CHAIRPERSON: Good morning everybody. Today is the 15th of August 2000, we are continuing with the applications which commenced yesterday. I should apologise that we didn't keep to the time promised, that is nine thirty. We shall complete today even though we would infringe on some of those ...(indistinct), just to make sure that the applicants at least get their fair slice. I would not pronounce those rights at the moment, when the time comes I shall. I apologise on behalf of the Panel, and to the applicants more specifically, and the victims. Thank you.
Mr Visser, I suppose you are ready.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, no, I finished yesterday with Brig Schoon and I informed the Panel that I have no further evidence to lead. I believe it's my learned friend, Mr Hugo, and Mr de Kock that has the floor this morning.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Visser. Mr Hugo, are you ready?
MR HUGO: Yes, thank you, Mr Chairman.
EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (sworn states)
ADV BOSMAN: The applicant's properly sworn, Mr Chair.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Advocate Bosman. Mr Hugo.
EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
Mr de Kock, you are the applicant in this matter which is known as the Abduction of Jabulani Sydney Msibi and the application appears in bundle 1, from page 29 to 38, is that correct?
MR HUGO: And then you have also submitted a supplementary affidavit which has been served before the Amnesty Committee upon various occasions, where you dealt with the general background, political motivation and so forth and you request that this also be incorporated as part of your current application.
MR HUGO: Similarly you have also filed a further affidavit which has also been served before this Committee and other Amnesty Committees, which dealt with Vlakplaas, its objectives, the background and any other elaboration regarding Vlakplaas, and you also request that this be incorporated as part of your application.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HUGO: Just for the sake of completion. In the bundle which has been served before this Committee, on page 12 there is a submission which was made by General Johan van der Merwe regarding the role of the SAP in the conflict of the past and you also request that his summary and his version be regarded as part of your application and your submission.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HUGO: Then to return to your application. In your application you did not affix a specific date to this incident, but you would concede that the incident took place in July 1986.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HUGO: What was your rank during the commission of the deed or the act?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think that I had already completed my Major's course but I had not been appointed yet, I was still a Captain, but I had not been appointed as a Major yet.
MR HUGO: And you were the Commander of C1 or Vlakplaas, as it was known.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HUGO: Just to get to the incident itself, how did you come to hear for the first time of a person by the name of Malaza?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I heard of Malaza for the first time on a Friday afternoon when I was requested by Gen Stadler to go to Daisy, which was the name of a smallholding and I was supposed to meet him there. I met Gen Stadler and two other members of the Intelligence Services there. I cannot recall their names anymore, so I'm not certain of exactly who they were. There was also a black man who was introduced to me as W/O Malaza from the Nelspruit Security Branch.
MR HUGO: And would you tell us what took place then, when you arrived there?
MR DE KOCK: Gen Stadler confronted Mr Malaza with the accusation that he was working for the ANC, he gave him certain facts. I do recall that he showed certain documents and he asked Mr Malaza to give his cooperation, which he did. He realised with the flow of information that existed, that it would not be of any use to resist, and Mr Malaza admitted that he was indeed working for the ANC and that his handler was a man by the name of Msibi. At that point, Mr Malaza had not yet admitted that he had recruited members of the SAP.
MR HUGO: And the interrogation which took place there, was any violence applied during this?
MR DE KOCK: No, not at all. I can only state that Gen Stadler, as he had to do with the Gerhard matter, was not the sort of person who believed in violence, he believed in the soft approach, so to speak.
MR HUGO: And during this discussion, Mr Malaza then admitted that his handler was one, Msibi?
MR HUGO: Was this the first time upon which you came to hear of Msibi?
MR HUGO: And what took place subsequently, after you departed from Daisy?
MR DE KOCK: If I recall correctly, Malaza was then persuaded or convinced that he could restore his honour and that he could save himself from charges of treason if he were to assist us in apprehending Msibi and if we could then cease the situation of the infiltration of the Security Branch and restore order.
MR HUGO: Very well. And after you yourself departed from there, did you have any liaison with Brig Schoon?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall that Brig Schoon was at Daisy, I think that I went to Head Office from there, I think Mr van Dyk was still with me, and I spoke to him ...(intervention)
MR HUGO: When you refer to "him", who do you refer to?
MR DE KOCK: With Brig Schoon himself, because he as my Commander, I would have had to receive further instructions from him.
The nature of the discussion and the time of the discussion I can no longer recall, but I had to compile a group rather swiftly. I'm referring to 12 o'clock or 1 o'clock on a Friday afternoon. I had to get the people together and send them over to Swaziland, because we also drove to Swaziland, Brig Stadler and his people would also be travelling to Swaziland that Friday afternoon.
MR HUGO: I think that we might be running ahead too quickly, certainly there must have been planning at some or other point here in Pretoria, you must have received an instruction regarding what exactly you were supposed to go and do. Can you recall this?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, very briefly it was said that we had to try to get Msibi out of Swaziland, in other words, we had to cut off that channel of leakage of information.
MR HUGO: At any stage during the initial planning phase in Pretoria at the Head Office, was any consideration given to the elimination or the killing of Mr Msibi?
MR HUGO: And the motivation for the removal, and when I say removal I do not mean killing, but the bringing back out of Swaziland of Mr Msibi, what was the motivation for it, why would it be necessary?
MR DE KOCK: He was an MK member and he was the Head of Military Intelligence at that stage, in Swaziland. If I recall correctly, his specific task was exactly to handle these recruited policemen who were part of the Security Force, that was his specific task, and it was necessary for us to neutralise him as an ANC and MK member.
MR HUGO: And this information regarding Mr Msibi's activities, where did you obtain this information from?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Mr Msibi was a member of the ANC and of MK, which was waging an armed struggle against the RSA.
