CHAIRPERSON: Before we start on today's hearing, there is a matter that I would like some information on, perhaps think about it.

There are various applications made by the same people that haven't been heard by this Committee. Am I right in assuming that you will all be concerned in those applications?

ADV PRIOR: Mr Chairman, I can't give you any assurance or undertaking, I know there are many other applications, where I was as Evidence Leader, involved.

CHAIRPERSON: You can probably make arrangements. Mr Ngubane, are you concerned in the others?

MR NGUBANE: No Mr Chairman, I was just instructed for these applications only.

CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps you can find out from your instructing attorney, who instructed you?

MR NGUBANE: Unfortunately I am the attorney, I was instructed by the families directly.

CHAIRPERSON: So you haven't spoken to the other families?

MR NGUBANE: No, I haven't. I don't know who they are.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Visser on record. On Friday last, Mr Chairman, my learned friend Mr Ngubane, enquired from the witness, Botha, who his informers were who assisted in the abduction from Swaziland of Ms Ndwandwe, to which questioning I objected.

You allowed the matter to stand down till today for legal argument to be presented to you in that regard, as to whether it was a proper question to ask and whether the witness or any witness should be compellable or should be compelled, to divulge, disclose the identity of his informers.

Mr Chairman, if you can give an indication as to what sequence you wish the argument to be heard in, I am happy to start.

CHAIRPERSON: I had thought we would finish the evidence first so we could excuse the witnesses, but if you want to proceed with the argument.

MR VISSER: Yes Mr Chairman, we are in your hands, we can do it any time. We thought it stood down until this morning 9 o'clock.

CHAIRPERSON: I just thought as a matter of convenience, it doesn't really matter, should we proceed with it now or ...

MR VISSER IN ARGUMENT: Mr Chairman, let's proceed with it now and get done with it, if it is in order with you.

Mr Chairman, we have found it possible to prepare heads of argument for you in which we attempt to deal with all the issues around the issue of informers and the disclosure of their identities.

Mr Chairman, the first point of departure must of necessity be the question of the power of the Committee to make an order, that a witness be compelled as it were, to answer a question.

Mr Chairman, the Amnesty Committee is a creature of statute as we know, it has no inherent jurisdiction as has the Supreme Court.

CHAIRPERSON: Can this argument and Mr Ngubane's argument be recorded? Fine.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, I am informed that the argument is being recorded. Mr Chairman, I was saying that the Committee is a creature of statute of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, to which I shall refer as the TRC Act, and does not possess of the inherent jurisdiction which resides in the Supreme Court.

Therefore Mr Chairman, it is bound to the four corners of the empowerment of its parent, the Act. The only reference in the TRC Act to the compellability of witnesses to answer questions Mr Chairman, you will find in Section 31, which I have quoted in my written argument.

I have quoted it there by reason of the fact that certain phrases and words are emphasised, I will read it to you Mr Chairman.

Section 31 deals with the compellability of witnesses and inadmissibility of incriminating evidence given before the Commission, and it says in subsection 1, any person who is questioned by the Commission in the exercise of its powers in terms of this Act, or who has been subpoenaed to give evidence, or to produce an article - the following words are not really relevant - says, be compelled to produce any article or to answer any question put to him, or with regard to the subject matter of the hearing, notwithstanding the fact that the article or his or her answer may incriminate him.

Now, immediately it becomes clear that subsection 1 deals with an entirely different situation, than does the Amnesty Committee. What it deals with here Mr Chairman, is clearly the proceedings before either the Human Rights Violations Committee or the Investigation Unit, because it is only there where these issues will become relevant.

The question of incriminating Mr Botha himself, does not enter the arena or the enquiry here.

CHAIRPERSON: Why not Mr Visser, if you think that the applicant has not made a full disclosure, one may well want to ask him questions about the precise part he played in something, and the answers might well incriminate him.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the meaning of incrimination here, is that the answer itself may incriminate him in the sense that he will as a result of the answer, may open himself up to prosecution. That is the point.

We will deal with the question of full disclosure a little later on Mr Chairman. Subsection 2 says a person referred to in subsection 1, shall only be compelled to answer a question or to produce an article, etc, if the Commission has issued an order to that effect after the Commission (a) has consulted with the Attorney General, who has jurisdiction, (b) has satisfied itself that to require such information from such a person, is reasonable, necessary and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality and (c) has satisfied itself that such a person has refused or is likely to refuse to answer a question, to produce an article on the grounds that such an answer or article might incriminate him or her.

Again, quite clearly Mr Chairman, the intention of Section 31(2) is to deal with situations which might arise before the Human Rights Violations Committee or the Investigation Unit, not before the Amnesty Committee, for the simple reason that these issues which are specified in the subsection, don't arise before you.

It does nor arise Mr Chairman. The test of what is reasonable and justifiable, reasonably necessary and justifiable in open democratic society, based on freedom and equality, is no test for any application for amnesty. The test here, as we well know, are those set out in Section 20, full disclosure, etc.

So, Mr Chairman, quite clearly, it appears from Section 31, that that is not an empowerment upon which the Amnesty Committee can rely in order to say to a witness I order you to answer a question.

The only consequence of not answering questions, will be twofold. One, if by inference it may be interpreted that Section 31 means that the Amnesty Committee can bring a charge, either of contempt of Court or refusing to answer a question, in terms of Section 31 which is doubtful whether it will ever succeed, but be that as it may, in terms of Section 39(e)(2), Mr Chairman, then such a person who has refused to answer the question, may be criminally prosecuted.

Section 39(e)(2) says any person who having been subpoenaed in terms of this Act, without sufficient cause refuses to be sworn or to make an affirmation as a witness or fails or refuses to answer fully and satisfactorily to the best of his or her knowledge, and believe any questions lawfully put to him or her, is guilty of an offence.

Now, that Mr Chairman, deals with the provisions relating to what is necessary and reasonable in an open and democratic society and nothing else.

With respect Mr Chairman, our first submission is that Section 31 deals with an entirely different situation than does the Amnesty Committee. This is not a hearing in terms of Section 31, where a person is questioned by the Commission for example. We know that. The applicants come here to move an application, it is not a situation of being questioned by the - the procedure is not to be questioned by the Commission.

Clearly the Commission or the Committee, has the right to ask questions of a witness, but that is not the situation, that is not the situation which is dealt with here. What is dealt with here, is the procedure.

It is not a procedure we say, Mr Chairman, where a person is questioned by the Commission, where that is the purpose of the proceedings.

Secondly Mr Chairman, it is also not the case where witnesses have been subpoenaed, where the applicants in this case, have been subpoenaed to come and give evidence. The classical situation is the one where the Human Rights Violations Committee, would hear evidence of the Commission of offences, and would then subpoena a witness in terms of Section 29, to come and answer questions.

That witness as we well know Mr Chairman, may not refuse to answer questions, on the basis that he may be incriminated by his own questions and we say Mr Chairman, without repeating ourselves, that that is not the procedure with which we are busy. We are busy with amnesty applications and therefore Section 31 has no application.

We say at page 3, paragraph three and following Mr Chairman, Section 39(e)(2) restricts the criminal liability to cases of refusal to answer questions where the offender has been subpoenaed. This question also provides a useful guide as to the true meaning of Section 31 Mr Chairman, which in our submission accords with the interpretation which we have just placed on it in our argument thus far.

We say that the only power of the Commission is to lay a criminal charge against a person who in the circumstances envisaged in subsection 39(e)(2), refuses to answer questions.

This finds no application or relevance in amnesty applications, whether the applicant to make such disclosure as he sees fit, always knowing that he runs the risk of his application being turned down should it be found that he had failed to make a full disclosure.

That is the risk he runs. Section 31 deals with the holding of enquiries by the Human Rights Violations Committee, or the Investigation Unit. Subsection 31(1)(b) Mr Chairman, which I have read to you, makes that much clear, in as much as the test expounded here is, here it is information which is reasonable, necessary and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality, finds no application in amnesty applications.

In Section 31(4) perhaps Mr Chairman, just by the by, needs to be referred to and that is where the TRC Act refers to the fact that the law regarding privilege as applicable to a witness summoned to give evidence in a criminal case in a court of law, shall apply in relation to subsection (1).

That deals simply Mr Chairman, again with the question of self-incrimination and really, there is nothing to be made one way or the other, of subsection 31(4) in our submission.

We submit therefore Mr Chairman, that the creator of the Amnesty Committee, namely the statute, has given no power to the Amnesty Committee to issue an order that a witness answers questions which he does not wish to answer.

If we are wrong in our submissions ...

CHAIRPERSON: This Section 31, applies to these hearings, doesn't it?

MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, it is difficult to see how they can apply to these hearings. Clearly Commission includes Committees.

CHAIRPERSON: What is the purpose of Section 19(5) then? The Committee shall for the purposes of considering and deciding upon an application, referred to in subsection (1), have the same powers as those conferred upon the Committee in terms of Section 5(l) and (m) and chapters 6 and 7, and this is chapter 6? So we have those powers?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, if that is your interpretation of it ...

CHAIRPERSON: The Act says clearly does it not, that we have those powers?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, then one must look at subsection 31(1) and ask the question, have any of the situations that have been envisaged in this subsection, arisen here, and we say they haven't.

I see Mr Chairman, how your mind works, well, then we are in agreement. I can't argue that the Committee should not be regarded as the Commission, because the definition says so. So clearly so that we won't be at cross purposes, this is not my argument.

Mr Chairman, if I am wrong in my first submission to you, then the question arises as to the very issue of the protection of the identity of informers Mr Chairman, and in that regard, most important judgment is that of Carla v Minister of Safety and Security, Justice Myburgh.

In that case Mr Chairman, the applicant attempted to compel the Prosecution to disclose the contents of a police docket in a criminal case, which included the identity of an informer to which the police objected to.

Mr Chairman, in the evidence presented by the Commissioner of Police, in resisting the application, the following two paragraphs are of importance Mr Chairman. The first is, he said:

The second and third points weren't relevant to the present instance Mr Chairman, and the fourth point that was made was that the South African Police are dependant on ordinary members of the public, coming forward with information about the commission of criminal offences. Many individuals however, are frightened of the consequences which might flow from assisting the police.

The level of intimidation of potential witnesses, constitutes one of the biggest single obstacles to the successful investigation and prosecution of crime in South Africa.

Many witnesses are only prepared to furnish information to the police on the strict understanding that their confidentiality will be protected, the fear of victimisation has reached such proportions in South Africa, that it has necessitated the establishment of a special unit, called Crime Stop, which enables members of the public to furnish information to the police anonymously.

That is referred to in Carla's case, at page 231, dealing with the issues Mr Chairman, Myburgh J, held the starting point in considering the defendant's justification for docket privilege, is an acceptance that the administration of justice is a fundamental public interest. It is an aspect, a crucially important one, of a broader public interest in the maintenance of social peace and order and reference is made inter alia to the case of D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children an all England report case, Mr Chairman.

His Lordship continues accordingly, as a matter of public policy, it is reasonable that some information in a public docket, should be privileged. (1) our law in regard to preserving the anonymity of police informers, is in keeping with the common law and statutory law of democratic societies, such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand.

Again reference is made to D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, Mr Chairman, where Lord Diplock, is quoted as having stated, the rational of this rule as it applies to public informers, is plain.

If their identity were liable to be disclosed in a court of law, these sources of information would dry up and the police would be hindered in their duty of preventing and detecting crime.

The public interest in preserving the anonymity of police informers, had to be weighed against the public interest that information which might assist a judicial tribunal to ascertain facts, relevant to an issue, on which it is required to adjudicate, should be withheld from that tribunal.

The balance has fallen on the side of non-disclosure, except where on the trial of a defendant for a criminal offence, disclosure of the identity of the informer, could help to show that the defendant was innocent of the offence and reference is made inter alia to Weakmore, Phipson on evidence.

Mr Chairman, His Lordship continues and says the various Freedom of Information Acts, referred to earlier, all create an exception to the public's right to access to information held by government agencies. In the case of information which would reveal the identity of a confidential source of information, the rule is that the Court is vested with a discretion to compel the Prosecution to reveal the identity of an informer, where it is in the public interest to do so.

The most compelling circumstances in which the Court would make such a compelling order, is where the identity of the informer could help to show that the accused was innocent.

The rules relating to informer privilege however, are not rigid or flexible. Public policy might and this is important Mr Chairman, for example require that the class of person whose identity should be kept confidential, is extended and it must be recognised that it may be in the public interest that in certain cases, a Court should not have a discretion to compel the disclosure of the identity of an informer.

Mr Chairman, what Judge Myburgh is saying here is that the rule as I read it in the law of the United States and England and New Zealand and Canada, etc, is that the option falls on non-disclosure. There are exceptions. The most notable one is when the identity of the informer could show the innocence of an innocent man.

But says His Lordship Mr Justice Myburgh, Mr Chairman, that the class of person who deserves protection, might be extended and in that, he is saying very explicitly, there might be cases where the classes might be diminished, where information as to identity should be more readily ordered. That is not what he is saying.

The emphasis falls on protection Mr Chairman, and in fact, he goes so far as obiter as it was, quite clearly, but obiter, he expresses the opinion that in certain cases, the Court should not even have the discretion.

CHAIRPERSON: Is this Myburgh, or is he quoting Diplock?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I drew this off the computer, I believe it is Justice Myburgh who is saying this.

CHAIRPERSON: ... as on the previous page.

MR VISSER: I believe it is Justice Myburgh, but I am under correction Mr Chairman, I will check that for you and let you know.

It is at Carla's, at page 233 - 234. I believe it is Justice Myburgh speaking here. However that may be Mr Chairman, if it were His Lordship Justice Diplock, with respect, it won't have compelling or binding - it won't be binding authority in this country Mr Chairman, but certainly it would be authority of a very persuasive nature, especially in view of our constitution which says that in dealing with matters, regard should be had to foreign law as well.

Mr Chairman, we submit that it is clear from the reading of Carla's case, that considerations taken into account on whether to order disclosure of the identity of the informers, must of necessity include the question of the effect of such an order, upon all aspects of the work of the police in fighting crime and the safety of the informers.

If I may say so Mr Chairman, it is important to realise that it is not a question which can or should be considered in isolation with regard to the facts or circumstances of any particular case Mr Chairman.

We submit with respect, that one must not be blinded by the facts of the particular circumstances here, of Ms Ndwandwe, being abducted from Swaziland during the struggle of the past, with all the accompanying political undertones, etc and say that in those circumstances, I am going to order you to tell me who the informers are.

The effect of such an order Mr Chairman, is an universal effect, on all the work of the police. The police also of today.

CHAIRPERSON: But Mr Visser, are we not dealing here with a very peculiar circumstances, where as I understand it, I may be wrong in this, the so-called informers were in fact, what is often referred to as askaris? They were members of the liberation struggle, who had been turned in some way or another, and were now being used by the police for their purposes.

MR VISSER: That is so Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it not relevant in those circumstances, and I would like to hear argument on this, to get the views of the so-called informers? If their attitude is we did this, we were forced to do it by the police, we would like to come out into the open now, it is a completely different picture, isn't it?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, if they wanted to be here, they would have been here.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, have they been notified that they might be implicated? That is another one of the problems that whatever decision we may come to, in my view and I am subject again to argument, would feel that we are subject also to the obligation on us, to notify persons who might be implicated parties, for them to express their views.

MR VISSER: Yes Mr Chairman, may I deal with it later on in the argument? I do come to that.

Mr Chairman, we submit also that there is no basis to distinguish between various types of crimes in which informers might have been involved. It is equally clear Mr Chairman, in our submission that Myburgh J, approached the classes of informers who deserved protection, under wide or to put it that way, liberal basis, even suggesting that such classes may well be extended, not curtailed.

That shows the approach Mr Chairman, that there should be an inclination to protect, rather than to disclose the identity of the informers, with reference do D v National Society case Mr Chairman, in which it was stated at 6058 to be the categories of public interest, are not closed and must alter from time to time, whether by restriction or extension, as social conditions and social legislation develop.

We have referred to the fact Mr Chairman, that Judge Myburgh suggested that certain instances, the discretion might properly be curtailed of the Supreme Court, but Mr Chairman, the important fact that arises from, the important decision that arises from Carla's case, is at page 233 where His Lordship says that the balance has fallen on the side of non-disclosure.

We refer you to S v Sefadi Mr Chairman, a case in which Manawick Acting J, held the following if the sensitive material, that is in the police docket, relates to the identity of an informant, Counsel's attention should be directed to the following passages from the judgment of (a) Pollock CB in Attorney General v Bryant and (b) Lord Esher MR, Master of the Rolls, in Mark v Byfuss, and he quotes Mr Chairman, (a) the rule clearly established and acted on is this that in a public prosecution, a witness cannot be asked such questions as will disclose the informer, if he be a third person.

This has been a settled rule for 50 years, and although it may seem hard in a particular case, private mischief must give way to public convenience, and we think the principle of the rule applies to the case where a witness is asked if he, himself is the informer.

What is stated there is if a witness is asked whether you were the informer, he is entitled to refuse to answer the question.

(b) if upon the trial of a prisoner, the Judge should be of the opinion that the disclosure of the name of the informant is necessary or right in order to show the prisoner's innocence, then one public policy is in conflict with another public policy, and that which says that an innocent man is not to be condemned when his innocence can be proved, is the policy that must prevail.

It is of interest Mr Chairman, that one of the recognised exceptions in the Austrian Freedom of Information Act, is information which and I quote "would or could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any persons."

While we are on that point Mr Chairman, I will make mention of it later, but while it is relevant now, in the South African context, there are authority, statutory provisions in which the position of informers are protected, and we think here Mr Chairman, of the Sea Fisheries Act for example, Act 12 of 1988.

