MR BOOYENS: Chairperson and members of the Committee, J.A. Booyens and we call Johan Hendrik Tait.
JOHAN HENDRIK TAIT: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Mr Tait, please page to page 26, your amnesty application. Do you confirm the particulars which appears on page 26?
MR BOOYENS: On page 27, actually it starts at the bottom of page 26, from 1979 you were attached to the Special Task Force at Oshakati and attached to Koevoet and then from 1988, C1 at Vlakplaas, is that correct?
MR TAIT: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: Would the statement be correct that in your whole Police career up to 1988 or up to 1993 when you were transferred to Radio Control, you were indeed involved with Operational/Combat Units of the South African Police?
MR BOOYENS: You give a summarised version of background, of your personal background from page 27, 28, is that correct.
MR TAIT: That is correct Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: During your service period in the then South West Africa, were you involved in any contacts?
MR TAIT: In several contacts, Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: If you have to estimate, how many?
MR TAIT: Approximately 200 contacts, Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: For the information of those who don't have that background, contact means shooting incidents with insurgents, is that correct?
MR TAIT: That is correct Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm the rest of page 28?
MR TAIT: I confirm Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: Page 29? With regards to the date in paragraph (a)(2), we have surmised that the date was the 21st of April when this incident took place, is that correct?
MR TAIT: That is correct Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: Sorry My Lord, he's got during end 1992 or during early 1993.
CHAIRPERSON: What does he say now?
MR BOOYENS: The incident took place on the 21st of April 1991. At that stage, was weapon smuggling from Mozambique to the Republic of South Africa, was it a problem at that stage?
MR BOOYENS: And you, along with a group of men went to the Komatipoort or a group of men went to the Komatipoort area and you joined them later?
MR TAIT: That is correct Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: Did you then as senior Officer there, were you in command of the whole weapon smuggling operation in that area?
MR TAIT: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: The group of people that you had there, please tell us more about them? You name them or you call them Ovambo's, but what were these people actually?
MR TAIT: Chairperson, these persons were former Koevoet members and some of them were former Angolan citizens. Some of them were also 32 Battalion members.
MR BOOYENS: Do you mean 32 Battalion of the SA Army which consisted of South African Officers and Angolans who fought on the South African side?
MR TAIT: That is correct Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: The Portuguese speaking members of this group, were they Angolans or were they Ovambo's?
MR TAIT: Chairperson, some of them were Ovambo's, but there were also Angolans among them.
MR BOOYENS: What was the objective behind the operation, the global objective with this operation within the Komatipoort environment?
MR TAIT: The global objective was to arrest arm smugglers.
MR BOOYENS: How did you go about this?
MR TAIT: Usually we would make use of the Koevoet members such as Lukas who would speak Portuguese to make contact with these persons and then around that, an operation would be planned in order to arrest these persons.
MR BOOYENS: This supply of weapons, was basically as the previous witness has stated, it wasn't an issue to the weapon smugglers to whom they sold these weapons, whether it was ANC, PAC, it didn't really matter?
MR BOOYENS: At the time of this incident, in other words we are now speaking about April 1991, how large was your group?
MR TAIT: I cannot say with certainty, however, I think at that stage we numbered about 15 to 18 members.
MR BOOYENS: And were various of these persons sent out in teams in order to activate the traps so to speak?
MR TAIT: Yes. There was more than one group that was busy with several information gathering activities.
MR BOOYENS: You were at Skomaans Base?
MR BOOYENS: On the 21st of April there, you were aware ...
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, before you go on, can I ask something that - you have been talking up to now about you would use these Koevoet members to contact and then an operation planned to arrest. Who would carry out the arrests?
MR TAIT: Mr Chairperson, the arrests would be executed by Task Force members who we usually applied with regard to arms smuggling networks, along with members of C10.
MR BOOYENS: The operation was centred about Skomaans Base, is that correct?
MR TAIT: Yes, that is correct.
MR BOOYENS: And on the 21st of March, was there an operation planned which Lukas Culino and Simon whose surname I am not going to attempt to pronounce, they were involved in this operation and they had assisted with the planning?
MR BOOYENS: Was this operation according to the information which you had, was this operation ready to be executed?
MR BOOYENS: And by that it means that people were deployed and that they would then deliver the weapons and the smugglers would be arrested?
MR BOOYENS: Tell us just for the sake of clarity what you can recall in terms of how far the operation had progressed. Were the persons who would set the traps in place, had they been sent out to the places where they would arrest the persons on that day?
MR TAIT: After the operation had been discussed, the people who were to be involved in the trap, went to the scene of the trap while Lukas and Simon returned to make contact with the people.
MR BOOYENS: Let us discuss the Task Force members and the weapon smugglers. So Lukas would have made contact with the weapon smugglers?
MR TAIT: Yes. They would have driven to take the weapon smugglers to conclude the transaction at the place where the arrest was supposed to take place.
MR TAIT: At this stage, I was at Skomaans.
MR BOOYENS: Where at Skomaans?
MR TAIT: As far as I know, I was in the Base.
MR BOOYENS: And on that day, were other members of your team also in the field?
MR TAIT: Yes, as far as I know, there were still other members who were busy with work in the field.
MR BOOYENS: Mention has been made of the fact that members of Vlakplaas frequently used a lot of alcohol, is that statement in general, correct?
MR TAIT: Chairperson, at times people did use alcohol.
MR BOOYENS: What was your personal principle with regard to the consumption of alcohol during an operation or while you were visiting people?
MR TAIT: My principle was that regardless of whether or not it was an operation or the usual line of duty, I would never visit my people if I had consumed alcohol, because my principle was that if they saw me in an inebriated state, they would be able to return to me later and ask me why I was drinking and speak about the fact that they were not allowed to drink and I could not enforce discipline.
MR BOOYENS: On that particular evening, did you have anything to drink?
MR TAIT: At the time of the operation, I had not consumed any alcohol.
MR BOOYENS: While you were at Skomaans Base and you were waiting for the operation to be executed, what happened?
MR TAIT: What I can recall is that we waited for the Ovambo's to return. Lukas and Simon arrived at the Base with Warrant Officer Willie Nortje. I was present along with other members of C10 and Task Force members. At this time we were informed that there was a shooting incident.
MR BOOYENS: This was the shooting incident between who and who?
MR TAIT: That there was a shooting incident between Lukas and Simon and then the weapon smugglers on the other side.
MR BOOYENS: I see that you refer to them on page 30, as two Ovambo members namely Lukas and Simon. Were they both Ovambo's or was Culino an Angolan?
MR TAIT: As far as I know, Culino was an Angolan.
MR BOOYENS: Do you know whether or not he was ex-32 Battalion?
MR TAIT: It was known to me that he was a former 32 member.
MR BOOYENS: Let us refer to the Koevoet persons, the Koevoet persons that you used there, as far as you knew, were they all members of the South African Police?
MR TAIT: As far as I know, or as far as I can recall, some of the members were not yet members of the SAP at that stage. However, they were in the process of becoming members, but as far as I can recall, there were persons who were not yet full members of the Force.
MR BOOYENS: In practice, these persons would be issued with weapons when they were participating in operations, is that correct?
MR TAIT: Members who had already been appointed as members of the Force, would be issued with weapons, but there would be certain persons whom we would not issue with weapons.
