CHAIRPERSON: Good morning. Will the representatives of the various parties, please announce themselves and indicate who they appear for for the purpose of the record?
ADV BOOYENS: May it please the Court, Mr Chairman and members of the Committee, J.A. Booyens, I appear on behalf of the applicant number 5, Johan Martin van Zyl, instructed by Mr Werner Nolte and on behalf of applicants numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6, instructed by Mr Francois van der Merwe.
I also appear on instructions of Mr Van der Merwe, on behalf of a Mr Fouche who has received notice that his name may be mentioned at some stage.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Booyens.
MR VAN DER MERWE: Thank you Mr Chairman. My name is S.W. van der Merwe. I appear on behalf of Mr Eric Winter who is the implicated in the application of applicant 7, Mr Eugene de Kock.
MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairman. My name is Schalk Hugo. I appear on behalf of Mr de Kock who is one of the applicants in this matter.
ADV BIZOS: Mr Chairman and member of the Committee, I appear on behalf of the widows of the four deceased, together with my learned friend Mr Patric Mtshaulana and instructed by the Legal Resources Centre in Johannesburg and Grahamstown.
We appear for the purposes of opposing the applications of the applicants for amnesty and we will try and show both by examining them and by leading witnesses, to show that they have not made a full disclosure and that they are protecting persons who were involved in these killings.
There will be other grounds as well which will emerge during the course of the proceedings.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Bizos.
MS PATEL: May it please the Committee. I am Ramala Patel, evidence leader for the Amnesty Committee.
CHAIRPERSON: Just for the record, this is the application in respect of the killing of what is known to be, or who is known to be the Cradock 4 of Messrs Eric Alexander Taylor in matter 3917/96, Gerhardus Johannes Lotz, matter number 3921/96, Nicolaas Jakobus Janse van Rensburg, matter 3919/96, Harold Snyman, matter 3918/96, Johan Martin van Zyl, also known as Sakkie, matter 5637/96 Hermanus Barend du Plessis, matter 4384/96 and Eugene Alexander de Kock, mater 66/96.
Mr Booyens, I understand that you will start?
ADV BOOYENS: That is correct Mr Chairman. I call as my first witness, applicant 5, Mr Van Zyl. The witness will testify in Afrikaans.
JOHAN MARTIN VAN ZYL: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY ADV BOOYENS: Thank you Chairperson. Mr Van Zyl, your application appears on page 42 of the record, is that correct?
ADV BOOYENS: You are applying for amnesty as set out on pages 45 for those aspects set out in paragraph 9 of your application, is that correct?
ADV BOOYENS: Mr Van Zyl, if you could perhaps just go back to that page. If we can go back to page 42, the aspects set out on page 42, do you have anything that you want to add to that?
ADV BOOYENS: Do you confirm the correctness thereof?
ADV BOOYENS: Anything you wish to add? Page 44, anything to add?
ADV BOOYENS: If we then turn to page 45, we have already dealt with paragraph 9, paragraph 1, anything to add there?
MR VAN ZYL: No, nothing to add.
ADV BOOYENS: As far as paragraph 3 is concerned, you there refer to alternative structures. Could you just perhaps elaborate on that, there will be more complete evidence later, but what did you understand under the term alternative structures?
MR VAN ZYL: The alternative structures established during that period by the activists, included street committees, the so-called people's courts, that is more or less what replaced the existing structures to such an extent that it led to a great deal of intimidation of the local population.
ADV BOOYENS: Do you further confirm that which is said in paragraph 3 of your application?
ADV BOOYENS: Paragraph 4, there you refer to the JMC meetings, is that correct?
ADV BOOYENS: And to a strategy which was eventually developed to be able to deal with this matter. Now, did you yourself attend JMC meetings?
ADV BOOYENS: The information contained herein, is this information which you obtained as a result of lectures and feedback and so forth from the officers who attended the JMC meetings?
ADV BOOYENS: You also refer to the so-called G-Plan. What was your personal knowledge in respect of the G-Plan?
MR VAN ZYL: The G-Plan according to my knowledge, entailed the establishment of these alternative structures - that is more or less what it entailed.
ADV BOOYENS: On page 47, paragraph 5, there you refer to a data base and the identification of people involved in political unrest and violence. Once again, that is something which was the result of an overall information gathering process, you did not only partake in this but you had knowledge of it?
ADV BOOYENS: Paragraph 6, you there refer to pressure by means of the JMC exerted on yourselves and you also refer to addresses made by politicians and the type of language they used.
That is also something which you learnt about from some of these politicians did not actually tell you these things personally, but you leant from other people this is what had been said and the pressure exerted, you actually learnt about this in the course of your work?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes. The pressure was exerted by senior officers to my level.
ADV BOOYENS: Paragraph 7, there you deal with so-called field work and that is the physical gathering of intelligence and what did that mean in practise?
MR VAN ZYL: My field work included the handling of informers, but especially giving leadership to the junior officers who also had to deal with and handle informers and they needed some guidance in respect of the interpretation of intelligence.
ADV BOOYENS: You refer to the fact that you were aware of the activities of - the names that you mention there are the four deceased, is that correct?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct. I mention the names of the four deceased because my amnesty application is actually directed at those deceased.
There were quite a number of other political activists who also were operating on very much the same level of activity at the time.
ADV BOOYENS: Just to clarify, you mention the same level or very close to the same level of activity. Are you referring specifically to the activities in the rural areas such as Cradock and elsewhere in the Eastern Cape interland?
ADV BOOYENS: Paragraph 8, you there make the statement that some weeks, you refer to that phrase, exactly how long was that?
MR VAN ZYL: It was about two to three weeks before the incident.
ADV BOOYENS: You also refer to the fact that Colonel van Rensburg made certain statements to you in his office?
ADV BOOYENS: Mr Van Zyl, I think we are starting to move to a rather sensitive area here, so I am not going to lead you any further. Could you perhaps just tell us what was the nature of the conversation between yourself and Mr Van Rensburg?
MR VAN ZYL: Colonel Van Rensburg summoned me to his office and told me that the situation at that stage had become so critical that there was only one way in which to try and stabilise these areas, and that was by means of the elimination of Mr Matthew Goniwe and his closest colleagues.
ADV BOOYENS: You have already referred to the situation which existed. Now what did Mr Van Rensburg say about the situation, what exactly was the situation at the time?
MR VAN ZYL: It was commonly known what the situation was. We had been engaged in this situation for many months in which many black townships and areas where there was complete chaos and during the day and at night, it was extremely difficult to perform normal policing duties.
It was virtually impossible to obtain evidence. We still got sufficient information via our informers and sources. The intimidation in respect of the community was such that we were not really able to take matters to court with any degree of success.
That was the situation which was discussed every day at the Security Police level. Colonel Van Rensburg did not elaborate in respect of the specific situation at that stage.
ADV BOOYENS: You knew what the situation was?
ADV BOOYENS: Page 48. You say that after you spoke to Mr Van Rensburg, you then also discussed the matter with Major Du Plessis?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct. We discussed it the very same day and my impression was that Colonel Van Rensburg had already spoken to Du Plessis.
Colonel Van Rensburg's words to me were that a drastic plan should be made very quickly with these particular people and that I accepted to mean that they should be eliminated.
ADV BOOYENS: Now after these two discussions Mr Van Zyl, what happened then, could you tell us how matters then developed in chronological order?
ADV POTGIETER: I am sorry to interrupt, who would have been these people referred to in respect of whom a plan had to be made?
MR VAN ZYL: Colonel Van Rensburg specifically mentioned Mr Goniwe's name and said that his hangers on and closest colleagues, that a plan should be made with them.
ADV POTGIETER: Did you know who these people were?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, at that stage we knew all the suspects and political activists in the Eastern Cape quite well, and I had a reasonable idea.
At that stage I had returned from a border duty in Ovamboland, not too long back and I was fairly aware of the activities in the Eastern Cape.
I would like to explain further. As a result of my conversation with Major Du Plessis at the time, I gave very intensive attention to these activities, specifically in respect of Mr Goniwe and the people whom he had contact with especially in the rural areas as well as in Port Elizabeth.
During this time, a considerable number of names of suspects or people came to the fore, it included the names of the four deceased and these names came from various parts of the Eastern Cape.
They were active in various parts of the Eastern Cape. In that time, I activated other members of the branch in a subtle way to be able to activate their sources so that I could obtain information in respect of the activities of these activists.
After having familiarised myself with the most effective of these activists, in other words, the activists who posed the biggest problems and threats for us in the sense that they were responsible according to our information, for the destabilisation and chaos in these areas, I spoke to Major Du Plessis again.
We actually had conversations on a daily basis. We then went back to Colonel Van Rensburg to notify him of our information, of our intelligence and of whom we regarded as the most prominent suspects, the most important suspects from our point of view.
ADV BOSMAN: I am sorry to interrupt you here. The members that you mentioned, you wanted to activate their sources and that they should look at Mr Goniwe and his sources, now these other people, who fell into the category of hangers on, assistants, Lieutenants, colleagues, are these the people that you were referring to that you had to investigate specifically?
ADV BOSMAN: You told the Chairperson that names surfaced and that the names of the four deceased were among those names?
ADV BOSMAN: Were there also other names, other people?
ADV BOSMAN: So it wasn't only the four deceased, there were other names as well?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes. Obviously, Port Elizabeth and the whole of the Eastern Cape contained many activists in the smaller towns and areas, there were also quite a few prominent people, so there were quite a few names.
CHAIRPERSON: I think the point to the question is, how many people falling into this category of hangers on, or colleagues, how many of these was a plan to be made with?
MR VAN ZYL: Chairperson, that was never specified. I would say now and perhaps at that time, the idea was that Mr Goniwe was the most important and that the activities closest to him would form the actual target group.
CHAIRPERSON: Now, would it have been four people in total or five or three or what was the case?
MR VAN ZYL: The position is that there were more people who had the same level of importance. It wasn't necessarily ever said that they all had to be eliminated.
CHAIRPERSON: What I want to know is this, as I understand your evidence, Mr Goniwe and his colleagues formed the target group. Now what I want to know is how many people was the actual target for this plan that had to be made?
MR VAN ZYL: That is what we had to ascertain with our investigations.
CHAIRPERSON: And as far as you were concerned, how many people were there potentially that a plan had to be made with?
MR VAN ZYL: Well, that will be very difficult to say.
CHAIRPERSON: Did you know at the time?
MR VAN ZYL: No, I don't think so.
ADV BOOYENS: Arising from the Chairperson's question, Mr Van Zyl, perhaps I should ask you this. You say that you intensified this investigation and certain names started surfacing?
ADV BOOYENS: With the exception of the, with the exclusion of these four names, were there other names and if so, can you remember any of these names?
MR VAN ZYL: Chairperson, there were a number of suspects who were definitely responsible for the destabilisation in the area at that stage. The names which I can remember, perhaps it is unfair after such a long lapse of time, to try and mention them - we were always busy trying to canvass and recruit new informers and we were always discussing the possibility of recruiting new names.
Possibly some of the people weren't considered for elimination because they were informers or they were potential informers in future.
I actually can't remember the names very well.
ADV BOOYENS: But in any event, you then had a number of names, namely Goniwe and his so-called colleagues and hangers on?
ADV BOOYENS: And amongst those names that you had, you also had the names of the deceased or some of the deceased, is that correct?
MR VAN ZYL: The four deceased's names yes, they were contained in that group.
CHAIRPERSON: I am assuming that there were more people than just the four deceased involved?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes. Because what we were looking at was who was responsible for the destabilisation according to our information at the time.
ADV BOSMAN: I beg your pardon, just to be thorough, you say in paragraph 10 that you had pertinently asked Mr Taylor and Mr Lotz to assist you?
ADV BOSMAN: Mr Goniwe's activities were established in the rural areas, is that correct?
ADV BOSMAN: Cradock was a branch of Eastern Cape Security?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct Mr Chair.
ADV BOSMAN: Were there any requests for information, Mr Goniwe was in Cradock, were there any requests made to Cradock, you spoke in general that others were subtly activated.
Were there any requests made to Cradock in relation to this?
ADV BOSMAN: And the eventual group which you identified, was this compiled from information which was derived from all these sources, which was collected by your own people, by people from Cradock, by people who tapped phones, is that correct?
MR VAN ZYL: Also from other Security sections or departments. Information which applied to us, was sent to our division from Colonel Van Rensburg's desk and then was added to our own information.
ADV BOOYENS: You have already stated that you were in liaison with Major Du Plessis. Eventually you reached a situation where in you had identified a group of persons, is that correct?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, that is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: What happened then?
MR VAN ZYL: As I have said, we spoke again to Colonel Van Rensburg about the situation. He informed us that final permission to proceed with the elimination operation had been received from Colonel Snyman, who was the Commanding Officer.
Myself and Colonel Du Plessis, or the then Mr Du Plessis, went to Colonel Snyman's office where a submission was made to Colonel Snyman by Colonel Du Plessis about the situation. This was no news to Colonel Snyman but our biggest source of worry was in the branch at that stage, and he then stated that he agreed with us and I think his words were that we should do what would be in the best interest of the country.
ADV BOOYENS: Just to state it in all clarity. The submission which was made to Colonel Snyman by Major Du Plessis, was the submission based upon the fact that this was a group of persons who was working with Matthew Goniwe and that they were his co-hordes and that they should be considered for elimination?
MR VAN ZYL: I think that it was that some of them should be eliminated, yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Were these specific four identified individually as persons who should or can be eliminated or were there any more in the discussion with Mr Snyman?
MR VAN ZYL: No, there were definitely more. Mr Du Plessis might remember who they were.
There were several activists who were mentioned.
ADV BOOYENS: Thank you. Colonel Snyman tells you that you should do what is in the best interest of the country, what happens then? How did you understand or interpret this when he told you to do what would be in the best interest of the country?
MR VAN ZYL: I understood it that it would be final approval for the procedure of the elimination.
We returned to Colonel Van Rensburg and informed him of this and we discussed the method or modus operandi of the operation with him.
ADV BOOYENS: Would you please tell us about that?
MR VAN ZYL: Colonel Van Rensburg proposed or gave order that the attack should appear as if it was a vigilante or AZAPO attack.
In other words we should use sharp objects to eliminate the individuals and that we should burn their bodies with petrol.
ADV BOOYENS: That would be the method that would be followed. Did you then begin to investigate the how component of the operation?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct. We felt that with our information that we had at our disposal, the best method would be to place them in a deserted road, they moved around a lot because of the activities, they were often travelling.
It would be impossible to eliminate them in a concealed fashion.
ADV POTGIETER: Mr Van Zyl, whose plans were these? Was this the result of one person's innovation or was this an actual discussed plan? A plan discussed by a number of people?
MR VAN ZYL: It is difficult for me to say at this stage Chairperson. It could be that I proposed it, but it was discussed between myself and Mr Du Plessis and also with Lieutenant Taylor and Lotz.
They had a smaller share in the planning and the proposal so it actually came from myself and Mr Du Plessis.
ADV POTGIETER: Mr Van Zyl, would it have been only one operation?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairperson, I cannot recall whether this was actually discussed whether it would only be one operation. I think that it is logical that we at that stage thought that we should first see what the effect of such an operation would be and the situation was so desperate that if the effect had been positive, it might not have been necessary to proceed further, but the facts of the matter was that at that stage we reasoned that the head of the destabilisation process should be chopped off, so to speak.
We were in no position to determine whether the rest of the activists were in any position to proceed with the activities with such intensity. So I cannot say for certain whether or not it was ever discussed.
ADV POTGIETER: When you were talking about this operation, who would have been the subject of the operation? Which persons had to be eliminated?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Matthew Goniwe was isolated as the most effective activist in the environment. He had a number of Lieutenants which co-operated with him or followed orders that he gave, and carried forth similar activities, some with more efficiency than others and in that manner, they were categorised.
ADV POTGIETER: But when you planned this operation, it was basically about Mr Goniwe, he was the subject of the planning?
ADV POTGIETER: You did not at that stage plan to eliminate anybody else with him?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, we did. We planned as I said, to eliminate the most important co-hordes we could implicate with him.
If we could only have eliminated Mr Goniwe, we would have done so, but I speak under correction.
ADV POTGIETER: Mr Goniwe was actually the main figure, if I might put it that way, in the planning, thus when you first sat down to discuss and plan, the objective was actually to eliminate Mr Goniwe and the plan surrounded him?
ADV POTGIETER: And at that stage there weren't any other names which you wanted to eliminated immediately? You wanted to determine the effect of the first elimination and then determine what other steps had to be taken?
MR VAN ZYL: That is not entirely correct, from the time that Colonel Van Rensburg told me to go ahead with the investigation into such an operation, I think it was common issue that the most important activists should also be eliminated.
ADV POTGIETER: But the point is that you did not know that someone else would be accompanying Mr Goniwe at a certain place at a certain point in time?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Goniwe almost always travelled with certain co-hordes, such as Mr Calata and Mr Mkonto and sometimes I recall Madolla Jacobs was often in his company and others who were regarded as effective, and it was discussed that they would form part of the elimination.
ADV POTGIETER: So did you discuss that you would collectively eliminate them?
MR VAN ZYL: If the opportunity presented itself.
ADV POTGIETER: And if the opportunity did not present itself, would you simply eliminate Mr Goniwe?
MR VAN ZYL: In that event, that would have happened Mr Chairperson.
ADV POTGIETER: So the chief objective was to eliminate Mr Goniwe, but if one encountered a situation where one could eliminate other prominent activists, would one do so?
MR VAN ZYL: Those who would be considered significant Mr Chairperson.
ADV BOOYENS: Just to go along with what Commissioner Potgieter has asked you, was there ever any talk during the discussion with Colonel Van Rensburg and the Commander and Du Plessis, was there any talk that Mr Goniwe was a single target or were there other targets as well?
MR VAN ZYL: I am trying to think Mr Chairperson. I think that the idea always existed that Mr Goniwe never was alone or acted alone as such.
ADV BOSMAN: That is the point. With that information, or the idea that he would never have been alone, who else would be murdered or killed along with him?
MR VAN ZYL: Those persons who moved the closest to him, who assisted him, who were his Lieutenants in other words, who enjoyed the same prioritisation as him.
If he would for example move along with someone who had nothing to do with politics, or nothing with the activities in the Eastern Cape, we would not even have considered the operation.
ADV BOSMAN: Thus, if these are the facts, there had to have been a list of people, listed in priority who should be eliminated?
MR VAN ZYL: There did not exist such a list.
ADV BOSMAN: Not a written list, but an idea - a general notion of who should be killed. Number 1 was Mr Goniwe?
ADV BOSMAN: And who were the others?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairperson, there were a number of suspects during that time in the Eastern Cape, who enjoyed discussion among us, whom we categorised as important enough that their elimination would actually stabilise the destabilisation, if I put it that way, I cannot recall the names.
ADV BOSMAN: Can you recall any names apart from Mr Goniwe?
MR VAN ZYL: The three persons, then there was a Mr Mbolelo Goniwe, Mr Madolla Jacobs and several others whose names I can't recall.
ADV BOSMAN: Mr Van Zyl, to formulate the question in another way, if there was someone that evening when the individuals were killed, if there was someone there whom you did not know, this is very speculative, but how would this have influenced the matter?
MR VAN ZYL: We certainly would not have continued with the operation.
ADV BOOYENS: And for the sake of clarity, to take it further back in terms of your answer to Commissioner Bosman's question, you say that there was not a list, but these other individuals, were their names ever mentioned to Colonel Snyman during the submission of Mr Du Plessis?
ADV BOOYENS: And did the authorization of Colonel Snyman include these individuals as well?
MR VAN ZYL: One can accept it that way.
ADV BIZOS: Mr Chairman, I would appreciate it if on vital issues such as the last question, my learned friend should be careful not to lead the witness.
ADV BOOYENS: I think we were last at the point where you had begun planning the method of the operation. Your aim was to intercept the individuals on the road. The where and the when, could that have been included in the planning at that stage. We have the how, but now we need the date and the place?
At that stage, would that have been included in the planning or would that have happened on an ad hoc basis?
MR VAN ZYL: That would have occurred on an ad hoc basis if the opportunity presented itself.
ADV BOOYENS: So you have mentioned that the activities of these individuals had been monitored intensely in order to collect information regarding a proposed conference in Port Elizabeth. Could you expand?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct Mr Chairperson. Just before 27 June, information was received that a number of activists would be in Port Elizabeth.
This was confirmed on the day of 27 June that they were actually in Port Elizabeth for a conference or a meeting. It was a UDF meeting at Mr Swartz's home. The persons who were with Mr Goniwe were identified by means of informers during the day.
And I reported to Mr Du Plessis that that evening we would make an attempt or investigate the possibility of undertaking the operation.
ADV BOSMAN: Your initial planning, that would have been yourself and who else that would undertake the operation? Who are the people that you included?
MR VAN ZYL: Before the time Taylor and Lotz received orders that they would assist me in the operation, and they were supposed to prepare the day before and meet me that afternoon at five o'clock at the police station.
And Sergeant Faku was given instruction to assist me that evening, if I should need him. Shepard Shakati and Mokadeka would have to accompany him.
