CAPT HECHTER: ... Kwandebele at the time and that happened by burning down of houses and schools, consumer boycotts, school boycotts, strikes and large scale intimidation and violence and also several murders. I assumed that Brig Cronje received an instruction that Piet Ntuli, we had to get rid of him since the aims of the ANC to destabilise Kwandebele were being promoted. A certain Jaap van Jaarsveld said to me that Brig Cronje received the instruction from head office. I received the instruction from Brig Cronje personally. He contacted me and said to me this is the instruction which was received and this is the instruction which must be executed. Capt Van Jaarsveld and I discussed this incident long after it took place and we spoke about this after the Brigadier was called to head office and thereafter the Brigadier said to me that we should make preparations for the elimination of this person. The information at that stage, which we had, was obtained from various informants who worked for the security police and this information was that Piet was involved in various strikes and incitements and arson attempts and grievous assaults, thefts and illegal possession of firearms and also the consumer boycotts and that was why it was necessary in order for stability in the region and in order to combat the ANC's plan to destabilise the region, to get rid of Piet
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Ntuli. And at that time there were talks for the independence of Kwandebele. And hence this unrest in Kwandebele, they would never have been able to obtain their independence. According to Brig Cronje in Piet's case it was repeatedly discussed at central information level which constituted the commissioner of police back then, the head of the South African Defence Force, the head of the security branch in that area, military intelligence and national intelligence who operated in the area at the time. Other security information which was available was discussed there and all the incidents were discussed and solutions and actions were then discussed in these meetings. I heard that decisions that were taken there were referred back to the security branch where the final decision was taken, the Council. And it was probable that the decision to eliminate Ntuli was taken there. Brig Daantjie van Wyk at that stage was the head of the special investigative unit into the riots that were taking place in Kwandebele at the time and then Sergeant Gouws and Warrant Officer Oosthuizen were working under him. They were seconded by the murder and robbery unit in Pretoria. I beg your pardon, just to give a bit more clarity, Brig Van Wyk's investigative unit was especially established in order to combat all acts of terrorism, murders, all acts - illegal acts which were taking place in Kwandebele they were to investigate because the local police had such a large volume of work the local police were used to combat the riots. They could not do actual policing duties by investigating these crimes and hence at that stage they were involved in the investigation of all crime, whether it was committed by the comrades or Piet Ntuli and Mbokoto. All crime was investigated by them. MOUTSE HEARING TRC/MPUMALANGA
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After I received instruction from Brig Cronje about the elimination of Piet Ntuli we decided upon a method of eliminating him. I contacted Joe Verster from the special force of the Defence Force and they designed a special bomb for me. This bomb inter alia was to be designed in such a way that it could be mounted under Piet Ntuli's vehicle. At that stage I had already worked with the special task force and had participated in some of their activities and these operations were probably an instruction from head office and Brig Cronje informed me that we received an instruction from head office to work with the special task force. On this specific day, I think it was the 29th July 1986, Brig Cronje and Capt Van Jaarsveld and myself went per combi of the security branch to Siyabuswa that morning. We hung around all day monitoring the situation and I had been to Kwandebele on a previous occasion and I knew where Piet was living and watching where the chief ministers were and getting information from our informants and from the police of which vehicle he drove and whether he was a fast driver or not, whether he was a slow driver. I investigated his background, not his past background but his actions, his daily routine. That night there was a meeting at the Chief Minister's house in the complex in Siyabuswa where they were residing. That same day, a bit later in the afternoon, the brigadier and Capt Chris Kendal who was the station commander at Bronkhorstspruit at the time of the security branch, went to the Chief Minister's house. Brig Cronje informed him that he wanted to meet the minister. We went into the complex in his car and we stopped there. I remained in the vehicle, seated in the vehicle with the bomb and the others got out. Piet Ntuli's car was in front of