MR HUGO: But is this information that you received from your seniors, such as Brig Stadler and Brig Schoon, did they give this information to you or did it come from Malaza?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it emanated from the discussion between Malaza and Stadler if I recall correctly, because I sat in on that discussion.
MR HUGO: And then an order was given to you to compile a group.
MR HUGO: And what took place then?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that very same afternoon the group and I travelled to the Oshoek border post and we rendezvoused at the clubhouse of the border post and there members arrived from the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch ...(intervention)
MR HUGO: I beg your pardon, may I interpose just for the sake of completion, the members of Vlakplaas who accompanied you, can you recall their names?
MR DE KOCK: I can recall Mr Nortje and Mr McCarter, Mr van Dyk and then I do have a recollection that Mr Brits was there, Mr Snyders was there and Mr Coetser. I cannot recall, I think there were other members, but I cannot recall all of their names.
MR HUGO: Can you recall whether Mr Vermeulen was there?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I can place Mr Vermeulen there.
MR HUGO: Whatever the case may be, you arrived at Oshoek and then a further group from the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch arrived there, who were these persons?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was Mr Greyling, Mr Visser or Major Visser, who was the Head of Nelspruit, W/O Greyling and Malaza. And then Brig Visser also arrived and so too, Brig Stadler and Col Schoon.
MR HUGO: And then, after all of you rendezvoused at the clubhouse, what else took place?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we interrogated Malaza, specifically. I interrogated Malaza as well, in order to determine how he usually established contact with Msibi, how he would enter Swaziland, which vehicle he would use, so that we could follow the same process that he would have followed previously, to establish contact with Mr Msibi and to obtain information from him in order to apprehend Mr Msibi.
MR HUGO: And based upon this information that Malaza gave you, you planned how you would launch the operation.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct. I cannot recall all the details, but it was arranged that Mr Malaza would establish contact with Mr Msibi. I'm not certain from which point he telephoned.
That evening we entered Swaziland, and when I say "we", I mean that it is not only Malaza but it would be Malaza and some of my members, and at approximately 9 o'clock or nine thirty some of my members came to report to me that Mr Malaza had had an accident with his vehicle near the T-junction on the Mbabane detour road and that he had practically written the car off. We had to cancel the operation at that point.
Mr Malaza made arrangements for the following morning, also telephonically, to meet Mr Msibi. It was in an area where there were light industries in Swaziland. It was in Mbabane.
MR HUGO: And after these arrangements were made what else happened?
MR DE KOCK: We were back at the border, I arranged with the vehicle branch of Oshoek that they would retrieve the vehicle that Malaza had written off in Swaziland, the following day. After we made those arrangements, we began to arrange for observation points in Swaziland, near this light industrial area, the vehicle which would be used and the members would take Msibi from his vehicle and put him in the Land Cruiser which would be driving behind Mr Msibi's vehicle, so that he could not go into reverse and try to escape that way.
We co-opted Malaza to seize Mr Msibi as soon as they had pulled him off the road. That gave us more time to get to Msibi, because we believed that he may be armed due to his task and then I myself and another person, I imagine that it was Mr Greyling, but I'm not very certain, had a patrolling vehicle and we had two Uzzis with silencers and if anybody else tried to interfere or intervene, we would be able to stop them, but then it would go over into armed conflict or violence.
MR HUGO: Perhaps I should have asked you earlier, but the crossing of the border, was this at a legal point of crossing, where you reported at the customs control point, or did you cross the border illegally?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we went through a legal border post but the documentation was falsified.
MR HUGO: Very well. And after you had made these preparatory arrangements, did Mr Malaza establish contact with Mr Msibi?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he did. That morning he confirmed the meeting for approximately between nine thirty and 10 o'clock. Mr Malaza confirmed with Mr Msibi that he would meet him near the light industrial area. I and another member of my unit also drove into that area. We parked within sight, but not in a suspicious place and we could observe the meeting between Mr Msibi and Mr Malaza. Mr Malaza then climbed into Mr Msibi's vehicle which was an Alpha vehicle and once they departed, we followed them and informed the seizure people by means of radio, that they were on their way.
MR HUGO: And did the seizure action take place?
MR DE KOCK: Yes. I did not observe it myself because we were approaching and we were the cut-off vehicle if for example, there would be any interference from anybody else. However, when we pulled in at the Land Cruiser, Mr Msibi was already in the back of the Land Cruiser and he was already bound. I think that there was also a balaclava which had been pulled over his head, and we immediately drove the seizure vehicle out of there, as well as the backup vehicle.
There was screaming from people on the left-hand side, or from the western side, who were washing clothes on the banks of the river, who observed the incident. And while the seizure vehicle departed and the backup vehicle departed, I and the person who was with me - I think I still drove Msibi's vehicle. On the way to Oshoek we pulled off the road, where there was a reasonable sheer cliff some distance away from the road and I quickly searched the vehicle to see if there was any documentation or weapons inside.
I searched under the seats and in the cubbyhole I found the handbook for the vehicle and in the boot I also searched and then we pushed the vehicle over the cliff.
MR HUGO: And did you move back over the border to South Africa after that?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct. On the South African side I first controlled the registration number of the vehicle that we had taken with the computer for stolen vehicles and it had been a stolen vehicle which had been stolen in Transvaal, which was used by Msibi.
I then moved over to the clubhouse. There were already persons there who were busy questioning Msibi. He was already there.
MR HUGO: Can you recall who the persons were who participated in the interrogation of Mr Msibi when you arrived there?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, it was quite a mixture of events at that point. He was being questioned from three sides. I had a question because I wanted to get to his facility to see what we could retrieve from there and see if we could neutralise any further actions which could have been detrimental to the Police. The Security Branch from Nelspruit wanted to know how many other persons from the branch had been recruited. Gen Stadler wanted to know about other members in the country.
