CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we want to proceed with the next matter which is the amnesty applications of Damien Michael De Lange, the amnesty reference number is AM7233/97. Ian Hugh Robertson, reference number AM5891/97 and Susan Catherine De Lange, amnesty reference AM7234/97.
The Panel is constituted as would be apparent from the record. I'm going to ask the legal representatives to put themselves on record for the applicants?
MR RADITAPOLE: Thank you Chairperson, I'm Mr Raditapole, ...(indistinct) Thompson and ...(indistinct) Attorneys, I appear on behalf of the second to fourth applicants.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Raditapole. Yes, Mr Koopedi?
MR KOOPEDI: Perhaps I should at this stage, Chairperson, my name is Brian Koopedi, I represent Mr Ronnie Kasrils who will only be able to give evidence tomorrow, Chairperson. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you Mr Koopedi. We have noted that. And then on behalf of one of the victims?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson, Honourable Panel, Coetzee, S.J., I appear on instructions of the firm Geiser and Coetzee Attorneys from Centurion. I appear on behalf of the victims and that is the Neethling family. Their father was the driver of the bus. He died shortly after the incident of a heart attack so he is deceased. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Coetzee. And then the Leader of Evidence is still Ms Mtanga.
Mr Raditapole, is there anything you want to put on record before we proceed with the evidence or do you want your first client to take the oath?
MR RADITAPOLE ADDRESSES: Thank you Chairperson, I do have a couple of preliminary points to make. The first point simply being to explain how we will run our evidence, that the second applicant will read a joint submission of all the applicants which will then be confirmed by the other applicants.
Having said that, then I'd just like to very quickly describe the nature of this application, Chairperson. It's an application in respect of acts for which the applicants were arrested and convicted and convicted in 1988 and the convictions were confirmed on appeal in 1989 and they subsequently were released on indemnity following the Pretoria Minute just concluded between the ANC and the then government around August 1990.
I do not propose to go into much detail around the issues because they are a matter of public record, save to describe the charges. The applicants were charged on various counts related to the bombing of a communications tower at Linksville Ridge in Johannesburg in November 1987 and a bombing of a bus carrying military personnel in Benoni on the 1st March 1989 -1988, I beg your pardon.
The accused were convicted after pleading guilty to various counts including counts under the Terrorism Act, unlawful possession of firearms and explosives, unlawful manufacture of explosives, malicious damage to property and attempted murder.
The second applicant also pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy and attempted attacks on Rosebank Police Station and ...(indistinct) Commando Headquarters.
So briefly, that's the background of the statement. So clearly, all we are doing in this application is really looking at their records being expunged of the convictions. Now I'd also like to say something about the background statement of Mr Hugh Lugg which is part of the bundle provided by the Commission, which is also unsigned. The statement has a range of inaccuracies which we do not propose to deal with for the purposes of this application, they are quite irrelevant. However, we wish to make the point that broadly the statement does explain the nature of the operations of the unit of which Mr Lugg was part of. It was subsequent to the arrest known of the Brooderstroom Unit.
We would also like to make the point that the statement, apart from describing the nature of the operations, certainly in a sense smacks of Security Police propaganda in relation to the political aspects that are raised in it, particularly from paragraph 1.13 on page 248 of the bundle through to paragraph 1.20 on page 259 of the bundle. And having said that, I'd then like to move to the evidence and to the affirmation of the second applicant who will read the joint submission. Thank you Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: The applications, are they basically in respect of the convictions of your clients?
MR RADITAPOLE: That is correct, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Are all of these charges that appear from the judgment of the court?
MR RADITAPOLE: That is correct, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Thank you, then we're with you. And you say that Mr de Lange will proceed?
MR RADITAPOLE: That is so, Chairperson and Mr de Lange will be affirmed.
DAMIEN MICHAEL DE LANGE: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY MR RADITAPOLE: Thank you Chairperson.
Mr de Lange, do you confirm that you made an application to the Amnesty Committee in relation to the offences and charges we've just referred to?
MR RADITAPOLE: Could you then take us through your joint statement after which I will pose a number of questions to you?
CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Lange, just before you do that, just for purposes of the record, the joint statement is before us and we will mark that Exhibit A. Yes, you may proceed?
MR DE LANGE: Chairperson, I'll read from the joint statement
"We have applied for amnesty and are appearing before this Committee today so that our criminal records against our names may be expunged. With all due respect, we must state up front that we are not apologetic for our role in the struggle for the liberations of South Africa and particularly with regard to the matters in respect of which we were charged and convicted. I deal with the relevant issues below
We were convicted on various charges related to acts being carried out in pursuance of the objectives of the African National Congress. In exile we joined the ranks of Umkhonto weSizwe, the military arm of the ANC, in order to participate more actively in the struggle for liberation of all South Africans. We were trained in various aspects of war and guerrilla warfare including intelligence and operations. We were under the command of Ronnie Kasrils who is the first applicant. He established us as a special unit that both collected information inside the country and carried out operations from 1987 until we were arrested. I was the Commander of the unit, Ian Robertson and Susan de Lange, then Westcott, were our Political Commissar and Communica-tions Officers respectively.
Other members of the unit were Hugh Lugg, who was the intelligence officer and Paul Annegan who served as our security officer. We were arrested in May 1988. We were charged and convicted on various counts related to attacks on communications tower at Linksville Ridge, Johannesburg and on a military bus carrying army - it was actually airforce personnel in Benoni. We carried out the attacks in late November 1987 and on the 1st March 1988 respectively. By the time of the second attack, Paul Annegan was no longer part of the unit. He was not with us when we were arrested either. The arrest took place 8th May 1988 after our then intelligence officer, Hugh Lugg, had sold us out to the Security Police on the morning of that day.
During our operations we conducted ourselves as soldiers fighting a just war for the liberation of our people. At all times we considered ourselves to be governed by the Geneva Convention on warfare and its various protocols. We believe that we should have been treated as prisoners-of-war under the same protocols, not as we were, like criminals. In this regard, comments made by the judicial officers in our trial and appeal reflect the extent to which the judicial system was part of the attempt to stem the tide of the struggle for the liberation of our people. The trial magistrate stated that and I quote:
'The accused aligned themselves against the law and order in this country to espouse the course of an organisation committed to overthrow the lawful government of the Republic of South Africa by revolution and acts of terrorism. They chose to call it 'acts of war'. If Black South Africans were in their position, their acts would be understood, although not excused. Van der Walt, J, in the Spar case regarded the fact that a White South African has espoused the cause of revolution as an aggravating feature."
In our appeal, Judge Curlewis, and Acting Judge Myburgh, had the following to say in relation to sentence imposed by the court. Again I quote:
'This much can be said of the sentence. It appears shocking in the light of the fact that those persons who sent the accused into the country to carry out these acts of murder and destruction are now by the present treated to tea and sympathy and made much of. But the learned Magistrate could not and this Court cannot take into account in assessing sentence any more than it can take into account the likelihood that these young people will be out before Christmas in defence to the request of the ANC.'
Negotiations between the ANC and the then government led to the signing of the Pretoria Minute in August 1990 in terms of which we were justifiably released from incarceration. In conclusion, we reiterate that we were soldiers, we should have been accorded prisoner-of-war status once we had been apprehended."
MR RADITAPOLE: Thank you, Mr de Lange. Could you just explain to the Panel what your intentions were when you firstly attacked the communications tower and secondly, when you attacked the military bus?
MR DE LANGE: Chair, without going into much detail, the communications tower was part of a project internally in the country to perfect the use of home made explosives. We had gradually gone through a number of smaller operations to a reasonable size, in military terms a reasonable size. The communications tower by our assessment was a tower used for line of sights communication by, amongst others, the Security Polices in and around Johannesburg. We saw it fit that this was a reasonable target in terms of war and a target which could be used to test the home made explosives.
The second explosion where we detonated again a home made explosive, supercharged with a limpet mine, was an airforce bus which bussed airforce personnel from Dunnotar near Johannesburg to the Pretoria Waterkloof area. If you will remember, Sir, the late '87 and early '88, the airforce received a lot of coverage for its role in the battle for Qita Kanavale in Angola. This and the fact that our targets were military targets, we deemed that the bus was a suitable and natural target in a war.