MR BOOYENS: I see, why is that?
MR TAIT: Because there would be trouble if they were carrying weapons and someone was injured and they were not members of the SAP.
MR BOOYENS: Very well. You have stated that the two Koevoets then arrived at Skomaans Base, you were present when they reported that there was a shooting incident with the weapon smugglers?
MR BOOYENS: From what was told to you at that stage, could you draw any inference as to whether or not their conduct had been legitimate, whether they had been justified in shooting?
MR TAIT: According to what I could infer, they acted legitimately.
MR BOOYENS: You say that they went to Willie Nortje, were you aware of a previously existing relationship between Nortje and specifically Lukas?
MR TAIT: Yes. Lukas and Willie ...
CHAIRPERSON: Did they go to, they didn't arrive with Willie Nortje, they went to him?
MR BOOYENS: Yes, they went to him Mr Chairman. Just for clarity sake, Willie was among others at the Base when they arrived there?
MR TAIT: Yes, Willie was already at the Base when the two reported.
MR BOOYENS: I would just like to return to my previous question, you say that you are aware of a former or previous relationship between Lukas and Willie?
MR TAIT: Yes, when Willie was in Ovamboland Lukas Culino was his direct Second in Command in his Koevoet team.
MR BOOYENS: His Koevoet combat team?
MR TAIT: Yes, his Koevoet combat team.
MR BOOYENS: But you heard the discussion between Willie and Lukas?
MR BOOYENS: When Lukas had finished speaking to Willie and told him what had happened, what happened next?
MR TAIT: According to my interpretation, or the way that I recall it, Willie proposed that we keep the Ovambo's out of the situation and that we should rather use Task Force members who would then have performed the shooting.
MR BOOYENS: In other words that the shooters be replaced with Task Force members?
MR BOOYENS: What was your reaction to that?
MR TAIT: I agreed with it fully because I believed that that was a good idea.
MR BOOYENS: What was your problem with the fact that the Koevoets had fired the shots and why did you want it to appear as if it was ordinary SAP members who had actually fired the shots?
MR TAIT: Because the members who had shot, were former Angolans and there was already a political situation surrounding this case and that is why I thought that if it came to light that South African Police members made use of mercenaries, it would cause a great uproar.
MR BOOYENS: At that stage the Harms Commission was underway, the ANC had been unbanned and there was a stage of negotiation between the then National Party government and the former liberation movements, is that correct?
MR BOOYENS: So did you foresee that this would cause uproar in the newspapers and create a great embarrassment for the government?
MR TAIT: Yes, that is what I foresaw.
MR BOOYENS: That is why you were satisfied that it would be a good idea?
MR BOOYENS: Was Wouter Mentz also present as far as you can recall?
MR TAIT: As far as my knowledge goes, he was present.
MR BOOYENS: Wouter was a former Murder and Robbery Policeman who among you men there, along with Dougie Holtzhauzen, was the only conventional Policemen in order to put it that way, while the rest of you were all former Koevoet members and unconventional Policemen if one may put it that way?
MR TAIT: Of the members who were there, I can recall that Wouter and Dougie were the most experienced persons with regard to Police work among all of us.
MR BOOYENS: What was the objective, why were they attached to your Unit?
MR TAIT: Chairperson, in this case, they undertook the investigation work where people would be arrested or whatever the case may be.
MR BOOYENS: Your impression after the proposal was made regarding which you stated that you agreed with it, with Mr Nortje, did you have anything further to do with what happened later that evening?
MR BOOYENS: On page 31 you state that Willie Nortje spontaneously stepped forward and basically took over the matter. Could you please explain to the Chairperson what you mean when you say that?
MR TAIT: I could say that Willie used his own initiative in that case.
MR BOOYENS: With regard to the further organisation of the management of the matter, you had nothing further to do with it, is that correct?
MR TAIT: Yes, that is correct.
MR BOOYENS: Did you ever visit the scene of the incident at any stage?
MR TAIT: No, not at any stage.
MR BOOYENS: Some of the people did visit the scene, is that correct?
MR BOOYENS: As far as you can recall, who were those people that went out to the scene?
MR TAIT: As far as I can recall, it was Wouter and there may have been approximately 10 members with him. I don't know whether Task Force members also accompanied him, it could be possible.
MR BOOYENS: I see. There is a measure of confusion here in the documents regarding when this incident took place, this shooting, whether the arrest group was still in their position or whether they had already withdrawn or what the position was. What can you recall about this?
MR TAIT: I cannot recall whether or not they were still in position or whether they had collectively withdrawn or whether certain persons had withdrawn in order to determine why the people had not arrived yet. But I am not certain about that.
MR BOOYENS: So you are saying that it is possible that some of the Task Force members could still have been at the ambush point whilst C10 people could have returned to find out what was going on with the operation?
MR TAIT: Yes, that is correct.
MR BOOYENS: Were you in the OPS room when the previous witness, Klopper, came to contact De Kock?
MR TAIT: Yes, I was in the OPS room.
MR BOOYENS: This line to De Kock, was it an open line?
MR TAIT: Yes. It wasn't a safe line, it was an open line.
MR BOOYENS: Did you listen specifically to the discussion between Mr Klopper and Mr De Kock?
MR TAIT: No, I did not catch the specific gist of the discussion.
MR BOOYENS: But you did hear according to what Mr De Kock's legal representative said, that at that stage when Mr De Kock was informed about the incident, he was merely told that it was a shooting incident in which some of the Koevoet members were involved and no mention was made of covering up the incident. Are you satisfied that in all probability that is what would have happened?
MR TAIT: Yes, I am satisfied with that.
MR BOOYENS: To a certain extent you have already discussed the reason why you believed and agreed that the operation was to be covered up. Do you also then confirm the political objective as you have summarised it on page 33?
MR BOOYENS: Once again with the one qualification, you used the word Ovambo members which isn't a correct phrase, would that be Ovambo's and Angolans or former members of Koevoet?
MR TAIT: Yes, that is correct.
MR BOOYENS: At that stage there were frequent accusations of SAP co-operation with a so-called Third Force?
MR TAIT: Yes, I know about that.
MR BOOYENS: Should it come to light that former mercenaries are now in the service of the South African Police, for operations near the Mozambican border, would you expect that this would create a great problem and great embarrassment?
CHAIRPERSON: Well, it wasn't a question only of former mercenaries, was it, the fact that these people were foreigners meant that they were themselves mercenaries and that would have caused embarrassment.
MR TAIT: That is correct Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: Yes, that is correct, the Angolans were still mercenaries but they were now in service to the SAP, is that correct?
MR TAIT: Yes, one could say that Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: Just one more aspect, what was the general order with regard to Koevoet members and even askaris with regard to publicity in light of their activities and the fact that they assisted the Security Police?
MR TAIT: The general instruction was that they should be kept as far as possible out of situations which could lead to court appearances or problems for the government.
MR BOOYENS: I see. So their involvement had to be kept as secret as possible as practically possible?
MR TAIT: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: Thank you Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, may I perhaps be afforded the opportunity to go first please, I have only one question. Mr Tait, did you ever see that Wouter Mentz shot any one of the arms smugglers?
MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS
MR HUGO: I have no questions, thank you Mr Chairman.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman, Lamey on record, on behalf of Klopper and also Nortje who is implicated. Mr Tait, I have noticed in your amnesty application that you were discharged for medical reasons in August 1995, is that correct?
MR LAMEY: Can you tell us the nature of these medical reasons?
MR TAIT: Post-traumatic stress disorder.
MR LAMEY: Are you still receiving treatment for this?
MR LAMEY: Has medicine been prescribed to you in order to manage your condition?
MR LAMEY: Are you undergoing psychiatric or psychological treatment for this?
MR TAIT: That is correct Mr Chairperson.
MR LAMEY: I beg your pardon, I did not hear your answer.
MR LAMEY: Is it your experience that due to the fact that you are suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, your short term and long term memory fails you?
MR TAIT: Yes, I do experience problems from time to time.
MR LAMEY: The events with regard to the Komatipoort incident, that which you have given evidence about and your recollection, could the fact that you are suffering from post-traumatic stress and that you are experiencing memory problems, influence the particular accuracy of your evidence?
MR LAMEY: Then I would just like to return and ask whether it is a justifiable inference to make with regard to the entire Operation Excalibur in which former Koevoet members were used, that previously during the planning phase, the possibility may have been foreseen that an incident such as this one, which indeed took place later on, that such an incident could take place and that something could go wrong and that Koevoet members could also perhaps in a contact situation with smugglers, or end up in such a situation? In other words before this specific incident took place, was the probability of that foreseen?
MR TAIT: Yes, it could have happened.
MR LAMEY: Could that have been foreseen during the planning phase?
MR TAIT: Yes, it may have been predicted.
MR LAMEY: I beg your pardon, I can't really hear you very well, could you repeat your answer?
MR TAIT: Yes, it may have been predicted.
MR LAMEY: And that generally, should something like this take place, they would then as far as possible, be kept out of the shooting incident in order to avoid this embarrassment that you have referred to?
MR TAIT: Would you please repeat the question.
MR LAMEY: If it had already been foreseen in the planning phase of Excalibur that something could go wrong, that former Koevoet members could become involved in shooting incidents, is it correct to accept that at that stage in planning, it was kept in mind and made part of the planning that former Koevoet members with regard to evidence which may emanate from a shooting incident, be kept out of such an incident, in order to avoid embarrassment?
CHAIRPERSON: Isn't it the other way round that because it was predicted, they should not be involved in such incidents, it would only happen when something went wrong? It was predicted there could be trouble if they were involved, so the planning would have been not to involve them in shooting incidents?
CHAIRPERSON: Is that the position?
MR LAMEY: Then perhaps we should divide this into two sections, the one being that the general planning was that the smugglers would be lured into an ambush and that the Task Force members should there be a shooting incident between the smugglers and the other members, that the Task Force members would undertake the shooting?
MR TAIT: C10 members as well as Task Force members were there and the reason for that is because they were better trained and more effective in their action and that is why we always used Task Force members so that we would be able to protect our own people and not to expose them to such explicit danger.
MR LAMEY: My question is aimed at the predictability in general of such a situation during which something could go wrong. In other words, that the plan to lead smugglers to a point where there would be an ambush may contain a point at which something could go wrong, when contact is made between former Koevoet members and the smugglers and in that event, a shooting incident could take place during which the Koevoet members then would be involved and that should such a situation develop, they would be able to reconstruct the position in order to keep the Koevoet members out of the situation or out of the incident?
MR BOOYENS: Chairperson, could my learned friend - I think I understand what his question is, but could my learned friend please put the question to the witness simply and briefly because he is putting it in a very complicated fashion. I think what my learned friend wants to know is whether or not there was previous planning for the event of a shooting incident and the Koevoet members' involvement in that and whether or not it would be possible to cover it up. I think that is what he is driving at.
CHAIRPERSON: As I understand it, that is what you want to know?
CHAIRPERSON: Had provisions been made for a cover up if Koevoet members did inadvertently get involved in a shooting?
MR TAIT: Not in this case. After they had been reported, it was decided that we should keep those members who had participated in the shooting, out of the incident and make use of the Task Force members.
CHAIRPERSON: The question was had this been anticipated beforehand? Was it a general understanding that you would do this?
MR TAIT: I would have done that.
MR LAMEY: Mr Tait, you made use of former Koevoet members and it is very sensitive to use them as it has appeared from your evidence, is that correct?
MR LAMEY: Anything could have gone wrong with regard to contact with smugglers. You must have foreseen and made provisions for a plan with regard to a certain operation should something go wrong and the Koevoet members then become involved in a shooting incident?
MR TAIT: There was not a previously formulated plan, but should things have gone wrong, we would have formulated a plan to keep them out of it.
MR LAMEY: You say that there would have been a level of planning to keep them out of it?
MR TAIT: Yes, in terms of the shooting incident which took place, we would then decide whether or not we were to keep them out of it or what the situation was. We would tailor a plan according to the situation.
MR LAMEY: Are you saying that should this take place, you would then formulate a plan?
MR LAMEY: So you would firstly evaluate the situation?
MR TAIT: Yes. We would automatically be able to determine whether or not it was necessary to keep these persons out of the incident.
MR LAMEY: Suppose the shooting incident took place legitimately between the Koevoet members and the smugglers, or that the report is that it was a legitimate incident, what would you do then?
MR TAIT: I would still have proposed that we make use of the Task Force members as a result of what I have already stated with regard to the political motives behind the matter.
CHAIRPERSON: As I understand your evidence, the legitimacy of the act was immaterial, what was important was the outside world, the public, would not get to learn that you were using Koevoet members in these operations?
MR TAIT: That was our objective.
MR LAMEY: Very well, may I then accept just to take this further, that that was already part of the plan and already foreseen during planning that that would have been the situation in the event of such a shooting incident taking place?
MR TAIT: It was not planned beforehand, it was discussed after the people had reported to us that there was a shooting incident.
CHAIRPERSON: Let's get away from the word "plan", we agree there was no plan made beforehand, but was it the practice where any action by the Police could cause grave embarrassment, to take steps to avoid such action becoming known? Was this a policy?
MR LAMEY: At a certain stage you gave evidence about when the former Koevoet members Lukas and Simon had left to go and meet these smugglers, you remained at the Base, is that correct?
MR TAIT: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: Can you recall at which stage you withdrew to the Base?
MR TAIT: Withdrew from where to the Base because we were at the Base?
MR LAMEY: Did they depart from the Base to go and meet up with the smugglers or were all of you at a pre-established point from which they went to go and meet the smugglers or from which you went back to the Base?
MR TAIT: Chairperson, there was a house in which these people resided, it was basically at the back of the Base, that is where they resided and they left from there. We remained on the Base which was basically in the same vicinity. It was simply a question of the house and the Base which is being discussed which would have been approximately a kilometre apart. That was their accommodation behind the Base, the house behind the Base.
MR LAMEY: Your recollection is that when they departed to go and meet the smugglers, you were at the Skomaans Base along with Klopper, Mentz and Nortje is that correct?
MR TAIT: Yes, that is correct. We remained at the Base.