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the front door, opposite the street. Brigadier went to stand by the car, Chris Kendal went into the meeting to inform the minister that the brigadier would like to meet him. When he had entered the house I got out of the vehicle and there were also two security guards on the other side and I got under Piet Ntuli's vehicle and I would only have been able to mount it at night so that it would have remained - this bomb was designed in such a way that it would have remained stuck onto the vehicle without falling off in any way despite any driving conditions. While lying under the vehicle mounting the bomb I saw a pair of feet coming out of the minister's house towards Piet Ntuli's vehicle. Brigadier spoke to these men and I later established that it was the Kwandebele police and they just greeted and then they walked away. After I had mounted the bomb I went back to Capt Kendal's vehicle and the brigadier remained standing at Piet Ntuli's vehicle. Earlier that day we also had Warrant Officer Oosthuizen and another person who we had loaded, Gouws and Oosthuizen we loaded into the vehicle and I handed them two remote control devices because they wanted to detonate the bomb that was to kill Piet Ntuli. In order to combat the possibility of a misfire we had two remote control devices which were provided with the bomb. These remote control devices were designed in such a way that the bomb would be detonated in a remote area where there weren't any houses around. The bomb was to detonate in such an area. After I had removed the safety pin from the bomb under the vehicle the bomb was to be activated within 30 minutes thereof. It was to detonate within 30 seconds. After the button had been pressed we drove out to Gouws and Oosthuizen's base about 4 kilometres outside
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Siyabuswa, I think it was some camp along the way. We just got to this place when a report was received on the police radio that the bomb had exploded. We went back to the scene of the explosion where we found the commissioner of the Kwandebele police at that stage, I think it was a Brig Van Niekerk. We found him at the scene as well with a whole lot of other policemen. Brig van Wyk was also at the scene already and they had put up lights. The whole scene had been lit up by that time. We hung around there for a while and then got back into our vehicles and went back home. Thereafter we heard that Gen Schutte the chief of the South African Police investigative unit had received personal instructions to investigate the incident. He instructed Col Neethling, who was the head of the forensic division of the South African Police to get involved in this case. I was never questioned by anyone in connection with this incident although I had to submit a report of what I was doing there. At that stage it was said by head office that where a senior officer visited any black area where there were riots he had to be accompanied by a junior member, firstly as a driver and secondly as protection. I then submitted such a report. So far that is what happened on the night of the 29th July. MR MALAN: Thank you very much, Captain. I was wondering if we could then just also listen to the brigadier and then we could look at your evidence jointly.
BRIG CRONJE: May I proceed? Mbokoto was a cultural group of which Piet Ntuli was the leader at the time. The ANC attempted to destabilise Kwandebele. It took place via burning of houses, schools, boycotts and school boycotts. At that stage I received an instruction that I should eliminate Piet Ntuli. Piet Ntuli had to be eliminated since
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there were attempts to destabilise Kwandebele and thus further the aims of the ANC. TREVITS is an acronym for the Anti Revolutionary Information Target Centre. It was a secret section which was seated at the security head office and identified potential targets. The information which we had available was that Ntuli was involved in several arson attempts, murders, assaults, intimidations, illegal possession of firearms and also consumer boycotts. It was thus necessary in order for the sake of stability in the region and also to combat the plan of the ANC to destabilise the region, to eliminate Ntuli. It was necessary to stabilise the region because if there was no peace in the region independence would never become a reality in the area and the government had to do this at all costs. Piet Ntuli's incident was discussed several times at the Joint Information Centre, which consisted of the regional commissioner of South African Police, the chief of the South African Defence Force, the head of the Intelligence Force, Military Intelligence and National Intelligence. All security information which was available was discussed there. All incidents were discussed and solutions and actions were decided upon. The decisions taken were referred back to the committee which would then take the final decision. It was thus possible decision that the decision to eliminate Piet Ntuli was taken there and also the decision that TREVITS should be established. Several recommendations that Piet Ntuli should be detained were submitted to head office by myself personally. Thereafter it was submitted to Minister Heunis who refused several times that we should detain Piet Ntuli. This was before the instruction was issued to eliminate Ntuli. At that stage
