--------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAIRPERSON: For the record, today is Monday the 10th of May 1999, it is the continuation of the amnesty applications, in this particular instance, W.F. Schoon and Others which applicants will be identified as the application proceeds. The panel is constituted as has been previously indicated on the record. The appearances for the applicants are as previously indicated. The Leader of Evidence also as indicated earlier on the record. For the victims this morning, Mr Mohlaba, would you put yourself on record?

MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair, my name is Bonka Mohlaba, I am appearing on behalf of the victims, that is the family members of Sebopa, the deceased and the Take Five, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Mohlaba. Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Good morning Mr Chairperson. Chairperson, I appear for five, all five the applicants in the matter of Take Five and Pule. We will be referring to the following Bundles, the rest you can move aside, it would be Bundle 1, Bundle 3 and obviously Exhibit A. We have prepared Chairperson, over the weekend, a statement for Brigadier Loots who will be the first witness to give you some background as well, and we beg leave to hand that up. That will be, if I am not mistaken, Exhibit L, and at the same time, might it be convenient for you to receive from us, a document which I will explain more fully as we go on, as Exhibit M and you could mark that document as Document X - Operation Vula. They are Operation Vula extracts, Chairperson. Having said that, the first witness which we wish to call is Mr Loots, Brigadier Loots. He is available to give evidence and he would like to give his evidence in Afrikaans.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much Mr Visser, we have received Exhibit L, which is the statement of Brigadier Loots and Exhibit M which is Documents X in Operation Vula.

WIKUS JOHANNES LOOTS: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Brigadier Loots, you are an applicant in this application and you apply for any unlawful actions emanating from the incident which is know during this procedure as Take Five and Sadie Pule, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And before you, you have Exhibit L, this is a statement which was drawn up on the basis of information give by you, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Beforehand you had the opportunity to have regard for the general background document, Exhibit A, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Is there anything in Exhibit A that is not applicable to you and that you do not want the Amnesty Committee to take into consideration when they consider your application?

MR LOOTS: No, I agree with the full document.

MR VISSER: If we can turn to Exhibit L, you there refer to Exhibit A and in (c) - ... in my ears all the time - you have also referred in Exhibit L under (c) to your own evidence before the Amnesty Committee and you refer there to the Nietverdiendt 10, the Silent Valley and the McKenzie incidents, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: They have been completed but judgement is still pending? In Bundle 1, excuse me in Bundle 3, on page 593 and following we find your application that you had filed when you applied for amnesty, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm the evidence and the correctness thereof?

MR LOOTS: Yes, I do Chairperson.

MR VISSER: If I could turn to page 2, in 1986 and 1987, what was your position?

ADV DE JAGER: One moment, the pages where this application is dealt with?

MR VISSER: It is 593, that is the start of it and 605. The question was could you please tell us about the command structure in December 1986 and January 1987 in the Western Transvaal, what was your position?

MR LOOTS: I was the Commander of the Security Branch of Western Transvaal.

MR VISSER: And at Zeerust, who was the Branch Commander?

MR LOOTS: At that stage, if I recall correctly, it was Colonel Du Preez Smit or Major Colonel Crause was up to the end of December and from the 1st of January, Colonel Smit took over command.

MR VISSER: If we could turn to the role that Botswana played on page 2, would you please inform the Committee from paragraph 1 as to your knowledge of the circumstances there?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, it was the knowledge and experience of myself and other members of the Security Branch at Western Transvaal as well as other divisions, I refer to the Western Cape, Northern Transvaal, Johannesburg, Soweto and indeed the whole South Africa that Botswana, since approximately 1997 (sic) had played a more important role for the ANC/SACP alliance with regards to the organisation, strategy, planning and provision of weaponry and human resources for the revolutionary struggle in South Africa. It was known that Mr Marius Schoon during approximately 1977 had left for Botswana and that he fulfilled an important function for the ANC/SACP alliance there. Amongst others, he successfully set up a sophisticated network of infiltration routes and logistical support between Botswana and South Africa. Already from 1977 there were indications that weapons, ammunition and explosives had been brought into South Africa illegally from Botswana and that the terrorists had left the Republic through Botswana and returned. Members who were recruited for MK in South Africa were trained in Angola, East Germany and Russia, and according to information they had bases in Zambia and Botswana. With these bases, we refer to transit camps, refugee camps, weapon and ammunition cache places, places where accommodation and logistical, financial and other support were provided as well as military training centre. I could mention here that even hotel rooms were used in that instance.