ADV BOOYENS: Can you just expand on the details regarding the commands issued to Taylor and Lotz?
MR VAN ZYL: I told them to prepare and that they should have an extra vehicle. That they should bring along knives and I think that is all.
ADV BOOYENS: Where would you have met them?
MR VAN ZYL: At the police station, five o'clock that afternoon.
ADV BOOYENS: At what time did you receive information that day?
MR VAN ZYL: During the morning Mr Chairperson.
MR VAN ZYL: Just before lunch.
ADV BOOYENS: And what time did you ask Lotz and Taylor to prepare?
MR VAN ZYL: Early that afternoon Your Honour. I can't recall the exact time. Taylor was involved with the collection of information and the identification of activists.
It could have been during his report back to me that I informed him.
ADV BOOYENS: In either case, during the course of the afternoon, you gave the command to meet at the police station five o'clock the afternoon. When you arrived, were they there Taylor and Lotz?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, we met one another there. I can't recall whether I arrived before them.
ADV BOOYENS: Okay, fine, you met there with two vehicles. What happened then?
MR VAN ZYL: We then travelled with the two vehicles in the direction of the Olifantshoek Pass. I drove with my vehicle and along the road, we found a suitable place where we stopped and parked the two vehicles off the road from where we could actually observe the road.
ADV BOOYENS: You are speaking of the Olifantshoek Pass, I don't think everybody is familiar with this area. Which road is this?
MR VAN ZYL: That is the road between Port Elizabeth and Cookhouse or Cradock.
ADV BOOYENS: Is that before Grahamstown?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes. We have referred to it as the Grahamstown road.
ADV BOOYENS: Approximately at what time did you arrive at the Olifantshoek Pass?
MR VAN ZYL: Approximately 18h00, 18h30.
ADV BOOYENS: Was it winter at that stage, was it already dark or was it still light?
MR VAN ZYL: It was approximately twilight, dusk.
ADV BOOYENS: Did you know for which vehicle you should be looking out, the vehicle that the deceased would be travelling in?
MR VAN ZYL: We knew that they had travelled with Mr Goniwe's Honda Ballade with the CAT registration number.
ADV BOOYENS: What happened as you were waiting?
MR VAN ZYL: At approximately eleven o'clock that night, we saw the vehicle passing on the way to Cradock. We followed them.
MR VAN ZYL: With both vehicles. Lieutenant Taylor and Lotz drove in front of me, I drove behind them and after about eight or ten kilometres I told them by radio to overtake the vehicle and pull them off the road.
I parked behind the vehicle, they parked in front of it.
ADV BOOYENS: You said that they moved them off the road, how did they do this?
MR VAN ZYL: They used a blue light.
ADV BOOYENS: Mr Van Zyl, geographically just for clarity, how far were you from Port Elizabeth if you had to take a guess?
MR VAN ZYL: I have not been in this area much, it was approximately 80 kilometres.
ADV BOOYENS: How far apart are Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown?
MR VAN ZYL: Approximately 130 kilometres.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, can we adjourn?
ADV BOOYENS: Yes, Mr Chairman.
JOHAN MARTIN VAN ZYL: (still under oath)
EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: (cont)
Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Van Zyl, before the adjournment we had stopped at the point where the people had been pulled off the road by means of the flashing blue light. Please take it from there?
MR VAN ZYL: We then got them out of the vehicle, we asked them to get out of the vehicle and we handcuffed all four of them.
ADV BOOYENS: How did you cuff them?
MR VAN ZYL: By means of handcuffs with their hands behind their backs and we then loaded them into Lieutenant Taylor's vehicle and two of them into my vehicle and Sergeant Lotz then drove their vehicle and one activist also accompanied him.
ADV BOOYENS: Mr Van Zyl, did you tell them anything when you stopped them?
MR VAN ZYL: I can't recall the exact words, but it was to the effect that we wanted to question them.
ADV BOOYENS: Did they know who you were?
ADV BOOYENS: You had had some dealings with some of them personally before, so they knew you?
MR VAN ZYL: I had had dealings with Mr Goniwe personally and the other three, I knew from photographs and from my own observation.
ADV BOOYENS: So I am assuming that you are now in the vehicle, what happened then?
MR VAN ZYL: Sergeant Lotz then placed some CB number plates over the number plates on their vehicle, by means of a rubber band or something and we then drove back in the direction of Port Elizabeth.
MR VAN ZYL: In the vicinity of St George beach, Blue Water Bay area, we then turned off onto a gravel road and drove in the direction of a wooded area along the coast.
ADV BOOYENS: Please give us an indication more or less how far is that from the central business area?
MR VAN ZYL: Approximately 10 to 15 kilometres.
ADV BOOYENS: So you drove into the bush, what happened then?
MR VAN ZYL: I instructed Lieutenant Taylor to guard the three activists and the one activist Mr Mkonto, we then put him in the back of my vehicle and the child proof lock was activated and the two of us then drove away from there.
My intention was to kill him some distance from there by means of a knife and that I would then thereafter kill each one of the activists in the same way.
ADV BOOYENS: Who is this we, you and Mr Mkonto?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes. Mr Lotz and Mr Taylor stayed behind with the other three activists.
MR VAN ZYL: I can't recall why I drove in the direction that I did along this path that I did, I suppose I wouldn't even be able to find it again, but I was driving slowly along a very bad little path or road and Mr Mkonto suddenly grabbed me from behind, around my neck and it was a total surprise because I was of the impression that his hands had been cuffed behind his back.
Although his hands were still handcuffed, he had managed to bring his hands to the front of his body.
ADV BOOYENS: How was this possible Mr Van Zyl?
MR VAN ZYL: I am assuming that he climbed through his handcuffs in a way, it is all I can imagine that happened.
CHAIRPERSON: He was still cuffed but his hands were now in front of his body?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, he had brought his hands to the front of his body in some way.
ADV BOOYENS: When you are saying that he actually climbed through these cuffs, I think I know what you mean, but perhaps you must try and clarify that for the benefit of the audience and the panel.
What do you actually mean when you say that somebody actually climbed through his handcuffs, when his hands are cuffed behind his back?
MR VAN ZYL: What I am trying to say is that he brought his hands through underneath his legs and his feet so that he could in that way have his hands in front of his body. I didn't actually see how it happened.
ADV BOOYENS: So you first became aware of this when he grabbed you from behind, grabbed you around the neck?
MR VAN ZYL: He caught me in a very firm grip and I brought the car to a halt, I couldn't break free from this grip and there was a weapon at my feet, it was an unlicensed .22 weapon which I had brought with me from Rhodesia illegally a couple of years ago, it was in 1975.
I grabbed this gun, weapon and I hit him over my shoulder, try to hit him to try to get him to relax his grip. He didn't relax his grip, this all happened very quickly and almost instinctively.
I then shot one shot in his direction over my shoulder, I didn't know where the bullet actually hit him. He let go of me and I pushed my hands over his head and immediately jumped out, pulled open his door, grabbed him from the car, threw him down onto the ground and I immediately shot him in the back of his head.
It was an instinctive happening and I realised that I had jeopardised the operation by trying to take this person to an isolated spot all by myself.
Before I had taken this person away from that previous point, Lotz and I had gone somewhere to the Aldo Screbanti race course to burn the activists' vehicle.
We poured petrol onto it and then burnt it.
ADV BOOYENS: Please let's just clarity the chronological order here. This was after you arrived in the bush?
ADV BOOYENS: At Blue Water Bay which you already mentioned?
ADV BOOYENS: You and Lotz then left with the vehicle?
ADV BOOYENS: I am assuming with one police vehicle and the Honda?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, with my vehicle and the Honda. We left Taylor with the four activists.
ADV BOOYENS: Where did you go to burn this vehicle at the Also Screbanti race course?
ADV BOOYENS: How did you do that?
MR VAN ZYL: We poured petrol over it and I think or I know that Lotz tampered with the petrol pipe or he cut if loose so that the petrol would flow out.
ADV BOOYENS: And the vehicle then burnt out?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, and we drove back to Taylor.
ADV BOOYENS: So this bit of evidence must actually be slotted in to the point before you left Lotz and Taylor with the activists and before you left with the one activist as you have just described?
ADV BOOYENS: You say that you realised that you had jeopardised the whole operation by trying to do it by yourself, how so?
MR VAN ZYL: As a result of the fact that the vehicle had already been burnt out, we couldn't actually afford any one of them escaping, so the situation or the gravity of the situation then hit me and I realised that I wouldn't be able to carry it out all by myself.
I removed the handcuffs from the person. I then drove to the meeting point where Sergeant Faku, Mokadeka and one other person, I met these three persons and they were waiting in a ten seater bus for me.
ADV BOOYENS: Can you remember exactly where they were waiting for you?
MR VAN ZYL: No. It was at some rendezvous point which we had previously agreed upon. I had various places of rendezvous with them and I can't remember exactly where we met.
It wasn't too far away from the New Brighton police station because we then drove to the New Brighton police station where we parked their kombi. They got into my vehicle and I sketched the situation to them.
I explained the operation and the purpose of the operation to them and they then drove with me to the point where Mr Mkonto's body was.
I told Faku that we had to stab him with a knife. Mr Faku and the other two members then all took part in that. They all stabbed the corps using knives.
They then took petrol from my vehicle, it was in a petrol can, they poured it over the body and set it alight. From there we drove back to the point in the Blue Water Bay area where Lieutenant Taylor and Lotz were waiting with the other three activists.
ADV BOOYENS: I beg your pardon. I think you should perhaps just give us a little more detail as to what you told Mr Faku and his colleagues and what was their reaction?
ADV BOOYENS: Yes, when you met them at the rendezvous point?
MR VAN ZYL: I can't remember my exact words, but what it amounted to was that we had arrested or intercepted four activists and we intercepted them along the road and that on the instructions from up high, we were busy eliminating them and that I needed them to actually take part in the operation.
ADV BOOYENS: What was their reaction, were they loath to take part or not?
MR VAN ZYL: No, they were not loath to take part. Mr Faku was quite agreeable because in the past, he had been one of the black members who had actually proposed this because he felt and his words were that the black members of the branch and their families were on the receiving end of the activities of these people who had been emotionally swept up and that we weren't doing enough to actually protect these members and their families, so there was actually no opposition from their side.
At that point I actually felt that I could trust them.
ADV BOOYENS: Now, to fast forward a little bit. Faku and yourself and the two other men went back to where Mr Lotz and Mr Taylor were waiting, is that correct?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes. Myself and Faku and Mokadeka then loaded Mr Mhlauli into my car and took him to a point about a kilometre from there - near the coast, near the dunes.
We were driving in that wooded area and we then got Mhlauli to get out of the car. One of the black members then hit him with a rubber truncheon over the neck or on the neck or head and the two black members then stabbed him with knives whilst he was laying on the ground.
ADV BOOYENS: Where did this truncheon suddenly come from?
MR VAN ZYL: It was a police truncheon or baton. It was in my possession, I can't recall exactly where I got it.
ADV BOOYENS: No, what I am trying to ask is, the man who actually hit the deceased, where did he actually get the baton from, did you give it to him?
MR VAN ZYL: I can't recall whether I gave it to him or whether he took it from the vehicle.
ADV POTGIETER: Mr Van Zyl, this Sergeant Faku and his two colleagues, were they members of the Security Police?
MR VAN ZYL: Sergeant Faku and Mokadeka were members of the Security Branch. Mr Shakati was a trained ANC guerilla who had been turned and who started working for us.
ADV POTGIETER: And they were willing participants in the whole operation?
ADV BOOYENS: Was it planned beforehand that he would be hit so that he would fall down on the ground and then stabbed, or what was the position?
MR VAN ZYL: I could have told Mr Faku that that was the plan at that stage, I can't recall when I told him that.
ADV BOOYENS: Now, after that had been done, what happened then?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Faku told me that the person was dead and we then left the corps there and returned to where Mr Taylor and Mr Lotz were waiting with the other two activists.
MR VAN ZYL: Sergeant Lotz and some of the black members then took one of the activists and they walked away from me with him.
When Lotz came back he reported to me that he had knocked the activist unconscious and that the black members then stabbed him to death.
Lieutenant Taylor then with the same black members, or some of the black members then, I can't recall who went along and who remained with me at the car, they then also walked to some point in the dark and Taylor made a similar report to me when he returned, namely that the activist had been knocked unconscious and that the black members then stabbed him and that they were both dead.
ADV BOOYENS: When the three remaining members or activists had been killed, what happened then?
MR VAN ZYL: I then gave the order that petrol contained in two petrol cans in my car, be poured over the corpses and that the three black members and myself would then return to the corps of Mr Mhlauli and also pour petrol over his body and then I would give a radio signal so that all three could be set alight at the same time.
The reason for this was that I knew that fire in that area might attract attention and that the time that we would spend on the scene after the fire was already visible, that we should actually limit this to the minimum and after that the members and myself, would then all go back to New Brighton, or the members would go to their homes and that we would meet each other later at the office.
I can recall that I told them not to forget to remove the handcuffs. The three black members and myself then went back to where Mr Mhlauli's corps was and I took petrol from the boot of my car, whilst Mr Faku and the other members removed the handcuffs from the body, from the corps.
CHAIRPERSON: Whose corps are you referring to?
MR VAN ZYL: It was mr Mhlauli's corpse. When Mr Faku took the petrol from me, they then told me that they could not get the cuffs off the body and that they had to remove his one hand to get the cuffs off.
CHAIRPERSON: You did not see this?
MR VAN ZYL: No, at that stage I was not close to the corps. They then poured petrol over the body and in a short radio broadcast to Taylor I told Taylor that they should set alight the other corpses and they did that and we then left.
ADV BOOYENS: They set the bodies alight?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes. Myself and the black policemen returned to New Brighton, this was early in the morning, but it wasn't light yet.
And then for the first time in the light of the parking area, I saw that there was blood on the seat of my car and I washed it off while I was there and then I returned to the office where I arrived at about seven and I reported to Mr Du Plessis that the operation was concluded and Mr Du Plessis and myself went to Captain Snyman's office and we reported to him that the operation was concluded. The four activists were dead.
ADV BOOYENS: So at the end of the day, there were six members of the Security Branch involved, is that correct/
ADV BOOYENS: Do you know Eric Winter?
ADV BOOYENS: Was he also involved?
MR VAN ZYL: No, not with the operation itself. He was the branch Commanding Officer and he participated in the gathering of information of activists, but he was not aware what the objective of this was.
ADV BOOYENS: You also had insight in a testimony of a Van Jaarsveld mentioned in the middle of 1984 that him and another person of the Intelligence Agency Police Head Office was sent by Graig Williamson to come and look at the possibility of the elimination of Mr Goniwe, this was the previous year and that he reported to General Erasmus and a member of Koevoet, he assumes that it is you, and you drove with him to Cradock - do you remember this?
MR VAN ZYL: I do not remember this at all.
CHAIRPERSON: Is it possible that he was right?
MR VAN ZYL: I think it is a minimal chance that I drove with him. I cannot remember this, this was a long time ago.
I can just say that he confuses me with somebody else or he has his time wrong, but I cannot remember that I participated in such a planning or operation.
CHAIRPERSON: It may be so that you cannot remember this, but this does not mean that it did not happen, that is what I want to ascertain.
MR VAN ZYL: It could have happened, the chance of it happening is minimal, but there is a possibility, but I cannot remember this.
ADV BOOYENS: He says that he reported to the Commanding Officer Gerhard Erasmus.
MR VAN ZYL: If this is so that he reported to General Erasmus, this eliminates me because I only started working at Security Branch in Port Elizabeth in 1984 and his service period as Commanding Officer ended at the end of 1983. I have never worked under him.
So he is confusing myself or General Erasmus.
ADV BOOYENS: When you arrived here, was Colonel Snyman the Commanding Officer?
ADV BOOYENS: Just to paint a picture, when did you leave PE?
ADV BOOYENS: You also had insight into Mr De Kock's amnesty application, is that correct?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, that is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Do you have an independent recollection of a discussion with Mr De Kock?
MR VAN ZYL: Not that I can remember, but it is possible. Myself and Mr De Kock were friends, we trusted each other and I do not remember the discussion itself, but it could have happened because we knew each other to an extent and we trusted each other to an extent.
ADV BOOYENS: You cannot remember the conversation, but as far as you are concerned as Mr De Kock states the facts and as you remember the facts, is this how this incident happened?
MR VAN ZYL: No, I don't have Mr De Kock's statement in front of me. I can remember seeing it, there are definite points that I think he is confused with.
If I have discussed it with him that he may have confused the conversation with that of other persons, but his version of our conversation is not just and the facts are not as he states it.
ADV BOOYENS: This is as far as you can take it because this is how much you can remember?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot remember the discussion itself.
ADV BOOYENS: If we can come back to the reason why you became involved in this incident, in other words your political motivation. You have already stated a political motivation on page 51 and 52 of your application, is that correct?
ADV BOOYENS: Mr Van Zyl, early in your application, you gave your personal background. Basically your history in border incidents and in shooting incidents, is this correct?
ADV BOOYENS: As you see it yourself here today, you as Security policeman, take us back to 1985. You as Security policeman when you became involved in the murder of the four activists, what was your objective?
MR VAN ZYL: I agreed with the principle that the situation was so desperate that only desperate action could stabilise the situation, whether it be permanent or temporary.
But apparently no help came from political side that could render a solution to the situation at that stage. At that stage I did not like it, but I agreed that the elimination of certain activists were necessary.
But the foundation was laid down according to me, that violent revolutionary war is in the country and there was nothing being done by the political people.
ADV BOOYENS: On the other hand, you have already referred to a Commission's statement, if we can look at your own situation. Did you have any knowledge about any instructions to the stabilisation of the situation, did you have any knowledge of that?
MR VAN ZYL: The pressure was there and the pressure worked up to my level and lower, that legal activity was counter productive.
That lawful detentions would simply lead to an escalation of the violence and the violent crime at the time.
ADV BOOYENS: From previous testimony given by Colonel Snyman, he said that during the month of February he attended a meeting to put this short, he was in discussion with the then Minister of Order, this was Min Louis le Grange and he had told him that you should make a plan with these activists.
You have told us previously that between January and March you were in Ovamboland?
ADV BOOYENS: Did you hear of this conversation?
MR VAN ZYL: I knew of this conversation, but I cannot remember when was this relayed to me, by whom or how, but I know of this conversation.
ADV BOOYENS: Mr Van Zyl, what you have done, do you agree that this was in contradiction with the laws of the country, did you act on own initiative, did you receive instructions, was this an authorised operation, what is the position?
MR VAN ZYL: I knew strictly speaking that it was an illegal operation, but I knew and I felt that it was an authorised operation and that I could never be covered because it was not authorised, but it was decided on such level as an authorised operation, that I could and should continue with it.
ADV BOOYENS: I just want to touch on this lightly, and I am talking of personal knowledge, do you know of the involvement of any other persons or institutions with this operation, besides these that you named in your amnesty application?
ADV BOOYENS: And you are not able to tell us what happened above Colonel Snyman, this is just what concerns you?
ADV BOOYENS: It may be suggested that the Defence Force was involved with this operation, what is your reaction on this?
MR VAN ZYL: I do not have any knowledge of Defence Force involvement in this.
ADV BOOYENS: I want to talk about your operation, would you have been prepared to work with the Defence Force people on such a sensitive operation?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chair, the sensitivity and the delicacy of such an operation and the implications that it could have later, I do not want to attempt this with any one else and any Defence Force involvement in the operation, would entail that people would be involved that I did not have control over.
ADV BOOYENS: From the judgement of the post-mortem there was testimony of a roadblock which involved the Defence Force, do you have any knowledge of this?
MR VAN ZYL: There were no roadblocks.
ADV BOOYENS: A roadblock is the impromptu pulling off of people off the road?
ADV BOOYENS: When you came back, were there any roadblocks?
MR VAN ZYL: No, there were no roadblocks.
ADV BOOYENS: If the Commission would just bear with me Mr Chairman. In so far as you have not done so, do you confirm the correctness of your application as supplemented by your evidence?
ADV BOOYENS: Thank you Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV BOOYENS
ADV POTGIETER: Mr Van Zyl, as I have understood your evidence it was important that you or Mr Goniwe in particular, that Mr Goniwe should be taken or removed from the community so that his influence on the community should not endanger the security of the country, is that how your evidence was?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, it wasn't only Mr Goniwe.
ADV POTGIETER: Yes, but him in particular?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, in my opinion he was probably the most prominent of the activists in the area. The other activists whom I had mentioned and the names I can't even recall, were mentioned in the same breath and they were also discussed, or the principle that they be eliminated, was also discussed.
CHAIRPERSON: Now you said that you had before this day, had contact with Mr Goniwe?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, that is correct.
MR VAN ZYL: Once as far as I can recall.
CHAIRPERSON: Was he arrested on that occasion or did you bring him in for questioning?
MR VAN ZYL: No, I was in the office. Some member of the Security Branch had picked him up in the township and brought him to the Branch office.
I spoke to him for approximately half an hour and that was the first time that I had spoken to him.
CHAIRPERSON: What happened to him afterwards, was he released?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, he was released immediately. I can't recall what exactly we spoke about, I think it was regarding his activities, but I can't recall the detail.