He was pushed around, he was shoved around and there were three or four times that I hit him quite thoroughly with the flat hand. I cannot recall that he bumped his head. I wouldn't say that it didn't happen, but if it did happen, it didn't happen while I was there or I cannot recall it.
He drew a sketch for me, indicating how to get to his house. He was sharing the house with a person. I think he must have been some form of a lodger and he also indicated to me where his room was. Seeing as it was daylight, we could not yet act upon this information.
And later during that day I went with Mr Visser and Mr Greyling, with Mr Malaza, to see whether we could pick up one of Msibi's contact persons. It didn't work, and in the process Mr Malaza escaped. And it was only later that evening, upon two or three occasions that we visited the house. It was somewhat east from the Iselhuni Hotel. Initially we could not enter the house.
Upon two or three occasions there was a vehicle parked in the driveway and when the vehicle wasn't there, we entered the premises. We had very little time at our disposal because we didn't know when the owner would return. We entered the house, we forced the front door open and in Mr Msibi's room we conducted a quick search. We found lots of books there. He was also a painter. There were documents and we put all of this into a cardboard box.
We found something similar to a shoe box with six devices with machinated aluminium covers. These devices were similar to a type which was used by the Irish Republican Army, where it would be connected to a tape recorder, the one set of wires, and then the other set would be connected to the explosive device and then, for example, the cassette recording would issue an initial warning to people to leave the area because a bomb would go off and then about three to five minutes later the device would explode. Similar incidents were taking place in London at that stage.
We took all of this and brought it out of the border post and handed it over to Brig Stadler.
MR HUGO: And when you returned to the border post, and I accept that you then returned to the clubhouse, Mr Msibi was still there?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, he was there, he was being interrogated by Brig Stadler. At that stage that I was there, no assault had taken place on him. Then it was about the planning regarding whether or not we would remain there, if we could still do something in Swaziland, whether we were supposed to return to the Republican side, or to Pretoria.
MR HUGO: When you arrived there, Brig Stadler was busy interrogating him? Did any further interrogation take place by yourself or any of the other members?
MR DE KOCK: No, not at Oshoek, but later at Vlakplaas, yes.
MR HUGO: You've heard some of the evidence that further assaults took place after it was established that he was, or that he had this shoe box with these aluminium wire devices, can you maybe recall if any assaults took place after that?
MR DE KOCK: I will not deny it, I just cannot recall it and I've got no reason to hide it. I just cannot recall it.
MR HUGO: But is it possible that an assault could have taken place afterwards?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, definitely, because this incident disrupted the whole top structure of the Police.
MR HUGO: Concerning the time could you just give us more details. The operation took place at 10 o'clock the morning and when you returned after you got the documentation in Swaziland and arrived at the clubhouse, can you give us a time?
MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, I would say it was approximately 8 or 9 o'clock that evening, because firstly, Greyling and Visser tried to find Malaza, as difficult as it was in Manzini with the circumstances there, and in the second instance we couldn't get into the house, we couldn't immediately go in to penetrate and search the house, so I spent the whole day in Swaziland.
MR HUGO: And after he was questioned by Brig Stadler, what was the decision?
MR DE KOCK: The decision was made by Brig Stadler and Visser and Schoon that we have to move back to Pretoria, in order for further interrogations to take place and where we can sort out the documentation. That evening we left, I would say it was approximately 11 or 12 o'clock that evening.
MR HUGO: Can you recall in which vehicle Mr Malaza was transported from Oshoek to Pretoria?
MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, if I recall correctly, it was either in the Land Cruiser or the kombi. It was Mr Msibi, it was either the Land Cruiser or the kombi, because I was driving in the vehicle that was in front.
We arrived at Vlakplaas in the early morning. It was approximately 5 or 6 o'clock the morning. Brig Stadler also arrived, I do not know if he first went home or to the office, but he also arrived there later that morning. Some of the other members of the Intelligence Service were with him and at a certain stage I and Brig Schoon and one or two of the other members dealt with Mr Msibi in a hard-handed way. I hit him and he hit the ground. I think I gave him nine to twelve blows and some of the other members assaulted him with the open hand, but immediately afterwards Brig Stadler told some of the members we must stop assaulting him, he will deal with Mr Msibi from then on. We immediately stopped and Brig Stadler took over.
MR HUGO: Concerning the initial planning of this operation, was the idea initially or from the start that he had to be abducted and then to be applied in order to provide information, or was the idea to bring him out and simply to neutralise him?
MR DE KOCK: No, Mr Chairperson, we had to bring him out, he had to provide further information. I did not have any say in that because my task was his abduction. His neutralising we can put it very broadly, it could mean death or you could simply that you can compromise a person in such a way that he cannot operate anymore, which then also happened with Mr Msibi.
MR HUGO: Brig Stadler then told you that you have to stop assaulting the person, that he will deal with it further, what happened then?
MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, what he said is that he will give further instructions at a later stage, we must ensure that this person is washed clean. We did that, we gave him the opportunity to wash his clothes, he took a shower and we gave one of our overalls to him, the overalls we had at Vlakplaas, and we provided him with a place to sleep. We cuffed him to a steel bed, bed's that are used in all State departments or issued in State departments. He had a mattress, he had a Defence Force sleeping bag. It was very cold and I cut a hole at the bottom of his sleeping bag in order for the leg-irons to come through and we cuffed around the framework of the bed and the other one was tied to his leg, or cuffed to his leg. He had to wake us if he wanted to go to the toilet. There were guards that rotated every two hours, he wouldn't have been able to escape with a bed connected to his leg.
MR HUGO: He then spent that evening there at Vlakplaas?
MR DE KOCK: Yes. The next morning, approximately 9 o'clock, it was between 8 and 9 o'clock, I received a call from Stadler saying that Defence Force helicopter will land at Vlakplaas and that Kallie Steyn, Col Kallie Steyn from Military Intelligence will be there and that I must then personally hand over Msibi to him.
