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Special HearingsType Mandela United Football Club Hearings Starting Date 28 January 1998 Location Johannesburg Day 1 Names A. KRITZINGER Back To Top Click on the links below to view results for: +coetzee +mpa Line 65Line 503Line 506Line 622Line 623Line 624Line 627Line 628Line 629Line 646Line 647Line 649Line 651Line 653Line 655Line 657Line 659Line 661Line 663Line 666Line 668Line 670Line 672Line 674Line 676Line 678Line 680Line 683Line 685Line 687Line 689Line 691Line 693Line 695Line 697Line 699Line 701Line 705Line 707Line 709Line 711Line 713Line 715Line 720Line 723Line 726Line 728Line 731Line 733Line 734Line 736Line 738Line 740Line 743Line 745Line 747Line 749Line 751Line 753Line 755Line 757Line 759Line 761Line 763Line 765Line 767Line 769Line 771Line 773Line 775Line 778Line 781Line 783Line 787Line 789Line 791Line 793Line 796Line 797Line 801Line 803Line 806Line 816Line 822Line 823Line 824Line 825Line 829Line 830Line 869Line 881Line 889Line 890Line 981Line 992Line 1020Line 1024Line 1025Line 1045Line 1092 CHAIRPERSON: ....hearing is that before the Commission can make any findings it has to try and get as much information as possible and get the views of everybody concerned before that time. We will be hearing a number of witnesses today and tomorrow. It will be a very full programme. I will be very grateful for the cooperation of the witnesses, of the legal representatives and those who are attending the hearing so that we can work expeditiously. I want to remind you that this is not a court of law, nevertheless the same standards of decorum and dignity which are normally observed in a court of law we expect to be observed here. We will do everything we can to give everyone a fair hearing and at the end of the two days we will re-examine our findings in the light of the hearing which started last year before drawing our own conclusions which will be made available in our report to President Mandela, at the end of the work of the Commission. I would like to introduce the panel to you. On my far left is Dr Xhoso Mgojo who is the convenor now of the Kwa-Zulu Natal district or province where one of our offices is based. He is also a member of the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee and he is a Commissioner. Immediately on left is Yasmin Sooka who is a Commissioner, who is Deputy Chairperson of the Human Rights Violations Committee and is based in Johannesburg. On my far right is Dr Fazel Randera who is the convenor and in charge of the Johannesburg office of the TRC. He is a Commissioner, and is obviously based in Johannesburg. Next to him is Miss Hlengiwe Mkhize who is Chairperson of the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee, a Commissioner and is based in Johannesburg. Immediately next to me is Dumisa Ntsebeza, a Commissioner based in Cape Town but also head of our Investigative Unit. My name is Alec Boraine. I am the Deputy Chairperson of the Commission and it is my job to ensure that these hearings are conducted fairly and efficiently. I would like to extend a very special welcome to legal representatives and for the record I would be grateful if you could indicate, starting on my right, as to who you are representing and then we will proceed. MR JORDI: My name is Peter Jordi and I represent the Sono and Shabalala family. MR KEMP: Mr Chairman my name is Peter Kemp. I represent all the witnesses that will give evidence today and tomorrow except Mr Potgieter and Eugene de Kock. MR SEMENYA: Mr Chairman my name is Ismael Semenya and I represent Mrs Madikizela-Mandela. MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman I am Roelof du Plessis of the Pretoria Bar. I represent Colonel Jan Potgieter on instructions from Rooth & Wessels, attorneys in Pretoria, Mr Fanie Rossouw who sits next to me. I also act here on behalf of Captain Wouter Mentz who is involved in the Mabotha incident who has already testified in an amnesty hearing on instructions of Strydom Britz attorneys in Pretoria, Mr Willem Britz. MR DU TOIT: Mr Chairman I Johan du Toit, Johannesburg Bar. I represent the family of the late Sergeant Pretorius. CHAIRPERSON: Anyone else - no, thank you very much. MR VALLY: Mr Chairperson we have received a message that Mr Makanjee who represents the Asvat family and the Seipei family is on his way. He is slightly late, so he should also be on record. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. May I also welcome the Interpreters, translators. We are very pleased to have them with us. They have served this Commission extraordinarily well. I want to indicate that the witnesses must feel free to use whatever language they would feel much more comfortable with. We have arrangements for translation, particularly English, Afrikaans and I am not sure if there are any other translations available, but certainly those two, we will indicate to you a little later what other translations are available. I call the first witness Mr Kritzinger. I will be glad if you will come up to the witness table please. Please be seated for a moment. I want to welcome you and thank you for appearing before us. I hope you will feel as comfortable and as relaxed as is possible under the circumstances. Miss Sooka will administer the oath, stand please. ANDRE KRITZINGER: (sworn states) CHAIRPERSON: Mr Kritzinger do you have an opening statement or does your attorney or advocate wish to address us? MR KEMP: Mr Chairman the witness is in possession of a statement as are all the witnesses who will testify here today and tomorrow. The statement is in the form of a sworn affidavit of which copies have been provided to the Commission. We intend only to read that statement into the record. They are fairly succinct and then to answer all those questions which may be asked. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Mr Kritzinger then please go ahead and read your statement into the record. Thank you. MR KRITZINGER: "I, the undersigned Andre Kritzinger declares hereby under oath as follows: I am a Superintendent in the South African Police Service. The contents of this statement falls within my personal knowledge unless stated otherwise and to the best of my knowledge is true and correct. BACKGROUND: On 9 January 1975 I entered the South African Police Service and since then have been in the service of that organisation. I was advised not to load this statement by giving too many details regarding the course of my career. I will limit myself to the years involved. In the period 3 September 1984 - to 16 April 1994 I was part of the Security Branch in Soweto. During this period as a member of the investigating team known as the Terrorist Tracing Unit I was a component head and my function was investigating of security matters. During my period at the Security Branch, Soweto, my rank was initially that of lieutenant and on 1 July 1989 I was promoted to the rank of Captain, the rank I had when I left the Security Branch in Soweto. I am now dealing with the matters mentioned in my subpoena. The questioning and following death of Sizwe Sithole. Although I know the name of Sizwe Sithole, I am aware of the fact that there was such a person I had no personal knowledge of the questioning and following death of Sizwe Sithole; the use and handling of informants, and sources associated with the Mandela Football Club and Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela. Although during my career as detective I did on occasion use informants during the period that I worked at the Security Branch in Soweto I did not make or deal with any informants. At the Security Branch in Soweto there was a very specific function and one of our functions was not dealing with informants. I do happen to have knowledge of the fact that there were members of the Security Branch who did deal with informants and had the specific task of doing that. However, I did not ever hear, nor was I aware at any stage of any sources which were specifically recruited or dealt with, with regards to the Mandela Football Club and Mrs Madikizela-Mandela. The abduction, assault and murder of Stompie Seipei in 1988 and information thereabouts, at no stage did I have anything physically to do with the Stompie Seipei matter. On occasions the investigating officers did enquire as to whether I had any knowledge about Mrs Madikizela-Mandela and the United Football Club. All the information I had in this regard I shared with the investigating officers that this was just background and no specific information regarding the murder, the relationship between the Security Branch, Murder and Robbery and other units in the South African Police Force with regard to matters dealing with Mrs Madikizela-Mandela and the Mandela United Football Club. To the best of my knowledge there was no branch of Stratcom at the Security Branch in Soweto which - regarding cooperation, the cooperation that existed was the normal cooperation and there was no specific action directed at Mrs Madikizela-Mandela or the Mandela United Football Club. I was requested by Colonel Jan Potgieter and assisted him in the compiling of a docket regarding Mrs Madikizela-Mandela's activities. In order to compile this docket I went to different units of the South African Police to gather information regarding activities. A complete analysis was made of all information regarding her activities and a complete docket stipulating more than 30 incidents was built up. The docket was finally handed to the Attorney General, Mr Klaus von Lieires. Thereafter I never saw the docket again and to the best of my knowledge it is still with Mr von Lieires at the stage when I was transferred from Security Branch, Soweto. The use of Intelligence material and the relationship of Intelligence agencies regarding matters affecting Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and the Mandela United Football Club, in this regard I refer to what I have said in the paragraph just before this one and the reply is applicable here as well. The interrogation and death of Petrus Johannes Mabotha I was not involved in the interrogation or the death of Mabotha therefore I cannot give any further information in this regard. Information regarding tapping of telephones regarding Mrs Madikizela-Mandela and the Mandela United Football Club, at no stage was I involved in any tapping of phones or the placing and monitoring of any listening device. I know that this did take place on Mrs Mandela's phone and I read many of the transcriptions and I read summaries and extracts. I placed this in the docket. I am also aware of the fact that from time-to-time by members of the security branch made use of taps, but I have no knowledge of any incident where Mrs Mandela or the United Football Club was monitored in such a way. To my knowledge there was no information from such source came under my attention. It was brought to my attention that there are allegations that Mrs Madikizela-Mandela was under a 24-hour surveillance. To the best of my knowledge this is not true. The killing of Sergeant Pretorius and two MK members, Leka and Vinyenga in 1988. I was not physically involved in the planning or execution of the action during which Sergeant Pretorius was killed. As a result I cannot provide any information about the facts regarding this matter. I knew Sergeant Pretorius and I am aware of the fact that he was a person who worked with informers. In my opinion he was a dedicated worker and had a good name among his colleagues. His death was a great shock and I attended his funeral". Mr Chairman that concludes my statement which has been attested to today. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Mr Hanif Vally is acting for the TRC and I will ask him to lead now please. MR VALLY: Thank you Mr Chair. If Mr Kemp has no further questions he wants to lead I will proceed with my questioning of Mr Kritzinger. MR KEMP: Mr Chairman I have no further questions at this stage. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Vally. May I just intervene and say for a moment that it's probably going to be a pretty hot day. If you would like to remove your jackets for those who haven't waited for my permission, who would like to remove your jacket please feel free to do that. Thank you. Mr Kritzinger can I just say too, to remind you that the questions will probably be put to you in the main in English, but you must feel very free to reply either in English or Afrikaans, it's in your hands. If you are going to then it may be advisable for you to use the headphones......... MR KRITZINGER: It seems like my ears are too small for these..... CHAIRPERSON: .....too big. (laughter) MR VALLY: Mr Kritzinger are you presently still a member of the South African Police Services? MR KRITZINGER: That is correct. MR VALLY: What is your rank presently? MR KRITZINGER: As set out in my statement, Superintendent. MR VALLY: We just got your statement this morning so there will be certain aspects in your statement that we still will have to go through. But by and large regarding the Mandela United Football Club the impression one gets from the statement you have handed to us, is you heard nothing, you saw nothing, is that correct? MR KRITZINGER: That is correct, I didn't have anything to do with that Football Club. MR VALLY: Let's just get some clarity on how long you were in Soweto. I am looking at paragraph 3 of your statement. You say that you were at the Security Branch Soweto from 3rd September 1984 to 16 April 1991. So were you there for that period, seven years approximately? MR KRITZINGER: That is correct. MR VALLY: The same paragraph, paragraph 3 of your statement, your last sentence "During my period at the Security Branch, Soweto, my rank was initially that of a lieutenant and on the 1st of July 1988 I was promoted to the rank of Captain which rank I held at the stage that I left the Security Branch, Soweto". I just want to get clarity whether between 1989 and 1991 after you had assumed the rank of Captain were you still in Soweto? MR KRITZINGER: That is correct, yes. MR VALLY: Let us talk about the Soweto Security Branch. Can you briefly describe the structure of the Soweto Security Branch to us, how many different sections were there, what were they focusing on, who did you report to, what was the command structure. So firstly let's deal with what different sections operated within the Security Branch in Soweto? MR KRITZINGER: If I can just sketch it to you very briefly it will be as follows:- There was a sectional commander. In this specific case it was Brigadier "Eg" Coetzee, now General Coetzee. He had a second in command. There was mainly an investigating unit linked to a Terrorist Tracking Unit. There was an administrative unit. There was also a unit which dealt mainly with the handling and recruitment of informers. There was an information leg as well as a technical section. MR KRITZINGER: Yes in brief that's all. MR VALLY: I will deal with them individually, but approximately how many policemen were involved in the Security branch at Soweto at the time that you were there? MR KRITZINGER: If I have to give an estimation and I hope that I am right then it will be more than a hundred. MR VALLY: Which unit were you in? MR KRITZINGER: I was involved with the investigation to security-related incidents at the Investigating Unit. MR VALLY: Which you also refer to as the Terrorist Tracking unit? MR KRITZINGER: Yes, that was one unit, but my task was mainly the investigation of security related matters. MR VALLY: Can you tell us what the initials MID stand for? MR KRITZINGER: Criminal Information Service. MR VALLY: Was that the section of the Security Branch that you were part of in Soweto? MR KRITZINGER: That is correct. The name Security Branch was the original name and a few years later the name was changed to the Criminal Information Service, it is one and the same organisation, just with another name. MR VALLY: Let's stick to the period we are talking about, the period you were in Soweto which you say was from '84 to 1991. At that point you were in the MID, what you call the Investigative Unit, the Criminal Investigation Section of the Security Branch, would that be correct? MR KRITZINGER: That's correct. MR VALLY: Now the information unit, what was the role of the information unit? MR KRITZINGER: Mainly the gathering of information regarding security matters. MR VALLY: Would this include the gathering of information by electronic means, telephone tapping, placing of bugs, what was the difference between that and the recruitment of informers section or the technical branch, what was the difference? MR KRITZINGER: The technical branch mainly had to do with the tapping apparatus after the necessary approval was gained. They had to tap telephone conversations, that was the technical side. I did not hear the first part of the question, can you just repeat that. MR VALLY: Well the technical branch you say was responsible for telephone tapping would this include bugging? MR KRITZINGER: That's correct. MR VALLY: Now when you talk about the Information Unit you are calling it now the Intelligence Unit. Did the information unit also give out information? MR KRITZINGER: They would have given information to me if it was court orientated. I was mainly involved with court-orientated investigation and if the information unit had any information that could be of use to me in my court directed investigations then they would have provided me with that information. MR VALLY: My question is, did the information unit also disseminate information, did they, for example, provide information to any senior officers at police headquarters or any politicians regarding certain activities which were taking place in Soweto? So in addition to collecting information did they also distribute information, either within the police senior ranks or to the public? MR KRITZINGER: Yes they would definitely have done that. MR VALLY: And would they have been involved in disinformation campaigns as well? MR KRITZINGER: I am not aware of the fact that the information leg in Soweto was involved in such activities if there were such, or if such activities would take place then it would have come from Head Office. As I have said in my statement I am not aware of any Stratcom divisions which were seated in the Soweto Security branch. MR VALLY: I note what you said about Stratcom divisions, but without using the word Stratcom, was the role that Stratcom later came to play assumed by this information unit of the Security Branch at the time when you were a captain there? MR KRITZINGER: I am not aware of any such actions which occurred. MR VALLY: Are you aware of any disinformation which emanated from the Security branch in Soweto? MR KRITZINGER: From the Security Branch in Soweto any disinformation I can categorically deny, I have no knowledge of that. MR VALLY: You had also what you called a section which dealt with the recruitment of informers, is that correct? MR KRITZINGER: That's correct, yes. MR VALLY: This was a section dedicated just to the recruitment and the handling of informers. MR KRITZINGER: It was not only the recruitment and handling of informers, their task was also more general in that they also dealt with the monitoring of organisations etc. So they did not only deal with informers, there were also other additional tasks such as the monitoring of organisations as I have already said. MR VALLY: From what you have told us and the activities you've described of the various units it appears as if there's a fair amount of overlapping that the different units would in fact cooperate on different issues? MR KRITZINGER: Absolutely, yes, there would have been cooperation between different units because that is how the necessary information was exchanged. MR VALLY: You were a fairly senior officer when you were made captain in 1989, for example, you would have access to a lot of the important information which was passing through the Security branch in Soweto, would you not? MR KRITZINGER: Yes, that would have been the case that if management felt that if I had the necessary information it would have been brought to my attention. I also want to state it very pertinently once again that I was purely court orientated and all that I was thus interested in, and it's not as if I worked with - I was mainly interested in court-orientated cases. MR VALLY: Would you not as a matter of course, especially since you were an officer, first a lieutenant and then a captain, have regular meetings as a unit focusing on what was happening in Soweto in terms of your responsibility involved within the Security branch, would there not be regular briefings? MR KRITZINGER: In the mornings it was the practice that we, together with the sectional commander, we had meetings and if important aspects had to be raised then it would have been brought to my attention and I would have been made aware of it. MR VALLY: So it wasn't a question of whether it's just a case pending or not, there were regular daily briefings which you, as an officer of the Security branch in Soweto, were privy to? MR KRITZINGER: That's correct. I had to deal with these meetings on a daily basis. MR VALLY: So you would know a lot more than you are saying in your statement. It will be a necessary assumption for me to make if you were part of the daily briefings your claim of ignorance of anything around Mandela United Football Club and Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela sounds barely believable. That question I am posing to you in view of what you have just told me. MR KRITZINGER: As my statement has also explained and I was also advised of such that I am not going to stretch this statement unnecessarily, this was mainly, the statement was mainly made with the purpose, as the points have been explained in the subpoena and this statement was mainly made to comply with the requirements as set out in the subpoena. MR VALLY: Mr Kritzinger you are presently a policeman who is still working in the South African Police force and you have a fairly senior rank, you would want to assist us as far as you can, would you not? MR KRITZINGER: Yes that is why I declared myself willing to be present here today. MR VALLY: So I am going to ask you certain questions relating to certain incidents which will help the Truth Commission carry out its mandate. MR KRITZINGER: If it is within my abilities and my memory does not let me down I declare myself willing to be of assistance to this Commission. MR VALLY: And I want to, for the outset, advise you that I would expect you to go further than you went into your statement which is really a very superficial exculpatory statement. So I want to say that up-front, please assist us, I will ask you questions directly. If you have knowledge of the matters, not just bare denials or very brief responses which you may or may not have been advised to give, please assist us in view of the fact that you are a serving policeman and we are carrying out a statutory mandate in what we are doing here. MR KRITZINGER: I have no problem with that. MR VALLY: Now let's go on to the Mandela United Football Club and Mrs Madikizela-Mandela. Mrs Madikizela-Mandela was obviously an important person within Soweto in terms of political activism, is that correct? MR KRITZINGER: That is correct. MR VALLY: And her activities would have been under the scrutiny of the Security Branch in Soweto? MR KRITZINGER: That is correct. MR VALLY: I am also aware that the way that the Security branch operated that different people would be given different responsibilities, for example there would be people who would concentrate on youths; there would be people who concentrated on Union activities and I have been advised by your colleagues who are not in the Security branch that you also had a special section which concentrated on Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela. What is your response to that? MR KRITZINGER: I am not aware of something like that while I was at the Soweto Security branch that there was a specific section concentrating only on Mrs Madikizela-Mandela. MR VALLY: Did you have sections concentrating on the youth and on trade unions? MR KRITZINGER: Yes, there are indeed such persons at the Security branch which would have monitored such organisations and investigated them. MR VALLY: In which category would Mrs Madikizela-Mandela have fallen? MR KRITZINGER: As I have said already in my statement I am only aware of the aspect that her phone was tapped. I think that's general knowledge. I am aware of that because I have transcriptions, I saw transcriptions which I read. MR VALLY: Mr Kritzinger we know you were part of daily briefings, we know you were an officer there, we know that you focused on different aspects of what was happening in Soweto, we are now talking about possibly the most prominent political activist in Soweto. Who would have been monitoring her activities, in regard to telephone tapping for example who would the reports go to? MR KRITZINGER: Good. I can give two names to this Commission who in my opinion were tasked with that and they were Captain Bosman, my colleague at the time. He was involved with the telephone tapping and activities arising from these transcriptions were referred to Louis Watermeyer. The activities around Mrs Madikizela-Mandela, as far as I know and I am not trying to mislead this Commission, I am not trying to give you any concrete information as asked by concerning her. I am not able to do that. MR VALLY: Well let's go on. You have mentioned Mr Watermeyer, what was his rank at the time? We are talking ...(intervention) MR KRITZINGER: He would have been a captain, he is also a superintendent at the moment. MR VALLY: And what was the rank of Mr Bosman? MR KRITZINGER: He was also a captain but is no longer a serving member of the South African Police Services. MR VALLY: And the information that they had at hand who would they forward it to? MR KRITZINGER: Transcriptions did reach my eyes and if anything relevant and court orientated it would have been preserved. The same transcriptions were also transported to Supt Watermeyer who would have analysed it and had he thought it necessary, had he found anything concrete he would have brought it to the attention of the divisional head. MR VALLY: Fine. So all matters which potentially could lead to criminal charges being brought would be brought to you? MR KRITZINGER: Yes, to me and my colleague, Colonel Jan Potgieter among others, he was naturally my direct commanding officer at the investigative unit and he would have referred these to me and after I had read it I would have initialled or signed it that I had taken note of such transcription. MR VALLY: Let's talk about the Oupa Sehere case, do you remember the Oupa Sehere case? MR KRITZINGER: Yes I remember Oupa Sehere. MR VALLY: You were the investigating officer in the murder of Mr Hole Makaula and one other, is that correct? MR KRITZINGER: That is correct. MR VALLY: My first question is, if this on the face of it was a straightforward murder why was the Security branch involved? I am sorry shall I repeat the question? MR KRITZINGER: Yes I didn't get it clear. MR VALLY: Sure. If this on the face of it was a straightforward murder why was the Security Branch involved in this investigation? MR KRITZINGER: You know it's perhaps easier to explain in this way. One could have given this a political colour. Oupa Alec Sehere was an overseas trained so-called during the old apartheid regime, a trained terrorist with overseas training. He also possessed weaponry from East Bloc countries, yes we could have called him definitely a terrorist. I was requested not to give a political colour to this question, I was requested by the Attorney General to investigate it purely as a murder charge. MR VALLY: So it was with the Security branch because you saw it as having a political flavour? MR KRITZINGER: Yes simply as I said because he was a trained ANC comrade, and that was part of the daily task of the Security Branch to investigate such matters and that is why that docket belonged with the Security Branch. MR VALLY: At which stage did you ascertain that Mr Sehere was a trained ANC cadre? MR KRITZINGER: If I remember correctly it would have been shortly after his arrest. MR VALLY: And how did you ascertain this? MR KRITZINGER: By way of interrogation. MR VALLY: Why did you decide to interrogate Mr Sehere at that stage when you did not know that he was a trained ANC cadre? MR KRITZINGER: I did not personally interrogate him. The procedure at the Security branch normally is that if a person is arrested that there'll be a specific interrogator as well as a person who will investigate the docket so that it would almost have been the exception to the rule to burden oneself with the interrogation. There was a specific person who had to do that. If there any un-clarities then obviously then the investigative officer would have had a look at the docket and would have given it to the Attorney General if necessary after consultation with the suspect, amongst others. MR VALLY: My question is this. You had the Murder and Robbery Unit in Soweto why did this matter come to the Security branch, the matter of Oupa Sehere? MR KRITZINGER: I think I have already answered that question, especially because he was an overseas ANC comrade, that's why. MR VALLY: When did you ascertain this? MR KRITZINGER: I think I believe that it was a couple of years ago, it should have been after the death of those two persons. I don't remember if we knew by then that he was an ANC comrade. I can't specifically remember whether his identity was already known by then or not, and whether it had been by way of interrogation or what. I don't know, I don't remember. MR VALLY: So there was a possibility that by this stage you already knew that he was a trained ANC cadre, before the murder of the Makaula brothers? MR KRITZINGER: Yes that is true there is a possibility, it's likely. MR VALLY: Who else was involved in this investigation, the one into the murder of Mr Makaula, besides yourself? MR KRITZINGER: A colleague of mine, Captain Badenhorst. At the time he was involved with the investigation. Other persons who helped at that time were Sergeant Engelbrecht if I remember correctly. MR VALLY: At this time while you were investigating this murder there were a number of people who were residing or present at the house of Mrs Madikizela-Mandela in Orlando West who were detained, do you recall this? MR KRITZINGER: Yes, that is possible, likely, I will not deny it. MR VALLY: And a number of them spent many months in detention in connection with this matter, would that be correct? MR KRITZINGER: Yes that could be so Mr Chairman. I did not see the docket so my memory is not quite clear on that investigation. To me it has been completed, has been finalised so I did no background check to make sure. MR VALLY: And were you personally involved in interrogating some of these people? MR KRITZINGER: Yes that is possible. I do not specifically remember. It is possible that I was involved with the interrogation of some of them. It is likely. MR VALLY: For my knowledge of how the Security branch worked it would be very unlikely that Mr Potgieter, I am not sure if his rank was...