ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, we're ready to proceed. I understand there may be a slight difficulty in the Ledwaba/Selepe matter. Some of the people present here today, members of the public, are Sotho-speaking. We've tried to arrange for a Sotho Interpreter this morning, he's not here yet, but I've spoken to the people present and they informed me that for the moment they don't have a problem if the interpreting will be done for them in English as well. Thank you, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Right, the Committee remains the same. This is the hearing of the matter referred to as Petrol Bombing - Ledwaba/Selepe. Could legal representatives please put themselves on record.
MR ALBERTS: As the Committee pleases, Mr Chairman. George Alberts, counsel for the first applicant, Eric Goosen, instructed by Weavind and Weavind Attorneys.
MR ROSSOUW: Thank you, Mr Chairman, my surname is Rossouw, from the firm Rooth and Wessels Attorneys, on behalf of applicant Deon Gouws.
MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Roelof du Plessis, instructed by Strydom Britz Attorneys, I act on behalf of Jacques Hechter and Brigadier Jack Cronje.
ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you, Mr Chairman. My surname is Steenkamp, I'm the Evidence Leader here and I also will be appearing on behalf of two victims today, namely Mr Julian Selepe and Mrs Elizabeth Ledwaba. Thank you, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Who is the second person you said you appeared for, Mr du Plessis?
MR DU PLESSIS: Brigadier Jack Cronje, Mr Chairman. You will find in his application, his second set of applications, which I handed to you last week I think, you will find a reference on typed page 19 thereof. I think we renumbered it from page 83, so the paginated number would be 101. If you recall, we said we'll include it in bundle 1. Paginated page 101, typed page 19.
CHAIRPERSON: I understand, or I heard that he has had an operation since ...
MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, Mr Chairman, may I perhaps just for public record and record purposes, place that on record. Brigadier Cronje had a heart attack last week Tuesday, just after he had given evidence, actually at night. He was admitted to the Unitas Hospital, he had a multiple bypass, heart bypass operation last week Thursday and apparently he is currently sitting in his bed making life difficult for everybody in the hospital.
JUDGE PILLAY: Old habits die hard.
MR DU PLESSIS: That's true, Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, may I just then for record purposes, say that Brigadier Cronje, this is one of those applications where he wouldn't have had anything to testify about, he didn't remember anything about this and he just takes responsibility because it happened under his command. And my submission to you would be that you could deal with his application simply on the basis of the written application and the evidence of the other parties who will give evidence before you.
CHAIRPERSON: The other people will give evidence as to what occurred and as to the fact that it was under Brigadier Cronje's ...(inaudible)
MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, Mr Chairman.
MR ALBERTS: Thank you, Mr Chairman. As I previously stated, Mr Goosen will give evidence first.
MR MALAN: Mr Goosen, are you prepared to take the oath?
EXAMINATION BY MR ALBERTS: Mr Goosen, as you've already heard, this incident deals with an incident that took place
in Serote Street 33, in Attridgeville, in September 1986, do you still remember this incident?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR ALBERTS: For record purposes we should perhaps start at the beginning of your application, which is on page 295 in bundle 2 before the Committee. Is that correct?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR ALBERTS: From page 295, page 336, your application deals with the relevant background, including this particular incident.
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR ALBERTS: Are you familiar with the contents on those pages?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR ALBERTS: Can you confirm the correctness thereof?
MR GOOSEN: I confirm the correctness thereof.
MR ALBERTS: Further, for record purposes and in view of the presence of the public at this application, would you please put it on record where you were working at the time when the incident took place.
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, I was stationed at the Security Branch Northern Transvaal and I served in Unit A.
MR ALBERTS: That is in Pretoria?
MR GOOSEN: Yes, that is correct.
MR ALBERTS: What was your rank?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, at that stage I was a Sergeant.
MR ALBERTS: Who was the commanding officer of the Security Branch Northern Transvaal?
MR GOOSEN: Brigadier Cronje, Chairperson.
MR ALBERTS: If we can now go to page 391 of the application, is that where this incident took place? This is the account of this incident. In this application you are asking for amnesty in respect of various offences, including murder, attempted murder, damage, arson and certain other transgressions, technical transgressions as well as perjury and delicts that may have followed from these deeds.
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR ALBERTS: Now with specific reference to page 392 of the application you there set out the nature and details of these deeds. Can we start there?
MR GOOSEN: Certainly Chairperson.
"On the 17th of September 1986, I was ordered by Lieutenant Jacques Hechter to assist him that night in an operation in Attridgeville. He also decided that we would meet each other just after midnight at the parking area of the Compol building."
MR ALBERTS: Can I interrupt for a moment please. In what unit was Lieutenant Jacques Hechter?
MR GOOSEN: Unit B, Chairperson.
MR ALBERTS: And he was your senior at that stage?
MR GOOSEN: Correct, Chairperson.
MR ALBERTS: So under whose command - after you received this order, under whose command did you operate with regard to this incident?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, under Lieutenant Jacques Hechter.
MR ALBERTS: Right, you can continue with your account.
"When I arrived just after midnight at the said parking area, Hechter and Sergeant Deon Gouws were already there and they were waiting for me. Hechter then opened his Skyline vehicle's boot and took out a set of false number plates as well as mellow-yellow bomb from the boot. The false number plates were attached to the Cortina station wagon - I've already referred to this in schedules 4 and 5 of this account, and the bomb was put on the passenger's side on the front on the floor. I also noticed that Gouws had an AK47 weapon with him."
MR ALBERTS: Can you just explain to everyone who are present here what a mellow-yellow bomb is.
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, a mellow-yellow is a self-activated explosive consisting of a coffee tin or similar container, which was usually filled with screws and which would have caused shrapnel and pentolic explosives with an activating mechanism.
MR ALBERTS: So you would say it was about the size of a medium-sized coffee tin?
MR GOOSEN: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR ALBERTS: Can you indicate with your hands how big that would be?
MR GOOSEN: It would have been about so high and this size.
CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps somebody could estimate that.
MR ALBERTS: In old language, approximately 10 inches high?
MR ALBERTS: With a circumference or 5 or 6 inches?
MR GOOSEN: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR MALAN: No, that sounds wrong. If you're talking about a circumference of 5 or 6 inches, that would be the radius?
MR GOOSEN: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR GOOSEN: That's correct, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: The diameter rather, the radius would make it 12 inches.
MR ALBERTS: Indeed, indeed. Excuse me, Mr Chairman, that's my mistake. It is the diameter that I intended referring to.
At that stage, and we will touch on this again later, you were an inspector of explosives, is that correct?
MR GOOSEN: Yes, that's correct.
MR ALBERTS: Can you perhaps give the Committee an indication now of what your knowledge was as inspector of explosives, what was involved and what were your duties, very broadly?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, in most of the cases we visited scenes of explosions. We had to investigate the happenings at such a scene. We had to take certain samples which were sent in for forensic tests, where it would be ascertained what type of explosive was involved in the explosion and to connect that to Russian origin if necessary.
MR MALAN: Excuse me, would you just repeat the last part again.
MR GOOSEN: To determine that it was an explosive of Russian origin, for example in a mini-limpet mine, if you took smears, because at a mini-limpet mine there would be certain explosives and at an SPM limpet mine there would be torpex, so for those purposes these tests were made.
MR MALAN: I heard you say, Mr Goosen, "if necessary" and that is why I asked the question. In other words, are you saying that things were said that things took place which may not have taken place, is that what you are saying?
MR GOOSEN: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson.
MR ALBERTS: The type of explosive that was in a particular explosive or bomb, would that be typical to your knowledge of the origin of that explosive?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR ALBERTS: Can you give an opinion concerning the force or the power of an explosion that would be caused by this particular mellow-yellow?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, if I had to make an estimate, I would say that this was between 800gms to a 1kg of pentolite explosive that would be contained in such a tin.
CHAIRPERSON: What sort of explosive?
MR GOOSEN: Pentolite, Chairperson.
MR ALBERTS: Were you at all involved in the manufacture of this mellow-yellow bomb?
MR GOOSEN: No, Chairperson, not at this incident, not before this incident and also not after this incident. I was in no way involved in the manufacture of this type of explosive device.
MR ALBERTS: This night when you met at the Compol Building, was this the first time that you saw this bomb?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR ALBERTS: What happened after you met and got the explosive into the vehicle?
"We then left for Attridgeville, where Hechter parked approximately half a block from the identified house, Serote Street 33. From there we walked to the said house. Hechter carried the bomb and Gouws was armed with the AK47. We all entered the premises and Hechter lit the safety fuse of the bomb and threw it into a window on the Northern side of the house. At that stage everything was dark and it was very quiet. We immediately ran away and heard how the bomb exploded before we reached the vehicle. Afterwards we immediately returned to Pretoria.
At the time of this attack I, on the strength of Hechter's communications to me, I was aware of the fact that an activist with the name Squash or something like that and other young activists who were the target of the attack, that they were involved a few days before at an attack on a black policeman's house in Attridgeville. Apart from that, Squash also, according to your information, had made a death threat to the said policeman. Apparently the said violence and threat arose from an action in which the policeman concerned took part and as a result of which a so-called comrade was killed."
MR ALBERTS: Can we just stop there for a moment. This name that you mentioned, Squash, is that correct?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, Squash is not the correct name that I used here, it's the name that I could remember when this application was compiled.
MR ALBERTS: Do you know now what the targeted person's correct name is?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, that is correct, his name is May Ledwaba, alias Squish.
MR ALBERTS: When did you remember this name?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, after the hearing on Thursday I had a discussion with Captain Hendrik Prinsloo, I mentioned the name Squash to determine whether he didn't perhaps know of this person and the activities of this person, on which he confirmed to me that the name of the person was in fact Squish and not Squash as I reflected here.
MR ALBERTS: I want to come back to this person Squish Ledwaba, actually May Ledwaba. That first paragraph on page 394 of the bundle, perhaps you should read that and then we can come back to this person.
"Information also indicated that the targeted activist was already busy instigating residents after a comrades funeral which would take place a day or two after our operation and large scale revenge attacks would take place on houses of various policemen in Attridgeville. This information forced Hechter to act preventatively immediately, which he in fact did, because no witnesses could be found that would be prepared to testify in a court of law with regard to the targeted activist's participation in the attack and his threat toward the black policeman and the resultant incitement to violence."
MR ALBERTS: We should perhaps fist ascertain if it was only May Ledwaba that was targeted for this bomb attack or other people apart from him.
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, as I understood it, May Ledwaba was the leader figure in this incitement action and that he would make use of youthful elements in Attridgeville to launch this attack on the policeman in Attridgeville.
MR ALBERTS: As you're sitting here now, do you know more about the background of May Ledwaba than you indicated in the application?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Chairperson. On Friday, 8th May, I had discussions with the chief investigating officer at that time involved in Operation Prickly Pear and then various other facts came to light surrounding May Ledwaba's activities.
MR ALBERTS: Will you please indicate to the Committee what facts you became aware of last Friday, which may be relevant to the fact that he was targeted.
Chairperson, approximately 1983 to 1985, May Ledwaba was very active in street committees, especially the kangaroo courts in Attridgeville, in fact a supreme judge or something similar in these illegal courts.
Information indicated that he was the only judge which could order an execution by way of necklacing. At the time of the incident he was charged in a necklace case, but owing to a lack of witnesses a hearing did not take place.
He was also actively involved in education matters in Saulsville and Attridgeville and he played a prominent role in various organisations involved in that.
During 1991 he was arrested as a result of the investigation to an MK operation with the code name Operation Prickly Pear. This operation was similar and in fact linked to Operation Vula.
On his arrest it became apparent that he was the magazine master of an MK group which played a prominent role in Operation Prickly Pear. As a result of this he was found in possession of more than 20 mini-limpet mines, various handgrenades, ammunition and some hand firearms.