The two pilots did not get out and Commandant Kallie Steyn got out. I accompanied him to the helicopter and I then asked him later to just give me back the leg-irons and the handcuffs. Mr Msibi was then transported to a place called Fontana. I understand it is towards Pyramids on the Pietersburg road. I do not know where it is.
MR HUGO: And then after he was transported in the helicopter, did you have any further contact with Mr Msibi?
MR DE KOCK: No, Mr Chairperson, I never had contact with him. I do know however, that he was detained, but we were not told and I also did not enquire. At a later stage in a discussion with Gen Buchner, he mentioned to me, and there were also other reason for this, that Mr Msibi was very stubborn, that he did not want to cooperate with the Police, he did not want to work with them, he did not want to accept any money from them and that all that Mr Msibi took was a tracksuit, because his clothes were in a very bad condition. He didn't want to accept shoes, he'd rather prefer to walk barefeet.
It was also round the fact that Gen Buchner mentioned to me that they are going to release Msibi and that I must warn the askaris working in Soweto, that this man is now free, they must not arrest or shoot him, that he's not for us but he's also not against us. He was neutral at that stage, he was neutralised.
MR HUGO: Then you make mention in your application of a certain friction between Gen van der Merwe and Dr Neil Barnard, can you just tell the Honourable Committee how you came to hear about this.
MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, I believe it came from Gen Stadler, because he dealt with the whole case. The information concerning the leakage came from National Intelligence and National Intelligence Services, apparently, from what I heard from Stadler, there was some kind of deal that they will not act, that this case of Malaza will be dealt with and that at later stage he will be moved out because the National Intelligence Service was scared that their source that receives this information from Msibi, or works with this information, will be made public. That somebody working above Msibi, somewhere in the line from Swaziland to Maputo and from there to Zambia, received these reports. So somebody above Msibi handed over the documentation which Malaza handed over, to the Intelligence Services and there was then a danger that this source can be made known or be exposed and that was where the friction came from.
MR HUGO: There was a perception with you that the higher ranks within the Security Police was aware of your participation and of the operation?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, there's no doubt about it.
MR HUGO: Were any steps taken against you?
MR HUGO: Concerning Mr Malaza, did you make any enquiries about what happened to him after he escaped in Swaziland?
MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, what I do know is that he, I don't know by means of which context, but we heard about another contact, a man by the name of Sam who worked at the railways, who was part of the network, and he went to that person and from then on arrangements were made and he went to Maputo. From the South African side at Nelspruit, in order to explain Malaza's disappearance, a dossier was opened and that he awoled from the force.
MR HUGO: But as far as you were concerned, Mr Malaza aligned himself with the ANC again. ... (transcriber's interpre-tation)
MR DE KOCK: Yes, definitely, Chairperson.
MR HUGO: You've explained the reason for your actions, can you just explain to us what your political motive was for this operation and why you took part in it.
MR DE KOCK: It was in order to prevent armed MK members to come into the country, to block them and with the ability that they had at that stage to get information from the South African Police, and it was also directly in line with the struggle of the past, where the National Party, the Defence Force and the South African Police acted against the ANC and then any of the ANC forces.
I would just like to mention here that at Oshoek, in discussions with Malaza, the names did come up of the two policemen in Pretoria who provided information to Malaza, who then gave it to Msibi. That is just for clarity's sake.
MR HUGO: What perception did the presence of the senior officers create with you, both with the initial interrogation at Daisy and later also at Oshoek?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was not a district crisis, it was a national crisis. At that stage we were not quite sure how far the Intelligence Service had been penetrated with the exposure that Malaza made, in that the father of one of the member's of the Pretoria branch worked at the Head Office. He was a Warrant Officer and he had access to all documentation that moved between the floors as well as top secret documentation that even I did not have access to. It was seen as a national crisis.
MR HUGO: Was there any doubt with you that this was a well planned operation, sanctioned at the highest level?
MR HUGO: If you say yes, maybe I did not put the question in the right way. You believed that that was what was planned and it was sanctioned at the highest level?
MR HUGO: I think just for completion and to prevent further cross-examination at a later stage, I would like to refer to Exhibit A concerning the relevant facts that maybe you can comment on. Mr Msibi says the following, and I will just read a few sections of it and I would like you to comment on it. Mr Msibi says
"We were together with Malaza in my car and driving to the meeting point. After we had stopped, I noticed three cars with a number of people inside. When I opened the door of our car to disembark, Malaza tried to grab me but I managed to break loose and leave the car."
What is your recollection concerning his version, as far as this aspect is concerned?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, especially concerning the Malaza situation, because that was discussed. I would just like to add this, the little bit of information that we could gather concerning Mr Msibi was that he was very fit, he played squash at the Royal Swazi Spa, he also belonged to the club. He was not a drinker and he did not smoke and the people I chose to grab were also from the same calibre, except that they drank.
"But outside the car, 10 white men in plain clothes and armed with guns surrounded me."
MR DE KOCK: Yes, it's also correct, except for the weapons. They did not have weapons, they did have radios with them.
MR HUGO: Then he says the following
"They forced me to the ground, handcuffed me to my back, tied my feet and gagged my mouth with adhesive tape."
What is your reaction to that?
MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, no, not on the ground, some of the members later told me that they grabbed him so hard and so fast, or threw him into the back of the Land Cruiser, that he fell on the back seat and not in the boot area. They threw him in so hard that he fell on top of the back seat and they had to cuff him while they were driving. It was something that happened very quickly, it was literally a few seconds.
ADV BOSMAN: Can I just come in here, just to get clarity.
Mr de Kock, I understood from you that you only observed after Mr Msibi was in the vehicle, in the Land Cruiser, just for clarity's sake, what you are saying now is that this is so or not, this is about what you heard, it was not your own observation.