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Ntuli was earmarked for the next chief minister in place of Sam Nkosana who was very ill at that stage. Brig Daantjie van Wyk was chief of the special investigative unit into riots in Kwandebele at that stage in 1986 and Sergeant Gouws and Warrant Officer Oosthuizen were working under him. After receiving the instructions a specially designed bomb was obtained from Joe Verster of the special task force of the Defence Force and the special task force was the leader of the special security branch and the plan was that it should be attached to the Toyota Cressida which Piet Ntuli drove. We worked with the special task force in terms of a special instruction previously received from Brig Schoon to obtain general background information. Myself, Capt Hechter and Capt Jaap van Jaarsveld went to Kwandebele with the bomb in a kombi. Later that afternoon Capt Chris Kendal who was the branch commander at Bronkhorstspruit joined us. Warrant Officer Oosthuizen and Captain Deon Gouws who worked at the murder and robbery unit of the South African Police had to investigate what was going on at Kwandebele and he worked with Brig Daantjie van Wyk. We met Oosthuizen and Gouws at Siyabuswa. We waited all day to see if we would get the opportunity to mount the bomb on Piet Ntuli's vehicle. There was a meeting at the Chief Minister's house, which was at the complex where the ministerial houses were. There was a field opposite the complex from where we watched the complex. When it was dark myself, Hechter and Captain Kendal went in Captain Kendal's vehicle and we entered the complex. I sent Kendal to the Chief Minister to say that I would like to meet the Chief Minister. While Kendal was in the Chief Minister's house Hechter got under Ntuli's Cressida and mounted the bomb. At that stage the Minister
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of Police came out of the Chief Minister's house. I went nearer to him and greeted him and he had a short conversation with me. After the bomb had been planted under Ntuli's vehicle we went back to Kendal's car. It was agreed that Oosthuizen and Gouws would handle the two remote control devices. The remote control devices were designed in such a way that the bomb would be detonated in a remote area through which Ntuli normally rode. There was also a delaying mechanism designed in it so that innocent people should not be killed if the bomb was activated 30 seconds thereafter. The intention was for the bomb to explode in a remote area. After the bomb had exploded we went to Gouws and Oosthuizen's base approximately 4 kilometres from Siyabuswa. When we got to the base the report came on the police radio about the explosion and we went back to the scene of the explosion. The commissioner of police at Kwandebele, Brig Van Niekerk also turned up there. General Schutte, the head of the investigative unit, received an instruction to investigate. They did not question me. I merely submitted a report. The special task force was to conduct the operation jointly with us because the bomb was designed by them and that is how they were involved in the whole operation. Mbokoto operated in the exact same way as the ANC in attempting to destabilise the region in exactly the same way as the ANC. This took place by burning down houses, schools and school boycotts and consumer boycotts. Mbokoto and the ANC had the exact same aims, which was political unrest and so forth. Information was received that Piet Ntuli and Mbokoto's actions were aimed at making Kwandebele unruly so that it could be ineffective as a self ruling state. Hence Mbokoto and Piet Ntuli had the exact
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same aims as the ANC in destabilising Kwandebele. Hence peace would never be a reality in this region. Piet Ntuli's behaviour, together with Mbokoto against the government at that stage advantaged the ANC in the destabilising process. The government of Kwandebele at that stage was permitted by the South African government. Piet Ntuli was originally placed there by the government to become the next Chief Minister. However, he went out of control and it was clear that the government could not detain him in terms of the Act because he would have had a bad influence on the other members of the government and hence Piet Ntuli became a poison ivy for the South African government and the only way out was to get rid of him.
CAPT HECHTER: I would like to rectify. I received a note that Gouws and Oosthuizen were not yet affiliated to murder and robbery in Pretoria at the time. They were at other stations and they were only deployed there after their duties here.