After Squish's arrest it was ascertained that since approximately 1983 to the mid-'80's he had already been operating underground. At the time of the incident he was therefore a seasoned MK operator.
After his arrest he also made certain identifications and on his confession it was clear that he was actively involved in the planning and execution of the escape from arrest of nine people who were accused in the well-known Delmas Trial. Together with Anchillo Mapito and Trotter, they were responsible for the planting of the limpet mines in the cafe opposite Poyntons Building in Church Street, Pretoria. (And here I refer - see Cronje Cluster 2, bundle 2, page 328, paragraph 9.11.6).
He also identified a house that was found in Attridgeville, as a weapons cache, which he personally established in his capacity as magazine master of the MK group in which he was involved. This group was involved, amongst others, for gathering intelligence and establishing weapons caches.
Squish in 1992 was killed and that stage it was estimated that he was approximately 35 old. On the day of his death a bakkie in which he, accompanied by two or three other people, the bakkie was found under suspicious circumstances just outside Attridgeville, and the police vehicle pulled it over. When on the policemen climbed out of the car to approach the bakkie, he was shot and killed.
Thereafter this policeman's companion amongst others, shot Squish dead. At this stage he was released on bail pending the terrorist investigation against him, for which he was already arrested in 1991. Amongst other things AK47 weapons were also found in the bakkie. Coincidentally I personally saw his body as a result of this attack, but at that stage I wasn't aware of the fact that one of the bodies that I saw was Squish's.
The above information was obtained on Friday, 7th May. It was told to me and confirmed to be correct by the chief investigator of Operation Prickly Pear."
MR ALBERTS: Right, can we carry on with your application, page 394, the second paragraph.
"As far as the last mentioned aspect is concerned, it would be good to mention that at that stage large scale intimidation of residents in Attridgeville, amongst other places, took place. This intimidation was a direct cause for the unwillingness of ordinary innocent law abiding citizens to testify in courts of law against activists, because of their fear for life threatening revenge attacks. This was a general trend which was found countrywide and naturally made normal policing almost impossible. It simply didn't make sense to arrest a politically violence transgressor and then to free him as a result of lack of evidence. In fact, should it happen it would simply destroy the already shaky status of the legal system and strengthened the offenders. This trend had a very negative effect on the Security Police staff, who were in fact supposed to apply safety legislation effectively, because they were simply not able to protect their own detectives and black uniformed policemen. All these factors forced us to take drastic action in order to overcome the politically inspired violent attacks. This naturally also applies to all the violent deeds mentioned in this application.
To go back to the incident under discussion, later that same morning, that is to say still the 18th of September 1986, after I had already gone to bed I received a call from the radio control. I ironically was ordered to attend the scene of the explosion at Serote Street 31, as the explosive expert, although I wasn't on duty that week.
In order to avoid unnecessary suspicion I answered the call and went back to the scene. On my arrival there, approximately two hours after the incident, I immediately went to work and completed my investigation. After that, in my capacity as Inspector of Explosives, I brought out a report under oath concerning my findings on the scene and my expert opinion in connection with such findings. A copy of the report is attached, marked Annexure EG10, which speaks for itself."
MR ALBERTS: This copy of the affidavit, is that the one that is found on page 549 and 550?
MR GOOSEN: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR ALBERTS: What was the normal custom when explosive experts were called to a scene? I mention it as a result of the fact that you say you weren't on auxiliary duty that week.
MR GOOSEN: The custom was that we worked in groups. If I remember correctly, there were six service groups in a period of a week. From time to time it did happen that service rosters were available by radio, but for each week there was one or two explosive experts on duty.
MR ALBERTS: And you say that this particular day you were not on duty?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Chairperson, for that week I did not perform explosives service.
MR ALBERTS: Now why would you have been called to this scene if you weren't on duty for those purposes?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, I can merely speculate that either radio control had an old service list, or my involvement in the investigation in Attridgeville, was to act as a type of sweeper.
MR ALBERTS: In other words, that you were purposely tasked to visit the scene afterwards, where you earlier, in which you had taken part earlier?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Chairperson, but no such discussion was held with me in this regard.
MR ALBERTS: So was it a surprise to you when they called you out early that morning?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR ALBERTS: What did you make of that?
MR GOOSEN: After receipt of the message from radio control, I decided to go to the scene and to draw the least possible attention and then to finalise my investigation there.
MR ALBERTS: Were you in any way involved in the planning of this whole operation, the execution of it, that preceded it?
MR GOOSEN: No, Chairperson, at no stage was I informed about the planning and on what information the operation was planned.
MR ALBERTS: Other than was told to you immediately before the bomb was thrown?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, it was only information given to me on the way to Attridgeville, by Lieutenant Hechter.
MR ALBERTS: What did you find at the scene when you arrived there later, the second time?
"During my investigation at the scene, I took smear samples on a wall which was next to the detonation area of the bomb. Such samples are normally taken with a wet acetone smear and the forensic analysis thereof identifies the type of explosive involved. In this particular case I only took a dry smear, in other words, I neglected to use acetone during the taking of the smear. I knew that this omission would make it almost impossible for the forensic experts to ascertain with any degree of certainty, the nature and type of explosive involved. The type of explosive ..."
JUDGE PILLAY: Would they not have asked about the sample?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, it can happen. You normally have this wet acetone smear on some cottonwool and then you seal it in a little pill box and this kept it damp and had I been confronted about the dryness of such a cottonwool sample, I would have told that the thing wasn't properly sealed and the cap had come off and the acetone had evaporated.
"The type of explosive used in the mellow-yellow is not generally used in explosive devices or explosives of east block origin, which is generally used by activists, and consequently there would be no proof that the revenge attack had probably not been performed by an activist. In this way I purposely destroyed evidence in order to protect the real perpetrators, including myself."
MR ALBERTS: Do you agree that there would have been no point to this operation if there had been a real risk that the nature of the operation and those involved, if their identity could be exposed afterwards?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Chairperson. In this particular case a dossier would have been opened at Attridgeville Police Station, which in the normal course of events would have received the necessary attention from the detectives and it was to minimise that risk that I acted at the scene as I did.
MR ALBERTS: Right, would you please continue on that page with your account.
"During my investigation that night, I also ascertained that a person by the name of Walter Ledwaba was killed as a result of the explosive and that another person by the name of Julian Selepe was injured. These people had already been taken to the hospital when I arrived, but their names were given to me by family members who were present at the scene. I made a note of these names amongst others, and put it in my explosives file together with a copy of my report.
I am not now able to produce the notes because during October 1996, I destroyed it since I did not want to run the risk that incriminating evidence could be found in my possession before this application was finalised.
I have been advised that on my second visit to the scene, and more in particular with regard to my previously mentioned action there and thereafter, I probably made myself guilty of the offences of perjury or attempts thereto. In this regard I must mention that the overall consideration for my actions mentioned before and my omissions on the other hand, was to keep the covert nature of the operation secret. If the true identities of the responsible perpetrators were exposed, this operation would have had far reaching consequences for the continued ability of the Security Branch Northern Transvaal, to combat political unrests successfully in a covert manner.
As already mentioned, my initial action arose directly from the order which was given to me by Lieutenant Hechter. Once again I am of the opinion that that action took place with the knowledge of Brigadier Cronje, however the same cannot be said of my later action, as mentioned. In this regard I repeat however, that such action took place bona fide with a view to ensure our continued ability to overcome the liberation struggle."
MR ALBERTS: Will you page - before you continue, this perjury, did you make a statement regarding that?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Mr Chairman. This statement is included in this bundle, it's Exhibit EG10.
JUDGE PILLAY: I did not hear you, sorry.
MR GOOSEN: This exhibit is EG10.
JUDGE PILLAY: Good, this one statement which you did under oath, are other statements orally which you have done under oath regarding the same incident?
MR GOOSEN: No, it's only this statement I've made under oath, and I reported the next day to Brigadier Cronje and I informed him regarding my activity.
JUDGE PILLAY: But that wasn't under oath?
MR GOOSEN: That wasn't under oath, but under an accompanying letter I handed in the evidence and I would have taken it through to the forensic laboratories the next day. That was called an SAP21, and this was signed by Brigadier Cronje. But I did not get a copy of that letter.
JUDGE PILLAY: To make a long story short, you only made one affidavit regarding this incident?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, as far as I can remember.
MR ALBERTS: Mr Goosen, that is apart from the contents of this application, which also took place under oath, is that correct?
MR GOOSEN: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR ALBERTS: Will you please then page to page 594 of this bundle - 549, I beg your pardon, concerning the affidavit.
MR ALBERTS: 549, Mr Chairman. I refer to paragraph 6 specifically, is the contents of that correct?
MR GOOSEN: The contents of paragraph 6 is correct.
MR ALBERTS: So this is what you found there?
MR GOOSEN: Yes, that is what I found there.
MR ALBERTS: Perhaps this should be read into the record. It reads as follows
"The explosion took place within the main bedroom, next to the double bed, on the ground on the north-eastern side of the house. Because of this explosion this bedroom and the walls collapsed and all the windows and other windows in the house were broken and this is because of this explosion. When detonation took place, various holes were blown in the floor of this bedroom. They were about 16cm in circumference and the plates right above the detonation point broke loose from their constructions. There were many signs of shrapnel on the walls and also found in the furniture in this bedroom.
During my investigation on this scene, I found various pieces of shrapnel, and I refer to photograph A ..."
Do you still have that photograph?
MR GOOSEN: No, Chairperson, that was sent away.
"Smear samples for the identification of this explosion was taken from the wall next to the point of detonation. Smear samples could not be done at this point of detonation because water was thrown over that by the people, to extinguish the burning curtains."
These smear samples you are referring to, are those the samples that you've previously said that you took that with a dry acetone smear?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Mr Chairman.
MR ALBERTS: And is that the only respect where you did not tell us the full facts in your statement, apart from your findings and your opinions?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Mr Chairman.
MR ALBERTS: But the facts that you've gathered there are as written down here?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR ALBERTS: When was this statement made under oath?
MR GOOSEN: That was done on the 19th of the same month.
MR ALBERTS: Was that the day after that incident?
MR GOOSEN: If I remember correctly, this operation took place on the 18th and the 19th would then be the day on which these attacks on the police were expected ...(end of side A of tape)
... funeral of the deceased comrade would take place on the 19th, and according to information which I've received, as referred to Ledwaba highjacked the arrangements for this funeral and said that these retaliation attacks of police officials would take place right after this funeral.
MR ALBERTS: So this would start then with the funeral and afterwards unrest and violence would follow, was that the idea?
MR GOOSEN: Yes, this is what I learnt.
MR ALBERTS: Also by means of the people who were attending this funeral?
MR GOOSEN: That's correct, as I've mentioned in my application, this information was available at May Ledwaba would use young people to launch these retaliation attacks after the funeral.
MR MALAN: This information you obtained from Hechter?
MR GOOSEN: Mr Chairman, this is information which was conveyed to me in the vehicle on my way to Attridgeville and this is what I could remember when I compiled this application. Perhaps other things or information could have been conveyed to me too, but I can't remember what was discussed.
MR MALAN: And the reason why you did not have that knowledge, was that because you were involved in Unit A and not Unit B or the Operational Unit and you were not usually involved with intelligence.
MR GOOSEN: No, Mr Chairman, I was involved in Unit A, I did not attend the conferences in the mornings when the commanding officers shared this type of information. I was involved in Lieutenant Hechter's planning and during the identification of May Ledwaba as a target and the reasons and which information he had in his possession. That was not made available to me, not by means of documents or orally before this incident had happened.
MR MALAN: This information became available the day before the so-called onslaught on policemen Attridgeville, but you did not know about that.