MR LAMEY: I would just like to hear your commentary about something or whether or not you can recall anything about the following matter - on page 39 of Mr Mentz' statement he states that
"... Lukas Culino, this is the second paragraph on page 39, Lukas Culino and the other Koevoet members waited in the big gravel road, they had their own vehicle there, they would meet the weapon smugglers there. At approximately seven o'clock that evening, they had not yet arrived. The order was given by Warrant Officer Willie Nortje that we were to withdraw and we then went to Skomaans, the Police Basis near where we stayed in order to go and rest."
As it appears from the statement, when the Koevoet members left to go and meet the weapon smugglers, some time was spent waiting next to a gravel road first and then the order was given by Nortje for you to withdraw and return to the Skomaans Base? What I want to ask you is whether or not Warrant Officer Willie Nortje would have given such an order at that stage because at that stage he was still in command of the operation?
MR TAIT: I don't understand your question.
MR LAMEY: Do you have page 39 before you?
MR LAMEY: Would you read it please?
MR TAIT: I have read it Mr Chairman. Could I then hear the question pertaining to this.
MR LAMEY: What appears there, is that the same as your recollection of the events?
MR TAIT: I cannot recall this, it may have been that way.
MR LAMEY: With regard to that paragraph, I would just like to put it in context and that is before the shooting incident took place.
MR TAIT: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: This paragraph states that you waited for the Koevoet members to rendezvous with the weapon smugglers at a point and when they had not yet returned at seven o'clock that evening, the order was given by Willie Nortje for you to withdraw back to the Base.
MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, nowhere in Mentz' statement is this person's name even mentioned. My learned friend says that you had to withdraw and that is not a reasonable question. If my learned friend wants to know whether or not the people who were there had to withdraw, then it would be an appropriate question but as far as I can recall, Mentz does not even mention John Tait's name in the statement.
MR LAMEY: But that wasn't my question.
MR DU PLESSIS: But then put your question in such a way that the applicant can understand it.
CHAIRPERSON: Wasn't your question "you must withdraw"?
MR LAMEY: I am referring to the group.
CHAIRPERSON: But he is not a member of the group, there is no suggestion he was. Are you putting it to him that he was a member of the group?
MR LAMEY: No, Mr Chairman, no.
CHAIRPERSON: How can you put "you" if he is not a member?
MR LAMEY: Perhaps I should then rephrase it. Mr Mentz states that the order was given by Willie Nortje that
"... we had to withdraw and we then went to Skomaans."
MR TAIT: Yes. I cannot imagine that Willie Nortje would have said "we".
MR LAMEY: No, it isn't Willie Nortje who is saying that, this is Mr Mentz' statement.
MR TAIT: Well, then I cannot comment on that because I was not present and I don't know what was discussed there at all.
CHAIRPERSON: Was Willie Nortje away from the Base, you have just told us that "we remained at the Base. I was at the Base with Klopper, Mentz and Nortje."
MR TAIT: I was at the Base with Klopper and Nortje and what I mean is that at the stage when I was at the Base with Klopper and Nortje, it was when they withdrew and returned and waited there for the Ovambo's to return.
MR LAMEY: Did I understand your evidence correctly in that at the stage that the Koevoet members had parted to rendezvous with the weapon smugglers, when they had departed from Skomaans Base or the house to which you have referred, was it you and Klopper and Nortje and Mentz who remained behind?
MR TAIT: According to my knowledge members of C10 departed along with members of the Task Force members to set up the ambush in which the people were to move. I remained behind at the Base according to my recollection. Nortje and the others later returned to the Base where we waited together for the Ovambo's to return.
MR LAMEY: Is this recollection of yours clear or could it possibly be vague?
MR TAIT: My recollection about this is reasonably clear I believe.
MR LAMEY: Would you look at page 30, the second paragraph of your amnesty application. You say
"... two Ovambo members by the name of Lukas and Simon went to rendezvous with the weapon smugglers while I was left behind at a predetermined Base and waited with other members of C10 and the Task Force."
MR LAMEY: The other members of C10 to whom you refer, who are they?
MR TAIT: I can recall that Boesman remained there with me along with a number of Task Force members whom I cannot recall or whose names I cannot recall.
MR LAMEY: Very well. I can only put to you what my instructions are from Mr Nortje and that is that when the order was given to depart, he maintains that he did not give that order, you were not present and you cannot argue this. He says that the withdrawal took place much earlier that day, before the smugglers, but not at that specific time.
MR TAIT: No, I cannot comment on that. When Willie Nortje and I and the rest of the group were together, it was when we waited at the Base for the people to return physically.
MR LAMEY: At that stage before their return, were you already in command and control of the operation, is that correct? I beg your pardon Chairperson, I didn't get that answer. If there was an order on the way back to the Basis, would you have been the person to give the order?
CHAIRPERSON: If he was present. If he was not present, he certainly would not be the person.
MR LAMEY: Yes, as it pleases you Mr Chairman. Just to return to the time after the shooting incident was reported, it is your evidence that Lukas Culino arrived there and made the report and informed you about the shooting incident.
MR LAMEY: And you say that he spoke to Nortje?
MR LAMEY: But that everybody was present?
MR TAIT: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: Did you hear what he said with regard to that, that would be Lukas Culino?
MR LAMEY: So was it the situation that he informed the group of people who were present there as such or did he only inform Nortje?
MR TAIT: He specifically spoke to Nortje, but everybody who was present could hear what he was saying.
MR LAMEY: And according to what he said, is it your recollection that it appeared that there was a reason for them to shoot the smugglers?
MR TAIT: From their discussion I could infer that there was a reason to have shot the smugglers, that their lives were in danger.
MR LAMEY: At that stage, had these events taken place reasonably quickly, in other words the departure of Wouter Mentz to the scene of the incident or how exactly did things take place after that?
MR TAIT: The events ensued reasonably quickly, exactly how, I cannot recall.
MR LAMEY: You say here in your amnesty application and I would like to request you to tell us what your recollection is, you say that that information given by Lukas and Simon made Nortje step forward spontaneously and take over, as he had done before. I want to know from you whether you are saying that Warrant Officer Willie Nortje with regard to this operation, actually took over the command of the situation out of your hands and basically handled matters from that point onwards?
MR TAIT: What I am saying is that he took over the initiative and that which he discussed there, was a logical solution and I agreed wholeheartedly with it.
MR LAMEY: You have said previously during your evidence in chief, that all of this took place upon his own initiative?
MR TAIT: The initiative for the proposal that we should use Task Force members, came from Willie Nortje.
MR LAMEY: Was there a group discussion about this?
MR TAIT: There was not a specific discussion, but I agreed with the situation and I believe that if there were persons in the group who did not agree with it, they could have expressed their disagreement.
MR LAMEY: Do I understand you correctly that when you say he took the initiative, this may have been a proposal which was put forward from his side, but not that he actually assumed command from that point onwards?
MR TAIT: It was a proposal from his side, as I have already stated and furthermore I agreed completely with that proposal.
MR LAMEY: Can you recall whether there was a detailed discussion about how precisely the reconstruction was to take place, the particulars surrounding that or was it a question of Mentz having to get to the scene of the incident as quickly as possible, evaluating the situation and then returning and reporting back about it?
MR TAIT: According to my recollection, he had to get to the scene as quickly as possible so that he could make an evaluation of the situation and then report back. So he had to go and see what happened there.