I think they are mentioned later Mr Chairman, I am just putting this out of context, yes, at page 17, paragraph 45. The Forest Act, Sea Fisheries Act and even the TRC Act Mr Chairman, where it deals in Section 20(3)(i) with the question of reward, and in the case of an informer, rewards received by him, are regarded as not being an obstacle in his application for amnesty.

Mr Chairman, just to return, we submit that our law in regard to the preservation of the anonymity of police informers, is in keeping with the common law and statutory law as was found by Justice Myburgh, and that there should, it should not be departed from unless exceedingly good reason exists.

Mr Chairman, His Lordship, Mr Justice Myburgh referred to one exception to the rule. We believe it is proper for us to state as we have done, the exceptions to the rule as we understand it in the authorities, page 9, paragraph 18, we say the first is the one that Justice Myburgh mentions, to show the innocence of a person, but secondly in the authorities Mr Chairman, there is also the rule that disclosure may be ordered by a Court, when it is material to the ends of justice and lastly, where the identity of the informer has become known, therefore removing the need of secrecy and we refer Mr Chairman, specifically to Sefadi's case at page 441, where you will find this authority.

Mr Chairman, any argument that the rule should be relaxed in the present case because we are dealing with political crime, or because the informer himself was a co-perpetrator, ought not to succeed. We say Mr Chairman, that no such distinction or exception appears from the authorities referred to.

In none of the authorities which we have been able to find, was the position of the safety of the informer placed subject to the type of crime or situation in which he might have been involved in, and we will refer you to the authorities in a moment, which we have been able to find.

We submit indeed Mr Chairman, that the authorities which we were able to find, if only by inference, suggests the contrary. Carla's case suggests that the classes of informers who deserve protection, ought to be extended and that the Court's jurisdiction might be curtailed. The Constitutional Court has upheld the rule of non-disclosure in Tshabalala & Others v Attorney General of the Transvaal & Others. I see I have left out the reference, it is 1996 (1) Mr Chairman, 725 Constitutional Court, 757(5), and perhaps I should read it to you, it is a brief summary of what occurred in the case Mr Chairman. Just by way of background in that particular case, the matter placed before the Constitutional Court was based on the submission that an accused person in a trial, should be entitled to all the information in possession of the Prosecution, and His Lordship, Mr Justice Mohammed in paragraph 5 of his orders stated the following "the State is entitled to resist a claim by the accused for access to any particular document in the police docket on the grounds that such access is not justified for the purposes of enabling the accused properly to exercise his or her right to a fair trial, or on the grounds that it has reason to believe that there is a reasonable risk that access to the relevant document, would lead to the disclosure of the identity of an informer, or State secrets or on the grounds that there was a reasonable risk that such disclosure might lead to the intimidation of witnesses or otherwise prejudice the proper ends of justice."

Mr Chairman, that is a full summary of the real situation as it were, really in a nutshell, including in our submission, placing the correct emphasis on the protection of the identity of informers, as did His Lordship, Mr Justice Mohammed in that case.

We now deal Mr Chairman, with the issue of an informer who is also an accomplice or if you wish to call him that, a co-perpetrator and we refer you to State v Rossouw & Another, Mr Chairman, a South West Africa case, presently Namibia, where His Lordship, Mr Justice Hookster as he then was, held that a statement by an accused to the police, that his co-accused previously illicitly dealt in diamonds, was not admissible as evidence because that would expose him as an informer.

In this case Mr Chairman, there were two co-accused, they were both charged under the Protection of Diamond Dealings Act, I am not sure that I've got the name of the Act correct, and they had a statement by the one against the other, that he had previously dealt in, illicitly dealt in diamonds, and that statement was refused by Justice Hookster on that ground.

And Mr Chairman, we say that it is of interest that Justice Hookster in this case, held that this State was not authorised to waive the protection of informers, which was held to be a protection which the Court was bound to protect in the public interest.

That is rather an interesting aspect of His Lordship's judgment in Rossouw's case.

MR MALAN: Sorry Mr Visser, am I understanding this correctly, did the Court hold in this instance that the accused could not make the statement, even though the accused seemingly wanted to have the statement put before the Court?

CHAIRPERSON: The ratio was this Mr Chairman, the evidence of a co-accused in circumstances where he would make himself known, disclose the fact that he was an informer of the police, was not admissible in evidence against the other accused, and that evidence was in fact struck off the record, after it had been given.

MR MALAN: May I just ask the second question here, the evidence also seem to be to have pointed to a crime which was not tried in this specific case, but he refers to previous illicit dealings.

MR VISSER: Indeed so, yes Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, we say that there are other authorities, not directly in point again, this has never been dealt with Mr Chairman, this particular situation that we are dealing with here today, I found no authority at all on the point.

We say not directly in point, which deals with the differentiation between informers and accomplices. From these authorities it appears that the question as to whether a person must be considered to be an informer as opposed to an accomplice, depends on his own mens rea. It also appears that a spy who participates in illegal activities, because he believes that he is doing it for his country, for a safer society, cannot be equated with the position of an accomplice.

That much appears from Ghani's case Mr Chairman. In Ghani's case I would read to you certain excerpts Mr Chairman. At page 208(f) - (h), their Lordships Justices Harcort and Leon, stated the following. They say in our view the case as a whole and these two extracts in particular, referring to extracts already given, emphasises the requirement that for a person to be an accomplice, there must be mens rea involved in a criminal association with the commission of the offence.

If I may just pause there for a moment Mr Chairman, that would entail literally that before a Court would make an order of ordering the disclosure of the identity, that the Court would have to decide whether the person whose identity is in issue, is in fact an informer or an accomplice.

This comes close to the situation where we are now Mr Chairman. Their Lordships continue at page 210 - 212 and they say the following "it is clear however, that the immunity from being considered an accomplice, is not restricted to traps in this restricted technical sense, nor is there in our view any merit in the contention advanced by Mr Louwhen that a person who acts as a trap in an extended sense, must be regarded as an accomplice unless he had prior authority from the police or the Prosecution authorities for detecting and reporting criminal conduct."

Their Lordships then referred to a case which they refer to as Salmonson's case and they say that it is clear from American and English authority which is appropo and of persuasive force in regard to the topic of accomplices, that persons who act to collect themselves, and to use it for the punishment of criminals, are not to be regarded as accomplices.

Thus, Weakmore in his work on evidence, 3rd edition, states the position as follows: the case of a pretended confederate who as detective, spy or decoy associates with the wrongdoers in order to obtain evidence, is distinct from that of an accomplice although the distinction may sometimes be difficult of application.

Reference is then made to 1848 Mall, J in R v Mullen, Mr Chairman, and the reference is given, stated an accomplice is a person who has concurred in the commission of an offence, but such are different from spies, that is persons who take measures to be able to give to the authorities information so as to prevent those who are disposed to break out from effecting their purpose.

In the case of an accomplice, he acknowledges himself to be a criminal. In the case of these men, they do not acknowledge ...

CHAIRPERSON: What is the relevance of this?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the relevance is this Mr Chairman, let's take the facts of our case.

CHAIRPERSON: These men were not accomplices on this authority, right, they were assisting the police. If they were assisting the police, why should the police not give their names? That is the question we have to decide.

This authority, they were assisting, if they were assisting voluntarily, they were not accomplices in any way, to what Ms Ndwandwe was doing. So right, that is it, they weren't accomplices, why shouldn't their names, this has got nothing to do with whether their names should be made known, has it?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, with respect, my understanding from my learned friend, Mr Prior and from Commissioner Malan is what concerned them, was whether the rule of protecting the identity of informers of which there can be no argument, should be relaxed in a case where the informer is also an accomplice.

CHAIRPERSON: There is no suggestion is there, that these people were informers. They knew the address, the didn't give any information.

They were told by their superiors in the Police Force what to do. They weren't informers, these two men, were they?

MR VISSER: The police called them informers Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: They may, they can call them what they like. They used them, not to get information, but to entice her into a vehicle by pretending to want to obtain ammunition and weapons from her. That is not an informer, is it?

I just don't see how you can say that these people were informers in any sense of the word?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, at least allow me to make the submission that we don't know then if there is any question as to whether they were informers, then we don't know, unless we enter an enquiry into that issue, into that question, and how are we going to do that Mr Chairman?

Because clearly before you make an order for the identity to be divulged Mr Chairman, one will have to have certainty as to that situation. As far as that is concerned, Mr Chairman, they may well have simply been the spies of which Justices Harcort and Leon are talking here, thinking that what they are doing, they are doing for king and country. We don't know, we simply don't know Mr Chairman, this is the point I am making.

CHAIRPERSON: Isn't the way of ascertaining that, of arranging for someone to interview them? Some independent person?

MR VISSER: Like a Judge Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: An Advocate, but not one engaged in the hearings.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, my attorney asked me to state the case to you on a different basis. We have the evidence of Botha, that they were informers, they were also applied in whatever way in order to effect the abduction.

That is the prima facie evidence before you. I hear you Mr Chairman when you say shouldn't this matter be resolved by an enquiry by an independent legal person. That is something which we haven't considered yet and we would like some time to think about that, because it seems like an imminently reasonable suggestion Mr Chairman, and if there can be safeguards built into that, some safeguards which we will have to think about, some safeguards.

If I may make the submission Mr Chairman, judging from the reaction from the audience, one can imagine what is going to happen to these informers if their identity ever becomes known.

Mr Chairman, may I refer you to that case and ask you Ghani's case Mr Chairman, and ask you to read it. At page 212, I will not read all of it, but you have already given an indication that it may be, page 211 I am sorry.

CHAIRPERSON: It is included in your reference 210(d) 0 212(a)?

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Chairman, and if I may just be allowed to read this, in referring to the evidence of Powell, the learned Judge said that although he had been designated as a spy or traitor and an accomplice, if his object in entering into the confederacy, was not to deceive or entrap anyone, but to serve his country, he was entitled to praise instead of censure, etc, etc, Mr Chairman.

Again, further down the page, a spy on the other hand, may be an honest man. He may think that the cause he pursues, is absolutely essential for the protection of his own interests and those of society and if he does so, if he believes that, there is no other method of countenancing the dangerous designs of wicked men, I can see no impropriety in his taking upon himself, the character of an informer.

Mr Chairman, perhaps lastly, with reference to Rex v Heuser, their Lordships referred to that case and say it was held that neither an informer, nor police officers who assented to his entrapping of an offender, became accomplices to the person so entrapped.

In my view it is thus established by authority and accords with our sense of justice, that a person who collaborates with an accused in purported furtherance of criminal conduct, but with provable and proved intention of merely collecting evidence against such a criminal and revealing such evidence to the police or prosecuting authorities, is not to be regarded as an accomplice.

Mr Chairman, we leave that point there, these were the authorities which may be obliquely relevant which we have been able to find on the issue of where the informer becomes part of the criminal act.

We say Mr Chairman, dealing with that very point which you mentioned to me just a moment ago, we say that a court of law will not depart from the general rule of non-disclosure where the person in question is not before it, so that it might enquire as to whether he was the one or the other, in terms of the authorities which we have read to you.

In the present instance Mr Chairman, we say they are described as police informers on the evidence, and they are not present to establish that they were in fact not accomplices Mr Chairman, and we say that suggesting that the disclosure of their identities would bring about a situation where they will have such an opportunity in a court, ignores the fact that they will probably never reach the portals of that court of law, as they would probably be killed once their identities have become known.

We refer Mr Chairman, to Siliman v Hansa where his Lordship Mr Justice Fannon held that in the case of an informer who give ...(indistinct) information to the police, thereby committing a crime or offence, public policy nevertheless requires that his identity as informer, must be protected.

That is the judgment in Siliman's case.

Mr Chairman, what is the reason for the rule of non-disclosure of identity of informers? Clearly Mr Chairman, it is their safety, it is submitted that the issue of disclosure of the identity of an informer, stands apart from the issue of whether he was an accomplice.

Whether or not, putting it differently, whether or not he was an accomplice, is going to make not the least little bit difference to the situation of his safety once his identity becomes known.

The rule of protection of informers, was devolved for specific reasons, and those have already been referred to. That rule cannot be waved because the informer also happens to be an accomplice. As the result of disclosure of his identity will be the same, whether he was an accomplice or not.

The disclosure of his identity Mr Chairman, will in all likelihood be tantamount to a death sentence and particularly we say, in the present circumstances and in the present instance.

Mr Chairman, now we come to the issue of full disclosure at page 13 and we say this Mr Chairman, let us not forget what we are busy dealing with here. We are dealing with amnesty applications.

The Act has stated the requirements and the specifications to which an applicant has to conform in order to obtain amnesty. We say Mr Chairman, that the question of the identity of these informers has got nothing to do with the application before you.

Whether you know about their identity or not, makes absolutely no difference in your enquiry as to whether the provisions, the requirements of the Act have been complied with by the applicants.

It does not form part of the facts, or circumstances which the Committee is required to adjudicate, in order to give judgment on the subject matter of the case. It is therefore irrelevant we say Mr Chairman, and again if we may quote from Carla's case as to what would be relevant information, where His Lordship says so the public interest in preserving the anonymity of police informers had to be weighed against the public interest that information which might assist the judicial tribunal such as you Mr Chairman, and your co-Commissioners, to ascertain facts relevant to an issue on which it is required to adjudicate.

Mr Chairman, you will agree that the identity of the informers cannot in any way assist you to adjudicate upon an issue which it is required for you to do in order to grant amnesty or refuse it.

We say therefore Mr Chairman, that the identity of the informers is therefore entirely irrelevant to the present proceedings. Those proceedings are to facilitate the granting of amnesty to the applicants, not proceedings for the benefit of those who with revenge in their hearts, wish to use the proceedings for purposes of gathering information for their own designs.

The exhibition of hatred and aggression Mr Chairman, by some of those present at the hearing on Friday and I dare say today again, would have made it plain that the information was sought not for innocuous purposes.

That was also confirmed in the submission of Mr Ngubane Mr Chairman, who suggested that it would be better for the identities of these two informers to be divulged in order to protect four or six or more others, who are presently suspected of having been those persons. Clearly Mr Chairman, it is from a point of view that harm was anticipated at least, and probably will definitely result.

Mr Chairman, why do we say that, we know this from the writings, information given out by the ANC. We refer there to Seshaba Mr Chairman, January 1979, page 28 where it is blandly stated as a fact in the recent period, some of the black members of the Police Force and informers, have been eliminated.

As a statistical fact, the ANC's struggle update, number 3 of 1985, a report of an interview with Mr Joe Modise under the caption Umkhonto update, at page 7, he says collaborators are being weeded out and are lucky when they are able to escape with their lives.

Can we really say that those sentiments are dead in our society today Mr Chairman, we believe not. Seshaba, December 1986, a report of an interview with Mr Chris Hani, under the caption 25 years of armed struggle and listen to what he says. He says so the necklace was a weapon devised by the oppressed themselves to remove this cancer from our society. The cancer of collaborators of the puppets. It is not a weapon of the ANC, it is weapon of the masses themselves to cleanse the townships of the very disruptive and even lethal activities of puppets and collaborators. We do understand our people when they use the necklace, because it is an attempt to render our townships, to render our areas and country ungovernable, to make the enemy's access to information, very difficult.

Mr Chairman, we also have in the volumes before you, volume 3 page 412, MK strikes against impimpis, with lists given of people who were regarded or alleged to be impimpis, traitors. It is under the caption kill the traitors.

In the ANC statement to the TRC Mr Chairman, dated August 1996, reference is made to the elimination, the murder of traitors, page 11, page 52, page 69 and page 100. I am not going to read through it Mr Chairman.

And then Mr Chairman, we come to the question as to the locus standi of the family of the deceased here, to bring such an application and without wasting time, we say they have absolutely no such locus standi Mr Chairman. They are not the prosecuting authority, they are not the Attorney General, who has approached the witness to say we wish to prosecute these people, give us the names.

What have the members of the family got to do with it Mr Chairman? The only purpose could be for purposes which are not innocuous and we say Mr Chairman, that in the authorities which you will find, and which we have referred to, the issue of the question of the protection of identity of informers, all occurred within a certain situation and that was always in order to assist an accused person, in a criminal case, with his defence. Not in circumstances as we have here today, and it may be argued yes, but the TRC didn't exist at the time when these authorities came about, and that may be so Mr Chairman, but clearly one would have to ask yourself, what is the locus standi of Mr Ngubane to ask these questions, and what is it intended to do with this information.

Certainly it is not intended that these people should thereby now be prosecuted, because that is the decision of the Attorney General, Mr Chairman. By all accounts, if there is an Attorney General, if I read the newspapers in Natal, Mr Chairman, we deal with the consequences of an order to disclose.

We say Mr Chairman, if you were to order and we mean no disrespect, we are looking at the situation here, if you were to order for example Botha to give the information, and he says I am not giving it, what happens then? What happens then?

You will not issue an order, and this is trait law Mr Chairman, which you cannot enforce. The only enforcement of such an order would be a criminal prosecution, having gone through the steps of Section 31, and reading Section 39 and clearly Mr Chairman, the argument is that there won't, there can't be such a prosecution in terms of Section 39, because the test differs.

It is not the same test. The test as I have already discussed with you earlier, was one devised to obtain evidence from a person in the situation where the Investigation Unit is looking for evidence or the Human Rights Violations Committee is looking for evidence, not in this test situation in which we find ourselves.

We say Mr Chairman, the Committee has no power to convict such a witness of contempt. Section 39(c) presupposes that the Committee would have to lay a charge of contravening the provisions of the TRC Act with the Attorney General for him to institute criminal proceedings for contempt.