MR RADITAPOLE: In your view, in carrying out these operations, did you act within the ambit of the instructions given by Mr Kasrils?
MR DE LANGE: Chair, I would believe and I can say this jointly that we acted firstly within the ambit of the instructions that were given by Ronnie Kasrils, within the ambit of the instructions given by MK's military High Command and in no way did we see that these instructions were in breach of either the MK code or the Geneva Protocol, Sir.
MR RADITAPOLE: And what was your intention when you detonated the bomb in respect of the military bus?
MR DE LANGE: Chair, our intention was to destroy the bus and the personnel in the bus, Sir.
MR RADITAPOLE: Thank you Mr de Lange. Chairperson, I have no further questions for the second applicant.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR RADITAPOLE
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Raditapole. Mr Coetzee, any questions?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson, Honourable Panel, I do have questions.
Sir, the reason why you're making this application, if I understand your evidence correctly, it is purely just to expunge your criminal record, your SAP-69 record, is that correct?
MR COETZEE: And you've got no other intention by bringing this application?
MR DE LANGE: I have no other intention.
MR COETZEE: Now as I understood from the statement from Mr Lugg which is attached to your application, that your cell was established for the purpose to collect information, is that correct? Was that one of your functions, to collect information?
MR DE LANGE: It was one of our main functions, that is correct.
MR COETZEE: You were, however, also an operational cell, you had to in other words not only get information, you also had to act on instructions to, for example, place these bombs?
MR DE LANGE: That is correct, Sir.
MR COETZEE: Now did you, from your information gathering actions, did you initiate or suggest that this bus, the Benoni bus, should be a target?
MR DE LANGE: Yes that is correct.
MR COETZEE: Now did you find out what type of personnel it was carrying apart from the fact that they were airforce personnel? What were there, in other words, were their functions? Was it pilots, was it administrative people? What was the employment scope of the people inside the bus?
MR DE LANGE: Sir, obviously we would not have had all the information on every detail of every person on the bus. The bus was an airforce bus. The bulk of the personnel were airforce uniformed people, wore their uniforms on the bus. Some of them were civilians. They all lived in and around Dunnotar in Devon. They worked in airforce establishments. Administrative roles, logistical roles and other support roles.
MR COETZEE: Yes, now you said that you acted in the ambit of your instructions and not in a violation of the Geneva Protocol. Now if I - does the Panel hereby understand, or have to understand, that you mean that placing bombs next to the road and exploding them in a civilian area causing damage and loss of life to people, that that is part of the Geneva Convention, that falls under the scope of the Geneva Convention?
MR DE LANGE: It does indeed, Sir. As long as you do not use more force than it is required. The bomb that was placed there was aimed at a bus. It had the ability, had the timing been correct, to destroy the bus and probably all the people. It did not have sufficient power to destroy for instance the robot junction that it was next to or other vehicles, so it was not force disproportionate to the target.
MR COETZEE: And was that the reason why there were bolts and nuts also placed in, to exacerbate the situation?
MR DE LANGE: Correct, that was to use or so to serve a shrapnel.
MR COETZEE: Yes, now if I understand from the documentation correctly and I must confess I do not know the area where this happened, it seemed to me as if there were buildings or houses as well as office buildings which were in the immediate vicinity where the bomb exploded. Am I correct?
MR DE LANGE: You are correct and as you have admitted so, you do not know the area, it is a big robot junction, there are wide verges between the place where the bomb was placed and the nearest vibacrete wall which backs onto civilian houses. On the other side of the junction and at a two lane with freeway junctions into it, was a Wimpy and a petrol station. The Wimpy was not functioning at that hour of the day. Due to our reconnaissance we also knew that there was not a lot of traffic in that area in and around that junction at the time. So I believe that we took all into consideration in terms of possible crossfire, possible innocent victims and that is what I mean by working within the protocols of the Geneva Convention.