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Chairperson, I was not involved regarding Attridgeville because I worked with the Whites, Coloureds and Indians and normally this type of information would not be brought under my attention.
MR MALAN: Mr Goosen, why I'm asking this, it really sounds strange that a relatively small unit based on numbers, as you've testified the other morning, that they were not reasonably informed that there was a threatening operation, a kind of door to door onslaught on policemen, and this whole unit was not prepared for this.
MR GOOSEN: This information from the informers which could lead to the identification of Ledwaba as an informer would be discussed during a conference in the morning, by means of oral discussion or by means of handing in documents.
And if I understood van Jaarsveld correctly, Lieutenant Hechter would take these facts to Brigadier Cronje, it would be discussed there and then he would receive instructions to take certain actions. I was not part of that Unit B's activities where this information was initially discussed.
MR MALAN: And in September 1986, the policemen still lived in their own houses in Attridgeville, were they withdrawn from the area at a certain stage?
MR GOOSEN: No, I don't know about that.
MR MALAN: Thank you very much.
MR ALBERTS: Mr Goosen, just to formally round off this evidence, this written part of your statement is from page 399 to 402, and the usual conclusion which you find from page 489 and further, with all the annexures. Do you know the contents thereof?
MR GOOSEN: I'm familiar with the contents.
MR ALBERTS: Do you confirm the correctness of that?
MR ALBERTS: Mr Goosen, then lastly, in comparison with the other investigations in which you were involved, we know today that there are certain family members of these people who were killed and injured, and also people who had interest in the property which was damaged. I don't know who they are, they are sitting there. They are sitting there in the audience on your right-hand side. Do you have something to tell them, based on this specific incident?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Mr Chairman. For the families of Walter Ledwaba and Julian Selepe, I just want to tell them that when this incident took place I was a young policeman and the political dispensation posted us at two different poles and in the midst of that guerrilla warfare I was convinced that what I was doing, my actions, was done under instruction. Today I know that I had contributed to a lot of suffering. I cannot say I know precisely how you feel about that, but for myself I can say that I've carried all these things on my conscience for 12 years and it is really a very heavy load. All I can ask you is to forgive me for the suffering I've caused you, and will you please help me process this and to help to carry this weight for the rest of my life. Thank you, Mr Chairman.
MR ALBERTS: I don't have further questions at this stage, thank you, Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR ALBERTS
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
Mr Goosen, did you know that there were other similar incidents where the houses of activists were identified and where bomb attacks or petrol bomb attacks were made on those houses?
MR ROSSOUW: So this was not an exceptional situation, it was a statutory followed throughout in the Northern Transvaal Security Branch?
MR ROSSOUW: And I assume that it followed - and I'm asking whether you know about it, it followed on an instruction which Brigadier Viktor gave to Brigadier Cronje, if I have my facts correct, namely that the situation in Pretoria is problematic and the police have to act. Did you know about this instruction or did you just know that the Security Police had to do something?
MR GOOSEN: I was not aware of Viktor's general instruction, but I knew that these types of activities were part of the strategy of the Northern Transvaal branch.
MR ROSSOUW: And this strategy, would you concede that this strategy was to fight fire with fire if an activist, for example, threw a petrol bomb it had to be retaliated in the same way.
MR GOOSEN: This is how I understood it.
MR ROSSOUW: And if he was involved in unrest and offences and political instigation, that that attack on his house would be to intimidate him, not to become involved in those activities.
MR GOOSEN: I answer in the positive. I did not know the finer details of when a bomb or a petrol bomb would be used, I was not part of this detailed information.
MR ROSSOUW: Can you possibly give an opinion regarding these activities of the Northern Transvaal Security Branch? Were those activities positive?
MR GOOSEN: I can't answer positively or whether it had the necessary effects to counteract terrorism. I don't have the necessary information to give such an answer.
MR ROSSOUW: You also apply for the offence of murder, attempted murder. Now the planning for this operation, that planning did not involve killing people, is that correct?
MR GOOSEN: When you use a self-made explosive device or a device using explosives, we could foresee that somebody would be killed because it was a powerful device and this whole operation was based on this, that May Ledwaba was our target. And as I have said, young people who would be involved the next day in attacking policemen would also stay in that house. In other words, the throwing of that bomb had the aim to kill or injure people.
MR ROSSOUW: But you are also saying that you could foresee that people would be killed or injured. That is a subjective inference you are making, is that correct?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, yes.
CHAIRPERSON: This bomb was designed to kill or injure people, wasn't it? It was basically a shrapnel bomb.
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Mr Chairman. Why otherwise would there would have been decided to throw a bomb on premises if you did not want to achieve your purpose, then you could just as well of used a petrol bomb. I can't say what planning was made, why they decided on that type of bomb and not a petrol bomb, I was not involved.
MR ROSSOUW: After this incident when it came under your attention that a person had been killed and others injured, did you report that to Brigadier Cronje?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, yes. The next morning I made a full report to Brigadier Cronje and provided all the necessary facts to him.
MR ROSSOUW: Those facts, did that include saying that I, Mr Gouws en Captain Hechter were responsible for the throwing of the bomb, Captain Hechter threw the bomb, he did the physically throwing?
MR GOOSEN: No, I would have referred to an activity in which I accompanied Lieutenant Hechter and I would not have mentioned Deon Gouws' name to Brigadier Cronje.
MR ROSSOUW: And you are saying, and we know that every morning the officers had the meeting. You were not present when there was a discussion based on this incident or when the planning was made for this incident.
MR ROSSOUW: As a Warrant Officer you were excluded from those meetings?
MR MALAN: Mr Rossouw, I beg your pardon. This report to Brigadier Cronje was actually a statement, that was the first statement after your investigation after your sweeper operation.
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, and also the SAP21, which I compiled. Those were exhibits I had to take in by hand. I wrote down all these facts and I took it to Brigadier Cronje to be signed. I discussed this with him and the SAP21 then was also signed. My statement was taken under oath by Blaauw, that was the unit's commanding officer. I did not convey any of these facts to him, and he would not know that that was related to activities of the Security Branch.
MR MALAN: Why would you not mention Gouws' name to Cronje?
MR GOOSEN: Mr Chairman, we referred to these types of activities as the compartmentalisation of activities. I would have told Cronje that I was involved together with Hechter in this operation, and I doubt it, I can't remember, whether I've ever mentioned Gouws' name or would mention his name.
MR MALAN: I can understand that you can't remember what you've done, but it's strange that you give evidence that you would not have mentioned his name. You were only three people involved in that operation, wouldn't you have said: "I'm giving you a statement, one statement then another statement, but I'm lying in these statements, this is actually an operation which Hechter and Gouws and I executed?
MR GOOSEN: In that respect - if I conveyed it in that way to Brigadier Cronje, I would have said that was an operation I was involved in together with Hechter, I would not have specified that Gouws was involved.
MR ROSSOUW: Mr Goosen, you've heard the testimony last week when Captain Hechter testified regarding the confidential basis on which information was used, this need-to-know basis.
MR GOOSEN: Yes, I've heard that.
MR ROSSOUW: You will remember that I specifically asked him, with the view of the relevance of this investigation
"What was the policy, would this incident, what would happen afterwards if you knew that somebody had been killed, would you discuss it with your colleagues, would you discuss it in the corridors of the Security Branch, would you report on it?"
MR GOOSEN: Some of these facts were contained in a report and I had no further conversations with any other individuals regarding this incident. I did not even inform Hechter regarding my awareness that there were victims on the scene. I've already reported this to Cronje and I've regarded this as a finished case. I don't know whether Hechter came to know that, but that was my report to Brigadier Cronje.
MR ROSSOUW: I assume that is why Captain Hechter did not know about the consequences of this operation until he consulted with you for his amnesty application. He said that only when he prepared his amnesty application you had told him that people were killed.
MR GOOSEN: I can't doubt Captain Hechter's word that he only now became aware of that.
MR ROSSOUW: As far as it concerns Mr Gouws, do you confirm that you did not discuss it with Mr Gouws?
MR GOOSEN: At no stage did I discuss this with Sergeant Deon Gouws.
MR ROSSOUW: And then one further question, you've heard that Captain van Jaarsveld also said there was a kind of an anomaly, the policy was that you had to act on a need-to-know basis, but the anomaly was that around the braaivleis fire people would discuss these matters. Let's talk or refer here to an informal level. Would you also confirm that you did not discuss it on an informal basis with Gouws?
MR GOOSEN: No, I would not discuss it on an informal basis with Gouws because I was well aware that a murder docket was open at Attridgeville. I played a large role in this incident and I would not go about and tell people about my involvement in this incident. I would never mention this around a braaivleis fire.
MR ROSSOUW: I'm putting it to you then that the first time Mr Gouws became aware of the consequences of this operation was when a consultation was carried out with him in preparation of this application.
MR GOOSEN: I wouldn't doubt that, Mr Chairman.
MR ROSSOUW: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR ROSSOUW
CHAIRPERSON: Can you just help me. I understand from your evidence that you had nothing to do with the planning of this operation, you were merely asked by Hechter to accompany him that night and on the way to Attridgeville he told you there is to be an attack on the house and he had taken the bomb with him. When you got there, Hechter parked the vehicle, he was driving it, he got out and took the bomb, Gouws had an AK47, you had nothing, you did nothing, Hechter threw the bomb in through the window after he had lit it and you all ran away. What do you mean when you said a moment ago
"I played a large role in this incident"
MR GOOSEN: Mr Chairman, what I implied and in which I implicate myself is, during this incident I did not play a leading or important role, but after I'd received the call from radio control, I went back to the scene and then acted in a certain way there, to protect this whole operation. By implication my involvement there was emphasised. There I played a leading role when I went back to that scene.
Usually during that operation an AK was necessary because if there was burglar proofing, the AK47 was used to knock out the window pane and then the bomb would be hurled in. In this case it was not necessary to break the window pane to throw the bomb, the bomb was just thrown into the house.
JUDGE PILLAY: Mr Goosen, let us forget about all the legal technicalities, this we can discuss with your advocate during argument. How do you see your position, how did you contribute to this incident?
MR GOOSEN: Mr Chairman, ...(intervention)
JUDGE PILLAY: This actual incident, I'm not talking about what happened later.
MR GOOSEN: Firstly, I was prepared to become involved in these types of activities and I've reconciled myself with the objectives to be achieved, with the actions to be taken there and in that respect I saw myself as part of this operation. My presence there cannot be wished away.
JUDGE PILLAY: But what was the part you played during that operation?
MR GOOSEN: I played no direct part on that scene.
JUDGE PILLAY: I'm not trying to catch you out, I'm trying to understand. How then did you contribute to this incident? How did you contribute to the success of this incident?
MR GOOSEN: With the wisdom of hindsight and taking my role into consideration, I did not contribute directly to something important in this regard.
JUDGE PILLAY: Perhaps indirectly?
MR GOOSEN: After the operation I indirectly contributed.
JUDGE PILLAY: Forget about that, I understand that part. I'm just trying to understand what you did directly or indirectly to contribute to this whole operation.
MR GOOSEN: I did not play an important role here.
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, I was not armed. With such clandestine operations you don't even take your service pistol with. These types of weapons can fall on a scene and it can incriminate you later on. No, I did not carry any weapons, I did not carry my service pistol.
MR MALAN: Can I ask you, because it sounds strange that you were taken with although you were not necessary for the operation. One would assume that if it's done clandestinely, that only Hechter and Gouws would have gone. You're not carrying the bomb, you're just a passenger, you're just a looker-on, a spectator. Could it have been that you were involved in this planning, that afterwards a call would be made to you to do further investigations?