An applicant who refuses to disclose the identity in spite of being ordered to do so by the Committee, can also not be accused of not having made a full disclosure of the relevant facts, in accordance with the provisions of Section 20, because as we have already stated Mr Chairman, relevant facts do not pertain to the identity of informers.

Such relevant facts cannot be interpretation refer to the disclosure of the identity of an informer. Mr Chairman, we deal separately with the question of public interest. We repeat the statement in Carla's case as to the two separate instances of public interest Mr Chairman. We say that with great respect, the disclosure of the identity of informers in the present case, is not going to assist this Committee in its work, in what it has to adjudicate on and therefore Mr Chairman, it should not so be ordered.

The interest of the family of the victims cannot be equated Mr Chairman, we say at paragraph 46 with public interest.

MR MALAN: Mr Visser sorry for interrupting you, your reference to the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, Section 23(i), is that the correct reference?

MR VISSER: Please refer me to the paragraph.

MR MALAN: It is paragraph 45. You refer here to rewards and then you refer to our founding Act, Section 23(i).

MR VISSER: There should be an (f) in between Mr Chairman, it is Section 20(3)(f).

MR MALAN: Yes, thank you.

MR VISSER: Sorry, that has fallen out in the wash Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, really the point about which we wish to make about the public interest, is this, and we make this in paragraph 48 and I want to conclude my argument with that.

The public interest which is served by the whole process of amnesty, is that of the promotion of national and reconciliation. That really adds a new dimension to the tests which have existed up until Carla's case. Mr Chairman, the question will be for you to decide how ordering the disclosure of the identity of a witness, is going to advance int he present circumstances, national unity and reconciliation.

And with respect Mr Chairman, one needs not to be very astute to realise immediately that it will do everything but, it will only kindle hatred, promote violence which is directly in opposition to the spirit and intention of the TRC Act.

Mr Chairman, we would ask you not to allow questions in cross-examination directed at establishing the identity of informers and that you would not order witnesses to answer questions by which it is reasonably possible that the identity of informers might be established, thank you Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, before you stop, let me put one of my difficulties to you. Saying now that these men were, I don't know if accomplice is even the right word, they were part of the team that went to Swaziland to unlawfully kidnap Ndwandwe. They played a very active role in the kidnapping.

Can, if the applicant refuses to tell us who the other policemen were who went with him, would he have made a full disclosure in terms of the Act? Can he select which policemen he is not going to tell us about, or must we say he hasn't made a full disclosure, he is concealing information?

MR VISSER: On your question Mr Chairman, as it stands, the answer is yes, to may find that he didn't make a full disclosure. The difference here is in his mind, and he may be wrong, as you pointed out, but in his mind, these people although they participated actively, were his informers.

That is what makes the informers, and with respect Mr Chairman, it has been put to me on the basis that I don't gain anything from protecting these people. If you want to know the names, I can give it to you, but you must know one thing, there is going to be a huge problem, because the police as, the present police are going to suffer because people will suddenly realise that they are not being protected as informers any more.

CHAIRPERSON: As I said, this was somewhat different from the ordinary police informer, it was a troubled part of our past. One might have to, if one is going to make any general ruling on that, have more evidence as to how these people were treated and what has happened to them subsequently.

MR VISSER: You know Mr Chairman, Mr Ramatolo sat here, he was called by my learned friend, he flatly refused to answer certain questions which didn't even involve informers, it involved his own past and nobody suggested that he should be compelled to answer. It is the same basic problem Mr Chairman, there are things of the past which are better left alone and one of them is the identity of informers.

MR NGUBANE IN ARGUMENT: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, at the initial state I would like to indicate that I have been informed that Botha specifically conceded yesterday that these people were not informers. That is what I am told, I don't know.

CHAIRPERSON: Where was this concession made, do you say?

MR NGUBANE: I was just made to understand that, I am not sure whether that is correct or not, but if that is correct, then my Heads of argument ...

ADV PRIOR: Mr Chairman, may I assist. I informed Mr Ngubane because he wasn't present, that what Botha conceded was that the information about Portia Ndwandwe's whereabouts, never came from these two persons, that he alleged were informants.

The evidence was quite clear that he knew the address and the reason for those questions was to obviously enquire around the circumstances of the alleged informers. That was conveyed to Mr Ngubane.

I don't think Mr Botha categorically stated the position as is stated by Mr Ngubane.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, if I may say so, it was quite clear that Botha said that at the time when they went into Swaziland, in order to find out where exactly Ms Ndwandwe was, they made use of Visagie, who at that time gathered that information. There is nothing that says that Visagie didn't gather it through those two informers for example, or that the informers didn't observe and monitor Ms Ndwandwe prior to that time Mr Chairman, so if it is going to be regarded as a concession, that these people were not informers, well then clearly Mr Chairman, we are at loggerheads.

MR NGUBANE: Thank you, I am grateful for that clarification because I didn't know how to go about with my argument.

Mr Chairman, before I come to the Heads of my argument, to follow that sequence, I would like to address some of the issues that had been raised by my learned friend.

The first one being an extensive quotation from Seshaba and other documentation from the ANC, the intention of that being to stress the point that there will be no security of informers if their identities are disclosed. I will come later on more fully to the question security of informers.

But I would like to point out to the Committee that a very important intervention was omitted by my learned friend, and that is after this publication, there was an important development that the ANC renounced the armed struggle and since then, there has been no indication that there was any inflammatory publication by the ANC to incite people to kill informers. My respectful submission Mr Chairman, is to the effect that in the absence of that, the point as advanced or intended to be advanced by the various publications by the ANC should fall away.

Regarding the locus standi of the victims, Mr Chairman, I would submit that they are here to indicate that the applicants are not disclosing fully and the whole question of informers centre around that, that here are these people, they are applying, but they are not disclosing fully.

I respectfully submit that the families as well as myself, have a locus standi to be here to disclose that these people are not being forthright with their application.

My Lord, turning to the issue at hand, that is the disclosure of informers, I do concede that it is established law in South Africa, that there is a privilege covering informers. That privilege as we all know, was adopted from English law and it was imported into South Africa, and it was interpreted in various judgments and applied in various situations.

What is important Mr Chairman, is that when this policy was developed and adopted by South Africa, there was no ...(indistinct) generous process as the truth and reconciliation and all the authorities that have been quoted by my learned friend, I do concede they do apply, but they do apply to ordinary situations.

Here we are dealing with a peculiar situation, the truth and reconciliation and the authorities quoted, were to an extend some doubt in Rex v Pillay 1945 AD 653 (658) and the Courts I submit sir, follow that authority and the existence of the privilege relates to certain instances, exists as a result of certain instances for example public policy, the likelihood of the informer not informing further if he is identified and hinderance of the investigations in the event of identity of the informer being disclosed.

In this situation we are dealing with the past, we are dealing with the policemen who in fact, on their own version, have resigned from the South African Police. We are dealing with the policemen who were not involved in legitimate investigations, and I submit respectfully that is why the distinction is public policy demands that those people be known.

If one looks at the spirit of the Act, the spirit of the Act is this, that all those people who have been involved in criminal activities should come forward, and say so otherwise they will be prosecuted.

We do not have information that the so-called informers have applied for amnesty or not. If they haven't applied for amnesty, and I submit in all likelihood they haven't, public policy demands that those people be prosecuted, be disclosed and be prosecuted.

I respectfully submit that then the privilege that extends to informers does not extend in this particular case.

CHAIRPERSON: Isn't that a completely different approach, and it may I am expressing no opinion on it, it may be a very valid one, that you lodge a complaint with the Attorney General that prosecution should be instituted.

MR NGUBANE: Well, we do not know who those people are.

CHAIRPERSON: The Investigator could question them, it would then be for the Investigator to question.

MR NGUBANE: That is the option, but the other leg of my argument Mr Chairman, is that in order for amnesty to be granted to the applicant, he must to an extent come out clear.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but surely full disclosure must be interpreted in the widest sense. If he can legitimately say I fear that if I disclose those people's names, they may be killed, I am not prepared to cause somebody else's death for my own benefit, can one then hold it against him and say you hadn't made a full disclosure?

He has disclosed everything he did himself.

MR NGUBANE: The difficulty that I have with that Mr Chairman, is that I don't see the difference between an informer and a person who is implicated. People who are in a worst position than informers, had been mentioned before the TRC and those people are at risk of being killed.

Then if now we come and say that informers because they are at risk, they shouldn't be disclosed, I submit that it would be flouting the constitution, we will be treating people unequally, we will be discriminating against people in favour of informers and I see no special reason why we should make this distinction.

There are people who are exposed to victimisation, either physical victimisation or political victimisation, who have been mentioned before the TRC, and my respectful submission Your Worship, is that quite correctly one can say that the informers can be exposed to danger, although that is speculation at this stage, but it is potential possibility, but now the difficulty that we have is that one might argue that in all the amnesty applications, where people have been implicated, where their security is at stake, that information should be expunged from the record, and I submit Mr Chairman, that will lead to further complications.

It is my respectful submission that the informers should be treated on equal footing as any other citizen of South Africa.

CHAIRPERSON: Now let me put another problem to you. These people are alleged to have done certain things. If their names are mentioned, it will be on the basis that they acted as the applicant/policemen who said they did. Doesn't justice demand that before that is done, they are communicated with, told that they have been implicated and given an opportunity to be heard or make representations?

MR NGUBANE: Well, justice demands that but I have been informed that there is a machinery to deal with the situation like the one we might find ourselves in, that is Section 30. Unfortunately I haven't dealt with the hearings more extensively as other, some of my colleagues might have dealt with, but I am reliably informed that there is provision for the Act to deal with that particular situation, that they can be notified in an appropriate manner, Section 30.

CHAIRPERSON: That should be done before any publicity is given?

MR NGUBANE: I cannot honestly answer that question, but I am informed that during the proceedings, if someone is mentioned, then he can be notified.

CHAIRPERSON: If one can avoid the danger, one should do it, shouldn't one?

MR NGUBANE: Yes. Yes, I agree with that Mr Chairman.

Mr Chairman, the point that I wanted to advance further is that if the Act of 1995, Act 34, intended to create a special category of people who should be exempt from being mentioned in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Act I submit would have made it clear that there must be full disclosure, but so and so should be disclosed.

In all, all in all Mr Chairman, I don't think I can advance the argument without repeating myself and that is all I wish to submit to the Committee.

CHAIRPERSON: Right, we will take the short adjournment now.

ON RESUMPTION:

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Prior?

ADV PRIOR IN ARGUMENT: Thank you Mr Chairman, Mr Chairman, I have prepared very brief Heads and I simply want to make one or two remarks if I may.

Mr Visser has correctly stated the legal position regarding the privilege relating to informers, and it is trait that those considerations apply. However, I would ask the Committee to distinguish those decisions on the basis that the circumstances before this Committee, are somewhat different from the circumstances in each of those cases, decided upon by the various Court decisions.

Those principles and the judgments which underpin those principles, operated or evolved in a normal situation, if I may refer to it as a normal situation, where the police were acting legitimately and lawfully in the combatting of crime.

Hence the submission that this Committee can well distinguish those views. I endorse the view and it is also the submission that the two persons referred to as informers, are not in fact informers in the true sense of the word and on that, if that is the case, then a lot of the argument then falls away regarding their protection or the refusal to communicate their identity.

I also endorse the suggestion made by the Committee at this stage, that possibly a practical solution to the impasse would be the one suggested by the Chairman, yourself Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I want to make it clear, I don't think it is necessary a solution to the impasse, but it will provide us with I think a great deal of relevant information on which to base any findings.

ADV PRIOR: Yes, in so far that it leads us to that point, yes Mr Chairman, I agree with that. Mr Chairman, may I simply also address the question of relevance.

We have heard evidence of how the Security Branch infiltrated the various liberation organisations, we know on the evidence that these two persons were involved in the liberation struggle, and were known to the deceased.

However, there may be more information which may be of greater benefit to the Committee, involving the method employed in luring or enticing the deceased to her death because what is implicit in the facts before the Committee is that the conspiracy to abduct and eventually kill the deceased, was in place before the operation set out, or set forth into Swaziland.

Those persons, I submit on the probabilities, would have known that the ultimate result would have been the death of Portia Ndwandwe.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Prior, I don't know if I understand your argument because as far as I am aware, there has been no suggestion made that these persons, their identity should be disclosed so that they can be available as witnesses.

We were told by Mr Ngubane, that the families wished to know the names and it stopped there.

ADV PRIOR: Yes, but the suggestion has been that one goes further, and I submit if that is implemented that these persons are approached, there may well be an indication that they wish to place evidence before this Committee and it is on that basis that I make that remark.

Mr Chairman, may I be permitted finally to refer the Committee to the matter of Azanian People's Organisation & Others v The President of the Republic of South Africa & Others which was reported in the Butterworth Law Reports Constitutional Law, 1996, Volume 8, 1015 particularly at page 1029, and with the leave of the Committee I wish to read out paragraph 20 which appears in marginal note b to e.

It effects really the position of the victims and it is appropo the comments of Mr Visser, that the victims really have no say or no locus standi and possibly flowing from that then interest, in the identities of these persons.

In Section 20(7) to the extent to which it immunises wrongdoers from criminal prosecution, nevertheless objectionable on the grounds that amnesty might be provided in circumstances where the victims or the dependants of the victims, have not had the compensatory benefit of discovering the truth at last or in circumstances where those whose misdeeds are so obscenely obsessive excessive, as to justify punishment, even if they were perpetrated with a political objective during the course of the conflict in the past, some answers to such difficulties are provided in the subsections of Section 20.

The Amnesty Committee may grant amnesty in respect of the relevant offence only if the perpetrator of the misdeed makes a full disclosure of all relevant facts. If the offender does not, and in consequence thereof, the victim or his or her family is not able to discover the truth, the application for amnesty will fail. Moreover it will not suffice for the offender merely to say that his or her act was associated with a political objective.

I end the quote there. Mr Chairman, it is obvious from the reaction of the victims and their families and possibly the community at large, that if there were co-perpetrators in this type of conduct, and those persons were living among them, I submit that it is relevant to full disclosure, that those persons are named and are known.

Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: I don't know whether my learned friends on the other side of the room, wish to express any opinions Mr Chairman.

MR NEL: Thank you Mr Chairman, Christo Nel, I have no opinions, except that I support what my learned friend, Mr Visser has argued, and I will leave it at that, thank you sir.

MR NOLTE: Mr Chairman, Mr Nolte on record, I also support Mr Visser.

MR VISSER IN FURTHER ARGUMENT: Mr Chairman, if I may be allowed to reply very briefly. Firstly Mr Chairman, to the suggestion which has now been made regarding the suggestion which you placed on the table Mr Chairman, of some method or means by which the people should be contacted, etc.

Mr Chairman, we have discussed that and we have various problems with that situation. It would appear Mr Chairman, that the proper way of doing that, if it was of concern to the community that perpetrators are not being prosecuted, is that you, this Committee refer this to the ... (tape ends) ... and let the matter be taken from there.

Certainly it is not a matter which we believe the Committee should attempt to finalise. Mr Chairman, as far as the submissions of my learned friend, Mr Ngubane is concerned, his submission as we understand it, is based on an equalisation as it were, of implicated persons, and informers.

Mr Chairman, we simply submit that there is no basis in law for making that assumption and that equalisation, certainly none of the authorities do so and in point of fact Mr Chairman, very specifically when reference is made to protection of informers, implicated persons has never been mentioned, nor is it mentioned in the same breath in the TRC Act.

My learned friend says Mr Chairman, he throws the argument in reverse and says the TRC Act does not provide for an exception in regard to informers, but we know on an interpretation of statutes Mr Chairman, that if the legislature wishes to make inroads in the common law and or change the common law, it has to say so explicitly so that there can be no mistake about that and that situation does not arise.

That Mr Chairman, takes care of my learned friend, Mr Ngubane. As far as Mr Prior's evidence, my learned friend, Mr Prior's submissions are concerned Mr Chairman, he submits that these informers are not informers in the true sense of the word and we submit that in doing so, he has telescoped into this one particular incident, and this one particular incident alone. Surely one has to have regard to the fact that these informers may have been people who might have given information over a lengthy period of time.

Which brings me back to my main argument Mr Chairman, and that is that you cannot change the protection in public interest, merely because an informer also becomes a co-perpetrator, and that would make good sense Mr Chairman.

Lastly Mr Chairman, just a remark which was made by you to Mr Ngubane, regarding askaris. An askari per definition of our past, was a person who had previously been a member or supporter of the ANC or another liberation movement, who had been turned to use that expression and who was applied overtly in order to identify members of MK and the ANC for purposes of identification so that the police could act on that information.

There is no evidence whatsoever that the two informers in question, today, were ever askaris Mr Chairman, and for so far as that, the word askari may lead to an inference that they weren't true informers Mr Chairman, we say that that would be a finding not found on the evidence before the Committee at the present time.

We therefore Mr Chairman, persist with our request to you and we say that with respect, questions in this regard ought to be disallowed, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: You have said several times may have been, might have happened, that is precisely why we feel further enquiries should be made and these people should be notified and be given an opportunity to make representations. We have not got that information before us at the present time. We know that Colonel Botha called them informers.

That may have been the word he used, he gave us no evidence about prior protracted dealings with them or anything of that nature. Couldn't you tell me where these people are, I don't want names?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I make it quite clear, I have asked Mr Botha and Mr Du Preez no questions about who they are, where they are, what they have done at all. I simply just don't want this on my conscience Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, the Committee feel that this is important that they should be told that they may be implicated and told what the nature of the evidence is that is been lead and then be given the opportunity through a legal advisor, to make what representations if any, they wish to make.