MR LAMEY: Would you say that a decision surrounding reconstruction and so forth within that context, had to be delayed until his evaluation of the scene could be made?
MR TAIT: As I have stated, the Ovambo members had to be removed and we had to use Task Force members. That had already been decided. He had to visit the scene of the incident and determine what had taken place and according to that, the scene would be reconstructed.
MR LAMEY: Do you know that photographers were dispatched to the scene?
MR TAIT: Yes, I know that Klopper contacted photographers.
MR LAMEY: Do you know that when Klopper and Nortje arrived at the scene with the photographers, neither Mentz nor any of the persons who had been shot, were to be found at the scene?
MR TAIT: No, I don't know about that.
MR LAMEY: Can you recall whether Mentz reported back after his arrival at the scene?
MR TAIT: Mentz did not report to me.
MR LAMEY: You have already given evidence that you suffer from memory problems and I would like to ask you specifically when you are testifying here and your memory is not exactly accurate and you are giving evidence about what happened at that point, and your answers in that relation, could this have been the situation that one sometimes tries one's best to recall certain things and you know for example that Lukas Culino and Willie Nortje served together in Koevoet and for that reason he may have directed this discussion at Nortje, but what I want to know is was it not more the case that there was already in general before the onset of this operation, it was already foreseen that should something like this present itself, a shooting incident, that Koevoet members were to be kept out of the picture, in other words when this happened indeed, that such an incident presented itself, there was a discussion after Culino and Simon had reported back and the possibility of such a reconstruction was discussed during that discussion, but that Mentz was supposed to go to the scene in order to evaluate the situation, the expectation would then be for him to report back and then a final decision regarding what you were going to do and how you were going to do it, would take place after the evaluation of the situation.
CHAIRPERSON: Hasn't he just said that? My note of his evidence is that
"... it has already been decided that the Ovambo members would have to have been removed. Mentz had to visit the scene to see what had happened there, then to report back and we would decide how to reconstitute it."
MR TAIT: That is correct Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: That is what you are asking him.
MR LAMEY: Yes, I just wanted to make certain about my understanding here because that is, Mr Tait, those are my instructions from Mr Nortje that there was a discussion about such a matter and that it is his recollection that it could have been before Mentz' departure, however, he says that it may have been after Mentz' departure, but that the idea was, according to my instructions that Mentz, with his experience at Murder and Robbery, had to visit the scene with Culino in order to examine the situation and that the expectation was for him to report back and that after that, further decisions would be made about the situation. In the meantime, he was present when the photographers were dispatched. I would just like to put it to you according to his recollection, and ask you whether or not you could really dispute that which I have just put to you.
CHAIRPERSON: Who was present when the photographers were dispatched? You said he was present?
MR LAMEY: No, when the photographers were called, were called to come, Nortje and Klopper. When they went to the scene it was Klopper and Nortje, according to my instructions with the photographers. Mr Tait, can we just return to the matter, do you dispute what I have just put to you?
MR TAIT: As I have stated it, Wouter had to report back after he had evaluated the situation. Is that what Nortje means, because if that is what he means, then I will agree with him.
MR LAMEY: What I would just like to put clearly to you is that his recollection is that the reconstruction may have been discussed, but that the final decision regarding that, would be linked to the evaluation of the situation at the scene of the incident which Wouter Mentz would find after he and Lukas Culino had departed from there.
MR TAIT: That may have been possible, however what I can say is that the decision had been taken to undertake this reconstruction. How it was going to take place, would have depended upon what the person would report back after he had visited the scene of the incident.
MR LAMEY: In Mr Mentz' affidavit he states in page 38, paragraph 1, he says that Lieutenant Chappies Klopper was in command of the operation with regard to the weapons investigations. That is on page 38. I would accept that that is incorrect according to your evidence, you were with Boesman Pretorius and you were in command of the operation together?
MR TAIT: Yes, I was in command of the operation, I cannot say on what grounds Wouter Mentz drew the inference or whether Wouter really did receive an order from them.
MR LAMEY: Furthermore on page 41 he says and this is after the shooting incident was reported, it would appear that a decision was made, he mentions that a decision was taken among others by Lieutenant Chappies Klopper and Warrant Officer Willie Nortje who was in command of the entire operation that the operation was to be reconstructed. It is not correct that he, Lieutenant Chappies and Willie Nortje were both in command of the operation when the decision was taken to reconstruct the operation?
MR TAIT: I said in the beginning that I was in command of the operation with regard to planning and the reporting when they reported that the people had been shot. Then the initiative came from Willie and one can accept then that Willie took over.
MR LAMEY: You see, it would appear from Mentz' affidavit that he goes further than saying that it was simply a collective discussion, what he says is that Klopper and Nortje are pertinently highlighted when it comes to the people who were in command of the operation.
CHAIRPERSON: And nobody agrees with that, it has been said time and again by everybody else, I don't know what you are going on with this about? I don't want to stop you, but we have got to reach some finality in the matter and you are just repeating and repeating and repeating what has been already said.
MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman, I just wanted to ... (end of tape) ... of Mentz in this regard. Mr Chairman, I don't have any further questions, thank you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: Thank you Honourable Chairperson. Sir, is it correct that you were the handler of Lukas Culino during this operation?
MS PATEL: And of Simon, is it Hiranbawasha? Were you his handler as well?
MS PATEL: Okay, can you tell us the information upon which this particular operation was based, did that information come to you from Lukas?
MR TAIT: That is correct, the information came from Lukas that they had made contact with a group of people who were going to bring weapons over the Mozambican border into the country and that they had negotiated with them to purchase the weapons from them and that is the information around which we planned the operation.
MS PATEL: Okay, can you tell us whether or in a sense, what legend Lukas had given over to the smugglers during that initial contact period with them? Who did they give out that they were?
MR TAIT: With regard to this specific case, I cannot submit his particular agenda.
ADV SANDI: But in principle, they were going to trick them, not so? They were going to trick them and pose as if they were interested to buy arms genuinely?
MR TAIT: That is correct, yes.
MS PATEL: All right, can you then given that you can't recall what the specific legend in this specific operation was, can you perhaps be helpful in terms of whether generally perhaps they would have posed to be what, members of a specific liberation movement or what would the probabilities have been?
MR TAIT: As far as I can recall, they presented themselves as smugglers who wanted to purchase weapons and then re-sell them.
MS PATEL: Okay. Did you authorise the monies, the use of the monies that they would have used during this operation?
MR TAIT: As I have already stated, during any operation where funds were necessary, you would put in a written claim with a motivation and then those funds would be approved by Head Office and then be allocated to you with which then you could provide the funds to the various members of the operation.
MS PATEL: Would you have been the person who put in the claim with a motivation?
MR TAIT: Yes, that would have been me, I would have requested it.
MS PATEL: Would you have taken this decision to put in the claim independently or would you have consulted other parties at Vlakplaas before you did it?
MR TAIT: I would have discussed the matter with Mr De Kock to ensure that he was informed regarding why the funds were claimed and what we were going to apply these funds for. I would not request funds on my own initiative because he would also have to lend his approval for that.
MS PATEL: All right, can you recall whether there was a meeting a few days before the incident had taken place to plan the operation?