(tape side A ends) MR KRITZINGER: .... it is possible that Colonel Potgieter was involved in the interrogation, I don't see anything sinister in that. I can specifically remember an incident where my Divisional Commanding Officer was also part of an interrogation team, there is nothing strange about a senior person dealing with the interrogation. MR VALLY: ... how you operated on the ground. The normal practise was you as Lieutenant or Captain would be responsible for the investigation? You would be driving, you would decide what was the questions that needed to be asked to prepare your case? MR KRITZINGER: Yes, I would have led the investigation, but if one of my senior colleagues participated in the interrogation or had to do with taking down statements, it would not have been strange in the Security Branch, not a strange sight to see. MR VALLY: ... but you led the investigation? Now, in the time that the Truth Commission has been in existence, we have heard lots of stories about the methods used by Security Branch members in interrogating people. I need to ask you specifically these people who were detained, in connection with the matter for which Oupa Sehere was subsequently convicted, were they tortured or assaulted in any way? MR KRITZINGER: I am not aware that any of the detainees were tortured in any way. MR VALLY: ... Ever aware of any Security detainee at Security Branch Headquarters at Protea Soweto, being tortured in any way whatsoever in the time that you were in Soweto? MR KRITZINGER: I never committed any torture, and I am not aware that any of my colleagues did in my presence, torture any person, I am not aware of that. MR VALLY: Did you ever hear of anyone being tortured at the Security Branch Headquarters at Protea? MR KRITZINGER: I am only aware of an occasion that took place before I worked at that Security Branch where a person allegedly and I don't remember all the facts, had allegedly apparently shot a detainee while he was being interrogated in the "lokaal" that was there, unfortunately I don't remember his name. I am aware however that my senior officer investigated this matter, and that there were criminal consequences, prosecutionary consequences in a criminal court. I am aware of such a matter, it did come to my attention. MR VALLY: In the period that you were there in 1984, September 1984 and April 1991, as the Investigation Officer attached to the Security Branch, were you ever accused of torturing any person that you took to court? MR KRITZINGER: I was never accused of torturing anybody, Mr Chairman. MR VALLY: ... that you, the interpreter says accused, you used the word "aangekla". I am not asking you whether you were charged with assault or torture, I am asking you were you ever accused? MR KRITZINGER: Yes, I think there was such an allegation. Once I was requested to be on an identification parade where it was said that apparently I had assaulted a person which I categorically denied. These matters were investigated and were referred to the Attorney General and I want to say that I was never charged with or accused of. MR VALLY: You were accused but you were not charged? But let's just take it slightly further, in the matters that you took to court on behalf of the Security Branch in Soweto, were there a number of matters where people had given you confessions? MR KRITZINGER: I beg your pardon, I did not hear the question. MR VALLY: In the matters that you took to court on behalf of the Security Branch in Soweto, were there any matters where there were confessions which were produced? Accused people who had made confessions to you which were used in court against them? MR KRITZINGER: I am afraid ... (no translation) MR VALLY: In your preparation of cases to be presented to the Attorney General for prosecution, were there a number of matters where the accused persons had made confessions to you or another Police Officer, but that they had made confessions? MR KRITZINGER: If I understand your question correctly, you are asking me whether any persons were charged with and confessed to being assaulted? MR VALLY: No, no, let's try for the last time. MR KRITZINGER: Maybe I should remove the earphones and listen to you in English and give my reply in Afrikaans. ADV NTSEBEZA: Let my try to assist here. I think what Mr Vally is seeking to establish from you is that when you prepared a docket, you sometimes (indistinct) is that correct? And sometimes confessions which are either made to Police Officers or to Peace Officers in the form of Magistrates? MR KRITZINGER: Quite right, sir. ADV NTSEBEZA: Now what he wants to establish from you is whether in your career in Soweto and in the cases for which you were responsible, there were confessions of the nature that we are talking of? MR KRITZINGER: Yes, I am sure that some - the accused alleged that he was assaulted and that was ... ADV NTSEBEZA: I think that will be a secondary step, there were confessions, not necessary through assaults? MR VALLY: Thank you Mr Ntsebeza. So there were confessions and generally when these confessions are produced in court, the accused alleged that they had been assaulted in making these confessions? MR KRITZINGER: Yes, I am sure there were such instances. MR VALLY: Would you say there were a number of such instances? MR KRITZINGER: Yes, I won't deny that, no, not at all. MR VALLY: Where they personally accused you of being responsible for torturing them to elicit a confession from them? MR KRITZINGER: Not that I am aware of. MR VALLY: Let's move on. We are going back to the Oupa Seheri matter. Were you present when the Scorpio machine pistol was found in the bedroom of Ms Zinzi Hlongwani Mandela at the Orlando West house of Mrs Madikizela-Mandela? MR KRITZINGER: Mr Chairman, as I have already explained I cannot recall this specifically. If I can have the opportunity to look at this docket once again and to read it through to refresh my memory, I will gladly do that. I cannot remember specifically, it is possible that I was there, it is possible that I wasn't there, I cannot remember specifically. If I could just see the docket again, then I would gladly try to answer that question more meaningfully. CHAIRMAN: Could I ask you to perhaps be a little more focused and specific and give us some indication of how much more time you are going to be using? MR VALLY: I estimate at this stage Mr Chairperson, that I should be approximately 15 minutes at the most. What we have started with and what we are trying to do is establish a pattern and so we will need some general questions before we home in on more specific issues. CHAIRMAN: Right, if you can get to that as soon as possible please. MR VALLY: Mr Kritzinger, you do not recall this particular incident where this firearm was found in the Madikizela-Mandela household? MR KRITZINGER: Mr Chairman, I am aware that such a firearm was found. I have knowledge of that, I can just not recall specifically as to whether I was present there or not. But of the case that such a firearm was found, I have knowledge of that, yes. MR VALLY: Were you ever involved in the questioning of Ms Zinzi Hlongwani Mandela in connection with this incident? MR KRITZINGER: I cannot remember that I interrogated her personally in this specific case, no. MR VALLY: Were you aware whether she was interrogated at all in connection with this incident? MR KRITZINGER: Yes, if my memory does not - she was interrogated and I think that a statement was also obtained from her. I cannot recall specifically if it was colleague Heyns or Lemmer who obtained a statement from her, but if I remember correctly I think that a statement was obtained from her, or in any case attempts were made to obtain a statement from her. MR VALLY: Was she ever charged with this incident? MR KRITZINGER: No, as far as I can remember, she was not charged. MR VALLY: As senior Investigation Officer, can you tell us why she wasn't charged? MR KRITZINGER: I think it dealt purely with the fact that prosecution did not rest with me, it is in the hands of the Attorney General and it is his prerogative to decide who he wants to prosecute or not. What I can remember in this specific case is that certain formal acknowledgements were made regarding the possession of weaponry by Mr Seheri and I think that those formal acknowledgements were made, or admissions were made to keep Zinzi or Mrs Madikizela-Mandela out of court and I think that the State without presenting that evidence to court by means of a formal admission, it was accepted as such. MR VALLY: Did you question Mrs Madikizela-Mandela herself on the issue? MR KRITZINGER: No, I never interrogated her. MR VALLY: Are you aware of any of your colleagues having interrogated her? MR KRITZINGER: In this specific case, I cannot remember. I think attempts were made to make contact with her and I believe that we were time and again referred to her Attorney without any success, that any concrete interrogation or statement was obtained from her. MR VALLY: Mr Kritzinger, it sounds like you were treating her with kitgloves and I find this very strange. A gun is found in her house, you acknowledge that? MR KRITZINGER: Yes, absolutely. MR VALLY: The vehicle that was used in the murder, was her vehicle? MR KRITZINGER: That is correct. MR VALLY: As Security Branch you will have on various occasions detained Mrs Madikizela-Mandela? MR KRITZINGER: Could you just repeat please, was she detained on several occasions? MR VALLY: Are you aware that Mrs Madikizela-Mandela had on various occasions been detained by Security Branch members? MR KRITZINGER: I think that I am only aware of the fact, if I can remember correctly, that she was detained on one occasion and this was for non compliance with a restriction order when she was in Krugersdorp, further I am not aware while I was there, that she was physically detained. I am not aware of that. MR VALLY: You are aware of at least one incident, regarding the breech of restriction order, yet you tell me that in connection with the murder of two people, a gun is found in her house, her vehicle is used in the murders, it appears and correct me if I am wrong, it appears as if Mr Seheri was a visitor at her household, would that be correct? A regular visitor at her household? MR KRITZINGER: That could have been like that, I will not deny that. MR VALLY: And you don't try and obtain a statement from Mrs Madikizela-Mandela herself? Doesn't it sound like very poor Police work? MR KRITZINGER: No, I do not believe that it is poor Police work, I think that I had a docket which proved the crime bona fide. I think that we must also take into consideration the fact that Mrs Madikizela-Mandela was a high profile person if I can use the English terminology. And it is also true that because she was a high profile person, it was my method of investigating that if she had to be approached, I would have done this by means of the Attorney General or the Advocate tasked with this investigation, to receive further instructions that I had to obtain a statement from her. That request, or such a request was never directed at me which could have assisted with a successful carrying out of this specific case. Therefore the State felt that it could prove this case, without Mrs Mandela being approached for a statement in this regard and to decide to prosecute her if she had provided shelter for so-called terrorists. There was never a request for such a matter to be investigated any further from the office of the Attorney General, so I do not believe that any accusation would be correct as to say that poor investigation was done in this specific case. MR VALLY: Mr Kritzinger, did you cite Mrs Madikizela-Mandela and her daughter, Mrs Zinzi Hlongwani Mandela as State witnesses in this matter? MR KRITZINGER: No, they were not cited as State witnesses. I cannot remember that they were called as witnesses, no. MR VALLY: We will come back to that later. You did tell us earlier that because of certain admissions made by the accused in this matter, it wasn't necessary to call Mrs Zinzi Madikizela-Mandela earlier on in your evidence? Do you recall that? MR KRITZINGER: Yes, I can remember that I said that if I remember correctly, formal admissions were made and as a result of the formal admissions that were made, it was not necessary for her to cite her as a witness because that which she could testify to, had already been acknowledged or admitted to. MR VALLY: Mr Kritzinger, on this issue, you make this admissions when you are in court. We've got a newspaper article and we are trying to find it now which shows Mrs Madikizela-Mandela and my learned friend, Mr Semenya will correct me if I am wrong, which shows Mrs Madikizela-Mandela and Mrs Zinzi Hlongwani Mandela coming to court with a caption which reads "they were cited as State witnesses". Mr Semenya on the last occasion raised this, pointed it out to me that while they were named as State witnesses, they hadn't formally given evidence. You advise me that it is because of admissions which were made. Were these admissions not only made in court for the first time? MR KRITZINGER: The formal, whether the formal admissions were made at court, that could be possible after consultations which Mr Seheri had with his legal representative, the fact of the matter is that when it was made, is irrelevant to me at this stage, the fact of the matter is it was made and that is why they did not testify. MR VALLY: How do you cite a person as a State witness without even having obtained a statement from her? MR KRITZINGER: Mr Chairman, if it was the request of the Attorney General that they had to be summonsed to appear in court without a statement having been obtained from them, I think that it is reasonably unfair to put that question to me. I cannot give an explanation on behalf of the Attorney General. If they were summonsed to be at court without a statement having been obtained from them, I cannot react to this. MR VALLY: On this issue, my final question. Since you were the Investigation Officer in the Unit which was and to quote you "responsible for tracking terrorists", did you follow up this investigation at all? MR VALLY: ... that you say that Mr Seheri was a trained guerilla, that you found a machine pistol in the house of Mrs Madikizela-Mandela, that your job was "tracking terrorists". Surely you would want to know who this person was, where he came from, who he had contact with, where he made the contact, weren't there this normal Police follow up in this instance? MR KRITZINGER: I believe that if my memory is correct, that the necessary investigation or follow up investigation was done in this case, to bona fide determine that he was a cadre that was trained overseas. I think that in the murder docket there would also have been a statement which would have explained this, about a so-called askari who received a statement that he had been trained overseas. MR VALLY: I am not sure if you have answered my question. Did you follow up this matter or not in terms of what your mandate within the Security Branch was? MR KRITZINGER: Yes, I believe I did that. If I understand your question correctly, I say yes, I did that. MR VALLY: ... without questioning Mrs Madikizela-Mandela? MR KRITZINGER: Correct. I think that I have already explained this to you that she was a high profile person and I would only have interrogated her if I had received the request from the office of the Attorney General. I think that my docket was of such a nature that I perhaps did not need her evidence. MR VALLY: ... the matter of the Makanda brothers. This was a case which you may recall, was the incident where certain people were allegedly kidnapped, had certain slogans carved into their bodies and battery acid rubbed into those wounds. Do you recall the case? MR KRITZINGER: Yes, I can remember such a case where the two young boys, words were carved into their bodies. I think one of the words was "Viva ANC", I can recall that incident, yes. MR VALLY: And where was this incident alleged to have taken place, this assault on these two youths? MR KRITZINGER: If I can remember correctly, it occurred at Mrs Madikizela-Mandela's house. I am speaking under correction, I think it was also during the 1980's, but exactly when, I cannot say. I think that it was, it did take place at her house. MR VALLY: Why was the Security Branch involved in investigating this matter? MR KRITZINGER: I cannot say specifically why, but I think because it took place at the house of Mrs Madikizela-Mandela and because the words ANC could have played a role. I cannot recall specifically why that matter was brought to our attention. Possibly it was persons who could have been responsible for that, were subjects known to us. It could have been agitators and people who we monitored. I cannot say specifically why. Perhaps I am just speculating at this stage. MR VALLY: And did you obtain a statement from Mrs Madikizela-Mandela in connection with this matter? MR KRITZINGER: I cannot recall that. I doubt it. MR KRITZINGER: I don't know. I would like to give you that answer, if I could just have some time to see that docket again. To have a look and see what the whole result of that investigation was, I cannot remember. MR VALLY: ... three people were charged and they were acquitted. But the issue for me is this, that if a serious assault of this nature takes place, the Security Branch has an interest in the matter, you are the Investigating Officer, yet, you do not question or obtain a statement from the owner of the house in whose home this assault takes place. Isn't that a reflection again of poor Police work? MR KRITZINGER: No, not at all. I think that my question is mutatis mutandis applicable to what I said earlier that Mrs Mandela was a high profile person and whether the Commission or any other person wants to hear it or not, it is a fact that I and this is the way I interrogated people, or investigated, I did not approach her for a confrontation, I knew what was the result of that, and that I would have gone to her. All dockets are handed to the Attorney General, or one of the Senior State Prosecutors and if they requested such, made such a request to me that I had to obtain a statement, I would have done so. I complied with the request, what was said by the Attorney General or the Senior State Prosecutors. MR VALLY: On this point, and I will be very brief, the Attorney General can ask you for further investigation. The basic investigations are done by you as the Senior Investigating Officer here and I have now pointed out two incidents which had a link with Madikizela-Mandela and you chose not to question her. I am not talking about further investigations requested by the Attorney General, I am talking about your role as a Policeman. As a Senior Superintendent if a junior Officer was to do that today, no matter how prominent the person was, and that person was not questioned or a statement was not obtained from them, would you as a Senior Policeman not reprimand your junior officer and say do your job properly, obtain a statement from a person who is linked by virtue of the fact it was here house in the incidents of the carvings, by virtue of the fact that her car was used in the incidents of the murders, wouldn't that be poor Police work if you were supervising a junior Officer? MR KRITZINGER: I am listening to exactly what you are saying to me and I agree with that, but let me sketch it to you in this way. Experience has taught that and this is very clear, that if you have to go to Mrs Mandela's house to interrogate her or her daughter, to get a statement from either, I can guarantee you that she would have shown you the door. She would have said at no stage would she speak to you and expose her to any form of interrogation, or the making of a statement. I think that at this stage the Commission should know that. MR VALLY: ... I believe that the Security Branch at the time we are talking about, had infinite powers to detain and interrogate supported by all courts, which they were not shy to use, to tell us now that you people were intimidated by Mrs Madikizela-Mandela does not ring true in view of the record of detentions, that she personally has experienced. How would you react to that? MR KRITZINGER: I had nothing to do with the period during which she was detained and how she was treated, I will not know. But I am going to tell you that when I was in Soweto it was my experience that I had with her. MR VALLY: I want to run through a number of matters, I will be quick. CHAIRMAN: I must warn you Mr Hanif, that we are using a great deal of time, with a very heavy load of witnesses to complete, you must start to finish please. MR VALLY: Thank you Mr Chairman. You have already told us that you were an Investigating Officer in the death of Mr Makaola. You already told us that you were the Investigating Officer in the case of the mutilation of the Makanda brothers. Are you aware of the murder of Susan Maripa? MR KRITZINGER: The name has come up. I am not aware of it and nor did I have anything to do with that. So I can give you no information regarding the death of this person. MR VALLY: Were you at all involved in the investigation into the disappearance of Mr Sibuniso Tshabalala and Mr Lolo Sono? MR KRITZINGER: No, I was not tasked with any investigation or anything to do with them. MR VALLY: ... the Security Branch was (indistinct) involved in taking statements in this matter? MR KRITZINGER: Yes, it is possible that that could have been so. MR VALLY: ... the Security Branch by virtue of the Security Branch, you yourself would be aware of this? MR KRITZINGER: As I said, I was aware of it, but I did not have anything physically to do with it. MR VALLY: Are you aware of the accusations or with the Security Branch would have been aware of the accusations, the linkage of Mrs Madikizela-Mandela to the disappearance of Mr Tshabalala and Mr Sono? MR KRITZINGER: It is possible that I could have heard of it, yes. MR VALLY: ... whether a statement was taken from Mrs Madikizela-Mandela in connection with this incident? MR KRITZINGER: No, I am not aware of that, I know nothing of that. MR VALLY: Are you aware of the attempted murder of Mr Lerothodi Ikaneng? MR KRITZINGER: Could you please repeat the question? MR VALLY: I am sorry, are you aware of the attempted murder of Mr Lerothodi Ikaneng? MR KRITZINGER: Yes, I am also aware of that, I have knowledge of that. MR VALLY: Were you aware of a linkage between this attempted murder and the Mandela United Football Club? MR KRITZINGER: I cannot say whether there is a link, I cannot tell you specifically, I do not know. MR VALLY: Were you involved in this investigation at all? MR KRITZINGER: I can recall the name specifically. I cannot say specifically, it is possible that I was involved, I cannot recall specifically. MR VALLY: Did you ever take a statement from Mrs Madikizela-Mandela in connection with this matter? MR KRITZINGER: Not that I can remember. MR VALLY: Were you involved at all in the murder of Dr Asvat? MR KRITZINGER: I have knowledge of the murder of Dr Asvat, but once again I was not tasked with the investigation of that matter. MR VALLY: Are you aware of the murder of Finkie Msomi? MR KRITZINGER: Yes, I am aware of that. MR VALLY: Was the Security Branch involved in the investigation at all? MR KRITZINGER: It is possible. I think that they were, if I remember correctly I think that this is where a house was burnt down. I cannot remember the detail, but the name is known to me and I believe that if the Security Branch were to investigate it themselves, there was co-operation between the Security Branch and the other department that was investigating it, but I cannot recall this specifically. If I can have the opportunity I can go back to the Security Branch Soweto and peruse the dockets that I investigated. I cannot recall these cases. MR VALLY: I want to just mention two more cases. We are talking about the death of Cookie Zwane as well as the kidnapping of Mr Kgase, Mr Mono and Mr Mekgwe, was the Security Branch involved in those matters? Cookie Zwane's abduction and the assault on Mr Kgase, Mr Mono and Mr Mekgwe, was the Security Branch involved in the investigation of those matters, any of them? MR KRITZINGER: Not that I have any knowledge of, I do not know. It could be, it could not be, I have no personal knowledge. MR VALLY: Are you aware of allegations of a reign of terror in Soweto being conducted by the Mandela United Football Club? MR KRITZINGER: No, I am not aware of anything like that, I have no knowledge of that. MR VALLY: The Security Branch did not know that? MR KRITZINGER: No, that is not what I am saying, I said I do not know about it, I have no knowledge of that. MR VALLY: Did the Security Branch know about that? MR KRITZINGER: I think it is an unfair question. If I say that I did not know it is possible that they could have known about it, but I do not know. MR VALLY: I find that very strange, because it was very well known in the community, we have had a number of prominent people here talking about what had happened, we are aware that her house was burnt down by the Daliwonga students? MR KRITZINGER: I have knowledge that the house was burnt down, yes, but as far as I can recall if I remember correctly, it is school children who attacked her house. I am not, I do not know the details but I think school children attacked her house. I do have knowledge of that, but once again I say that if I have knowledge of something, it does not mean that I personally investigated this or dealt with it further, it is merely a question that I had knowledge of it. MR VALLY: With your wire chappie, with your informers, with your investigations which linked certain youths living in Mrs Madikizela-Mandela's house to certain incidents, you are still not aware of activities, criminal activities centred around the Mandela United Football Club, is that what you are telling us? MR KRITZINGER: I am not aware of the fact that the United Football Club were guilty of any criminal activities, I have no knowledge of that. MR VALLY: There is just one issue I want to take up with you. CHAIRPERSON: Is this the final issue Mr Vally? MR VALLY: The very final issue Mr Chairperson. There are a number of others which I am not going to pursue. You have advised us there was no STRATCOM branch in Soweto. We have evidence and I am referring to page 1354 of the record, your Attorney has the record, where Mr Erasmus an ex-colleague of yours based in John Vorster, you know Mr Erasmus? MR KRITZINGER: I can just say to the Commission that I only know his name, I never met him personally. If he had to appear in front of me now, I would not even know that it is him, it is only his name that is known to me. Further I do not even know what he looks like. I have never met him in my life. MR VALLY: Fine, I will just tell you what he says and then I will quote you something else and then I would like your comment on that. At page 1354 Mr Erasmus says, your Attorney should have this record, STRATCOM operations were carried out with all the Security Branches in South Africa at the time. In the Soweto Security Branch personnel dealt with STRATCOM operations who worked in tandem with the Intelligence Unit. That is what Mr Erasmus says. I will tell you what Mr McPherson says. Do you know, I think it is Superintendent at this stage, do you know Superintendent McPherson? MR KRITZINGER: Yes, I know Superintendent Vic McPherson and I have also met him. I know who he is. MR VALLY: He said on page 1314 "I was the head of STRATCOM. I was more involved in setting strategies there and co-ordinating STRATCOM operation throughout the country though I personally did not get actively involved in STRATCOM operations against Mrs Madikizela-Mandela, but we had people as I said STRATCOM section at Soweto and a section here at Witwatersrand that dealt on her matters personally." Superintendent McPherson says that there was a STRATCOM operation in Soweto? MR KRITZINGER: There are some of my colleagues present here today who were responsible for the information leg. I am once again saying that I have no knowledge of any STRATCOM division, section at the Soweto Security Branch and with a bit of humour if there was such a STRATCOM action, they were strategically so good that I had no knowledge of their existence. MR VALLY: I find this very strange, however and this is the last question. MR KRITZINGER: This is the truth. CHAIRPERSON: You are quite correct. MR VALLY: You say in your statements, after you say a number of times you use phrases such as I have no knowledge, at no stage was I involved in any tapping of phones. ... setting out how you were not involved, yet you say in paragraph 8 that you assisted your senior, Colonel Jan Potgieter, and I will quote you "in order to compile this docket, I went to different Units of the South African Police in order to obtain information regarding her activities. A complete analysis was made of all information which dealt with her activities and a bulky docket containing more than 30 crimes, was compiled in the process. In terms of the work that you have done with and for Colonel Jan Potgieter, you had compiled a docket with 30 serious offences which you submitted to the Attorney General's office, is that correct? MR KRITZINGER: That is correct yes. MR VALLY: Did you at any stage take a statement from Mrs Madikizela-Mandela or at any of this 30 serious offences? MR KRITZINGER: As far as my knowledge goes, she was never approached to comment on this before the Attorney General had made a decision, this is my interpretation. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Vally. Mr Kemp? MR KEMP: Mr Chairperson, at this stage I do not have any questions, but I believe there might be other interested parties. Perhaps they should be given a chance and then if there is anything at the end, then I might comment again. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Are there any others who wish to ask any questions? Yes, Mr (Indistinct) CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Richards? MR RICHARDS: Thank you Chairperson. Superintendent, I am correct in making the assumption that you have tried your best to give evidence only to matters that you have within your personal knowledge, am I correct? MR KRITZINGER: Could you just repeat that please. I cannot hear very well. MR RICHARDS: Thank you Superintendent. Your evidence this morning, am I correct in saying that your evidence is to the effect that you have only spoken about things that are within your personal knowledge, you've avoided hearsay is that not correct? MR KRITZINGER: That is correct, yes. MR RICHARDS: I can assure you that in these hearings you are at liberty to give hearsay evidence, we are not before a court of law. Now, the next proposition I put to you, isn't it true that the Security Police were not only interested in taking matters to court for convictions and prosecutions, they were also interested in getting information, detaining people and so on? MR KRITZINGER: Yes, the component where I was, I was only interested and tasked with obtaining court orientated information and therefore I was also involved in the terrorist tracking unit. My task was mainly court orientated investigations. MR RICHARDS: Is that the reason that you presented these 30 or so dockets to the Attorney General for decision? It is in the nature of your function to have presented the prosecutable cases, or so you thought, to the Attorney General? MR KRITZINGER: That is correct. It was a reasonable period that my colleague and I attended to this investigation, and this bulky docket was handed to the Attorney General. MR RICHARDS: And during the preparation of that docket, there was constant interaction with his staff, is that not correct as well, according to your evidence? MR KRITZINGER: No, I don't think that is what I said. If I understand you correctly, the docket after my colleague and I were in agreement that we had a good case against her, we handed the docket to the Attorney General. Perhaps there were discussions previously with the office of the Attorney General where we could have informed him that we were busy with such an investigation, but I do not believe that there was feedback on a daily or weekly basis to the Attorney General in order to tell him how far this had progressed. My colleague could have done it, but I did not do that. MR RICHARDS: ... in the ordinary course of your investigation, you could have taken statements from whom you liked? MR KRITZINGER: Could you repeat the question please? MR RICHARDS: In the ordinary course of your investigations, you would approach the people you thought were relevant to take statements from and to ask Mr Vally's question yet again, there was no particular restraint on you taking statements from Mrs Madikizela-Mandela? MR KRITZINGER: No. Let me put it this way. The statements that we had, were mostly from people who had been arrested and in which she could have been incriminated. I cannot physically recall that we actually went out into the street and used other independent people in the community and obtained statements from them. Possibly, as many of the statements in the Seheri docket would have been placed in the docket of Mrs Mandela, where she was incriminated her name was mentioned or whatever the case, so the investigation was built on evidence from people who were detained or dockets which could have been closed where her name was mentioned as to being linked to one or other activity. MR RICHARDS: ... inference that I had drawn from your evidence earlier today that Mrs Madikizela-Mandela was in a special category which was untouchable and that meant that the Attorney General had to authorise you to take a statement from her, is untrue? MR KRITZINGER: No, that was my interpretation and the fact that she was untouchable was what I thought, and that if I had visited her, I would have been shown the door. MR RICHARDS: I would proceed to the next point. My client concedes that he was a police informer. In any Police operation, informers are unfortunately part and parcel of the operation. He also says that Sergeant Pretorius was his handler. What was Sergeant Pretorius' function in the Security Police at the time? MR KRITZINGER: I think that I can try to give you an answer. Sergeant Pretorius did not work with me, he was directly under the command of my colleague, who is also present here today. ... (tape ends) ... one of my functions was not dealing with ... (tape 1 - side B blank) MR RICHARDS: Who did you and Captain Watermeyer account to and report to, Colonel Jan Potgieter if I understand you? MR KRITZINGER: No, I would personally reported things regarding investigations, I would have reported to my colleague Colonel Jan Potgieter. If I am not wrong, I think Superintendent Watermeyer reported to his Commanding Officer, who I think at that stage was a Colonel Claassen. I believe that he would have reported to him. MR RICHARDS: ... canvass in preparation for other witnesses, is the Brandfort story. Is it not true that it would have been a particular interest to the Police as to where Mrs Mandela was at the time and if she would have made a trip to Brandfort, their surveillance mechanisms would have known that she had left Soweto for Brandfort? MR KRITZINGER: Yes, that is possible. The Security Branch could have been aware of that, I do not deny that. MR RICHARDS: I am not asking what is possible or impossible, I am saying is it not true that if Mrs Mandela had left Soweto at that time, they would have been aware, that is the Security Police, it is not a possibility or an impossibility or probability? MR KRITZINGER: As far as my knowledge goes, I would say that that is correct. That the Security Branch would have been aware of such a thing yes. MR RICHARDS: The last question, who was in charge of the recruitment of informers? MR KRITZINGER: Over all it would probably have been Colonel Claassen regarding the handling of informers, but I think it is actually a simplistic question in the sense that the information section also had informers, but they had their own Commanding Officer, so it is difficult to say whether there is someone in over all charge of informers. MR RICHARDS: Thank you Mr Chairperson. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Richards. Any other questions? MR DU PLESSIS: Superintendent Kritzinger, but I am going to call you Mr, because Superintendent is too long. I act on behalf of Colonel Jan Potgieter who was your Commanding Officer. I want to ask you about certain aspects of your testimony because it seems to me that certain of the questions and answers were confused, and I would like to clear up. I am going to read to you what Colonel Potgieter says regarding the investigation of Mrs Mandela. There might have been confusion in terms of the docket. I refer to paragraph 7 of my client's statement if you want to follow me there. He says originally there was one large investigation into Winnie Mandela called, it was in connection with her activities. It should be borne in mind that the Security Branch would have investigated only those aspects of her activities that - so normal criminal activities which had nothing to do with security, would not have fallen under your jurisdiction? MR KRITZINGER: No, it wouldn't. MR DU PLESSIS: If the criminal activity could have been related MR KRITZINGER: Yes, then it would have. MR DU PLESSIS: And the other things would have been murder and robbery? The offices were not in the same section or area as yours either? MR KRITZINGER: Are you now referring specifically to murder and robbery? MR KRITZINGER: No, it was not the in the same building, but on the same premises, approximately 400 metres from where the Security office was. MR DU PLESSIS: But you worked separately? MR DU PLESSIS: He goes further and he says the original idea was for senior MK members who were involved in certain terrorist activities, to use them as witnesses in a case in which Winnie Mandela could be prosecuted. My deduction was that the view of the Attorney General was that Winnie Mandela could not be prosecuted by using evidence, but they would have refused to testify. These witnesses had to be found guilty before they could be used in a case against her. I had no problem with that phrase. Then he says and I think it is important, as a result of the Attorney General's view, it is decided to approach the investigation differently, it was done in consultation with Headquarters and the decision was made that high treason docket would be opened and investigated separately. Can you recall that? MR KRITZINGER: Yes, I can. The cases against the accomplices were carried out successfully, the case continued under my leadership and was handed to Attorney General, Advocate Claus von Lierres. MR DU PLESSIS: We are now only talking about the high treason docket? MR KRITZINGER: That is correct. MR DU PLESSIS: So if one looks at your statement, the bulky docket of more than 30 offences which you refer to, so it is not the high treason one, it is the first one which was later broken down of which a part became the high treason docket? MR KRITZINGER: That is correct. MR DU PLESSIS: He goes further and he says that the high treason investigation had nothing to do, it didn't overlap with the Stompie Seipei investigation which was dealt with Murder and Robbery? MR KRITZINGER: That is correct, the Stompie Seipei was not incorporated with that, it had nothing to do with that. MR DU PLESSIS: There we see the distinction between the function of the Security Branch and that of Murder and Robbery. Then we just add to that, for your attention, the translation of the witnesses and the cross-examination thereafter, of the November interrogation is confusing, it does not give the correct impression. Further more Adv von Lierres' attitude was that he would only, if he wanted to prosecute her, he would not do it based on statutory political offences, do you agree with that? MR KRITZINGER: Yes. I do not have personal knowledge of that, I was informed by Colonel Potgieter to that statement. I cannot remember that he said it to me directly, it is a deduction I made. MR DU PLESSIS: The high treason docket was handed to Adv von Lierres and according to his register it took place on 3 April 1989. I checked this personally. You don't know about that? MR KRITZINGER: No. I have no knowledge what happened to the docket. MR DU PLESSIS: I searched in the offices of the Attorney General but could not find it, this was during May 1979. They did sign for the receipt of the docket and no notes were made that the docket could have been handed to any other person or any other section. That is how I was informed by Colonel Potgieter. I also want to put it to you that Colonel Potgieter will say that all the dockets which are in possession of the Attorney General at the moment, that he has checked them and that he did not find this docket there either. MR KRITZINGER: I accept his word as such. MR DU PLESSIS: A few aspects that I would like to clarify. The high treason investigation, let me just make another statement. I want to say that Colonel Potgieter will testify that with regard to the high treason investigation, a docket was handed to the Attorney General where certain witnesses or certain people from whom they still had to obtain statements. He will also testify that the final step of this investigation would have been to do a complete interrogation of Mrs Mandela, to interrogate her completely. Do you have any knowledge of that? MR KRITZINGER: It is possible that it could have been like that, but seen in the view of the fact that Colonel Potgieter played the leading role, if that was his strategy, then I accept that is what he would have done. MR DU PLESSIS: The final decision to prosecute and how he would have prosecuted, would have rested with the Attorney General? MR KRITZINGER: That is correct. MR DU PLESSIS: He will also testify that Mrs Mandela and Zinzi Mandela in general refused to make statements regarding anything that they had been approached by by the Police? MR KRITZINGER: That is correct. MR DU PLESSIS: The only two statements that could be traced by Colonel Potgieter, you will find as Annexures JDP9 and JDP10 in Colonel Potgieter's statement. Annexure JPD9: is a statement by Zinzi Mandela, dated 2 March 1997. That is the only statement of hers that I could trace. Annexure JPD10: is a statement from Mrs Mandela which was not signed. MR KRITZINGER: Yes. May I just ask how is this relevant, to which matter? MR DU PLESSIS: The statement of Zinzi Mandela is relevant to the Scorpion pistol matter. I also want to put it to you that Colonel Potgieter with regard to the Scorpion matter, checked his diary and in his diary it seems that Seheri on 25 January 1989, was arrested? MR KRITZINGER: That can be so. I do not have the details in front of me. MR DU PLESSIS: I am sorry, 1987. MR KRITZINGER: Yes, I will agree with what you say. MR DU PLESSIS: The Scorpion weapon was found in Mrs Mandela's house on 27 February 1987 and he will testify further that as far as he can remember, the Scorpion pistol had nothing to do with the Seheri matter. MR KRITZINGER: I cannot recall that specifically, no. MR DU PLESSIS: Something else that I want to take up with you. Mr Chairman, ... you had the copies of Colonel Potgieter? CHAIRPERSON: No, we don't have it in front of us. MR DU PLESSIS: I beg your pardon, I was under a different impression. However, I will endeavour to enlighten you in respect of that and to refer you to that in respect of any aspect that you did not follow me about. CHAIRPERSON: I've got no problem so far. What I would argue is that if we are going to hear at length from Colonel Potgieter, I hope you will be fairly brief. MR DU PLESSIS: I am nearly finished Mr Chairman. I just want to put this so that certain aspects which have been raised which Colonel Potgieter might enlighten the Committee to and which might make questions in future in respect of other witnesses easier, that is the reason why I put his evidence now in respect of these aspects. MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Do you have any knowledge of tapes regarding telephone conversations which were tapped of Mrs Mandela, who are at present in possession of the Attorney General which would also been used in the further investigation in the high treason case? MR KRITZINGER: Yes, I have knowledge of that. MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Are there any other questions? Yes please Mr Semenya. MR SEMENYA: Thank you Mr Chairperson. The name is Semenya, I am acting for Mrs Madikizela-Mandela. Mr Kritzinger, I think when I listen to your evidence, you used the word Mrs Mandela was an untouchable. Am I not? MR KRITZINGER: That was my interpretation thereof, yes, that she was untouchable, that was the word that I used. MR SEMENYA: The other description to her given by Mr Richard is that she is of a special category, did you hear that evidence? MR KRITZINGER: No, I did not hear that specifically. But I accept that if you say that is Mr Richardson's evidence, then I accept your word for that. MR SEMENYA: Mr Vally says it seemed that she was treated with kitgloves, did you hear that? MR KRITZINGER: It is possible that I could have read this in the press, but I did not hear this specifically. CHAIRPERSON: To shorten things, Mr Vally, this morning suggested to you that Mrs Madikizela-Mandela was being treated with kitgloves by the Security Police? CHAIRPERSON: It had nothing to do with the press. MR KRITZINGER: That is correct. I just understood you incorrectly, but that is correct yes. MR SEMENYA: Let us try and ascertain to what extent then she was an untouchable. You tapped her telephones, did you not as Security Police? MR KRITZINGER: That was done yes. MR SEMENYA: And you invaded her privacy did you not? MR KRITZINGER: If you would like to see it in that way, yes, then I believe it is possible that her privacy was invaded if you say that we listened to her telephone conversations, it has to be mentioned that it was done with the necessary approval of Section 118 of the Act on Postal Facilities. I would concede that it was definitely an attack on her privacy. MR SEMENYA: So you do agree, you did invade her privacy, whether it was authorised or not is another question. MR KRITZINGER: Yes. I did not attack her privacy. The only way that I could have done this was by reading the transcriptions. If you want to suggest that by reading the transcriptions that I actually violated her privacy, then that is debatable. MR SEMENYA: It is not debatable that you are reading something about a person without her knowledge on matters which are personal, what is the debate there? MR KRITZINGER: No, that is why I say, that if you want to interpret it in this way, that by reading her taped conversations, then I agree that I could have violated her honour and her dignity and her privacy, yes. MR SEMENYA: All of this tapping was intended to find leads that can expose her to criminal activities, isn't that right? MR KRITZINGER: Criminal activities in the form of what? MR SEMENYA: You did not tap her telephone just surely to know who is coming to dinner that night, you must have done that with a view of obtaining information that can expose her to some criminal activity? Is that factually correct or not? MR KRITZINGER: Yes. That would have been so, yes, it could have been like that. MR SEMENYA: And if you found leads that would expose her to common law crimes, you would have investigated those common law crimes, isn't that right? MR KRITZINGER: Yes, we would have. If it was relevant to the Security Branch, yes. MR SEMENYA: Particularly because it was her. If you had conclusive evidence to arrest her, you would have done that, isn't that right? MR KRITZINGER: I am going to tell you quite honestly that I would not have arrested her. I would have once again as I have said previously, I would have discussed this with the Attorney General as I regarded her as a high profile person. MR SEMENYA: But if you had conclusive evidence that Mrs Mandela had shot somebody and killed her, you would have done the arrest, isn't that right? Or you would wait for the Attorney General? MR KRITZINGER: I believe that if I had those, the proof that she was guilty of murder and that it was related to the Security Police, I would have arrested her, yes. MR SEMENYA: And you would have made sure that she appears in court and she is prosecuted for that type of offence, isn't that correct also? MR SEMENYA: ... never any special treatment in the sense of putting her away from possibility of a prosecution and or conviction and or sentencing, isn't that correct? MR KRITZINGER: I did not understand your question quite properly. Could you just repeat this? MR SEMENYA: ... could not have been a policy position by the Security Department to treat Mrs Mandela different from all other agents that you are looking at, isn't that correct? MR KRITZINGER: Let me be honest with you. My whole interpretation regarding Mrs Madikizela-Mandela is that I would definitely not have just gone to arrest her. I would have brought her to the attention of my Divisional Commanding Officer and I believe, and this is merely my own interpretation and conclusion, that my Divisional Commanding Officer would have liaised with Head Office in Pretoria in order to inform them what actions were to follow. In my opinion she would not just have been arrested. She was as far as I was concerned, a person whom one had to deal with very carefully and I think that I would have had to have had instructions from Head Office in order to go and arrest her physically. This was the personal impression that I got while I was working at the Security Branch at Soweto. MR SEMENYA: ... Attorney General was in fact premised that no political trials would be advisable at that time, but surely if the Police had evidence of common law crimes, he would have prosecuted, isn't that right? MR KRITZINGER: That is possible, I don't know. It is a decision which rests with the Attorney General. MR SEMENYA: The point I am making is the very reason that the docket that was placed before him was not finally prosecuted, was not because of favouritism to her, but more importantly it was deemed imprudent to prosecute at that time in our political history. Political trials under the Internal Security Act, isn't that correct? MR KRITZINGER: I do not know if I understand your question correctly. Does this deal with political trials? MR SEMENYA: The reason why the prosecution was not made in respect of offences which are (indistinct) under the Internal Security Act, you would not deny it was because it was deemed imprudent to prosecute under that Act and in terms of the various sections of that Act, political offences at the time when there were negotiations with the various political parties? Are you able to dispute that? MR KRITZINGER: No, I don't think I will dispute that. MR SEMENYA: I have no further questions, Mr Chairperson. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Mr Kemp? MR KEMP: Mr Chairman, I have no questions for the witness. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hanif, I know, I have experience of your short questions which go on for hours, so I must ask you either we must adjourn and come back because the Commission is yet to put questions to the witness. I suggest that we hold your question till after tea and then I will put it to the Commission so that we can make some progress. We are now adjourned until five past eleven, thank you. CHAIRPERSON: Before I ask Mr Vally, I am asking the photographers a moment to take pictures, but we will continue our work. Before I ask Mr Vally, can I just make a plea to all concerned, myself as well, the witnesses, to the legal representatives, these microphones are extremely sensitive, so please don't touch them, it is not necessary to lean forward like that, they are very sensitive you can sit a little way from it. The only reason why I am mentioning this is because for audio and for recording and for radio the slightest jar will just about kill anybody whose got earphones on or who is listening on the other side, and this is live on radio. I would be grateful if you could be sensitive to that. Mr Vally, your brief question. MR VALLY: My two brief questions. The first one is Mr Kritzinger, we haven't had the opportunity to look at all the statements given to us, but I have seen three of the statements given to me. That is your statement, Mr Coetzee's statement and Mr de Jager's statement. All of you represented by Attorneys Wagener Muller & Du Plessis. What I would need to know is in compiling your statement, there is broad general denials. Did you people together, jointly prepare your statements, all the people represented at this hearing represented by Attorneys Wagener Muller & Du Plessis? MR KRITZINGER: I was upon occasion requested by the Attorney, Mr Kobus Muller to come and see him at Adv Kemp's offices. The first consultation I could not attend. I did upon occasion go and see him where were present the Adv Muller and the Attorney and Coetzee, myself, Colonel Potgieter. Sorry that was at Mr Wagener's office, upon which I once at a stage spoke, consulted alone with Mr Wagener. The second incident was at Adv Kemp's office and we consulted together as a group, that is correct. MR VALLY: So in other words the story that we are getting in your statements, is a joint story that you all have taken it upon yourself to assume the same position? MR KRITZINGER: If I understand you correctly, yes. Each statement is not the same. My statement is only relevant to the things that I know personally of the questions as set out in the subpoena. MR VALLY: Very briefly I am saying, did you people collude in your statements? CHAIRPERSON: May I just interrupt for a moment, I am sorry. Photographers please, stop now and move away. MR KRITZINGER: If I understand you correctly, no not colluding, definitely not. But that there was a joint consultation, that is correct. MR VALLY: Just to leave this matter, from the way your statements are phrased, from the phrases used in the statements it looks like you have colluded in your responses. Now I want to ask you a last question. Did it not serve the interest of the Security Branch in Soweto to have disruptive elements such as the Mandela United Football Club continuing the disruptive activity, did it not suit your interest to leave them to behave in the way they were behaving? CHAIRPERSON: Just repeat the question. MR VALLY: Did it not suit the interest of the Security Branch to leave the elements in Mandela United Football Club who were carrying out a reign of terror in tact rather than ensuring that they were prosecuted for example, that you were aware of their unlawful activities, you are aware of their criminal activities, but it suited you politically - I am talking about the Security Branch - to leave them to continue acting the way they were? MR KRITZINGER: If I was aware of the fact that the Mandela United Football Club was involved in activities, were guilty of Security related activities, then we would have launched an investigation. MR VALLY: Thank you Mr Chair, no further questions. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Dr Mgojo? DR MGOJO: Thank you sir. I am just going to ask a very short question because of the time, other wise I would ask many questions which are puzzling me. Maybe because I am a layman, I am not a lawyer. Was it a common policy or practice within the Security Branch Unit that if a person had a high profile, you had to wait for an instruction from the Attorney General to do the investigation or take these statements, before you did it? And tied up with that statement, in your knowledge, do you know of any other people who fell under that category? MR KRITZINGER: No, I have no personal knowledge of any other person who fell in that category. It is my personal observation and that is how I experienced it that I did not touch her without kitgloves and I waited for decisions from above, if it was necessary to confront her, I would have done so. But as has already been explained, my personal experience with her was that in any case, she would have refused to make any statement of whatever nature and if interrogated, she would just refuse to answer the questions. That is the perception that I had and I keep to that perception today, I still have that perception at this moment. MS SOOKA: Mr Kritzinger, I think that I just want to lay out two scenario's to you. You were the Investigating Officer on as we know, two matters. The one in which a gun was found at the home of Mrs Mandela. You were also the Investigating Officer on another matter where youth had their chests calved with inscriptions, Viva ANC, and you have knowledge of the fact that that happened at Mrs Mandela's home. You also admit in your statement that you read transcripts of the tapes that were made when her telephone was being monitored, so clearly there was a great deal of surveillance placed both over Mrs Mandela and the activities at her home and yet in spite of that, some of the most logical follow up procedures or as a lawyer I would think a logical, the interrogation of Mrs Mandela and her daughter, either taking a statement from her, these things didn't happen. Would you agree then that the only two conclusions that one can draw. One, that either there was just very sloppy Police work, and quite frankly in terms of what we know of the activities of the Security Branch during that time, it clearly cannot be that conclusion, so therefore the only other conclusion that one can actually lead to is that it suited the Security Branch to have Mrs Mandela and her Football Club to continue operating in this fashion. Because you did nothing about it. MR SEMENYA: Chairperson, the Commissioner is saying Mrs Mandela was continuing in this fashion. What fashion is she referring to? MS SOOKA: I think that what I am referring to are that there were activities taking place in the home of Mrs Mandela, which could either lead to an investigation of Mrs Mandela, her own involvement possibly in these activities, but nothing happened at the level of the Police. I am putting it to Mr Kritzinger they wanted the situation to carry on, where the Mandela Footfall Club or members of it, continued participating in criminal activity. MR KRITZINGER: At this stage both scenario's that have been sketched, I would like to deny this categorically. I think that the Security Branch and especially the Investigating Unit which I am proud to have been a member, did everything in its ability to protect the community of Soweto and the investigations we launched regarding Mrs Mandela, I think that this is a story that has been repeatedly mentioned. I want to mention again that she wasn't a person simply to be approached. One must take into consideration that at that stage, she was the wife of President Mandela. I think that it is an armchair approach to now point a finger and say that we wanted violence to continue. It was just a matter of you could just not approach her. As I have repeatedly said, she showed you the door and she would in any case, her Attorney would have advised her not to have any contact with us or consultation with us. So that is not true. I keep to the evidence that I have given that she was a person in a totally different category. MR NTSEBEZA: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Kritzinger I just want to find out whether what came out in the translation with reference to paragraph 3, I think the translation said you attached to the Security Branch in Soweto from September 1984 to 16 April 1994. It was obviously an error. If the translation as I heard it was saying 1994, it was an error, is that correct? MR KRITZINGER: Yes, that is an error. It must read that during the period 3 September 1984 to 16 April 1991 I was working at the Security Branch in Soweto. If I read incorrectly, I apologise for that. MR NTSEBEZA: Further, I would like to understand your testimony. You were asked if in the Oupa Seheri matter you did any follow up investigation from a Security standpoint and I think you said you did. Is that correct? MR KRITZINGER: That is correct yes. MR NTSEBEZA: Without going into detail, would you agree that in the circumstances it would have been possible for instance to charge Mrs Mandela in the light of those facts? We are for instance harbouring