MR GOOSEN: During my consultation with my legal representative this was an option to explain why I became involved in this incident. I played no big role, but my role only fell in place when I had to return to the scene. This is how I can answer you. Why Hechter approached me specifically I can't comment on. Brigadier Cronje initially identified me for these types of operations and my participation every time took place with his knowledge beforehand and afterwards and it was never questioned. This is all I can answer in all honesty.
JUDGE PILLAY: What actually happened that day, you were not even a co-perpetrator as I understand the facts.
MR GOOSEN: Mr Chairman, I see my role as a co-perpetrator in this respect, that at no stage I withdrew from this after I became aware that a bomb was put in the vehicle, there was an AK47 and the purpose was a clandestine operation. I reconciled myself with this type of operation and I travelled with them and in the whole process, although I did not contribute directly, I was there all the time.
JUDGE PILLAY: You see this is what is worrying me. How did you reconcile yourself, just by thinking about it, or did you do something during that operation?
MR GOOSEN: As you can see from my application I did not contribute directly. My participation in this operation, how I reconcile myself with that is, I received my instructions when I became involved in these clandestine operations, I acted under direct instructions from Cronje and I understood that Cronje would discuss it with Hechter and then Hechter would decide whom he would involve for each operation. Why I was targeted for this operation, with no important role, I can't answer.
CHAIRPERSON: But you didn't act under direct instructions from Cronje on this occasion.
MR GOOSEN: Mr Chairman, if you read my whole application you will see that I had general instruction when I became involved initially, a general instruction from Cronje, and then when I got involved with Unit C and with Prinsloo I received instructions. But as I understand the action to be followed, Captain Hechter consulted with Cronje regarding certain matters, certain targets, Brigadier Cronje would not tell him which planning or how he should plan, which people he had to involved.
There could have been instances where Cronje could have said Goosen and Momberg were the right people to do this, or Hendrik Bokaba was the correct person to assist, but I think the final say was with Hechter, to finalise the planning and to identify the people to assist him in this operation. This is how I understand my involvement in these types of operations that I became involved in. But Brigadier Cronje initially gave me direct instructions and even afterwards, that is also correct.
MR MALAN: I just want to ask again, is there any reason why Hechter himself carried the bomb, why? You were a junior, why didn't you carry bomb, you were the explosives expert?
MR GOOSEN: I don't know why he carried the bomb, all I know is he carried the bomb.
MR MALAN: You did not ask him "Why you carrying the bomb?" and "Captain, can I please carry the bomb"?
MR GOOSEN: No, I would never have made such a suggestion, I was still a very young policeman and Captain Hechter was round about 30/35 years old, he was a senior policeman at the Security Branch, he was an officer, so I would never have questioned him in this regard: "Why are you carrying the bomb, give me the bomb". I can't see that I could have asked him that.
MR MALAN: This is just to assist a senior officer.
MR GOOSEN: No, in this case I did not do this. The facts are that Captain Hechter carried the bomb.
MR MALAN: If he gave the bomb to you, you would have carried it, you were right to carry out all his instructions, you had no questions in your mind regarding the actions.
MR GOOSEN: If Captain Hechter had asked me to carry the bomb and to throw the bomb into the house, I would have done that. If he said: "Take the AK47, use that", I would have done that. It just happened that not one of these weapons were handed to me to use.
MR MALAN: And at that stage you were involved in operations together with Hechter?
MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I think it's my turn now.
CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct) finished.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
Mr Goosen, I can't see you. Thank you. Mr Goosen, is one of the other possible reasons why you went with, isn't it that if something had gone wrong, if there were only one or two people, but there should be more people there and that you may have been of assistance in that way?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, the possibility for that purpose might also exist.
MR MALAN: Excuse me, I don't understand the question. All that he could contribute was to run away as well, because he wasn't armed, what could he have helped with had problems arose? Can you put the question clearer?
MR DU PLESSIS: We are going to speculate, Mr Goosen, about what possibilities could have existed. For example, let's think about possibilities that the persons in the house might have been armed, they might have seen you, shot one of you and then it would have been very difficult, had there only been two of you, for one of you for example, to take the other person away under fire.
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, I would agree. Even just a simple thing like spraining an ankle, which might happen while you're running away, that possibility might exist that one person may perhaps not be able to get the person away from such a scene. I'm also speculating, I didn't have knowledge that that might have been my role.
MR MALAN: I'm not sure if we should continue with this speculation. I haven't heard of any other application where someone might have been asked to go along to help if someone sprained an ankle. The only reason why I asked for the reason was the possibility of a pre-planning to let you do the follow-up work to the cover-up.
MR GOOSEN: That is possible, Chairperson.
MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, Chairperson, I asked the question owing to evidence that came before, especially with regard to this specific question and the question of why in certain cases more than one or two people may have been involved in a specific operation, and that answer was given as a reason in previous applications. I just wanted to create that possibility so that it could be argued later on.
I think possibly if Captain Hechter is here he might through light on the matter. He is not here now, so I can't ask him to make a statement, but I will ask it when he testifies.
Mr Goosen, and then the question of ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Can you just wait a moment. I think we have the new interpreter, but I think he needs assistance as he hasn't got earphones or anything. Are there some available here for him? When he has finally taken up his position, could you inform those who which to listen in that language, what channel to use. Channel 3 will soon be giving Sotho.
CHAIRPERSON EXPLAINS CHANNELS AND INTERPRETATION
MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
You have been asked what you reported to Brigadier Cronje. We can probably assume that Captain Hechter also would have spoken to Brigadier Cronje about the operation.
MR GOOSEN: The possibility cannot be excluded that Captain Hechter would give feedback at the same time, but we didn't do it together, I gave feedback separately to Brigadier Cronje about the specific statement and the covering letter and I gave him the full facts.
MR DU PLESSIS: And your report back actually had to do with what you did, is that correct?
MR DU PLESSIS: In other words, would it be correct to say that the person who would have told Brigadier Cronje about Gouws' involvement, if Gouws didn't speak to Brigadier Cronje himself, would have been Hechter?
MR DU PLESSIS: Right. Can you remember how this particular house was identified?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, no, I don't know how the house was identified before the time, or based on what informers' information or oral information that was available to Unit B, I cannot comment on.
MR DU PLESSIS: And then I assume you also don't have any knowledge of whose house it was specifically?
MR GOOSEN: AS I understood it, the targeted activist at these premises was May Ledwaba, alias Squish, if it was his house or someone else's house, I didn't have those facts to work on.
MR DU PLESSIS: And let's just make sure again, what information did you have concerning what would happen that night at the house and who would have been at the house?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, this was merely information by Hechter in the vehicle on the way to Attridgeville. He mentioned to me that - at that stage May Ledwaba's name wasn't even told to me, he just referred to a person Squish, who would have been involved at an envisaged attack on various policemen's houses after a funeral. He briefly explained to me that a policeman was involved in the shooting of a comrade a few days before and that Squish had basically hijacked these funeral arrangements and had probably made certain statements that the policemen had to be paid back and after the funeral this retaliation would have taken place on members of the Police Forces in Attridgeville.
MR DU PLESSIS: And am I correct in saying that the action was actually preventative of this planned operation by Squish?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, that is how I understood it.
MR DU PLESSIS: Because you see, Mr Goosen, Captain Hechter cannot remember anything about this incident and naturally also not details about Squish and his comrades, so we now have to rely on your evidence with regard to that. Can you remember if Captain Hechter indicated to you how many people would be in the house that night?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, all that was mentioned to me was that Squish himself would be in this particular house, and information also indicated that youths that would be involved in the attacks the next day were also in this house. I think I set it out in that paragraph, but that is really all that I can remember about the discussion on the way to Attridgeville.
MR DU PLESSIS: Can you remember if they would have been living in the house or if there would just have been a meeting that night in the house?
MR GOOSEN: In the context that I was informed, I thought that they would have been living there.
MR DU PLESSIS: And can you remember - and I'm just testing the facts now, can you remember if anything was said concerning information that Captain Hechter would have had with regard to possible other people in the house, apart from these youths and Squish?
MR GOOSEN: I cannot remember that other people's names were mentioned pertinently.
MR DU PLESSIS: Right, in other words, is it correct to say that your impression and the information that you had, and those are the facts that we have to judge this matter on, was that you would actually have gone to a type of house where activists such as Squish and the other people that would have been there, where they would have planned an operation? In other words, you were under the impression that that was the objective.
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Chairperson. I don't know if they would have had to meet there or if they would have just met there with a view to the next day's operation that was aimed at the policemen.
Terms such as "meetings in the house", that I cannot remember, it may have been put to me like that. But all that I know is they would have been staying there and the planning was that after the funeral Squish and some of the youths would have been involved in the attacks on the policemen.
MR DU PLESSIS: So in your thoughts, would you at that stage have given any thought to any other possible people that may have been in the house?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, the possibility that other persons were in the house, I never forgot that. I wasn't blind to the fact that there should only be activists in the house. I don't know on what information this operation was based, or that might have been indicated that other innocent people may have been there or not. But with the throwing of a bomb you can assume that it does not specifically target activists in an explosion, but can also affect other people in such an explosion.
MR DU PLESSIS: That's the point that I want to get to. At all relevant times with this type of operation, with the throwing of a bomb, there was always a chance that perhaps by chance or in any way someone would be in that house, who would not necessarily be a target for you, but who could be hurt.
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, those possibilities did indeed exist.
MR DU PLESSIS: And if you look at this ex post facto, such an innocent person who was injured would not necessarily be the specific person against whom you wanted to act, do you agree with me?
MR DU PLESSIS: But your action in such a case would an action in general against the liberation movement, do you agree?
MR GOOSEN: Yes, that's correct.
MR DU PLESSIS: If you'll just bear with me, Mr Chairman. Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS
ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, on behalf of two of the victims who are actually present here today, I would like to put a few questions to Mr Goosen. May ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, can I interrupt before you do ask him.
Mr Goosen, what sort of house was this? We talk about house and other people in the house etc., what sort of house was it?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, it looked to me like a standard residence. If I remember correctly, Serote Street is in front of the house, from a north to south direction. We went in at the gate and next to the house we moved down an alley where, the window as I said was on the northern side of the house. In the front of the house there were also windows with the front door also in front, but we moved past on the northern side of the house. That is where the window was identified.
CHAIRPERSON: Corrugated iron roof?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, I can't remember. It was a corrugated iron - I think in my application I say that the corrugated sheets were blown off by the explosions, so it was a corrugated iron roofed house.
CHAIRPERSON: And how many rooms do you think there would be in it? - an estimate.
MR GOOSEN: Four or five rooms, Chairperson.
ADV STEENKAMP PLACES VICTIMS ON RECORD: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, may we just for record purposes, I think I must just put the full details of the two victims on record. The first person that is here present today is
Mr Julian Selepe. His ID Number is 630919 5905 087.
Also present here today is - I can maybe just put on record that this Mr Julian Selepe is the grandson of Mrs Elizabeth Ledwaba, who is also present here today and her ID Number is 221016 0117 084.
My information is also that at the time of the incident, Mr Chairman, which is confirmed as being during 1986 at 2a.m. on the morning of 18 September in Attridgeville at number 33 Serote Street. At the time of the incident the house belonged to Mrs Elizabeth Ledwaba, the grandmother of Mr Julian Selepe.
I can also maybe just put on record before I proceed, Mr Chairman, that Mr Julian Selepe at the time used to word at Rowntree Chocolate Manufacturers at the East Rand, where he was a full-time employee. And as a result of this incident he lost his work and is currently receiving disability pension. His right hand is basically, was totally destroyed and also his left leg was partially injured, to such an extent that he actually can't use it. He is walking, but not in the manner that he can use it on a day-to-day basis.
May we also for record purposes, Mr Chairman, Mr Selepe informs me that at the time of the incident he was sleeping in the same room as the deceased, who was Mr Walter Ledwaba, who is also the other grandson of Mrs Elizabeth Ledwaba.