BRIG CRONJE: At that stage the South African government wanted to grant independence to all black states at all cost. They wanted Kwandebele to accept independence but Kwandebele could not obtain independence while these unrests continued and also the Kwandebele government at the time wanted to accept this independence although a large majority of the population here in Kwandebele were opposed to the idea of the independence of Kwandebele. Mbokoto's leader, Ntuli, was initially for the idea of independence or they pretended that they were for the government and for the idea of independence but in the year 1984/85/86 there was a large scale of violence and unrest where people were necklaced here in Kwandebele. I know earlier in 1986 Piet Ntuli and
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his Mbokoto were responsible for the arson on 50 to 60 houses were several people, and I speak under correction, I think about 30 people were killed and I know inter alia about a Mrs Mgede whose two children were burnt to death there. Piet Ntuli, according to eye-witness accounts, threw the children back into these burning houses. So at that stage Piet Ntuli assured the destabilisation of this area. To us as security police it appeared as though Piet Ntuli was using Mbokoto to destabilise this whole region instead of stabilising the reason, as was originally intended. Consequently they had the same vision, the same destabilising tactics as the UDF and the ANC, who also had a strong presence in this area. At that stage it was clear that Piet was working against the South African government by these destabilising tactics. Since it would have been such an embarrassment to the government since Piet Ntuli was their man so to speak, the instruction was then forwarded to us that we should eliminate him. The assumption which we made at this stage was that as long as Piet Ntuli was there no independence from the Republic of South Africa would be obtained, the government didn't want that, and the elimination of Piet Ntuli would then be to promote their aims. After the incident there were reports in several newspapers by mainly our South African newspapers and also Shashaba, which was the ANC newspaper, where the ANC said that they were responsible for Piet Ntuli's elimination and those documents had already been submitted while we were giving evidence before the amnesty committee in Johannesburg where it was clear in the Shashaba that the ANC claimed to have eliminated Ntuli. At that stage it was a political advantage to them in the eyes of the people of Kwandebele
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and it suited us as well because it portrayed us as being innocent. It would have been difficult for anyone who was investigating the matter to look at us as the perpetrators because then it was clear that the ANC was responsible.
MR MALAN: Is there anything else that you would like to add?
BRIG CRONJE: Chairperson I would like to mention that the two persons James Mahlangu and Cornelius tried their best on the other side to bring about peace in the area. They did everything in their power to get the children back to school and then Piet tried to get them out of school. So these two persons tried their best to bring about stability in the region. Thank you.
MR MALAN: Thank you very much. We would like to put a few questions to you. At least I would like to ask a few questions for the sake of clarity and then I will hand back to the chairperson who will give my colleagues the opportunity to ask a few questions. I would like to make it very clear that the aim is not to cross-examine the subject matter of this so we are not going to go into detail on that but it is important for the bigger picture to get information on for example the instructive lines here. Exactly what was the position, what reports were there from the region to you, where was information coordinated and to whom were reports submitted from you. Who did you report to? That is the first question. The second question to go with that is that would you like to give us a bit more information on the functions of the uniform branch and then let's also say the security branch in the area, possibly the relationship between the two as well.
BRIG CRONJE: The commanding line firstly, Kwandebele had
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its own commissioner, Brig Van Niekerk, with his own uniform and investigative members here. As far as security was concerned I was overseer of Pretoria in the region of the Northern Transvaal. The unit in the Northern Transvaal included this region. There was also a security branch here in Siyabuswa and one in Bronkhorstspruit who were to serve this area jointly. So all the security information was obtained by these two units and forwarded to me and I in turn submitted it to the central control centre and then of course to my head office and then Brig Van Niekerk, who was the commissioner here, was also informed of circumstances. MR MALAN: Who informed him?
BRIG CRONJE: He obtained his information from head office. I also liaised with him personally.
MR MALAN: Was it the same process followed after Commissioner Lerm took over here?
BRIG CRONJE: ... as I said in my evidence that when we tried to chop off the head Mbokoto was useless as such but Lerm of course came here and made all of Mbokoto special constables so they could proceed with their activities legally under the flag of the police. So the area suffered the same under Mbokoto, under the command of Lerm.
MR MALAN: You say he made them special constables. Was it his choice, do you have first hand information?
BRIG CRONJE: It was his choice and as far as I know his recommendation to head office. He also reported to head office police headquarters in Pretoria.
MR MALAN: Did he report to another channel?
BRIG CRONJE: Are we talking about Lerm? No, he did not report to me. The situation deteriorated so much so between myself and Lerm, Lerm did not want to co-operate with us.
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Lerm went so far as that sometimes he would take my members from Bronkhorstspruit and detain them here because they came onto his territory without permission so the relations between Lerm and myself and his staff and my staff deteriorated.
MR MALAN: So are you saying that Lerm did not accept the role in principle which he saw as uniform branch's responsibility?