MR TAIT: I don't know about that, according to my recollection the planning of the operation took place at Skomaans.
MS PATEL: Okay, and who was present at the planning?
MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, with respect, he said he has got no knowledge of such a meeting, now my learned friend asks him who was present there.
CHAIRPERSON: He has just said the planning of the meeting took place at Skomaans, the question is now who was present during that planning?
MR BOOYENS: Oh, that meeting, okay.
MR TAIT: I cannot recall precisely who was present, Boesman Pretorius was present along with other members of C10 as well as the Commander of the Task Force in order to assist his people with the set up of the ambush regarding which he would have briefed them.
MS PATEL: Can you recall whether Mr Klopper was present during that planning meeting that you are now referring to?
MR TAIT: It is possible, but I would not express that as a fact.
MS PATEL: Okay. Sorry Honourable Chairperson, just grant me a moment. If I can just go to the actual incident now, you have testified that you were in the OPS room at the time when Mr Klopper called Mr De Kock. Can you give us a time frame on that please, was it the same evening or was it some days after or when?
MR TAIT: It was during the course of the evening, I cannot attach a specific time to that event.
MS PATEL: Okay. Can I just put to you, Mr Nortje in his statement on page 73 states that, at about line 10 from the top, Honourable Chairperson
"... Wouter took Lukas, John and one or two more whites, I cannot recall exactly who, he took them back to the scene."
MR TAIT: As I have already stated and will state once again, at no stage did I visit any scene.
MS PATEL: Okay. Did you receive a report after the entire incident had taken place, given that you were Mr Culino's handler, did he come back to you at some stage and report what had happened at the scene after Wouter and company had gone back there?
MR TAIT: I received no report from anybody afterwards, concerning what had taken place there.
MS PATEL: My next question is based on my ignorance of what would have happened so I would like you to see it in that light. Would it not have been standard procedure for Culino, given that you were his handler and that the operation was planned in conjunction with you, for him to report after the incident, to you? What would the position have been?
MR TAIT: As I have already stated in my affidavit, firstly when Lukas came to give us the information, he came to speak to Willie and he did not make any admissions to me. I don't know whether or not he made any admissions to Nortje about the matter, but he did not tell me anything.
MS PATEL: I - perhaps we are at cross purposes, I am asking whether Lukas Culino would not have, after the entire incident had taken place, after the reconstruction of the scene, etc, etc, whether he would not then at that stage have come and reported to you as to what had happened? I am not talking about the initial report when he came and said things went wrong and the smugglers had been shot.
MR TAIT: No, at no time thereafter, after the incident, did he return to me and make any report to me.
CHAIRPERSON: Changing the subject slightly, surely you as his handler, as the handler of the two of them, would have spoken to them and said "look, we have now changed the position, you must make no mention that you were involved in any shooting incident that night?" Isn't that one of the functions of a handler?
MR TAIT: Chairperson, it is a function but I did not discuss this with him.
MS PATEL: And you didn't discuss it with Simon either?
MR TAIT: No, I did not discuss this with Simon because at that stage I regarded the situation as having been taken care of.
MS PATEL: Okay, just as an aside, can you confirm whether Lukas Culino is in fact deceased? Do you have any idea?
MR TAIT: I have absolutely no knowledge of whether he passed away or not, whether he is still living or where he is at the moment, what his whereabouts are.
MS PATEL: Okay. If I can just take you to your political motivation on page 33 of the Bundle, Honourable Chairperson. Your first line of your political motivation you say
"... the arrest of arms smugglers who had entered the Republic of South Africa and provided weapons to the struggling political parties in the reigning violence."
Given that, Lukas Culino's legend at the time when he negotiated or when he made contact with the smugglers, was that he himself, would have in all probability have been a smuggler. In regard to this specific incident, what information do you have that it was in fact said to the smugglers that that weapons would find its way to a liberation movement in the country or to any of the parties who were involved in the political violence in the country?
MR TAIT: I cannot see that this case would have differed from any other case in which we had actions, because according to information, these weapons were provided not only to persons who could use them for political reasons, but also to common criminals. So I cannot see why the weapons would then follow a different route.
MS PATEL: Right, thank you sir, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS PATEL
MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, may I just say that I, relating to the reference to Mr Tait, John, in the context of that sentence which has been quoted by Ms Patel, that he, Wouter Mentz and him went to the scene, page 73, my instructions from Nortje is that he could be mistaken there about the reference to John, being John Tait.
MS PATEL: Honourable Chairperson, if I may just for clarity on the previous page, Mr Nortje refers to John Tait and then further down he says "Boesman and John", so is it not the same John, is there a possibility that there was another John on the scene or is what the legal representative is putting forward, that he is not sure whether John Tait was in fact present?
MR LAMEY: I could just get, but as far as I understand there was only one John among the group and that was John Tait and the reference to John on page 73, is a reference to John Tait.
MS PATEL: I am done, thank you Honourable Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: No re-examination, thank you Mr Chairman.
NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS
CHAIRPERSON: Any further witnesses?
CHAIRPERSON: Is anyone else intending to call witnesses in regard to this application?
MS PATEL: I can't find any, Honourable Chairperson.
MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, as you know, I represent also Mr Nortje. I am still considering the position in his instance, but for this purpose, could I suggest that we take the adjournment and perhaps - there are certain aspects about this and also provisions of the Act which also I need to clear out first before coming to that decision. Could I perhaps request that I be afforded also the opportunity to discuss this in chambers with members of the panel?
CHAIRPERSON: I don't think we should discuss matters of that nature without all interested parties being present.
MR LAMEY: No, all interested parties present, yes.
CHAIRPERSON: I propose to take the adjournment now in any event, until two o'clock, if he does not, I would be delighted to hear argument from you gentlemen.
MR BOOYENS IN ARGUMENT: Mr Chairman, it is my respectful submission that the applicant, Mr Tait, has complied with the requirements of the Act, to be granted amnesty. It would seem that in light of the evidence he has given, the offence of which he could theoretically be prosecuted, would be an attempt to defeat the ends of justice or something like that, the moment that they agree to change certain facts of something, at the moment they say unnatural death, there's got to be a judicial investigation as we know, whether it be by way of an inquest and the fact that they agreed to substitute somebody else there is a clear attempt, so I would submit the first requirement is there.
Now as far as the application complying with the second requirement, the application I submit, complies with the requirements of the Act. The only question that I think one has to consider here, is whether it was committed with a political objective.
Now, it is my respectful submission that he falls under Section 20(2)(b), he is an employee of the State and what they did is at that stage, they were still engaged in a struggle against the liberation movements. The point at which they decided to cover up the activities of the askaris, is the point where they took a political decision to protect the previous government against the type of propaganda that could be useful to members of the opposition of that government and more specifically the opposition parties, people like the ANC and the PAC who were involved in the struggle against the government.
CHAIRPERSON: Isn't it in this case different in that they were not, this wasn't really, it may have been part of the liberation struggle, but it was more aimed that at this stage there were already negotiations pending and the government might be gravely prejudiced in those negotiations, so it was part of the negotiating process, political objective there was to protect the government from embarrassment at the negotiations, not as we have in other cases, to prevent the blowing up of buildings or this or that?