If any of the other persons, any of those of you who have argued, wish anything else to be raised with them, could then notify me and I will ask so for that purpose, I would also request that I be given the name and address of these persons. It will not be put into the record of the organisation, where it will be accessible to others at the present time, it will remain entirely confidential and the idea is we should engage, if it is in Natal, I would suggest Mr Lister who happens to be here today, who is no longer - who has resigned from the TRC, but if you have objections to that, which your attorney appears to have, we could engage some other member of the local bar, and they would report directly to the Committee.

Other parties would be notified, but not of the names, or nothing that would reveal their identities until a decision has been reached.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, may we perhaps just be allowed to kick ideas around this a little bit longer?

CHAIRPERSON: Should we adjourn and do it, we don't necessarily want to do it?

MR VISSER: I was just going to make one further proposition, put one further proposition Mr Chairman, we clearly all realise the seriousness of the matter.

One wonders Mr Chairman, from a point of view that some publication has already taken place about the applications which are presently proceeding before you. If these people, and I am certainly, I am prepared to ask Mr Botha and Mr Du Preez that, whether they are still in the country, but the point is, if they are here, clearly Mr Chairman, they would know about the fact first of all that these amnesty applications are in progress and one would have thought that if they wanted to do anything, they might have stepped forward.

As far as that is concerned, wouldn't it be as a first step at least, advisable to place through the newspaper media Mr Chairman, advertisements calling on those who were informers in this incident, if they wished to step forward and to contact the Chairman of this Committee?

CHAIRPERSON: If we have their names and addresses, why go through the newspaper Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: As it pleases you Mr Chairman, but perhaps we should discuss this a little more.

CHAIRPERSON: We will have a short adjournment, and you can discuss it.

ON RESUMPTION:

MR VISSER: Mr Botha and or Mr Du Preez, who are the two people who know the identities of the informers, should in the company of my attorney, Mr Wagener, attempt to arrange for a meeting with them.

That suggestion has found general favour Mr Chairman, with my clients. What we would suggest should be done is the following, that Mr Botha be given a reasonable time in order to set up a meeting. He would suggest that a month would be a reasonable time.

Mr Chairman, what is suggested is that depending on whether the two gentlemen in question would be prepared to reveal their own identities to Mr Wagener and whether they would be prepared to meet with him at all, and assuming that the latter comes to pass, it is probable Mr Chairman, that the two gentlemen in question will probably disguise themselves from Mr Wagener. It is something which we foresee might happen.

But in the hope that such a meeting can be laid on, it was suggested that what Mr Wagener would do, would be to inform them of the amnesty application, to further inform them that they might be implicated as accomplices and further to inform them that the Committee would like to hear anything which they may wish to add, if they so wish and then Mr Chairman, to make notes of their replies in that regard, and to feed that back to the Chairman of this Committee.

We would also like to say Mr Chairman, that if there are any directions which you might wish to make as to what Mr Wagener should do at that meeting, assuming that it comes to pass, that we would appreciate receiving some indications from you and Wagener would then inform them or ask them about that.

Lastly Mr Chairman, we thought that Mr Wagener must make it clear that it would be in their interest if they so wished, to consult an attorney or an Advocate of their choice, if they should wish to make any representations to this Committee, with or without disclosing their own identities.

That is about as far as we have come at this stage Mr Chairman, subject to what you might want to add.

CHAIRPERSON: I think we should place on record that the impasse that has arose, was that Colonel Botha indicated that he was not prepared to disclose the identity of these people, or where they might be found. I would suggest having listened to what you have to say, that he doesn't need a month, that we should reduce the period for Mr Botha to make contact with these people, to tell them that they may be implicated parties in this hearing, tell them what the subject of the hearing is about, and then inform them that he can arrange a meeting with Mr Wagener, who will advise them as to their legal position and their rights.

Inform them first, not wait a month to inform them. If he inform them within two weeks of that there is an amnesty hearing, that they may be implicated parties in it, and that if they wish, he can arrange a meeting with Mr Wagener who can explain to them fully their legal rights position, and if they wish to make any representations or send any messages through Mr Wagener, if he is prepared to act as a conduit pipe, he can do that.

MR VISSER: Yes Mr Chairman, it is rather a question of whether they will trust Mr Wagener, than Mr Wagener being prepared to do it. He is obviously prepared to do it.

CHAIRPERSON: I think Colonel Botha should also indicate to them that they are at perfect liberty to consult an attorney of their own choice, not wait to see Mr Wagener.

To furnish them (a) with Mr Wagener's address and (b) with the address of the Committee, where they can be contacted. They have the choice that they can choose to go their own way, do nothing, or contact us.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, we find that agreeable with respect, may I then add that on the basis that Botha is given two weeks to contact them, that there should be a report back at that stage or soon thereafter, as what he has accomplished in anticipation of a meeting to be arranged with Wagener as we suggested, later on. That is imminently reasonable Mr Chairman, I believe that is acceptable.

CHAIRPERSON: It would seem that is as far as we can go at the moment, Mr Ngubane. Do you have anything further you can suggest?

MR NGUBANE: No, nothing further.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Prior?

ADV PRIOR: Well, it seems that we are in a catch 22 situation, if Mr Botha is under no circumstances going to divulge the identity, obviously this process that has been discussed is probably the only alternative, except that I am just cautious or I am just sensitive to the perception that might be created, that these persons being interviewed by Mr Wagener, that they are going to be disguised, or their identities are going to be withheld from himself, possibly to satisfy that perception, it may well arise to have someone with Mr Wagener, an objective person.

MR VISSER: That has been discussed, and it is totally unacceptable Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: That means of course that we will reserve our decision, our ruling on the matter that was argued before us today in that this may supply vital evidence if they do elect to come, it may make the whole matter pointless.

MR VISSER: As it pleases you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: We reserve our decision on the application by Mr Ngubane that Mr Botha should divulge the identity of the two persons who were with them in Manzini when Ms Ndwandwe was kidnapped.

MR NGUBANE: As the Chairman pleases.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, may I call Mr Du Preez to give evidence.

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Are you Salmon Johannes Gerhardus du Preez?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you apply for amnesty in the case of Ms Ndwandwe as well as Pumeso Nxiweni and the kwaMashu 3?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You filed an application in terms of the Act?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes.

MR VISSER: And that application appears in volume 2, on page 24 and following. Is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: In your application on page 26, you admitted that your memory about what happened, is vague and that you do not have any documentation or any other information where you could refresh your memory with, and my question is that during this period in which you signed your application, you did receive information from your co-applicants that refreshed your memory concerning the details of this incident?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: You then on page 28 at the bottom of the page, referred to the amnesty applications of Steyn, Botha and Forster and you confirmed it in where it is applicable to you, is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ: I do not have a page 28 in front of me Mr Chairperson. That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You mentioned this in your amnesty application, or about the amnesty application of Ndwandwe, is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Now concerning Nxiweni, on page 29 you said that you and Sergeant Wasserman eliminated him and buried him in a sugar plantation. We know that Steyn was not involved in this?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is as far as Nxiweni.

MR VISSER: And then the kwaMashu 3, Steyn was again not involved?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Was it your intention to say that in that incident or to which you referred to in Botha's statement, that you would like this to be added to your application?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: On the 29th of November 1953 you were born in Pretoria, and you did your schooling or you completed your schooling in 1972 in Durban?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Your father was a member of the South African Police?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you, yourself, grew up in we can describe it as a police culture?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: What were your parents' political and moral viewpoints? What were your parents like?

MR DU PREEZ: They were very conservative and they were both members of the National Party.

MR VISSER: Were they also conservative?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, they were conservative.

MR VISSER: As members of the National Party, and the party to which your parents belonged to, did this influence your viewpoints from childhood?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, certainly so.

MR VISSER: And did you see anything wrong in the policy of apartheid that was upheld by the National Party?

MR DU PREEZ: No Mr Chairperson, I supported this.

MR VISSER: Directly after school, you joined the South African Police in 1973?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Have you got anything to say about the unrest during that time?

MR DU PREEZ: I was a member of the Special Branch and I also served in the 1976 unrests.

MR VISSER: During that time, what was said to you concerning what your tasks would entail as a member of the Special Force?

MR DU PREEZ: When I became or joined the Special Task Force, we had to be willing to kill if it was necessary.

MR VISSER: Yes, this now specifically refer to what we in general consider as the political struggle?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: I am sorry Mr Visser, I do not know if I heard you correctly, did you say that you must be willing to kill other people if it is necessary?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, to kill people if it is necessary.

MR MALAN: Was this a general statement or was it said what the circumstances would be? It is a very broad statement, isn't it, when would it be necessary, did they tell you?

MR DU PREEZ: It was not specified no, but it was part of the selection, that if you are willing to kill any person, you would not have been selected in this process.

MR MALAN: In other words if you were a pacifist?

MR DU PREEZ: Correct.

MR MALAN: But if you were an ordinary person who in an emergency situation, would kill, then you would succeed?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: It had nothing to do with illegal activities, you did not read it like that?

MR DU PREEZ: No.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Just to explain this better, this was part of the psychometric test that you did, to find out if you would be suitable for this Special Task Force?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: In your capacity as a member of this Task Force, you came face to face with the realities of the internal warfare that was going on at that stage?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct. During that time I also served in the previous South West and I was also applied there as more than just a soldier, we were an Anti-terrorist movement.

MR VISSER: Were you in contact?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes.

MR VISSER: Can you say how many contacts you had? Not in numbers, but was it a few?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, it was in more than 10 contacts where various terrorists were killed and also of our own members.

MR VISSER: Where there was firing at both sides?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: You refer or I would like to refer the Committee to specifically volume 2, the Exhibit E47 that appeared before the Amnesty Committee, in this case in volume 2, that is the statement of the Generals.

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: We are not going to read this, but what is your comment on the situation that is explained in paragraph 13 and 14 and 16 concerning your own situation? Can you identify yourself with this?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes.

MR VISSER: In 1979 you were placed with the Security Branch in Port Natal?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: In Durban?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you referring to page 142?

MR VISSER: Page 161 Mr chairman, of volume 2, the involvement of the South African Police in both the former Rhodesia and former South West Africa in a military support role, to the Rhodesian Army and the South African Defence Force, necessitated training them in purely military tactics and techniques. In neither of these situations, they were expected to act as civil police. Every contact between them and their opponents, led to a bloody shootout, with the result that ordinary civil police functions fell by the wayside.

The ordinary policemen drawn from the ranks of the police, from the whole country involved in these guerilla warfare and counter-insurgency activities, where he in fact had to kill or be killed, became progressively more accustomed to this type of conflict and the ways, means and methods utilised in combat the enemy and it goes on Mr Chairman.

It is those ideas that Mr Du Preez says. In 1979 you were transferred to Port Natal. In what section, or I will lead you in this, originally you served in the Church Section. Was this at the desk of the ANC or what desk was this?

MR DU PREEZ: No, there was a Church Section concerning church matters.

MR VISSER: It was completely independent?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes.

MR VISSER: In the Security Branch or in the ordinary branch?

MR DU PREEZ: No, it was in the Security Branch.

MR VISSER: And in 1981 you were transferred to the Terrorist Section?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Under Colonel Andy Taylor? Did you receive any special training?

MR DU PREEZ: In the investigation of terrorism?

MR VISSER: Are you an explosives expert?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And at that stage, did you investigate certain incidents?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Can you give a number of the amount of incidents that you visited or investigated?

MR DU PREEZ: Mr Chairperson, in that time in Durban, I investigated more than 100 scenes of explosions.

MR VISSER: And were people killed in those incidents?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: What time was it?

MR DU PREEZ: It was from 1981, I would say up to 1990 and up to around 1994.

MR VISSER: You also became aware of the death of one of your colleagues, is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, various of my colleagues died during the period when I was in the Special Branch. Four of my colleagues died and or were killed by ANC terrorists.

MR VISSER: Amongst others?

MR DU PREEZ: Colonel Welman, Zukela, Mike Mbede and Radjo.

MR VISSER: Yes. Is it so that in 1994, May 1994, you were found medically unfit for the task of a policeman?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And at the May of 1995, you were discharged with the rank of Superintendent?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct yes.

MR VISSER: What was the diagnosis of your state?

MR DU PREEZ: It was post traumatic stress.

MR VISSER: What would you say led to this state?

MR DU PREEZ: I think it must have been the politics, the things that happened in the police and the situation in the police itself.

MR VISSER: You are now referring to the violence, etc?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: As a member of the Security Branch, did you feel that you were busy with normal, legal actions or what was your position?

MR DU PREEZ: Mr Chairperson, from 1981 in Durban with the beginning of the bomb explosions, we felt that we were more in a war than in ordinary service as police officers.

MR VISSER: Did you feel that you became more and more involved in a political struggle, rather than just crime prevention?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: From time to time suggestions were made that members of the Security Branch killed terrorists, MK members indiscriminately, those that they could catch?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes. No, it is not true, if it would have been the case, I would have been involved in hundreds of incidents or cases, then this amnesty application would not have been just about a few people, but about hundreds of them.

MR VISSER: Would you say that in the incidents where it did occur, would be the exception?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is true.

MR VISSER: Mr Du Preez, if we can continue and get to the point of the political background in the broader terms and we have listened to the evidence of Mr Botha and Steyn and Forster, do you agree with the general political background?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, I do agree with it.

MR VISSER: Do you also agree with the political views with which these actions were executed?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Were you involved in the Ramlakan case?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: In what capacity?

MR DU PREEZ: I was one of the Investigators, I also took down statements from people in this incident.

MR VISSER: You also heard the evidence of Mr Botha in broader terms, about what the Ramlakan case was about.

MR DU PREEZ: Yes.

MR VISSER: Do you agree with this?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes.

MR VISSER: Concerning Ndwandwe, she was discussed or from Mr Botha, she was involved in the Ramlakan case?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: At one stage, we know in 1987 she left the country and Mr Botha said according to the information, or your information that you received, she received training and she later went back to Swaziland. Would that correlate with information that you had?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes.

MR VISSER: And from Swaziland she operated as the acting Commander of MK operations within the Republic of South Africa, and more specifically in the area of Port Natal?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you know that she was pregnant during 1987?

MR DU PREEZ: No Mr Chairperson. I knew that she had a child later on.

MR VISSER: I must admit Mr Chairman, I wasn't aware of that information myself.

CHAIRPERSON: Newspaper cuttings that we have been given says she had a one year old child, when she was abducted, which would have meant that she was pregnant in 1987?

MR VISSER: Probably.

CHAIRPERSON: The child would have been born in about October.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman. In any case, you were part of the abduction out of Swaziland?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Were you familiar with the planning and the purpose of this operation beforehand?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Can you just tell us when you became aware of this operation and what your knowledge was concerning this?

MR DU PREEZ: Colonel Botha informed me, I am not sure what his rank was at that stage, it could have been Captain.

MR VISSER: Just refer to him as Botha.

MR DU PREEZ: Well Botha informed me that an operation was planned to abduct Ndwandwe out of Swaziland. He discussed this with me, and we discussed the finer details about how we were going to do this.

MR VISSER: And among others, was there made use of two people?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: If I ask you who these people were, I am not asking you their names, I am asking what their status were of these two people.

MR DU PREEZ: They were informants.

MR VISSER: For how long were they informants of the Security Branch before this incident?

MR DU PREEZ: That is difficult to say, but I can guess it could have been a year, I am not sure of the time span.

MR VISSER: Were they askaris?

MR DU PREEZ: No, negative.

MR VISSER: Were they applied and did you receive information from them in other cases apart from that of Ndwandwe?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: You then heard as you have just said, what the purpose of this operation was, and you then accompanied them?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: We know who the people were who went with, we do not have to cover that again.

MR MALAN: Before you continue Mr Visser, the purpose of the operation was the abduction, but you said that you discussed further details with Botha, or he discussed it with you. Did he tell you what the purpose of the abduction was?

MR DU PREEZ: The purpose of the abduction was then to recruit her as an informant.

MR MALAN: Did he talk to you or discuss with you about the possibility of success to recruit her as an informant?

MR DU PREEZ: It was discussed Mr Chairperson. I cannot remember the finer details.

MR MALAN: Did you think that the chances are good that she will be able to be recruited as an informant for the police?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, I thought that it was possible.

MR MALAN: No I am asking you if you think that it would be good, not impossible?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, I thought the chances were good.

MR MALAN: In other words the chances were better that she would be recruited?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: Did Botha tell you this?

MR DU PREEZ: I think that was my own opinion.

MR MALAN: At no stage he told you that it would be difficult to recruit her?

MR DU PREEZ: I do not think in a percentage, I thought that the chances would be good to recruit her.

MR MALAN: You have heard his evidence, and if I can summarise it correctly, he said that in his mind she must be abducted, that she will be eliminated, except if she could be recruited. Didn't he put it to you like that?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that possibility was there.

MR MALAN: No sir, it is not a possibility. That is the framework in which Botha began this operation. That is what he said to us.

Not that it is possible that she will be eliminated, but that it would be a possibility and that she could - I think he used the expression, that she could save her own life by becoming an informant.

MR DU PREEZ: Mr Chairperson, I knew that if she will not cooperate as an informant, she will be eliminated.

MR MALAN: But the probability was not shared with you, is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ: Not that I can remember of.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Your personal view was that it would be worthwhile to abduct her from Swaziland, because there is a possibility that she could have been recruited as an informant?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: If you did not foresee that possibility and you just wanted to eliminate her, what would you have done then?

MR DU PREEZ: Then we would have eliminated her in Swaziland.

MR MALAN: Can I just ask you on what basis did you make this conclusion, was there something specific?

MR DU PREEZ: Before this incident, various other people or persons were recruited in this manner.