CHAIRPERSON: You mentioned, I think, 2a.m. on the morning of the 18th of September.
ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, that is what my information is.
CHAIRPERSON: Is that when the bomb went off?
ADV STEENKAMP: That is what my exact information is, Mr Chairman, thank you.
Mr Goosen, my information is also, perhaps for information, that at the time of the attack on this house there were nine people in the house.
Mr Chairman, maybe I should just put this on record as well. My information is that there were actually nine people, including the person who was killed in the house. If you would allow me just to give the names to you. The first person was:
Mr Julian Selepe, as mentioned. He was severely injured. At the time of the incident he was 23 years old.
- The next person was Mr Walter Ledwaba, who is the deceased. My information was that at the time of the incident he was a school pupil or a student in Attridgeville, in standard nine, at the school called Hofmeyr High School.
- The third person present in the house was Mr Albert Ledwaba. He was an uncle of the family.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you say "uncle of the family", uncle of the two young grandsons?
ADV STEENKAMP: I'm sorry, yes, Mr Chairman.
The fourth person in the house was Mr May Ledwaba. My information is that he was uninjured in this incident.
- Then, Mrs Elizabeth Ledwaba, who is present here today. At the time she was 62 years old.
- The next person was Mr William Ledwaba.
- Then Mr Michael Ledwaba, who was also her grandson.
- The eighth person was Ms Lydia Ledwaba. At the time of the incident she was 13 years old.
- And the last person, Mr Chairman, my information is that it was Ms Palesa Ledwaba. At the time of the incident she was 8 years old.
Both the last two people, Ms Lydia Ledwaba and Ms Palesa Ledwaba were both granddaughters of Mrs Elizabeth Ledwaba.
CHAIRPERSON: Now you haven't got the age of the deceased.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, my information is, unfortunately I can't confirm it, but at the time he was round about 18 to 19 years old. We can't confirm that unfortunately, but the moment I get more information I will inform you.
Mr Goosen, Mr Selepe and Mrs Ledwaba feel that the attack on their house was unasked for and as far as they are concerned, and here I exclude Mr May Ledwaba, not one member of this family was a member or members of any political organisation or party. Do you have any comment on that?
MR GOOSEN: I have no comment on that Chairperson.
ADV STEENKAMP: You cannot argue with that?
MR GOOSEN: No, I cannot argue against it.
ADV STEENKAMP: The family also feels that this attack on the house, proportionally speaking, was not justified because they feel that to attack a whole house with a family, with the possibility of killing everybody just to kill or to attack one person, is not justified.
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, I do not dispute the statement of the family that they hold, but as I understood it on the way to Attridgeville, Mr May Ledwaba together with other youths would have been in this particular house at which this operation was aimed.
ADV STEENKAMP: I must also ask you ...(intervention)
JUDGE PILLAY: Mr Goosen, if one of them was the actual target, against whom the country had to be protected, in other cases people were abducted, kidnapped, taken to a place where he could have killed or whatever, why wasn't that an option, instead of placing other people's lives in danger?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, I can just answer by saying that it wasn't for me to decide how this operation against May Ledwaba and the youth should be launched, based on the information. That aspect I think, Captain Hechter decided on and I was merely on the way to Attridgeville and only then was I informed about the facts planning where and why I wasn't involved with that at all.
ADV STEENKAMP: You probably expected that in the middle of the night there would be family members in the house.
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, I did foresee the possibility that the information indicated on youth and Mr May Ledwaba, but I did foresee that other people, other than them could also be present in the house.
ADV STEENKAMP: But then the question, insofar as you reconcile yourself with the operation, why didn't you ask: "Why don't we just take this man away and do what is necessary?"
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, that decision-making belonged to Captain Hechter and I was not in a position to doubt his planning or decisions at all. At that stage I was a Sergeant, he was a Lieutenant. As was testified, he was in command of the Operational Unit within Unit B. I did not question him and I think in terms of my structure at that time, measured against Captain Hechter, I don't think I would have questioned him at all.
ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
MR MALAN: Can I just follow up? Didn't you testify on another occasion that you refused to carry out an instruction from van Jaarsveld?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, my evidence went that Captain van Jaarsveld would have given us an order that we would have gone further by questioning a man, that we should have killed him. I wasn't asked pertinently, but I think Colonel Momberg testified directly that the attitude of Captain Hechter by standing back from that suggestion, told us that it would not have been a sanctioned instruction and therefore another option was exercised by Momberg, to take the man aside and talk to him and see if there wasn't some other means to get the information from him.
MR MALAN: The question that I'm actually asking is, Hechter was present and the evidence at the other occasion said the way that he reacted or whatever, made you decide that you weren't going to carry out this instruction that you got from van Jaarsveld. Hechter was also there, he didn't actively go against it, in fact I think he said he said nothing.
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR MALAN: Why there where you also took part in an operation under van Jaarsveld and you refused to do something, but here you can't even ask questions about the planning?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, I will answer by saying that this type of operation and sanctioning by Brigadier Cronje, where it was specifically decided these are acts 1(b), (b) and (c), it would have been entrusted specifically to Captain Hechter. And the incident in question at Warmbaths, I am now still convinced that Brigadier Cronje would never have given a person like van Jaarsveld the sanction to take a person out while he knew that Captain Hechter was also on the scene, he would rather, in my mind he would rather have given the instruction to Captain Hechter, had it come into question at all.
CHAIRPERSON: I understood you to say that Brigadier Cronje would not give instructions, he would say: "Carry out that operation" and that Hechter would then decide how it was to be carried out and who should accompany him. You told us that a short while ago.
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Now Hechter on this occasion had seen fit to bring a bomb full of shrapnel, were you satisfied that Brigadier Cronje would have approved of this? Because we have heard of numerous other attacks with petrol bombs.
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, at the time that Captain Hechter approached me, I was under the impression that this thing had already been discussed with Brigadier Cronje and if it had not been discussed, on completion of the operation it would have been discussed with Brigadier Cronje.
I cannot comment on whether this incident in question was discussed in depth beforehand with Brigadier Cronje or not at all, but he previous methods of working that were followed, was that information was gathered by Captain Hechter, he made a submission to Brigadier Cronje on which a general decision was made, that steps would be taken based on the information available.
I was not directly involved in Unit B, in that process of when we would talk to Brigadier Cronje or not.
MR MALAN: Mr Goosen, but with great respect there's also been evidence last week that Hechter often acted on his own, that he did not always get permission from Brigadier Cronje.
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, that is what I said. I don't know when he did discuss something with Brigadier Cronje or not.
MR MALAN: But you don't even know if he discussed this?
MR GOOSEN: I was under the impression that it was discussed because I got my direct first instruction from Brigadier Cronje and I assumed that all such operations would be cleared at such a level.
MR MALAN: But that was months ago that you got the first instruction, isn't that so?
MR GOOSEN: No, Chairperson, it was just a few months before this incident.
MR MALAN: Yes, months before this incident?
MR MALAN: With this incident, after you had carried out the explosives investigation, the sweeper instruction, you came back, you reported to Cronje, on your evidence, and you told him: "I was in an operation, I was involved in an operation with Captain Hechter", you don't tell him: "I don't know if Hechter has reported to you yet".
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, that is what I said. I can't remember if I asked him if Captain Hechter reported to him or not, I just discussed specific documentation with him and gave him full feedback. If Captain Hechter gave him feedback afterwards, I cannot comment on that.
MR MALAN: And when you reported to him, didn't he answer anything to you about that?
MR GOOSEN: No, Chairperson. His reaction wasn't unusual to me, basically to sign the SAP21 and to tell me to take the evidence through to forensics.
MR MALAN: He just signed it and he didn't ask any questions?
MR GOOSEN: Before he had signed it I would have informed him that this is the documentation, the evidence in connection with the operation the previous night with Captain Hechter, more-or-less. The precise brief to Brigadier Cronje, I cannot remember, but more-or-less that would have happened and he would have nodded his head and he would have signed the documentation.
MR MALAN: Mr Goosen, I don't know if it's important or not, but it does seem to me very strange that you at that stage, according to your testimony, I would say almost absolutely were convinced that Hechter wouldn't have done it without Cronje's instruction, Cronje's involvement in the planning. You go back with the report, with reports and the evidence and you say: "Brigadier Cronje, I was involved in an operation with Hechter", and you don't give him the detail or you don't ask him if Hechter had already reported.
You see why I'm saying it, to me it is the same strange phenomena as the first application that we started with last week, with you and Momberg, and you were the only people who had a recollection of the incident.
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, my ...(intervention)
MR MALAN: Excuse me, just let me finish. And this is very similar to me, there is no recollection of this incident with Hechter, no recollection - well we'll still hear it, but I think on the words which Mr du Plessis put here and the applications before us, no recollection of other perpetrators. You are the only one who knows about it and you can't give us complete information.
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, the full information and planning wasn't given to me from the start. I saw the process of the TRC to make a full disclosure. I was involved in far fewer incidents than Captain Hechter or Sergeant Gouws. My recollection of these things is that I can remember a few incidents pertinently, in fact these are all the ones that I can remember, and as far as possible I have tried to tell you completely the truth, to tell it as I can remember it now after 12 years.
My specific discussion and visit to Brigadier Cronje had to do with the evidence and my declaration as Inspector of Explosives. It would not have been specifically to give feedback of an operation to him. I merely took my documentation which had to be done and evidence which had to be delivered by hand. I discussed that documentation with him. I more-or-less gave him the information that he would have realised this was the same operation as had been sanctioned the previous day by himself, in which Hechter would also have been involved.
I did not see it strange to discuss it in that context with the Brigadier. He didn't pertinently question me about the matter and he signed the documentation that I submitted to him. That is all that I can remember. The specific discussion and the feedback that I gave to him, that I cannot pertinently tell you that is a, b, c, d, that I told him and those are the questions he put to me.
MR MALAN: You didn't consider - I am trying to put myself in your position because this is after all the basis on which we have to judge it, and I'm specifically not trying to be myself, but I cannot do other than to tell you that I think you would have gone to him and said: "Brigadier I was sent out to do this investigation at the scene, it's the same scene in which I was involved when I went out with Hechter and Gouws, I'm actually now busy with perjury, cover-up, I just want you to know it so that if there are problems you mustn't say that I didn't report to you".
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, I did more-or-less testify, except I would not have given Gouws' details to the Brigadier, I would have told him more-or-less: "These are the documents in connection with the operation in which Hechter and I were involved last night." To protect the whole process and operation, Brigadier Cronje would have known that I was an Inspector of Explosives. Given the affidavit that I submitted to him, that Lieutenant Fred Blaauw signed at that time, who wasn't informed about the true facts, he would have known that I would have committed perjury in preparation of these documents and the evidence I took in by hand. I had no doubt to believe that he, I'm sure that he was aware of that.
MR MALAN: Thank you, Mr Steenkamp.
ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
Mr Goosen, can I just ask you, did you take any steps or try to ascertain anything from Captain Hechter or whoever, whether this target that had been chosen, whether there weren't other people involved, that there might have been other civilians in the house.
ADV STEENKAMP: Did you just go and attack the house?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, I did not question the target identified by Captain Hechter, I also didn't ask those questions, if he could foresee that other innocent people might be in the house. I didn't have that sort of discussion with him, no.
ADV STEENKAMP: You'll agree with me if I say the information was, if we look at it unfortunately ex post facto this operation was actually to say the least very unsuccessful. In other words I'm trying to say the information that you had was insufficient.
MR GOOSEN: I would have to conceded as the facts are on paper here today, that it could be regarded as a failed operation. I must concede that. But on this specific incident, why they decided to do these things I can't really can't throw any light on the matter.
