised 11 years ago, we continue to peel off those layers, to try and understand what happened, what exactly was at the roots of the violence in those years. We are continuing with our investigation and what this hearing has done is really to just give us that little edge forward to help us understand, in a fuller sense, what exactly was happening in those years.
It is important to state that we do not make findings at these hearings. We do not draw any conclusions. It is important to note that the importance of this hearing and what evidence has been led here enabled us to understand just a little bit more of what happened in those years and nothing is conclusive at this stage. We continue our investigations, it's really just raising more questions. We want to push this to a conclusion.
Perhaps one of the most important aspects of the hearing is the evidence that has been led by people like Mr Schelhase and people like Mr Knipe, and many of yourselves, Mr Odendal and Mr Vermeulen are just kind of telling us a little bit more of what we wanted, but the other two gentlemen I mentioned first, their evidence seems to point to what Steve Kahanovitz, at the time or actually yesterday, referred to as documents that could not be released. It is possible that the information that was in those documents is the information that has come out at this hearing. We do not know but we continue to investigate that. We are going to have a State Security hearing very soon, Council hearing very soon, and that information is certainly going to inform us in understanding the intricacies of what happened in that Council.
As is usual before we call up the choir to render a few items for us and to sing the National Anthem I just want to thank a few people who assisted us at this hearing.
I just want to thank many people whom we consulted with, people who have not come to this hearing or who have not been acknowledged necessarily through the documents and briefings that they had with our investigators. We thank them very heartily. Among these people I would like to mention Alan Feldman who is here on a Gagenhaum(?) Foundation and is investigating the possibility of a process similar to this one to be used in the peace process in Ireland, the peace process that seems to be on and off. We thank Alan very much for the many conversations that he has had with us in trying to tease out the many complications of violence in States, particularly violence that involves states.
I would like to thank also Josette Kohl(?) whose book we use very extensively in understanding some of the issues that happened then.
Among our own people who are working with us now I will start with the Interpreters, Sydney Zotwana, Mavis Nkepu, Brenda Barrow, Isabel Cillier and the organiser of the Interpreters being Chris Wegend. I would like to thank also the sound technician, Hannes Hattingh, who has been very helpful when we were facing a bit of crisis.
Perhaps the group of people who should be thanked very specially is the investigators. We have mentioned them before, Mark, Phumla and Madeleine and Lucky and Zoelpha, but most importantly Zenariah Bahrens who is the head of the investigating unit in the Western Cape region for her unflinching support of her team and for really just assisting us and carrying us all in this endeavour. Thank you so much Zenariah. Zenariah has been with the process in all these hearings and we really appreciate your great commitment to this work.
Ruth Loewin(?) who is our regional manager for maintaining the team of logistic workers and everybody who works under her to make these hearings possible. Elizabeth Gill, Matshela Ngoza, Velasi Matibane and David and Freddy and Auntie Ginny, the lady we call Auntie Ginny in the office, we thank you very much Auntie Ginny for filling our stomachs.
Now Gayle Moosman is a person who many of us don't see in public because she works behind the scenes and pushes the statements, not only the statements but pushes also, drives also the findings, the pre-findings process. We thank you Gayle Moosman wherever you are.
Tembakazi who was here as the person who takes and sends messages for us, we thank you very much Tembakazi for your assistance.
I think many of you have seen at the many hearings that whenever witnesses come up they come with someone accompanying them. We wish to thank Paul who is sitting right in front here very much for your assistance as one of the briefers in this case, we thank you very much for your gentleness, not only for the witnesses but for us as well working in the Committee. And I will say the same for George Molebatsi whom I don't see who has been working with you as well. Thank you very much, we appreciate your commitment.
Now Faisa Brown, Faisa who puts together all these documents, thank you very much Faisa for helping us in all these hearings, we really appreciate your keeping us up to date and making sure that we have all the documents that we need.
I was asked by Matshela to announce that the mural that was being painted at the Masinedgane(?) Clinic is now complete. We would like anyone who has an opportunity to go and see it, obviously in the light of day, we would like to encourage you to go to the Clinic to see it. As for ourselves we are planning to go and see the mural as people from the Commission when we do our follow-up work that Paul Hobbs and George are going to organise.
I would like to now thank the choir for braving the night and coming to shake us up a bit. The Dalingebo Adult Choir you are now allowed to clap.
CHOIR SINGS
HEARING ADJOURNS