MR MALAN: But there was nothing specific in Ms Ndwandwe's actions that made you think that there is a chance now to recruit her, it was just because of other operations?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: If she had been eliminated in Swaziland, wouldn't there be a danger of a political scandal?

MR DU PREEZ: Mr Chairperson, not necessarily. The ANC eliminated many of their own members in Swaziland, so if she were to be eliminated in Swaziland, fingers could be pointed to the ANC themselves.

CHAIRPERSON: But fingers may well be pointed at the South African Security Forces, might they not?

MR DU PREEZ: Certainly so, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Particularly if a fairly large group in three different vehicles had crossed the Swazi border that morning?

MR DU PREEZ: If it was about the elimination, we would not have used so many personnel or vehicles.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman. It is also true, is it not, and we know this from the facts, that Ndwandwe during the Ramlakan case, did indeed under Section 29 detention, apparently offer her cooperation?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct, she also made a Section 29 statement.

MR VISSER: In either event, as history has taught us, your feeling about this was incorrect, but let us first move into Swaziland. Is it correct that you moved in three vehicles, Taylor's Nissan, the kombi and a bakkie?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: You have listened to the evidence which was given by Wasserman and he has stated that you and him were basically together.

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you agree with his breakdown of how it happened, where you went, first to Onverwacht, then up to Manzini, that you made observation in front of the bakkie, after you had given the bakkie to the two informers on the way to Manzini and that Ndwandwe climbed into the bakkie and that the bakkie moved behind you, you moved ahead. The vehicle of Taylor, with Taylor, Botha and Forster inside, was driving behind the bakkie, is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Is it also correct that outside Manzini, Ms Ndwandwe was transferred from the bakkie to the kombi?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And that you then travelled in the direction of Culel?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And that you turned then on the Hluti road?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And then you stopped after you had travelled that road for a short while, and Botha and Ndwandwe took shelter at the back of the bakkie, under a piece of canvass?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you and Wasserman were in front of the bakkie?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Can you recall that it rained on that evening, as we have heard?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct. We drove the bakkie in fourth wheel drive.

MR VISSER: It was a 4 x 4?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: When you were in Manzini, can you remember what time you were there, what time of the day?

MR DU PREEZ: We were in Manzini at dusk.

MR VISSER: In October that would have been approximately what time? Was it October?

MR DU PREEZ: Approximately 6 o'clock, half past six.

MR VISSER: Yes. We know that the minibus was driven by Forster away from the border post, and the bakkie was driven out...

MR DU PREEZ: No, Wasserman and I drove the bakkie.

MR VISSER: I beg your pardon, I meant that Botha and Taylor were in Taylor's vehicle and that is how they moved out at the Culel border post?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Is it also your recollection of the facts, that the two informers were dropped off and that they crossed the fence illegally to the other side?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, I assume that that is how it happened.

MR VISSER: We know that there was a point at the fence, where there was a rendezvous that evening, where Botha and Ndwandwe climbed through the fence to the people who waited on the other side, that would be Steyn, Forster, Botha and Taylor. Can you remember that?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: What time in the evening was that approximately?

MR DU PREEZ: I cannot remember. All that I can remember is the time that we dropped them off and on the way back, we saw that there wouldn't be enough time to go through the gate.

MR VISSER: Which gate?

MR DU PREEZ: The Culel border post.

MR VISSER: And what did you do then?

MR DU PREEZ: Wasserman and I turned away to Shlangana and drove around that way.

MR VISSER: Is that in Wasserman's words, to get to a tar road as soon as possible?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you burgle a house that night?

MR DU PREEZ: No.

MR VISSER: Are you aware of a burglary and money which was stolen from a house?

MR DU PREEZ: I heard about that from newspaper reports which I read later.

MR VISSER: Did you or Wasserman have anything to do with that?

MR DU PREEZ: No, not at all.

MR VISSER: Can you remember at what time you arrived back in Manzini that evening?

MR DU PREEZ: Mr Chairperson, it was early morning. We arrived in Manzini, we slept in the bakkie for approximately an hour or so, and then we departed back to the Culel border post, in order to cross at about 7 o'clock in the morning.

MR VISSER: When you arrived in Manzini, you were then too late to sleep in a hotel?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: The following morning ... (intervention)

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon Mr Visser, sorry to interrupt you once again, you would have known that you would arrive in Manzini at such a late hour, why did you drive to Manzini, why didn't you just sleep somewhere near the border post?

MR DU PREEZ: Chairperson, we had planned to go to Manzini, and as a result of the road, we didn't think that we were going to be driving for such a long time, and seeing as we were on our way, we decided to continue.

MR MALAN: Well, seeing as you were on the tar road, you could have predicted your time of arrival at Manzini, that would have been easier?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct, but we became stuck quite a number of times on the road that we were taking, and we decided not to take that road back.

MR VISSER: That is the road which we are referring to as the Hluti road?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And Wasserman has told the Committee that that was very muddy?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct, yes.

MR VISSER: The following morning you left and you arrived at the Onverwacht police house?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR VISSER: An you remember approximately what time that was?

MR DU PREEZ: It was approximately 7 o'clock when we went through the border post.

MR VISSER: And did you find Ms Ndwandwe there along with Forster, Steyn and Taylor and Botha?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you participate in her interrogation?

MR DU PREEZ: No Mr Chairperson, Ms Ndwandwe was put in the kombi and taken back to Pietermaritzburg, that was shortly after our arrival, we hadn't been there for very long.

MR VISSER: Did you enter Swaziland with a legal passport?

MR DU PREEZ: No, it was a false passport.

MR VISSER: You then departed for Pietermaritzburg, is which vehicle.

ADV SIGODI: Sorry, just on that point, do you still remember the name under which you left?

MR VISSER: The name of the passport, the name under which the passport was issued, can you remember that?

MR DU PREEZ: I think it was Du Toit.

MR MALAN: How many false passports did you have?

MR DU PREEZ: I only had the one.

MR MALAN: Do you think it was Du Toit or do you know it was Du Toit?

MR DU PREEZ: It was Du Toit, I am not entirely certain about the name.

MR VISSER: In which vehicle did you journey to Pietermaritzburg?

MR DU PREEZ: I drove the kombi.

MR VISSER: And were Botha and Ndwandwe in the back of the kombi?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Could you hear what the contents of their discussion was?

MR DU PREEZ: No Chairperson, there was a partition which divided the driver from the back of the kombi.

MR VISSER: This kombi, what was it usually used for?

MR DU PREEZ: It was an observation vehicle.

MR VISSER: But Visagie changed it, we heard that.

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR VISSER: What were the changes in principle which he brought about?

MR DU PREEZ: There were large periscopes and other such apparatus with which to undertake observation, they were mounted into the kombi so that one could make observations of what was outside.

MR VISSER: And that was removed?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that was removed.

MR VISSER: The tables and that?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that as well.

MR VISSER: You then arrived in Pietermaritzburg.

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you participate in any interrogation of Ndwandwe while you were there?

MR DU PREEZ: I did ask her some questions.

MR VISSER: Did you assault her?

MR DU PREEZ: At no stage.

MR VISSER: What was Ndwandwe's attitude regarding the questions which were put to her, did she provide any answers or did she refuse to answer?

MR DU PREEZ: She gave me answers and regarding the persons in terms of whom I made requests, she gave me the names.

MR VISSER: Mr Forster yesterday indicated that she was proud of her activities. What was your impression?

MR DU PREEZ: That was not my impression. The questions which I put to her, were answered very concisely and I never obtained that impression during my interrogation of her.

MR VISSER: At a certain stage, Ms Ndwandwe was killed in the district of Elandskop. Did you have anything to do with that?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Can you tell us how it occurred?

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, one more interruption while we are on this point. You said that she answered very concisely. Were you trying to see whether or not she would be suitable for recruitment?

MR DU PREEZ: I did not consider it at that stage, it did not come up in my mind as a consideration.

MR MALAN: Was that not the primary reason for the abduction, isn't that what you told us?

MR DU PREEZ: Mr Chairperson, at that stage of my interrogation of her, I think it had already been decided that she would be killed.

MR MALAN: Who told you that?

MR DU PREEZ: I deduced that from Mr Botha and Mr Taylor and Mr Steyn's discussion.

MR MALAN: Which discussion are you referring to?

MR DU PREEZ: It was decided, when it was decided that she would not be recruited, it became generally known that she would not be applied as an informer and at that stage Taylor gave Wasserman and I the order to dig the grave.

MR MALAN: Mr Du Preez, I asked you how you found out and you initially told me that it was from the discussion of three of your colleagues, and later you said that it was generally known.

Who told you that the decision had been taken to kill her, where did this come from?

MR DU PREEZ: I can't recall Mr Chairperson, it is something which was left unsaid.

MR MALAN: May I put it to you like this, initially you very clearly told us that you thought that the chances were favourable that she could be an informer.

Your first contact was the interrogation at Pietermaritzburg, direct contact with her in the form of a discussion?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: You said at that stage you knew she was going to be killed.

MR DU PREEZ: The stage during which I questioned Ndwandwe, was after Botha had completed his interrogation of her.

MR MALAN: Were you present during Botha's interrogation?

MR DU PREEZ: No.

MR MALAN: On what grounds did you know that she was not suitable? Or in another sense, why didn't you try to formulate your own opinion?

MR DU PREEZ: Mr Chairperson, I think Mr Botha was primarily responsible or would have been primarily responsible for the recruitment of this person.

It was clear that he had not succeeded.

MR MALAN: Why? Why was it clear?

MR DU PREEZ: Through Ms Ndwandwe's attitude.

MR MALAN: What was her attitude?

MR DU PREEZ: Mr Chairperson, I was not involved with her interrogation until that point.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, perhaps you are misunderstanding me. You have told us that it was clear that Botha had not been successful.

Then I asked you upon which grounds, and you said on the grounds of her attitude. Now I would like to know on what grounds it was clear to you that he had not succeeded?

MR DU PREEZ: From Botha's attitude. The fact that Botha said that she cannot be recruited.

MR MALAN: When did Botha say this to you?

MR DU PREEZ: I can't recall that Botha specifically said this to me, I deduced this from discussions between Botha, Taylor and Steyn, that she would not be recruited.

MR MALAN: Where did you hear those discussions?

MR DU PREEZ: At the house.

MR MALAN: Were you present during the discussions?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, I was present at some of the discussions. Mr Chairperson, these things were not said in one sentence.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Mr Du Preez, let us just discuss this. I think that you and Commissioner Malan are on two different wave lengths, let me just put it to you like this. You were interrogating her, for what reason, for what objective?

MR DU PREEZ: I had a dossier which was out of date, and I was looking for names of people who had committed acts of terrorism.

MR VISSER: By the way, now that you mention it, did you obtain any information from her which was of assistance to you?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Can you recall today exactly what that was?

MR DU PREEZ: It was about the Radjo case, that was one aspect of the information.

MR VISSER: Okay. Did you interrogate her with the purpose of recruiting her as an informer?

MR DU PREEZ: Negative.

MR VISSER: Whose duty was that?

MR DU PREEZ: That was Botha's duty.

MR VISSER: And you said that afterwards there was a discussion between Botha, Steyn and Taylor.

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Which you heard?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you deduced from that discussion that it was Botha's view that she was not recruitable?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Later you received an order?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR VISSER: From whom?

MR DU PREEZ: From Taylor.

MR VISSER: And what did this order entail?

MR DU PREEZ: It was that Wasserman and I were to dig a grave and that we were to eliminate Ndwandwe.

MR VISSER: Did you then carry out this order?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Before we arrived at this point, were there any other people on this farm, on that particular day who interrogated Ndwandwe?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Was that Labuschagne and Verwey?

MR DU PREEZ: I can only remember Labuschagne.

MR VISSER: Sorry?

MR DU PREEZ: I can only remember Labuschagne.

MR VISSER: Were you present during their interrogation, Labuschagne's interrogation of Ndwandwe?

MR DU PREEZ: No Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Now we are back at the point where we were a few moments ago, where you were to go and dig the grave. What happened next?

MR DU PREEZ: We dug the grave. Wasserman and I told Ndwandwe told her that we were going to take her away to another place.

MR VISSER: Did you tell her where to or did you just tell her that you were taking her elsewhere?

MR DU PREEZ: We simply told her that she was being transferred.

MR VISSER: Was she blindfolded?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, she was blindfolded and I led her out of the house.

MR VISSER: Yes?

MR DU PREEZ: Wasserman then hit her unconscious with a wooden stick. We carried her to the grave. We placed her next to the grave and Wasserman shot her once in the head.

We then removed her clothing, and placed her inside the grave.

MR VISSER: Just before you continue, let us just take a step back. Wasserman said something about her being placed half way into the grave, something to that effect?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, she was placed in the grave in a skew fashion, her feet were in the grave, but her upper body still emerged. She was standing half upright in the grave, if I remember correctly.

MR VISSER: The sides of the grave, were they diagonal or straight down?

MR DU PREEZ: I think they were diagonal.

MR VISSER: And you say that Wasserman then shot her and her clothing was removed and she was then placed inside the grave.

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Can you remember anything about plastic bags?

MR DU PREEZ: Chairperson, Wasserman sprinkled lime over her, there was a bag with lime inside, and we began to close the grave.

MR VISSER: Before you did that, did you also place the lime bag in the grave with her, the bag in which the lime had come?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Where did this lime come from, can you perhaps remember?

MR DU PREEZ: No, I don't know from where it came.

MR VISSER: But it was present after Taylor had given you the order to carry out the elimination and the burial?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, where did you see the lime for the first time, at the grave?

MR DU PREEZ: At the grave, yes.

MR MALAN: You didn't see Wasserman carrying the lime to the grave?

MR DU PREEZ: No, I can't remember that.

MR MALAN: And you said that you and Wasserman dug the grave?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: And you went together to go and fetch Ms Ndwandwe?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: Any explanation or suspicion as to how the lime arrived at the grave?

MR DU PREEZ: I cannot say.

MR VISSER: Well, one of you must have taken it there?

MR MALAN: No, why Mr Visser? Why should one of them have taken it?

MR VISSER: Well, it had to have arrived there in some manner.

MR MALAN: Yes, but there were other men there.

CHAIRPERSON: And there were how many other men there?

MR VISSER: That is where my question is leading to Mr Chairman. Were any of the others persons that you recall today, near the grave?

MR DU PREEZ: No, at the time of the elimination it was only me and Wasserman, Taylor and Forster who were on the farm. The other persons had all left.

MR VISSER: Where were Forster and Taylor?

MR DU PREEZ: They were inside the house.

MR VISSER: And they weren't by the grave?

MR DU PREEZ: No.

MR VISSER: You said that the lime was sprinkled over her, that the bag was left there and then soil was filled into the grave?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Was anything else placed over the body?

MR DU PREEZ: Refuse bags were thrown over her.

MR VISSER: The contents thereof?

MR DU PREEZ: The contents of refuse bags, they were in plastic bags.

MR VISSER: What was the reason for that?

MR DU PREEZ: So that if anybody were to dig around there, it would look like a rubbish dump.

ADV SIGODI: Sorry, did you know why you had to sprinkle lime on the body?

MR DU PREEZ: The purpose for that was to remove any odour for wild animals who might start digging around there.

ADV SIGODI: Who told you that?

MR DU PREEZ: I think that it was Mr Taylor who arranged it.

ADV SIGODI: When did he tell you that?

MR DU PREEZ: I can't specifically recall whether or not I asked him about the lime, but after the lime had been sprinkled, it became known to me that it would divert odour.

ADV SIGODI: Did you get to know about this before sprinkling the lime or after you had sprinkled it, that it would divert the odour?

MR DU PREEZ: I think afterwards. I don't know whether or not it really would have worked that way.

But I did this because Taylor said so.

MR MALAN: You didn't see the lime there, you didn't see anybody bringing the lime, and you didn't see Wasserman bringing it in. You assumed that it was him, because the others were never at the grave, didn't you ask him why he had brought this lime to the graveside?

MR DU PREEZ: Chairperson, as I have already said, the lime which was sprinkled was to remove any odour.

MR MALAN: Yes, but you said that you heard this from Mr Taylor and you think that it was afterwards. In afterwards what you are saying is that when you sprinkled it, you already knew that it was to remove odours.

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct, but I don't know who put the bag there, it could have been Wasserman or Taylor or perhaps even Forster still.

MR VISSER: When would Taylor have told you about lime which removes odour if this was before this occurrence, because you didn't know that the lime was going to be there, yet you found it there?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR MALAN: Then, why would Taylor have discussed lime with you, was there a previous incident in which you had been involved?

MR DU PREEZ: No Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: You cannot explain the chronological order to us, you can just tell us that the lime was there, and secondly you didn't know then that it would remove odour?

MR DU PREEZ: Shortly afterwards, I knew.

MR MALAN: But you didn't ask Wasserman why the lime was there?

MR DU PREEZ: I can't remember having asked Wasserman.

MR MALAN: Thank you Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Mr Du Preez, there was indeed a previous incident, however you were not involved in that incident, that was the incident of Deon Cele is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ: I know about that incident.

MR VISSER: But Wasserman indeed had been involved in that case.

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, I heard that.

CHAIRPERSON: Was Kubeka buried?

MR DU PREEZ: Negative Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The first matter in which he applied for amnesty for.

MR VISSER: Perhaps you should just state the case of Tombi Kubeka, in 1987, was that a case of elimination?

MR DU PREEZ: Negative.

MR VISSER: What happened there, just briefly?

MR DU PREEZ: It was the disposal of a body after she had died of natural causes.