CHAIRPERSON: The other three deceased, were they ever questioned or arrested or prosecuted in the courts?
MR VAN ZYL: Not as far as I am aware.
CHAIRPERSON: I am speaking now in the context of the security legislation.
MR VAN ZYL: That is possible, but I was also away from time to time, and I was also not stationed in Cradock, so I can't recall that.
CHAIRPERSON: But as far as you are concerned, there was no such occasion in respect of the other three deceased?
MR VAN ZYL: It is possible, but I can't recall it.
CHAIRPERSON: In those days there were a lot of very oppressive acts or pieces of legislation which could be used to remove people from their communities?
CHAIRPERSON: The three other deceased, I am not talking about Mr Goniwe now, why was that option not exercised in respect of those three?
MR VAN ZYL: The matter was extensively discussed over a period of time and the general feeling at a more senior level than my own, was that detentions of activists, who had achieved that level of prominence, would at that stage, simply act in a counter productive way and it would lead to an escalation of the violence.
CHAIRPERSON: Even if they had been removed from the communities where they had influence?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, as a result of the mass reaction and the activities of remaining activists.
CHAIRPERSON: What did you think would happen if they were killed?
MR VAN ZYL: I don't know. I can't remember what I actually thought about it at that time.
CHAIRPERSON: Can't you recall now what the answer would have been and what you thought at that time?
MR VAN ZYL: I would have to speculate about what exactly I was thinking at the time.
CHAIRPERSON: Would there have been a difference in the reactions of the people whom he had influence over, that is now Mr Goniwe, if he had been arrested or killed, would there have been any difference?
MR VAN ZYL: At that stage that was what we thought. We were convinced that that was the case.
CHAIRPERSON: What exactly did you think?
MR VAN ZYL: We thought that if they were in detention, there might still be the occasional contact between them and the outside world.
CHAIRPERSON: And the only way to prevent that, was to kill them?
MR VAN ZYL: That was apparently the way that we thought at the time.
CHAIRPERSON: As they say, dead men tell no tales?
DR TSOTSI: Did I understand you correctly to say that there were many activists who were due for elimination but that you didn't have a list of them? Is that correct?
MR VAN ZYL: In principle, yes, Mr Chairman.
DR TSOTSI: How did you ensure that you would not eliminate the wrong people if you didn't have a list of them?
MR VAN ZYL: The members that were taking part in this operation, knew the majority of the activists Mr Chairman, and if an innocent person would have been in the vicinity of one of the targets, if I may call it that, the operation would not have been carried out or would have been aborted.
DR TSOTSI: I am talking about yourself, did you personally know these persons, these activists who were due for elimination or not?
MR VAN ZYL: I knew some of them as I said Mr Chairman, by sight, and some of them by photograph.
DR TSOTSI: Apart from Goniwe, did you know the other three men who were eliminated?
MR VAN ZYL: I had seen Mr Calata before in the presence of Mr Goniwe sir, and at that time I had seen pictures, photographs of Mr Mkonto and Mr Mhlauli.
DR TSOTSI: Would you say you knew them sufficiently to identify them?
DR TSOTSI: When you were chasing Mr Goniwe's car, did you know who was travelling with him?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, Mr Chairman, we had actually confirmed the names of all the activists at the meeting that day.
DR TSOTSI: I am not talking about the names, Mr Van Zyl, I am talking about your knowledge of the individuals, your personal knowledge of the individuals?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, Mr Chairman, we did.
DR TSOTSI: Did you know them personally?
DR TSOTSI: I saw that when you arrived at the spot where you stopped the car where you stopped, you didn't find it necessary to enquire who they were to identify themselves?
DR TSOTSI: You knew them so well, that you thought you can just go and kill them without necessarily identifying them because of your knowledge of them, is that right?
MR VAN ZYL: We would not have carried out the operation, if there was somebody with them that we did not know Mr Chairman.
DR TSOTSI: What would you have done, just suppose Mrs Goniwe was present in the car, what would you have done?
MR VAN ZYL: We might have taken them back to Port Elizabeth for questioning about the meeting and I would definitely have not gone forward with the operation.
DR TSOTSI: Let me leave it there.
ADV POTGIETER: Mr Van Zyl, is your application based upon the fact that you received instructions from Colonel Snyman?
MR VAN ZYL: It was not based upon that. I am applying because I feel that the crimes in which I participated formed a part of the political struggle of that time.
Unfortunate as it was, it was nothing else but that and that is what I base it upon. The facts which I received from Colonel Van Rensburg and later Colonel Snyman personally, are part of that.
ADV POTGIETER: The point that I would like to achieve clarity on is that you say that the authorization for this behaviour or action, was the instruction that you received from Colonel Snyman?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct Chairperson.
ADV POTGIETER: And what Colonel Snyman communicated to you after you had made a certain submission, was that you should do what would be in the best interest of the RSA?
MR VAN ZYL: There was no doubt what he meant about it, the submission was made by Colonel Du Plessis and it was about the elimination of a group of activists and Colonel Snyman concurred with this.
ADV POTGIETER: Why do you say that Colonel Snyman concurred with this?
MR VAN ZYL: He knew exactly what the submission was about and at several occasions before that, had discussed it.
ADV POTGIETER: However, upon what do you base this in reference to the agreement with Colonel Snyman, upon what do you base your testimony that Colonel Snyman agreed or concurred that you should kill these individuals?
MR VAN ZYL: Colonel Snyman was a soft-hearted person. I don't think he would ever have been able to get the words out where he would actually say that one should actually kill someone.
That was his manner of telling us that we should proceed with an operation.
ADV POTGIETER: That is the point which I have a problem with. The words which he used, could be incriminating and do you agree that the words do what is in the best interest of the RSA, the point that I am interested in is why did you say that this was an instruction to kill these people?
MR VAN ZYL: Because the submission was about that and if Colonel Snyman had wanted to stop us, and had wanted us not to do this, he would certainly have told us no.
He listened to the details, he had knowledge of everything that we had discussed over a number of meetings where the information had been discussed and there was absolutely no doubt about his interpretation of this.
ADV POTGIETER: Do you agree that Colonel Snyman did not expressly state that you should kill these individuals?
MR VAN ZYL: No, I do not agree with that. He did not state it expressly, but there was no doubt as to what the interpretation of his intentions would be.
ADV POTGIETER: That is the next step sir. It wasn't expressly stated that you should kill the individuals, but you interpreted this as permission to proceed and kill these persons, is that what you are saying?
MR VAN ZYL: That is how I interpreted it.
ADV POTGIETER: Just another aspect. Why did you stab or have the corps of Mr Mkonto stabbed with knives?
MR VAN ZYL: I think today, originally that is how it would have been done and things went wrong and I shot him.
The fact that he was also stabbed with knives, would represent the original intension.
ADV POTGIETER: The fact that he was shot through the back of the head with a weapon, would that not have eliminated that image?
MR VAN ZYL: In retrospect, yes, Mr Chairperson.
ADV POTGIETER: So it wasn't actually necessary to stab the corps with knives?
MR VAN ZYL: Well, naturally not, it wasn't necessary but nonetheless, I carried this out.
ADV BOSMAN: Mr Van Zyl, just for the sake of clarity, could you please explain to us the exact line of authority, let us assume that Colonel Snyman did not intend to have the persons killed, where would the line of authority have halted?
MR VAN ZYL: Chairperson, from Colonel Snyman we went to Colonel Van Rensburg, and we reported to him that Colonel Snyman had authorised the operation, the operation thus to eliminate.
He was second in command of the division and Mr Du Plessis was in command of the division that dealt with black matters. So it went from Colonel Snyman, Colonel Van Rensburg, Colonel Du Plessis and then myself.
ADV BOSMAN: Can we once again just achieve clarity, if Colonel Snyman had not given instruction, from whom would the instruction have come?
MR VAN ZYL: We would not have been able to proceed with the operation, if he had not given authorization.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV BIZOS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Van Zyl, 63 stab wounds were inflicted on the four people you murdered on the night of the 27th, 1985.
Do you agree with the District Surgeon's report with that?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot disagree with that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Do you agree that the 63 stab wounds is evidence of barbaric conduct?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, in retrospect, absolutely. The fact is though that instruction was that this killing should look like a vigilante attack and that a more humane way of doing it, would not have had the same effect.
ADV BIZOS: Does your answer mean that you were prepared to behave like a savage barbarian in order to mislead anyone that bothered to investigate the murders that you had committed?
MR VAN ZYL: In effect yes, Mr Chairman. I thought at the time that I could do it and it turned out that I personally was not able to do it myself.
ADV BIZOS: What is it that makes an Officer such as yourself, able to command a Unit that inflicts 63 stab wounds, but you yourself want to have hands supposedly free of blood?
MR VAN ZYL: I never said that Mr Chairman. I said I was fully intentional to do the whole operation myself at the time, to try and protect the two younger members from the same act. It turned out in the end that I could not do that.
ADV BIZOS: You couldn't stab anybody?
MR VAN ZYL: I have never attempted it, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: But you could give orders to your black colleagues and supervise their inflicting 63 stab wounds, and you thought that that was better?
MR VAN ZYL: I did not think so. That is the way it happened sir.
ADV BIZOS: Now, let us take one by one what you knew about each one of the persons that you murdered.
Let's start with Mr Mhlauli. What was his occupation?
MR VAN ZYL: He was a teacher as far as I can recollect Mr Chairman.
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot remember Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Where did he teach?
MR VAN ZYL: In Oudtshoorn as far as I remember.
ADV BIZOS: What sort of school?
MR VAN ZYL: No, I cannot remember Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Do you know whether he was married?
ADV BIZOS: Do you know whether he had any children?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot remember that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Do you know where he was born?
ADV BIZOS: Do you know what he was doing in Cradock, or he may have been doing in Cradock in June 1985?
MR VAN ZYL: Over the time preceding this incident, he had regular visits and contact with Mr Goniwe, at various places in connection with the unrest at the time Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: You have no personal knowledge of that, but let's - you agree that you have no personal knowledge of that?
MR VAN ZYL: Of course I have, his activities came to our notice months before that Mr Chairman.
MR VAN ZYL: From sources, both technical and people that gave information Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: What was he doing in Cradock according to your information in June 1985?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, the information that we were receiving was that he was briefing and being debriefed by Mr Goniwe on the situation in Oudtshoorn regarding the school and school boycotts and unrest.
ADV BIZOS: Was there a file on him?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot remember if there was a file on him Mr Chairman. He was a subject of the Security Branch of the South-Western District at the time.
ADV BIZOS: Did you get any written report from the South-Western Districts?
MR VAN ZYL: He was a subject of written reports, yes, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Were those put into a file?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, as far as I can recall, they were put in a file.
ADV BIZOS: Would the file have had a number?
MR VAN ZYL: The file would have had a number Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And would that have been known to Mr Eric Winter?
MR VAN ZYL: That is possible Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Wasn't Mr Eric Winter in charge of the mechanical means of spying on Mr Goniwe's home?
MR VAN ZYL: He was Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And would that all information relating to the activities of Mr Mhlauli in Cradock, would have been communicated to you presumably?
MR VAN ZYL: Communication between Mr Mhlauli and Mr Goniwe?
ADV BIZOS: Goniwe, which was picked up on the "tamatie" that there was in Mr Goniwe's home?
MR VAN ZYL: I would think so Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And that would have been put into a file?
ADV BIZOS: And that file would have had a number?
ADV BIZOS: And where would that file have been kept?
MR VAN ZYL: I would think that it would have been kept at Divisional Headquarters in Port Elizabeth Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And the number would have been known to Mr Eric Winter and also the people who typed the conversations that took place between Mr Goniwe and the others in his home or on the telephone?
MR VAN ZYL: If the interception was done in Cradock, yes Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And it was important for Mr Winter to have the file number, so that there would be coordination when the telephone transcripts were sent through in order that they should be pigeonholed into the various file numbers, not so?
MR VAN ZYL: That was done Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: That was done? And it must have happened in relation to Mr Mhlauli?
MR VAN ZYL: I would presume so Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes, and you remember actually, you had access to these files, did you not at the Divisional Headquarters in Port Elizabeth?
MR VAN ZYL: Access to what Mr Chairman?
MR VAN ZYL: To the files in Port Elizabeth, yes, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes? And do you remember whether there was a file for Mr Mhlauli?
MR VAN ZYL: I don't know if there was a personal file for Mr Mhlauli, but he was definitely mentioned in reports regarding the UDF and the Residents' Associations and they had different reference numbers.
CHAIRPERSON: Excuse Mr Bizos. Mr Van Zyl, having taken that drastic decision that certain people ought to be eliminated, did you not bother to look and find out whether there was such a file available before carrying out what you had planned to do?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, it is a long time ago. I cannot remember who had personal files and who had suspect files, and who were mentioned from time to time without files actually being opened on them personally.
CHAIRPERSON: No, I am not asking whether you bothered to find out whether there was any information to gain by looking at whatever file, personal or otherwise?
MR VAN ZYL: As I said, I had insight in all the source files regarding meetings and communication between people and that was not necessarily everything in a personal file, because this person was a suspect of the Division of South-Western Districts.
We would not have necessarily kept a personal file of him in Port Elizabeth.
CHAIRPERSON: But is precisely the point, having decided on these drastic measures, would you not have thought it prudent to investigate the position of any of the proposed victims of the attack?
MR VAN ZYL: We were in possession of a background study of the person. I cannot remember whether it was in the form of a style of a file or what the communication was Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: For a number of months prior to June 1985, was there increased supervision and intelligence gathering in relation to Mr Goniwe?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And was every word that was spoken in his house or on the telephone recorded and communicated to the Divisional Headquarters in Port Elizabeth?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot say that, I would presume that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Now, if I were to put to you that in accordance with the evidence produced in the second inquest, where those transcripts were produced, the name of Mr Mhlauli nowhere appears mentioned at all, would you accept that from me for the time being?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, I would Mr Chairman, that is quite possible.
ADV BIZOS: Quite possible? So that we have a situation that although you say that there was the strict supervision of Mr Goniwe for a number of months prior to June 1985, Mr Mhlauli's name was never mentioned either in his house or on the telephone in a manner which would have attracted sufficient attention in the Security Police in Cradock to record his name?
MR VAN ZYL: That would pertain only to the technical coverage in his house and on his telephone of Mr Goniwe's.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. Now, do you or did you know that Mr Goniwe and mr Mhlauli were personal friends from a young age?
MR VAN ZYL: No, I cannot recall that I knew that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Didn't anybody report to you that these were old pals and fellow teachers and colleagues?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot recall the information of that time fully, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And did you know that Mr Mhlauli, although he was the principal of the school in Oudtshoorn, was actually born in Cradock?
MR VAN ZYL: I don't recall that, no Mr Chairman, it is a long time ago.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. And for how long was a - to use your own words - a hanger on of Mr Goniwe in Cradock before the 27th of June, for how long were they around according to the information supplied to you?
MR VAN ZYL: His name came up over a period of time Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Answer the question please. According to the information placed before you, for how long before the 27th of June was Mr Mhlauli in Cradock?
MR VAN ZYL: No, I don't know whether he was in Cradock at that time Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Can you deny that the purpose of Mr Mhlauli's visit to Cradock, was nothing more than going back to his birthplace for the midyear school holidays?
MR VAN ZYL: That was not our information at the time Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Well, was it during the school holidays that you killed Mr Goniwe and Mr Mhlauli?
MR VAN ZYL: It was at the end of June Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Was it during the school holidays?
MR VAN ZYL: It is possible Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Was Mrs Mhlauli with him in Cradock for at least a part of their stay in their maternal homes in Cradock?
MR VAN ZYL: I don't recall that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Did you bother to find out whether there was any connection between Mrs Mhlauli and Cradock?
MR VAN ZYL: Not that I can remember Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Obviously you cannot deny that she too was born in Cradock?
MR VAN ZYL: It is very possible Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And that her family was there? Can you deny that?
MR VAN ZYL: Of course not, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And that Mr Mhlauli's family were there in Cradock?
MR VAN ZYL: I might have even known it at the time, but I cannot recall that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And Mr Mhlauli's misfortune was that he was a good driver and that Mr Goniwe didn't have a driver's licence, did you know that?
MR VAN ZYL: One of the other activists were actually driving the car Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes, it may be that Mr Calata was driving the car because he was the other driver. But let us deal with the (indistinct) of the first question.
Did you know that Mr Goniwe did not have a driver's licence?
MR VAN ZYL: I do not recall that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. Are you able to deny that the purpose for which he came, the purpose for which he came along was in order to assist with the driving?
MR VAN ZYL: That was not our information at all Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Well, first of all we have to believe you as to what your information was, secondly we would have to be satisfied that the people that gave you information, gave you the truth.
But be that as it may, did you know that Mrs Mhlauli, although she had come to Cradock, had left her husband in Cradock in order to come to Port Elizabeth for the purposes of attending a refresher course as a school teacher herself?
MR VAN ZYL: I do not recall that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And that if your information was accurate or you bothered to find out, that an additional reason for Mr Mhlauli taking that fateful drive was that if there was time and if they had finished early enough, he may have tried to pick up his wife from Port Elizabeth and take her back to Cradock. None of that was reported to you?
ADV BIZOS: If those facts turn out to be accepted as correct, would you agree that your information was miserably sparse and inaccurate?
MR VAN ZYL: About his family life, yes Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Well, and also for the purposes of why he was there. What sort of meeting was there in Port Elizabeth in Swartz' house?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot recall what was actually happening at the meeting, it was a UDF meeting Mr Chairman.
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot recall that now Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: It had nothing to do with the South-Western Districts and Oudtshoorn and where Mr Mhlauli came from. Did it?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot recall that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Wasn't Mr Swartz' house bugged?
MR VAN ZYL: It is possible yes, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Well, don't give us possibilities. You were the architect of the execution of this plan. Was his house bugged or wasn't it?
MR VAN ZYL: Either his house or his telephone was bugged Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. In the wealth of information that you obtained from the bugging of Mr Goniwe's home, was Mhlauli's name ever mentioned or what interest he may have had in any executive meeting of the UDF in the Eastern Province?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot recall which information we got from technical means and which information we got from living sources Mr Chairman.
At the time I was relaying of the sources of the people on the Branch in Port Elizabeth.
ADV BIZOS: Of course I do not want to deal with the subject matter of your other applications for amnesty for other killings Mr Van Zyl, but I think I must deal with it only in so far as it is necessary as to how you and your fellow Security Policemen behaved in the early 1980's.
Let us deal with the Pebco 3. You were involved in that?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: How long before the Goniwe killings?
MR VAN ZYL: About six weeks, five weeks, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Who authorised those killings?
MR VAN ZYL: That was authorised from the Divisional Commander's office as well Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Were there only Port Elizabeth people involved?
ADV BIZOS: Where did the others come from that killed the Pebco 3?
MR VAN ZYL: The people involved in the actual killing were from Port Elizabeth. The abduction which was part of the operation, there was some assistance from the Vlakplaas Unit.
ADV BIZOS: At whose instance did they become involved?
MR VAN ZYL: I take it from the Divisional Commander's instance Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Would that have been Colonel Snyman, the soft-hearted one?
MR VAN ZYL: Colonel Snyman or Major Du Plessis at the time if I recall.
ADV BIZOS: The efficiency of the Pebco killings showed greater sophistication in that it was made as if they had disappeared and had gone to join Umkonto as part of the fabrication given out to the people of South Africa by you and your colleagues? Is that correct?
ADV BIZOS: Was it intended that the killing of Goniwe and his associates, should be performed in a similar manner so that their bodies would not be identified and that the same fiction or "dekstorie" I think was the current expression at the time, given out that Goniwe and the other occupants of the car had disappeared and the Police were wrongly blamed for their disappearance and or death?
ADV BIZOS: Well, let me take you through some of the details that emerged at the inquest.
You had a motor car, the Security Police had a motor car which had been deregistered, is that correct?
MR VAN ZYL: I don't follow the meaning of being deregistered?
ADV BIZOS: That for the purposes of the municipal records, it couldn't be traced, the owner could not be traced?
MR VAN ZYL: Not that I know of in that sense Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Mr Goniwe's motor car had false number plates on it, taken from that car which the police were using and in respect of which, over a dozen parking tickets had been issued, don't you remember that?
MR VAN ZYL: It is not to say that the car was deregistered. That set of number plates was used at the Branch Mr Chairman, and that is correct as you say, that the vehicle itself from time to time, different vehicles had different sets of number plates, if you could call it that.
ADV BIZOS: Those number plates that you put on Mr Goniwe's car, were number plates on the car when it was owned and used by a member of New Brighton and you put those on after the name had been erased. The vehicle with that registration number no longer existed as far as the records were concerned?
MR VAN ZYL: I don't recall the origin of the number plates.
ADV BIZOS: Well, wasn't it that the burnt out car should not be able to be identified as Mr Goniwe's car?
MR VAN ZYL: No, Mr Chairman. As I remember the purpose of the number plates was just to take the car from the point where we had actually intercepted and abducted the people, back to where we were going to burn it out.
That number plate was left on the scene due to miscommunication between myself and Sergeant Lotz.
ADV BIZOS: Well, perhaps in the interest of truth it was miscommunication which left the two false number plates on the car, but accidentally one of the true number plates of Mr Goniwe's car was dropped in the vicinity of the car?