ADV STEENKAMP: I don't want bring other incidents in but I was to ask you, was this standard practice? Let me put it this way, that you would just go in blindly and attack a target, or did you at least try to ascertain if the man was in the house, where is he, are there activists in the house, can there be woman and children in the house, how did you normally act?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, that type of work and follow-up would have belonged to Unit B, and I was not part of that part of gathering of information to be able to answer those questions, if there would be anyone else there, was May Ledwaba specifically there? That resorted under Unit B.
I was brought into an operation when it was at the final minutes, to carry out the operation, what preceded that I don't really know how they came to this conclusion and decided on the target.
JUDGE PILLAY: But why didn't you question it? You expected that there would be other people, 2 o'clock/midnight, why didn't you question it?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, ...(intervention)
JUDGE PILLAY: After all you did it in another matter.
MR GOOSEN: That's correct, Chairperson, I initially became involved in these cases, in direct instructions and I regarded it as a lawful instruction, that this is the way to do these things. With this type of clandestine operation, I'm only speaking for myself, there is always the possibility, especially when explosives are involved, that innocent people could also be affected. The possibility that other people other than the targeted people in this house, their presence wasn't excluded and I reconciled myself with the objective of this operation, and that was to target May Ledwaba and other youths in order to avert a potential threatening retaliation act the following day on various policemen.
JUDGE PILLAY: Irrespective of the fact that other people and even children could be injured?
MR GOOSEN: Yes, Chairperson, I didn't think at that time in those terms. Today I heard for the first time that there were 8 and 10 years old children and there was an aged woman in her 60's in the house. At the time of this incident I did not think in terms of age, I must be quite honest.
JUDGE PILLAY: I wonder how many houses do not have children at 2 o'clock at night, who lie there sleeping. You should have foreseen it, not so?
MR GOOSEN: Yes, the possibility is always foreseen that children can be present, but I didn't think in terms of ages, 6, 4, ...(intervention)
JUDGE PILLAY: Whatever and old people.
MR GOOSEN: I foresaw that other people might also be injured or killed in the process, but I did not think in terms of a young child, old people, I thought in terms of other people that could also be affected.
JUDGE PILLAY: Let us accept that the death or the target was an acceptable target, would you agree that there was another way to handle it apart from putting other people's lives at risk?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, I've already testified that May Ledwaba was an accused in a necklace murder case in Attridgeville and people did not want to give evidence. I can just think that what gave rise to this drastic step is the lawful prosecution owing to a lack of evidence, a lack of people who were prepared to give evidence against an individual like May Ledwaba, that those options did not exist. That we had already experienced at the end of '85 when he was an accused in a necklace murder.
JUDGE PILLAY: We're missing the point, we're talking past each other. Let us assume, let's accept that there was good reason to kill this man, according to your evidence, for the Security Police there was good reason, they were still fighting the fight. I'm asking, wasn't there another way to kill him apart from throwing a bomb into a house in which nine people were sleeping? Why didn't you take him, go and kill him in some other place? It seems to me that it was habit.
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, the run-up to these decisions I cannot comment on that and why they pertinently decided to throw a bomb into this house. I really cannot give you an answer, I don't have that information, why in this operation they decided to throw a bomb into Serote Street 33. I would have to lie if I were to give you an answer to that.
MR MALAN: Can I just ask you, the identification of the room into which the bomb was thrown, you testified that it was on the northern side of the house, you walked down the side of the house to throw in the bomb, did you know beforehand which window or was it simply thrown in indiscriminately without differentiating?
MR GOOSEN: No, Chairperson, when we approached Serote Street 33 and when we moved into the erf, Captain Hechter moved directly into this ally next to the house to throw the bomb into the window. ...(intervention)
MR MALAN: But you only walked ...(intervention)
MR GOOSEN: So it wasn't that there was ignorance about where the bomb should be thrown in. That is how it appeared to me. If I can express it like this, it seemed to me normal and with purpose. We got into the erf and he pertinently walked to that bedroom and threw the bomb in there.
MR MALAN: But he didn't tell you anything about why he chose that room?
CHAIRPERSON: I think the time has come to take the adjournment. We will adjourn till 2 o'clock.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV STEENKAMP: (Cont)
Thank you, Mr Chairman, if you would allow me just a few more questions.
Mr Goosen, the Ledwaba family says, especially Mrs Ledwaba, they said that they'd been living there since 1963, you can't dispute that?
MR GOOSEN: I can't dispute that.
ADV STEENKAMP: And that they are well-known people in that environment, do you bear knowledge thereof?
MR GOOSEN: I don't know about that personally, but I don't dispute it.
ADV STEENKAMP: Mrs Ledwaba will also say that May Ledwaba and Mr Julian Selepe were born in that house, you can't dispute that?
ADV STEENKAMP: You see she says that Mr May Ledwaba, the person to whom you are referring to in your amnesty application, until his death lived in that house, he has never lived anywhere else. Do you understand what I'm saying?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, I understand that.
ADV STEENKAMP: In other words this was the place where he lived from birth to death, and the instruction from Mr Julian Selepe and Mrs Ledwaba is that during this incident, Mr May Ledwaba was on bail of R10 000, do you know about that?
MR GOOSEN: Mr Chairman, I don't know about that.
ADV STEENKAMP: One of the bail conditions was that he should report to the Attridgeville Police Station every day, which was near his house and which he did everyday, do you know that?
MR GOOSEN: No, I don't know anything about that.
ADV STEENKAMP: My instruction is further that Mrs Ledwaba and Mr Selepe, if necessary, will testify that Mr May Ledwaba was a well-known person in that neighbourhood, he was involved in the community structures and everybody, even the police, knew him well.
MR GOOSEN: Mr Chairman, I don't dispute that.
ADV STEENKAMP: And furthermore if necessary, Mr Julian Selepe will testify that the police at various instances - and he refers, with respect Your Worship, these are my instructions, he says that various white policemen in ordinary clothes and also black members of the police often visited this house without warrants or anything, they just went into the house and enquired about May Ledwaba.
MR GOOSEN: I don't know about that, Mr Chairman.
ADV STEENKAMP: At a certain stage they were so tired and fed-up with the enquiries of the police that they said Mr Ledwaba lives here and they even showed them his room and they said: "He's not here now, this is where he lives, this is where he sleeps, he's not unknown". Do you know anything about that?
MR GOOSEN: I don't know anything about that, Mr Chairman.
ADV STEENKAMP: The point I'm trying to make is that it seems strange to me, on behalf of the victims, why this house had been attacked if Mr Ledwaba reported to the police station on a daily basis in the first place and secondly, he was out on bail. So somewhere there was a docket against him and there were records against him. And what cannot be disputed is that the Ledwaba family had shown the police where he lived and regardless of this aspect their house was bombed.
MR GOOSEN: My answer is that he was a suspect in 1985, the accused rather, in a necklacing case, 1985. I don't know whether the bail referred to here refers to that necklacing. What we also know is that the structures in which he was involved were amongst others, the street committees and also the kangaroo courts. We knew about those and those were part of a continuous investigation.
ADV STEENKAMP: I cannot take it any further, but my information is that May Ledwaba was arrested on an escape case where he assisted somebody to escape in the Delmas area.
MR GOOSEN: In my main evidence I maintained that he confessed in 1991 that he was involved in the escape of many people from the Delmas Prison.
ADV STEENKAMP: Further instructions from Mr Julian Selepe was that even after this incident he did not disappear from there, he stayed there and the police came to that house but he remained there. According to their information he still remained there, he did not run away. Do you know about that?
MR GOOSEN: No, I don't know about that.
ADV STEENKAMP: And furthermore, May Ledwaba told the police that: "Here I am, I have a bakkie", and at that stage Mr Ledwaba and Mr Selepe, he was going to take them to the nearest hospital and the police refused.
MR GOOSEN: I can react on that. Two hours after that incident I came to that scene. Having arrived there, that was about 4 o'clock that morning, Walter Ledwaba and Julian Selepe had been taken to the Kalefong hospital, if I have my facts right. They were not on the scene anymore, somebody had taken them to the hospital before 4 o'clock that morning.
ADV STEENKAMP: The Ledwaba family feels that you had access to information, full address etc., of Ledwaba, the police records already had that because he was arrested. The question is, seen in the light of these facts, these facts were available, can you give them an explanation why it was necessary to attack that house?
MR GOOSEN: Based on my application I will answer it as follows. There would have been a funeral on the 19th, a funeral of a comrade, May Ledwaba was directly involved in arrangements for this funeral. The planning was already in an advanced stage and attacks would be launched on the policemen and they would be responsible for killing policemen in the Attridgeville environment. With all these facts I assume that the operation to prevent attacks, the operation was geared to prevent attacks on policemen.
Perhaps it was not the only reason for the attack, but what was discussed in the vehicle to Attridgeville was this attack or intended attack on policemen. And this would have been an attack on May Ledwaba to prevent this attack and our information was that young people were also in that house.
ADV STEENKAMP: You did not only have a strong suspicion, but you had very detailed information about his proposed involvement in this incident.
MR GOOSEN: The type of information conveyed to me indicated that there was information available about this proposed attack which would happen after the funeral on the 19th. There was a refined information or intelligence network at the branch. Hechter for example has testified in detail as to that. I was not involved in the handling of the informers in that network, but information or intelligence did exist and this led to what was told to me in the vehicle.
ADV STEENKAMP: Am I right in assuming that the powers which the police had regarding security legislation still existed?
MR GOOSEN: Yes, security legislation was still in force.
ADV STEENKAMP: And according to this legislation a person could be arrested just on suspicion and brought before the court and kept in detention for 90 days.
MR GOOSEN: I can just react by saying that he had been an accused in a necklacing or necklace murder in Attridgeville and nobody was prepared to give evidence against May Ledwaba's participation in this necklacing because he was a supreme judge of a kangaroo court and he was the only person who could give official permission for the necklacing and in a court case there was no evidence because there were no people who were able to give evidence.
ADV STEENKAMP: You don't understand my question, ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: The question is simply, you knew where the man lived, it had been put to you that he reported to a police station daily and you feared he was going to arrange attacks on the 19th, after the funeral, why didn't you detain him?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, the facts I am providing here regarding his involvement in attacks, that was based on hearsay, on what was told to me in the vehicle on the way to Attridgeville. I don't know why other options were considered, I don't know why they had not decided to do something else.
CHAIRPERSON: And you didn't bother to find out.
MR GOOSEN: Mr Chairman, at that stage I was aware of the clandestine activities of these types of operations. I believed and I still believe today that this matter was discussed with Brigadier Cronje. All relevant information regarding this matter, regarding the attack on the policemen was discussed, and therefore they decided on certain actions. I can't comment why something else was not considered.
MR MALAN: Mr Goosen, can I just ask you, was it ever explained to you, formally explained to you that there was such a programme of covert operations that only a few people knew about, or were you only involved in the first incident and others thereafter?
MR GOOSEN: My honest answer will be it was never discussed formally with me, I was only involved first of all by Brigadier Cronje to assist Hechter during operations. During this information conveyed to me nothing else was told to me by Brigadier Cronje. So that will be my honest answer to you, I was only involved right from the start of these operations.
MR MALAN: So you couldn't have known whether that was part of the policy or whether it was just something which Cronje was handling?
MR GOOSEN: I can't tell you emphatically I knew or I did not know, but I just accepted that if Cronje approached me on that level and asked me to be available to assist Hechter to execute operations, that to a certain degree he it would carry away his approval, ...(intervention)
MR MALAN: Mr Goosen, that is my question, that it carried his sanction is one thing, but was it just a policy or was it just an unlawful instruction by an individual, did you ever consider that?
MR GOOSEN: No, Mr Chairman, I never thought about it in that way and I'm unaware of the general instruction of Brigadier Viktor.
MR MALAN: But then my question is, on which basis were you justified in thinking that that was something which was within the policy framework of the state or the South African Police or the Security Branch?