BRIG CRONJE: At that stage Lerm was also but, if I could use the word, a stooge. He was sent here under the pretence that he was coming to stabilise the region which he could never do and which he never did get right.
MR MALAN: You are confusing me because you say he was a stooge because he was sent here to stabilise the region but you say that was your aim as well.
BRIG CRONJE: If I could just express it otherwise. He was sent here to come and stabilise the region but I think he also got out of hand and at a later stage started working for his own benefit.
MR MALAN: Are you saying he was working for his own benefit?
BRIG CRONJE: For example he would order Mercedes Benz and was driving subsidised vehicles and I don't think that was done in Pretoria. According to me he became a second Piet Ntuli but for different reasons. As I say I think he was working for his own gain.
MR MALAN: You say what he kept himself occupied with destabilised more than stabilised. Do you want to make any specific mention of his activities or don't you want to do that now?
BRIG CRONJE: No, I would rather not say anything now.
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MR MALAN: Certainly. Possibly we will come back to you about that. Something else which surprises me is that the two opinions are used in the same concept. You are talking about peace and stability for independence and it does not sound as if you are speaking about peace and stability and order for the sake of peace and stability and order. It is as if it just does not fit into the concept of security. It is like it fits into a political context because surely the role of a security branch is to combat crime and to prosecute criminals. Are you talking about the ordinary police service there? But both you and Capt Hechter emphasised peace and stability for the sake of independence. You create the impression that without that there could not be any independence. Would you like to elaborate on that?
BRIG CRONJE: The uniform branch of the South African Police was here to ensure order. The security branch was merely here to play a political role. I do not know if that answers your question.
MR MALAN: That clarifies things a bit but what still makes it a bit complicated for me is that - but I don't want to comment on that.
BRIG CRONJE: Mr Chairperson perhaps I can help a bit here. In the evidence it came out that General Van der Merwe was also the commissioner of police and also head of security police. The difference was you have to differentiate between the uniform branch who would do normal policing duties and the security police. Now the security police were the political police. They were specifically appointed to further the aims of the government of the day and as General Van der Merwe gave evidence at the amnesty if the security police were not there the National Party government
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of that day could not have remained in power for a day longer. The role of the security police differed from the uniform police. The uniform police were the normal police and the security police were the political side who had to further political objectives. That is why today there is no longer that differentiation between the two.
MR MALAN: I understand that. My perception was in a different direction. According to what was said in the amnesty application - can I just ask you, you say the government wanted them to be independent. The government decided to eliminate Ntuli. The government wanted this and the government wanted that. Could you just describe that government.
BRIG CRONJE: The National Party who was in power at the time.
MR MALAN: I am talking about the decisions. I am not talking about the need for independence. The decision to eliminate Piet Ntuli, was it the government's decision, it was a decision which you accredited to the government. How was the government involved in that, was it in the cabinet, in the caucus, in parliament?
BRIG CRONJE: I would like to read something to you. I spoke about TREVITS. It was a secret organisation called TREVITS, the Anti-Revolutionary Target Centre, which was established in 1985 firstly to identify targets in neighbouring states and also ANC targets which later expanded to targets inland. And it is possible that this instruction came from TREVITS that TREVITS collected information from all different regions in connection with various targets. Meetings were held once a month where information from all sectors such as military intelligence,
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national intelligence, security branch of the South African Police and the South African Defence Force special task forces would identify targets. At that stage the Vlakplaas Unit C2 was the interrogative unit and the C2 was TREVITS. Each region had its own target identifying unit and the regions were West Transvaal, Northern Transvaal, the Far North, Northern Cape and Eastern Transvaal. Colonel Tom Louw was initially in charge of TREVITS as the coordinator of information. The Executive Chief General Buchner led them in 1978 and thereafter Beukes and then Brig Victor. The targets were identified at TREVITS. The representatives of military intelligence and the other units were there and they also had a permanent sitting there at the time. In each region records were kept of who the activists were, who emanated from which regions and who were the trouble-makers in such regions. Tom Louw did the logistics of the whole thing and information was used to identify targets. It was a secret component which was available only to people who worked with terrorists. There was also a priority list which was kept which had to be kept updated by them, a priority list of targets. The Council, according to me, had to have information about the existence of TREVITS because no such secret organisation could have been established without them knowing about it.