MR VAN ZYL: The intention was not to mislead anybody after the burning out sir, it was just from the point where we actually picked them up, back so that the vehicle could not be seen during that time easily as a CAT vehicle, because that was a CB plate that you are talking about.
ADV BIZOS: Come to terms with my question. Had it not been for the accidental dropping of a loose number plate taken off Mr Goniwe's car, you had hoped that the Investigating Officer would not be able to identify his car, you had burnt the bodies for the purposes of not being recognised and it would make it as if vigilantes have killed people and it would be put down as one of the incidents of what you called black on black violence, wasn't that the plan?
MR VAN ZYL: Not fully as you described it, Mr Chairman, because the car's identification could have been picked up by the engine or the chassis numbers.
The burning of the bodies was not to conceal their identity at all. If it had been, I would have said so, because I am admitting what I did.
The burning of the bodies was unfortunately further part of this act to make it seem like a vigilante attack.
That was not my plan, that was what Colonel Van Rensburg told us to do. I did not like it, Major Du Plessis dit not like it at all, but I felt I just had to do it.
ADV BIZOS: And wasn't Major, General Krappies Engelbrecht, whatever his rank may have been in 1985, sent down to sweep the evidence clean and didn't he cause the parking tickets that were issued to the Police used vehicle with the number plates that had been attached on Mr Goniwe's car, away so that they would not be traced back to the Security Police?
MR VAN ZYL: I have no knowledge of that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. Now, the Pebco 3 were not the first people that you killed and for which you ask for amnesty. Whom else had you killed for whom you are asking for amnesty?
MR VAN ZYL: I was involved in an elimination in 1979 or 1980 of a trained ANC cadre, Mr Chairman.
MR VAN ZYL: His MK name was Scorpion as far as I can remember.
ADV BIZOS: Who else have you killed that you have asked for amnesty for?
ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, with all due respect isn't this really going outside the scope of this? As far as the Pebco 3 is concerned, the questions asked by my learned friend I could still see the relevance, but really my learned friend is now casting the net so wide, what is the purpose of these questions?
It cannot really effect, he is not applying for other murders in this application, he is applying for this murder. What is the relevance of these questions? I object, this is going too wide, quite frankly.
ADV BIZOS: May I try and justify the question? The witness is giving out that he was almost a reluctant participant in this and acting under orders of Snyman and Van Rensburg.
The questions that I am asking show that this was one of a number of known acts, I am not asking him about unknown acts.
ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, with respect, that is not the case. The witness, the reluctance he expressed was the reluctance for the method of killing.
CHAIRPERSON: If we can give Mr Bizos a chance to finish what he is saying.
ADV BOOYENS: My apologies to my colleague, sorry, I though he was finished.
ADV BIZOS: I was saying Mr Chairman, that the purpose was in order to show that this had happened on a number of occasions before, and that it was a manner in which people thought to be enemies of the State, were to be eliminated, and this was not the first time.
I accept that the Pebco 3 is nearer to the event and much more relevant, but I do not concede with respect that the other events are irrelevant. I want to assure my learned friend and the witness, that I am not going to enter upon the details upon that, I do not want this Committee to hear what happened, nor to prejudice the witness in any way in relation to other applications.
CHAIRPERSON: Do I understand you correctly Mr Bizos, it is merely an investigation to what you at least, perceive as reluctance?
CHAIRPERSON: Does that help you Mr Booyens?
ADV BOOYENS: Yes, except that the point that I was making is that the witness, his evidence was that he said he didn't like it, that was the fact that it was supposed to be made to look like a vigilante type killing, in other words killing by stabbing people with a knife.
I do not think it is fair to the witness to say that he was reluctant to take part in the operation. He all along said that he regarded the operation and the killing of these people, as essential.
The reluctance expressed by him was only in so far as the method was concerned Mr Chairman, that was his evidence really.
CHAIRPERSON: I am going to allow the question.
ADV BIZOS: What other killing in respect of which you have applied for amnesty, had you performed before 1985?
MR VAN ZYL: As I said Mr Chairman, the one in - I think it was 1980, where I was involved in the elimination of one person.
MR VAN ZYL: The Pebco 3 and the Cradock 4.
ADV BIZOS: Wasn't there an instance where you actually blew up the body with explosives?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, that was the very first instance that you were referring to now.
ADV BIZOS: We will leave it at that, I don't want to become involved in the others Mr Van Zyl.
What I want to ask you is what arises out of paragraph 2 on page 45 of ...
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, are you going to (indistinct) Can we take the lunch adjournment?
CHAIRPERSON: Interpreter will you interpret the following for me to members of the public?
This process means a lot to many people, in particular it commemorates the lives of people who were respected in the community and it is a process that other people have resorted to come to terms with themselves.
And therefore this process needs to be respected. While I am not making a ruling, I would be thankful if people would remove their caps and sunglasses if they are not prescribed.
JOHAN MARTIN VAN ZYL: (still under oath)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV BIZOS: (cont)
Thank you Mr Chairman. I said that I was going on to another topic, and would return or intended to return back to the question of Mr Mhlauli's position when we traced a couple of documents.
We traced them during the lunch hour and I want to return to them if I may.
I am making copies, we have asked for copies to be made, but they are short entries and we will hand them in as Exhibits. The whole record is available and there is an agreement that we will draw attention to those portions of the record, of which we will be making use and if they are sufficiently important, the documents will be handed in as Exhibits, so that they may be readily available to members of the Committee, Mr Chairman.
If any information was obtained in relation to Mr Mhlauli in Cradock, it would have been channelled by Mr Eric Winter to the Port Elizabeth Headquarters, would it not?
MR VAN ZYL: If the information was gleaned by his sources, whether technical or live, yes, Mr Chairman.
MR VAN ZYL: If the information was gleaned from Port Elizabeth handlers on the Security Branch, handling sources in Cradock, it would have of course been dealt with directly.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. Mr Koni was employed, was he not, as a Security Officer in Cradock?
ADV BIZOS: Koni. He was an African Security Policeman whose job was apparently to listen to Mr Goniwe's conversations and all the activity that there was in the house picked up with the "tamatie". Do you remember that that was an instrument that conveyed information not through the telephone lines, but directly through a radio type of communication system?
MR VAN ZYL: I do not recall the name of that person that you mentioned, basically because I did not know all the members on the Branch.
ADV BIZOS: Very well. Well please accept from me, he gave evidence at the second inquest before Mr Justice Zietsman and he produced the transcripts that he made according to his evidence, and handed over to then Captain Eric Winter.
Just accept that for a moment. Now, could you please have a look at the first three pages of G9 in the Exhibit, we will hand in copies to the Committee.
If you look at the first three pages of G9, a document running to 58 consecutive pages and it may be possible that we will make reference to other portions of it in due course.
MR VAN ZYL: No, Mr Van Zyl. I have now.
ADV BIZOS: You see right in front, we might as well use this as an example of how the Security Police worked. Cradock CT/7/1721189/2/7/85 - Sergeant Koni.
Now that is a few days after the death of Mr Goniwe and his friends, do you accept that?
ADV BIZOS: Right. WH11 - Technical, what does that mean?
MR VAN ZYL: It was the reference given to telephone interceptions Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Telephone interceptions, yes. Lee Bozelick (G/L) Organisation Legal Resources Centre (S7/17/21/189) - what does that mean?
MR VAN ZYL: The S7 is reference to that file which deals with Legal Resources Centre, and the G/L above that stands for no file "geen lêer".
ADV BIZOS: So that we can at least take it that what many people considered a perfectly lawful organisation like the Legal Resources Centre at which my colleagues and I now work, was a suspect organisation to the Security Police at the time and we had a number?
MR VAN ZYL: I would not say it was a suspect organisation sir, a lot of organisations had reference numbers. I did not decide on those, but not all of them were suspect organisations.
ADV BIZOS: Oh, I see, was that an alternative telephone directory for the organisations?
MR VAN ZYL: It was just a reference to the organisation.
ADV BIZOS: Oh, I see. Didn't have the telephone number, but the serial number? Be that as it may sir, liaison with Niameka Goniwe's wife and G/L, what does that stand for?
MR VAN ZYL: "Geen lêer", no file.
ADV BIZOS: No file? Above-mentioned source reports that Lee Bozelick reported from the Legal Resources Centre that in Cape Town Mr Goniwe was in connection - herewith in Security information from the discussion.
Now can we please go to the bottom of page 2? You see there Sparrow Mkonto, (OPV2950) - what does that mean?
MR VAN ZYL: That is his personal file - referring to his file at the Divisional Headquarters Security Branch, Port Elizabeth.
ADV BIZOS: And there is a number which is not very legible on the right hand side, what is that number sir?
MR VAN ZYL: That is his S4 number, refers to his personal number as Security Branch Headquarters, Pretoria, sir.
ADV BIZOS: Pretoria? Now, Sicelo Mhlauli - what does the absence of any numbers against his name mean?
MR VAN ZYL: It would mean Mr Chairman, that Mr Mhlauli had no personal file at Cradock at the Branch and that the Branch did not have the means at their disposal at the time, because they were using just an index system to ascertain whether he had a number at Security Branch Headquarters or at any other Branch.
ADV BIZOS: Can we assume that the person that was actually the ear of the informants, both technical informants in Cradock, didn't know of any Security number of Mr Sicelo Mhlauli?
ADV BIZOS: Yes? Now if you have a look at the affidavit, may we hand in the first document, will you give it a number please Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Will that be Exhibit A. Mr Bizos, Exhibit A will consist of three pages?
ADV BIZOS: (Indistinct) which is part of the record and if my learned friends want any other portion brought to the Committee's attention, I am sure that they will do it, we would like to reserve the right to draw attention to any other portion of the document.
We don't want to burden this record unnecessarily, nor do we want that any time that you want to look everything up, that you should look to three cardboard boxes full of record and we thought that this was a way in which we could actually facilitate the proceedings.
CHAIRPERSON: I appreciate that Mr Bizos.
ADV BIZOS: Will you please look at the next document with A28 written in heavy marking pen?
An affidavit which was filed by the Head of the Security Police at Cradock and he says "I knew Matthew Goniwe personally quite well. I had knowledge of Fort Calata and Sparrow Mkonto. I did not know Sicelo Mhlauli at all". Do you accept that Major E.F.N. Winter made this affidavit for the purposes of the inquest into the death of Mr Goniwe and others and that is what he said about Mr Sicelo Mhlauli?
MR VAN ZYL: I accept that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Will you put in this document as Exhibit B please Mr Chairman.
Now, Mr Van Zyl, I want to appeal to you and it may even anew to your advantage once the evidence is put before you, to tell a bit more of the truth that Mr Sicelo Mhlauli was killed because he had the misfortune to be in that car and if you killed anyone of the four, everyone had to be killed in order not to prejudice the secrecy of the operation?
MR VAN ZYL: That is not so Mr Chairman, Mr Mhlauli had come to our notice before this operation. He was discussed at our level and he was prioritised as was each of the other individuals.
ADV BIZOS: But you see the Committee will have to work on probabilities and not on your say so Mr Van Zyl.
Let's just place a few other facts on record and then ask you to comment on them.
Was Mr Winter in Port Elizabeth on the morning of the 27th shortly after it was heard on the telephone monitored by Mr Koni that they had left Cradock because there was some doubt, they were supposed to come down on the Wednesday and they changed to Thursday and you having fixed the plan to eliminate them, wanted certainty that they had actually left early in the morning of the 27th?
What I am asking you is this, was Mr Winter in Port Elizabeth at Security Police Headquarters or at Murder and Robbery Squad Headquarters on the morning of the 27th?
MR VAN ZYL: Not to my knowledge Mr Chairman. As a matter of fact Mr Winter called me by telephone the next day, from Cradock, telling me that they had not received any word from Mr Goniwe and company, that they had not reported back to Cradock and that they must be in PE because they had left for Port Elizabeth the previous day.
They at the time, didn't know where they were and they were calling around to find out where they were. He then called me to say that they must be in Port Elizabeth, reporting to me that they must be in Port Elizabeth.
I told him that I would make a note of that and that is as far as Mr Winter's knowledge of this matter is concerned. If he was in PE the previous day, I didn't know about it and it was not in connection with this operation sir.
CHAIRPERSON: What was the purpose of noting it?
MR VAN ZYL: I told him that I would note it.
MR VAN ZYL: Because it was not his business what had happened to them at the time and he was not party of it, it would have made him an accomplice and he was never part of it sir.
ADV BIZOS: Well, if what you are telling us consistent with Mr Winter saying on the morning of the 28th when it was reported to him by Mr Koni that Goniwe's car was found burnt out in the bush, that his immediate response was AZAPO must have gotten them?
Is that consistent with what you are telling us?
MR VAN ZYL: Well, firstly I do not know about this conversation between Mr Koni, or if it had actually taken place on the date that you say. I cannot comment whether it is consistent sir. All I know is that is what happened.
He called me quite early in the morning on the 28th, and I don't know when Mr Koni told him about this.
ADV BIZOS: The "dekstorie" was going to be, was it not, that AZAPO must have gotten them, that was going to be what you were going to give out for your self-defence?
MR VAN ZYL: That was part of it, yes Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: How would Eric Winter have known about that "dekstorie" unless he was party to this conspiracy to kill if in fact he did not participate in it as Mr De Kock says that he did, according to you?
MR VAN ZYL: He did not get that from me or from anybody else as far as I know, and as far as I am concerned, that was his own deduction Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Of course, if Mr De Kock is speaking the truth in his application, and he repeats it before the Committee and he is believed, that you reported that Winter was there, but as usual he was drunk, that would not square up with your evidence, would it?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot recall a conversation between myself and Mr De Kock, referring to this instance and referring to Mr Winter being drunk Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Did Mr Winter have a drinking problem at that time?
MR VAN ZYL: I do not know if he had a drinking problem, at times he could drink quite heavily Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Did he have a drinking problem even whilst you were comrades in arms in Koevoet?
MR VAN ZYL: I did not consider it a drinking problem, Mr Chairman, but as I say he could drink or he was a heavier drinker than I was.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van Zyl, was he a frequent heavy drinker?
MR VAN ZYL: No, I would say at occasions Mr Chairman, he could drink heavily.
CHAIRPERSON: How often would that be?
MR VAN ZYL: At special occasions, like maybe once a week or once every two weeks, if the teams were out of the field and were together in the canteen, which was there for the junior members especially for their use, it actually happened at the time.
ADV BIZOS: Of course, a person who is even occasionally drunk would be a danger to an operation as sensitive as the one you arranged?
MR VAN ZYL: He wasn't part of the operation Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: No, I am saying - what I am saying is the nature of the operation was such that admitting to a person who got drunk from time to time, would endanger the secrecy of the operation?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, I received instructions from General Van Rensburg here and Major Du Plessis - what I want to say is that Major Winter was my senior in this matter, he was a Major at the time, I was still a Captain.
It was put to me that I had to put together a team to do this operation. There was no way that I could pick Mr Winter to form part of this operation to work under me.
ADV BIZOS: I am going to suggest to you that Mr De Kock is telling the truth, Mr Koni told the truth in the inquest, despite certain unsatisfactory features found by the Judge in his evidence at the time when the Judge did not know that the Security Police had done the killings.
That Major Winter was there and that the reason why you and your co-applicants do not put him on the spot is because he is, he was shown to be an absolutely hopeless witness before Judge Zietsman and because of his drinking problem, you and your colleagues excluded him from these proceedings because you could not trust him to sustain a plausible story?
MR VAN ZYL: That is absolutely not true Mr Chairman.
MR VAN ZYL: I would not have included Mr Winter in my team if he was my junior, because I thought the team that I had put together was sufficient.
ADV BIZOS: Well, we have heard that Cradock was the "brandpunt" of the Eastern Province. How could you leave out the man in charge of Cradock when you made a plan to kill Goniwe and any one that may have been associated with him, particularly if they were from Cradock, without Eric Winter being there to say hi, this person doesn't deserve to die, he is not such a bad man or woman in Cradock. He may even have gone as far as to say that he or she was an informer or a potential informer.
How could you have left a so vital person out of this murderous group?
MR VAN ZYL: I did not regard him as vital at all Mr Chairman. He only started working in Cradock at the beginning of that year and I did not think that he knew his suspects sufficiently at the time any way, so he wasn't as vital as you would like to put it.
ADV BIZOS: He would surely know more about a comparatively smaller place like Cradock than you?
MR VAN ZYL: Definitely Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: 240 Kilometres away and responsible for a much larger area?
MR VAN ZYL: Definitely more than me, particularly sir, but there were members at the Branch at Port Elizabeth, whom I regarded very highly in collection and (indistinct) of information.
MR VAN ZYL: The two members that I took with me, I thought were absolutely sufficient in this regard. They also helped in the gleaning of information as did every other member of the Branch in the preceding weeks.
ADV BIZOS: Is that Lotz and Taylor?
ADV BIZOS: Well, let's deal with that. They would also have had geographical difficulty between Port Elizabeth and Cradock?
MR VAN ZYL: No, Mr Chairman, we went to Cradock on a very regular basis. It is two hours' drive away. I can remember that Lotz in particular did regular stints of investigation in the Cradock area.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. Now, you knew this question of Mr Goniwe, particularly well. You were ceased with a problem and you were deputed by Van Rensburg and Du Plessis to put the plan together.
And in your application you say that this was three weeks before the 27th, is that correct?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Now, you know precisely three weeks earlier, a very important event occurred in relation to the fate of Mr Goniwe and his associates, do you know about that?
What happened at or about the time that Mr Van Rensburg told you that a plan had to be made about Goniwe?
MR VAN ZYL: Are you asking me if I know about what you are referring to sir?
ADV BIZOS: No, did you know about any important event that took, which may have had a result in relation to the fate of Mr Goniwe?
MR VAN ZYL: Not that I can recall of Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: You cannot recall off hand? Do you recall that it became generally known much later, that on the 7th of June, that is precisely three weeks prior to the murders, a signal was sent by General Van der Westhuizen to General Van Rensburg at the SSVR, that is the Secretariat of the Security Council in relation to Mr Goniwe, Mr Calata and Mr Goniwe's brother.
Mr Chairman, this signal appears in many places, but it is also to be found in the judgement which is in your file. I am just trying to find the page. It is on page 101 of the documents before you.
We will read this portion of His Lordship, Mr Justice Zietsman's judgement and reference to the signal. The signal marked priority and strictly confidential purports to be a signal sent from the EP GBS to the Secretariat of the State Security Council. What was the EP GBS?
MR VAN ZYL: It refers to the Eastern Province Joint Management Centre, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. The Joint Management Centre, yes. It reads as follows: "To General Van Rensburg. 1. Telephone conversation General Van Rensburg/Brigadier Van der Westhuizen on 7 June 1985 refers - names as follows: Matthew Goniwe, Mbolelo Goniwe brother or cousin of above-mentioned, Fort Calata. It is suggested that the above-mentioned persons should be permanently removed from the community as a matter of urgency. Wide reaction can be expected locally as well as nationally because of the importance of these persons, specifically the first mentioned for the enemy for example (a) interdict as recently as the disappearance of Godolozi, Hashe and Galela, Pebco Office bearers, (b) reaction of left politicians like Molly Blackburn, (c) protest as example of Oscar Mpeta in sympathy.
Would you mind interpreting that for us sir, what does it mean? What does this mean to you?
MR VAN ZYL: It is obviously a signal that we have all read about in the newspaper since then sir.
ADV BIZOS: Yes, I know but leave out the newspapers for the moment, the question is what does it mean to you?
MR VAN ZYL: That the GBS or the author of this signal was sending a message recommending the permanent removal of the mentioned persons in this communication sir.
ADV BIZOS: What did permanent removal mean?
MR VAN ZYL: To me there is no doubt about the meaning that it means elimination Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes? Well, thank you for that, it took us months to try and persuade Judge Zietsman whom we did eventually, that it means precisely that despite the interpretations put on it by other people.
But now, Mr Van Rensburg came to you three weeks before, on or about the 7th and says make a plan to kill Goniwe and the then Brigadier then later Van der Westhuizen, on the same day says it is proposed that Goniwe, Calata and Mbolelo Goniwe should be killed. Are you asking this Committee to believe that it was a mere coincidence and that there was not close cooperation between Van Rensburg who told you to kill Goniwe and Van Rensburg signal to the SSVR proposing that Goniwe should be killed?
ADV BOOYENS: I think in all fairness my learned friend should just make it clear, the signal does not say, it is not a signal by Van Rensburg to the SSVR, it is a signal sent personally to Van Rensburg, page 101, and perhaps just in all fairness to avoid confusion, this was of course an Army Van Rensburg and not a Police Van Rensburg, it is not the same one.
ADV BIZOS: It is clear that it is not the same Van Rensburg. We will accept that the two Van Rensburg's is a coincidence by name, but the question is is it a coincidence that the Port Elizabeth Van Rensburg proposes the death of Goniwe three weeks before it happened, and Van der Westhuizen proposes to the Pretoria Van Rensburg that Goniwe and the two others should be killed.
Are you saying that that is a coincidence because if you are, then I would suggest that it would be an insult to the intelligence of the members of the Committee. What do you say?