MR GOOSEN: I can say that I accepted Cronje's instructions when those were given to me, to assist with these operations. In my first participation I was unaware what was to be expected from me that evening. We were there during that first operation in Mamelodi and then I became aware of what the extent was of such an operation.
MR MALAN: During this specific operation you say that it was about two months after the first operation, after the first time you got involved, how did you know you had to do a cover-up afterwards?
MR GOOSEN: I did not know I had to do a cover-up. It was a surprise for me then. After the operation I'd gone to bed - I was at home, I'd gone to bed and then I received a radio call from these people to come back to the scene.
MR MALAN: Why did you do that, you were not on duty, not on standby, did not get authority from Hechter or Cronje? Why did you react on a radio control?
MR GOOSEN: I don't want to create additional suspicion regarding my involvement in this matter by for example saying I am not on duty ... and it would have easier just to go back to the scene and handle this.
MR MALAN: The radio control, were they part of the uniformed policemen?
MR MALAN: Thank you, Mr Steenkamp.
ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you said you didn't want to raise suspicion, additional suspicion by saying you were not on duty, is that what you said?
MR GOOSEN: Mr Chairman, what I'm saying is, when I was requested by radio control to go to that scene I don't want to refuse because I was not on duty that week, not to go to the scene, that would cause suspicion. On the spur of the moment I decided. Here I receive a call, they tell me there had been an explosion and it was explosives experts who were not on duty sometimes went to the scene, and then I did not want to create suspicion and excuse myself because I was not on duty and therefore I went to that scene.
CHAIRPERSON: But surely it would not have caused any suspicion at all if you had said: "Look, I am not supposed to be on duty tonight, have you contacted the person who is on duty?"
MR GOOSEN: Mr Chairman, I can't remember whether I had that argument or said that to radio control, but I immediately told them that I was willing to go back to the scene to help with this investigation. It was not extraordinary for explosives experts who were not on duty to go to a scene. At that stage it was extraordinary for me to consent to go to that scene.
MR MALAN: And you immediately knew when you reacted on this request that you were going to cover up.
MR GOOSEN: There and then I decided that that was what I will do in order to cover up this operation in which not only I myself, but other people from the Operational Unit were involved.
MR MALAN: And you already had knowledge from previous operations that there were cover-ups?
MR GOOSEN: I've said that when I received this radio call I decided that that was the way I would act. I don't know if in other cases an explosives expert was involved and was asked to go back to the scene.
MR MALAN: You don't understand me, I'm talking about sweeper operations, to make evidence so-called "clean". In your other operations did you ever experience something that there were sweeper actions or cover-ups?
MR GOOSEN: No, I'd never been involved in sweeping operations before, but when I received this call I knew that that was the kind of thing I had to do there. That was how I perceived this situation, now I'm going to a scene where I had been two hours before.
MR MALAN: When you say "this was", you immediately felt that that was what you were going to do there. That was an earlier question from me. Did you see it as - you are especially contacted because you knew what had happened there and you could remove all evidence?
MR GOOSEN: I can answer in the affirmative, that that was an option I considered.
MR MALAN: Was that not perhaps why your presence and participation there was required?
MR GOOSEN: It was never told to me in so many words by any person.
MR MALAN: They never told you that they knew you were involved?
MR GOOSEN: Or told me that: "You were involved in that operation, go and do the sweeping". That was never told to me.
CHAIRPERSON: Now what you did, as I understand it, was when you took a smear of the explosive you did not use the acetone which would have kept it moist and enabled the forensic laboratory to diagnose what explosive had been used.
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: What explosive had been used?
MR GOOSEN: Mr Chairman, I've already said a mellow yellow was that there was pentonite explosives used. It's not explosives with a Russian origin, it differs from TNT and terpex, which are usually found at a terrorist or violent scenes. Because there was no moist smear I wanted the forensic experts to be prevented from finding, to say that those people were themselves responsible for that attack.
MR MALAN: In other words that the suspicion could be created that that was an internal fight?
MR GOOSEN: That's correct, Mr Chairman. - not an internal fight, but for example that they might have made a mistake.
MR MALAN: Which kind of mistake, it was an attack on a house which you thought was a terrorist or an activist's house, where necklacing was involved, who would have made that mistake?
MR GOOSEN: Mr Chairman, the perception was created by the dry acetone smear was not to be able to determine what origin that explosive was. They could not determine which kind of explosive was used and that created the suspicion that May Ledwaba, who was the main target of this operation, that he had used a self-made explosive device and during this process something went wrong and an explosion took place, from their point of view.
MR MALAN: But with all due respect according to your perception of what had happened, the information conveyed to you by Hechter, according to your evidence, did you thought May Ledwaba was there and you thought there were other young activists also present and perhaps other people.
MR MALAN: And based on your evidence, Mr Goosen, you said that you did not know that everybody would be killed, you foresaw that some would be killed but that they perhaps could be seriously injured or maimed, especially in the room where the mellow-yellow exploded.
MR GOOSEN: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR MALAN: On which basis would any of those people now give evidence to say May Ledwaba was busy making a bomb and that exploded? That was one of the possibilities you mentioned, that was the reason for not being able to determine the origin of the explosion.
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, as I've already testified, there was an intended attack on that policeman involved in the shooting incident and all the other policemen. This self-made explosive could have been built by Ledwaba, could have been made for the attack the next day on the policemen. That was just a perception I wanted to create.
MR MALAN: But my question is, there are nine other people for arguments sake, together with May Ledwaba, you know that they were not going to be killed, all nine of them, you wanted to create the perception that May Ledwaba had built the bomb himself. With whom did you want to create that perception, not with the liberation movement or the terrorists because they would have known if he had built the bomb, because they experienced that the bomb had been hurled at them? With whom did you want to create that perception, that it could perhaps have been built by the comrades and then exploded? Perhaps only the white voters of that time could have believed that.
MR GOOSEN: That was an option, Mr Chairman, that first of all to do this and secondly to cause confusion about exactly what had happened. The police were going to find that they can't find the origin of the explosion, that an explosion had taken place, that was a fact and now the question arises, were they not busy building a bomb, and that was the broader community. That was to create that perception with the broader community.
JUDGE PILLAY: Was it not to withhold from the judicial inquiry?
MR GOOSEN: That was also a reason for my action. I knew that a murder docket would be opened at Attridgeville and that the detectives were not aware of the Operational Unit in the Security Branch, they were unaware of these covert operations. The normal detective would investigate that, there would have been a judicial inquiry. Most probably I acted on that scene to mislead the detectives there regarding the judicial inquiry, just to protect the broader operational part of this Operational Unit and to prevent that they find out what the origin of the explosives were.
MR MALAN: Mr Goosen, I want to ask this question now, at no stage did you ever consider that all these actions for which you are applying for amnesty which you knew about, in which you were involved, that they were actually a programme on an inner circle of a few individuals who were busy fighting their own war in the name of the big matter.
MR GOOSEN: My participation in these operations was never viewed in this regard, that it was only a small selected inner circle. I really thought that what was happening there was for the protection and for the prevention of terrorist activities and I really thought that it was in the broader political dispensation of the day a broader objective.
MR MALAN: That I accept, but whose purpose, the purpose of Cronje, the people in the Security Police to establish security, because you exclude the Detective Branch because they were not aware of these types of operations. So the uniformed policemen did not know about these things and they shouldn't know about this, who should know then?
MR GOOSEN: Mr Chairman, yes, the detectives in the uniformed branch were unaware of these types of operations. These operations were executed by the Security Branch Northern Transvaal, and I thought it was under instruction of Brigadier Cronje. And with the extent of the operations, I thought it had been cleared out for all these operations because you couldn't regard these types of operations lightly and as a daily activity because they had far-reaching consequences. In one of our actions one person was seriously injured, one was killed and I really believed there was a purpose, an objective, to be realised.
MR MALAN: I accept that, but just to understand this, you mentioned the word that Cronje had given approval, you did not think that he had received instructions to do this, you thought he had cleared this out. Did he get approval from somewhere?
MR GOOSEN: I believed that these types of actions had been sanctioned.
MR MALAN: Yes, I understand that there had to be approval, but how did you see the approval, did Brigadier Cronje think that that was the way you had to handle it or did somebody from elsewhere think this out and say that that and that and that you had to do, you had to build mellow-yellows and throw these bombs? Did you never consider all this?
MR GOOSEN: I knew that this definitely had been discussed, had been approved, and that instructions had been given. I was 22 years old, I was a Sergeant and I never thought if somebody was going to make a submission to Cronje and then get approval, or did the instructions come from head office. It did not make any sense to me at that stage to consider that.
ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you, Mr Chairman, if you would just allow me two or three extra questions.
Perhaps I've understood wrongly, how did the bomb into the house?
MR GOOSEN: It was hurled through the window, as far as I can recollect what happened that night.
ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Ledwaba says they can't understand, and they agree with you and they allege that this bomb was thrown from the neighbour's side through the window of the room where Selepe was sleeping.
MR GOOSEN: As far as I can remember we went onto this, entered this house from Serote Street 33 and then hurled the bomb through the bomb through the window. I can't think that we went to the neighbours and threw the bomb over the fence into the room.
ADV STEENKAMP: They can't understand why you thought it necessary to attack the house, you could just have removed Mr Ledwaba, number one, and then why this room where Ledwaba was not sleeping.
MR GOOSEN: I don't know why that specific action was decided on. On the scene, Captain Hechter carried the explosive device, he moved past the northern side of the house, he threw that through that window. Why that window, I don't know, I just assumed that he knew May Ledwaba was sleeping in that room, otherwise I can't make sense of that.
ADV STEENKAMP: And then they want to establish whether you are also applying for attempted murder on other members of the Ledwaba family.
MR GOOSEN: Up until today I had been unaware of who was in that house. When I returned to this scene I saw family there, I talked to them, they told me that two people were injured, they had not died at that stage, they had been taken to Kalefong Hospital. I did not realise it then, but you'll see in my application I also apply for attempted murder and my legal advisor can qualify that better when he argues. But now with what I know, I certainly would have applied for attempted murder.
ADV STEENKAMP: And then finally, I want to put it to you that during the time of this incident, Mr William Ledwaba, deceased now, he is the husband of Mrs Ledwaba who is here today and also Mr Abel Ledwaba and the other victims, Mr Julian Selepe, are solely responsible for the maintenance of this family. Mr William Ledwaba is dead, Mr Abel Ledwaba has other work and the other Ms Ledwaba cannot word. Today they are still living in a house which they couldn't have maintained since this and they do not have enough income because of your activities. Do you have any comment on that?
MR GOOSEN: With hindsight and with regard to the evidence and because this interpreter wasn't here this morning, I wanted to address the Ledwaba and Selepe families again. I just want to repeat what I had said this morning.
I am aware, I'm very aware of the pain and suffering I have been directly and indirectly responsible for on the morning of the 18th of September 1986. I wish I could think, just wish all these things away, turn this clock back so that this thing could never have happened. I am very sorry about this and we know that it is a fact that our actions at that scene caused pain and suffering.
I myself have carried this burden on my conscience for 12 years. I knew that somebody had been killed, somebody was injured and I withheld this information. All I am asking, I am begging is that with the disclosure of all the facts I've done it in as much detail as possible, that you see your way to possibly forgive me so that I too can live with my conscience for the rest of my life. Thank you, Mr Chairman.
ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, just to confirm for the record, I understand that the deceased in this matter at the time was 19 years old. And for the record, Mr May Ledwaba, who subsequently was killed in a police action, was at the time of the incident 34 years old, which means he, this is now May Ledwaba, was born in 1952. It's the only information that I have.