MR COETZEE: Now, if I understand also from the sentence and I'm referring to page 51 and 52 of the documentation and it makes reference to some houses that were damaged by the blast. It refers to twenty two houses and four businesses that were damaged by the blast and I'm referring to page 52, the third line from the top. Was that a correct assessment by the Magistrate in his sentence?
MR DE LANGE: It is correct and you must also remember and I'm sure you are aware, Sir, that damage, whether it was a broken pane, whether it was a whole ceiling falling in, was registered by the Security Police and I'm sure that you are aware that the Security Police made every attempt as the document, but like to make sure that it was not a target of war ...(intervention)
MR COETZEE: A military target.
MR DE LANGE: ...but that this was largely aimed at civilians.
MR COETZEE: But do you - let's just deal with whether or not it was a window pane that was broken or a ceiling panel that fell out. In fact some residences where people stayed were damaged?
MR DE LANGE: I would accept that as very possible, you're right.
MR COETZEE: And did you, at the time when you said that the bomb there and the charges there, did you anticipate the possibility that innocent civilians might be injured or die or could have died?
MR DE LANGE: In war you have to anticipate that there are going to be possible innocent people involved. Your task is to make sure that within your capabilities and within the capabilities of the weapons that you use, it is reduced to a minimum. You cannot say that you can rule it out forever.
MR COETZEE: Alright, you say generally that is the situation. Did you in fact in this, when you planted this specific bomb, did you have a look at the area to see there are houses, this is what you should perhaps do to minimise the effect on the civilian population?
MR DE LANGE: Yes, correct and as I've indicated we used the time of the bus, limited traffic, we used distance. The fact that some windows were going to break, it could have happened that someone else drove past at the wrong time. The fact that we used line of sight equipment, that we could actually observe the bus.
MR COETZEE: But what I'm actually more referring to, the fact of the matter is, I understand what you say with regard to traffic due to the hour, but that could have meant that there's people that's not on the road were in their houses and that that hour also there might have been children, school children, babies, people, even any people could have still been in the houses? They most likely were still in the houses at the time when the bomb went off?
MR DE LANGE: Sir, you are right, they probably would have been in the house and that was our assessment that they would be. If you go to the scene as it was then in 1988, there were vibacrete walls right along the backs of all of those houses. It was unlikely that shrapnel would go through the vibacrete walls, but the fact that the sound of the detonation would break windows or dislodge a ceiling or break a lamp or set off an alarm is one of those things that you have to take into consideration.
MR COETZEE: Apart from the fact that the passengers in the bus were airforce personnel, were there any specific target, in other words, as I understand your evidence correctly, you said that at that stage the airforce was quite visibly involved in counter-insurgence as it was being referred to. Were there any specific targets in that bus apart from the fact that they were airforce targets, in other words a pilot for example that as far as your knowledge was involved with any of these counter-insurgence actions?
MR DE LANGE: No Sir, war is never personalised to that level. A target is a target because they are on the opposing side and in a military institution, it doesn't matter whether you pilot is killed or whether one of your log staff is killed, it means that the enemy has struck you.
MR COETZEE: Now Sir, the instructions that you received from Mr Kasrils at that stage, did you present him with a formal plan to say that we have now in our intelligence found out this bus will be travelling on this route and you set down to him that we intend or we suggest that we use this kind of force to the bus, to destroy the bus. Did you make such a presentation to Mr Kasrils?
MR DE LANGE: No, Sir, you don't - we would never do that kind of plan. More especially in a guerrilla war situation or especially if you're working in cell systems where you are using cells to protect people's security activities. There is a lot of ambit given to the Commander to select and to make those kind of decisions on the ground. The go-ahead for operations to strike, operations against the armed forces of the then South African Government, provided the overall ambit. The area is then restricted as PWV.
MR COETZEE: What I'm actually getting at is, would Mr Kasrils have been aware of the fact that you were going to set off this bomb before you actually did it or did you just afterwards inform him that that operation there was from "our cell"?
MR DE LANGE: Sir, it's getting down to a technical detail. In essence he knew we were going to carry out operations and in this case he knew that we were progressing along a line of experimenting with home made explosives. The explosions were going to be bigger and bigger. We were going to inform him, he would hear either through the radio informally and then from use formally through a report as to which target we again selected. He did not know a bus on the 8th March on such and such a place on such and such a road.