a terrorist in terms of the Internal Security Act? MR KRITZINGER: Once again, this is my personal opinion. I am convinced that there is a prima facie case in the Oupa Seheri matter where Mrs Mandela could have been prosecuted successfully. MR NTSEBEZA: Yes, no, no, I agree with you, you could have also persuaded the Attorney General to have preferred for instance charges of furthering the aims and objects of terrorism in so far as she, you know, was keeping a person like Oupa Seheri knowingly at her premises, if that was your investigative evidence, is that correct? MR KRITZINGER: Yes. I could only make such recommendations to the Attorney General, but as it is generally know, prosecution does not lay in my hands, but such a recommendation I cannot remember whether I made such a recommendation, but that is all that I could have done, is to make a recommendation. MR NTSEBEZA: Thank you, I just wanted to be very clear that I understand that evidence. If I understand you well, firstly it would have been politically incorrect at that time, for all the reasons that you have given, to prefer charges in terms of the Internal Security Act as you understood Adv von Lierres to have been meaning. Was that your understanding that if she was charged in terms of the Internal Security Act, it would have been a problematic prosecution? MR KRITZINGER: I am convinced of that yes, and that is in agreement with the statement that you made, yes. MR NTSEBEZA: Now, that is the one view. The other view of course is that and I would like to understand, get from you I don't say you said this, the other theory that is associated with absence of action by the Security Police, is that Mrs Madikizela-Mandela herself was working with the Security Police, what is your views? What are your views in that regard? MR KRITZINGER: That is news that I am hearing here today. I am not aware of that and I have no personal knowledge of the fact that she could have worked with the Security Police. I have no knowledge of that fact. If you want my personal opinion, I would say that I deny this categorically. I cannot believe it to be true. MR NTSEBEZA: Finally, the third theory would be that so-called honey pot theory, that it was in the interest of the Security Police to let her be because these guerillas which you in your terrorist tracking unit were wanting to get, would continue to stream to her place and because you had her place under surveillance, you would be able to get them then. What is your comment on that? MR KRITZINGER: I don't believe that is true. Once again, it is my personal opinion that that is not true. I do not believe that there is any member of the South African Police Service who would just want to leave people alone, be it to create political unrest and by doing so to endanger their own lives and to see people being killed. I do not believe that there is any substance in that argument. MS MKHIZE: Sir, I am not looking for factual information but I would just like to know your explanation or when looking back, how would you explain not having any information on a high political profile person like Mrs Madikizela-Mandela and the youth which surrounded itself around her, especially during the years 1984 to mid-1980's to the late 1980's, which is the time when there was intensified hostility and conflict between the liberation movement and the State? MR KRITZINGER: I am afraid I didn't follow your question, I didn't get an idea what you want me to answer on this actually. MS MKHIZE: I just want to get your views as to how do you explain that. I am not asking for factual information. I suppose by now you are beginning to reflect, you are aware that the Commission is interested in what happened around that time, at that particular place and you seem not to have much information. Surely you are beginning to reflect to see and to think about where you might have lost an opportunity of getting critical information about a high profile person like her, in a place where you were located during those years in particular? MR KRITZINGER: If I have understood it correctly, that is once again the fact that I am convinced that there was sufficient information regarding Mrs Madikizela-Mandela in order to prosecute her successfully in any court of law. That is my personal opinion. With all information that we have at our disposal, with the docket that was available. Whether it was politically orientated or whether there were criminal activities which could have been added, which were investigated by other departments, I am convinced of the fact that there were sufficient grounds to prosecute her successfully, but as a result of the high profile person that she is, I think it is an explanation that the Attorney General will have to give as to why he decided not to prosecute. That is my humble opinion as according to how I read the dockets and cases that were put together. I am of the opinion that there was sufficient evidence to prosecute her successfully. MS MKHIZE: Actually my question really relates not so much to information which warranted persecution, it pertains to information which might help the Commission in terms of understanding what exactly was happening around her at that time, especially around the cases which have been put forward before you. So we haven't been really looking for that kind of information which you are having in mind. The questions which people have been raising is that you seem not to be helpful in giving whatever information you might have had around that time, not so much information which warranted persecution. MR KRITZINGER: If I understand you correctly, I was summonsed to appear in front of this Commission and the statement which was prepared, was mainly directed at the eight aspects mentioned in the subpoena and this statement and I have only been advised to testify to that, if there are any other facts which have to be made public, which I could testify about, again I say that I am willing to do so as long as I can be given the opportunity to just as in die Oupa Alex Seheri case. This is a case that took place a long time ago and it places me in a very bad position as I am the Investigating Officer and I cannot remember all the details. I would like to be given the opportunity to go through all those dockets again, to refresh my memory and if there is any other information, that you feel that I could give to this Commission, then I would gladly do so. That which has been asked of me and put to me here, I am afraid my answers is the only way in which I can assist this Commission. DR RANDERA: Senior Superintendent, my question is really trying to look at the future. The overwhelming impression I go away without listening to you, is that there seems to be one set of rules for yourself and I can't talk about other people, for yourself, when it came to investigating ordinary terrorists, let put it that way and there seem to be another set of rules for high profile terrorists and I would put, you know a lot of people would fall into that category and at the time that expression would have also applied to Mrs Madikizela-Mandela. Now, my question therefore to you is is that a prevailing attitude that has been taken into our new dispensation and if it is, what are the checks and balances that can be brought into play so that these things don't happen again because clearly as so many people have commented already, you fell very short in terms of the investigative work that you did at the time? MR KRITZINGER: ... case, what case are you referring to? DR RANDERA: Sorry, Senior Superintendent, I don't want to go over the work that Mr Vally has done already. I think if we can just deal with the impression that I have, rather than to go back to the specific? MR KRITZINGER: If I understand you correctly, then I want to agree that investigations were done with the ordinary terrorists and when it came to Mrs Mandela there was another method of investigation, as to the fact that she was not approached. This is my personal way of doing things. By means of example I would also like to mention that if we wanted to visit her house, we had to get permission from Head Office as to whether we were permitted or not, so I want to qualify that by saying that she was a high profile person. I do not believe that there is any doubt regarding that argument. As far as the future is concerned, if I understand you correctly, it is my wish that everyone will be treated equally and that if a person has a high profile, that person will not be treated any differently and I also want to ask the Commission to assist me and to say that not even Mr P.W. Botha has been treated any differently and he is also definitely a high profile person. So my argument is yes, that in future everybody should be treated equally. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. I only have one question which has been touched upon, but I want to ask it. Mrs Madikizela-Mandela received a great deal of attention from the Security Police. You've already conceded that whether it be tapping her phone, surveillance or whatever. There are those who would go further and say that the Security Police did not see Mrs Madikizela-Mandela as a very popular figure in terms of their own feelings and views about what was happening and the future of the country and so on. Indeed there would be those who have stated that she was a risk to the country and that because of her stance, viz-a-vie the government, she was dangerous. What I find quite incredible, is that if this is the case, that the actions you did not take in terms of securing a statement, can only be on the grounds of instructions given to you. Now, you have alluded to that. I want to ask you quite specifically did you at any time receive from any source, either your Commanding Officer, from Headquarters, from the Attorney General, from the politicians of the day, did you receive and your colleagues, any instruction not to take statements from Mrs Madikizela-Mandela? MR KRITZINGER: At no stage did I myself receive such an instruction. And nobody ever gave me an instruction not to obtain a statement from her. If I can just elaborate on this, regarding the court orientated investigations which I was tasked, I did not receive an instruction specifically from the office of the Attorney General to take a statement from her. CHAIRPERSON: So the decision not to take statements from her, was your own decision? MR KRITZINGER: I would concede that it was my own decision and the explanation I have already given is a personal experience and that she would not have given a statement in any case. CHAIRPERSON: But for heaven's sake, there are many, many instances where the Security Police simply detained people who refused to co-operate? MR KRITZINGER: That is correct. As I have already said in the investigation in which she was implicated and I am referring regularly to the Attorney General, but if he thought it was necessary for a statement to be obtained from her, we would have attempted to do so. The Attorney General never found it necessary for us to obtain a statement from her. CHAIRMAN: It does seem to me that what you are saying is that whilst you received no specific instruction, it was your understanding that you yourself would be very unpopular if you went and took statements from Mrs Madikizela-Mandela? MR KRITZINGER: Yes. I don't care whether I am popular or not, that wasn't relevant to me at that stage. If I had to go to her in the course of investigations that I did, I did visit her home but where I was really and truly shown the door. So it is not a question of being popular or not. As far as I was concerned, a crime had been committed and it had to be investigated to the best of our abilities and the docket was handed to the Attorney General and if there are any deficits or shortfalls in the investigation, he would have decided that further investigation would have had to be done, be it physical investigation or the obtaining of statements from evidence or whatever the case may be. MR KEMP: Mr Chairperson, there is only one aspect. Mr Kritzinger, the compilation of the docket with more than 30 offences against Mrs Madikizela-Mandela, what was the purpose of the compilation of that docket? MR KRITZINGER: The whole purpose of compiling that docket was that and this is once again my personal experience, that she had a free hand, and the word that I used untouchable, that is actually unacceptable that a person could be involved in so many activities and that nothing was ever done to her. The docket was compiled in order to present it to the Attorney General for him to make a decision whether as to prosecute or not. MR KEMP: Mr Chairman, I have no further questions. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. MR SEMENYA: Chairperson, if I may. CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but you must be brief because you've had an opportunity. Please go ahead. MR SEMENYA: Thank you Chairperson. I am just referring to something that you said quite recently now, that you are convinced that there was sufficient evidence to prosecute her successfully. MR KRITZINGER: That is correct, that is my opinion that there was sufficient evidence in the compilation of the docket in order to prosecute her successfully. MR SEMENYA: Successfully prosecute her for what offence? MR KRITZINGER: I think that in general as we have already said the whole compilation of the docket dealt with high treason, in the general sense, by that I am not saying that she would have been found guilty. There would have been many other charges of possession of firearms and there would have been a number of complaints which could have arisen from that specific docket. Once again, it lies in the hands of the Attorney General to decide which charges would be filed if he wanted to prosecute. MR SEMENYA: My question is a very simple one, she could have been successfully prosecuted of what offence? MR KRITZINGER: I think that I replied to your question, I said that there could be a main complaint or charge of high treason and many other alternative charges. It is difficult for me to say now particularly of what. In brief I would say of high treason. MR SEMENYA: After 1990 she could have been prosecuted of high treason, successfully you say? MR KRITZINGER: I cannot recall specifically when the docket was handed to the Attorney General, if I can just refresh my memory. I do not remember exactly when the docket was handed to the Attorney General. MR SEMENYA: On one of the records it is 3rd of April 1989. This is the time that you say she could have been successfully prosecuted of high treason? MR KRITZINGER: That is correct. MR SEMENYA: That is your final answer? MR KRITZINGER: That is my final answer, yes. MR SEMENYA: I've got no further questions. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Mr Kritzinger, thank you for your attendance and for your evidence, you may now stand down. MR KRITZINGER: Thank you Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: I call Wilhelm Johannes Coetzee. Welcome, good morning, thank you for (indistinct) WILHELM JOHANNES COETZEE: (sworn states) CHAIRPERSON: Mr Kemp, you are representing Mr Coetzee? MR KEMP: Mr Chairperson, I represent all the witnesses who will testify today and as with the previous witness, there is also a short statement which will be read into the evidence. Mr Chairman, I stated at the commencement of these proceedings that these statements were drawn in a (indistinct) manner and addressing the issues specifically mentioned in the subpoenas. I have also mentioned at the outset that there is no objection to any other questions being asked of these witnesses as far as they relate to these proceedings, and that they will assist this Commission as far as possible. May I proceed, Mr Chairperson? Mr Coetzee, would you please read the statement into the record which is in front of you? MR COETZEE: "I, the undersigned Wilhelm Johannes Coetzee, declare under oath as follows. I was a Lieutenant Colonel in the then Police Services. The contents of this statement fall within my personal knowledge, unless otherwise stated and are correct and true according to my best knowledge. I was from 3 April 1981 up to 31 December 1987 attached to the Security Branch, Soweto. I was initially attached to another branch in Soweto. This included inquiries, information etc. Later I was used for the collection of information gathering and in that component. When I reached the Security Branch, I was a Warrant Officer and was promoted to the rank of Captain when I left. I was advised not to give details of my career, more careers. I deal with the matters mentioned in the subpoena. The interrogation and the death of Sithole. I believe that the incidents referred to took place in 1990. I have no knowledge of the interrogation or the death of Sizwe Sithole. Use and handling of informers as sources associated with the Mandela United Football Club. During my time in Soweto I was not involved with any tasks relating to Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela or the Mandela United Football Club. Mrs Mandela's premises were on the eastern side of Soweto and did not fall within the area for which I had a primary responsibility. I am naturally aware of it, that the Security Branch made use of informers and I myself, made use of informers. I am not personally involved of any informers which were specifically associated with Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela or the Mandela United Football Club. I am aware that information regarding Mrs Mandela was received from time to time from a great number of various sources as it was received about other people as well. The kidnapping, assault and murder of Stompie Seipei in 1988. In the stage that these things took place, I was no longer attached to the Security Branch Soweto and I have no personal knowledge of these incidents. The relation between the Safety Branch, Murder and Robbery, STRATCOM divisions and other Units in the South African Police with regard to matters relating to Mrs Mandela and the Football Club. During the time that I was working at Soweto Security Branch, there was no STRATCOM component at Soweto. My Unit operated covertly and in that regard, did not co-operate in the same way with other Units of the South African Police Services. Any liaison which did take place, would only have happened at a very senior post level. To the best of my knowledge, the whole STRATCOM idea only found its basis in 1989 on a national level, that is. The use of intelligence material and the relationship with the Intelligence Agencies with regard to matters regarding Mrs Mandela and the Mandela United Football Club. I have no knowledge of any such material and I am not aware of any position I think, with regard to Mrs Winnie Mandela and the Football Club. The interrogation of Themba Johannes Mabotha. I am advised that this matter took place during 1989, I have no personal knowledge of the interrogation or the death of Themba Johannes Mabotha. Information with regard to observations or monitoring including telephone tapping, bugging, etc in connection with matters relating to Mrs Madikizela-Mandela and the Mandela United Football Club. I know that tapping of Mrs Mandela's telephone conversations took place at her home. However, I never went to her home, never was there. As far as I know, also there was never at any stage permanent monitoring of Mrs Mandela or her Football Club. The killing of Pretorius and two MK members, Maleleke and Mbenenge. These also took place once I had already left Soweto and I have no personal knowledge thereof. MR KEMP: Thank you Mr Chairman. MR VALLY: Mr Coetzee, which section of the Security Branch in Soweto were you a member of? MR COETZEE: The Intelligence gathering component. MR VALLY: Would you gather intelligence through informants as well? MR COETZEE: Could you repeat the question for me please. MR VALLY: Would you gather intelligence through informers as well? MR VALLY: Did you have informers in the Madikizela-Mandela household? MR VALLY: Did you receive any reports from any informers whatsoever regarding Mrs Madikizela-Mandela? MR COETZEE: That is possible, but only on a ad hoc to which people did not have access. MR VALLY: I am not sure if I understand your answer. Let me get some clarity. At the time you left the Soweto Security Branch in 1987, you were then a Detective Major? MR COETZEE: Can you please repeat the question, I cannot hear you. MR VALLY: Do you want to wear the headphones? At the time you left the Soweto Security Branch, on the 31st of December 1987, you were a Detective Major? MR VALLY: This was a fairly senior rank in Soweto? MR VALLY: Therefore a lot of the information that came through to the Security Branch, especially if you were involved in Intelligence gathering, would have been directed to you? MR COETZEE: I would like to explain here with regard to the Information gathering component. The following aspects will be highlighted, that there were Officers in charge above me in rank who acted at that stage as Information Managers. We had a specific role, task and function and we operated within that role, task and function at that stage. MR VALLY: What specifically was your role, task and function? MR COETZEE: My role, task and function were the gathering of military or MK structures' activities. MR VALLY: Did you gather intelligence information that Mrs Madikizela-Mandela was in any way involved with MK structures? MR COETZEE: No. We had no access. My Unit and myself, not my information network had no access to that. MR VALLY: After you left Soweto and went to Pretoria, were you still monitoring Intelligence gathering in Soweto? MR COETZEE: That was not primarily my function and role, but I was allowed to do it. MR VALLY: Did you in fact do it? MR VALLY: So you would have had information from Intelligence sources in Soweto even after 1987? MR VALLY: At the time that you were in Pretoria, did you get any Intelligence, any information from your sources or from your intelligence gathering capacity in Soweto regarding MK activities around the Madikizela-Mandela household? MR VALLY: So you knew nothing about the Oupa Seheri case? MR VALLY: You weren't even aware that a trained MK cadre had murdered two people and that a Scorpion machine pistol was found in Mrs Madikizela-Mandela's house? MR COETZEE: My task, role and function after 1987 was more training oriented and at that stage I only placed agents and informants from a training point of view operationally with a view to court oriented activities. I was a low profile agent with very limited access, an explanation. MR VALLY: I will get some clarity on that just now, it sounds rather confusing. What you said is you were still monitoring intelligence reports coming from Soweto. You are now a Detective Major, you are sitting in Police Headquarters in Pretoria. Here is a matter which went to court, here is a matter where there is a machine pistol found in Mrs Madikizela-Mandela's house, here is a matter where there is an allegation that a trained ANC cadre had at some point been in Mrs Madikizela-Mandela's house. Are you telling you that this information was not forwarded to Pretoria, to Police Headquarters? MR COETZEE: At this stage I want to say it is possible that I might have had such information notes, have read such notes upon occasion, but my role and function after 1987 were more trained oriented. Training agents and informer handlers. I want to correct your impression. In a very limited way only was I allowed to continue monitoring certain court oriented investigations. These matters that you refer to did not fall within those specific monitoring actions. MR VALLY: Mr Coetzee, I specifically chose a matter which went to court. I will chose another one which went to court, the assault on the Makanda brothers. This is the case where they were allegedly carved up with certain slogans and they had battery acid put into their wounds, and this incident allegedly took place in Mrs Madikizela-Mandela's house. This matter also went to court. I have now cited two matters, were you aware of this matter at all? MR VALLY: So nothing actually reached you? MR COETZEE: Involvement wise and collection wise, no. I may upon occasion have read information notes around these specific aspects, but I would like to point out that at Head Office there was a Desk Supervisor from an Information Management point of view and my role, task and function were directed more at training, recruitment and placement of agents and fellow handlers. MR VALLY: Let's talk about that. I will come back to the former question in a short while. Did you train specific informers for specific tasks? MR COETZEE: I trained informants not in specific fields, training is training generally. Let's say groups or military structures have to infiltrated, the same methods are used. MR VALLY: Who was the most prominent political activist in Soweto at the time? At the time that you were in Soweto? MR COETZEE: There were various. MR VALLY: Was Mrs Madikizela-Mandela one of the most prominent political activists at that time in Soweto? MR VALLY: Would you want to place an informer in her household if you could? MR VALLY: Did you train someone to be an informer to be placed in her household? MR COETZEE: There is a reason, since I arrived in Soweto I was part of the West and my information was from the west. There was also a group of persons responsible for the eastern side of Soweto and I would like to refer to Colonel Claassen, Colonel Grundling and members. These persons were responsible primarily in that area. In other words they would have been responsible for the gathering of information relating to suspects in their area. MR VALLY: You are confusing two different issues. I will come back to this issue as well, but my question is you are now sitting in Police Headquarters in Pretoria. You are specifically training agents or informers. You have told us that one of the most prominent activists, political activists in Soweto was Mrs Madikizela-Mandela. My question to you was specifically this, did you train any informers to be placed in the Madikizela-Mandela household or close to her? MR COETZEE: No. The training of agents is the pre-phase of placement and when you have trained your agents, you place them on a ground level for connection purposes with a non-active information phase. These agents then transferred to other units which continued placement of them according to analysis, needs analysis in a specific investigation. MR VALLY: We know that the Soweto Security Branch infiltrated a number of MK units which were infiltrating Soweto from Botswana, are you aware of this? MR VALLY: And did any of these Units that you infiltrated from Botswana, wherein you had informers, did any of them had contact with Mrs Madikizela-Mandela? MR COETZEE: No, according to the best of my knowledge, negative. MR VALLY: As a Major in the Security Branch and being responsible for intelligence gathering, you would have had regular briefings together with your colleagues who are responsible for the eastern part of Soweto, would you not? MR COETZEE: Sorry, I missed the question sir. Could you please repeat the question. MR VALLY: Sure. You stated a number of times that you were responsible for the western part of Soweto and Mrs Madikizela-Mandela lived in the eastern part of Soweto. Is that correct? MR VALLY: Now, what about the time when Mrs Madikizela-Mandela lived in Orlando-West, did that fall under your area? MR COETZEE: I want to put it clearly that when I started in Soweto, I was part of the west. There were two information component branches under two Officers in charge. At that stage already I was a part of the west and all my informations, activities with the west as geographic basis, came through the west as geographic basis and not through the east. I in person never had informers with regard to Mrs Mandela and had she moved to the west, I would not have tasked informers with regard to her. I pointed out just now that according to my knowledge there were a group of persons who performed the activities, monitored the activities of Mrs Mandela carefully in that time, that was their responsibility. And therefore I did not task any informers with regard to Mrs Mandela and I was working with foreign MK overall activities. MR VALLY: You mean that you never exchanged information with your colleagues about what happened in one part of Soweto? You strictly stuck to your part of Soweto? MR COETZEE: No. There was in the beginning when we were part of the overt information component, there was information in the morning around a conference table, we exchanged information but I must say information I cannot say today whether it was substantiated information. I am also referring to a time when we began to generate more covert information and moving out of the normal structure. MR VALLY: It is absolutely not clear to me why you can't answer a simple question. You had daily briefings, your Unit's task is specifically to recruit and place informers. On the basis of your daily briefings, were you or were you not aware that informers had been placed close to or within the Madikizela-Mandela household? MR COETZEE: I speak under correction, but I think Mrs Mandela's restriction orders were lifted. I don't know when, but I want to say that at that stage we had already at that stage, been operating on a more covert basis and I had an order from a Colonel de Jager with myself as Operational Commanding Officer, I did not receive such tasks from Colonel de Jager with regard to Mrs Mandela. And Colonel de Jager in his turn would have liaised with his equal and coordinated the information on that basis. MR VALLY: During your briefings were you ever made aware of the fact that an informer had been placed near or in the Madikizela-Mandela household? MR COETZEE: I would like to get back to one aspect. One, I did not attend meetings daily. Two, you must understand the informants' methods that handlers would never admit or identify an informer to his colleagues in terms of his access or his placement. MR VALLY: Who were the people who monitored Mrs Madikizela-Mandela? MR COETZEE: That I can remember from the meetings that I did attend, was Colonel Claassen who was at that stage the information or component head of the east and at that stage, today, Colonel Piet Grundling and members under the direct command and leadership. What happened was that from time to time ... MR VALLY: Your statement ended abruptly from time to time, did you say more? MR COETZEE: I cannot hear you. According to me Colonel Claassen and Colonel Grundling with members under their command were responsible for the east. And in terms of their area to monitor suspects, of the members were transferred, it was not a constant unit of members that were permanently there. Members were from time to time transferred or they left and that is what I mean by the members varied from time to time. MR VALLY: I would appreciate it Mr Coetzee if you gave me a specific answer to a specific question. In the time when you were in Soweto, who was in charge of the section where Mrs Madikizela-Mandela lived? We are talking about the section that ... MR VALLY: Now, are you aware at all of MK guerillas going to Mrs Madikizela-Mandela's house, either the one at Orlando-West or the one in Diepkloof Extension? MR COETZEE: I would like to put it this way. The activities of MK members were a general subject of discussion and it is possible that I had upon occasion heard from a member or someone of a specific MK member or MK members who associated themselves with Mrs Mandela or who functioned under her auspices. MR VALLY: You were personally aware of this? MR COETZEE: I was aware, but I had no access. MR VALLY: Are you aware in your daily briefing sessions, whether a decision was made by the senior officers in your Unit that these issues needed to be followed up? MR COETZEE: There were many rumours around the monitoring of her activities, as I said. Much information that I cannot tell you whether it was substantiated. I am aware of the fact and I heard upon occasion as already referred to by Kritzinger, that they were busy with a court oriented investigation against Mrs Mandela. MR VALLY: Had you people at the stage you were in Soweto, infiltrated the Soweto Youth Congress? MR VALLY: Are you aware of divisions with in the Soweto Youth Congress which subsequently led to the formation of the Mandela United Football Club? MR VALLY: Are you aware of members of the Soweto Youth Congress who later became members of the Mandela United Football Club? MR COETZEE: I would, I think that I heard of members of the Youth who formed part of the Football Club concerned. MR VALLY: So were the informers that you had placed within the Soweto Youth Congress also now placed within the Mandela United Football Club? MR VALLY: Did you subsequently, or your colleagues subsequently try and infiltrate informers into the Mandela United Football Club? MR COETZEE: I would like to put it this way. In the information compilation component, I am not aware of any member in our charge tasked by Colonel de Jager and myself to place agents in the specific Football Club. MR VALLY: Were you aware that the Mandela United Football Club had been linked to a number of illegal activities in Soweto? MR COETZEE: I know of rumours, but I cannot confirm it. It was in the late 1987's. MR VALLY: If you are aware of such rumours, why informers within the Mandela United Football Club to determine the veracity of such rumours? MR COETZEE: At that stage as I have already said, I was not primary tasked with that. We were overloaded already with the monitoring of foreign MK activities and related structures. MR VALLY: Did the Soweto Security Branch conduct joint operations with the members of Vlakplaas? MR COETZEE: Please repeat the question. MR VALLY: Did the Soweto Security Branch conduct joint operations with the members of Vlakplaas? MR COETZEE: Yes, via Head Office. MR VALLY: Did this joint operations take place both within Soweto and outside Soweto? MR VALLY: Both within Soweto and outside Soweto? MR COETZEE: Outside of Soweto. MR VALLY: Are you aware of a joint operation between Vlakplaas and the Soweto Security Branch wherein an assault took place on an askari at a police farm near Marble Hall? MR VALLY: Are you aware of a farm near Marble Hall that was used by the Security Branch? MR VALLY: Are you aware of Vlakplaas operating within Soweto jointly with the Security Branch wherein people were assaulted and tortured? MR VALLY: Are you aware of any MK guerillas who you may have infiltrated who had come via Soweto who had been put into safe houses by Mrs Madikizela-Mandela? MR COETZEE: I only heard of that, I cannot confirm it. I don't have any access to those sources in that field. MR VALLY: Would you not assume if there was such serious allegations against a prominent activist, that there would be some kind of operation planned wherein you can get more information about the issue? MR COETZEE: That is possible yes. MR VALLY: This was primarily your task, this is primarily why your Unit existed. Surely this would be primarily what they would be doing? They would be identifying people who would be helping out MK cadres who came back into the country. Why do you say possible, isn't it probable that it would happen? MR COETZEE: Because I want to refer to Colonel Kritzinger's remarks. The investigation unit was at that stage busy with investigations in co-operation with the anti-insurgents component. I had been already transferred to another front and because of limited manpower, I could not do everything. That I had done, I had to finish off and then I left Soweto in 1987. MR VALLY: You say that you were involved in more covert activities. Can you give us some details of these covert activities you were involved in? MR COETZEE: This is very important for any informant when you infiltrate military components, to look at the person's security operational background and this led at the end of the day, to the fact that we also became more covert within the Branch in order to protect the identities of these persons. I think that is only right. I would like to ...(tape ends) ... MR VALLY: ... a Security Branch member? Did you know him? MR COETZEE: I was at that stage no longer in Soweto. I understand he was a junior member, a new member and I had no physical contact with the member concerned. MR VALLY: As the handler of an informer, did you give him any training? CHAIRPERSON: Mr Vally, are you going to finish now please? MR VALLY: I will be no more than five minutes Mr Chairman. Paragraph 5, your last sentence, you state you are aware that there were a large number of different sources of information regarding Mrs Madikizela-Mandela from a wide variety of people. This is how I understand what you are saying. Is that correct? MR VALLY: The Security Branch had lots of information about the activities of Mrs Madikizela-Mandela from these sources, did they not? MR COETZEE: I would say primarily the Branch's capacity was primarily seated in the tapping of her telephone lines. MR VALLY: And so you would be aware of whatever happened in her household that she spoke about on the telephone? MR COETZEE: To an extent, yes. MR VALLY: You would be aware of also any other bugging devices that were connected via her telephone but not solely dependent on the telephone being used? Do you understand my question? MR COETZEE: Yes, but I can't comment because I did not have anything to do with the technical part or the implementing of that aspect. MR VALLY: Were you ever instructed or were you aware of any Security Branch person ever being instructed to go easy on Mrs Madikizela-Mandela? You heard Mr Kritzinger say that one did not approach Mrs Madikizela-Mandela, one handled her very carefully - he was even frightened to take a statement from her. Were you aware of any such express of implicit instruction? MR VALLY: Thank you Mr Coetzee. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. That was actually less than five minutes, I congratulate you warmly. Are there any questions, Mr Richards? In each case, just to help us, even though we know who you are, if you would state the name for the record please. MR RICHARDS: Thank you Chairperson, Tony Richards. Sir, I have great difficulty in understanding what you are saying. I am having difficulty in understanding what you are saying. From what you have said, I gather that you didn't get any information about the goings on at Mrs Madikizela-Mandela's house, is that correct? MR COETZEE: This is not the field of work. This Unit worked day and night, we worked on underground structures of which Mrs Mandela did not part of our focus point, and one must keep in mind that we had limited manpower. MR RICHARDS: Thank you. Now, if you didn't get the information as the person responsible for the information and intelligence gathering, who did? MR COETZEE: As I have already pointed out, there were specific persons as far as I know, who monitored her activities closely and who would also have been responsible to ensure that her activities were monitored, but the fact that the Soweto Security Branch used technical aids, is an indication to me personally that there was a lack of access and I want to go so far as to say that the Soweto Security Branch and the involved members, whom I have already identified, did not really have access to Mrs Mandela and the people surrounding Mrs Mandela. That is why we used the technical aids. MR RICHARDS: But who physically received the information, analyzed it and processed it, there must be a name to that person? MR COETZEE: Two persons, Colonel de Jager and Bosman. MR RICHARDS: Thank you, no further questions. CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please go ahead. MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairman, maybe I must just put myself on record, I am Schalk Hugo from the firm Solomon Nicolson Rein & Verster, and I am acting on behalf on Eugene Alexander de Kock, and I have no questions for this particular witness. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Any other questions. MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I have no further questions. DR MGOJO: Thank you sir. I have to ask questions because some of the documents here are in Afrikaans, I don't understand Afrikaans. You must bear with me. As a matter of logic here really, when you tap somebody's phone, you want to achieve something. And of course you have already said that Mama Mandela was not, could not be touched, you could not even access to her and so you had to use the technical aids. My main question is did this technical aids achieve anything with respect to the security of the country which you wanted to monitor? MR COETZEE: Mr Chairman, I was not involved in the motivation to obtain authorisation in order to tap her phone or to place any other instrument. I have already pointed out to the Committee that I did not monitor her activities personally as a result of a great deal I had to to at another terrain. The persons who could comment on the contribution from the technical view point, would only be the information management and the Commanding Officer of the Information component. MR KEMP: Mr Chairperson, I have no further questions. CHAIRPERSON: This is an important question that you should have asked earlier, I will give you leeway now, but not again. MR VALLY: Thank you Mr Chairperson. It has just been pointed out to me that in response to Mr Richards' question, Mr Coetzee's microphone was off and it is important that that be put on record. The question was, which police Officers would have had overall coordination of information which came in and although Mr Coetzee did answer that question, it wasn't on record. CHAIRPERSON: Could you just repeat those two names Mr Coetzee, that you gave us earlier. MR COETZEE: Colonel de Jager and Colonel Bosman, that I want to add he was a technical man and the last man, the Investigative Commanding Officer. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Vally for your help. MR VALLY: The name please of the last person. CHAIRPERSON: Do you have the name of the last person? MR COETZEE: There were several Commanding Officers of the Investigating Unit. In this case I would like to then refer to Colonel Potgieter. CHAIRPERSON: Right, than concludes the evidence and the questions. Thank you very much Mr Coetzee, for being here and for answering the questions. You are free to stand down, thank you. I call Lodewyk de Jager. Welcome and good afternoon Mr de Jager. Would you please give attendance to Ms Sooka for the administration of the oath, thank you. LODEWYK DE JAGER: (sworn states) CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much Mr de Jager. Mr Kemp, we know that you represent Mr de Jager, he has his statement in front of him, shall I just ask him to read it? MR KEMP: Mr Chairperson, that will be in order. May I just ask Mr Chairperson, all these witnesses have been subpoenaed to remain in attendance until Friday. Those who have already testified, are they excused or do they have to remain in attendance until the end of the session? CHAIRPERSON: They may be excused. MR KEMP: Thank you Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr de Jager. I understand that you have a statement that you will read into the record, won't you please go ahead. MR DE JAGER: (No translation into English) I became a member of the Security Branch of the South African Police in 1971 and remained in that Unit. CHAIRPERSON: Can we proceed now, are the translators all right? Thank you very much. MR DE JAGER: I am a Colonel and former member of the South African Police. I am at present a business man of Cape Town. The contents of this statement falls within my personal knowledge, unless otherwise stated and is to the best of my knowledge true and correct. On the 29th of March 1965 I entered the service of the South African Police. I became a member of the Security Branch of the SAP in 1971 and remained a member of that Unit until my retirement on 31 January 1995. On 12 December 1984, I was transferred to the Security Branch Soweto where I served until 29 December 1988. With my transfer to Soweto I had the rank of Captain and during my transfer I was, I had the rank of Major. I was advised that it was not necessary to give any further details regarding my career in the South African Police. At the Security Branch Soweto I was at the outset part of the information gathering component which became known as the Intelligence Unit as group head and at the stage when I was transferred from Soweto, I was the head of that Unit. I am dealing with matters mentioned in my subpoena. The questioning and following death of Sizwe Sithole. I have no personal knowledge of this matter. I have been advised that the events regarding Sizwe Sithole took place in 1991 after I already left the Security Branch Soweto and was transferred to Cape Town. The use and handling of informants, sources associated with the Mandela Football Club and Winnie Mandela. During the period that I was associated with the Security Branch Soweto I only have knowledge of one source which was specifically associated with Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and the Mandela United Football Club. The existence of this source only came to my attention shortly before my transfer from Soweto, resulting from the death of Sergeant Fanie Pretorius. The Security Branch continually used informers and sources and during the years various informers and sources gave information regarding Mrs Mandela. I cannot remember specifically that there was information during the time that I was there, with regard to the Mandela United Football Club. The abduction, assault and murder of Stompie Seipei in 1988 and information regarding that. The whole Stompie Seipei ended after I had already left Soweto in December 1988 and I have no knowledge of these events. Relationship between the Security Branch, Murder and Robbery, STRATCOM divisions and other units in the South African Police with regard to matters affecting Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and the Mandela United Football Club. There was good co-operation between the Security Branch of the South African Police and other Units of the SAP such as Murder and Robbery. Information was exchanged continually between the different Units, but I have no personal knowledge of any specific co-operation regarding to the activities of Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and the Mandela United Football Club. I was informed that there are allegations before this Commission that I was in control of the STRATCOM unit at the Security Branch Soweto. I deny this allegation. To the best of my knowledge there have existed no STRATCOM unit outside Head Office in Johannesburg during 1988. After my transfer to the Cape Province, it was part of my duties to create a STRATCOM unit. I was not aware of any specific STRATCOM action aimed at Mrs Mandela or the Football Club during the time that I worked at the Security Branch, Soweto. It is however, possible that there was STRATCOM actions on instruction from Head Office or Security Branch Witwatersrand which were carried out during this time, but I cannot specifically remember that any of them were directed at Mrs Mandela or the Football Club. I knew Paul Erasmus well and exchanged information with him on a continual basis when I came into Johannesburg. Because of the nature of my activities I came in Johannesburg often. I also knew Vic McPherson. I want to point out that both Erasmus and McPherson testified that I was the head of the STRATCOM unit at the Security Branch Soweto, that is not correct, and I also want to point out that both of them testified that this took place in 1990. At that stage I had already left the Security Branch Soweto. The use of Intelligence material and the relationship with Intelligence agencies with regard to matters regarding Mrs Winnie Mandela and the Mandela United Football Club. In this regard I want to refer to what I have already testified in the paragraph preceding this one. The questioning or interrogation and death of Themba Johannes Mabotha. According to information at my disposal, the detention and death of Mabotha took place in 1989, after I had already left Soweto. I have no personal knowledge of this matter. Information including observations, telephone tapping, bugging, etc, regarding matters regarding Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and the Mandela United Football Club. I am aware of the fact that the tapping of telephone conversations of Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela took place on a continuous basis, I have no knowledge of any bugs which were used. The Security Branch Soweto did not have an observation unit that was out, excluding tapping, and it is not possible that they had the ability to observe a person for 24 hours a day. I have no knowledge of any permanent observation of Mrs Mandela's house or business or any such observations regarding the Mandela United Football Club. The killing of Sergeant Pretorius and two MK members, Maleleke and Mbenenge in 1988. I was not involved in the planning of execution of the action during which Sergeant Fanie Pretorius was killed, nor do I have any personal knowledge of this matter. I did know him very well and he was a loved member of the Force, known for the fact that he was a hard worker. We were all very shocked by his death. Thank you. MR VALLY: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr de Jager, you have just heard Mr Coetzee saying that you would have an overall knowledge of informers who had been placed within Soweto and the information they were providing, is that correct? MR DE JAGER: ... knowledge of such activities Mr Chairman. MR VALLY: In paragraph 7 of your statement you talk about one source which you knew about. Can you tell us who this is? MR DE JAGER: Do I have to put the name of an alleged informer on the table here where that person in future might be jeopardised Mr Chairman? I have personally got a problem with that. MR VALLY: You can write it down, we will not disclose it publicly at this stage until we properly investigate it. MR DE JAGER: Thank you Mr Chairman. Might I just as regards this particular informer mention that I was not involved in the recruitment or the placing of this person, it only came to my attention on the afternoon after Fanie Pretorius was killed, Mr Chairman. MR VALLY: Mr de Jager, the whole performance just now about not mentioning the name was very strange. Have you been following the press, specifically this hearing? MR DE JAGER: Yes, I certainly have. MR VALLY: Are you aware that Mr Jerry Richardson had said in public that he was a paid informer of the Security Branch? MR DE JAGER: I have read it in the media, yes. MR VALLY: And now you say you don't want to mention his name, and you write it down on a piece of paper and we close it and you pass it to me. Are you saying you know no other source that was placed in Mrs Madikizela-Mandela's household? MR DE JAGER: No other source, whatsoever. MR VALLY: Are you saying that Mr Coetzee was lying? MR DE JAGER: In what sense Mr Chair? MR VALLY: You have a unit set up specifically to plant informants and get information and you tell me you know of no single source except for Jerry Richardson which is already public knowledge which was placed in the Madikizela-Mandela household or close to her? MR DE JAGER: In my time in Soweto Mr Chair, no other source that I bore personal knowledge of, was successfully recruited and or infiltrated or penetrated the Mandela household, sir. MR VALLY: Are you aware of a number of illegal activities centring around the Mandela United Football Club? MR DE JAGER: To a certain extent, yes Mr Chair. MR VALLY: Did you not then try and place informants in the Mandela United Football Club so as to get to the bottom of these illegal activities? MR DE JAGER: Mr Chairman, during these activities the division in Soweto was such that the Mandela household fell amongst the responsibilities of a unit which was overseen by Colonel Claassen and the unit that pertinently dealt with matters pertaining to the ANC in broad terms and also the Mandela household, was run by Mr Louis Watermeyer, who is here sir. MR VALLY: Mr de Jager, there seems to have been an incredible lack of co-ordination within the Security Branch and sometimes even within the same unit. I put it to you sir, that you and Mr Coetzee are continuing your disinformation on this issue of informers within the Madikizela-Mandela household and within the Mandela United Football Club, what is your response to that? MR DE JAGER: Mr Chairman, I deny that implicitly. What I might just mention here is that certain activities did come to my attention within the context of early morning meetings which we had in the office regularly, of Brigadier Coetzee, where section group heads and sections heads would then put certain information on the table, and also the transcriptions which were done by the unit run by Colonel Bosman, were also then mentioned from time to time, and anything relevant to any of us around that table, was placed on that table there. But handling a source, per se in the Mandela household, I am sorry Mr Chairman, I cannot help the Committee there. MR VALLY: Are you aware of any source besides Jerry Richardson in relationship to the Mandela United Football Club? MR DE JAGER: Mr Chairman, if I can put it in very broad terms, I think I did say that from time to time from numerous other sources, what happened is that obviously we did have sources in many organisations, where bits and pieces of hearsay were occasionally gleaned as regards what happened at the Mandela home, but not to the extent where a source per se was in the household to give information or intelligence, whatever one would like to call it here, sir. MR VALLY: In terms of the morning briefings that you were all party to, what activities were you aware of that had taken place at the Mandela United Football Club, during the Mandela United Football Club activities or at Mrs Madikizela-Mandela's household? MR DE JAGER: Mr Chairman, might I point out please sir, it is ten years ago. I do not remember specifics any more. What I do remember, my memory was refreshed just now by Mr Vally that apparently they started off as a group that broke away from SYCO. Yes, I can now remember that, but specific and pertinent activities such as were eventually revealed in the media subsequent to my departure from Soweto in December 1988, I have no personal knowledge of. Stompie Seipei broke in the media and press after I had left Soweto, thank you. MR VALLY: Would your unit have been aware of the controversy surrounding the abduction of the four youths including Stompie Seipei from the Methodist Manse by virtue of your monitoring of the telephone? MR DE JAGER: It could in all probability have been put on the table at a morning meeting, if as I have read I think in the documentation which I have perused in the last few days, it was apparently picked up due to technical, that might have been put on the table at a morning meeting, but I cannot implicitly here say yes, I was aware. MR VALLY: And if this was put on the table by virtue of the monitoring, why did the police not take pro-active steps to rescue these young people from the Madikizela-Mandela household? MR DE JAGER: Mr Chairman, I cannot answer that question. The investigation of criminal activities, dockets, etc, were not my prerogative and or my task. And that particular question I cannot answer sir. MR VALLY: Was your task not ultimately the saving of lives and the prevention of crime from taking place? MR DE JAGER: Most certainly sir, but I was not the Commanding Officer to make decisions as to what action should be taken in this particular regard as I pointed out the area and the Mandela household which that entailed, was not in my particular responsibility at that point in time. MR VALLY: And who had responsibility for this? MR DE JAGER: One would have to find out sir, if indeed this was put on the table, and who were there that particular morning and one would have to speak to those personal individuals personally to find out what if any action was taken at all. I cannot bring it to mind on a particular morning, I said it might have happened. MR VALLY: There have been various allegations about various individuals who were in the Mandela household and they were accused of being informers. Do you know of Mr Themba Mabotha? MR DE JAGER: No sir, I do not. MR VALLY: Do you know of Mr Katiza Cebekhulu? MR DE JAGER: What I gleaned in the media afterwards, yes sir. MR VALLY: At the time that you were in Soweto, were you aware of allegations that he was an informer? MR DE JAGER: Not to my knowledge, no. MR VALLY: So, you only found out subsequently about Jerry Richardson, an issue which we did not get from the police? You can't tell us about any informer in the Mandela United Football Club, yet it was your department that was primarily responsible for the placing and the training of informers in Soweto? MR DE JAGER: Mr Chairman, with your permission, if I might take it slightly wider here. We are dealing with a period when there was a state of emergency. We are dealing with a point in time when the armed struggle was escalating at an alarming rate. We are dealing also with us having to detain people in terms of the emergency regulations. We had a vast, a vast amount of work to do. There were many organisations that had to be monitored as well. Although with all due respect, Mrs Mandela was a prominent figure, she couldn't solely be given all the attention of the whole Branch in Soweto. We had to do what we could do with what we had to do it with, if that answers the question sir. MR VALLY: So your priority was not the death or alleged death or torturing of individuals in Soweto, your priority was what? MR DE JAGER: I deny that I did not regard that as a priority. I most certainly did, and I think my record speaks for itself during my time in Soweto, but part of our work as well was, one has to bear in mind there was unrest at that stage, we are talking necklacings and all other actions which we also had to prevent. We also had to monitor meetings. With all due respect, I think it is an unfair allegation Mr Chair, that I am accused that I didn't bear human lives as part of my responsibility. MR VALLY: My question is very simple, there are these serious allegations some of which involve torture and murder, surrounding the Mandela United Football Club. There are charges laid regarding abduction, yet you tell me you had other priorities, I ask you why? MR DE JAGER: Mr Chair, we could possibly pin this down to a particular month, time or date, as I said I left Soweto in 1988, during December. MR VALLY: November and December 1988? MR DE JAGER: As I have said, it might have been put on the morning table, but it was not my priority to deal with that which went on in the Mandela household. MR VALLY: Are you aware of the abduction and charges being laid regarding Lolo Sono and Sibuniso Tsabalala? MR DE JAGER: Subsequently through the media, yes Mr Chairman. MR VALLY: Where the Security Branch members had taken statements from individuals involved in the abduction of Sibuniso Tsabalala and Lolo Sono where you tell us you had morning briefings, were you tell us that your primary focus was to look at incidents involving individuals who were politically active in Soweto and monitoring them. You tell me that you didn't know about it until recently? MR DE JAGER: Mr Chairman, in Soweto where we were, it was a very large building. We were on different levels, we were compartmentalised and every, most things as far as intelligence any way was concerned, was on a need to know basis. I certainly do not think at this stage that at every morning meeting, an Investigating Officer or his Commanding Officer would put on the table as to whose statement he had taken or was going to take. I trusted those who did the investigations would do it according to procedures and to it thoroughly. It was not for me to question as to who would take what statement, there were people more senior than I who were in command of the Investigation Unit, sir. MR VALLY: You were a Major at this stage? MR VALLY: And that is a fairly senior rank? MR VALLY: How many Majors were there in the Security Branch in Soweto? MR DE JAGER: At that stage I would say five, maybe six. MR VALLY: Five or six? You have an allegation that Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela had been involved in an abduction and assault of two youths. You are telling me that this was not discussed at the morning briefing? MR DE JAGER: Mr Chairman, I can certainly not recall that I was present at a meeting where this abduction was discussed, I cannot call that to mind sir, I am sorry. MR VALLY: Are you aware of any information which was put forward at your morning meetings, regarding unlawful activities of the Mandela United Football Club? Any single one? MR DE JAGER: I