MR BOOYENS: No, that was the purpose, but the purpose of course, it cuts two ways. Not only do you protect the government from that, but you do not give the opposition parties ammunition which they can use against the government, during the negotiations. It is for that reason that it is my respectful submission that this certainly does fall within the ambit of the Act and I would submit that it is clearly a case where Mr Tait qualifies in that regard, in so far as the question as to whether he made a full disclosure Mr Chairman, the Court has seen, the Commission has seen Mr Tait, I would respectfully submit that he is a soft spoken man, but he is certainly not being demonstrated to be untruthful about anything that happened there. I think he tried to answer the questions to the best of his ability and he was open about what happened there and the objective facts, in fact proved the correctness of his allegation.
The most important one being that he says that there was a proposal made by Nortje that they should substitute the members of the Task Force, that is made on the 21st. We know that people go out to the scene, by the 22nd, according to the document that I referred to in cross-examination, by the 22nd, the shooting report goes up and apparently it had been done. In the circumstances, my respectful submission is that it cannot be said even remotely that Tait has failed to make a full disclosure, and I would accordingly submit that he qualifies for amnesty in the circumstances. Unless there is something specific in this regard that the Committee would like to hear me on, those are my submissions.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, this is not really if we want to hear you on, I want to know if you agree with me, isn't one of the problems facing the Committee and our Leader of Evidence in this case, the fact that it is almost impossible having regard to the evidence and the papers before us, the affidavits and what have you, to come to any clear decision as to whose version is correct or not? Basic agreement yes, but there are so many odd conflicts between them that one is, can't as one can in other cases say well, he is contradicted on this point and that point by the other people and therefore we don't accept him because none of the other people - I am expressing only my own views here, not of the Committee as such - it seems none of the people involved in the present application, can say my evidence can be believed beyond all doubt? Your client has fairly conceded that he is receiving treatment and psychiatric treatment which might influence. The other applicant says he has been drinking all evening and that is the problem that we have. The other, Wouter Mentz, was apparently so drunk he didn't know what he was doing, so one can't attach the weight to the evidence of those statements that one otherwise do. The only fair way of doing it is to judge each person's evidence on its own?
MR BOOYENS: On its own merits, and I would submit respectfully that judged on its own merits, he certainly tried to make a disclosure to the best of his ability, that is why I deliberately didn't deal with the contradictions between him and the other people Mr Chairman. I mean we have only got to look at the witness statements that are attached, then a further story seems to be creeping out somewhere, but he certainly in this regard, we cannot say that on what he has told us, that he has been demonstrated to be false and for that reason, I would submit he has made a full disclosure.
As far as proportionality is concerned, Mr Chairman, I do not think what they did was disproportionate at the time, to the mischief that they tried to prevent, in fact the situation that we had, we were faced with a situation where the then government could be accused of employing mercenaries to some extent.
CHAIRPERSON: Not accused, be shown to be that way.
MR BOOYENS: Yes, exactly, it would have demonstrated them to be using mercenaries, that is the correct term. I agree entirely with you Mr Chairman, so in the circumstances my respectful submission is that he is entitled to amnesty.
CHAIRPERSON: All right, thank you.
MR LAMEY IN ARGUMENT: Thank you Mr Chairman. I will start off in my address on the full disclosure aspect. It is a requirement as we know, one of the criteria for granting amnesty. Mr Chairman, I would like to make a submission in that regard and that is that, the submission is that only where the evidence is of such a nature that the Committee could conclude that an applicant is making on purpose not a full disclosure, or he is purposely not telling the truth and that a negative inference in this regard, should be made.
If I can bring this to the evidence of Klopper, it is so that he was, he conceded possibilities but he had a lack of memory precisely as to the event that took place. I think the truth of this version and his intent to make a full disclosure lies therein that he was readily prepared also to concede that also he was a party to a discussion and a decision that there should be a cover up. It is also for that purpose that he asks amnesty for defeating the ends of justice in the manner that it has also been specified in Exhibit B and also in this regard, a conspiracy to do that.
CHAIRPERSON: Can I interrupt you at this stage, something that I should have put to Mr Booyens as well, is the offence attempting to defeat or did they defeat? They prevented a proper investigation of a killing, isn't that defeating the ends of justice?
MR BOOYENS: I think they did defeat, it is not just attempt.
MR LAMEY: Yes, Mr Chairman, in Annexure B, point 3 there Mr Klopper also asks indeed amnesty for defeating the ends of justice or attempt thereof. The difficulty which I would submit many applicants face before proceedings before the Amnesty Committee is that for various reasons, there is a problem with their memory. We have heard of such, for instance Tait, post-traumatic stress disorder, we don't have that evidence regarding Klopper, but he said a very important thing during re-examination and that is about that he has sort of blocked in his mind, the events of the past. That is after also his evidence in the De Kock trial.
Mr Chairman, my submission in this regard is that one can very much imagine a person in his position, to be that that be the case. One could think back that him being one of the first persons, if not the first person who made the disclosure to the Goldstone Commission about Vlakplaas activities and further on the subsequent trial where he was for three months' under cross-examination and though we don't have that record before us and one can imagine how much trauma a person in the position of Klopper has experienced in the past, relating to testimony and it is my submission that in also to appear before an Amnesty Committee in this regard and for what he has been through to again relate the events, is not an easy task.
On this aspect, it is my submission that if his evidence would appear to be vague, it is my submission in his position, he made an honest attempt to relate the events and it could not be said that he did not make a full disclosure.
CHAIRPERSON: What of his evidence that he had been drinking all evening?
MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, exactly, he was not hesitant to say that.
CHAIRPERSON: Nobody challenged that and I must say it surprises me that if so, he can recollect any detail of the evening concerned.
MR LAMEY: Yes, that is a further aspect, but what I want to say is the fact that he is so open about that, indicates also his intention to make a full disclosure of all the relevant facts.
Mr Chairman, as far as the political objective is concerned, my submission is that the evidence as it has unfolded also and as also supported by the evidence of Tait and as well as also the submissions by my learned friend, I agree with that, what has been stated by him in the Exhibit A which is the political objective, addendum to his application, is in line with the evidence before the Committee.
He has specifically referred also as far as the cover up is concerned, defeat the ends of justice, also about the embarrassment, that this could have been caused and the domino effect thereof further on, for the Security Forces and as such, the government. I want to make, I want to add that we also have evidence here that these arms smuggling also found their way to the political opponents of the government and they played a role still in that time frame, unrest related incidents.
As such it is my submission Mr Chairman, that he qualifies for amnesty bearing in mind the provisions of Section 20(2)(b), that he was a member of the Force who acted in the course and scope of his duties in an act aimed against well known political organisations and liberation movements at the time which was still at that stage, in that time frame, engaged in a political battle against the government and that these actions were bona fide in an attempt to counter this conflict.
I want to go also further and say that Section 20(2)(f) would also be applicable, relating to reasonable grounds that they at least also believed that that would be the position.
Mr Chairman, the application of Klopper goes also a bit further and it relates to being an accessory after the fact in relation to defeating the ends of justice relating to murder by Wouter Mentz. I know we don't have the evidence before the Committee that a murder took place, but as I in my submission view the purposes of the process, is that should it transpire later and it is hypothetical, that Mentz has committed in fact murder, then my submission is that Mr Klopper should also be granted amnesty for being an accessory, that he just declined as an Officer at that stage, from what has been related to him in terms of information, to do anything about it.