MR COETZEE: And I understand from also Mr Lugg's statement that there was apparently some unhappiness for the fact that there was no body count, the words he used, that there was nobody dead. Was that a concern for you that you consider your operation there as being a failure because there was nobody killed in this incident?
MR DE LANGE: No, the body count was not necessary and was not an indicator of a success or not a success. That was the aim, but the aim behind it was to strike at airforce SADF personnel, which was achieved. I don't know whether it's relevant to our application, but as our counsellor said, the document, unsigned document by Hugh Lugg, which did not form part of the evidence in court during our trial, has a lot of inconsistencies and to me, personally, it smacks very highly of Security Police plan and then I would put this embellishment of need for a body count within that kind of bracket and not take it very seriously.
MR COETZEE: Why I'm referring to that, Sir, is if you have a look at page 223 of the said statement you're referring to now, it states here that
"De Lange was concerned that there was no, what he called, a body count"
that's why I asked that question because it appears from this that you actually wanted a body count?
MR DE LANGE: Sir, look, we can go into this document and I've said that and we go into it and we can take it apart piece by piece. In essence, if we have to, then we have to deal with it. I don't know if it's relevant to this, De Lange - this is Hugh Lugg, he hasn't signed it, it didn't form part of the evidence of the court, I was not unhappy that we had not killed all the people and tore my hair out.
MR RADITAPOLE: Chairperson, if I may? I did make the point earlier the difficulties of this statement in relation in particular to these aspects and that we would confirm the contents of it insofar as they relate to operational issues but these other areas are really areas that we don't prefer to go into. You know, if the Panel believes if these are relevant to the application at all?
CHAIRPERSON: Well, we'll assess the questions as we go along. I think Mr de Lange has stated the attitude of the applicants towards this document and we'll see to what extent Mr Coetzee wants to make something out of this. So for the moment, Mr Coetzee, if there's anything else you want to deal with on this document, let's hear?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, yes, I'm definitely not going to take Mr de Lange step by step through the statement to see where he concurs or not concurs. There was just some of the aspects which I needed to clarify and I believe that we're quite entitled to do that.
Sir, the one other aspect that I also wish to enquire from you, Sir, is the financing of your cell, was that based on a performance bonus or anything like that whereby if you performed and you set off a certain amount of bombs you would be remunerated to a certain extent?
MR DE LANGE: Sir, I find it an odd question but I will answer it. Number one, as members of MK, we were paid no salary at all, for all the activities, for all the work. Wherever you were sent you expected that at least you would get some food and some clothes, some ammunition and water. That was your expectation. There was no salary, there was no remuneration. I served in Angola, I served in worse conditions. There was no bonus, there was no red line pay, there was no R and R, there was not going home for seven days leave. It was a guerrilla warfare for a very specific cause. When you came into the country you knew you could die, you could be arrested. No one said at the end of it you will get X, or for a body or bring back ears, it was not a SADF.
MR COETZEE: Yes, thank you. Then one other aspect. I see that on the statement here, this is a joint statement of the second to third applicant - that should read second to fourth applicant, if I'm not mistaken?
MR COETZEE: Is that right? So that is also for the fourth applicant. Then the one aspect that I noted is that in page 43 of the documentation before the Commission, I see that the third applicant did not plead guilty, she pleaded not guilty to this aspect. Was that just because of the fact that she was not linked to that at that stage or do you not know the reason?
MR DE LANGE: I don't understand what you're saying. But Susan - the fourth applicant here, or Susan Catherine de Lange as it is listed here was charged under the same charges as us, found guilty under the same charges as us. I don't see where, we all pleaded guilty to the same charges. The only difference was that I, myself, had three accounts of arson.
MR COETZEE: The only reason I'm asking, I just wanted to clarify this because I see from the charge sheet there that she was accused number three and I see from page 43 there that accused was - she pleaded not guilty and was acquitted on the count. You see, I'm not tricking or I'm trying to make any - score points here, I just want to know is it because she was not perhaps actively involved there at the day in the planting of the bomb, that it was more a conspiracy situation that was involved there rather than a physical planting of a bomb?