Furthermore, that this house was a brick house, it consisted of seven bedrooms with a sink roof ...(intervention)
ADV STEENKAMP: Seven bedrooms, Mr Chairman - seven rooms, I'm sorry, seven rooms in total, not bedrooms. And that it is still in a state of non-repair, it's exactly as it was during the attack. Thank you, Mr Chairman, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV STEENKAMP
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR ALBERTS: I'll be very brief, thank you, Mr Chairman.
Mr Goosen, this operation took place early on the morning of the 18th, is that correct?
MR ALBERTS: And if I understand your evidence correctly, you first had to do your paper work thereafter arising from your investigation of this scene, as an explosives expert.
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR ALBERTS: And I see that the affidavit was sworn to on the 19th, it was dated on the 19th of September, is that correct?
MR ALBERTS: That's the next day?
MR ALBERTS: And only after the finalisation of this affidavit, did you only go to Brigadier Cronje after that?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, I first wrote the affidavit and I drafted the covering letter, had it typed and only on the morning of the 19th, in other words, I went to Brigadier Cronje for the signing of the one document. That is correct.
MR ALBERTS: So a day, a work day elapsed after the incident before you saw the Brigadier.
MR ALBERTS: And you say - the impression that I get - please help me if I'm wrong, but the impression that I get is that Brigadier Cronje didn't make particular enquiries into this whole incident at that time when you saw him.
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Chairperson. I informed him that: "These are the relevant documents and evidence that I'm going to deliver by hand, here's my affidavit concerning the incident". I probably referred that Jacques Hechter and myself were involved on the 18th.
MR ALBERTS: Now if Brigadier Cronje did not know what happened after the operation, he would surely have asked you as a young Sergeant, made enquiries and wanted to ascertain from you precisely what happened?
MR GOOSEN: That is so, Chairperson. If the Brigadier had not received feedback in some or other way, most probably he would have asked me more than I simply told him.
MR ALBERTS: And did he do that or not, ask more?
MR GOOSEN: No, Chairperson, basically after I informed him and the signing, he signed the SAP21.
MR ALBERTS: So after this discussion with him would you have assumed that he was familiar with what happened?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR ALBERTS: We will ask Captain Hechter what the method of work was as far as these operations were concerned, when he had his turn. But in any case that was your experience of the situation with the Brigadier?
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR ALBERTS: Something has also been said about the perception, and that is a word that you chose with regard to your activities at the so-called sweeping of the scene. I get the impression - and once again please help me if I'm making a mistake, wasn't that also just the final part of the cover-up to keep this whole thing secret?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, the perception to which I referred I regarded as part of protecting the whole process and more specifically my part pertinently in the scene and then also the operational leg. There were many more things that I thought of on the way to the scene after I'd left my house until I arrived there, how am I going to conduct my investigation at the scene to remove all finger-pointing possibilities?
MR ALBERTS: Because I got that impression from evidence last week, that you the, it suited the Security Police, especially with things like explosions and so on, to always keep a back door open and when the matter is investigation you could always point a finger at someone else as a possibility.
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Chairperson. If I can refer to Pienaarsrivier, that is why the landmine was used on the gravel road during which the person's body was destroyed. That was also to create a perception for the next person who arrived at the scene, that this person was in the process of planting a landmine and something went wrong and he blew himself up in the process.
MR ALBERTS: But the point would be that it would always be, leave a handy way out.
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, there's always another possibility.
MR ALBERTS: So it suited you well, owing to the covert nature of these operations, to always leave a possibility so that the finger could be pointed elsewhere.
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Chairperson. In this specific case the finger even pointed to May Ledwaba.
MR ALBERTS: And in this way you would of course ...(no sound)
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR ALBERTS
MR GOOSEN: That is correct. When the report came in they would say they couldn't determine the origin of the explosive, that it was a self-manufactured device that exploded in the house, that is correct.
MR MALAN: I'm sure about that. Would the Detective Branch not also have thought, if the origin couldn't be determined, then it was probably also not of Russian origin and the Security Police or the explosive experts would surely point out as soon as they can that it came from there. So wouldn't the uniformed branch have thought there's just total confusion at best?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, it may be that the one detective would respond like that and the next one makes the same deduction as we wanted to create at the scene. It is difficult for me to say what the investigating officer would have thought about these circumstances at Serote Street 33.
MR MALAN: It seems to me that you are saying "we didn't have to create confusion, we were always confused".
MR GOOSEN: No, Chairperson, that is not what I'm saying.
CHAIRPERSON: As I understand it you were told on the way there that this man, a notorious activist, had taken over control of a funeral which was going to take place on the 18th.
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, the 19th.
CHAIRPERSON: And that after the funeral he was going to - he had a lot of people organised, he was going to lead them to attack various policemen in that area and attack their houses and kill them.
MR GOOSEN: That is correct, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: You gathered that he had made all these plans, this man May Ledwaba.
MR GOOSEN: That is what I was told, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: So it was extremely serious to stop this happening that afternoon?
MR GOOSEN: That was my interpretation, Chairperson, that our action would have to be seen as a preventative step rather than something else.
CHAIRPERSON: And you went there at 4 o'clock that morning and you discovered the two people who had been hurt.
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, that is after I returned for the second time to the scene, that was plus-minus 4 o'clock in the morning.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. And we know that neither of these two people was the man who had planned the attacks and was going to launch the attacks on the police?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, the only information that I received in the car was that the person was targeted was Squish and other youths that would be involved in the subsequent attack. At the scene at 4 o'clock some of the family told me that it was Julian Selepe and Walter Ledwaba. I didn't know the background of the activists in Attridgeville to say that Squish could be identical to one of these or not.
CHAIRPERSON: Did you tell Hechter as soon as you got back "Look, I found out who was injured, it was so and so and so", give him the names so that he could take action to save these policemen from this attack? - if you'd got the wrong man.
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, I did not mention to Hechter the next day specifically that there were victims at the scene, the standard procedure at the Security Branch was that after such an explosive incident or another incident, a crypto report was written. That information I made available with the full facts, and those things were reported to head office ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Goosen, we were talking about an operation you took part in, which was a matter of great urgency because policemen's lives were in danger. Don't talk to me about crypto reports, why did you not tell the man responsible for the operation the information you had now got, so he could satisfy himself that they had eliminated the man they wanted to.
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, I cannot recollect that I discussed with Captain Hechter the next day or after the morning's investigation, that I discussed the pertinently with him. The possibility exists that I may have mentioned it ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Precisely. I want to know why you didn't discuss it with him if it was so urgent, if it was justification for throwing a bomb into a house, that when you yourself visited the house and ascertained who had been taken to hospital, they hadn't even been killed at that stage, but you didn't tell Mr Hechter.
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, I cannot remember that I had this discussion with Captain Hechter. There is a possibility that I did mention it to him. I really can't sit here and say I told him or I concretely didn't say it to him. It may be that I may have informed him in this regard the next day. I have no reason not to have discussed it with him, but I cannot pertinently recollect it, that I mentioned it to him.
CHAIRPERSON: A few minutes ago you were telling us you did not discuss it with him, now ...(intervention)
MR MALAN: That must have been a problem with translation, he did say the possibility existed.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well, thank you.
JUDGE PILLAY: Mr Goosen, did I understand you correctly, when you spoke to the family, that you hoped or you wished that you could turn the clock back, if we turn the clock back there's always still going to be apartheid, what would you do then?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, I hope that if we turn the clock back there wouldn't be a dispensation like apartheid.
JUDGE PILLAY: Because you realise that the people will still always ..(indistinct)
MR GOOSEN: That's correct, Chairperson.
JUDGE PILLAY: The survivor was targeted as a person with other young activists, so your application says, who would they have been?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, it was just told to me, the information from Captain Hechter, that other youths would be involved by May Ledwaba at the proposed attack on policemen after the funeral on the 19th. There wasn't a pertinent name or individual told to me in that regard.
JUDGE PILLAY: I must say once again that we will discuss it with your legal representative, but are you applying in connection with attempted murder or assault with regard to the other victim that was injured there.
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, ...(intervention)
JUDGE PILLAY: How is he a target, how was he a political target?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, with the execution of this operation and where the use of explosives was in question, there was always the possibility at such a house that someone other than just the target could be effected by such an explosion, but I have no doubt what the damage caused by explosive is, it doesn't choose its target pertinently of who is an activist and who is not.
JUDGE PILLAY: That's the point, why do we throw it in there? Let's say for example that the other person had also been killed and he was not an activist, he wasn't a target, it wasn't intended to kill him, would you still think that he falls under the law where you would have to receive amnesty in his case? - because he wasn't killed for a political reason.
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, I would still ask the Committee to give me amnesty for such a person's injury or death. If I can put it in this way, this operation was purely based on an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. Various policemen's lives were at stake. When they were targeted amongst others, the policemen involved in the shooting incident, his house was also attacked two or three days before in Attridgeville. And the mere association - I cannot really express how I see myself getting amnesty for example, for Julian Selepe and Walter Ledwaba, but I'm not convinced, I am not aware of the fact that they weren't possibly also part of this plan for the next day.
JUDGE PILLAY: But Mr Goosen, you were told that the deceased had planned to attack the houses of policemen after a funeral and he was in a position to involve other people to do that. As I understand your testimony he was envisaged as a person who had control over these people, and the reason why he was attacked was to stop that and you see saw that the normal laws would not be sufficient for that.
I've just been correct, the person who was killed wasn't that person, am I correct?
JUDGE PILLAY: In his case, was it necessary for him to be killed, because he didn't have control over these things?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, the attack was not aimed at all at killing Walter Ledwaba who apparently was innocent, through evidence given here, but with the execution of the operation, the possibility was foreseen that other people, even innocent people - if one can label it like that, would be killed or injured in such an attack.
JUDGE PILLAY: Now on what basis do you say that his death contributed to a political motive?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, the whole operation concerned specific planning to achieve a specific objective, based on that the operation was carried out and in the execution of this operation what was foreseen was Walter Ledwaba was killed and Julian Selepe was injured.
JUDGE PILLAY: Did you think that Cronje would have allowed that an old person would be killed in that house?
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, I can't answer to that, I don't know.
JUDGE PILLAY: But in a previous case you gave evidence that you hesitated to do something that van Jaarsveld told you to do because you didn't that Cronje would have permitted that to happen.
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, I was unaware with the carrying of this operation that in terms of Mrs Ledwaba, who was 62 at the time, I was unaware that there was an old woman in the house. But be that as it may, we did foresee that innocent people other than the targeted people might be in the house. The information indicated that May Ledwaba was there as well as youths that he would have used after a funeral to attack policemen and that is, as I understood it, that was the purpose of the operation, to target them.
JUDGE PILLAY: But the lives of other people, to put those lives in danger, do you think that Cronje would have permitted that, would he have agreed?
MR GOOSEN: I have no reason to doubt that he would have acted differently, that is was also a possibility for him when he approved such an operation that not only the targets would be hit.
MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I know it's perhaps inappropriate here to mention this, but I just want to mention for purposes of the questions Judge Pillay asked, that this specific issue you asked this witness about was dealt with in quite a lot of detail at the previous hearings, for what it is worth.
JUDGE PILLAY: Mr du Plessis, I wasn't questioning Mr Cronje's motives, I just found it strange that in one instance there had been a refusal to attack and others not.
CHAIRPERSON: One last question, one last matter. Is there anything untruthful, it may be a little unrevealing, but is there anything untruthful in EG10? - that is your affidavit.
MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, on page 550, that's the second page of my statement, I mention smear samples that were taken to determine this type of explosive and here I did not reveal that the smear samples were taken incorrectly by taking dry smears.
CHAIRPERSON: No, I'm saying you did not disclose all you should have, but you haven't said anything that is not truthful. You did take smear samples, you took them the wrong way, but you did take smear samples from the wall near to the point of detonation.