CHAIRPERSON: What political objective, he just didn't want to do anything. He left it to De Kock or somebody else. He didn't inform them of it, what political objective has he shown?
MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, he has stated and it is also in Exhibit A that he says that his omission to act against Mentz, would have had a domino effect that could also have caused a political embarrassment. One can also think that if he had to come forward and he was the person to take on his own, the step to relate to the authorities what had happened here, it is my submission that it would have had the same effect regarding Vlakplaas, killing people, wounded people and this in itself, during that time frame, would still as the case with the ex-Koevoet members, in my submission would have caused the same type of problem to the government.
He has also, his evidence also he reported, well, it was the shooting incident of the ex-Koevoet members but he also said and I understand that from his application, that he assumed that the Officer Commanding of Vlakplaas would act in his discretion at that stage. Now, it is my submission that there was also no problem as far as that was concerned.
Mentz himself was under the overall command of De Kock and that is my submission. I think what he has stated if one view it also in the general context and the general position that De Kock has also testified, that it would have been uncalled for for a person in his position, to take the initiative at that stage against Mentz, on his own.
CHAIRPERSON: Why uncalled for? He was the person who reported back to De Kock? Why not report back to De Kock?
MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, I think the crux of his evidence that he assumed that De Kock, we must remember that Holtzhauzen was also a member of Vlakplaas, and his evidence was that Holtzhauzen took further also the investigation about this. I think his position and his evidence is to the effect that he left it there and assumed that if there had to be done something about that, that De Kock would know of it and would do something about it.
Mr Chairman, if I remember correctly in the general submission which was made also by De Kock, it was - I am not correct, I don't know whether it was on record, but if I remember correctly, there is some evidence to the effect that if he would have been in that position, he would also have covered it up in general.
What I want to submit Mr Chairman, is that the inference could be drawn here that from the whole total concept and the way in which Vlakplaas operated, that Klopper did not need I think to, need not require a direct instruction from De Kock to say nothing further and to do nothing further about this aspect of Wouter Mentz. If one view it in the total context, I would submit that he had in so far as Section 2(b) is concerned, the implied authority not to take this further. That is my submission Mr Chairman.
MS PATEL IN ARGUMENT: Honourable Chairperson, I sit in the (indistinct) position of so many different versions to this incident, that I am afraid I am not sure which way to argue in the matter.
CHAIRPERSON: Isn't the trouble that the more one thinks about it, the more one can think of possible reasons and motives and they become more and more intertwined, that certainly I think I can speak for the whole Committee now, we have applied our minds to the evidence we have heard and what we have read and there seems to be a number of possibilities, but it is impossible on the information, the acceptable information before us to settle on any one of them. That is your position, isn't it that you can't invite us to believe any one version and say on that?
MR TAIT: Yes, absolutely Honourable Chairperson. One of the curious features of this case is the manner in which the smugglers were shot, if there was a shoot-out, what are the probabilities that they would all have been shot in the upper body and at close range as has been alleged by some of the members. I can take this matter no further, I will not make any further submissions, thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: I have had the benefit of looking briefly at the post mortem reports and they add more to the confusion, because there are injuries as I understand them to the leg, to the elbow, to the arm, it is not a case of careful execution style killing, there was obviously some random shooting at some stage which would appear to support the version of a shoot-out. And we have had no evidence and none appeared surprisingly, in the reports as to what damage was done to the various motor vehicles.
MS PATEL: And the problem further with the post mortem reports is one is not sure whether they were part of the cover up and exactly whether one can accept the contents of those reports given the way in which the cover up had taken place. What does one rely on in this case, I am not sure, Honourable Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, it appears quite clear, I make no finding against the credibility of the Doctor concerned, that somebody had told him when the deaths took place, because if you look at the post mortem it says this death occurred 16 hours before, this occurred 16 and a half hours before, this occurred 17 hours before and his post mortems were performed at half hourly intervals, so he was certainly working on the basis that this killing took place at a fixed time because I must say I have seldom seen a Doctor who so confidently fixed the time of death before. It does seem that, and again one doesn't know what pressure was brought to bear on the Doctor, that the post mortems were performed very quickly and were available to be included in the report made on the day after the shooting. The post mortems were over by half past one I think it was, or two o'clock and again, I want to make it clear, I am not blaming the Doctor for an apparently responsible Policeman comes before him and gives him information that appears to accord with what he is seeing. One can't blame him for accepting it. But again, you get no help there, do you? And there appears to be no evidence that Mr Mentz in fact shot anyone, apart from his own story of a drunken reaction to some joke where he thought the people were dead, but he pulled out a gun and shot. There is nothing there to substantiate a charge of murder, is there?
MS PATEL: Absolutely Honourable Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Accessory after the fact, falls away?
CHAIRPERSON: And do you agree that if they had committed any offence, it would be defeating the ends of justice?
MS PATEL: That is all, thank you Honourable Chair.
ADV SANDI: Sorry Ms Patel, sorry, do you accept that this incident occurred within the context of the conflicts of the past that we are looking into in terms of the Act? It seems to be clear to me?
MS PATEL: All right, there is a difficulty again with that. There are two legs as I understand it to that argument. The one was that they attempted to protect the government and the other one was that they didn't give opposition parties, the weapons didn't go to other parties who were involved in the conflict so as to fuel the political violence that had taken place. The question of protection to the government, I think there can be no argument or no dispute from my side in terms of that. In terms of ...
CHAIRPERSON: And isn't that enough?
MS PATEL: Certainly. Certainly, and so I didn't argue the second point which was in terms of handing over - there is no clear evidence that the final destination of that weapons in this specific incidents, would have indeed have been to any of the political parties who were involved in the struggle.
CHAIRPERSON: If you think back to those days, wouldn't any Policeman have believed that if automatic weapons were brought in ... (tape ends) ...
MS PATEL: You will get no argument from me in terms of that perception, Honourable Chairperson. Thank you.
MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, may I just ask something. If - listening to the argument of Ms Patel and we have so many different versions, that also takes into consideration just affidavits that have been placed before this Committee in the total totality of the Bundle, does ...
CHAIRPERSON: We consider information that is made available to us, this is not a trial.
MR LAMEY: But Mr Chairman, does that mean that because before the totality of the information before this Committee and the Committee is unable to make a definite finding as to the fact, that that automatically would place an obstacle in the road of the applicants for purposes of amnesty?
CHAIRPERSON: We cannot make an order if we don't find that there was such an offence. How can we grant amnesty when we are not satisfied that an offence was committed?
MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, it is just a hypothetical question, what if the - it is later proved that such an offence has been committed?
CHAIRPERSON: Well, then perhaps the applicant should have proved it.
MR LAMEY: But Mr Chairman, if such an applicant is not in the position to in fact prove it, but it later transpires ..
CHAIRPERSON: That is extremely unlucky for him, he can't come and say "well, I may have committed various offences, I don't know if I did or didn't, but give me amnesty." I don't even know if those offences were committed.
MR LAMEY: As it pleases you, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: I should have said it earlier, everybody is aware, aren't they, that we are not going to sit on Wednesday.