MR MALAN: So if you say TREVITS took the decisions, TREVITS obtained the information, they made the decisions and them implemented them.
BRIG CRONJE: They gave the information to the State Security Council at the time.
MR MALAN: Did the State Security Council function with them?
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BRIG CRONJE: They had to authorise it.
MR MALAN: Is it a council or a secretariat of the State Security?
BRIG CRONJE: I do not know.
MR MALAN: One more thing and then I will provisionally hand back to the Chairperson. Later, after Piet Ntuli's death when Lerm and De Jager, they are both going to come and give evidence tomorrow, did you have contact with De Jager?
BRIG CRONJE: Yes, De Jager had to deal with the detention documents of persons who Lerm decided to detain in terms of the Detention Act. He had to put together those documents and forward them to my office but it was done so seldom. We had a lot of problems with him to get those documents. Lerm would just decide that he would detain them and sometimes the princes were also detained by Lerm and thereafter they would be released.
MR MALAN: If I say to you that Lerm gave evidence to us, I am going to avail information which is probably not key information but that he did give evidence in terms of section 29 and brought us documentary proof that he received an instruction to detain people and that some of them refused and sometimes De Jager would tell them to investigate. Would it surprise you? In other words the information received from him was that he received these instructions to detain and also investigate and that a lot of them did not want to execute the instructions.
BRIG CRONJE: I do not know about that but what I can say to you is that if De Jager did investigate he did a very bad investigation.
MR MALAN: So there were very few detentions.
BRIG CRONJE: No, there were many detentions without any
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documentation.
MR MALAN: Yes, that is also information which we have. But those detentions were not authorised by Lerm, they were authorised elsewhere.
BRIG CRONJE: Lerm had to make the recommendation but head office would authorise the decisions at Lerm's recommendations.
MR MALAN: Do you have any such documentation?
BRIG CRONJE: No, I do not have any records but I believe that a lot of documents were destroyed.
MR MALAN: Do you want to say anything about the relationship between Lerm and De Jager? Did De Jager report to you?
BRIG CRONJE: No, De Jager submitted his documentation and reports to Colonel Loots who was my officer at the time who dealt with the detention documentation and processed such documentation.
MR MALAN: But he played the role of security police at the time in the region or did he play the role of uniform police?
BRIG CRONJE: I think he was with the investigative unit.
MR MALAN: Mr Chairperson I would like to say Colonel Loots is present here today. If there are any questions which you would like to put to him perhaps we can just clear it up with him hereafter. Thank you very much.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Wynand. Wynand has been playing this primary role simply because he is our legal man on the bench. He understands when we could be encroaching into matters that are purely of amnesty committee and those of the HRV. Thank you, Wynand.
COMMISSIONER: Brigadier, I am a bit confused about the
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politics that you have referred to. You say that security
police was the political arm of the National Party. That is what you alleged. What I am finding difficult, however, to understand is the following. If Piet Ntuli was for independence and that was the policy of the National Party and he would then have been eliminated who was left to carry forward this policy of independence?
MR ?: My apology for saying that, it is an unfair question. I will put questions with regard to policy. He was just a commander, a security commander you are asking questions in relation to the political policy with regard to Piet Ntuli and how he has perceived it. He cannot now give comments on what you have asked him because he would not be able to give first hand information. That will go on hearsay information. You are talking about a political power base that carried out the implementational policy of a certain government. It doesn't reflect on who gave the command to kill Piet Ntuli. I think we will have to wait for that at a later stage.
COMMISSIONER: Look, with respect, as security police you did make recommendations and in your opening comments you actually spoke about your understanding of the political situation. Now I mean the question is really to help us to try and understand what was happening politically. It is not a question that has got any legal implications at all. It is a question simply to try and get some perspective because that is what we are trying to get in this event here and to understand perspective and motive and context. Now if the recommendation was that Piet Ntuli was - that there was political destabilisation, the he was actually doing the work of the ANC with him removed how was the Nationalist
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Party going to pursue this issue of independence. If the
brigadier can't answer that question that is fine. But I don't think that it is in any way an unfair question.