MR DE KOCK: My observation was that he was already in the vehicle when I got there, but I was very close to them, or close to Msibi's vehicle. We were more worried about the Swaziland Police who patrolled that road and that was our worry or concern at that stage. It was mentioned at a later stage that he was thrown into the vehicle, yes.
ADV BOSMAN: I would just like to know, the comment that you just made now, the placing of Msibi in the vehicle is not your own observation, this is what was reported to you?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HUGO: Then the following sentence
"I heard screams of women in the background"
and you have already testified about that and you confirm it.
MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.
"I was lifted and placed in a jeep which drove towards Oshoek border post."
MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, yes, that is correct, they did go to Oshoek.
MR HUGO: Except your evidence was that it was a Land Cruiser, but it's maybe just his perception.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that would be his perception, Chairperson.
"And the car crossed the border and stopped in the middle of the forest. The adhesive tape was removed from my mouth an leg-irons placed on my feet."
"I was driven to what looked like a clubhouse, where we found about 20 policemen, 5 of them took part in my interrogation."
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I can only comment on the part where I was involved, where I assaulted him. I do not know if he was assaulted before I arrived there.
MR HUGO: Yes, that is exactly the next paragraph that I would to read to you for your comment
"I was punched, slapped, beaten with a thick belt and my head hit against the wall and my toes stepped on as the interrogators forced information out of me."
What is your comment about this specific part?
MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, I cannot say that he was not beaten with a belt, he was not beaten in my presence with a belt, but at Vlakplaas I personally beat him with a belt.
MR HUGO: Then he deals with the aspect of which you're already testified, that you went to his house. And the following aspect that I would like to read to you is when he says
"They continued the interrogation until I lost consciousness. They later forced me to drink about four to five glasses of brandy."
MR DE KOCK: No, Mr Chairperson, he was never unconscious, and concerning the brandy, there was no alcohol or liquor and I've already testified about that. I had a strict, an arrangement that no alcohol is used 24 to 48 hours before an operation. If he had five glasses of brandy he would not have been able to make sense, we wouldn't have been able to get any information out of him, but I know that no alcohol or liquor was forced down his throat.
MR HUGO: Very well. And then he says
"I was blindfolded and driven to Pretoria"
MR DE KOCK: We did go to Pretoria, and I believe that he was blindfolded, yes.
"And I wish to indicate that I later learnt that the person who hit me with a fist and belt, was Capt de Kock and the one who struck my head against the wall, was Major Visser."
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I hit him with a belt at Vlakplaas. The hitting of the head against the wall, I cannot say. I do not say it didn't happen, but I really cannot recall it, and I would have told you. If I broke his arm I would have said it.
MR HUGO: But in your participation he is in essence correct, that you beat him with a fist and slapped him?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, at Oshoek I did slap him and I did slap him very hard. At Vlakplaas I beat him with a belt.
MR HUGO: One last aspect that I want to deal with.
"... interrogation, cigarette butts were nipped on my face and an attempt was made to set my hair alight. A tyre was put on my neck and a threat made to necklace me."
MR DE KOCK: No, Mr Chairperson, he was never burnt and his hair was also not burnt or no attempt was made to light his hair. Gen Stadler's instructions were very clear and we stuck to that. The tyre round his neck, it was my unit's method. And we would know about that by now, the necklace and the lighting of it, that is specifically a specific person's trademark, but that's not mine.
MR HUGO: You then ask this Honourable Committee to grant amnesty for the illegal crossing of the border, abduction and so forth, in respect with all the offences committed and which is covered by the evidence which you now gave, is that correct? ...(transcriber's interpretation)
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, yes.
MR HUGO: Thank you, Mr Chairman, that's the evidence.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HUGO
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Hugo. Mr Visser, any cross-examination?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Chairperson, yes, if it may please you.
Mr de Kock, this first aspect is not really a question to you, but it is because I put something in the wrong way, concerning Gen van der Merwe. Yesterday I was under the impression that Gen van der Merwe, the Security Commander, was not the Security Head in '86, I was wrong, he was indeed the Security Head at the beginning of '86. I spoke to Gen van der Merwe and he basically agreed with what you said today, so I will not repeat it, and it is indeed so that there was a lot of problems because National Intelligence had a source and with information which they did not hand over to CIC or to other Committees and this is where this big problem came from. You agree with that apparently?
MR VISSER: I'd just like to ask you one thing, and you must excuse me, I do not know if it is an explosive expert or what you call yourselves, but are you an expert as far as explosives and so forth are concerned? ...(transcriber's interpretation)
MR VISSER: Can you positively identify the apparatus which you found in the shoe box as a mechanism which is used to set off bombs? Which you found at Msibi's room. ...(transcriber's interpretation)
MR DE KOCK: It is correct, Mr Chairperson, because we went as far as to send those devices to our explosive unit or section, in order for them to inform all the other explosive units in the country and we did circulate a photograph of that device.
MR VISSER: The reason for this was because this was a new mechanism or device which has not been used before and that you had not seen in the struggle before.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, yes.
MR VISSER: And that was indeed mechanisms which was used in the British Isles, with their explosives there?
MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Visser. I suppose I should be gender sensitive and hear a lady's voice. Ms van der Walt?
MS VAN DER WALT: No questions, thank you.
NO QUESTIONS BY MS VAN DER WALT
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Cornelius?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair.
Mr de Kock, you said that Mr Vermeulen was a footsoldier.
MR CORNELIUS: And there's no doubt from the footsoldier's side that there was authorisation from a higher level?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, they just followed their instructions.
MR CORNELIUS: And in the presence of all the Brigadiers and higher ranks, especially with the assault, it was also very clear that they did give authorisation for all of this?
MR CORNELIUS: As well as yourself?