MR VAN ZYL: I am not saying that Mr Chairman. At my level, I was in no position to know more than I knew, so I am in no position to comment out of knowledge, out of common sense it looks certainly like it was not a coincidence.
ADV BIZOS: It was not a coincidence? Would you accept that if we take these two facts together, Port Elizabeth Van Rensburg telling you go and kill Goniwe and Port Elizabeth Van der Westhuizen telling Pretoria Van Rensburg to go and kill Goniwe, shows clearly in your mind that there was at the very least, cooperation, I think the Afrikaans word "skakeling" puts it better, that there was this "skakeling" between these two high ranking officers.
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, with the exception that the Security Branch had a more comprehensive list of suspects that were regarded as being active and being responsible for the situation Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: But you do agree with my proposition but you say that in so far as there may have been differences in names, you explain that you were the people on the ground and that your information was more extensive and possibly more reliable, did I understand you correctly?
MR VAN ZYL: That is what I am saying.
ADV BIZOS: Thank you. Now, let us assume for the purposes of argument Mr Van Zyl, that you didn't know about the signal or the goings on at the OP GBS in Port Elizabeth, when this signal was made public, an intelligent such as yourself and the Security Police, trained in the method of investigation, trained in the way in which you put facts together and draw inferences for your further investigation, when the signal was made public, did you go to the Port Elizabeth Van Rensburg and say Colonel, Brigadier or General, whatever rank he may have achieved by that stage, you told me to go and kill Goniwe, or to make a plan for the killing of Goniwe, look what the Army said.
What connection was there between us and the Army, did you go to Mr Van Rensburg, Port Elizabeth Van Rensburg, the applicant in this case, to ask him that simple question?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, by the time that the signal was made public knowledge, I had left Port Elizabeth for a number of years and I think General Van Rensburg had as well. I will admit that it crossed my mind, certainly because this thing has always been in my mind, but I did not approach him to ask him about it, no.
ADV BIZOS: Where were you in 1992, 1993, 1994 - the signal was not only published, but there was an inquest which lasted months on end with breaks over a period of two years? Why didn't you seek out the person that gave you the orders to make a plan for these murders to ask what was the connection between the Army and us?
ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, my learned friend has asked two questions, he has asked the witness where were you in 1992, 1993 and 1994 and why didn't you seek him out. Which one does he want answered?
ADV BIZOS: There are two questions, but I think you can handle them well enough for a person with your intelligence and memory Mr Van Zyl.
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, in 1992 and 1993 and 1994, I worked in Mozambique mostly. I was there for months on end, sometimes as long as four months without getting back to South Africa.
MR VAN ZYL: I have no reason why I did not ask General Van Rensburg for any explanation, but the fact is, we never discussed it again before the preceding events of this very hearing.
ADV BIZOS: Now, did the Attorney General, Mr Hargin and his assistant, Mr Marais, come to speak to you?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, they did Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Did they put to you that they had information that you were responsible for the death, you and other persons were responsible for the death of Goniwe?
MR VAN ZYL: Not as such, I don't recall them telling me that they were suspecting me. They asked me if I knew anything about it and if I was involved.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. And there was an opportunity for you was there not, to say to the Attorney General as you had done to others like Mr Du Plessis, who had produced the signal, will you give me indemnity and I will testify? Yes, you are correct in your suspicions, I will testify, why didn't you do that?
MR VAN ZYL: It was not put to me as an option, and I didn't know that I could do that Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: How long were you a policeman?
MR VAN ZYL: 17 years, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: And you didn't know that that was an option?
MR VAN ZYL: No obviously I knew if I became a witness, it would have been an option Mr Chairman. But I did not expect to receive indemnity.
ADV BIZOS: ... public knowledge, headlines all over the place that Colonel Du Plessis who produced the signal and was giving evidence about his Generals, had been given indemnity.
MR VAN ZYL: But he had done nothing in connection with their deaths Mr Chairman, and I knew that.
ADV BIZOS: Well, he proposed that they should die and did the signal which is participation in the planning of the murder?
MR VAN ZYL: He could give no real hard evidence on this actual murder Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. Well, I want to ask you this. You didn't take an opportunity of telling the truth to Mr Hargin and Mr Marais when they came to you. When did you decide that you would come clean?
MR VAN ZYL: Towards the end of 1996, Mr Chairman.
MR VAN ZYL: Because at that time, the full facts of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission came to my knowledge, as I was working in Angola at the time and I did not have any means of ascertaining the pro's and the con's or whether I could trust the system at the time sir.
ADV BIZOS: Did you not come back from Mozambique during weekends?
MR VAN ZYL: Certainly not during weekends, Mr Chairman, but ...
MR VAN ZYL: From time to time, of course I did.
ADV BIZOS: You had friends here who knew what was happening?
MR VAN ZYL: Very few friends that I could really get good information about this procedure Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Did you apply for amnesty before or after you had learnt that other amnesty applicants had mentioned your name?
MR VAN ZYL: After Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: After? Who told you that you had been mentioned in an amnesty application in relation to the murder of Goniwe and his companions?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot recall anybody telling me that, I was implicated in the Pebco 3 and I thought that if I asked for amnesty I could ask for everything.
CHAIRPERSON: But Mr Van Zyl, I just thought you answered and the effect of the question is you applied for amnesty after your name was mentioned by other applicants, not so?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: I would have guessed that that was in relation to this?
MR VAN ZYL: No, no, I was referring to the Pebco incident Mr Chairman, I am sorry.
ADV BIZOS: You in your application say that there was pressure from the GBS, let me read your own words on page 58 of the bundle before the Committee.
I am reading from the last paragraph on that page, ...
ADV BOOYENS: That is Mr Du Plessis' ...
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, I think you are referring to paragraph 4 on page 46?
CHAIRPERSON: Very powerful organisation, it influences a lot of people.
ADV BIZOS: Yes, I beg your pardon, 46 paragraph 4. "This state of events enjoyed tremendous attention at the end of 1984, during the JMC meetings. It became clear that the normal legal options such as restriction and detention of political activists would not produce the desired results."
Let's stop there for a moment. Where did you get this information about the pressure from GBS?
MR VAN ZYL: From, mostly from Colonel Snyman during very regular Officers' meetings and the pressure came down from him, through the other senior Officers, to ourselves.
ADV BIZOS: And did he specifically say that there was pressure from GBS to find an unconventional solution?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot say that he said that GBS had said that they should find an unconventional solution. The pressure was from GBS Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Did he tell you where he had met Minister Le Grange when he, Le Grange told him that they must deal with the agitators which he understood to mean, to eliminate them?
MR VAN ZYL: I heard about that meeting later. I cannot remember if Major Du Plessis told me about this when I came back from Ovamboland Angolan border. I went in January and I came back in April and apparently that meeting took place some time early that year while I was away.
ADV BIZOS: Now, let's just get clarity. Precisely when did you hear from either Colonel Snyman or Major Du Plessis at the time, that it was the view of Minister Le Grange that the agitators had to be killed in order to find a solution?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, it must have been shortly after I came back in April or probably April of that year.
MR VAN ZYL: 1985 sir. But I am speculating because it must have happened between going away and before the Pebco incident.
ADV BIZOS: And were you told, this is when you heard it, did either Snyman or Du Plessis tell you when Minister Le Grange had said that agitators should be killed for the purposes of bringing order to the country, when had Le Grange said that?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot recall that they told me exactly when. I have since heard exactly when it was Mr Chairman.
MR VAN ZYL: I have since heard when it was.
MR VAN ZYL: In February of that year I believe.
ADV BIZOS: In February of 1985?
MR VAN ZYL: I think so, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Right. Who was Commissioner of Police at the time? Let me remind you, Johan Coetzee?
ADV BIZOS: Not so? Ministers do not say things behind their Commissioner's back do they to Officers junior to the Commissioner of Police?
ADV BOOYENS: Really Mr Chairman, that is not a proper question. How can the witness be expected to answer that?
MR VAN ZYL: I was often speaking to Mr Le Grange personally when I was on the border Mr Chairman, and he spoke to me personally, often.
ADV BIZOS: Did he tell you that one of the ways to bring peace to the country, was to kill - did Le Grange personally tell you that one of the ways in which we could bring peace to the country, was by killing the agitators?
ADV BIZOS: The question was, do Ministers of Police tell junior Officers such as Snyman or Du Plessis who is to be killed and who is not to be killed, behind their Commissioner's back?
ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I object against this question. I do not really think the witness is qualified to answer it. He has neither been a Minster nor a Commissioner of Police.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, let's put it this way. Do you know of any instance where a Minister would bypass the Commissioner and speak to a lower ranking Officer in respect of eliminating people?
MR VAN ZYL: I don't know of any other incidents like that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Do you find it easier to repeat what you've heard about Louis le Grange's suggestions that the agitators should be killed because Mr Le Grange is dead?
MR VAN ZYL: I beg your pardon Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Do you find it easier to report a conversation about suggestions by the Minister of Police that agitators should be killed, because Mr Le Grange is dead?
MR VAN ZYL: Not at all Mr Chairman. If I had known about it first hand and the Minister was still alive, I would say so. If Mr Botha, P.W. had said that I would say so and he is alive. If I knew about Army involvement, I would have said so as well, but I don't know of that sir.
ADV BIZOS: All right. You were in Port Elizabeth were you not at the third meeting of the GBS held on the 23rd of May 1985?
ADV BIZOS: Were you aware of who the Chairperson of the GBS was in Port Elizabeth?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot recall who he was Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Well, wasn't it common knowledge that Brigadier C.P. van der Westhuizen was the Chairman?
MR VAN ZYL: He probably was, I had forgotten that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. And Lieutenant Colonel H. Snyman was the Security Police representative on the OP GBS?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Did the OP GBS have any jurisdiction in relation to planning or receiving information from Oudtshoorn?
MR VAN ZYL: I am also not in a position to answer that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Would you say that the position in May when the third meeting of the OP GBS was held, the position in the Eastern Cape was better or worse than the previous period?
MR VAN ZYL: I don't know Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: I want to read to you that according to the minutes of that meeting, in relation to the difficulties between AZAPO and the UDF were expressed in these words, and I want to get confirmation from you whether this is correct or not.
ADV BOOYENS: Have we got a copy Mr Chairman? If my learned friend can just remind me if we've got a copy, where in the record it is.
ADV BIZOS: (Microphone not on) ...the incidents between the UDF and AZAPO, it seems as if the unrest situation stabilised. Is that a correct reflection of what was happening at the time?
MR VAN ZYL: What was the date Mr Chairman, excuse me?
ADV BIZOS: 23rd of May 1985 sir.
MR VAN ZYL: And what period would that cover?
ADV BIZOS: Well, presumably the period before that date.
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, but one week or a month?
MR VAN ZYL: I don't know either sir.
ADV BIZOS: Well, you will know how the reports were made. I am sure that they would not have been interested in out of date information, would they?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, but I don't know if they are referring to a month before because the impression that I had was that it was since I came back from border duty, that things were deteriorating steadily.
ADV BIZOS: Well, that would contradict you if it was a correct reflection of the situation that was reported in the OP GBS.
MR VAN ZYL: Depending on what time, if it was just referring to a couple of days Mr Chairman, it is possible.
ADV BIZOS: Very well. We will argue the rest, but now let me ask you something else.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, can we take a ten minute break?
JOHAN MARTIN VAN ZYL: (still under oath)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV BIZOS: (cont)
Whilst you were busy planning the murder of Mr Goniwe and his companions, did you become aware of the fact that the Minister of Education, Mr De Beer, held the view which became publicly known that Mr Goniwe and Mr Calata should be reappointed to the school from which they had been dismissed in order to bring about peace among pupils at Cradock and even further in the Eastern Cape, were you aware of the proposal by Minister De Beer?
MR VAN ZYL: That was not communicated to me Mr Chairman, and I don't ...
ADV BIZOS: You didn't know about it?
MR VAN ZYL: I didn't know if it was communicated to the Branch at all.
ADV BIZOS: You didn't know what?
MR VAN ZYL: I do not know if that was communicated to the Branch, the Security Branch.
MR VAN ZYL: I have no knowledge of it.
ADV BIZOS: When did you first hear that there was such a proposal?
MR VAN ZYL: Afterwards, Mr Chairman.
MR VAN ZYL: After the elimination Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: The elimination, the murder? Yes. But now, you see, at this very meeting that we spoke about at which Mr Snyman was present, on the 23rd of May 1985, to be found in the second file of Exhibits in the inquest, page 5 in sequence. The following is recorded: JMC Eastern Province, Recommendation. On page 14 of that minute Mr Chairman, page 20 of the Exhibit, that is not the file that is before you unfortunately, we will have to make copies of these pages, but may I just read it for the purposes of progress and at the end - paragraph 26, Eastern Province JMC Recommendation. Message to the Security Council will be conveyed to the relevant Ministers. (a) Matthew Goniwe and Fort Calata must never be appointed again. Didn't that come to your notice?
MR VAN ZYL: Not at the time, no Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Well, if this was in Colonel Snyman's presence, are you suggesting that he withheld it from Colonel Van Rensburg, your superior and Mr Du Plessis, your superior in order to mislead you into believing that there was no contrary view that a Minister in the South African government was of the view that the matter should be for the good of South Africa, not what the Security Police thought, but what the Minister of Education thought, that it would be for the good of South Africa that far from killing Goniwe and Calata, peace would be restored by reappointing them to their school in Cradock? Never heard about it?
MR VAN ZYL: I am sorry, I lost the thread of your question Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: You've never heard of this proposal at all and if you have not heard of it, are you asking the Committee to come to the conclusion that Mr Snyman who was present at this meeting when this matter was obviously discussed, kept quiet about it either to your superiors and certainly to you in order to mislead you as to what some people thought was for the good of South Africa?
MR VAN ZYL: It was certainly not communicated to me Mr Chairman. I am not in a position to say what Mr Snyman did with the information or not, or if the Minister of Education was in possession of the information that we had received at the time. I just did not work at that level.
ADV BIZOS: Well, you see, because on the very same date, on the very same date ...
ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I do not want to be unnecessarily difficult, but really to try and follow my learned friend's questions, he is sitting with documents in front of him that we don't have, it is extremely difficult I think, and unfair to the witness.
My learned friend asks very long, involved questions and really unless we have the document in front of us, it is virtually impossible I would submit for my client to properly deal with the questions, because I had a similar problem just now with my learned friend's question, I didn't follow it either and I don't have the document in front of me either.
So, perhaps I don't know, I think they have gone to make a copy of some documents, but we haven't got it with us at the moment. It is really getting virtually impossible with this sort of level of questioning to understand what is going on.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, can you deal with something else until those copies are available?
ADV BIZOS: I am going to deal with the document which I have just sent to be copied Mr Chairman. But this was one sentence, which I am sure that my learned friend understood and that is all there is about this.
I would like to continue cross-examining in order not to take up court time with documents. The documents are equally available to us as they are available to my learned friend, but I am not going to hold him to it, we will try and be as cooperative as possible in the interest of fairness.
CHAIRPERSON: I am just trying to avoid a situation.
ADV BIZOS: No, I don't want to put him at a disadvantage, but it is a simple sentence. Matthew Goniwe and Fort Calata must never be reappointed. Please assume for the purposes of my questions, that this matter must have been discussed at the meeting of the 23rd at which Mr Snyman was present and it was decided that the two should never be reappointed. That is all I am asking you to assume.
What I am asking you is do you ask the Committee to believe that this move by Minister De Beer, would have been hidden from the people responsible for State security such as your immediate superiors and yourself by Colonel Snyman? That is the question?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, I am not in a position to say what the Minister would have done, I do not know if that matter was discussed at that meeting that you are referring to either.
And I am sorry I would really like to give my opinion, but I cannot ask the Committee to believe anything that I don't know about. I am sorry.
ADV BIZOS: I see. Because and the document, I will be able to put a document before you as soon as a copy has been made, that this decision of this Committee of the OP GBS was communicated to the SSVR. Will you accept that there was liaison through Colonel Snyman with what was going through the Chairman of OP GBS to the SSVR?
MR VAN ZYL: I am sorry, I am missing you here.
ADV BIZOS: Do you, will you accept as a fact that the Security Police communicated through the OP GBS to the Ministers responsible that Goniwe should not be reappointed?
MR VAN ZYL: Was that not a GBS recommendation sir?
ADV BIZOS: The GBS recommendation with Mr Snyman present.
MR VAN ZYL: And you are asking me whether Mr Snyman would have channelled it through GBS to SSVR?
MR VAN ZYL: I really do not know.
ADV BIZOS: Because the Security Police I am going to put to you, wouldn't take as important a decision as to kill Mr Goniwe and his companions without authority from the SSVR.
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot say anything about that sir, I do not know what happened at that level.
ADV BIZOS: What was likely to have a greater effect on the well-being and security of South Africa, a reappointment or non-reappointment of Mr Goniwe to the school that he was appointed at or the death of Mr Goniwe? And why was SSVR to be bothered about a reappointment and not concerned with the murder of Mr Goniwe and his friends?
MR VAN ZYL: I can only speculate about that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Well, yes please speculate, let's hear your speculation and then we will deal with the probabilities.
MR VAN ZYL: That the communication about the subject was overtly kept up so that the security was not leaked at that stage. That is all I could think of, I did not work at that level.
ADV BIZOS: Let me see if I understand what you are saying Mr Van Zyl. You say that all these resolutions and the what happened thereafter in relation to the appointment of Mr Goniwe was a smoke-screen, is that what you are saying?
MR VAN ZYL: I am saying if I should speculate that it is a guess Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: That it was a smoke-screen?
MR VAN ZYL: It is a possibility.
ADV BIZOS: And who do you suggest was responsible for creating this fiction?
MR VAN ZYL: I don't know Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Well, let us see from the way you understood the security apparatus, at what final level would it have to be decided as to whether Goniwe was to live or die?
MR VAN ZYL: I don't know at all Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Shouldn't you have found out before you formulated this plan to kill Mr Goniwe and his companions?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, I knew Colonel Snyman and I was convinced at the time that Colonel Snyman would not take such a decision on his own.
He did not give me any indication that that was the case. I just knew him as a person, and therefore I have always been under the impression that there was an instruction from a higher level. I did not confirm this and I do not know from which level.
ADV BIZOS: Well, let us see. Thank you for that Mr Van Zyl. Let us see because your idea of creating smoke-screens has got more evidence that I am going to show you to support it.
But certainly by the Security Police section. Please have a look at the signal that was sent by Mr Van der Westhuizen. Have we got it Mr Chairman, can we make it as an Exhibit C? That as a result of the meeting, well, let's read it into the record, Confidential EP JMC, 789 of 23 May 1985. Personal from Van der Westhuizen to Lieutenant General Van Deventer or Major General Van Rensburg. Do you know who Lieutenant General Van Deventer was?
MR VAN ZYL: I presume that he was in the Defence Force Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And General Major Van Rensburg?
MR VAN ZYL: I heard about him later, he was apparently in the Defence Force.
ADV BIZOS: And were they attached to the Secretariat of the Security Council to which we know the President and four Ministers had seats?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot remember that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. Well, that is the evidence that will become apparent from the documentation. They were in the Secretariat of the Security Council's body that gave advice and kept minutes and gave directions.
"Situation at black schools and educational colleges at Fort Beaufort. At this meeting, the JMC meeting of the 23rd of May 1985, the situation at the black schools as well as the situation at the Cape Education schools at Fort Beaufort was discussed. The meeting unanimously decided that the following recommendations in respect of - yes my Afrikaans is a bit rusty - the above matters, should with urgency be brought to the attention of the Security Council and should also be brought to the attention of the relevant Ministers for further planning for a particular date, that Goniwe and Calata should under no circumstances be reappointed in any post in the Department of Education and Training".
Then it doesn't matter about the student cells where - "in both cases press statements had already been made by the Ministers that the people involved should not be reappointed and should not be reallowed, seeing as the advantages or disadvantages of such a step must first be considered. The meeting is also of the opinion that any concessions in this respect would not defuse the situation."
Now, did any of that come to your notice, were you asked about it?
MR VAN ZYL: Not, it may have, but not that I can recall Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Well, let me tell you what your informant in chief from Cradock said in the inquest, that he had heard all about the attempts to reappoint Mr Goniwe, he heard of a visit which was well publicised in Cradock where the Director of Education came on behalf of the Minister and had meetings in Cradock in order to appoint, reappoint Mr Goniwe and Mr Eric Winter told His Lordship Justice Zietsman, that he, the Security Police representative in Cradock, was actually dead against any proposal to kill Goniwe, he was an enthusiastic supporter of the idea that he should be reappointed at the school that was so well run before he was transferred.
ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I don't know, with respect, before my learned friend, I don't know if it was a slip of the tongue, Mr Winter as far as I know, never testified that he was dead against any effort to kill Mr Goniwe. Is my learned friend suggesting that Mr Winter was aware of an effort to kill Mr Goniwe there, or was it a slip of the tongue?
ADV BIZOS: Dead against any proposal to kill Mr Goniwe, he said he was against the sending of the signal on the contrary, he was in favour of the reappointment of Mr Goniwe.
Now, what do you say to that, how firstly there were obviously such proposals made before the death of Mr Goniwe and if anybody took the trouble to report to you truthfully, you would have known about that?