BRIG CRONJE: No, I cannot quite explain how they were going to do that. I cannot answer that.
COMMISSIONER: Just to pursue another matter. You mentioned Kendal. Chris Kendal who was responsible for the security police in Bronkhorstspruit. Now are you aware of the fact that Chris Kendal actually at one point conducted his own survey in the area in which he found that people in Kwandebele were not supportive of independence and that Chris Kendal was actually making recommendations that this whole issue of independence should be dropped?
BRIG CRONJE: I am aware of such allegations.
COMMISSIONER: It is so much more confusing, the political situation, to understand what you are saying about the political situation, that the policy was independence, yet here is a security policeman saying that we must abandon independence because the people don't support it. Now again if you can't answer that question that is fine but I think that it is important for us to try and understand these conflicting signals at the time.
MR : Mr Chairman if I may try and help you there because it is not that I am giving evidence, it is what I have heard in front of the - and what testimony has been given in front of the amnesty committee was specifically that to enable the government to proceed with the independence of Kwandebele at the time stabilisation must have been achieved but the problem was that because there was no stabilisation all the people, and that was the theory and the whole ideology behind it, because there was destabilisation people or a
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person like Piet Ntuli and the Mbokoto busy in the area destabilising and actually working against what the security police and the government at that stage wanted because it was easier for them to turn the population's minds to independence if there was stabilisation. So if a report from Kendal was coming forward it was maybe in respect of the mindset of the people at the time and it was important then maybe after that report because my clients can't remember, then the decision was maybe taken to eliminate Piet Ntuli. We are not specific on that because they can't remember that so when he came back and said well there was no way, and that is what their testimony was in front of the amnesty committee, there was no way or means that they were going to turn the people and the population of Kwandebele towards independence without stabilisation and peace in the process and maybe it was after this report from Kendal that the decision was made upstairs to eliminate Piet Ntuli. Sorry, again I say I am not giving evidence but I would like to clarify it because I have heard a lot of the evidence in front of the amnesty committee.
COMMISSIONER: That is helpful and just again as I say this is just to assist us because the issue is very confusing as you can appreciate. Because then what seems to happen, just to go through the sequence of events then, Piet Ntuli is assassinated, eliminated on the 29th July 1986. What then seems to happen is that as you say instead of Mbokoto being utilised that Mbokoto is given a new lease of life in the form of the kitskonstabels because what seems to happen then is that the people at the time like the then commissioner of the police Chris van Niekerk, also the commissioner general, Gerrie van der Merwe, they were then removed - and these
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were the people who were actually saying that this issue of independence is the issue that is causing all the unrest. They are then removed and people like Hertzog Lerm and others come in and the whole issue of independence and the whole issue of destabilisation again recurs. Now I am not necessarily asking you to comment on it if you can't but you can understand the confusion then that where are these orders and these instructions coming from? You say that this is going to the State Security Councils, it is going to government, and yet there is conflicting signals that the State Security Council says eliminate Piet Ntuli but then it seems as if the very same people with a position of influence able to put other people again, who you say are second Piet Ntuli's. So that is really to indicate to you some of the confusion that we have about the situation.
MR ?: Again Mr Chairman I think Brig Cronje testified to that that Hertzog Lerm was predominantly sent here to try and destabilise the whole area but in the end it again, in Brig Cronje's words, he turned out to be a second Piet Ntuli. And what happened after that we are not certain. That was the time when they retired from the police force.
MS SEROKE: I am a bit confused here, Mr Chairman, that since we have been here listening to all the statements we have heard witness after witness say that Mbokoto was set up in this region to fight against the forces who were not in favour of independence. And which independence the government also wanted here in this region. Now if Mbokoto now is seen now as a destabilising unit like ANC was considered were there no other ways of encouraging them to stop destabilising instead of eliminating the leader of Mbokoto?
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BRIG CRONJE: I did say that if we eliminate Piet Ntuli and chop off the head of the snake then the rest of the body would not function. That is in fact what happened until another stage, until Lerm came here.