MR VISSER: Natural causes then, so it is the disguising of a body?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR VISSER: After you had filled in the grave, you all left?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Just to move back a little, with regard to information received, you have heard Botha and the evidence which he gave regarding the information which Ndwandwe provided to him, at Onverwacht and also during the journey to Pietermaritzburg and also possibly thereafter, it doesn't really matter where, but it was with regard to certain incidents which she referred and regarding which she had given information as to who had been responsible for those incidents. Did you listen to that evidence?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And is that in accordance with your recollection at that stage?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: When Taylor told you that you were to dig the grave and eliminate Ndwandwe, did you regard this as an order?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Was it an order with which you agreed?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you have already stated that you also agree with the evidence of Botha regarding his motivation or the political objective with regard to this action?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And that was chiefly about Ndwandwe's activities from Swaziland as manifested in units in the Port Natal area?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Can we then move over to Pumeso Nxiweni? Can you just tell us what your share was in that case?

MR DU PREEZ: In that case, Mr Botha had an informer who arranged a meeting with Nxiweni and we arrested him at the rendezvous point.

MR VISSER: That was on the 4th of November 1988 as we understand it?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And it was Botha, yourself and Van der Westhuizen?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct. We then took him to a safe house.

MR VISSER: We know that it was at the Kingspark stadium?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: You took him to a safe house and then what happened?

MR DU PREEZ: That is where we interrogated him.

MR VISSER: With what purpose?

MR DU PREEZ: In order to obtain information from him with regard to terrorist activities in Durban.

MR VISSER: Weapon stockpiling points.

MR VISSER: yes, weapon stockpiling points.

MR VISSER: Did you interrogate him?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, I did.

MR VISSER: Did you assault him?

MR DU PREEZ: He was assaulted, I assaulted him.

MR VISSER: In what way?

MR DU PREEZ: It was slapping and punching with a balled fist.

MR VISSER: Where?

MR DU PREEZ: In the face and on the body.

MR VISSER: And in the face? As a result of the interrogation, did any information emerge?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, information did emerge.

MR VISSER: We heard from Botha that he, Nxiweni, apparently provided information that on the previous evening an act of terrorism had taken place at the Rosborough station, and it was committed by members of the unit under his command?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And on that very same evening, the 5th of November, another explosion was to occur. Was that the 4th of November, I am sorry, I beg your pardon. Sorry, it is the 4th of November, another explosion was to take place?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Where would that be?

MR DU PREEZ: That would be at Montclair, on the railway line at Montclair.

MR VISSER: What happened as a result of this information?

MR DU PREEZ: Van der Westhuizen and I drove to the place where he said the bomb would have been placed and on the way there, we received a report that the bomb had indeed exploded and when we arrived on the scene, we did see that it had exploded.

MR VISSER: Were there any police on the scene?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, they were already on the scene.

MR VISSER: Pumeso was held overnight at the safe house,is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes.

MR VISSER: Did you remain there or did you go home?

MR DU PREEZ: I remained there.

MR VISSER: Was any attempt made to recruit him as an informer?

MR DU PREEZ: No Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: From your side, that is what I mean?

MR DU PREEZ: No, there was no attempt from my side to recruit him.

MR VISSER: During further interrogation, more information came to light with regard to armed vehicles?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct. He indicated to us that there was a trunk full of arms and ammunition in the suitcase room at the Allan Taylor residence.

MR VISSER: Did you go along to the Allan Taylor residence in order to fetch these arms?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR VISSER: How did you obtain access to this room?

MR DU PREEZ: We climbed over the fence, and we went into the room.

MR VISSER: You opened the door and went in or did you break in?

MR DU PREEZ: I cannot remember whether the door had been forced open or simply opened.

MR VISSER: Did you find anything?

MR DU PREEZ: We found a trunk which fitted the description which Nxiweni had given us, and we found arms inside, we took the trunk and brought it back to the safe house.

MR VISSER: Was it your impression that Nxiweni was recruitable as an informer, judging by what you had observed from him?

MR DU PREEZ: No.

MR VISSER: What else happened?

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon Mr Visser, while you are discussing this matter, was it ever said to you that it was a consideration to recruit him as an informer?

MR DU PREEZ: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: We have heard from Botha that in during the afternoon of 5 November, Taylor and Wasserman arrived at the safe house, and that they were informed there by him about Nxiweni's arrest. Do you know anything about that?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Was that after their arrival that you went to the Allan Taylor residence to lift the weapons?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Upon your arrival back at the safe house, what happened then?

CHAIRPERSON: Can I disturb you for one moment? This safe house, was this the safe house at Verulam?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You have arrived back at the safe house at Verulam, what happened next?

MR DU PREEZ: Colonel Taylor told Botha and Van der Westhuizen that they could go home and he began to dig a grave.

MR VISSER: That is who, who began to dig a grave?

MR DU PREEZ: Taylor, he started digging a grave.

MR VISSER: He didn't ask anybody else to do it, he did it himself?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct, yes.

MR VISSER: Can you provide any reason why he did this?

MR DU PREEZ: No Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, nobody offered to assist him?

MR DU PREEZ: Wasserman and I helped him later with the digging of the grave. When we arrived there, Taylor had already begun to dig the grave.

MR MALAN: And when you started helping him, did he withdraw? Surely it wouldn't have been all three of you digging the grave at the same time?

MR DU PREEZ: He was there throughout the time that the grave was being dug. We took turns.

MR VISSER: During this stage of the grave being dug, were Botha and Van der Westhuizen still there, or had they already left?

MR DU PREEZ: I can't remember.

MR VISSER: Now you have dug the grave, what happened next?

MR DU PREEZ: Taylor told Wasserman and I to eliminate Nxiweni. He and I took Nxiweni out of the house.

MR VISSER: Did you say anything to him?

MR DU PREEZ: We told him the same thing, we told him that we were taking him to another place.

MR VISSER: Was that during day time or night time?

MR DU PREEZ: It was at night.

MR VISSER: Yes?

MR DU PREEZ: He was blindfolded, and we walked with him until the grave. There I shot him in the head with a Scorpion pistol.

MR VISSER: Who shot him?

MR DU PREEZ: I shot him.

MR VISSER: Was this pistol legally in your possession?

MR DU PREEZ: No Mr Chairperson, it was a Russian Scorpion pistol.

MR VISSER: Where did he stand, or did he sit or lay down when you shot him?

MR DU PREEZ: He was standing.

MR VISSER: Where were you standing when you shot him?

MR DU PREEZ: I stood right next to him.

MR VISSER: On his left or right side?

MR DU PREEZ: On his left side.

MR VISSER: Was the pistol held near or far from his body when you shot him against his head, so indeed he was shot through the head?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Was he dead?

MR DU PREEZ: He died instantaneously. He fell down, we removed his clothing and placed him in the hole and closed the hole.

MR VISSER: Was he buried in the same fashion as Ndwandwe?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you also sprinkle lime over him, can you remember anything about that?

MR DU PREEZ: I cannot remember it.

MR VISSER: Can you remember if rubbish was also thrown into the grave in that case?

MR DU PREEZ: No, we didn't put any rubbish into the grave.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I notice that it is 1 o'clock, I am just about finished with this incident, if I may proceed a little while longer.

What happened with the clothing? I think you already said that his clothing had been removed?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct, we burnt the clothing afterwards.

MR VISSER: And then you departed?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Just with regard to this aspect, Mr Taylor says in his amnesty application, that Nxiweni went along to point out the DLB at the Allan Taylor residence. Is this in accordance with your recollection?

MR DU PREEZ: I cannot recall that.

MR VISSER: And he also says that Botha was present when Pumeso was killed, can you remember that?

MR DU PREEZ: No one else was there. By the time we killed Pumeso, Taylor had left the farm.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, that concludes this incident, thank you.

MR MALAN: Just one final question, or regarding your final answer, you said at the time of your shooting Nxiweni, Taylor was no longer on the farm.

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR MALAN: How much time elapsed between digging the grave and the elimination? What did you do after you dug the grave?

MR DU PREEZ: I think Taylor told us after the grave had been dug, that the decision was taken to eliminate him, and when we went to fetch Nxiweni to eliminate him, Taylor drove away.

That is when we went in to go and fetch him, that is when Taylor left.

MR MALAN: Are you certain of that?

MR DU PREEZ: That is how I remember that.

MR MALAN: Why would he have departed, he helped to dig the grave completely, he stayed there, you took turns, then you go and fetch Nxiweni 60 metres away from where he is about to be buried, and during that time, Botha or Taylor at least left.

MR DU PREEZ: Nxiweni was not fetched directly after the grave had been dug. After the grave had been completed, as far as I can remember, we first cleaned up. We wouldn't have walked in to the room where Nxiweni was with soiled feet and tell him that we were taking him away.

MR MALAN: And you also wouldn't have left the farm without cleaning yourselves up, so in other words you would have cleaned up twice?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR MALAN: Did you do that?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes.

MR MALAN: Can you remember that?

MR DU PREEZ: I can remember that.

MR MALAN: Why do you say that you wouldn't have, your choice of words looks like construction rather than recollection.

MR DU PREEZ: Chairperson, I think it may be a construction, but there is no way that one would have gone to the person or left the farm with soil on one's shoes.

I can't remember specifically that I had a bath before I left the farm.

MR MALAN: Wouldn't Taylor have taken a bath before leaving the farm? If he were to work with these constructions, because he helped to dig the grave?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR MALAN: So you would all go and clean up first, and then take Nxiweni out for the elimination?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: While you were walking to the grave with him, Taylor climbed into his car?

MR DU PREEZ: What I can remember is that Taylor was not on the farm, that he had already left when we eliminated Nxiweni.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, just in that regard, if you will allow me just a last reference. In volume 2, page 63, the words that stand here coming from Taylor, are in my submission significant.

He says, I will read the last bit of that paragraph at page 63 Mr Chairman, he says I cannot remember today who actually pulled the trigger. It wasn't me, but I admit I was part of the decision to kill him.

Then Mr Chairman, he says, I do recall that myself and Colonel Botha were definitely present. It may be that Sam Du Preez and Laurie Wasserman were also present, but I cannot remember whether any other members were indeed present when this incident took place.

We have the two people here that were actually instrumental in the elimination. Mr Taylor couldn't remember whether they were there, with respect Mr Chairman. I just point this out to say that the evidence of Mr Taylor must be regarded in the light of what Mr Wasserman said, and Mr Botha said about his recollection at the time when he completed these documents.

I just wanted to make that point at this stage. There are conflicts Mr Chairman, clearly, there are conflicts in recollection.

MR MALAN: Mr Visser, I just don't understand the argument with regard to Taylor's absence or departure. In order to case light on this issue, because in terms of the evidence we cannot rely on the fact that Taylor had departed.

When he made this statement, he was in a condition which meant that he could not really stand in for that statement. But you say Mr Du Preez, that your recollection is that Taylor departed before Nxiweni was eliminated?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: We will now adjourn until 2 o'clock.

ON RESUMPTION:

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: (still under oath)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: (continued) Mr Du Preez, we've got now the third and last incident, and that is the case which was referred to as the kwaMashu unit to which these people belonged to. After the elimination of Pumeso, we have heard that members of the Security Branch succeeded with the help of informers to make contact with the members of the kwaMashu unit, are you aware of this?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, I am.

MR VISSER: Apparently these informants took them into their confidence and agreed with them, that a meeting will take place, it seems to me, at a certain place?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct, yes.

MR VISSER: On the 17th of November 1988, a report was received from informants and members of the Security Branch then went to the Avoca Bridge between Durban and kwaMashu, is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Were you one of the members of that team?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, it was myself, Botha and Wasserman.

MR VISSER: You found people there or met up with people there. How many were they?

MR DU PREEZ: Three.

MR VISSER: Was it the three that I have just mentioned?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: How many people did you expect?

MR DU PREEZ: We expected four.

MR VISSER: Were they then arrested or whatever you want to call it?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct, we took them to the house of safety.

MR VISSER: Which house is this?

MR DU PREEZ: It is the house is Verulam where Taylor waited for us.

MR VISSER: Were they then interrogated there?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Did they have anything with them?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, they had a carrier bag with limpet mines.

MR VISSER: How many?

MR DU PREEZ: Three.

MR VISSER: Limpet mines?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes.

MR VISSER: During interrogation, did they give an explanation for the reason why they had these mines?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, they did give an explanation.

MR VISSER: What was that?

MR DU PREEZ: That someone dropped it off at their homes, and that they were going to get rid of it at some place.

MR VISSER: Did they tell what happened to this person?

MR DU PREEZ: This person then left to Swaziland.

MR VISSER: You knew better, because of the informants?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And in the interrogation, what you heard - what happened afterwards?

MR DU PREEZ: We interrogated the three persons to who the other member was.

MR VISSER: Did you then try to find out if they had any other weapons?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes.

MR VISSER: Were there any results?

MR DU PREEZ: They gave us the name of the fourth person who went to Swaziland.

MR VISSER: Can you remember that name today?

MR DU PREEZ: It was Naya Ngema.

MR VISSER: Did you attack them, assault them?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: In the same manner that you did, or was it different, to Nxiweni?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, it was the same way that we assaulted them. We slapped them and hit them with a fist.

MR MALAN: Sorry, just before you get to the assault. Did you say that they told you that the fourth person who did not arrive there, went to Swaziland?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct. With later interrogation, it was not during the arrest.

MR MALAN: Did they say to you that the fourth person was the person who gave them the limpet mines or that it was an unknown person?

MR DU PREEZ: Their initial lie was that it would have been another person, and not the person who went to Swaziland and that they did not know him, but it was a lie, and we knew that.

MR MALAN: How did you know this?

MR DU PREEZ: We knew who the group was and who the members of this group was.

MR MALAN: How did you know that Ngema did not go to Swaziland if he was then the fourth person?

MR DU PREEZ: I am sorry, I do not understand your question.

MR MALAN: When your evidence was led, you said that they told you that the fourth person went to Swaziland?

MR DU PREEZ: Mr Chairperson, when they made that allegation, they said that it was a person who went to Swaziland, who left the weapons with them.

At that stage they did not say it was the fourth person of their group.

MR MALAN: Thank you, it is more clear now. Excuse me, did you ask any questions with regards to the absence of this fourth person?

MR DU PREEZ: We expected four to arrive at the scene.

MR MALAN: And you knew that it would be Ngema?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: Did you ask them questions about this?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes.

MR MALAN: And what did they answer?

MR DU PREEZ: They admitted at a later stage that it was Ngema and they said that he went to Swaziland.

MR MALAN: In other words he went to Swaziland as well as the person who left the weapons with them, went to Swaziland, was that their story?

MR DU PREEZ: No Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Well, then I do not understand who went to Swaziland?

MR DU PREEZ: Ngema went to Swaziland.

MR MALAN: And the person who left the limpet mines with them?

MR DU PREEZ: It would also be Ngema?

MR MALAN: Did they say so?

MR DU PREEZ: Initially they said, or they said that they did not know Ngema.

MR MALAN: Did you know that he did not go to Swaziland, is that what you are saying to us?

MR DU PREEZ: We did not know at that stage that he went to Swaziland.

MR MALAN: Well, then I do not understand Mr Visser's question that you knew better. Maybe Mr Visser can just explain this to me.

MR VISSER: Commissioner, it was about the fact that they told a story that an unknown person left the limpet mines with them, and that they were on the way to get rid of them. That is what they knew better, they knew that they were on their way to go and place the limpet mines as a group or a unit.

MR MALAN: Thank you Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: They firstly referred to an unknown person, and that this person went to Swaziland if I understand you correctly?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And afterwards it seems that the fourth person was Ngema and that he possibly also went to Swaziland?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that he indeed went to Swaziland and that he was part of their group.

MR VISSER: But you did not know at that stage if he did go to Swaziland?

MR DU PREEZ: No, we did not know that.

MR VISSER: During the questioning, did they agree that they would show where the target would be?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And the members who were present there, the four, Taylor, Botha, yourself and Wasserman, did you then take a decision?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What was the decision?

MR DU PREEZ: We decided that we are going to eliminate them at the place or the spot that they wanted to target.

MR VISSER: What are you going to do then?

MR DU PREEZ: We will then get rid of the bodies with explosives.

MR VISSER: The people then went to the railway line in the Phoenix area?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR VISSER: What happened there at the scene?

MR DU PREEZ: We took the explosives out of the car.

MR MALAN: I wonder Mr Visser, if you can just ask him, he has heard the evidence, if maybe he can add anything else.

MR VISSER: It would be in order yes. The evidence from here on would be the same as Mr Wasserman's. I would just like to deal with it short.

The three people were then taken to a place at the railway where with the nod of Botha, they were killed or shot by your group. After the first shot was fired, do you know if any other shots were fired after that?

MR DU PREEZ: I fired two shots at the person who was in front of me.

MR VISSER: Afterwards, did you then prime the limpet mines?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct yes.

MR VISSER: And the bodies were then placed on the limpet mines, with the hands and heads on them and you then left there and afterwards you heard the explosion of the limpet mines going off?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct yes.

MR VISSER: Did you agree with the decision that they had to be eliminated?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, I did.

MR VISSER: What was the reason for this?

MR DU PREEZ: There was no possibility to recruit them as informants because they were three together, and also because they were responsible for most or various explosions in the Durban area.

MR VISSER: Did you consider them as dangerous?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, they were dangerous terrorists.

MR VISSER: Did you think that they had more explosives or ammunition?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, I thought that.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR NEL: Thank you Mr Chairperson, Christo Nel. Mr Du Preez, just a few questions about late Colonel Taylor.

Do you agree with me, I think especially the applicants here, you would be the one who would have known Taylor the best?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, I knew him very well.