MR CORNELIUS: And what is very important that has not been put in this hearing, is that everybody worked on a need-to-know basis.
MR CORNELIUS: In other words, for Vermeulen, nobody would have told him all the details concerning Malaza and Msibi, he just followed instructions?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairperson, it was so sensitive that we did not try to spread the information.
MR CORNELIUS: And there were also no disciplinary actions taken against Mr Vermeulen?
MR CORNELIUS: And then lastly, could you have been mistaken when you made the statement that Brits was present?
MR DE KOCK: It could be, Mr Chairperson, but somewhere my recollection is that his face came up somewhere.
MR CORNELIUS: There were various operations that you executed in Swaziland, so you could be mistaken, is that correct?
MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Cornelius. Mr Prinsloo?
MR PRINSLOO: No questions, thank you Mr Chairperson.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR NEL: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.
Mr de Kock, just one aspect. Mr Msibi's affidavit or statement where he says that the white men were in plain clothes and armed with guns, you said that they did not have weapons.
MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, not as far as I can recall. I know the two Uzzis were with me and the driver.
MR NEL: The reason why I'm asking this is, the instructions from Mr McCarter, he says he can recall, and he says it in his application, that it was a specific order that those who drove in the Land Cruiser were not supposed to be armed, for various reasons.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairperson, I did not want them to be pulled off with weapons in the car and for their own protection I would have the weapons with me in the car.
MR NEL: That is exactly what Mr McCarter said. Thank you, Mr de Kock.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR NEL
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Nel. Mr Lamey?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chairperson.
Mr de Kock, just one or two questions. The subordinate members knew before the operation, or at the stage when the instruction was given and they became aware of what was to happen, to get Msibi out of Swaziland, they knew that this instruction came from Head Office and not only from you. ...(transcriber's interpretation)
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson, so much so that Head Office actually drove with us to Swaziland.
MR LAMEY: And then another aspect. According to yourself and the people you mention who were at Oshoek at a stage, according to your recollection, it must be more than the eight persons that I think Brig Visser mentioned. That is according to his recollection, but if you count all of them it was indeed more than ten.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, it would have been more than ten.
MR LAMEY: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, I've got no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Lamey. Mr Makondo?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MAKONDO: Thank you, Chairperson.
Starting with Buchner, Mr de Kock, when did you meet Mr Buchner?
MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, I saw him the first time in 1968, in Rhodesia at the Victoria Falls.
MR MAKONDO: Now I'm referring to - you said in your testimony that you met him later, when he reported about Mr Msibi.
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I do not know if I made enquiries or if he called me in, but we did discuss this matter.
MR MAKONDO: It was after how long after you had met Mr Msibi?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot give you a date because I did not work with it and I was busy with other operations, this one just passed me by.
MR MAKONDO: You say that they gave you instructions to warn the askaris not to kill him.
MR DE KOCK: He just mentioned to me that this man is going to be released, because there was a danger that if some of my askaris see him in Soweto, or in any other place and they do not know that he is now back on the Republic, because there were no black members on this operation, except for Malaza, then they can make a mistake, try and arrest him and he could try to get away and they may shoot him.
MR MAKONDO: What did you understand by him when he said he was neutralised?
MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, the way in which I understand it is that Mr Msibi could not go to the ANC, because he would immediately have been taken to a camp, a detention camp. Within the Republic he compromised himself when he testified in this case, which is ironic because he did not provide the information concerning the two policemen at the Security Branch, Malaza was the person who did it, but because of the fact that he was going to testify against these two people, that compromised him concerning ANC activities. In other words, he found himself in a position, he cannot go back to the ANC, he's in the country and he cannot act against the Security Forces, then he will go back to jail.
MR MAKONDO: When you say he did not give information, what do you mean?
MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, the information around the two policemen from the Security Branch here in Pretoria, came from Malaza. I'm not saying that at a later stage he confirmed it, I did not work with that part of the interrogation.
MR MAKONDO: You said you went back to the abduction area, the time, you said it had been around 10a.m., which is somehow not far from what he says, he talks of nine thirty or so, now you said you spent the whole day in Swaziland, at that time was he with other members at the club at Oshoek?
MR MAKONDO: Would that include all the seniors who were part of that operation?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, all the senior members stayed there on a permanent basis.
MR MAKONDO: After he had given you - when exactly, after his abduction, when did he give you the information about his house? Was it at the clubhouse or somewhere along the way?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, when he got we also came out and that is where I participate in the assault.
MR MAKONDO: So he gave you the information whilst you were still in Swaziland, when you were in the clubhouse?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, yes.
MR MAKONDO: And you said you forced the door of his room open.
MR DE KOCK: No, his door was not locked, but the front door of the house was locked.
MR MAKONDO: So you forced the first door but you went in, you just opened it.
MR MAKONDO: During your search, can you perhaps describe your search, how systematic it was.
MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, in the way in which we usually search a place, it was done very quickly, it was very superficial, because we do not know who the other person or persons are who are staying there or when they will come back, so we tried to go in as quick as possible, gather what we can and immediately leave. The sorting out we can do later, just get what you can now and leave.
MR MAKONDO: I'm asking you because my instructions are that there were a number of his properties that went missing after the search.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, as I said there were documents, books, and we found those devices, we did not take anything else. We did not have any reason to take anything else.
CHAIRPERSON: What are your instructions in respect of the property? Probably if we could have it on record.
MR MAKONDO: Thank you, Chair. I'm told that there was a TV missing, a video machine, money which he kept for his role, and some of his clothing and also that there was some damaged that was caused in the house generally.
CHAIRPERSON: Was there any damage to the property, other than the front door being forced open, Mr de Kock?
CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed, Mr Makondo.
ADV SANDI: Sorry, just one thing, Mr Makondo. How much was involved? You say there was also some money that was kept for his role, how much?