cannot deny it implicitly, it might have been, it is probable that it was done, but I cannot remember any single incident that might have been put on the table on a particular day. Sorry Mr Chairman, I cannot remember that. MR VALLY: Are you aware of the time when a machine pistol was found at the Madikizela-Mandela household? MR DE JAGER: Yes, sir. May I have a moment to explain to the Commission how this came about? I presume it was the matter where I was called out as a Duty Officer early one morning, where young people had been found shot in a house somewhere in Soweto. I can't recall where. Upon arrival there, the Investigation Unit was already there. To my knowledge information was gleaned on the scene that certain people were involved and that this had taken place due to an action by an individual to recover a Scorpion machine pistol and that he had then subsequently killed these people. And the follow up action there was done by the Investigation Unit. Although I can recall, if I am not mistaken, I was part of the party that afternoon which visited the Mandela home, that is as far as that is concerned. MR VALLY: So you personally visited the Mandela home? MR DE JAGER: That particular afternoon, yes sir. MR VALLY: And you were present when the machine pistol was found? MR VALLY: So when was the machine pistol found? MR DE JAGER: Mr Chairman, what I am saying is the Investigation Unit did the necessary investigation. The procedure there that afternoon is that we did a penetration of the premises in order to secure the premises, to make sure that armed people there did not attack us or whatever, and then the Investigation Unit moved in. That is standard procedure sir. We don't trample up a scene or whatever, the Investigative people do it and they do it according to procedures. Whether they found it in which room, or in which possession, that I really cannot say. I will not say anything about that. ... incident where it went around, the recovery of a machine pistol which had been taken from a cadre due to the fact that he was allegedly drunk and undisciplined. MR VALLY: You know Mr de Jager, for the Intelligence gathering component of the Security Branch in Soweto, the impression one gets is that you people were remarkably ignorant by virtue of the fact that we've had a number of community leaders here who talked about the illegal activities, they used words like gangsters, they've used words like thugs, we've had a number of Mandela United Football Club people sitting where you were, while serving sentences for murder, and you are telling me that you, whose job it was to monitor this kind of issue in Soweto, was not aware of any of these activities? MR DE JAGER: Mr Chairman, once more, we were compartmentalised. There were divisions and areas which people worked. The impression it would appear is created that we with all due respect sir, had Mrs Mandela only to monitor, that is not a fact. We had many, many people that we had to monitor. With all due respect, I think we are being given credit here beyond the abilities we had at that particular time. It is a fact that Mrs Mandela was an important person, yes. It is also a fact that she had access to legal counsel which was not available to anybody else, readily available. It is also a fact I think, that it was mentioned on occasion around the morning table, that Mrs Jana had again approached the Commanding Officer stating Dear Sir, you have approached so and so, offered him such and such money to inform on the Mandela household, would you please desist. That happened on regular occasions, I remember that. But the fact of the matter is sir, nobody in Soweto, bar this particular one source, was ever able during my time, to infiltrate or penetrate the structures under which Mrs Mandela operated. She operated on a totally different level than your basic run of the mill cadre or SYCO or who ever. I have no doubt as it has been said, and I have read in the documentation, that she did actually harbour cadres, that she might have given them other assistance, I will not deny that. The fact of the matter is at that time we did not have the ability to determine that timeously and take the necessary action as the gentleman there said, maybe to try and save human lives. We did try with that which we had available at that time, thank you sir. MR VALLY: The fact was that the disruptive activities of the Mandela United Football Club suited the goals of the Security Branch, wasn't that true? MR DE JAGER: No, I would not say it suited, I would deny that sir. It certainly did not suit me, the little bit that I knew about. As I said I cannot be explicit as to certain actions. MR VALLY: Was it also not true that through your bugging of her telephone and through that her house, that you were aware of a lot more than you are admitting? MR DE JAGER: May I just explain the procedures here please Mr Chairman. Bugging a telephone was common practice in those days in terms of the law, it was done legally. But Mrs Mandela also being a very clever lady, with all due respect, I am sure she was aware that he phone was bugged. One often found in the transcriptions don't speak, the Boere are listening or whatever. So bugging of a telephone is limited to a particular conversation that one might have. As far as placing a bug in a room in those days, I don't know what the abilities are now, that was limited to the room in which that particular bug was placed. It did not encompassed the whole house, that would be totally impossible. So yes, sir, we did glean some intelligence I think, but not as much as I think you would like to think that we in fact did, sir. MR VALLY: And where people have laid criminal charges like Mr Sono, like Mr I think it was Mr Ikaneng? MR DE JAGER: That is a strange name to me sir. MR VALLY: You don't know Mr Lerothodi Ikaneng? MR VALLY: Mr Jerry Richardson was in fact convicted of attempted murder in relation to Mr Ikaneng. What you are telling me is, you didn't have co-ordination within your own department, the Security Branch, you didn't know what was happening regarding the placing of informers which was your department, your unit's specific role, but in your statement sir, paragraph 10, page 5 you talk about good co-operation between the Security Branch and other units of the South African Police such as Murder and Robbery. You go on to say on an ongoing basis, information was exchanged, although you don't have personal knowledge. MR DE JAGER: Yes sir, there was co-ordination, there was co-operation, but handling informers in those days, I don't know what it is like now, worked on a strictly, strictly need to know basis. A person would apply to his immediate Commander to register a person as an informer. That would then be put before a more senior person, it would be okayed or vetoed, whatever the case might be. Should that person then in fact be recruited, he would be allocated a number either by Head Office depending upon the profile of the person, or at the Branch itself and that person would be dealt with as a number which is international standard practice. The protection of the identities of sources was one of the primary aspects that were also always borne in mind when information or intelligence was put on the table. I think I read in Paul Erasmus' documentation that they would play spot the agent those days. Yes, it was so. One would try and determine through reports the contents thereof, maybe whose agent was what. But I would, there is no way that I could have known who every intelligence informer in Soweto was or which, who handled each person. That would have been totally impossible. The Commander at the end of the day might have been, but I think it would have been a mammoth task because we are talking many, many informers. MR VALLY: Who was Mr Jerry Richardson's handler? MR DE JAGER: Subsequent to the death of Fanie that afternoon, I think at a debriefing session in General Coetzee's office, it was mentioned that he was indeed the source of Fanie Pretorius. MR VALLY: Although you were the Major in that unit, you didn't know that before then? MR DE JAGER: I was not in that particular unit. Colonel Claassen, then a Major, was in overall charge of the sub-unit which Lieutenant Louis Watermeyer was the Commanding Officer. MR VALLY: Did you work closely with Vlakplaas at all? MR VALLY: Can you tell us in which activities specifically did you work closely with Vlakplaas? MR DE JAGER: Not inside Soweto per se, certainly outside. My knowledge of Vlakplaas in Soweto was within the context where they periodically send a team leader with askaris to move through Soweto with the Soweto Terrorist Tracing Unit if I can call it that, in order to possibly identify at railway stations etc, where known return cadres might be. That is the extent of knowledge that I have of Colonel de Kock's Vlakplaas people in Soweto. MR VALLY: And activities outside of Soweto? Co-operation between the Security Branch of Soweto and Vlakplaas Unit of Colonel de Kock? MR DE JAGER: Might I at this stage mention Mr Chairman, that I have applied for amnesty and this question pertains to my application and I don't know if this is the correct forum to voice that. If I might be advised by counsel there. CHAIRMAN: Right, I think you should reserve that until you are before the Amnesty Committee. MR DE JAGER: Thank you Mr Chairman. MR VALLY: Mr de Jager, what you are telling us sounds a lot like what Mr Coetzee, Mr Kritzinger told us. We know nothing, we saw nothing, we heard subsequently. Yet, you pointed out there was a state of emergency and in terms of states of emergency people had a lot more legal and practical freedom on the ground than you had at other times. MR VALLY: So you would have had more freedom to make enquiries and get to the bottom of issues, yet there isn't a single bit of information you can give us today, other than the name of Jerry Richardson, which was out here in public, regarding information surrounding the activities of the Mandela United Football Club. Does this mean that the Police, specifically the Security Branch of Soweto were just incompetent? MR DE JAGER: Mr Chairman, I don't think we were incompetent. I think history speaks for us there and this is why this Commission amongst others has been formed, with all due respect sir. But as far as the infiltration and or penetration of the Mandela household and the organisation related to her, was concerned, we did not have success sir. And I am adamant about this. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Vally, could you just guide me here. We ought to be adjourning for lunch - are you just about finishing or do you want to come back after lunch? MR VALLY: I am just about finishing Mr Chairperson. CHAIRPERSON: Would you finish then so that we can adjourn? MR VALLY: I will. Mr de Jager, were there any direct instructions or was there an understanding that Mrs Madikizela-Mandela was not to be prosecuted possibly or was not to have had been investigated such as taking of statements from her regarding any incidents that she was involved in? MR DE JAGER: Mr Chairman, I am totally unaware of any instructions to that effect. What I am aware of as I have stated earlier on, she was a high profile person, she is an important person, she was at that stage Mrs Mandela, who had access to possibly the best legal assistance that anybody could have and I don't think it was uncommon for Mrs Mandela to give Head Office a hard time whenever she was approached or whatever. I think one might put it as Kritzinger has said, that one did handle her with kitgloves. She is a formidable woman sir, with all due respect, and I say that with respect. MR VALLY: I have two final questions. Throughout your career in the Security Branch, were you ever aware of anyone being assaulted by the Security Branch? MR VALLY: You've never witnessed it? MR DE JAGER: I haven't witnessed it. MR VALLY: You've had no complaints laid against you? MR DE JAGER: Mr Chairman, not that I can recall as far as Soweto is concerned. I think maybe as far back as Middelburg, Cape, if I am not mistaken, going back as far back as 1976, 1977, I am not sure. I really don't want to commit myself and adamantly say no. I have never been charged in a court of law sir. MR VALLY: You have never witnessed askari's under Colonel de Kock assaulting people at Protea Security Headquarters? MR DE JAGER: Absolutely not, sir. MR VALLY: Finally, we have had a complaint from the family of Sergeant Pretorius who was killed in a shootout and the allegation is that Sergeant Pretorius was set up and purposely allowed to be killed, because he wanted certain steps to be taken regarding the information he had surrounding Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and the Mandela United Football Club. What are your comments on that? MR DE JAGER: Mr Chairman, it is so far beyond the truth, that it is even beyond absurd sir. Fanie was a respected man. I personally liked that young man very much and there is no way that that could have taken place. Even if one reads the statements and the documentation which I had to peruse in the last week from the members of the Riot Squad who were on the scene, who was supposed to do the penetration and all that, I am totally absolutely convinced that this is, with all due respect to the members of the family there and Fanie's memory, that that is absolutely not so. MR VALLY: Thank you, I have no further questions. CHAIRPERSON: I have not forgotten. The Commission will adjourn and resume the proceedings at two o'clock, thank you. CHAIRPERSON: I mentioned that I was going to allow the legal representatives to put any questions if they had any to Mr de Jager. Are there any? Mr Richards? MR RICHARDS: Thank you Chairperson. I am having a certain amount of difficulty in understanding the chain of command. From Mr Kritzinger I understood that those above Mr Kritzinger were one Louis Watermeyer and Colonel Jan Potgieter, is that correct? MR DE JAGER: Sir, Kritzinger would have fallen under the command of Jan Potgieter, but Louis Watermeyer would have been under the direct command of Colonel Claassen, who in turn would then be under the command of General Coetzee. MR RICHARDS: And then, who was above you? MR RICHARDS: Who was above you? MR DE JAGER: Yes, and the second in command General Nienaber who is also here, sir. MR RICHARDS: Now clearly while you had limited resources and manpower was spread thin on the ground, it was of importance to you to process information and to get the maximum value out of it, wasn't it? MR RICHARDS: Who was the person who coordinated and processed and evaluated information? MR DE JAGER: Mr Chairman, we had a system of desks if I might call it that, or sections, who then would work PAC or ANC or SYCO or SANSCO or whatever, and that senior desk officer would do the necessary processing and then report to the Commanding Officer in Louis Watermeyer's case then to Colonel Claassen who would then in turn sign the necessary reports and have them go wherever they needed to go. Relevant and necessary information or intelligence was then put on the table by that particular officer whenever it was necessary. MR RICHARDS: And in Soweto at the time, you had Mrs Mandela's house which she, I think with good reason, described as a police station. It can't be contested that she was an object of much interest? MR DE JAGER: Yes sir, but I also see the allegation that she was on 24 hour surveillance which is totally absolutely impossible, unless one terms it to be electronic surveillance if one wants to mention the so-called bug and or telephone tapping. It was not possible to surveil Mrs Mandela's house. We had the experience one evening, I do not have the total details any more, but we did do a follow up and as part of that, we had to place two people outside her house to do surveillance to see whether a certain person would be coming to the house. One of those policemen were shot down right in front of the gate sir. So, it is not possible to do surveillance in the true sense of the word around her house. MR RICHARDS: But nonetheless the surveillance was such that her comings and goings and her movements and those in and out of her house, were watched as closely as possible? MR DE JAGER: On an ad hoc basis, yes. And maybe coinciding with what might have been gleaned on the telephone taps, then one might have tried to follow her or whatever, but it was never very successful. MR RICHARDS: Now, it follows therefore that if you had an informer from within her house, that person would have been a valuable asset? MR DE JAGER: With all due respect Mr Chairman, I did not handle the person. The person who handled him and his Commander were not on my section, but from discussions I've had with Louis Watermeyer in the last few days, it would appear as if only in this particular case and one or two other cases, did he give any information of any value. He was I think one might in a broad sense, to be more of an as we say an occasion source, not a trained agent, informer in the true sense of the word. MR RICHARDS: In your evidence in chief, you said you only became aware of Mr Richardson's presence on the afternoon of Sergeant Pretorius' death, is that correct? MR RICHARDS: From the evidence of Richardson, it is apparent that he was in contact with Pretoria for some number of months before that. MR DE JAGER: I would not dispute that sir, but I would not be aware of that as Fanie was not in my team and neither was Louis Watermeyer. What actually happened, I was in my office that afternoon and we, I always had a two way radio on, and I heard Colonel Claassen reporting to Colonel Coetzee that in fact a firefight had taken place and that Fanie had passed on, and then I went up to General Coetzee's office and from there we managed the process as far as the admin was concerned, the writing of the telex, etc. That is as far as my knowledge of that goes. MR RICHARDS: From the transcript, you have no doubt heard that the thesis of what was happening during that period was that you had Mrs Madikizela-Mandela's house with this variable number of people attached to it and there was to put it in one way, a paranoia about informers, leaks, impimpi's with the result that, well my client, according to his evidence, concedes that he killed four and attempted to murder one other on the basis that they were informers and he had so been instructed to do so by Mrs Mandela. Now wouldn't that sort of information have been of great interest to the Security Establishment? MR DE JAGER: If we had known about it timeously yes, but I really cannot comment on this particular remark that you have made. It would have been of importance yes, if we knew timeously that the man was supposed to be killed, but I might just mention Mr Chairman, that during those days as the gentleman there rightly said, there was a paranoia about informers and I think this Commission has in all probability heard the evidence how informers were dealt with. And I think it was a known fact that in order to get rid of a person, or to discredit him or whatever, you merely had to whisper that a person could possibly be an informer. The only informer that I know about in my personal capacity and I learnt about it that afternoon, is the matter of the gentleman that has been mentioned. MR RICHARDS: Thank you, you have answered my next question, but then to proceed. From the evidence earlier today, we have the information that there were approximately 30 dockets in the process of preparation, investigation regarding Mrs Mandela and her household and her doings. Who in fact made the decisions as to what would happen in those matters, was it the Investigating Officer? MR DE JAGER: If I might describe the procedure as I would see it. I think an instruction would have come say from the Divisional Commander that on the basis of the information being received, that one should now look at this person with the intent of going to court and then a person would be appointed to start building a docket. That person would get the relevant information reports, whatever it might be, and start actually building a docket. I think that instruction was given to Colonel Potgieter, if I am not mistaken. What exactly went in there, how it was handled, when it went to the Attorney General, I really would bear no knowledge of that sir. MR RICHARDS: There was some rather surprising evidence that when it came to investigation decisions and all the rest of the practical steps that were taken, difference was made and instructions were taken from the Attorney General at the time, Claus van Lierres, is that correct? MR DE JAGER: Sir, I bear not any knowledge of the investigative process and what went on with that. I was involved in the intelligence gathering. All that I know is that during the many years in the Security Branch is that very seldom was any prosecution done without the specific instructions of the Attorney General, who then obviously would appoint a Prosecutor etc, etc. MR RICHARDS: So that then follows that it is correct that even to the detail of whether to classify a particular investigation as political or common law, the Attorney General was referred to and his guidance sought? MR DE JAGER: I really cannot comment in total on that, but I would presume and as I said, my experience is that the Attorney General most of the times, had a say as to who should be prosecuted for what. MR RICHARDS: In other words, the conclusion is correct that the Attorney General of the time was indeed part and parcel of the Security Establishment of the time? MR DE JAGER: No, with all due respect, I think Mr von Lierres would not feel kindly about the remark, as such. He was a person with an office in his own right, and I think he was fiercely independent too not to have anybody interfere with him or prescribe to him, sir. That is my experience of Mr von Lierres on the one or two occasions that I did meet the gentleman. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Richards, where are you taking us? MR RICHARDS: No further questions, Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Are there any other questions? MR DU TOIT: Mr du Toit, on behalf of the Pretorius family. MR DU TOIT: Mr de Jager, I didn't hear clearly. Could you explain to us again the task of Louis Watermeyer? MR DE JAGER: In broad terms he was a section head of a certain section which among others included Fanie Pretorius as part of his direct personnel. Fanie was an informant handler who would report to Mr Watermeyer with regard to the information gathered in whatever sense. MR DU TOIT: I think that you used the term that his section was involved with the Mandela household, is that so? In broad terms, I understand that part of his sections were among others to look at what went on at the Mandela household. MR DE JAGER: We had a reasonably broad distribution of personnel who dealt with things like the PAC, SYCO etc, and part of Fanie's duties may have been to see to what was going on in Mrs Mandela's house. MR DU TOIT: What was the duties of a handler when he got information? MR DE JAGER: If one bears in mind that the opposition of that time had disinformation campaigns, then one didn't immediately react to a certain single person's information. Depending again of course on circumstances. In the investigation into organisations and people who lived in the townships at that stage, overt investigations, you could, but information in connection with trained cadres and so forth, we reacted at the first moment that we got the information, that is also why we lay traps for them as it were. In this case I think that Fanie would have let his handler know. MR DU TOIT: Is it your information that it was indeed Pretorius who reported to his handler? MR DE JAGER: No sir, in broad terms again, that was not my field. Each informer also had a co-handler and the real handler in case the real handler was not available. So, maybe it was the co-handler and not ... MR DU TOIT: Was there a James Radebe on your staff at that stage? MR DE JAGER: Yes sir, I certainly remember that name. MR DU TOIT: Were you ever involved in action with the Riot Unit in Soweto to have a look at the situation of taking out cadres? MR DE JAGER: Yes, I imagine so. There were many actions be that in terms of the emergency regulations or in terms of riots. I think I know what you are aiming at, it was practice for most of us who had certain forms of training at that stage to call in the Riot Unit and sometimes we did the house penetrations ourselves, because we had had training in the Riot Unit. Some of the other people had done the same training. MR DU TOIT: Was there any standard drills or prescriptions as to when the Riot Units would go with the Security Branch? MR DE JAGER: Yes, if they called us we preferred them to do the house penetrations because they had the best bullet vests available, and the vests they had was what we called chopper jackets. They were the only jackets that could stop an AK bullet at that stage. MR DU TOIT: To put it clearly the Riot Units had better jackets? MR DE JAGER: Yes, they had what was called a Reaction Unit that had been trained by a special task team and were trained to go out on short notice. They had better jackets than us and went out if there was time. MR DU TOIT: Do you know that Pretorius was wearing such a jacket but that the AK actually penetrated that jacket? MR DE JAGER: If you would allow me, I want to give you more information on those jackets. We came to hear that there were jackets of that kind made and we ordered some of them and I think that Fanie's jacket was issued at that stage without the ceramic plates. Those were normally put in in front of the chest and behind the back. That alone would have stopped an AK. If the ceramic plate was not there, that jacket was actually useless, except for normal hand weapons. MR DU TOIT: But at that stage, the Riot Police already had such jackets, is that right? MR DU TOIT: You testified of a meeting at General Coetzee's office that evening. Was it Brigadier I. Coetzee? MR DE JAGER: Yes. I don't want to say that it was a meeting in the real sense of the word. I think it was more some of us had heard of the matter and went to the Commanding Officer's office to discuss the matter, that was our procedure. He was our manager and we went to help manage the situation, we had to write telex's etc, etc and to do all those things. MR DU TOIT: Why were you involved in that if it wasn't a casualty in your leg of the association? MR DE JAGER: I think it was because I was a senior officer serving on management, so it was only right that I should go and help to manage the situation. MR DU TOIT: Who made the reports of what had happened at that occasion? MR DE JAGER: It is likely that it would have been Louis Watermeyer and maybe Colonel Claassen. One of us would have written and General, I don't know who, would have evaluated. MR DU TOIT: A last question. We know that Sergeant Pretorius carried an Oozie hand machine carbine, I take it that - I don't know whether Fanie had been on a security training for that weapon but I think he was. Obviously he wouldn't carry a weapon that he wasn't trained in? MR DE JAGER: Yes, that is true. But with great respect sir, the Oozie is such a basic weapon that if you knew an HMK it would have been second nature to handle an Oozie. MR DU TOIT: I've got no further questions, thank you Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: Just for the record, mention that you are representing Sergeant Pretorius' family. You are Mr du Toit, is that right? CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Yes, Mr Semenya? MR SEMENYA: Do I understand your evidence to be that by the time you left Soweto in 1988, you would have known the time that Jerry Richardson was an informer? Would you have known by the time you left Soweto that Jerry Richardson was an informer? MR DE JAGER: Yes, I knew about it on the afternoon that the two gentlemen were killed at his house and that Fanie Pretorius died. It was mentioned in General (indistinct) office, while we were doing the necessary documentation and paper work. MR SEMENYA: Just probably for my edification. The use of informers normally is to use the information the information they give among others, to prevent the commission of a crime, right? MR DE JAGER: Depending upon the timeous receiving the information, intelligence and obviously one certainly used it afterwards, in follow up investigations which could then give pointers where one would begin to look for whatever needed to be looked for. MR SEMENYA: Yes, I was going to say secondly, also for the purpose of making the necessary arrests among others? MR DE JAGER: If I might just mention the channels of communication in Soweto in those days of boycotts etc, there was virtually no telephone communication, and obviously an informer could not converse with his handler outside the office like now, with cellphones. At best there could have been a page message. So the lines of communication were not as they are at the moment with cellphones sir. MR SEMENYA: The other reason you would find it useful to have this information is clearly to use that information in prosecutions, if possible, is that right? MR DE JAGER: Yes, provided that one didn't jeopardise the identity and compromise the life of an informer. MR SEMENYA: Well, there were processes in the Criminal Procedure Act to give that type of protection, is that right? MR DE JAGER: Not to my knowledge in those days, there was no witness protection programme and I think it is well known that people who gave evidence, in those days, eventually met their untimely deaths sir. MR SEMENYA: Yes, but I don't want to be destructive, the only point I am making is wouldn't you have expected an informer such as Richardson to have communicated the information that Stompie Seipei and them were removed from the Manse? MR DE JAGER: I would have expected, depending upon his own, possible, not probable, possible involvement that he might not have wanted his handler to know about it. MR SEMENYA: No, but even if he is involved as an informant, he could find indemnity against prosecution for his involvement. I don't want to go that way, I am just saying at the level of your understanding as a Security Police Officer, you would have expected that type of information to have been communicated, is that right? MR DE JAGER: Yes, I would have expected it. MR SEMENYA: And you would have expected the type of information that suggests that Stompie together with others had been brutally assaulted to be communicated to the handler, as well, isn't that right? MR SEMENYA: And if he knows that Stompie and the group spent a whole day in that injured condition without access to medical attention, you would have expected that type of information to have gone to the handler, isn't that right? MR DE JAGER: Yes, if I might just qualify. Depending upon the availability of a communication process with the handler. MR SEMENYA: Oh yes, there would have been the handler proper, the second handler or whoever, but that is the type of information for which the man is being paid? You would expect that information to be communicated across, is that fair to say? MR DE JAGER: I agree with you sir. MR SEMENYA: And you would expect that after Jerry Richardson, now that we know had killed Stompie, why can't that type of information have gone to the handler too? MR DE JAGER: I am not in a position to comment here. I was neither the handler nor the Commander of the handler. I really cannot make comment on this, I am sorry. MR SEMENYA: Was there any basis upon which the type of informants that were engaged, were screened? MR DE JAGER: To a certain extent. They were screened I think, more along the lines of their access, but it is well known that anybody that gives any information, one was only too glad to receive information. MR SEMENYA: Well, he was not that type of informant as you said, an occasion source? MR DE JAGER: Sir, with all due respect, I would not have turned down the information or the intelligence received from a criminal if I had known he was a criminal. We were gathering intelligence and if it was sound intelligence, that was utilisable, I would have been only too glad to have received it. MR SEMENYA: Richardson confesses to have participated in criminal conduct such as hijacking of cars, wouldn't this type of conduct have been known to his handler as well? MR DE JAGER: I think that is a question that his handler could have answered. I wouldn't know whether he actually confessed that to his handler, but one also has to bear in mind sir, with all due respect, that when one approaches a person or when one recruits a person, you don't really go into total depth I am speaking about those days, on things that you don't possibly know about. The matter of the hijacking is news to me and I think, I don't think Fanie would have been aware of that. MR SEMENYA: I am trying to test the reliability which you would place on an informer. It is the critical aspect about the information given by informers? MR DE JAGER: And that is why I said earlier on that intelligence and or information received from a source, we usually tried to double check and triple check it from other sources as well, in order to make sure that it was not disinformation or that it was worthless. MR SEMENYA: No further questions, thank you. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Semenya. Mr Du Plessis? MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman, just one or two questions. Mr de Jager, do you agree that the actions of the Security Branch were aimed at internal security and not the investigation of purely criminal events? MR DE JAGER: Yes. I agree, that is our task definition. MR DU PLESSIS: In other words the Security Police would not have a docket on somebody who had committed criminal offences? MR DE JAGER: No, they wouldn't, except if a person from Murder and Robbery for instance came to tell us that maybe, ask us for our informants, whether or informants had perhaps got information, but generally it wasn't our task definition. MR DU PLESSIS: In other words if Mrs Mandela was doing criminal deeds with her soccer club, you wouldn't have been involved? MR DE JAGER: No, not necessarily. But in retrospect that is speculation. MR DU PLESSIS: But you would have been able to get such information from your informers and from your tapping and bugging? MR DE JAGER: Yes. I think from time to time maybe we would. MR DU PLESSIS: Would you have passed that on to purely criminal departments? MR DE JAGER: Yes, I think so. But we must also bear in mind that our colleagues in the other branches for instance if we got the information from telephone tapping, we would have expected them to use it with great circumspection not to endanger the, to jeopardise the operation. In retrospect one can debate a lot about it. MR DU PLESSIS: Mr de Jager, one gets the impression from the interrogation and everyone who had to do with this whole case, that the Security Branch in fact was almost full time busy to investigate Mrs Mandela? Give us an idea of other things that you were involved in in light of the broad picture? MR DE JAGER: In that time, Mrs Mandela would have been one of various suspects. The organisations to which she possibly belonged were also suspect. We had a lot of pressure at that stage because of a joint management system etc, to find people who would qualify for detention etc. Fanie in all probability would also hypothetically have done physical monitoring of situations such as Regina Mundi, etc. We also had many other tasks, combining also the national intelligence service among others. So we had many other tasks apart from information gathering and this often really did great damage to our information gathering process. MR DU PLESSIS: In other words Mrs Mandela was not purely your most important object of investigation? MR DE JAGER: No, on the contrary, there are people who are now in Parliament who were under surveillance at that stage. It is so that most of the suspects of that time, worked by day in Johannesburg and lived in Soweto at night. There was a much broader field than the suspects mentioned. MR VALLY: Mr de Jager, these transcripts of the telephone conversations, what did you do with them, where are they now? MR DE JAGER: The usual procedure was those that were deemed to be necessary to be discussed at the morning conference, was thereafter in all probability placed in the relevant file or down to an individual in a sub-section who might have pertinently dealt with the matter like that. Then they would be filed and as far as I know, I left Soweto in 1988, I don't know whether they are still on file or whether they might in terms of archive instructions or laws, been shredded or whatever. MR VALLY: For us to find them at the Soweto Security Branch Head Office or archives or whatever, where would we look? Would there be a file saying Mrs Winnie Mandela? MR DE JAGER: It would either be her or it would be, I am sure ANC files don't exist any more and if a Winnie Mandela file exists, you might find it in there. MR VALLY: Thank you Mr de Jager. CHAIRPERSON: There is a strong possibility of course that some of those files were destroyed. MR DE JAGER: It has come to my attention in the media that certain files had been destroyed sir. CHAIRPERSON: A great number. Dr Randera? DR RANDERA: Mr de Jager, two questions. One specific - you mentioned that Sergeant Pretorius was the handler of Jerry Richardson. If my memory serves me well, that happened some time in August or September of that year? MR DE JAGER: It was late 1988 sir. DR RANDERA: Jerry Richardson was arrested at the time and then he was subsequently released after a month. I presume he continued being an informer, who was the handler of Jerry Richardson after that? MR DE JAGER: Without wanting to seem uncooperative, I think that is a question that Louis Watermeyer can answer, I really don't have the details sir. My apologies on that, but I don't know. DR RANDERA: Mr de Jager my second question is really related to something that you said early on, which is when you made the point that perhaps the public at large gave the Security Branch much more credit than what you were actually able to achieve in relationship to one of the questions that your reputation was much stronger than what actually happened on the ground, because of the work, and clearly if one looks at what happened in the 1980's particularly, you must have been overstretched, but yet you had this reputation throughout the country. Now we are clear that the reputation of the Security Branch was not only in Soweto, but it prevailed right through the country. Can you perhaps comment on that as to how that came about? I really want to understand that in terms of helping us for the future, because I don't really want to see this happen again? MR DE JAGER: Mr Chairman, I think that can be seen in the context of the many successful prosecutions of cadres and of other persons that were not necessarily cadres but for other let's call it politically related crimes. I think it can be seen due to that and those cases were normally stretched over some time. They were given prominence and I think that might be the main reason why people think that we did have abilities which we not always had. I don't know if that answers your question. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Kemp? Mr de Jager, before I ask you to stand down, just for your information. You have referred to the impossibility of having 24 hour surveillance on anyone, let alone one person. CHAIRPERSON: It was not the TRC or any outside person, but Paul Erasmus who gave evidence before this Commission. CHAIRPERSON: And so clearly your evidence contradicts his. Secondly, you say you knew him very well. He also stated under oath that so important was Mrs Madikizela-Mandela that there was a special plot if you like, yes, to sow disinformation concerning her, and he gave a number of examples where he himself was directly involved and he seemed to think that she was much, much more important than you have made out. How do you clarify that? MR DE JAGER: If I might just answer both your questions Mr Chairman. As far as surveillance is concerned, I have practical knowledge in the true sense of the word. I established a unit of that nature in Cape Town, and to surveil any person for 24 hours, is not an easy task and it was not possible within the Soweto context. As far as Paul Erasmus is concerned, yes, I knew him sir. I think to a certain extent I even facilitated his transfer down to Mossel Bay, myself being in the Cape. It is a given fact that Paul and I did see one another sometimes because I closely associated myself with Johannesburg Security Branch. I had personal friends there. We were also on the same frequency as far as held hand radio's were concerned, and frequently if something happened in Soweto, one would arrive at a scene and Paul Erasmus would be there. Particularly one afternoon when Colonel Sauer and Theart were shot, I had hardly gotten to the scene and Paul Erasmus was there, totally outside the ambit of his normal instructions and without how can I put it, as far as Paul in concerned, he might have had less wider and broader tasks and he might have deemed Mrs Mandela and that which went on around her, to be more important in his own task definition than we did in Soweto. I am not trying to beat about the bush Mr Chairman, but I can't bring it closer and speak on Paul's behalf, I apologise for that. CHAIRPERSON: I think I understand what you are saying. Mr de Jager, thank you very much for your attendance and for the answers to the questions that we put to you. You may stand down, thank you. CHAIRPERSON: I call Daniel Francois Malan Bosman. Mr Bosman, may I say welcome, thank you for your attendance. Ms Sooka will administer the oath. DANIEL FRANCOIS MALAN BOSMAN: (sworn states) CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Mr Bosman, I understand you have a statement that you would wish to read into the record? CHAIRPERSON: Could we go ahead as before? Thank you, we are listening to you Mr Bosman. Can I just say I would ask the cameraman to observe some of the rights of people. I do not want any more photographs taken in front here, excepting new witnesses, thank you. MR BOSMAN: I, the undersigned Daniel Francois Malan Bosman, declares under oath as follows: I am a Lieutenant Colonel and former member of the South African Police. At present I am a businessman of Bromval Way 19, Hillican Park, Randfontein. The contents of this statement falls within my personal knowledge, unless otherwise stated and is to the best of my knowledge true and correct. During the period 12 December 1983 to 29 February 1996 I was associated with the Security Branch Soweto. I was associated with the information gathering component and had the rank of Lieutenant when I arrived there and that of Lieutenant Colonel at the stage that I left. I had been advised that the rest of my career is not relevant in the giving of this evidence. Initially I started with the Investigating Unit, but after the need arose later I joined the information gathering component and was tasked with the covert gathering of information with assistance of among others, the tapping of telephone conversations. I deal accordingly with the matters mentioned in my subpoena. The questioning and following death of Sizwe Sithole. Apart that this person's name was mentioned in telephone conversations from time to time, I had no knowledge of this person nor do I have any knowledge of his interrogation and following death. The use and handling of informers, sources associated with the Mandela Football Club and Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela. The handling of informers, sources was handled by people who were tasked with that. I was never one of these persons and did not work with any source or informer at any stage. Although I was aware of the fact that the Security Branch depended greatly on the information provided by informants or sources and a great deal of trouble was taken to recruit the informers, I am not aware of any specific informer which was directly associated with the Mandela Football Club and Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela. I am aware of the fact that attempts were made to establish such sources, later I heard that there was one such source which appeared which did provide information to the Security Branch Soweto for a short period. The abduction, assault and murder of Stompie Seipei in 1988 and information in regard with that. The only involvement that I had in this matter was that due to my position, I had insight into the telephone conversation which took place in the house of Mrs Madikizela-Mandela. From a variety of these discussions it seemed that there were problems regarding certain young people and that certain people were taken away from the Methodist Church and taken to the house of Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela. I cannot recall the name Stompie Seipei specifically and cannot remember if the name was specifically mentioned before the raid which was done by the Police at the house of Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela. Furthermore I can give no details regarding the abduction, assault and murder of Stompie Seipei. The relationship between the Security Branch, Murder and Robbery, STRATCOM divisions and other units in the South African Police, with regard to matters affecting Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and the Mandela United Football Club. There was continual cooperation between the Security Branch and other divisions and units of the South African Police. As far as I know Soweto Branch of STRATCOM never existed. I am aware of the fact that STRATCOM actions were done by the Security Branch Soweto on the orders of the Security Head Office, Pretoria. At no stage did I personally have any direct contact with a person of STRATCOM Head Office, regarding information about the Mandela Football Club or Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela. Nor do I have any knowledge that there was any specific action between the various units regarding Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela or the Mandela United Football Club. After the Stompie Seipei raid my unit was approached by other units and requested to provide them with any information we had regarding the matter. I do not know what information was provided as cooperation in this regard took place on the level of the Commanding officers. The use of intelligence material and the relationship with intelligence agencies regarding the matters of Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and the Mandela United Football Club. The distribution of information to intelligence agencies only took place on top levels, but I am aware of the fact that there was interaction between the Security Branch and National Intelligence. As far as my knowledge, no information was exchanged with any other agencies. We also received information from time to time from other intelligence agencies, but as far as I can remember, it had never any direct regard to Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela or the Mandela United Football Club. Interrogation and death of Themba Johannes Mabotha. I have no knowledge of the interrogation and death of Themba Johannes Mabotha. Information regarding the observations including telephone tapping, bugging etc, regarding the matters regarding to Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and the Mandela United Football Club. During the period that I was associated with the Security Branch Soweto, tapping was done on a large scale of Mrs Madikizela-Mandela's telephone conversations. The contents of the tapes on which these discussions were taped, was routinely transcribed and given to the investigating unit or the administrative component where decisions were then made as to action to be taken. The use of bugs did not take place on a large scale, but did take place. I am of the opinion that at a stage a bug was placed in the house of Mrs Madikizela-Mandela. This apparatus was linked to her telephone line so that conversations in her house, could be relayed to tape recorders which taped her discussions. Information which was achieved or obtained in this way is dealt with on the same way as ordinary tapping, it was transcribed and handed over to the investigating unit or top management or both. There was never talk of any 24 hour observation of Mrs Mandela's house or the activities of the Mandela Football Club. From time to time her house and business was placed under observation, especially during the time that she was restricted. We also drove past her house often and often her house was observed. Any information which was gained, was also passed through to the investigating unit and the administrative component. The killing of Sergeant Pretorius and two MK members, Maleleke and Mbenenge in 1988. I knew Sergeant Fanie Pretorius very well. He was an extremely hard worker and well loved by his colleagues. The day that he died, I knew about the operation, but was not part of it. I did hear what happened, later. As a result I can give no personal information regarding the death of Sergeant Pretorius or the two MK members Maleleke and Mbenenge. MR PIGOU: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Bosman, could you tell us exactly when you moved from the Investigation Unit into the job of working on telephone surveillance in the Soweto Security Branch? MR PIGOU: Could you tell us exactly when you moved from the Investigation Unit into the intelligence information gathering department of the Security Branch in Soweto? MR BOSMAN: Mr Chairman, that was in 1985 that I was transferred from the Investigating Unit to the Intelligence Unit. MR PIGOU: Mrs Mandela returned from Brandfort during the course, towards the end of 1985. When you moved to the information gathering department, was there already a tap on her telephone, was she back in Soweto or was she still in Brandfort at that stage? MR BOSMAN: When I reached the Unit, we had only just started with the tapping of her telephone conversations. MR PIGOU: When you arrived at the Unit, how many people were under this kind of surveillance in Soweto? MR BOSMAN: At that stage, during my service, term of duty, we had approximately 70 people that we were listening to. MR PIGOU: How many people were working inside the information gathering department on the telephone tapping, in terms of listening to the tapes and so forth? MR BOSMAN: I had a staff of 28 readers, two technical people. MR PIGOU: Now, your relationship in terms of Security Branch investigations with the information gathering department, were you kept abreast of certain investigations to the extent that you were instructed to look out for certain information with regards to certain people that were under surveillance? MR BOSMAN: What happened is that the moment the people came to apply to monitor a telephone, they gave us specific indication as to what had to be listened to and as a result of that, the application was put through to Head Office and the Head Office of Telkom for approval, before the operation could be launched. MR PIGOU: And who physically organised the tapping or the placing of bugs inside people's telephones, how was that done, who did that kind of work? MR BOSMAN: Mr Chairman the investigating officer made an affidavit in which he gave us the reasons why the telephone had to be tapped. We sent this through to head office and from there it had to go to the head office of the Post Office and then the functionary approved this service at the Post Office and as soon as this was approved, we started functioning. The Post Office then phoned us and said that the service would be approved and then we would start with the service. MR PIGOU: But who actually physically place the bugs in the telephones? You have referred to a bug being placed in Mrs Mandela's telephone, who actually did that? MR BOSMAN: The service is not done from the house, but is done as from the exchange, the telephone exchange. MR PIGOU: So you had specific contacts in the telephone exchange in Telkom who would do that for the Security branch? MR BOSMAN: It was a specific person who had been appointed by the Postmaster-General to provide us with the service. MR PIGOU: You have indicated that there was a - paragraph 13 of your affidavit - that there was a device that was attached to Mrs Mandela's telephone. Could you tell us who would have been involved in the physical placing of that bug? MR BOSMAN: Mr Chairperson, that was done in the same way as - listened to in the same way as the telephone conversation, but what we did, is that they for example, cut the telephone off and the client would complain that the telephone line was dead. Somebody from the Post Office was sent out to go and fix the line and at that stage the bug would then be inserted into the phone. MR PIGOU: Do you recall after the burning down of Mrs Mandela's house in Orlando in July 1988, that an operation of the nature that you have just described took place, to place a bug in the telephone of Mrs Mandela's house in Diepkloof? MR BOSMAN: We transferred to Diepkloof, her telephones there were also bugged as well as her office at Commercial House in Orlando East, and later also the new house against the kopje in Orlando West. MR PIGOU: Okay. Just going on to the abduction and kidnapping, assault and murder of Stompie Seipei. You have indicated that you have some recollections of information that was collected at that time, around discussions, around the abduction of youth from the manse. Who did you pass that information to in terms of the transcripts of, in the investigation unit? MR BOSMAN: Mr Chairperson, all information after it had been transcribed, I read through the information, to ensure that the correct version was given and that the use of language was correct. Then we gave it through to the different units, and at that stage it was passed on to Lieut Watermeyer's unit, because he dealt specifically with the monitoring of the Mandela house. MR PIGOU: Do you recall, because it was of great national importance at that time, it was all over the newspapers and so forth, whether information was passed over to the security branch, relating to telephone conversations by Mrs Mandela at her house, at the end of December 1988 and the beginning of January 1989? MR BOSMAN: Do you now mean did Mrs Mandela phone us to give information to us? MR PIGOU: No, no, Mr Bosman what I am trying to determine is whether from the transcripts of the telephone conversations from the - the conversations that your people were able to listen to, were you able to determine whether Mrs Mandela was in the house at the end of 1988, beginning of 1989, in the crucial days which have become the subject of much debate and much discussion by this Commission, the courts and so forth? MR BOSMAN: On those specific days she alleged that she was at Brandfort, but we did pick up her voice and this was all passed on to the Murder and Robbery unit, Soweto. MR PIGOU: Mr Dempsey, who sat where you are sitting in November and December, told us that the - really the only information of any use that he received, was in relation to Mabotha, and that other information was of no particular use at that time. Is Mr Dempsey not telling the truth? MR BOSMAN: I am not - I cannot say that he did not tell the truth, but what I can say, is what is important to me, is perhaps not important to me. MR PIGOU: Did you receive information relating to the telephone conversation which has been reportedly made by Mr Themba Mabotha to Mrs Mandela from, I believe it was Groblersdal, requesting for money to be cabled to him, so he could get back to Soweto? Do you recall that particular occasion? MR BOSMAN: There were few occasions where we did get calls where Themba's name appeared. MR PIGOU: Do you know a Sgt Badenhorst who was working in your unit? MR BOSMAN: No, I think it was a Capt Badenhorst. MR PIGOU: And do you remember which section of the Soweto security branch he was working in? MR BOSMAN: If I am not mistaken he was also in the investigating team. MR PIGOU: Mr Bosman, do you recall a conversation that you and I had in, I believe it was the end of October, beginning of November, last year, in connection with the relationship between the Murder and Robbery unit and the security branch? If I can just refresh your memory, at your offices in the West Rand. MR BOSMAN: I am not quite sure what it was about, because we spoke quite a great deal about what happened there. MR PIGOU: Okay, well, let's focus on one specific matter. The relationship between the Murder and Robbery and security branch. You informed me, and you will correct me if this is not the correct recollection, that Mr Dempsey wasn't particularly popular in the security branch, because he had investigated a case in which a member of the security branch had been sentenced to 10 years imprisonment, for shooting dead a suspect in, I believe, in 1982? MR PIGOU: Is it possible that information which you passed over to Lieut Watermeyer's unit, was not subsequently passed over to Mr Dempsey during the course of the Stompie Seipei investigation? MR BOSMAN: It was policy that all information which was relevant or criminal relevant information, had to be passed through to Murder and Robbery if it appeared. MR PIGOU: We know that it may have been policy, it is policy also not to torture people, but we know these things have happened, do you think in the light of the acrimonious relationship which we spoke about last year, that information may well have been withheld from Mr Dempsey during the course of his investigation? MR BOSMAN: I do not believe that this information would have been withheld from Col Dempsey. MR PIGOU: With regards to the totality of the transcripts that were made, the tapes of Mrs Mandela and other people, you also indicated to me that that information had been destroyed. Is that the case? During the same conversation, that was. MR BOSMAN: At this stage most of the things have been destroyed. There is nothing more in existence, except in certain cases. MR PIGOU: Now perhaps you could enlighten us on how that happened, because you have indicated that you were working with the Soweto security branch until 1996. I didn't believe the security branch was still in existence then, but until 1996. Could you perhaps provide us with some detail about how that information got to be destroyed? MR BOSMAN: Instructions were received that all documents had to be destroyed, and this is what we did. Everything was shredded or burnt. MR PIGOU: And where did that instruction come from? MR BOSMAN: I accepted that it was from head office. MR PIGOU: And who did you actually receive the instruction from inside the Soweto security branch? MR BOSMAN: I think it was from Brig Van der Merwe, who informed us to destroy these documents. MR PIGOU: Can you perhaps enlighten us as to when that happened? Which year? MR BOSMAN: That was in - that was just before the elections. MR PIGOU: So end of 1993, beginning of 1994? MR PIGOU: Somewhere around that time? MR PIGOU: Okay. You indicated in your statement that you were aware of interaction between the security branch and National Intelligence. Is that correct? MR KEMP: Could you tell us the nature of this interaction? MR BOSMAN: The purpose of (sensor)? censor? method was that all information that I had obtained from tapping, I had to convey to information components in Soweto and this was also done by Intelligence as well as the information leg of the security branch. MR PIGOU: And do you recall who the contact person was, the main person from National Intelligence who was dealing with Soweto Security Branch? And I would like you to, if you can recall, focus your attention on the '88, '89 period and subsequently through to 1990, 1991, I am wanting you to think around the time period that Mrs Mandela was being investigated in connection with the Stompie Seipei case. MR BOSMAN: Mr Chairperson, I think that we have the whole thing wrong here. It wasn't National Intelligence, it was the Information Intelligence leg of the security branch. We did national intelligence in another way with people in whom they were interested. MR PIGOU: And how did you assist them in that way? I mean, I want to get through this quite quickly, but I just want to know if you had dealings with National Intelligence. If your office had dealings with National Intelligence, who was the person in National Intelligence that you had dealings with? MR BOSMAN: Mr Chairperson, it was also one of their technical officers. MR PIGOU: Did you have any dealings at all, your unit in terms of the information you passed with Section (c)(4) of the Security Branch, the counter-revolutionary task team, information intelligence task team? MR PIGOU: Are you aware of this structure inside the Security Branch? MR BOSMAN: I was never interested in them. MR PIGOU: You didn't receive specific information or requests to specifically look for certain people relating to structures, vehicles or personalities in terms of the information you were listening to, on your telephone tapping service? MR BOSMAN: This was only information that Col Watermeyer requested from me, and all information was passed through to his unit. What he did further with the information I don't know. MR PIGOU: Two last issue areas. The first is opinions that I need from you. You have told us that you recorded telephone conversations which indicated or clearly showed that Mrs Mandela was present during the time period that she says that she was in Brandfort, around the Stompie Seipei case. Were you surprised that this information was never used in terms of the prosecution against Mrs Mandela? MR BOSMAN: I can just say that at one stage they said that the information was too sensitive to use. They did not want to make the information public. MR PIGOU: I mean it would seem also from the context of our conversations, that - in last year - there was a considerable amount of information around Mrs Mandela, and please correct me if I am wrong, and that there seemed to be some level of protection for Mrs Mandela, in terms of not pursuing prosecutions against her. Would you agree that that was the impression that was created? MR BOSMAN: I also reached that - I always reached the conclusion that the people were afraid of her. MR PIGOU: Which people were afraid of her? MR BOSMAN: The whole country was scared of her. MR PIGOU: Was this discussed amongst yourselves in the security branch? MR BOSMAN: Yes, the members did discuss that. MR PIGOU: So if we received information in this Commission that the security branch did everything they could to try and deal with Mrs Mandela, to try and get prosecutions against her, would you agree that that was the case? MR BOSMAN: As I heard this morning, and as we know, investigations were launched but nothing came of it. MR PIGOU: Where do you personally rest the responsibility for nothing happening in this regard? MR BOSMAN: If the Attorney-General refused to prosecute, then nobody could have done anything. We were powerless, we didn't know what to do. MR PIGOU: This issue area now, I have to - the last issue area, and I have to remind you, Mr Bosman, that you are under oath. You will recall that we were together on an investigations in 1995 into gross human rights violations in the Vaal Triangle? MR PIGOU: Against the Murder and Robbery Unit where we came across numerous cases of electric shock torture and so forth. During your time in the Soweto Security Branch, did you have either any direct or indirect knowledge of gross human rights violations in terms of torture, assault, extra-judicial executions or anything of that nature? Did you hear anything in relation to that? Now we know of the Van As story. MR BOSMAN: Allegations were made that people were tortured and cases also investigated against me as well, but the Attorney-General refused to prosecute any of them. MR PIGOU: Yes but do you believe, do you believe, and I am not talking about the cases specifically against you, do you believe that torture took place and was conducted by members of the Soweto Security Branch? Do you believe that that happened? I mean, we have heard evidence in front of this Commission that there was systemic abuse throughout the country. Do you believe that there was systemic abuse or are we talking about the old rotten apple syndrome? MR BOSMAN: It could have happened, but it has never been proven. MR PIGOU: No further questions. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Mr Richards, are you going to do this every time, are you? MR RICHARDS: Unfortunately Sgt Pretorius' death is an issue where my client was involved. CHAIRPERSON: Please proceed - briefly. Sir, in paragraph 15 of your affidavit, you say I can consequently not say that I have any personal knowledge of it. Oh, sorry, with regard to Fanie Pretorius, I can give no information. I knew him as a member. He was in my office every day. He came to me with papers of some sort every day. We had to put this up and put that up, I knew him personally, but I cannot say anything about his death, because I was not involved in his death, I was not on the scene. However you're entitled to give hearsay evidence before this hearing. Is there anything that you know that you heard at the time? MR BOSMAN: At that stage, no, nothing. MR RICHARDS: The last question is, who listened to the tapes that there were made? MR BOSMAN: Members who were on my staff listened to the tapes. MR RICHARDS: Did you read the transcripts? MR BOSMAN: Yes, I did, and if something was important I went and listened to it myself. If it was in a strange language I took an interpreter along to interpret to me, to get more clarity. MR RICHARDS: And were there conversations between Mrs Madikizela-Mandela and the South African Police or the Security Police apparatus? NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR RICHARDS CHAIRPERSON: Please give your name for the record. MR MAKANJEE: I am Sanjay Makanjee appearing for the Seipei family. I would just like to ask you a few questions. If I am correct with what you are saying, the Attorney-General at the time had evidence that would overturn Mrs Madikizela-Mandela's defence in a trial. Is that correct? MR BOSMAN: I won't directly say that there was direct evidence on the Stompie Seipei incident. There were, however, problems, because she was playing two factions up against each other. MR MAKANJEE: Let me rephrase that. Mrs Madikizela-Mandela stated in her defence in the trial in which she was charged for the assault and kidnapping Stompie Seipei, that at the time of that incident, she was in Brandfort. Are you saying that the Attorney-General had information stating that she was not in Brandfort at the time? MR BOSMAN: As I have already said, at that stage there was a scope of time and if I remember correctly, your phone - on certain days, certain phones, the tapes of certain phones were taken off. Others went through from Friday night until Monday morning, especially if there weren't many conversations, because the tapes were long and durable. But from the Friday to the Sunday, there were conversations on her tapes where she spoke. MR MAKANJEE: In your personal knowledge, who was the person who decided not to use that evidence against Mrs Madikizela-Mandela? MR BOSMAN: I would not be able to say. I just gave the transcriptions to the various units and that was the end of the matter. I never heard of it again. MR MAKANJEE: Just one last question. Of the 80 or so people whose phones were tapped in Soweto, were there any of the other people who had incriminating evidence that could be used against them and was not? MR BOSMAN: As I have already said, there are many, there is a lot of sensitive information, positive, but too sensitive to place, because the whole operation could have been blown by that. MR MAKANJEE: Thank you, Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Any further questions? MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, if I am next and if I may? MR WAGENER: Mr Bosman, how long did you know Fanie Pretorius? MR BOSMAN: From the time he came there until he died. MR WAGENER: Was that two or three years? MR BOSMAN: I am not sure how long, but from the beginning he started working at that specific section. MR WAGENER: And you saw him probably almost on a daily basis? MR BOSMAN: Yes, that's correct. MR WAGENER: Did he in that time ever show any signs of instability or unbalanced actions, conduct? MR BOSMAN: I thought that he was going to kill himself working at a stage. MR WAGENER: Are you aware of the fact that he was never ever charged with anything during his police career? MR BOSMAN: No, I don't know of that. MR WAGENER: Are you aware of any case where he disobeyed an instruction or an order? MR WAGENER: And yet, in your statement you said that on that day you knew of the operation but you were not part of it. Am I correct to deduce that you knew of the operation before it started? MR BOSMAN: Yes. At a stage in the office they spoke about going out to something. They went to do something. MR WAGENER: Is that all the information you have? MR BOSMAN: Nothing, I don't have any more information than that, sorry. MR SEMENYA: Chairperson, if I may come after everybody else, unless there are answers arising out of what he ask, that I may ask again to ask for an indulgence. CHAIRPERSON: Normally the last questions are asked by the Commission, but I do know that Mr Pigou has one final question. Perhaps he should do that in case it affects, and of course Mr Kemp, as well. Why don't you go ahead, Mr Pigou? Mr Bosman, are you aware of any recordings or conversations from the Asvat surgery, from Dr Asvat to Mrs Mandela's house during the time period between the end of December 1988 and January 27 1989, the day that Dr Asvat was murdered? MR BOSMAN: Of his death itself I have no personal knowledge. I can't remember that I know anything, but there were conversations from the house of Mrs Albertina Sisulu, it could be that between her and Mrs Mandela, that happened, or maybe between her and the office, there were conversations. MR PIGOU: So just to clarify, you do not recall telephone conversations being recorded between Dr Asvat and Mrs Mandela during that time period? MR BOSMAN: She did liaise with doctors. MR BOSMAN: Over a period, not on a specific time, but over a period. MR PIGOU: Just lastly. With the list of 70 people, or the number of 70 people, would you be prepared to divulge those names or those that you can remember to this Commission. I am not asking you to do that now, but would you be prepared to sit down and write out a list of people whose telephones were tapped and hand that to the Commission? MR BOSMAN: Those that I do remember I will write down. MR HUGO: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Mr Bosman, if I understand your evidence correctly, your testimony, then you are the co-ordinator of the tapping of several telephones in the Soweto area during the time. Until what period, until when did this tapping take place? MR BOSMAN: Mr Chairman, I left the tapping unit in the beginning of 1975. Sorry, I mean 1995. MR HUGO: If I understand it correctly, then the tapping took place on the tapes being tapped and then being transcribed and you then read it or at least scanned it? MR HUGO: So you did then on a daily basis have intimate knowledge of the conversations that took place? MR BOSMAN: Yes, that's correct. MR HUGO: And you also testified that in the process Mr Johannes Mabotha, his name appeared on the tapes at various occasions. Please, can you say to the Commission what was the tone of the conversations when Mr Mabotha's name came up from time to time? MR BOSMAN: There were love conversations between her and Mabotha, or Themba, as they called him at that time. MR HUGO: I don't want unnecessary detail, but perhaps you should just tell us what you mean by love conversations. MR OOSTHUIZEN: At one stage she had a conversation with him where he fell from the bed and she told him how sorry she was that he might have hurt himself. MR HUGO: Mr Bosman, I see you find that funny. Let me tell you it is very serious in a certain aspect, respect, that Mr Potgieter in the statement given to us, he says among others, that he knew of what you say now, and Mr De Kock said that it was a lie, that something like that never happened. MR BOSMAN: I know of this specific case. It was very funny to me. A few occasions she had such conversations with different people. That specific case, one of the members came to me, the reader of the thing, and came and showed me specifically after we had followed the name Themba for quite a time, because we normally followed a certain person in a conversation. For instance, if Jan was mentioned, then we would follow that name for a time. MR HUGO: So you then made a careful study of the conversations between Mrs Mandela and this specific Themba? MR HUGO: And I assume that the transcriptions were made and to whom did you give these transcriptions? MR BOSMAN: The transcriptions were all passed through on the same, in the same way. MR HUGO: I am asking you more specifically, for which person did you give these transcriptions? MR BOSMAN: Mr Chairman, the transcriptions were normally, and I believe that this specific transcription, also went to Col Watermeyer. MR HUGO: Is there a possibility that this transcription could have gone to Mr Potgieter? MR BOSMAN: I am not quite certain but it is possible. MR HUGO: If I put it to you that Mr Potgieter was the investigating officer regarding this specific Johannes Mabotha case, would you agree with me that on the probabilities you might have given these specific transcriptions to him? MR BOSMAN: Yes, that is possible. MR HUGO: Now over and above the amorous aspects, which you found funny, were any other political conversations, activities discussed between Mr Mabotha and Mrs Mandela? MR BOSMAN: I would not be able to say of such, to talk about that. MR HUGO: I don't understand your answer. That you listened to these conversations, but certainly you would have known whether there were political connotations, whether things were discussed, which could have given rise to misdemeanours or could have proved misdemeanours? MR BOSMAN: Mr Chairman, if something like that had appeared, it would have gone through to the investigating officers. If there were anything of a political nature. For a fact I know that a call came through from the Eastern Transvaal, I am not sure whether Boskoprand or some place, where they spoke about money that he needed to get back to Johannesburg, from Mrs Mandela. MR HUGO: And was this transcription made and given to the investigating officers? MR HUGO: And can you make a statement, a judgment as to whether it went to the Attorney-General? MR HUGO: Did you try to find out? MR BOSMAN: No, I never made any enquiries. MR HUGO: Can I ask you, why did you go ahead with tapping the phone conversations in 1990, after the armed struggle had already come to an end? MR BOSMAN: I think it is a general phenomenon, that it is done even today, just perhaps in another way. MR HUGO: Are you involved in it? MR HUGO: I have no further questions, thank you. NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HUGO MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, flowing from the questions of my ... CHAIRPERSON: So have I, but go ahead. MR ROSSOUW: Flowing from the questions my learned friend put to this witness, it involves my client, Col Potgieter, and I would like to ask one or two questions to this witness. I will be very brief. MR ROSSOUW: Mr Bosman, did you ever tell Col Potgieter about this whole conversation, about the relationship between Mabotha and Mrs Mandela, did you ever mention it to him? MR BOSMAN: Mr Chair, as I said, it was general, I discussed it with my people first, and the person who read it, explained it to me and then we listened. I listened, and then we passed it on. Whether Col Potgieter had an interest in the matter at that stage or whether only Col Watermeyer was involved, the information was passed on. It was not destroyed, it was legally passed on. So I don't know to whom. MR ROSSOUW: In other words, you can't say whether Col Potgieter was ever made aware of those allegations? MR BOSMAN: Col Potgieter did say at the time that he was building up a docket and that we had to give him certain information and from that time we made all tapes in triplicate, one for Watermeyer, one for Potgieter and one to put away. MR ROSSOUW: Because, you see, Col Potgieter would testify. He says in his submission and he said under oath to the Attorney-General, that if De Kock had made certain testimonies in his criminal case, which was not true, and he says also that De Kock stated that Mabotha had been Winnie's sex slave, and that that was not true, but he said this in the context of the fact that he says he never got any information and never listened to any tapes during that investigation. MR BOSMAN: I can't say that's true or not true. MR ROSSOUW: All I want to put to you, is that you don't know whether Potgieter knew of it or not? MR ROSSOUW: No further questions. MR SEMENYA: Thank you, Chairperson. The answer you gave to my learned colleague, is that you knew at the relevant time that her voice - referring to Mrs Madikizela-Mandela was picked up. Do you recall that? MR BOSMAN: She was monitored throughout, from the time she came to Soweto until I suppose 1993, 1994. MR SEMENYA: Do me a favour, I will try and repeat the question. You recall your evidence that during the relevant time her voice was picked up. Do you recall saying that? MR BOSMAN: Do you mean the time when she says she was in Brandfort? As I said, Mr Chair, we put a tape on, it could be that it went through the weekend. On Monday morning, you take it off, you don't know what time it was used, but there was talking on the tape and we assumed that she was, she had been in Soweto. MR SEMENYA: I am going to ask it for the third time. Did you say at the relevant time when she alleges she was in Brandfort, you had a transcript of her voice in her house in Soweto? MR BOSMAN: Mr Chairperson, as I said already, on the specific tape throughout the running of that tape, it doesn't give the exact time, it tells you that it is ongoing. Her voice was on that tape. MR SEMENYA: I will repeat the question for the last time. Was it your testimony that on that relevant time, at that relevant time, Mrs Mandela was in her house and not in Brandfort? MR BOSMAN: Mr Chair, as I have said, I cannot say during the Stompie Seipei incident that she was at home. I am saying that she was in Soweto during that weekend. MR SEMENYA: Mr Bosman, with the greatest of respect, sometimes you are very flippant. For instance, you are just saying that the whole country is afraid of Mrs Mandela. What type of statement is that? MR BOSMAN: Can you repeat, please? MR SEMENYA: Mr Bosman, when you are saying the whole country is afraid of Mrs Mandela, what type of statement is that? Is there any factual correctness for the statement? MR BOSMAN: As I have said, it appeared to me as if nobody wanted to touch her and now I will say the same as Col Kritzinger, it felt to us as if she were untouchable. That is the reality. MR SEMENYA: Mr Bosman, it is factually incorrect that the whole country is afraid of Mrs Mandela. Is that correct? MR BOSMAN: I am saying, going to tell you, Mr Chair, at a stage no person in South Africa was willing to say anything about the Mandelas, and I will stand and fall with that statement. MR SEMENYA: I will ask you a very simple question. Are you suggesting in your evidence as a matter of factual correctness, that I was afraid of her? MR BOSMAN: Mr Chairman, I can't say the whole country, I think it is a general statement that I am making. I don't think it includes each and every person, but the general feeling originated with us, we began to have that feeling, that people were afraid of the Mandela house. MR SEMENYA: Are they afraid of the house? I am trying to get you to be exact in what you are saying, because there are profound implications of what you are saying. Now after five attempts to establish whether or not you had evidence, that Mrs Mandela at the relevant time when she says she was in Brandfort, she was in fact in Soweto, I still don't have an answer. Is that right? MR BOSMAN: Mr Chair, I am not going to say she was here, I am not going to say she was away. According to the tape that we had at our disposal at that stage, there was a conversation of her on that tape. MR SEMENYA: And you say the reason this information was not used in the Stompie trial, is because the information was sensitive? Is that your evidence in the first place? Let's hear that one. MR BOSMAN: Mr Chair, as I said before, all information was passed on. Whether the investigating officer found it applicable or not, that did not fall within my jurisdiction. I just did my work and when it was done it was done. I didn't know what happened to the evidence further. MR SEMENYA: I will ask you the same question again, Mr Bosman. Did you say that the reason that evidence was not used, was because it was sensitive? Were those your utterances? MR BOSMAN: Mr Chair, I have already said, the information was passed on. If the Attorney-General found that it was sensitive, then he didn't use it, otherwise he would have used it. I don't know. MR SEMENYA: I will try for the last time. Who said that information was sensitive? MR BOSMAN: In general bugging evidence was treated as sensitive throughout the country. It was not only in Soweto but countrywide. MR SEMENYA: I will ask it in Afrikaans. I am going to ask, who said that the information was sensitive? MR BOSMAN: Is that on the specific Stompie Seipei matter or in general? MR SEMENYA: You know what you are talking about. Who said the information was sensitive? MR BOSMAN: Mr Chair, when I took over from the sensor method section, it was said to me that each and every bit of information should be treated as sensitive and highly secret. That's why we had a stamp on every copy of a tape, strictly secret. It was not for every Tom, Dick and Harry to hear. It was confidential. MR SEMENYA: Apparently I won't get an answer to that one. Do you recall during 1988/89, reading a transcript which puts Mrs Mandela at the relevant time in her house, as opposed to Brandfort? Do you recall during 1988/89 you, Mr Bosman, reading a transcript which places Mrs Mandela in her Soweto house at the time she alleges she was in Brandfort? MR BOSMAN: As I have said, there was such a transcription. The tape was available that she had been during, she must have been in Soweto during the weekend. MR SEMENYA: Is your answer yes, that you recall in 1988/89 reading a transcript of that form? MR SEMENYA: Let me tell you why it cannot be correct. She was only prosecuted I think during 1992. Isn't that correct? MR SEMENYA: Isn't that correct, sir? MR BOSMAN: I don't know of her. MR SEMENYA: But it is the only time where the defence of an alibi was raised, it could not have been of pertinent relevance to you in 1988/89, whether she was or she was not in Brandfort. MR BOSMAN: Mr Chair, I don't know Mr Chair whether they made use of the transcriptions at that time. I am not sure. We passed it on to the investigating officers, but whether they used it, I don't know. MR PIGOU: Mr Chairperson, for the record, could I state that it was not, in 1990, the alibi was first raised publicly at the Jerry Richardson trial. Thank you. MR SEMENYA: What is your answer, Sir? MR BOSMAN: As I have said, I know nothing about the hearing. I was not involved with the hearing, and at no stage, if I passed the tapes on, the transcriptions, then it is out of my hands. They never approached me for an explanation in this regard. MR SEMENYA: Do you give the transcript over to the investigating team? MR BOSMAN: That was directly after the transcription had been read, then I distributed it and each morning they were distributed to the different sections. MR SEMENYA: But that's the point I'm making, it must be a couple of days after that recording was made, is that right? MR BOSMAN: No if the tapes were taken off on the Monday morning 7 o'clock then the tapes would have been read by 5 o'clock in the afternoon and distributed by the Tuesday morning, received by the sections on the Tuesday morning at the latest. MR SEMENYA: But it is that Tuesday morning when I am saying to you it could not have been known, at least by the Security department that she would be prosecuted, is that right? MR BOSMAN: No, it's impossible, nobody would have known it at that stage. MR SEMENYA: And at that stage no-one would have known that she would be raise a defence of an alibi in respect of those events. MR SEMENYA: Yet at the time Mr Bosman you knew that you have evidence which could overturn her alibi defence? MR BOSMAN: Mr Chairperson, we never destroyed those tapes. MR SEMENYA: I don't know what you are talking about now. MR BOSMAN: Mr Chairperson, we never destroyed the Madikizela-Mandela tapes before we weren't absolutely certain that nothing had happened. MR SEMENYA: Can I read from your statement that it is possible for us to go and obtain the transcript that you are talking about? MR BOSMAN: At this stage? At this stage I think it is impossible, I think everything has been destroyed by now. MR SEMENYA: I have no further questions. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Mr Richards? MR RICHARDS: May I ask one question, Chairman, which I think is of curiosity to us all. From these tapes, Mr Bosman, would it be possible for you to say with certainty where Mrs Mandela was, whether she was in Brandfort or in Johannesburg or would you simply hear a voice on the tape? MR BOSMAN: Mr Chairman, she had a specific voice with a high tone. You could clearly recognise her voice when she spoke on the phone. In time you get to know everyone's voice, that is how you know, how you identify people. MR NTSEBEZA: That's not the question. The question is whether when you hear the voice, and it is accepted that you know that it is the person who you think it is, say for instance in this case it is Mrs Mandela's voice, are you able just from hearing that voice that the person is speaking in Johannesburg or in Brandfort? MR BOSMAN: Mr Chair, yes, it is possible if she spoke to a person who stayed in Johannesburg at a stage. If she spoke to a person called Piet, we would know that Piet was staying in Soweto. MS SOOKA: I think that you are confusing all of us and it is a very critical issue, because what it does, is it throws some doubt about Mrs Mandela's credibility, because in terms of the evidence that you have given here before the Commission on the 29th of December, which is the date that we are talking about, she places herself in Brandfort. Now if I hear your explanation correctly, the 29th of December must be on a Friday, because you are going to remove the tape on the Monday. Am I correct so far? MS SOOKA: So effectively you have got a device on the telephone and you are recording all the information that is on the telephone and recorded between the Friday and the Monday morning. Is that right? MS SOOKA: But you are not actually able to tell us which particular day that is. Is that correct? MS SOOKA: And further if we established that the 29th is either between Monday, between Monday and Thursday, then effectively that throws what you are saying out. Is that correct? MR BOSMAN: Mr Chairman, no. Through the week it's another story. From Monday to Friday is another story. Then we are on the premises. Then we listen to what's on the tape and take it back, but over the weekend it is difficult, because over the weekend the tapes weren't always changed. MS SOOKA: Mr Bosman what I am - from what you said this was a tape which you picked up, it was after a weekend, it was on a Monday morning. MS SOOKA: Now I would like to know whether you read the transcript or whether you listened to the tape recording yourself. MR BOSMAN: Mr Chair, in 99%, for 99% I only read the transcriptions. It would have been impossible to listen to the tapes. MS SOOKA: In this particular instance can you remember? MR BOSMAN: I would lie if I say, to say that I had listened specifically to that one. MS SOOKA: You also said that you are not sure or I am not quite sure if I picked it up correctly, that you mentioned Mrs Sisulu's name in connection with this tape recording as well. Is that correct? MR BOSMAN: No, I think Mrs Sisulu was mentioned on another occasion when we spoke about Dr Asvat and Mrs Mandela. This was not a case between Brandfort and Mrs Mandela. It was between Dr Asvat and Mrs Mandela. MS SOOKA: I just want to recap. This is a tape on Mrs Mandela's telephone at her house in Soweto. It is a tape recording that starts on the Friday, it is wound up on a Monday morning, and based on the fact that you hear her voice on the tape, you place her at the Soweto house on the Friday. You have also said in your evidence that there were three copies of the transcription; one for Mr Watermeyer, one for Potgieter. MR BOSMAN: (Indistinct/not translated). - (not speaking into the microphone) MS SOOKA: And one for yourself. And both the tapes of course and the transcription have now been destroyed. MR BOSMAN: (Indistinct/not translated). MS SOOKA: One last question. Mr Semenya tried to establish, I think, this question of what you meant by sensitive. Because you actually used the word that this information was not used because it was too sensitive. Why did you use the word sensitive and why did you mean by it? MR BOSMAN: That was at a stage when there was strict surveillance of the organisation and then there was a classification of secret, confidential and strictly secret. It was not for every Tom, Dick and Harry to know that information. For instance, we didn't even allow a transcription on a table. If I entered a person's office and a transcription was lying on the table, then I spoke to him about it. I would reprimand him, because it was not a general phenomenon that everybody should know what was going on. MS SOOKA: Sorry you are not answering the question. There is a difference between classifying information as being highly sensitive and not using information, because it is sensitive. And what you said to us, is that the information was not used because it was too sensitive. MR BOSMAN: No, the information was not used, as a fact that it was not not used, because it was sensitive, the real wording was that it had to be treated sensitively. MS SOOKA: I see. One last question. The tapes for, when you made these tape recordings, if for instance, you have a tape set on a Monday, are we to assume that the tape will be switched off on the Monday, it will be transcribed on the same day and the information will be available on the next day? I would like to know what you say about tape recordings during Monday and Thursday. MR BOSMAN: Mr Chair, say for instance it is the Monday morning's tape which was put on on Monday morning seven o'clock and went through to Tuesday morning seven o'clock, then it was taken out, booked out to a transcriber. The man sat there and he recorded the conversations in the transcription and by the afternoon when he was done, I read it, signed it and passed it on to each section, which was interested, which had an interest in this specific operation. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Mr Bosman, thank you very much for your presence here and for your answers to our questions. You may stand down. |