MR VAN ZYL: I might have known about it at the time Mr Chairman, I cannot remember, that was 13 years ago.
ADV BIZOS: But how could you have forgotten such an important aspect which had become public knowledge? Whilst you were busy organising the murder of Mr Goniwe, there was a campaign going on led by the Minister of Defence of this country, that he should be reappointed as a teacher?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, I have forgotten about it if I ever knew about it.
ADV BIZOS: The question is firstly, how could you have known about it, and if you did know about it, how is the person responsible for making the plans to kill him, you could have either have missed the information or how could you have forgotten about it if you did not miss it at the time?
MR VAN ZYL: I think it is personally natural to have forgotten about it over this time period.
ADV BIZOS: In matters of life and death Mr Van Zyl, where there was a proposal by a Minister not only that he should not be killed, he probably didn't know anything about your plans, but that he said let him be reappointed.
MR VAN ZYL: Is it not more natural that my seniors would have stopped me Mr Chairman?
ADV BIZOS: Yes, unless of course the truth is that your little group of murderers in Port Elizabeth, decided never mind what any Minister says, and it doesn't matter what any Committee says, we are going to do our own thing?
MR VAN ZYL: That is not so Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Not so? Well, let's have a look even further. CHAIRPERSON: Before you carry on Mr Bizos. Which Ministers would this have been?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, I don't know. I would think it would be the Minister of Black Education at the time and I do not know, I was thinking about it myself. I did not write the signal so I don't know who they are referring to.
CHAIRPERSON: I think it will be fair to assume that the Minister of Police at the time, would be one? Not necessarily two Ministers, maybe more.
MR VAN ZYL: That is why I don't know why they are referring to two Ministers, the two Ministers.
CHAIRPERSON: Whether it is two or three, would it be safe to assume that the Minister of Police at the time, would have been one of them?
MR VAN ZYL: It is possible Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Why don't we tell the whole truth? Didn't the Security Police in Port Elizabeth engineer Mr Goniwe's sacking from his school at Cradock?
MR VAN ZYL: That I don't know Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Well, listen to what Mr Gunter Willy Mehrbolt said in an affidavit before His Lordship Mr Justice Zietsman. You know for the Security Police in Port Elizabeth to wash his hands of this tragic events, isn't easy because they are honourable people who are prepared to tell the truth Mr Van Zyl. Listen to what Mr Mehroldt says. I want to make it very clear that as Regional Director, I could take no policy decisions. That was done by Head Office in Pretoria. He is the Regional Head in the Department of Education and Training at the time and I am reading from his affidavit.
As far as Mr Goniwe's school activities are concerned, we had no grounds for acting against him. From a disciplinary point of view, I could therefore not take any action against him. I would like to comment on why he was transferred.
During an Eastern Province JMC meeting I was asked to transfer Mr Goniwe. What did the Security Police and the other people had to do with the movement of teachers Mr Van Zyl?
MR VAN ZYL: I would only guess that it was because of Mr Goniwe's political activities, that there was a request from whoever to have him transferred sir.
ADV BIZOS: It happened repeatedly because he was seen as the cause of the unrest in Cradock. I couldn't react to that because he could not be acted against outside of the disciplinary framework of the Department of Education and Training, and I can also not remember who exerted pressure on me within the JMC to transfer Goniwe.
It was however, very strong pressure exerted by the whole of this meeting. Because I couldn't act, they then approached the Headquarters of the Department of Education and Training. Mr Jaap Strydom then also intervened and he came down to the Eastern Cape and had an interview with Mr Goniwe at which I was not present. Mr Goniwe was an excellent mathematics teacher and they were very much sought after.
And so he goes on. And then in relation to the signal of the 7th of June he says the following: I have never seen this document previously. I do not know of any Eastern Province JMC meeting where Mr Goniwe was to be eliminated and in any case I am not aware of the activities on internal security.
Never on any of the Eastern Province JMC at which I sat, was it suggested to the detention of people in accordance with the law on internal security.
Now, if this evidence is correct, would it not indicate clearly to you that the OP GBS that Colonel Snyman sat on, didn't really make the decisions that it had to make about eliminating people whilst people from the Education Department and the City Council and the SABC and all the other people that had been dragged into the GBS structure were present, that there must have been a small group of Security Policemen and Army Officers that really decided on matters of life and death and even they had to refer it to the Secretariat of the Security Council in Pretoria, on which Mr Van Rensburg was the recipient of this signal of the 7th of June? Does it make sense to you?
MR VAN ZYL: I understand what you are saying Mr Chairman, but this strong recommendation from the GBS, if this gentleman was at the GBS meetings, certainly he would have known about the signal?
ADV BIZOS: No, he knew about that he shouldn't be appointed, but he says that he was never present where the restriction or any other action against anybody else, was discussed.
MR VAN ZYL: I was never at a GBS meeting Mr Chairman, so I really don't know.
ADV BIZOS: Mr Chairman, could we mark this affidavit as Exhibit D, and we will make arrangements for it to be distributed.
You will forgive some notes that were made by me and my assistants on it, please ignore them. They do not betray any secrets on our part, they are merely evidence of our thinking which we make known in public, by this stage.
But now, there was a meeting of the - an Action Committee meeting, held on the 6th of June 1985, the day before the signal was sent and Mr Le Grange's successor was present, Deputy-Minister A Vlok. It is a very short passage that I want to read to you.
Decision 1. After discussion of the Goniwe incident, it is decided that a Committee under the leadership of the SSVR will decide over Goniwe's fate and make suggestions to the Chairperson, on the 12th of June 1985.
Did anybody tell you about that decision?
ADV BIZOS: Who is Lieutenant General J.B. Stevens of the South African Police?
MR VAN ZYL: I don't think he was in the Security Branch Mr Chairman, I am sorry my memory is not good about that, but I think General Stevens was a Uniform Branch General if I am correct.
ADV BIZOS: And who was General, Major General B.K. Genis of the South African Police?
MR VAN ZYL: What was that surname please sir?
ADV BIZOS: And who was Major General S.H. Schutte?
MR VAN ZYL: That was General Schutte from Security Branch Headquarters, Pretoria if I am correct.
ADV BIZOS: So that, Security Branch Headquarters' representative was present at a meeting that the South African Police Headquarters on the 6th of June, the day before the signal that was going to decide on Goniwe's fate?
Did you know, or did anyone inform you whilst you were preparing to murder Mr Goniwe that the Deputy Minister, seven Generals of the Police and the Army, ten Brigadiers of the South African Police and the Army, a Colonel from the Army, five people from National Intelligence and five people from the Department of Education had come together in order to make a decision about the future of Mr Goniwe, and you planning his murder on the authority of your superiors and their junior officers were planning to murder him?
Was this what was called at the time parallel action?
MR VAN ZYL: There was also a lot of civilians at this meeting Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes, there were a number of civilians. But we don't know of course what discussion there is during intervals and at tea times and after the meeting, but what is important is that the question of the future or the fate of Mr Goniwe, was a matter that concerned people in the security apparatus well above your and your immediate superior's authority.
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, I knew Colonel Snyman so well, that I had assumed at the time that he would never take that decision at his own, therefore I had assumed that he had received instructions from above.
It could have included people of this stature, it might have included somebody else. To me at the time, I didn't know.
ADV BIZOS: We are in an unfortunate position and we regret for his personal discomfort and also the possibility of this Committee having the full truth, but this must have worried you once you were of the belief that Mr Snyman would not have made the decision on his own.
Did you go up to him and say Colonel, you are almost at the end of your life, don't die with a lie on your lips, tell us who gave you instructions that Goniwe must be killed?
MR VAN ZYL: I did not ask this to Colonel Snyman Mr Chairman.
MR VAN ZYL: Because if he is going to tell, he will surely tell this Committee.
ADV BIZOS: Have you visited him in his ill condition?
CHAIRPERSON: Why didn't you think it necessary to ask him?
MR VAN ZYL: I never really consulted with him on this matter Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: We know that, why did you not think it necessary?
ADV BIZOS: I am going to put to you Mr Van Zyl, that you in common with many of your colleagues during the period that you were committing these acts, may have been expected to hear nor see no evil. But don't you feel that you have protected those above you for long enough?
MR VAN ZYL: I am in no position to protect anybody above me Mr Chairman. I have told you where I got my instructions from. I have no further knowledge as to anybody above Colonel Snyman.
ADV BIZOS: If you were really interested in finding out the full truth about who was eventually instructed, who eventually was responsible for the instruction for you to commit this terrible deeds, if you wanted the full truth to be ascertained, why didn't you ask Colonel Snyman who did you check this with and what dealings did you have with General Van der Westhuizen that sent the signal?
Why didn't you do that, do you still owe these people loyalty in the position that you are in?
MR VAN ZYL: No, I don't Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Well, perhaps you should consider whether you should visit Mr Snyman this evening Mr Van Zyl.
But now, it doesn't stop there.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, can I just interject please. Let us get back to the question I asked you, why haven't you thought it necessary to enquire even at this stage where this instruction came from? I know you haven't done it, I am asking why?
MR VAN ZYL: I have still to this day, I assume that there was an instruction from higher up Mr Chairman, and I expect Colonel Snyman to tell the truth about that. But I have not asked him.
ADV POTGIETER: I am sorry. Sorry Mr Bizos. Mr Van Zyl, Colonel Snyman did not know you were to approach him in connection with this incident?
MR VAN ZYL: At which stage are you referring to?
ADV POTGIETER: When you received the instruction?
MR VAN ZYL: At the stage when Colonel Van Rensburg gave me the instruction?
ADV POTGIETER: Yes. When you and Mr Du Plessis went to Colonel Snyman, he didn't know that you were coming to him?
MR VAN ZYL: In connection with this incident?
MR VAN ZYL: As I have said previously, the facts that we gave to him, was not news to him. It is impossible for me to say if he expected it or not.
As I have said, I left there with the impression that he - I actually got the impression when Colonel Van Rensburg spoke to me, that he is speaking on higher authority.
ADV POTGIETER: But he did not consult with anyone in your presence, except with yourself and Mr Du Plessis?
ADV POTGIETER: He immediately reacted and he said do what is in the best interest of the country?
MR VAN ZYL: I can say immediately as far as I can remember.
ADV BIZOS: Did anybody tell you that the SSVR took up the matter of Mr Goniwe's fate and whether a day after the recommendation of the meeting at which Minister Vlok was present, a Committee was appointed by the SSVR known as the Geldenhuys Committee in which the various Services were represented and which after going through all the information available to it, came to certain conclusions in relation to Mr Goniwe which was sent to the Minister.
Did anybody tell you about that?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot recall that it was communicated to me Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Mr Peter Johannes Geldenhuys, whose affidavit is to be found on page 137, Mr Chairman, did I put in Exhibit D Mr Chairman, 137 and we will put this affidavit in, he was the Chairman. Colonel McDonald of the South African Police was a member of the Committee. Who is Colonel McDonald?
MR VAN ZYL: I don't recall him Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Chairman, you said it is on page 137?
ADV BIZOS: 137 of the file of affidavits put before the Committee, I beg your pardon. I should have made that clear, but this is why we will make a copy and give it an Exhibit number Mr Chairman.
But because I will deal with only formal matters, but by the time I am finished, the witness will have had an opportunity of getting a copy.
Do you know whether Colonel McDonald had close contact, whether he reported to the Commissioner of Police?
MR VAN ZYL: Which document are you referring to Mr Chairman?
ADV BIZOS: No, it isn't before you. According to an affidavit made by Mr Geldenhuys, they are all Mr's now, you know they all became ill along the way I think, and became - took passage, so that is why I refer to him as Mr.
With him as - or I may be doing him an injustice, because he was from the Air Force I think, he was just the Chairman. But Colonel Mcdonald, I am asking you whether you knew that he was close to the Commissioner of Police?
MR VAN ZYL: I don't recall knowing Colonel McDonald Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And Mr Jaap Strydom of the Department of Education and Training and Mr Tok van Vuuren, and a Colonel Le Clus, but pronounced the French way, do you know anything about this Committee meeting?
ADV BIZOS: And nobody told you that they were in favour after full discussion of the reappointment of Mr Goniwe?
MR VAN ZYL: No Mr Chairman. I don't know about this meeting. All I can think of is that they were not in possession of the same information that we were in possession of, because we were working with this every day.
ADV BIZOS: But there can be conflict of interests, but I thought that South African was one and indivisible at that time and if a Committee appointed at the request of a Minister or Deputy-Minister of Police, appoints a Committee which comes to a conclusion that a person should be reappointed, how did it come about that the little group comparatively little group in Port Elizabeth decided without knowledge of what the Minister had done and what the Generals were doing in Pretoria, to make plans for the killing of Goniwe?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot answer for Colonel Snyman in that respect Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: In truth and in fact, Colonel Snyman didn't instruct you to kill him? He instructed you to do what would be in the best interest of South Africa. Wasn't that a political decision?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct Mr Chairman, but as I said before, Colonel Snyman knew full well what this briefing was about.
ADV BIZOS: An instruction would have been put your plan into operation, kill them?
MR VAN ZYL: I have never heard a superior officer say that to me, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Why, did they all take lessons from Pontius Pilate where they were not prepared to use the ugly words, they washed their hands from evil by speaking in the manner that you say he spoke? That you must decide what to do having regard to the best interest of South Africa?
MR VAN ZYL: That is possible, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Now, you told us that Mr Van Rensburg was - what word did you use in Afrikaans?
MR VAN ZYL: I don't know what you are referring to.
ADV BIZOS: "Sagmoedig", I think.
MR VAN ZYL: Colonel Snyman, yes he was sir.
ADV BIZOS: A person who wouldn't order murder?
MR VAN ZYL: A person who would not order murder unless he has considered it very seriously or had received instructions to do so.
ADV BIZOS: You were the one who received his words. Why didn't you ask him to clarify it?
MR VAN ZYL: Because it was clear to me what he meant Mr Chairman.
MR VAN ZYL: It was clear to me what he meant Mr Chairman.
MR VAN ZYL: I also reported to him when it was finished Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. Had you not been misled by your senior colleagues and you had been told that there were recommendations made by the Geldenhuys Committee and by the Commissioner of Police in a report which we will produce in due course, suggesting that he should be reinstated and or have a very light banning order imposed upon him, you would have known that it was in the opinion of the Commissioner of Police, if he was telling the truth or if it is not a smoke-screen, that he and the Geldenhuys Committee and the SSVR would have been against the death of Goniwe?
You were misled if these facts are correct?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, at the time the information to our disposal was such that I had believed that the operation was going to carry on and to be pulled off. None of this information came to my knowledge.
On the other hand at the time I believed in what I did and I was strongly motivated and I don't know if Colonel Snyman knew about these Committees of their decisions. I am not in a position to comment on that.
ADV BIZOS: There is of course another possible explanation that you and your immediate superiors and the hawks in the (indistinct) situation wanted him killed, the doves led by Minister De Beer and others wanted him reinstated and you and your fellow members of the same pack, closed your ears and eyes to what was going on in the process of investigation and recommendation to the government and you did the act of killing whilst the foolish doves were debating as to what should happen to Mr Goniwe?
MR VAN ZYL: I don't think it was like that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Well, perhaps you can think overnight sir, why it was that you who had been entrusted to kill Mr Goniwe and other persons, that you did not know who would be accompanying him, was kept in the dark about what was going on in Pretoria in the offices of the Security Council and in the office of the Minister and why there were these apparently contradictory instructions. Tell us tomorrow.
MR VAN ZYL: Were you asking me why it happened sir?
ADV BIZOS: Yes, I have given you a reason why you were kept in the dark.
ADV BIZOS: Well, if you were not kept in the dark, that you and your colleagues were going to have one up on those who wanted a peaceful resolution of this country's problems.
MR VAN ZYL: There was nothing like that Mr Chairman.
ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I presume my learned friend has indicated that he has finished for the day.
This cross-examination this afternoon was completely unacceptable situation. If I could just request my colleague, he knows what documents he is going to rely on tomorrow. The whole agreement was that we were not going to, as I understand from my Attorney, we are not going to burden the record with the entire inquest record, we will make use and if I want to make use of any documentation at any stage, I will make that available beforehand to my learned friend, and if I could ask if he could do the same, because quite frankly we are sitting in an impossible situation, I do not even know whether I can object to a question because it is properly asked because I don't know whether something is quoted out of context, out of a document.
Really it is, I am going to object most strenuously tomorrow morning if there are any further questions out of documents that we haven't got copies available.
CHAIRPERSON: Is it possible Mr Bizos?
ADV BIZOS: Yes, may I just say this by way of self-defence. I am not using documents which I have up my sleeve Mr Chairman. These are documents which are matters of record and the record is equally available to the applicants and my learned friend.
I am entitled to put questions Mr Chairman, on documents which are a matter of public record, without actually drawing attention to the applicants precisely which portion of the document or what publicly known documents I am going to use and what questions I am going to ask.
They are all as part of the record and the Exhibits of the inquest. We have done a considerable amount of homework, I will try and be of whatever assistance I can to the Committee, including my learned friend, but I cannot take responsibility of preparing the documents for him.
He may have to do some homework Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, even if it is to help us, is it possible...
ADV BIZOS: Yes, I will have documents, ready copied so that by the time I use them, he will have them Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We will adjourn to half past nine tomorrow morning.
ADV BIZOS: Thank you Judge. I am sorry to say due to some technical difficulties, the documents that I intend put copies in, are not yet ready because despite every effort the machine apparently decided not to work this morning.
I am pleased to inform you that it is now working, and I have asked my learned colleague, Mr Mtshaulana to go and see to it that they are put in proper order. I don't want to take up Court's time, I am going to go away from what I was dealing with and come back to it, but in the meantime I can go on with other matters.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Bizos, we will bear with you.
ADV BIZOS: Thank you. Could I ask counsel for the Committee Mr Chairman, to hand in a batch of photographs of the deceased? May I just say that I am only going to deal with one of them at this stage, I would suggest that the faint-hearted don't look at them.
I am not putting them in for that purpose, just have a look at photo 7 of the album relating to Mr Mkonto.
CHAIRPERSON: Is that the one that depicts the motor vehicle?
ADV BIZOS: No, it is not a motor vehicle, it is two fingers showing - perhaps counsel for the Committee can assist with the copy.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, can we just see if I've got a proper copy.
MS PATEL: If I may assist, it is 5 in the batch, but it is marked 7 from the inquest, it has the original inquest markings.
ADV BIZOS: I will just ask a few questions before showing the photographs to the witness. Has the witness been sworn in Mr Chairman?
CHAIRPERSON: I will do so now, I am just clarifying something here.
Mr Bizos, there is somewhat of a duplication in the numbering of the photographs here.
ADV BIZOS: Unfortunately, that is - could we appeal to the - we have had these from counsel for the Commission, would I appeal to her to indicate the particular volume and the particular photograph to members of the Committee.
CHAIRPERSON: In any event the one that I have been handed, doesn't have the photo you've shown me. Thank you.
JOHAN MARTIN VAN ZYL: (still under oath)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV BIZOS: (cont)
Mr Van Zyl, would you please describe the firearm with which you killed Mr Sparrow Mkonto?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, it was a .22 calibre, it was a short rifle that was really a shortened version.
MR VAN ZYL: It was a shortened .22 rifle that I had brought from Rhodesia on one of my tours of duty in the 1970's. The weapon was semi-automatic and I cannot remember the magazine capacity.
ADV BIZOS: Now, to whom did that belong?
MR VAN ZYL: That belonged to myself.
MR VAN ZYL: Well, it was an unlawful weapon that I had at the time Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Did you tell anybody that it belonged to a friend of yours?
MR VAN ZYL: I see that Mr de Kock said that Mr Chairman, I do not recall the conversation. I know that I wanted to licence the weapon at some stage for myself, because I was a collector of guns and it is possible that I had said that to Mr de Kock.
ADV BIZOS: That it belonged to a friend of yours?
ADV BIZOS: What was so special about this gun that you wanted it as a collector's piece?
MR VAN ZYL: It was just a very scarce weapon that I had managed to come by in Rhodesia.
ADV BIZOS: Why did you take it with you on this murderous mission?
MR VAN ZYL: I suppose I took it with me because I thought I needed maybe a backup in case things didn't go right.
CHAIRPERSON: Why didn't you prefer your ordinary firearm that was issued to you?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, because my ordinary firearm could have been traced back to myself, and the unlicensed gun I could get rid of if I had to.
ADV BIZOS: You told us that you fired two shots with this firearm - one in the car, and one outside.
MR VAN ZYL: That is the way I remember firing two shots Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Well, would you have remembered it that way if you did anything else?
MR VAN ZYL: I don't follow you.
ADV BIZOS: You say as far as you remember it, don't you remember the number of occasions, the number of bullets you shot out of this gun?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, this firearm was a semi-automatic weapon and I can remember firing twice. If I had fired more than that, it was instinctive as I said yesterday, it was a very traumatic occasion and I felt that I was actually fighting for the operation, for my life in a way and I cannot remember clearly, but that is the impression that I had afterwards, that I had fired two shots.
ADV BIZOS: One in the car and one outside?
MR VAN ZYL: That is the way I remember it Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Did the shot fired outside, was that at point blank range?