MR MAKONDO: I was told, Chairperson, it was around 5 000. Thank you.
Mr de Kock, you talked of the torturing that Mr Msibi mentioned here in his affidavit, that it was not your trademark, do you know whose trademark it is?
MR DE KOCK: The necklace method is not a Vlakplaas trademark. We have already read and heard about whose trademark it is, it's a person who was creating unrest in the neighbourhoods or residential areas. I've already testified that we either bury them or we blew them up, but we never used the necklace method, or burning necklace or tyres.
CHAIRPERSON: And the use of cigarette butts?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, definitely not.
ADV SANDI: Just for my own clarity, Mr de Kock, if you say you were away from the clubhouse for the whole day, you were in Swaziland, I mean surely you cannot categorically say certain things could never have happened? You were not there for the whole day.
MR DE KOCK: No, I cannot say that, I can speak regarding what I would have been there for, but upon my return from Swaziland, I did not see a drunk or an unconscious person.
ADV SANDI: Yes, but what time did you come back from Swaziland that evening?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would say that it was approximately 9 o'clock, 8 o'clock or 9 o'clock.
ADV SANDI: What I'm trying to say to you is, you cannot say there's simply no way this and that could have happened, because it was not part of our way of doing things. I mean, you do have people doing things which are not part of your trademark. You cannot exclude that possibility here, can you? You can't, you weren't there for the whole day.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if I've understood correctly, it says that this happened at Vlakplaas, this burning, I'm not certain.
ADV SANDI: Thank you, Mr Makondo.
After he left Vlakplaas, do you know where he went, perhaps where he was kept?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I accompanied him to the helicopter, I assisted him in embarking and as I've stated, Col Kallie Steyn told me that they were going to Fontana, which was some or other military facility somewhere to the southern side of the Pietersburg highway, but I myself had not yet been there.
MR MAKONDO: After his release, do you know who was monitoring or watching his moves?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. I would accept, or I could accept, and this is merely my perspective, that the Soweto Security Branch would have been informed that he was in their area and that he would have come up every now and again for attention, in order to determine whether or not he was neutral.
MR MAKONDO: And his killing, when did you learn about it?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, security reports indicated that he was shot and then in one or two newspapers, I think the one was the City Press and the other was the Sowetan, but it was one of the newspapers which was aimed more at black readership, I read that he was shot, but I also read that someone was arrested, and I remembered yesterday that this was not mentioned, but that somebody was indeed taken into custody regarding his shooting. This is according to the newspaper, but I didn't see it in the security report.
MR MAKONDO: In the report, the security report that you gathered, your own interpretation, would you say this was still the force's different departments' action, or would you say it's something outside that?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, what struck me was the total clinisism of the entire shooting. It is difficult to explain it to you if you didn't move in those circles, it was completely clean and silent. With any sort of work or operation a fingerprint would be left, as the people say, or the operatives would sometimes use a regular kind of method, but in this case he was shot and that was that, there was nothing further from anywhere. That is what struck me, the total clinisism of it all, the fact that it was such a clinical event.
MR MAKONDO: Thank you, Chair, nothing more thanks.
CHAIRPERSON: I think you are being given instructions, wouldn't you take the instructions first? I would suggest we have a short adjournment and take fuller instructions, I think it's only fair that ...(inaudible) to your client fully.
MR MAKONDO: Thanks Chairperson.
EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Makondo, are you proceeding with your cross-examination after taking instructions?
MR MAKONDO: No, Chairperson, thank you, that will be all. Thank you for the time, Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MAKONDO
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms Patel?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson.
Mr de Kock, just one or two things I'd like clarity on. At the time that Mr Msibi gave you the information as to his address, did this take place at the Oshoek clubhouse?
MS PATEL: Did he hand over the information voluntarily or was there a measure of assault involved at that stage?
MR DE KOCK: At first I slapped him and subsequently he drew a sketch for me, indicating how to get to the premises, because it wasn't very easy to explain how to get there, one had to view the directions on a sketch.
MS PATEL: Can you recall who was present at that time?
MR DE KOCK: When we searched the house?
MS PATEL: No, no, at the time when he gave over the information.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I was there, as well as Gert Visser, the senior officers, I could place Col Visser there, I cannot recall whether Brig Stadler was there, I do not have that recollection. Schoon wasn't there, because I recall that he was anxious to notify Head Office that we had acted in Swaziland, because this also related to other persons who had to be notified. For example, Ministers and so forth.
MS PATEL: Okay. And did Brig Schoon return subsequently, when you returned back from Swaziland from the search? Was he there when you came back?
MS PATEL: Okay. Thank you, Honourable Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS PATEL
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms Patel. Mr Hugo, we will adopt the same procedure, allow the Panel to ask questions that your re-exam, if any, should be completed.
ADV BOSMAN: Thank you, Chairperson.
Mr de Kock, at what time would you say did Mr Msibi arrive at the clubhouse and how much elapsed from that point onwards to your return?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would say approximately an hour, anything to and beyond an hour - from his abduction to the point that we got him to the clubhouse?
ADV BOSMAN: No, from his delivery at the clubhouse, so to speak, until you arrived there later that evening.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think it would have been within half an hour to an hour.
ADV BOSMAN: You don't understand me.
MR DE KOCK: I beg your pardon.
ADV BOSMAN: You heard the evidence yesterday that he was interrogated for approximately three hours in total, you heard that?
ADV BOSMAN: From your evidence it would appear as if this interrogation must have taken several hours.
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I wanted operational information from him and it was urgent information.
ADV BOSMAN: At what time did you interrogate him, approximately?
MR DE KOCK: I would have said that it would be between half an hour to an hour from his arrival at the clubhouse, because I first had to get rid of Msibi's vehicle.
ADV BOSMAN: You don't have to give me a specific time, but at what time, approximately, did this interrogation take place? You could allow for an hour on either side.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would say it was in the vicinity of between half past eleven and half past twelve.