CHAIRPERSON: For the purposes of reconciliation I would personally seek your own personal opinions, getting away from all those layers of commands and what not. Perhaps I am putting the same question that was put by Joyce here, that where you have Mbokoto destabilising, ANC destabilising and then you have those two chiefs that you relied on and I suspect that they too were not in favour of independence, just how did you see stabilisation coming into place in Kwandebele at that time or even if it might not be specifically at that time I would say in future.
MR ?: Again I think what they testified was what Capt Hechter said - sorry that I am again repeating but I think it is going to be easier to clarify matters - he testified initially the Mbokoto was there to work towards independence. That as a cultural group to work under the population to turn their heads but then with Piet Ntuli as a head, as Brig Cronje said, as the head of the snake, they started working for their own reasons, for their own objectives. So at the time it was necessary, and again to stabilise the area and maybe we don't know again what the whole tactics of the politicians at the time was because they can't testify about that, that would be hearsay or what they think, if they at that stage could eliminate Mbokoto who was actually working against it, remember now it was a political problem for the whole government. They couldn't arrest Ntuli. If they arrested Piet Ntuli, all the members of the Mbokoto what would the cabinet of the Kwandebele MOUTSE HEARING TRC/MPUMALANGA
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government, who were supposed to support the National Party government and independence, what would they say at that stage. So the only option left was to eliminate Piet Ntuli because they knew that Piet Ntuli was - well there was a possibility that maybe the ANC was going to claim because all the population, and they testified to that again in front of the amnesty committee, was against Piet Ntuli at the time. So with Piet Ntuli out of it the Mbokoto couldn't have worked - well for the purposes of Piet Ntuli and maybe that is when - and they are speculating about it - when Hertzog Lerm came in he was supposed to take control of Mbokoto and stabilise the area with the Mbokoto. Now whether that happened or not they can't testify about that specifically. They were operators of the security branch of the Northern Transvaal at that stage.
CHAIRPERSON: You see what I want to say is that I think we are all saying that all things went haywire during that time and almost everybody you know either lost control or what. But now I am saying having experienced that kind of a thing by way of talking reconciliation. How would you see stability and peace having to be brought in a situation that was one raped of that peace and stability?
MR ?: If I understand you correctly it is for purposes of this now.
CHAIRPERSON: Precisely. I mean here ...
MR ?: Now today.
CHAIRPERSON: Now today.
MR ?: Not then. Now. How they feel about it today.
CHAIRPERSON: For your information this is what we have been getting even from the people who were testifying before. How do we see our way forward by way of reconciliation.
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MR ?: Okay, I can hand it maybe to Capt Hechter first and say how he sees this - are you talking - he doesn't quite understand the question he says to me but I can hand to him to say that what he feels about the whole process of the Truth Commission. Is that basically what you are saying?
CHAIRPERSON: Okay.
MR ?: And we have given that evidence again in front of the amnesty committee when we started an opening statement was read on the way we feel about the reconciliation. Maybe I must give him the statement again about the reconciliation that we have drafted in our amnesty application and he can read it to you and we can take it from there.
CAPT HECHTER: At that stage I believed in what I was doing in the interests of the Republic of South Africa, its people, my religious service and my religious convictions. Today I am uncertain about where I stand how I ended up in this position that I am currently finding myself in. It is unfortunate and I am sorry about the loss of relatives of the victims who suffered back then and I hope that this will lead to a greater understanding, reconciliation and also the reconciliation of all the people of South Africa. It is, however, not for me to decide what is right or wrong but as a fully committed citizen of the new South Africa I am committed to the truth of the past surfacing and that is on the side of the government of the day and also the freedom fighters, we have to talk about what happened in the past, how it happened and why it happened to try and prevent a possibility of this recurring in the future.
CHAIRPERSON: It goes next to what we would want to understand but perhaps in view of time constraints I would not pursue the question.
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MR MALAN: Chairperson since I had the opportunity of talking to them beforehand to arrange the process and procedure here I would just like also the opportunity to thank them for having come here. It is still a long way for the brigadier and his colleagues but we appreciate the time that you have taken off to share with us what happened here. BRIG CRONJE: We thank you Mr Chairperson. Thank you Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