MR NEL: You worked with him longer than the others at the Security Branch?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR NEL: Is it correct that late Bobby Welman who were also an explosives expert, was in charge of Taylor and were also very close to him?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR NEL: And the late Mike Mbede worked under Taylor's command as one of his men?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR NEL: Would you say that Colonel Taylor's political viewpoints would be the same as yourself and the others here?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR NEL: And it is also so that in the last few months of Taylor's life, and also in the application that he submitted, you had a lot of contact with him?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, I did liaise with him regularly.

MR NEL: What was your impression concerning the memories he had, or information that he had, if you discussed it with him?

MR DU PREEZ: Well, Taylor could not remember a lot of things.

MR NEL: If you look at Taylor's application, he says at one stage that he helped with the digging of the grave on Ndwandwe. Can you comment on that?

MR DU PREEZ: That is not true.

MR NEL: Would you say that it is a mistake that he made because of his bad memory?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, it was a mistake that he made.

MR NEL: Thank you Mr Chairperson, I've got no further questions.

MR NOLTE: Mr Chairman, no questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR NGUBANE: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Du Preez, before you could go to Swaziland, was there any decision that Ms Ndwandwe would be killed if she didn't cooperate?

MR DU PREEZ: I cannot remember such a pertinent decision.

MR NGUBANE: Was there any practise prior to your going to Swaziland that any person who didn't cooperate to become an informer, would be killed as a matter of course?

MR DU PREEZ: No Mr Chairperson.

MR NGUBANE: Was there a decision at any stage that any person who did not want to cooperate as an informer, would be killed, that was taken in your presence and perhaps with your participation?

MR DU PREEZ: At any time, the time I spent at the Security Branch or are you talking about Ndwandwe specifically?

MR NGUBANE: Yes, the time you spent at the Security Branch, was it ever taken as a principle that anyone who didn't cooperate with you, would be eliminated?

MR DU PREEZ: No Mr Chairman, each case was dealt with on its own merit.

MR NGUBANE: So when you went to Swaziland for the kidnap of Ndwandwe, your aim was to kidnap her and convert her to be an informer, is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct yes.

MR NGUBANE: And did you discuss when and where you were going to do this, to convert her?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, we did discuss it.

MR NGUBANE: Where was that process going to be done?

MR DU PREEZ: I cannot remember.

MR NGUBANE: Did you gain the impression that she was going to be brought back into South Africa, and then be converted in the offices maybe of C.R. Swart or in Maritzburg, or what was your impression?

MR DU PREEZ: Mr Chairperson, the plan was very clear. We would take her to a house of safety at the border post, and from there, we would go to Pietermaritzburg.

MR NGUBANE: So when you left South Africa, your plan was clear, kidnap her from Swaziland, bring her to the border post and then take her to Pietermaritzburg, is that your evidence?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct yes.

MR NGUBANE: There was no plan that she would be taken to the border post, converted and brought back to Swaziland?

MR DU PREEZ: If she were recruited as an informant, it would have been the process, yes.

MR NGUBANE: What would be the purpose of bringing her to Maritzburg?

MR DU PREEZ: Mr Chairperson, if she were to be recruited, we would have sent her back to Swaziland. If we did not recruit her, we would have taken her to Pietermaritzburg. That was the plan.

MR NGUBANE: So your evidence earlier on that you didn't, you can't recall where she was going to be converted as an informer, is incorrect?

MR DU PREEZ: I am not sure what your question is.

MR NGUBANE: I heard your evidence as being that you can't recall where the process of converting her was going to take place.

MR DU PREEZ: Mr Chairperson, we would have tried to recruit her after the abduction in Swaziland or during the abduction in Swaziland. How long this process would take, we could not have decided that beforehand.

MR NGUBANE: When she was taken the following day from the border post to Maritzburg, what was created in your mind, what did you think was happening?

MR DU PREEZ: Mr Chairperson, at that stage I haven't seen or did not know a lot about Ndwandwe, I did not form an opinion.

MR NGUBANE: You were just happy about taking her to Pietermaritzburg?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct. At that stage Steyn, Botha and Taylor in control.

MR NGUBANE: Did you enquire why she was being taken to Maritzburg?

MR DU PREEZ: It was part of the plan, yes.

MR NGUBANE: Well, did you enquire why she was being taken to Maritzburg?

MR DU PREEZ: No, I did not.

MR MALAN: If I understand you correctly, then the plan or part of the plan was to take her to Pietermaritzburg and that was for the elimination, because if you were to turn her, according to your evidence, you would take her back across the border.

I think the question is really when Pietermaritzburg came in, was it part of the implementation or the decision on the basis that she will not be recruited and that she must be eliminated?

MR DU PREEZ: Mr Chairperson, at this stage I cannot say when it became clear to me. I think it only became clear tome that afternoon in Pietermaritzburg, that she will be eliminated.

MR MALAN: Mr Du Preez, Mr Ngubane asked you what was the plan and you then explained the plan concerning taking her across the border, and if she is not recruited, her elimination, and when he asked you if this was the decision, you then said no, if she cooperated, she would have been taken immediately across the border, back into Swaziland.

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: In other words it would have been another plan that you would have implemented, is that not correct?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct, yes.

MR MALAN: The question is, the execution of the plan where she will not be taken back, but will be taken to Pietermaritzburg, must that then be seen as a confirmation of an execution of the first plan, the moment when she was taken to Pietermaritzburg?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR NGUBANE: Thank you. I won't pursue with that point. Why did you have to use a false passport to go to Swaziland?

MR DU PREEZ: I had a false passport and I usually used it when I went to Swaziland.

MR NGUBANE: Yes, why?

MR DU PREEZ: To cover up the activities of the Security Branch, so that other people cannot see that we are operating there.

MR NGUBANE: Well, if you say other people, who do you mean? Who was going to get into these affairs and know that you are the Security people who are doing dirty works?

MR DU PREEZ: I am not sure what you mean with dirty works?

MR NGUBANE: Well, you could have used your ordinary passport, go to Swaziland and come back. I still don't follow the reason why you had to use a false passport.

MR DU PREEZ: Mr Chairperson, we worked with informants and a lot of the work we did, was undercover.

MR NGUBANE: Did you travel in false number plates, registration plates?

MR DU PREEZ: I did, yes.

MR NGUBANE: The vehicles that you used when you abducted Ndwandwe, did they have false registration number plates?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, they did have false number plates.

MR NGUBANE: And you did that for the purposes of cover up, is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR NGUBANE: Coming to the question of a baby, you say that you were not aware that she was breastfeeding, is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct yes.

MR NGUBANE: Did she at any stage complain to you that she had left a baby for quite some time and she wanted to see the baby?

MR DU PREEZ: She did mention that she had a child, yes.

MR NGUBANE: And was it in the presence of Mr Botha when she mentioned this?

MR DU PREEZ: I cannot remember if Botha was there.

MR NGUBANE: At what stage did she mention that she had a baby, in Maritzburg or the border?

MR DU PREEZ: Mr Chairperson, I knew she had a child.

MR NGUBANE: Well, I know that you knew that she had a child, but you say that she mentioned that. All that I want to know is was it in Maritzburg or at the border when she mentioned it?

MR DU PREEZ: I cannot remember.

MR NGUBANE: Under what circumstances did she mentioned to you that she had a baby?

MR DU PREEZ: I cannot remember it Mr Chairperson.

MR NGUBANE: Was she crying?

MR DU PREEZ: She never cried in my presence.

MR NGUBANE: Did she say that she had a baby and she was longing for the baby?

MR DU PREEZ: Mr Chairperson, during that time she mentioned to me that she had a child.

MR NGUBANE: Yes, did she say she was longing for the child?

MR DU PREEZ: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR NGUBANE: Did she plead with you not to kill her because she had a small baby?

MR DU PREEZ: No Mr Chairperson.

MR NGUBANE: Was there any stage before she could be killed, when you gained the impression that she was aware that she was going to be killed?

MR DU PREEZ: No Mr Chairperson.

MR NGUBANE: When you blindfolded her, did she cry, scream?

MR DU PREEZ: No Mr Chairperson.

MR NGUBANE: Was she talking when you blindfolded her?

MR DU PREEZ: No Mr Chairperson.

MR NGUBANE: Did she complain and say why are you blindfolding me?

MR DU PREEZ: No, we gave an explanation why we were blindfolding her.

MR NGUBANE: And she was happy with your explanation?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct yes.

MR NGUBANE: What explanation did you give her?

MR DU PREEZ: I cannot hear, can you repeat please.

CHAIRPERSON: He did not hear that last question.

MR NGUBANE: The question was what explanation did you give and the answer was that he can't remember.

MR DU PREEZ: That is not true.

CHAIRPERSON: The answer was he did not hear you.

MR NGUBANE: Okay. All right, you have heard the question, can you give me an answer?

MR VISSER: Can I just know what the question is, because I am confused.

MR NGUBANE: When you blindfolded her, you said that you gave her an explanation why you were blindfolding her, and my question was what explanation was that.

MR DU PREEZ: We told her that we are going to take her to another place, or transfer her to another place.

MR NGUBANE: And she was happy about that, as far as you could, did she ask you what place it was?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct. No, she didn't ask any questions. She accepted it like that.

MR NGUBANE: And when you transferred her, before you could shoot her, did anyone tell you to shoot?

MR DU PREEZ: No Mr Chairperson.

MR NGUBANE: When the order was given to shoot her, was it given at the house or at the spot when she was actually shot?

MR DU PREEZ: I have already testified that Colonel Taylor told us that we must eliminate Ndwandwe, he did not give any prescriptions on how to do it.

MR NGUBANE: Was it at the house or at the spot where the shooting took place?

MR DU PREEZ: At the house.

MR NGUBANE: And was it in the presence of Ndwandwe?

MR DU PREEZ: Negative.

MR NGUBANE: Let's turn to the incident of Nxiweni. You say that he was involved in the Ramlakan case, is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct Chairperson.

MR NGUBANE: And some of the people that were arrested in connection with that case, they were promised that they would be made State witnesses, they made statements in terms of Section 29, is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct Chairperson.

MR NGUBANE: Were those people that made statements in terms of Section 29, Umkhonto We Sizwe people?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct Chairperson.

MR NGUBANE: And did you influence them by assaulting them, so that they could make these statements?

MR DU PREEZ: No Chairperson.

MR NGUBANE: Did you attempt to influence Nxiweni to turn into a State witness?

MR DU PREEZ: No Mr Chairperson.

MR NGUBANE: Why not?

MR DU PREEZ: I didn't work with him.

MR NGUBANE: Well, how did you know that there was no attempt to turn him into a State witness, do you know?

MR DU PREEZ: Could you please repeat the question.

MR NGUBANE: Do you know whether there was an attempt to turn him into a State witness, if I may make myself clearer?

MR DU PREEZ: No, I wasn't aware of any such attempt.

MR NGUBANE: But your investigations, was it not the plan to make the case as strong as possible against the main actors, Ramlakan and Duduzile?

MR DU PREEZ: Chairperson, I was one of the interrogators and I questioned one of the persons, by name of Robert Mlanzi. I was not in control of those that Mr Taylor had to do with.

MR NGUBANE: But you accept it as a fact that Mr Nxiweni did not offer to be a State witness, is that correct?

CHAIRPERSON: As he said, he said he doesn't know. He doesn't know if an attempt was made to get him. The first question you asked him was if he did it, and he said no.

MR NGUBANE: Yes, if I may just put it the other way. Do you accept it as a fact that according to your knowledge, no Section statement that you are aware of, was taken from Mr Nxiweni?

MR DU PREEZ: I am not aware of that.

MR NGUBANE: Do you know how much time they spent in prison before the trial could be heard?

MR DU PREEZ: I suspect approximately one year.

MR NGUBANE: Do you agree with me that if there was an attempt to make him a State witness, a period of one year could have been enough inducement for him to turn into a State witness?

MR DU PREEZ: I cannot comment on that.

MR NGUBANE: And when he was arrested, just immediately before he could be killed, that is the second arrest now, were you present when he was interrogated for the first time?

MR DU PREEZ: No Chairperson.

MR NGUBANE: Did you meet him on the very first day that he was arrested?

MR DU PREEZ: For the second time?

MR NGUBANE: Yes?

MR DU PREEZ: For the second time, yes.

MR NGUBANE: And approximately when did you come into contact with him?

MR DU PREEZ: When he was arrested?

MR NGUBANE: Yes, that is for the second time now, that is the second incident, forget about the Ramlakan incident.

MR DU PREEZ: It was in the late afternoon that he was arrested.

MR NGUBANE: Yes, well when you came into contact with him, approximately at what hour?

MR DU PREEZ: Late afternoon, 6 o'clock approximately.

MR NGUBANE: Were you involved in the immediate interrogation of him?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, I was.

MR NGUBANE: From 6 o'clock until when?

MR DU PREEZ: It was from 6 o'clock until late at night.

MR NGUBANE: All right. Did he give you information during that period?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, he gave us information.

MR NGUBANE: That is after you had assaulted him as you have indicated?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR NGUBANE: The following day, did you also participate in his interrogation?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, I did.

MR NGUBANE: Did you assault him on the following day again?

MR DU PREEZ: I cannot recall that he was assaulted on the following day as well.

MR NGUBANE: But did he give you information on the following day?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, he did. He did provide information.

MR NGUBANE: If you can recall, how many incidents did he talk about during the interrogation the previous day and the following day?

MR DU PREEZ: Chairperson, he told us about him and his unit, which places they had bombed.

I don't know, do you want me to mention specific things, I can refer you to Exhibit 88. I think amongst other things, there was the Montclair railway line, the Rosborough railway station, offices, court offices which they had bombed.

I might be able to mention more if I could peruse Exhibit A.

MR NGUBANE: Okay, not a problem. But do you confirm the evidence of Mr Botha that on the following day, he was interrogated the whole day?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, he was interrogated.

MR NGUBANE: Well sir, these incidents that you have mentioned, I suggest to you that they are not so lengthy as to necessitate a period of more than 12 hours of interrogation, do you agree with me?

MR DU PREEZ: Chairperson, we did not only interrogate him regarding the explosions, he was interrogated regarding other matters as well.

MR NGUBANE: Which matters are you referring to now?

MR DU PREEZ: Regarding other activities, other divisions which were under his command.

MR NGUBANE: Yes, even those, I suggest to you they could not have necessitated this length of time.

MR DU PREEZ: Chairperson, this interrogation was not continuous throughout the day. There were times when we took breaks and there were times when we went over things that he had told us.

MR NGUBANE: Is it not the position that this interrogation was not as mild as you have put it to us, this man was severely assaulted before he could give you any information?

MR DU PREEZ: Chairperson, he was assaulted as I have described.

MR NGUBANE: Had you discussed with Mr Botha that this man would just be given a few slaps and a punch?

MR DU PREEZ: I did not discuss that with Botha.

MR NGUBANE: I am just surprised by the similarity of the pattern. Mr Botha assaults this man, he gives him a few slaps and punches and you also do the same thing. Was it a coincidence?

MR DU PREEZ: Chairperson, this man was questioned, and if we were not satisfied with his responses, he was assaulted.

MR NGUBANE: How many times approximately?

MR DU PREEZ: I can't recall.

MR NGUBANE: It could have been 10 times, 20 times, because you cannot recall?

MR DU PREEZ: That is possible, I can't recall.

MR MALAN: Mr Ngubane, if you will just allow me - Mr Du Preez, this so-called question and answer method, I would like to have more information regarding this, because it is something that the other applicants have mentioned.

This question/answer method incorporated assault, that if there wasn't any cooperation, the person would be slapped and hit with a fist?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: One of the things on everybody's conscience would be, the degree of severity of these assaults, these slappings and fist blows. Regarding fist blows, he was hit in the face and on the body, I think you also gave evidence which was similar?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR MALAN: Was he injured, did he bleed at any place on his body as a result of being hit with a fist?

MR DU PREEZ: I can't remember that Pumeso was bleeding.

MR MALAN: Could his nose have broken as a result of the fist blows, could one have broken a rib, what was the violence with which he was struck?

These are the questions which are being put consistently, what was the degree of assault which would make a man talk? Can you remember?

MR DU PREEZ: Mr Chairperson, he was assaulted as I have said. I can't remember that there was any blood running from his nose or his mouth for example and I am very certain that there were no fractures, such as broken ribs or arms.

MR NGUBANE: Thank you. As far as you were aware, before Nxiweni could be arrested, was there any intention of turning him into an informer?

MR DU PREEZ: No Mr Chairperson, not according to me.

MR NGUBANE: If I understood your evidence correctly when you were being led, you said that there was no chance that this man could be turned into an informer and he was eliminated, is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ: Chairperson, it was clear from two years previously that he had been busy with bombings, and it was not his intention to seize his terrorist activities.

MR NGUBANE: Yes, my understanding of your evidence is that you interrogated this man, and you realised that he could not be turned into an informer. To me it sounded as if it was a realisation of that particular moment, was I correct in my understanding of your evidence?

MR DU PREEZ: No Mr Chairperson.

MR NGUBANE: So you were going to eliminate him any way, without even attempting to turn him into an informer? Was that your plan?

MR DU PREEZ: That was the plan Chairperson.

MR NGUBANE: You wanted to squeeze him of all the information and then kill him just like that?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct Chairperson.

MR NGUBANE: Was it ever in your mind, that he should be prosecuted?

MR DU PREEZ: No Chairperson.

MR NGUBANE: Why not?

MR DU PREEZ: I think that we had learnt from previous experience.

MR NGUBANE: Yes, what previous experience and what had you learnt?

MR DU PREEZ: When Pumeso was formerly charged and found not guilty.

MR NGUBANE: So, after the Ramlakan case, is it your suggestion that you decided that if we catch this man, we must just eliminate him?

MR DU PREEZ: No Chairperson.