ADV BOSMAN: And it is your evidence that you returned at 8 or 9 o'clock that evening.
ADV BOSMAN: In other words, if my calculations are correct, he spent 10 to 11 hours in the clubhouse?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
ADV BOSMAN: Could you assist us in any way, even if it is hearsay, regarding what took place in those 10 to 11 hours, was it ever discussed?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, but I believe that he would have been interrogated, because it wouldn't help us to have him and not interrogate him, especially in light of the urgency of the situation, so I can only accept that he must have been further interrogated.
ADV BOSMAN: You didn't exchange notes regarding what information was provided by him during that period, or what people did in order to attempt to obtain such information?
ADV BOSMAN: The last time that you had contact with him at Oshoek, in the clubhouse, were you relatively close to him?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, because I slapped him, so I was next to him.
ADV BOSMAN: Could you see what his general condition was, could you notice whether or not he was injured?
MR DE KOCK: He was in shock, this is something that I have observed many times in my life, I have 24 years of counter-insurgency at my disposal.
ADV BOSMAN: I'm more interested in his physical condition.
MR DE KOCK: His clothes were rumpled and he was in a state of shock, as I've said, but he didn't show any external injuries such as blood on his face, there was no evidence that he was bleeding anywhere on his body.
ADV BOSMAN: When you arrived at Vlakplaas, did he complain to you about any injuries that he may have sustained, did he request any treatment?
ADV BOSMAN: Do you think he would have done so, you observed him?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he was the sort of person who would deal with the situation with dignity, he was one of the very few people who I met that dealt with things in such a way.
ADV BOSMAN: Very well, thank you.
ADV SANDI: Just one question from me, Mr Chairman, thank you.
Mr de Kock, is it the position here that you were the only person around who assaulted the deceased before he gave information regarding where he stayed in Swaziland, were you the only one?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think that some of the other guys also hit him, but I cannot recall who it was, because I was completely focused on the situation. We didn't know exactly what was there and one expected that there may be other things, such as radio devices or a copying device, cameras, so these were the things that we needed quite urgently. I'm not trying to protect anybody, if I could recall I would tell you.
ADV SANDI: So your answer is you were not the only one?
MR DE KOCK: I was not the only one.
ADV SANDI: Thank you. Thank you, Chair.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Kock, I just want clarity about the actual place of abduction. You said the road between the border and Mbabane, which is very short, there's a lot of traffic by the police.
CHAIRPERSON: When you proceed, I think next to the garage you would take the turn-off that goes down and takes you to probably Swaziland Spa and all that, but that would be next to the valley?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson. If you drive from Oshoek and just before you enter Mbabane, there is a detour around through the valley, which leads to the various hotels and it was on that detour road that we abducted him.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr de Kock. Mr Hugo, any re-exam?
MR HUGO: No re-examination, thank you Mr Chairman.
MR HUGO: Mr Chairman, sorry, I've just been instructed that Mr de Kock has a request, he just wants to address the family in respect of Mr Msibi. If you grant us that indulgence.
CHAIRPERSON: Oh certainly, you may go ahead, Mr de Kock.
MR DE KOCK: I would just like to know where the young man is who was here yesterday, is he here? Very well, thank you Chair.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Makondo could be of assistance there.
MR MAKONDO: Chairperson, the one who was here yesterday is not here, but there is the youngest brother to Sydney, he's seated there in the crowd, Chairperson. I just wanted to indicate to him that he's here somewhere. Thank you.
MR DE KOCK ADDRESSES FAMILY OF DECEASED: Chairperson, I would just like to say to the family that I have come a long way in this sort of work, and this isn't about sentimental values or anything else, but it would be malicious and petty and dishonest of me to not to tell of certain observations that I made in that brief time and which I found in the person that Sydney was. And I just want to tell the family that Sydney Msibi was not an askari, he was also not a traitor. And I believe that due to the background that I have accumulated in guerrilla warfare over 24 years, I have the capacity to say that I found a man who was the personification of courage, of backbone and strength, and this man was not a defector, he had to be abducted. And what struck me, and this is something that many of us who lived by the sword and who fell by the sword knew, it's not about how good a man is when things are good, it is what he is like when things are bad. He was the sort of man who was good when things were bad and exceptionally bad.
And I just want to tell you that his dignity and his integrity, his faith and his loyalty in the ANC, remained unscathed consistently and that is how he died. He was he sort of man who I, at any time, would have wanted in my life with me at my darkest hours. That is the kind of person I would have wanted with me. In my limited capacity as a human being, he has all the respect that I could muster and I believe that if any of my members have the courage of their conviction and if they would speak the truth, they would underwrite what I have just said, that he is worthy of respect of the party and the people whom he served at that time.
Within my limited capacity as a human being and my even more limited capacity due to my special circumstances, I would like to say that regarding me, he was one of the ANC's and the country's most loyal supporters. He stubbornly refused that anything should break him or his loyalty, and I would just like to tell the family that. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, Mr de Kock, for giving us a background of the man we are about in this application. The Committee, and I hope I'm speaking or expressing the sentiments of the Committee and to a limited extent, that of the family, that we know what kind of man you were dealing with and that he would have been a credit, as you say, that you would have also taken him under your services, that at least we know now what Mr Msibi, what his personality was and what his loyalties were to whoever he belonged to. Thank you very much. You are excused.
CHAIRPERSON: Are you leading any further evidence, Mr Hugo?
MR HUGO: No further evidence, thank you Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Hugo. Who's taking the bait?
MR NEL: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I like that. I've discussed it with my colleagues and they have no problem if I call Mr McCarter, he's from Port Shepstone and would like to drive back today, which is quite a long way, if we could dispose of his evidence now. As it pleases you, Mr Chairman.