MR RADITAPOLE: Perhaps if I could assist? There is some confusion here but in fact what transpired was that there were a whole range of charges and in discussions between the prosecution and the defence it was then agreed which charges the accused would plead guilty to and which charges they would plead not guilty to and I believe there might have been some confusion as things panned out which led to the comment being made in the judgment that accused number three pleaded not guilty in relation to this. That's the best I can say. Particularly because the fourth applicant does state that she did not plead guilty in relation to that charge to the attack on the bus. I can't take it any further than that.
CHAIRPERSON: Is it common cause that Susan de Lange was acquitted on that count which seems to be count 20, if I understand this correctly? Because you see on page 40 of the bundle, when the Court is giving its judgment and the finding is made in respect of which charges there would be in an acquittal and in respect of which charges there would be a conviction, Mr Sogget, who seems to have appeared at the trial then intervenes and he reminds the Court that - that's about line 13 - and he says that in respect of accused number three, which would have been then Ms de Lange, count 20 should be added, that is in respect of matters acquitted.
Yes, do you need some time to clarify that?
MR RADITAPOLE: Well Chairperson, as I stated, some deals were done in relation to these charges and some there was agreement to drop some and so on and it may well be that Mr Sogget, on the basis that Mrs de Lange was not present when the bus was attacked, may well have managed to get that dropped but as far as Mrs de Lange is concerned, you know, she didn't particularly plead not guilty to the attack on the bus. I can't take it any further than that.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes and perhaps you should just, perhaps you should just clarify because I'm about to take the luncheon adjournment, just to clarify whether or not she is asking for amnesty in respect of that count here or not and you can indicate to us at a later stage.
MR RADITAPOLE: I will do so, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: We'll take the luncheon adjournment and we'll reconvene at 2 o'clock.
MR RADITAPOLE: Chairperson, you had given me an assignment over lunch.
CHAIRPERSON: Oh okay, ...(inaudible)
MR RADITAPOLE: Yes. It would appear what transpired in the trial was that Mrs de Lange indeed pleaded guilty to count 20 but as matters proceeded, counsel saw a gap and jumped up and said no, but she wasn't there, she can't be found guilty on this one and that's how it happened and in fact that was contrary to instructions. My instructions are that Mrs de Lange was quite upset about that because in principle she had aligned herself to the other accused. So that's what transpired in that instance.
CHAIRPERSON: And you don't want to take that gap here? You don't see the gap? You're accepting responsibility?
MR COETZEE: (continues) Thank you Chairperson.
Mr de Lange, apart from these acts that you were charged with and found guilty of, were there any other acts of violence that you were involved with or any other acts that could have, in some way, be construed as being a crime and during that stage, that 1988, '87/'88, in which you and your cell were involved in the Republic of South Africa?
DAMIEN MICHAEL DE LANGE: (s.u.o.) The question would seem unusual because it would seem like I'm going to throw myself into something ...(intervention)
MR RADITAPOLE: Chairperson, can I perhaps just come in here? Again I'm not sure what the relevance of that, we are applying for amnesty in relation to two stated issues and I'm not sure about the relevance of the question as far as these applications are concerned.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Coetzee, is it in respect of the matters that are before us or is this just an open question because if it is an open question?
MR COETZEE: Yes Mr Chairperson, if I may just explain?
MR COETZEE: Maybe I did not explain myself quite clearly during the question. One of the aspects of obviously considering amnesty, you will bear in mind whether there was full disclosure.
MR COETZEE: I know that there's been certain various different interpretations as to what exactly is full disclosure, whether it is limited to the acts currently before yourselves or whether it refers to all the other possible acts which might have been committed?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes of course the provision is that the applicant should disclose all relevant facts.
MR COETZEE: All relevant facts?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, of course relevant what is before us.
MR COETZEE: Yes, if that is so, is such an interpretation, I have just been in front of other commissions where they took a more broader stance on other acts which are not necessarily within the confines of the application. But I will leave that there, I'm not going to press the point. I just wanted to point out whether perhaps there are other applications which are still pending.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, no I think if it is the broad question that you intended to ask then of course it won't be relevant what is before us and insofar as we are concerned, what is required of us is to make sure that the material that was placed before us constitutes a full disclosure of what is relevant to the incidents that we have to decide upon.