MR NGUBANE: At what stage did you then because of the Ramlakan experience, decide that this man should be eliminated?

MR DU PREEZ: After we had become aware that he had once again become involved in bomb explosions and continued with his acts of terrorism.

MR NGUBANE: Immediately after the Ramlakan case, did it ever occur to you that this man has escaped and he is going to continue with his terrorist as you put it, activities?

MR DU PREEZ: It did not come to my attention then.

MR NGUBANE: You thought that he was a changed man after the acquittal?

MR DU PREEZ: I did not give that a thought.

MR NGUBANE: You didn't think about him at all?

MR DU PREEZ: I can't recall whether I thought about him specifically. There were many persons involved in that case who got away.

MR NGUBANE: Okay, the kwaMashu 3 incident.

MR MALAN: I beg our pardon Mr Ngubane. Nxiweni and Bhila were the only two who got away on a specific date before the others, isn't that correct?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR MALAN: So there weren't many others who got away with him, it was only those two?

MR DU PREEZ: In the court case there were also other persons who got away.

MR MALAN: I don't have the records in front of me, but according to the judgment it was much later?

MR DU PREEZ: I think Buthelezi was much earlier.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon?

MR DU PREEZ: Buthelezi was earlier if I recall correctly.

MR MALAN: Weren't Nxiweni and Bhila let go at the end of the State's case on the basis that there was absolutely no evidence brought in against them, that is the reflection of the record?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR MALAN: Well, then the others would not have been set free, the hearing continued, and the question is when he was released, when he got away from the case from which you say you have learnt things out of previous experience, did you then think of him as someone who would continue with his activities, and your answer was then, but there were many other people, it wasn't only him.

But there were actually only those two people. So, I am just asking you this question again, did you ever consider when Bhila and Nxiweni were released, that the risk would arise that they would continue with their activities?

MR DU PREEZ: It was a possibility. I did consider that possibility.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it also true that there were many others who had not been charged?

MR DU PREEZ: And also not caught.

MR NGUBANE: Thank you. The kwaMashu 3 incident, before I put any questions to you, I have been requested by Mr Filikazi to enquire from you whether you can point to him a spot where these people were killed, so that they can do some traditional rights on that spot. Are you in a position to do that?

MR DU PREEZ: Chairperson, my evidence was that all of them were shot in the back of the head.

MR NGUBANE: No, I mean the scene where they were shot, are you in a position to point that out?

MR DU PREEZ: The scene?

MR NGUBANE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the Investigation Unit knows exactly where the spot is, it has been pointed out by the witnesses to him. There is no problem in them finding it through the Investigation Unit.

CHAIRPERSON: This is the kwaMashu 3. There are numerous.

MR VISSER: We all know where it is, well, except myself, I haven't been there, but there is no problem in finding out.

MR NGUBANE: Then that satisfies us Mr Chairman. When you had information about the activities of the kwaMashu 3, especially about the bombing they were about to execute, when did you hear about that? You personally?

MR DU PREEZ: I myself? Botha contacted me and told me that the informer had arranged a meeting.

MR NGUBANE: I take it that Botha requested you to come with him, to prevent that bombing to take place, is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR NGUBANE: You wanted to add something?

MR DU PREEZ: Botha called me to come and help him with the arrest of the four that we suspected.

MR NGUBANE: So as far as you were aware, the plan was to go and arrest these people, is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ: That was initially, when Botha contacted me.

ADV SIGODI: Sorry, in other words, the number of people who were expected to come, there were four people expected to come on that day?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

ADV SIGODI: Do you know if that would also include Naya Ngema?

MR DU PREEZ: It would have been him as well, he was supposed to be with the group.

ADV SIGODI: He was also expected to come?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct yes.

MR NGUBANE: But to make everything clear once more, is it correct that it is not your evidence that Naya Ngema was the person that gave you information about these people, he was one of the people that you intended to arrest, is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct Chairperson.

MR NGUBANE: Before you could go to arrest these people, was there a meeting amongst all of you that eventually went there, to discuss the plan?

MR DU PREEZ: I can't recall where we all came together. Botha contacted me and Wasserman and told us to come along.

I don't know where we rendezvoused before the time, but we moved together or congregated and then moved to Avoca Bridge where the other four would arrive.

MR NGUBANE: With the purpose of arresting these people?

MR DU PREEZ: Arresting, yes.

MR NGUBANE: Pardon?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR NGUBANE: And you intercepted these people, and you put certain questions to them, is that right?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR NGUBANE: But you knew all that they were going to do, is that right? You had information about what they were going to do?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR NGUBANE: Why was it necessary to enquire from them about their activities, if you knew what they were going to do?

MR DU PREEZ: Chairperson, if you arrest someone, you would obviously ask them what they were doing. Even though you know who the person was, you would ask their name and ask them where they were on their way to.

MR NGUBANE: And they told you a lie and you decided to assault them, is that right?

MR DU PREEZ: That is not correct.

MR NGUBANE: Well, what made you decide to assault them?

MR DU PREEZ: Mr Chairperson, we arrested them and took them to the safe house at Verulam, where we began to interrogate them.

It was during this process that they were assaulted.

MR NGUBANE: When you interrogated them, well, I understood you as saying that when you asked them about this incident they were going to be involved in, they told you a lie and you gave them a few slaps because you realised that they were telling a lie. Was that not your evidence?

MR DU PREEZ: Mr Chairperson, that was when they were arrested. At the house, they tried to repeat this story when we asked for an explanation as to what they were busy doing.

MR NGUBANE: And they told you a lie before you could assault them, is that right?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR NGUBANE: And you assaulted them in order for them to repeat what you already knew, is that right?

MR DU PREEZ: We assaulted them so that they would produce the true story.

MR NGUBANE: Yes, well, if you knew about this story, was it not out of spite that you assaulted them? What more did you want them to tell you, because you knew the story?

MR DU PREEZ: Chairperson, it was a test for other questions which we were going to put to them.

MR NGUBANE: And you hadn't put those questions to them to see whether they were going to tell you some information?

MR DU PREEZ: We did put other questions to them, upon which they did provide us with answers.

MR NGUBANE: Was it before you could assault them, that you asked them about the other incidents?

MR DU PREEZ: Could you please repeat your question.

MR NGUBANE: About the other incidents that you asked them about, did you ask them before you could assault them, or after you had assaulted them?

MR DU PREEZ: We interrogated them, and if they were telling lies, according to what we suspected to be lies, we would assault them.

MR NGUBANE: So this process of assaulting them, was an ongoing process, if they told you something that you felt was a lie, you kept on assaulting them?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR NGUBANE: For how long did this process take place? Was it a day or six hours, ten hours?

MR DU PREEZ: It was approximately four to five hours.

MR NGUBANE: Can you recall, the question has been put whether they bled at any stage, can you recall?

MR DU PREEZ: I can't recall.

MR NGUBANE: When was the decision taken to eliminate them?

MR DU PREEZ: This decision was made on the farm, at the safe house, after they had been arrested.

MR NGUBANE: It was taken at the farm, was it after the interrogation or during the interrogation?

MR DU PREEZ: I think that this was during the interrogation.

MR NGUBANE: They were giving you information, why decide to eliminate them?

MR DU PREEZ: Chairperson, we were of the opinion that all three of them could not be recruited or charged.

MR NGUBANE: Why couldn't you charge them, you had found them in possession of instruments in terms of the law, which were illegal to possess. You had direct evidence that these people had been found in possession of these instruments. What prevented you from charging them?

MR DU PREEZ: I think that the decision had already been taken to eliminate them.

MR NGUBANE: Well, you have told us that the decision was taken there at the house. Now if you say that you think that it had been taken to eliminate them, what makes you say so?

MR DU PREEZ: Perhaps I may be wrong, the decision had been taken to eliminate them.

MR NGUBANE: Are you sure about that?

MR DU PREEZ: I think the ultimate is indicative thereof.

MR NGUBANE: No, are you sure about the fact that when you came to the house and interrogated these people, the decision had been taken to eliminate them?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct Chairperson.

MR NGUBANE: Assuming that the decision had been taken that they would be eliminated, before you could go to the house, was there a decision taken at the house again, to eliminate them?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, with respect to my learned friend, he is confusing not only the witness, but even myself. The witness has made it quite clear that the decision to eliminate them, was taken after they had arrived at the safe house.

My learned friend is now juggling it around to when you arrived at the house, or on the proposition that before you arrived at the house, none of which was the witness' evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: He is now agreeing with it Mr Visser. As I understand it, your witness has just agreed that the decision had been taken by the time they came to the house.

MR VISSER: That is precisely my point Mr Chairman, it is because of the confusion that is created by the question. He is being misled into answering questions which is not correct.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think he is being misled, I think he is being pushed along, and he is agreeing.

MR NGUBANE: Mr Du Preez, can we get an answer, the question was at the house, was there a stage when it was agreed again that these people should be eliminated?

MR DU PREEZ: Mr Chairperson, after these arrests of these persons, when we arrived at the house, we had decided that they were to be eliminated.

MR NGUBANE: Mr Du Preez, I am going to put it to you that the conflict in your answer is a clear indication that you are not making a full disclosure.

You are trying to create a story that should agree with the other applicants, who have told fabricated stories before this Commission.

MR DU PREEZ: Mr Chairperson, I am not certain what Mr Ngubane is driving at.

MR MALAN: I am watching you and I am watching the questioning. I don't know if you should listen to the interpretation, if there is one available, because I am not certain whether or not you are following the intonation of all the questions.

Mr Ngubane, will you proceed, we will see if helps a little if the interpretation assists him.

MR NGUBANE: Thank you. I am putting to you sir, that you are telling this story differently because you are not coming out clean on what happened. You are trying to tailor your evidence.

MR DU PREEZ: Could you repeat please.

MR NGUBANE: I am putting to you that you are contradicting yourself precisely because you are not coming out clean as to what happened regarding this incident. You are tailoring your evidence to agree with the story of the other applicants, which also is fabricated, which is not a full disclosure of what happened.

MR DU PREEZ: That is not true Mr Chairman.

MR NGUBANE: I am putting it to you that you killed these people out of spite, there was no reason why you should kill them, the kwaMashu 3?

MR DU PREEZ: That is not true.

MR NGUBANE: Thank you Mr Chairman, no further questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV PRIOR: I have a few aspects, thank you. Mr Du Preez, in the case of terrorists who were caught with weapons, what was the possibilities except for the elimination or killing of them, you could have detained them, is that not true?

MR DU PREEZ: It was not a decision in this case.

ADV PRIOR: No, I am talking now in general. You could have detained them, is that not true?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: In terms of Section 29 or any other Section.

MR DU PREEZ: That is a possibility, yes.

ADV PRIOR: For how long before you charged them?

MR DU PREEZ: I cannot remember at that stage, what it was.

ADV PRIOR: Was it months, weeks?

MR DU PREEZ: I think 30 days maybe.

ADV PRIOR: And you could get a new certificate and still detain that person?

MR DU PREEZ: No, it wasn't very easy.

ADV PRIOR: And the fact that they were in possession of limpet mines, you could successfully charge them? There were direct evidence against them, is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ: Not what I believed.

ADV PRIOR: Let us leave the decision to eliminate them out of this. You could if you wanted to, charge them under whatever legislation and continue with a successful prosecution?

MR DU PREEZ: At that stage I did not think that it would be the case.

ADV PRIOR: You found three limpet mines in a carrier bag, is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

ADV PRIOR: You said that you did not trust that evidence. I am talking in general, Mr Du Preez, it is not a trick question.

If they were charged, would they have been found guilty?

MR DU PREEZ: Possibly yes.

ADV PRIOR: And at least five years?

MR DU PREEZ: That is possible.

ADV PRIOR: And effectively would be taken out of circulation through this method, on the basis of that?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

ADV PRIOR: Exactly the same with Nxiweni, he was found with weapons and explosives in a trunk in his house?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct yes.

ADV PRIOR: Is it not the case that the decision was made a long time before they were arrested, and that is to kill them?

MR DU PREEZ: No Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: With the release of Nxiweni and Bhila in 1987, according to the amnesty application of Mr Rosslee, bundle 1, Mr Rosslee put it as follows, page 24 of that bundle, although it is being denied, but I am going to question you about this and present you with a probability.

We Mr Wasserman of the local Security Branch. He told us that two of the accused in the Toti bomb blast criminal trial, had been acquitted, but was still continuing their subversive actions, that our task was to arrest them for purposes of elimination.

We know that that reference there is about a period after the Ramlakan case and the release of Bhila and Nxiweni?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct yes.

ADV PRIOR: I would like to put it to you and it seems out of Rosslee's initial application, that at that stage in 1987, a decision was made to those who were referred to wrongly in the Toti case, was the Ramlakan incident, and that they had to be killed at that stage, will you agree with me?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, I heard that in evidence.

ADV PRIOR: Was that the case?

MR DU PREEZ: No, I cannot comment on that.

ADV PRIOR: The name Pindele Mfeti, is it known to you?

MR DU PREEZ: No.

ADV PRIOR: The questions that I put to your colleagues, you heard it?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes.

ADV PRIOR: Have you got any comment or can you maybe assist us in that regard?

MR DU PREEZ: No Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: Is it possible that you at one stage in April 1987 rather than Nxiweni, abducted the wrong person?

MR DU PREEZ: No Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Why do you say that?

MR DU PREEZ: Because I did not pick a man up before that.

MR MALAN: No, I do not think that they refer to you, they refer to the unit?

MR DU PREEZ: No, I do not know about a person that was picked up.

MR MALAN: The question was is it a possibility?

MR DU PREEZ: I do not think that it is possible, that a person would be wrongly abducted.

MR MALAN: Did you have any knowledge of Bhila's abduction and elimination?

MR DU PREEZ: No, I did not.

MR MALAN: Why is it not possible that you would not have any knowledge of that attempt to eliminate Nxiweni?

MR DU PREEZ: I have not heard anything like that.

MR MALAN: But you haven't heard about Bhila?

MR DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR MALAN: Is it possible that there was such an attempt?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, it is possible.

MR MALAN: Is it possible that the wrong person was picked up?

MR DU PREEZ: It is possible.

ADV PRIOR: During the Ramlakan hearing and also the investigation thereof, mention was made of a Taylor unit, the Allan Taylor unit, is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ: During Ramlakan?

ADV PRIOR: Yes, Nxiweni had ties with that unit, is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is.

ADV PRIOR: Can you remember who else were members of that unit, that is now during the Ramlakan hearing?

MR DU PREEZ: I remember that there was a person named Chichanzi and I cannot remember the other person.

ADV PRIOR: Was there another person?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, there was.

ADV PRIOR: Do you agree that that unit broke away after the arrests, or disbanded completely, they did not exist, because of the Ramlakan charges?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes.

ADV PRIOR: And that was also the information that you had?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

ADV PRIOR: The whole organisation was infiltrated to such an manner as we heard and that the information received, was of good quality?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, it was.

ADV PRIOR: In 1988, what was the information that you had concerning the Allan Taylor unit? Did it still exist?

MR DU PREEZ: At that stage Nxiweni, there were two other members with him.

ADV PRIOR: Who were they?

MR DU PREEZ: I tried to remember their names. I did know their names Mr Chairperson, but I cannot remember at this stage.

ADV PRIOR: They were not your informants?

MR DU PREEZ: No Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: What happened to them according to the information that you have?

MR DU PREEZ: The two people were taken back by bus to the Transkei after Pumeso's elimination.

ADV PRIOR: Just a moment Mr Chairperson. Mr Chairman, may I place something on record, to correct a statement of fact that was put to, I think, Colonel Botha. I don't have any more questions of this witness.

If the Committee will recall Exhibit H was tendered and I had indicated that these were notes made or preparatory notes made in the course of an investigation. A lot of the information had not been corroborated.

It was then put to Mr Botha and some of the others that Pila Portia Ndwandwe had remained in attendance at the Ramlakan trial, which conflicted with the applicants' version, that she had left the country in 1986. I have subsequently been able to confirm that in fact, she left the Republic in October of 1986, which means that she was not present at the Ramlakan trial, as was suggested to the witness.

I thought it necessary to place that on record Mr Chairman.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Yes, I thank my learned friend Mr Chairman, not that I believe that there was really a big point turning around it, but we thank him for his honesty.

Mr Chairman, I have one question this time by way of exception, in re-examination. I might deal with it immediately, unless the Committee has questions to this witness, in which event, we will stand down till tomorrow.

Well, then may I deal with the one question Mr Chairman. Mr Du Preez, one easily thinks that if one arrests someone, take him to court and he is charged or put into jail for a period of time, that he would have no influence in the community, is that true?

MR DU PREEZ: No Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Why do you say that is not true?

MR DU PREEZ: I think if we can just look at the ANC leaders at Robben Island and the influence they had on the organisation.

MR VISSER: In your experience, is it that messages were sent in and out of jail?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes.

MR VISSER: And that instructions were given from out of jail?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes.

MR VISSER: Not just in our country, but all across the world?

MR DU PREEZ: Yes, it is the general experience.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

It is quarter past three Mr Chairman, I hope your dentist is going to be waiting for you.

CHAIRPERSON: No, my turn is half past.

MR VISSER: Oh, I thought 3 o'clock.

CHAIRPERSON: No, half past. Do you want to start another witness, or do you want to finish early?

MR VISSER: We can start another witness, yes Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: May I suggest that we take the adjournment now, we have one last witness, Mr Chairman. By all accounts, we should be finished with the evidence tomorrow as a whole, so we are ahead of schedule. If we call a witness now, he is going to stand over, we are not going to finish any of the cross-examination.

MR VISSER: Yes Mr Chairman, I would go along with that.

CHAIRPERSON: We will adjourn until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.