MR VAN ZYL: That was very close yes, Mr Chairman, must have been. And the shot fired inside must have been as well, because I had basically, I could not see where it was going.
ADV BIZOS: And the shot fired outside the car, was that to the head?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: So that if there was an instinctive delayed pressure on the trigger, that more than one shot was fired, there would have been two bullet wounds in the head?
MR VAN ZYL: I would have had to pull the trigger twice, and there would have been two bullet holes, I don't know if there were.
ADV BIZOS: Yes, if in fact the post-mortem report shows that there was one bullet wound through the chest and one bullet wound in the head, then you would accept would you not, that you fired only two shots, one in the car and one outside?
MR VAN ZYL: That is the way I remember it Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes, and that is how the objective evidence appear to indicate as far as the wounds are concerned, there were not two shots on your version, fired outside because there was only one bullet wound in the head?
MR VAN ZYL: That is the way I remember it Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes, but if you look at the photograph, marked in my copy as - could we make the album an Exhibit Judge, Exhibit E. According to photograph 7 on my numbering in Exhibit E, does that accord with the Committee's numbering Mr Chairman?
CHAIRPERSON: I wonder Mr Bizos, if it would not be wise to renumber these photo's amongst ourselves?
ADV BIZOS: Yes, well shall we mark it as E1, the one that I am referring to.
CHAIRPERSON: The first photo in my album is one that - it is an aerial view of a sea shore.
CHAIRPERSON: Can we make that photo 1?
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, are we - the second photo has a typed photo number 12, it is also an aerial view of some junction in a road, let's make that 2.
CHAIRPERSON: The third photo is marked 13, it is also an aerial view with the letter A depicted on it?
CHAIRPERSON: Let's make that 3. The fourth photo is marked photo 1.
CHAIRPERSON: It depicts a burnt body.
CHAIRPERSON: Let's make that 4. The next photo is the one you want to refer us to, it is marked 7, let's make that number 5.
CHAIRPERSON: The next photo is a photo marked photo 2, let's make that number 6, it depicts a burnt body.
CHAIRPERSON: The next photo is marked photo 7, it depicts a burnt out motor vehicle.
ADV BIZOS: We will leave it at that.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, 7. The next photo is a photo marked photo 9, it depicts a number what appears to be foot prints, orange in colour. If we can make that photo 8.
CHAIRPERSON: The next photo is one that is marked photo 10, it depicts a burnt out motor vehicle, we will make that, leave it at 9.
CHAIRPERSON: The next photo is a photo marked 1, it depicts bushy area. If we can make that 10.
ADV BIZOS: I am sorry, which one is that?
CHAIRPERSON: It depicts bushy area.
ADV BIZOS: Oh, yes, thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: The next photo is marked photo 2, it depicts a burnt body. We will make that photo 11. The following photo is a photo marked photo 1(a), depicting a burnt body. We will make that photo 12.
ADV BIZOS: Thank you Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: You want to refer us to photo 5?
ADV BIZOS: To photo number 5, have you got a copy? Do you see that there is a pool of blood there and the hands of an Investigating Officer indicating that two shells were found in the immediate vicinity of the pool of blood, do you accept the correctness of the facts depicted on photo 5 of Exhibit E?
MR VAN ZYL: I see that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Do you accept the correctness of that as a fact?
ADV BIZOS: Now, it would appear that you fired two shots outside and if we take the post-mortem report into consideration, it would appear that one shot must have been fired into the head, and the other into the chest because only two bullet wounds were found on the body, would you accept that?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, the fact that there were two bullet, two spent casings laying outside the vehicle, doesn't necessarily mean that the one wasn't fired inside the vehicle.
This weapon had an injection opening on the right hand side of the vehicle, I was shooting towards my back. If the weapon was canted, it would have ejected the case against the roof or towards the right. If the weapon was upside down, I cannot tell you how the weapon was when I fired it, but I did fire inside the car, because that was the only way that I could release this grip on me.
ADV BIZOS: Would you agree that if the car was anywhere around there, on this photograph showing in great detail, you would have expected to see tyre marks there?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, I don't know how long after the incident happened, these pictures were taken. I cannot comment on that.
ADV BIZOS: Well, there will be evidence if need be, that they were shortly after the event. We will look into the statement, it must be a matter of the Investigating Officer, but do you agree that there is no evidence of any car tyre marks in that vicinity?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot comment on that, I did not investigate that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Well, no on the photograph as you see it, you do not see any marks, any motor car tyre marks? Do you agree?
MR VAN ZYL: I don't see any, no.
ADV BIZOS: And would you agree that if the photograph 8 was taken at approximately the same time as photograph 5, if the car was in the immediate vicinity of the spot depicted on photograph 5, you would have expected the sort of marks that you see on photograph 8?
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, is it the same terrain?
MR VAN ZYL: It is not the same terrain Mr Chairman, this is miles away from each other. The one is - the one where photograph 8 was taken, is a very remote area where nobody ever probably moved in those times. The other one was much closer to the township and it is definitely not the same type of area.
ADV BIZOS: Yes, I would agree that it does not appear to be the same terrain that photograph 5 appears to be a harder surface than the sandy surface that we have on photograph 8, but do you agree that it isn't tar or any other compressed surface?
MR VAN ZYL: I agree with that.
ADV BIZOS: Tell me, had you used this rifle before?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, Mr Chairman, I have testified to the fact that during the Pebco 3 I used the rifle as well.
ADV BIZOS: During the Pebco 3 you used the rifle, to do what?
MR VAN ZYL: To shoot the three activists.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. It has been suggested Mr Van Zyl, that the Pebco 3 was a trial run for the Goniwe 4 as they came to be known, even though one of them, or Cradock 4 ...
ADV BOOYENS: With respect Mr Chairman, suggested by whom, where and when? I was involved in the Pebco 3 matter, that suggestion I never heard, not there, perhaps my learned friend can say who suggested it and where it was suggested, but other wise I don't think that statement is fair.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, are you saying that that was never said?
ADV BOOYENS: No, I am saying it was never said in the Pebco 3 matter and perhaps if my learned friend can say who said it and when it was said, that this was a trial run, a sort of practise run really is what he is saying.
CHAIRPERSON: And if you had the answers to those questions, would you object to the question?
ADV BOOYENS: No, if my learned friend can tell us where ...
CHAIRPERSON: What does it matter who said it and when?
ADV BOOYENS: Well, if it was said My Lord.
ADV BIZOS: May I change the form of the question in order to avoid unnecessary argument. Was the Pebco 3 a trial run for the murder of Goniwe and his associates?
MR VAN ZYL: Not to my knowledge Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Now, at the time that you abducted the Pebco 3, had there ever been any suggestions before that date that Mr Goniwe was a candidate for murder in order to solve the problems in the Eastern Cape according to the opinion of the Security Police?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, it is possible. There were casual discussions at meetings into the sense that people had said from - that there is no other way that we are going to bring this thing to normality again.
It was not necessarily discussed seriously, it might have been mentioned by different people, different levels. As I said even Sergeant Faku had often expressed his opinion about that.
ADV BIZOS: Let us not concentrate too much on what the dead have said, and deal with the living.
Tell us when for the first time, there was a suggestion of killing Mr Goniwe.
MR VAN ZYL: I have just said I can't remember exactly when Mr Chairman.
MR VAN ZYL: It is impossible for me to say.
ADV BIZOS: Well, let me just refer you to paragraph 2 of your application on page 45.
Will you please read out the first sentence?
MR VAN ZYL: Gedurende 1984 en die eerste helfte van 1985, het die aanslag van die ANC/SAKP alliansie om die regering van die dag met geweld omver te werp, en die staatkundige bestel te vernietig, momentum gekry.
This is a general overview of the way that I remembered it and the way that the normal conditions had deteriorated during the time that I experienced it myself.
ADV BIZOS: Please have a look at paragraph 4 of your application on page 46. Read it together with paragraph 3 to yourself, because I have a question to ask you about that.
Now would you agree that the question of elimination of people in Security Police quarters and at the Joint Management Centres must have commenced during 1984?
MR VAN ZYL: It is possible Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Now, please try and tell us when, where an by whom during 1984 was a suggestion made that Goniwe should be killed?
MR VAN ZYL: It is impossible Mr Chairman, I have just said that it was possible that it happened in 1984. I do not know for sure that anybody had mentioned it in 1984 or whether it was mentioned in 1985.
ADV BIZOS: Well, let's take it 1984 and or 1985, who was the first person to make the suggestion or proposal or mention of Goniwe to be killed?
MR VAN ZYL: That I can't remember who the first person was. But surely murder wasn't something with which was made lightly as if you were having chats at the tea party, it was serious business, was it not?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, we were dealing with life and death every day in the townships. I really cannot remember that.
ADV BIZOS: We are dealing with the blowing out of this life of a principal of a school and a community leader. Please tell us who was the first person to suggest that he should be killed?
MR VAN ZYL: It is impossible to tell that sir.
ADV BIZOS: Who did it second, who did it third, don't tell us generally what the talk was. Please specify if you want to help yourself in making full disclosure to this Committee, who was it for the first time who said let us kill Goniwe?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot remember who it was that said it the first time Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Or at any time, let's broaden it, let's see how far your amnesia goes.
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot remember specific names, except for the people that were involved in this amnesty application and myself. I had said it.
ADV BIZOS: But this was according to you, only three weeks before - what discussions were there during 1984 and 1985?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, those were not discussions on which decisions were taken and it is a long time ago, I cannot remember that.
ADV BIZOS: Are you saying that what distinguishes other discussions from the one of three weeks before, that three weeks before the death of Goniwe a decision was taken to kill him, and is that the distinction that you are making?
ADV BIZOS: Does that mean that the decision to kill Mr Goniwe was taken before you visited Mr Snyman?
MR VAN ZYL: It must have been because General Van Rensburg told me, Colonel Van Rensburg then, told me to make a drastic plan and that he had spoken to Colonel Snyman before that. So the decision was taken before Major Du Plessis and myself went back to Colonel Snyman, that is correct.
ADV BIZOS: Oh, on the version that you have now given us, the consent of Colonel Snyman had been obtained before you and Du Plessis were asked to go to Colonel Snyman?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, I have no personal knowledge of that.
ADV BIZOS: You have personal knowledge to this extent sir, that Van Rensburg told you that he had discussed the matter with Mr Snyman and Mr Snyman had okayed it.
MR VAN ZYL: No, he didn't say that. He said, he mentioned Colonel Snyman, I cannot remember whether he said that he had spoken to him, whether he had received instructions from him or that he came from him, but it was clear to me that he came from his senior officer.
ADV BIZOS: Well, it was clear to you as a result of what was said that it was on the initiative of Colonel Snyman, even on the version that you had just given.
MR VAN ZYL: He was our Divisional Commander, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes, therefore it was unnecessary for you and Du Plessis to go to Colonel Snyman?
ADV BIZOS: Well, but you've just said that you understood him to say that he had discussed it with Mr Snyman and that he had been told something which indicated to you that the ...
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, I did not say that he had told me that he had discussed it with Mr Snyman, I have just said so again. I said I came away with the impression that he spoke to Mr Snyman because he mentioned his name.
ADV BIZOS: Yes, well I think we can leave the noise to the people whose business it is, may I proceed Mr Chairman.
MR VAN ZYL: As I said Mr Chairman, I never said specifically that Colonel Van Rensburg told me that he had heard or that he was told by Colonel Snyman to do this.
ADV BIZOS: Now, when he told you to make a plan, please tell us precisely what he said to you.
MR VAN ZYL: Those were his words, he said, he sketched the fact that matters were out of hand.
ADV BIZOS: Please say what he said to you and not your interpretation of it, please tell us what he said to you.
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, it is impossible to relate his direct words under oath. I can tell you what I can remember how he said it to me.
ADV BIZOS: Just try and repeat the words that you remember of what he said to you.
MR VAN ZYL: He said "ons moet 'n drastiese plan maak met hierdie mense, en baie vinnig ook".
ADV BIZOS: Right, and how did you understand that?
MR VAN ZYL: That they should be eliminated Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Why did you understand it in that way?
MR VAN ZYL: Because he would have used direct words if he wanted us to detain them or to arrest them or to charge them.
ADV BIZOS: This was the euphemistic way in which the Security apparatus dealt with murder?
MR VAN ZYL: That was the way that I understood it, yes.
ADV BIZOS: But what did he say about Snyman?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot remember what he said about Snyman, I told you before. He either said that he came from Colonel Snyman, or that he had spoken to Colonel Snyman, but those were the impression, that was the impression that I came away with.
ADV BIZOS: And you must have understood in that context that Colonel Snyman had authorised that a drastic plan should be taken quickly in order to kill Goniwe?
ADV BIZOS: That is how you understood it?
ADV BIZOS: If that is how you understood it, was it necessary to go back to - you and Du Plessis to go back to Snyman to ask him to authorise it once your immediate Commanding Officer had said words which you understood to mean that he, Snyman, had authorised it?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot speak for what Colonel Van Rensburg meant, but he did refer us back to Colonel Snyman. Maybe, and you are asking me to speculate on this, maybe it was for final authorization or maybe if Colonel Snyman wanted to stop it, he could have stopped it.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van Zyl, are you saying that while you went to your superior with Mr Du Plessis, that you went on independent ventures?
MR VAN ZYL: I don't follow you, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: You testify that you don't know why Du Plessis went to him, that must be after Du Plessis himself.
MR VAN ZYL: No, I meant what Colonel Van Rensburg meant, I do not know what he meant Mr Chairman, not Mr Du Plessis.
CHAIRPERSON: Oh, okay, well answer this then. Why did you and Du Plessis find it necessary to go to your superior for permission to carry out this operation when in fact you understood that authority had already been given?
MR VAN ZYL: That was in the time preceding that Mr Chairman. Then, when we - Colonel Du Plessis and myself, went back to Colonel Van Rensburg, Colonel Van Rensburg said that he was aware of everything and that we should get final authorization from Colonel Snyman for the operation to carry on and to continue.
ADV BIZOS: When you went - or rather when Van Rensburg said to you you must make a drastic plan, did he specifically identify any persons other than Goniwe?
MR VAN ZYL: He said that his closest collaborators should be targeted as well Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: So that when Van Rensburg spoke to you, the only name that he had authorised presumably, was Goniwe?
MR VAN ZYL: The first time, that is only name he mentioned, that is right Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And when you went to Snyman, what names did you specify to Snyman if any other than Goniwe's?
MR VAN ZYL: The names of the four deceased, that is including Mr Goniwe and as I said there were other activists mentioned as well, who were equally active at different places in the Eastern Cape.
ADV BIZOS: Please tell me, did you require specific authority from Mr Snyman to kill specific people or did you seek an open mandate, Goniwe and any other of his "trawante" or hangers on as you sometimes described them. What did you ask Snyman for?
MR VAN ZYL: We mentioned specific names Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Which names did you mention to Snyman?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, there were a lot of activists active at the time.
ADV BIZOS: Please tell us which names did you mention to Snyman?
MR VAN ZYL: Colonel Du Plessis gave the presentation and the names that I can remember other than the four mentioned here as I said yesterday, were Mr Madolla Jacobs and I think Mr Mbolelo Goniwe, I am not certain of him and others Mr Chairman, I mentioned it yesterday.
ADV BIZOS: Mr Mbolelo Goniwe is the third person mentioned in the signal by Colonel, the then Brigadier, Van der Westhuizen?
MR VAN ZYL: I am not certain if he was part of this presentation of Colonel Du Plessis'. Colonel Du Plessis may clear that up, or if he knows of any other names.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. Now, did you regard Mr Mhlauli as part of the Cradock 4?
MR VAN ZYL: He was regarded as part of the active activists that were responsible for school unrest and boycotts at the time Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Did you regard him as having anything to do with Cradock?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot remember whether we regarded him as having anything to do with Cradock Mr Chairman. He was from Oudtshoorn.
MR VAN ZYL: No, I am sorry I cannot remember that because it has been a long time, but he was from Oudtshoorn.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. Did you have any information that he had anything to do with any of the activities that you thought may have been taking place in Cradock?
MR VAN ZYL: Not at Cradock specifically Mr Chairman, but in his own area.
ADV BIZOS: In his own area? What authority did Colonel Snyman or Van Rensburg or you have to do with a person who was resident in Oudtshoorn and about whom you hardly had any information?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, the state of unrest at that time was spreading through the country, and through the country side and that did not, did not necessarily include our divisional area, it happened in the Karoo as far as Hofmeyr and Steynsburg and I can remember places like Port Alfred and Graaff-Reinet, further west, that were not necessarily in our control area, but the fact was that Mr Goniwe at the time had direct influence over all these happenings.
ADV BIZOS: Yes, we are not discussing Mr Goniwe's influence at this stage or rather the information that you had true or false, about Mr Goniwe, we wanted to know whether you had any information that Mr Mhlauli had anything to do in relation to any of the unrest in your area?
MR VAN ZYL: Except that he attended some meetings, had direct contact regularly with Mr Goniwe in connection with the school activities in our area, he was not active in our area.
ADV BIZOS: He was not active in your area? Now, who was in charge of the Security Police in Oudtshoorn?
MR VAN ZYL: That I don't know Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Well, you were planning to kill this man and you mentioned his name to Colonel Steyn, why didn't you pick up the phone and ask the person in charge of the Security Police at Oudtshoorn as to what they knew about Mr Mhlauli?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, there was liaison between us. Not myself, but some of the members definitely found out from the division.
ADV BIZOS: Well, you know this seems to me that you are leaving it wide open for anyone of you to come up and make up a story about it. I want to know from you, as the person who was responsible for putting this murderous plan into operation, what you did or what information you had from the Security Police in Oudtshoorn about Mr Mhlauli?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, this is 12 years ago. I cannot remember the extent or the type of information I even had at that time.
ADV BIZOS: Who reported to you anything at all about Mr Mhlauli, that was obtained from the Security Police in Oudtshoorn?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot remember which members of the Branch reported directly to me, except for Lieutenant Taylor who reported information that he had received, but there must have been others as well, I cannot remember who specifically.
ADV BIZOS: What did Taylor say to you?
MR VAN ZYL: That I cannot remember Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van Zyl, why would Taylor come tell you about Mhlauli?
MR VAN ZYL: Because we were at the time investigating the activities of all activists in the area Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Did you perhaps ask him to make enquiries?
MR VAN ZYL: I asked him to make ...
CHAIRPERSON: About this person who comes from outside your jurisdiction?
MR VAN ZYL: When a person comes to our notice, whether he comes from anywhere Mr Chairman, he was noted and his activities were investigated and that is how he came to our notice.
CHAIRPERSON: Maybe you don't understand me. Here is a plan to kill four people one of whom you don't know much about because he comes from outside your jurisdiction.
You say Taylor came to make a report to you, the details of which you forget?
MR VAN ZYL: I have forgotten yes.
CHAIRPERSON: All I want to know is why did Taylor feel it necessary to come and make such a report to you?
MR VAN ZYL: Because he was at the time very busy investigating and correlating information as well Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: At your request for the purpose and in the context of this plan of yours, or what?
CHAIRPERSON: So you did ask him to make enquiries?
MR VAN ZYL: I asked him to make enquiries in general, just so that we could prioritise the activists that were responsible for the conditions in the country.
ADV POTGIETER: Mr Van Zyl, over what period were you getting information about Mr Mhlauli?
MR VAN ZYL: About him specifically, Mr Chairman?
MR VAN ZYL: Information about him might have come to our notice long before, but specifically from the time that Mr Van Rensburg told me to get involved in this operation.
ADV POTGIETER: That was about two weeks before the actual killing, correct?
MR VAN ZYL: Two to three weeks, yes Mr Chairman.
ADV POTGIETER: So that was the only period during which you concentrated or that you paid attention to the situation of Mr Mhlauli?
MR VAN ZYL: To him as a person personally myself?
ADV BIZOS: Please give us a date on which you went to Mr Snyman with Mr Du Plessis.
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, it could have been a week or ten days before the actual happening, I cannot remember.
ADV BIZOS: Do you know - well let's put it this way - did Mr Mhlauli come to your attention for the first time when it was reported that he was in Cradock?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot remember when Mr Mhlauli came to my notice the first time Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Did you find out before deciding to kill him, or to suggest that he should be killed for how long he had been in Cradock before his death?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, if I knew that, I have forgotten that now.
ADV BIZOS: Can we accept that you had no information whatsoever about Mr Mhlauli before you may or may not have received information from Mr Taylor, after you had been ordered to prepare the plan by Van Rensburg?
MR VAN ZYL: Are you referring to myself or to the Security Branch?
ADV BIZOS: Yourself, yourself, you are not giving evidence as Security Branch, you are giving evidence as yourself.
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, it is very possible that I had come across his name often in the past. We had a Branch at the time with files running back to the 1960's and it is possible that I had come across his name.
ADV BIZOS: Well, what is the answer to the question? Was he in your mind as an activist, an important activists in the Eastern Province before or after you were asked to get a plan together by Van Rensburg?
MR VAN ZYL: To be honest, after I - probably from after I got the instruction, in my mind personally.