MR COETZEE: Yes. I will leave that then there, thank you.
Mr de Lange, there is the last aspect which I wish to deal with is that the whole commission was convened on more than one leg. The one is the application for amnesty and the other one is the - as it is very clearly stated there on that banner there, it is also the Truth to the Road of Reconciliation. Now do you - and this is a general question, firstly, it might not be all pertinent, but have you found it in yourself to reconcile also with your previous enemies?
MR DE LANGE: Firstly I would like to say it is probably a bit broader than maybe even outside of the specific application, but as you know, as you probably would know, the progress of South Africa's history brought a democracy. Within that democracy was the integration of the desperate and opposing armed forces. I find myself now as a ranked officer in the South African National Defence Force where there are some of the officers who were on that bus in other installations. There is no direct animosity between us, in fact we are building a national defence force for the common cause of defence of democracy and its constitution. So if that is the reconciliation you are looking for, I think definitely I have, on that road.
MR COETZEE: Thank you. Thank you, Mr Commissioner, I've got no further questions to the applicant.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR COETZEE
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Coetzee. Mr Koopedi, would you have anything that you want to raise?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR KOOPEDI: Perhaps a few questions, Chairperson.
Mr de Lange, is it correct that as a cell Commander or a unit Commander your instructions, that is when you were inside the country, included the taking of initiatives on your part, you know, in terms of looking and deciding at a target and similar things? My question, is it correct, do I understand correctly that you would have to take initiatives and not necessarily have to go and ask for permission from your overall Commander, Mr Ronnie Kasrils, about each and every aspect of your operations?
MR DE LANGE: A hundred percent correct, Sir. Whether that was collecting the information, the area of collecting the information, the specific target, actually carrying out operations as long as it fell within the ambit of what MK saw as military operations and we were limited to the PWV, then I would not ask for specific guidance or instructions or a go ahead, it would be left to our initiative, my initiative at the end of the day to take a decision.
MR KOOPEDI: Thank you. You have stated that as an MK member, a soldier of Umkhonto weSizwe, you were not paid and therefore then perhaps my question should be did you receive anything personally, anything personally which would be of material gain?
MR DE LANGE: No, not at all, Sir.
MR KOOPEDI: Your actions, do you view them as having been politically motivated and if so, briefly tell this Committee how politically motivated were they?
MR DE LANGE: Sir, I would say they were politically motivated, they were in the general sphere of anti-apartheid, they were in the specific sphere of the ANC's direction as how to liberate South Africa for all South Africans of all races, of all colours and more specifically as MK, obviously by definition it is defined more specifically to military operations but under the guidance of the ANC's strategy, positions, goals, whether it was Freedom Charter as a document or whether it was at standpoint on particular issues and definitely political guidance was of utmost importance, Sir.
MR KOOPEDI: Regard being had to the testimony you've just given, your amnesty application form and the joint statement, do you think that you have fully disclosed all the relevant facts before this Honourable Committee for it to consider granting you amnesty?
MR DE LANGE: I believe yes, Sir, we have done so.
MR KOOPEDI: Thank you Chairperson, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR KOOPEDI
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Koopedi. Ms Mtanga, have you got any questions?
MS MTANGA: Thank you Chairperson, I have no questions for this witness.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you ma'am. Has the Panel got any questions?
ADV SANDI: One question on a very peripheral matter. What is your rank at this stage Mr de Lange? Did I hear you say you are in the army?
MR DE LANGE: Sir, I'm a Brigadier General.
ADV SANDI: Thank you Brigadier.
CHAIRPERSON: How is that called, what is the - is it Brigadier or General?
MR DE LANGE: Sir, this time it is now General we have changed more to the American style and it's regarded as a General.
CHAIRPERSON: So you're addressed as General?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Have you got any re-examination?
MR RADITAPOLE: I have none, Chairperson, thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you General de Lange. You would be excused then.