ADV BIZOS: You see, because it is clear is it not, from paragraph 10 on page 48 of your application, that according to you, if you are to be believed and I am not for one moment suggesting that his name did come up, but I am merely referring to what you say that "gedurende hierdie proses waartydens Goniwe, Calata en Mkonto baie aktief was, het die noue skakeling in samewerking tussen Goniwe en Mhlauli pertinent na vore getree".
If that is so, the information must of necessity would primarily come from Cradock?
MR VAN ZYL: Because Mr Goniwe was not restricted to Cradock. He moved around much more than most activists, and he moved right across the Eastern Cape from time to time Mr Chairman, at a very regular basis and he was very active and I think Cradock's sources of information was quite limited compared to our own.
So it was not restricted, the information was not restricted to come from Cradock only.
ADV BIZOS: Does the fact that Mhlauli was not known at all to Winter and his does not appear to be anywhere mentioned in the documents, and he did not even have a number in Port Elizabeth nor in Cradock, does that not satisfy you that Mr Mhlauli's elevation to an important activist was as a result of his being identified after you killed him?
MR VAN ZYL: It is a long question. Mr Chairman, I cannot comment on Colonel Winter's knowledge of Mhlauli. As I said yesterday Winter only arrived in Cradock at the beginning of 1985.
I find it strange that he did not know of him. I cannot comment on it any further, and information that we had at the time was that Mr Mhlauli was an important activist from the South Western District area.
ADV BIZOS: But now, how many names did you give to Mr Snyman?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot remember the number of names sir.
ADV BOSMAN: Mr Snyman, if Mr Mhlauli was active in Oudtshoorn and you had information that he was active in Oudtshoorn although he was in Cradock some times, wouldn't you have had a file on him in Cradock or in Port Elizabeth?
MR VAN ZYL: Not necessarily. There were so many suspects in the country at that time that some of them appeared in organisation files during meetings or conferences and so forth.
The process was to receive personal files, but I wasn't responsible for the administrative side of that.
ADV BOSMAN: Wouldn't you have identified the network around Mr Goniwe by means of files?
MR VAN ZYL: No, not necessarily. More through informants and technical confirmation of meetings.
The problem with the technical covering of homes and meetings was that the nature of our technical apparatus was not really high quality and often during meetings we had no, we could not obtain a proper version of what was said and to a large scale we were dependant on independent informants who would provide information and also confirm information in terms of the business of the activists.
ADV BIZOS: The information furnished by informers was put into a file with a number and cross-reference in relation to the other people's files that were mentioned in the information. Without a file in Port Elizabeth, how could Mr Snyman decide whether this man was a sufficiently active activist to deserve to die, to be convicted by Mr Snyman without - not only without being heard, but without even knowing whether or not there was a file on him, so that he could have a look whether or not he was active enough to deserve to die?
MR VAN ZYL: I am sorry, I've lost the thread of the question. If you are asking me how Colonel Snyman could decide that because the person did not have a file, there was a lot of written information coming from source reports about his activities, but I cannot tell you why there was no file.
Mr Chairman, I do not know if the fact that the person had a file or not a file, would have influenced Colonel Snyman if the information was such that he could judge the person's activities on the information.
ADV BIZOS: But now, did Mr Snyman, Colonel Snyman, ask any questions about Mhlauli, did he ask any questions of Mhlauli and the other unspecified number of activists that you say he gave you authority to kill at random?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot remember if he asked any questions Mr Chairman.
MR VAN ZYL: It was a short discussion.
ADV BIZOS: How long did it last?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, probably 10 or 15 minutes.
ADV BIZOS: And in 10 or 15 minutes, death warrants were issued by Mr Snyman for Goniwe?
MR VAN ZYL: That is not true, Mr Chairman. Colonel Snyman had regular information coming over his desk, the same as over ours, as did Colonel Van Rensburg.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van Zyl, are you saying that Colonel Snyman had more information than you about Mhlauli?
MR VAN ZYL: No, he was just fully kept informed because he was the Divisional Commander Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Now, in determining the life and death of Mr Mhlauli, who informed Colonel Snyman of the relevant factors he had to consider when making this decision?
MR VAN ZYL: Colonel Du Plessis or Colonel Van Rensburg reported directly to him.
CHAIRPERSON: No, I am talking at the time you went to visit him.
MR VAN ZYL: Colonel Du Plessis did, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Only Colonel Du Plessis?
MR VAN ZYL: I might have said something as well, but Colonel Du Plessis had all the information at the time Mr Chairman, and I was his junior. He was my Section Commander.
CHAIRPERSON: But Mr Van Zyl, this worries me and I need to clear it up with you.
You were in charge of this operation as it were and you were the one that was investigating these people in order to put into operation this plan to kill him, not so?
CHAIRPERSON: And one would expect, would you agree, that you would be in possession of all the relevant knowledge so that Colonel Snyman could make an informed decision as to whether Mr Mhlauli or others had to die or continue living?
MR VAN ZYL: I was certainly Mr Chairman, I passed this on to Major Du Plessis at a regular basis.
ADV POTGIETER: I am sorry Mr Bizos. Mr Van Zyl, do you have Exhibit A in front of you, it is the report regarding the telephonic conversations which were recorded from Mr Goniwe's telephone.
Refer to page 3, paragraph 7. Do you have it?
ADV POTGIETER: Paragraph 7, identification?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, that is correct.
ADV POTGIETER: The second last inscription regards Mr Mhlauli, do you have it?
ADV POTGIETER: This is apparently a summary of the information which was made available according to the records of the Security Police regarding those who were identified in the conversation which was tapped?
MR VAN ZYL: This is a report from the Cradock Branch to the Divisional Headquarters and it was written by Sergeant Connie and it is correct, we discussed this yesterday and I stated that Cradock in the right hand column had no file against the person's name.
That means that Sergeant Connie did not have a reference for it in Cradock. I do not recall who had the reference with us, but those were his file details of what was known.
ADV POTGIETER: Is it correct that this inscription is a summary of the information which was available in terms of the relevant person in the files of the Security Police?
MR VAN ZYL: In Cradock possibly Mr Chairperson.
ADV POTGIETER: Do you suggest that various regions had various forms of information or in fact no information regarding a person whereas there might have been information elsewhere?
MR VAN ZYL: It is obvious that the Divisional Headquarters would have possessed a much greater overview of an individual whereas the Regional Offices were focused on smaller issues.
They did not have as much at their disposal at the Headquarters.
ADV POTGIETER: According to the inscription regarding Mr Mhlauli, there is a reasonable amount of information surrounding him.
It reflects that he originally came from Cradock and states the fact that at that stage he was working in Oudtshoorn. It states his office or his occupation, he was a teacher at a primary school.
So there was quite a great deal of information regarding an individual before the report was written in Port Elizabeth?
ADV POTGIETER: And firstly you indicated to us that there was no file, that is your first reference and secondly, there was no indication that this person was a high profile activist in the Oudtshoorn region?
MR VAN ZYL: This is a Cradock writer.
ADV POTGIETER: Regardless of that, do you agree that there was absolutely no indication that this person had a high profile as a political activist?
MR VAN ZYL: In this context, in this writing?
MR VAN ZYL: No, not in this writing Mr Chairman.
ADV POTGIETER: In this report there is information regarding a person that wasn't in the Cradock area, information about the Legal Resources Centre, other individuals Molly Blackburn, Aubrey Coleman and so forth. Is that so?
ADV POTGIETER: If the person, Mr Mhlauli was a high profile activist in Oudtshoorn who was also involved in the Cradock situation, would it not have been reasonable to expect that that information be given in this report?
MR VAN ZYL: If there had been prior correspondence, there would definitely have been a larger reference.
ADV BIZOS: Judge, I want to hand in the affidavit of Jan Hendrik Willem Wilken, I can't read the last name, is it Frederik I think, the last first name, and to hand it in as Exhibit F.
Have you any reason to believe that the contents of this document is not correct Mr Van Zyl?
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, shall we make that F?
ADV BIZOS: F. Do you agree that if there had been a file of Mr Mhlauli in Port Elizabeth, there would have been a file such as there was for Sparrow Mkonto, Fort Calata and Matthew Goniwe which would have been destroyed for some reason or other, upon his death? Do you accept that?
MR VAN ZYL: If, yes, if he had a personal file I accept that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes, and can we then ask the Committee to accept as a fact that Mr Mhlauli did not have a file in Port Elizabeth on the basis of this affidavit?
ADV BIZOS: Yes. Now, would you like to venture any explanation as to why the person that the Port Elizabeth Security Police decided to sentence to death on your version, was not even worthy to have a file of his own in the records?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, the files were used, if I remember correctly, to keep correspondence and information that was sent to various Divisions and Headquarters.
If - I cannot see that we would in the short time before Mr Mhlauli's death, that there would have necessarily have been a file opened on him, if he was on a list of possible people to be eliminated. It is not - it does not necessarily mean that there had to be a personal file for him.
ADV BIZOS: The information that was coming in from informers, didn't it have to be verified by their handlers in documents which were put into the individual files?
MR VAN ZYL: Not necessarily, only if a report was sent to Headquarters as far as I can remember Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Well, any way we have it as a fact that he was not worthy to have a file opened in his name.
How many people were meeting at Swartz' house on the 27th?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot remember the number of people Mr Chairman.
MR VAN ZYL: That I cannot remember.
ADV BIZOS: Did you have information as to who were the persons there?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, we had them identified during the course of that day.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. How many - there must have been many more than four?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, I cannot remember how many there were.
ADV BIZOS: Try and remember how many more than four were there in the Area Executive meeting?
ADV BIZOS: Did you determine whether they all stayed there or whether some of them were just "bywoners" so to speak in the meeting, did you determine that? Could you determine that?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, it is a long time ago. I cannot remember what the type of meeting was that was held in Mr Swartz' house that day.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. Who identified Mr Mhlauli to you when the car was stopped?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman I think I have seen a photograph of him before and one of the other members had actually said who he was as well.
ADV BIZOS: Where did you get the photograph and where was it kept?
MR VAN ZYL: We got photographs of all suspects from the Department of Interior at the time Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: There must have been a file then in order to ask the Department of the Interior give us a photograph of this agitator so that we can keep it in the file?
MR VAN ZYL: That wasn't necessary at all.
ADV BIZOS: But where did you keep the photograph, in your back pocket or in your waist pocket?
MR VAN ZYL: No, it was probably kept in an informal file, but all the information about the activists were kept in a file that did the rounds at the time Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: What is the difference between a formal file and an informal file?
MR VAN ZYL: A formal file is being filed in the normal place where it is being filed, and an informal file is one that can be used for your work and can be carried around at your desk and between offices and so on.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van Zyl, was there an informal file in respect of Mr Mhlauli?
MR VAN ZYL: It was not a file as such Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Was there a documentation then?
MR VAN ZYL: There was documentation, yes Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: What was that documentation?
MR VAN ZYL: It was written reports from sources Mr Chairman that mentioned the activities, the link and the liaison between these activists and what they were doing and responsible for at the time.
ADV BIZOS: Well, why didn't you tell us when we were asking you whether there being a file on this person, and you said that there was not file? Why do you mention it when you find yourself in difficulties in explaining where the photograph was?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, the term file is a formal one that you are talking about, a file, the informal type of file that I am talking about is just a folder that you keep all the information in.
It is not the terminology that we used to use as a file, if a person had a file like you mentioned it, it is a personal file with a reference number.
ADV BIZOS: What happened to that "file" as defined as an informal file by you, what happened to it?
MR VAN ZYL: That I cannot remember, maybe it could have been with Colonel Du Plessis afterwards.
ADV BIZOS: Why wasn't it kept at the Headquarters so that other people could have access to it that may have wanted to refer to it?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, these were written source reports, sometimes by the source themselves, sometimes by the handler while he was making his notes.
ADV BIZOS: I am going to ask you again, to give you an opportunity to give yourself Mr Van Zyl, we were talking about a file in relation to Mr Mhlauli in Port Elizabeth and the record will show that we must have mentioned it at least 20 times.
Why did you not on any one of those occasions say that there was a folder or a file or an envelope or anything else in which information relating to Mr Mhlauli was kept, why didn't you say that?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, because I was specifically about a file, a personal file relating to this person. The files that we kept on people were - personal people, was a personal file with its history, his background and all the information as it came in. That was a personal file, it was a formal thing.
The file that you used to help you with the investigation or to keep your source reports before they were formalised in a written or a typed report, was not referred to as a file. It was just basically a folder in which you kept your notes.
ADV BIZOS: Who asked for his photograph from the Department of Interior?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot remember that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Would a letter have been written?
MR VAN ZYL: It is possible, yes.
ADV BIZOS: How else would you have got a letter from the Department of Interior other than writing to them?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, I cannot remember if we a contact to do it in a personal way, but ...
ADV BIZOS: Yes, I am going to put to you that this is pure prevarication on your part Mr Van Zyl, in order to explain away the fact that there was no information whatsoever in relation to Mr Mhlauli and that you killed him because he could not be allowed to live to tell the tale.
MR VAN ZYL: That is not so Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van Zyl, now let's not get into definitial problems, the matter of the Cradock 4, we've had difficulty of explaining simple phrases and terms for a long time.
This file - was that ever taken to Colonel Snyman?
MR VAN ZYL: It must have accompanied Colonel Du Plessis when he gave his briefing, yes Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Did you see it there?
MR VAN ZYL: It was in Mr Du Plessis' possession at the time.
CHAIRPERSON: So you remember he took it to Colonel Snyman?
MR VAN ZYL: Not distinctly Mr Chairman, that he took it with him.
ADV BIZOS: Was that a file separate from Mr Mhlauli, not for a number of all sorts of activists that didn't have individual files, but for the sake of convenience had a common file?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, we received a lot of information. At the time there were a lot of activists emerging as well, we did not have personal files on all of them at the time, and we were - the administrative process of opening a file, was not one - we would have to wait for Security Branch Headquarters to get a number as well.
ADV BIZOS: The file that was taken to Mr Snyman, why didn't you mention this before?
MR VAN ZYL: I did not say that I had seen, that there was a file, I assumed that the file went along, because Mr Du Plessis gave the briefing, but Mr Du Plessis was in possession of the file at that time.
ADV BIZOS: You wouldn't go as far as to tell us that Mr Mhlauli was actually singled out and his photograph was shown to Mr Snyman, will you?
ADV BIZOS: Of course not, yes.
CHAIRPERSON: When did you come into possession of this photograph?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, I don't know exactly.
CHAIRPERSON: Would I be correct in assuming that it could only have been during the last two weeks of his life because as I remember your evidence, it is only in the last two weeks of his life that you took particular, paid a particular attention to him?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, the origin of the photograph I cannot remember. I assumed that we got it from Internal Affairs. How long it had been at the Branch or between the members, because we did the copying ourselves of the pictures, I cannot say.
CHAIRPERSON: But didn't you get the picture from wherever you did get it?
MR VAN ZYL: At that time, yes Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, and that must have been in the last two weeks of his life?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, yes Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: We were discussing the Geldenhuys report yesterday. I would ask for leave to hand in a copy of firstly the affidavit of Mr Pieter Johannes Geldenhuys, as Exhibit G, Mr Chairman.
The report of the (indistinct) Committee to Major General J.F.J. van Rensburg as Exhibit H.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, is this one report or is it two different documents?
ADV BIZOS: They are two different documents.
CHAIRPERSON: Which one would be G.
ADV BIZOS: G would be the affidavit, if I could suggest. H is the document headed "sekretariaat van die" State Security Council.
ADV BIZOS: Do you see that in Exhibit G a Committee was set up as suggested by Minister Vlok, do you recall that, who had it before, and who the Committee members were, would you accept the correctness of the facts contained in Major General Geldenhuys' affidavit?
ADV BIZOS: And will you please turn to paragraph 43, on page 8 on Exhibit H. "Dit word aanbeveel dat (a) Goniwe in 'n onderwyspos op Cradock aangestel word, en (b) geen voorwaardes buiten gewone onderwys aanstellingsvoorwaardes van hom vereis word nie."
This is dated June 1985 and the evidence was that it was sent to the Minister, I want to just get the date Mr Chairman from another document.
CHAIRPERSON: Maybe we can find all those things out during the tea adjournment.
ADV BIZOS: Thank you Mr Chairman.
JOHAN MARTIN VAN ZYL: (still under oath)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV BIZOS: (cont)
hank you Judge. In order to place a date on Exhibit H, we ask for leave to hand in Exhibit I Mr Chairman, in which the document with a date is referred to and I will draw attention to it. So if you will receive Exhibit I which is a secret memorandum addressed to the Directors and Deputy Directors by the Strategic Communication Chairman of Mr Stemmet, of the Secretariat of the Security Council.
May I place on record Mr Chairman, that these documents emerged from the documents handed in at the inquest conducted by Judge Zietsman.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, you say that Exhibit I is submitted for the purpose of placing a date on Exhibit H.
ADV BIZOS: And other factors My Lord.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, for the purpose of the date, have we got an agreement as to what that date would be?
ADV BIZOS: Yes, I will read the passage out Mr Chairman. I will read out the passage. Mr Van Zyl, have you got Exhibit I before you?
ADV BIZOS: Will you please look at 2.2. It reads "in 'n skrywe gedateer 13 Junie 1985, waarin 'n afskrif in die besit van die Adjunk-Minister mnr S.J. de Beer, word heraanstelling aanbeveel." That refers clearly to Exhibit H the previous Exhibit, do you accept that?
ADV BIZOS: Thank you. We will come back to Exhibit I, but let's go back to Exhibit H.
You see that read with Exhibit I, as early as the 13th of June the Secretariat of the Security Council recommends the reappointment of Mr Goniwe as a teacher in Cradock, after weighing all the possibilities and the pros and cons and that the decision was unanimous and even Mr McDonald from the Police, agreed that that should happen.
Could you please tell us how come that you and your colleagues in the Security Police, were planning the murder of Mr Goniwe when a senior Police Officer had agreed to a recommendation that he should be reappointed as a teacher?
MR VAN ZYL: I had no information about that recommendation Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: But you see, I am going to suggest to you and we will prove to this Committee, that all those who had eyes to see and ears to hear, and were in any way concerned with the fate of Mr Goniwe, knew by mid June of this recommendation for his reappointment. How come that you, who had been appointed to do such a thorough investigation, missed this fact and continued to plan for his murder?
MR VAN ZYL: It was not passed on to me Mr Chairman.
MR VAN ZYL: It was not passed on, the information was not passed on to me.
ADV BIZOS: It was not passed on to you? Well, could you please go to Exhibit I and let us read paragraph 2.1 in the record. "Die saak is op 'n GVS vergadering onder voorsitterskap van mnr A. Vlok, Adjunk-Minister van Verdediging en Wet en Orde bespreek op 6 Junie 1985, op aandrang van die Hoof-Direkteur."
Now, we know do we not, from a previous Exhibit that Colonel Snyman was at that meeting, presided over by Mr Vlok on the 6th of June? Do you agree with that?
MR VAN ZYL: No Mr Chairman, I've got the dates different.
ADV BIZOS: Do you not recall that we showed you a document in which Mr Vlok's name in on top and who else was there, a long list of people, do you recall that? I will just try and get the Exhibit.
ADV BOOYENS: Colonel Snyman's name does not appear on that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: I am sorry, yes, Mr Snyman's name does not appear there, but the - yes. It has not yet been handed in Mr Chairman, I was referring - Mr Snyman's name appears on another document which we will hand in, but let us leave that aside for a moment.
Did you not know of a meeting at which Mr Vlok was present on the 6th?
MR VAN ZYL: No, not that I can recall Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And that a Committee had been recommended by him?
ADV BIZOS: But let's come nearer home. "hier is 'n spesiale komitee onder voorsitterskap van die Sekretariaat van die Staatsveiligheidsraad benoem om die aangeleentheid van heraanstelling te ondersoek en aanbevelings hieromtrent te doen", did you know nothing about that?
ADV BIZOS: But now you see, let's have a look at 2.5. "Die plaaslike veiligheidsgemeenskap te Cradock is voortdurend ingelig en steun die strategie vir heraanstelling." Have you got any reason to doubt the correctness of that statement?
MR VAN ZYL: The - I cannot comment on that except for the fact that "die veiligheidsgemeenskap" means the security community which included the Defence Force, for whom I cannot speak Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, what about the Security Police?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, I don't know. I never knew that that was the case at the time.
ADV BIZOS: "Veiligheidsgemeenskap" was an expression in general use at the time, meaning a combination of the Army, the Police, particularly the Security Police - was that not so?
ADV BIZOS: And would you accept that the Security Police in Cradock must have been informed if this statement is correct?
MR VAN ZYL: Not necessarily Mr Chairman, it could have been a representative of the Defence Force that had expressed his opinion as well.
ADV BIZOS: Would you suggest for a moment that the body responsible for the security of this country through its Secretariat, the Security Council and the Secretariat of the Security Council, would put on record that the local Security Forces or security community in Cradock was kept in touch and supports the reappointment of Mr Goniwe, would have excluded the then Major Winter who was in charge of the Security Police in Cradock?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, if the Security Police in Cradock was of that opinion, there would have been a report like that in Security Branch Headquarters, Port Elizabeth.
If somebody from Pretoria, representing the SSV was in Cradock and spoke personally to Mr Winter and got his ...