MR VISSER: Could I just ask you with reference to logistical, can you please just go a little bit slower so that the Interpreters can keep up with you.

MR LOOTS: Very well Chairperson. I continue with paragraph 5, as the war continued, Botswana became more important with regards to the following: the maintenance of insurgency routes from the RSA and the support and assistance to persons who had left South Africa to receive military training abroad, the assistance to returning trained terrorists and the smuggling of weaponry, ammunition and explosives to the RSA. After completion of their training in the named countries, members, trained terrorists as members of MK, came into South Africa where they committed deeds of terror. Swaziland was also used as a thoroughfare route. MK mainly used Botswana as an insurgency routes during 1986 and 1987. Weapons and explosives were stored in Botswana and brought into the country from there, where it was used for terror attacks. Examples of this is the fact that Robert McBride and Gordon Webster had used explosives which they had received from Botswana. I refer furthermore in this instance, to one Piet Mogoai.

MR VISSER: I spell it for the record, Mogoai. Continue please?

MR LOOTS: Piet was an MK Commander in Botswana, he became disillusioned with the ANC and became an askari later. He was in control of weaponry in Botswana and when he had returned, he had 10 metal containers which were filled with weapons and ammunition, hand grenades and explosives which he handed over to the Police. I can also mention that four of those containers in Botswana were stored in such difficult places, that we could not remove it. As early as 1978 there were MK terrorists who had infiltrated the RSA from Botswana and in this instance, we can refer to the murder of Jaap van der Merwe, a farmer in the Northum vicinity and a skirmish on the 19th of January 1979 between the Security Branch of Zeerust and a group of terrorists who had infiltrated the RSA from Botswana. One MK member was killed there, if I can recall correctly his MK name was Authu Muzerewa.

MR VISSER: Could you repeat the name?

MR LOOTS: Authu Muzerewa.

MR VISSER: Can you spell that?

MR LOOTS: I will spell it for you, it is Authu and then Muzerewa. I cannot recall his correct name. By 1983 the activities of the ANC/SACP alliance in and from Botswana had reached a very progressed stage. At this time the informants from the Security Branch had infiltrated the ANC structures in Botswana and large quantities of weapons, ammunition and explosives were smuggled into the RSA for ANC.

MR VISSER: Do you refer to the McKenzie situation who was an agent or a source of the Northern Transvaal Security Branch but the ANC did not know and he transported these weaponry and ammunition with his vehicle?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson, it was known to the Security Branch that weaponry and or explosives were smuggled into the RSA from Botswana and was used amongst others in planned attacks on strategic places in Transvaal with weaponry and or explosives which were brought in by McKenzie, which the South African Police had found before it could be used. Chairperson, the second instance is the destruction of three transformers at the Trident power station close to Rustenburg on the 5th of September 1984 if I recall correctly. The total damage was about R14 million. The attack on Constable Molete who was stationed at Stilfontein, he was attacked with a RGD5 handgrenade on the 28th of September 1984, on the 3rd of January 1985 Major Laubscher from Counter Insurgence Services and Constable Clau from Mafeking were murdered.

MR VISSER: Would you stick to the words that you have before you because the Interpreters have a copy of this and you are going to confuse them if you diverge from the words on the paper.

MR LOOTS: The fifth instance, murder of a border guard, David Motlala at Kopfontein border post on the 3rd of February 1985; the sixth instance, murder of Mr and Mrs Joubert, farmers at Swartruggens on the 13th of March 1985; following instance is the murder of Constable D.J.F. Boshoff, stationed at Ventersdorp on the 8th of April 1987 and the following instance the placing of landmines on farms Ottoshoop at Ottoshoop and Zeerust by MK persons, Biscuit, MK Thabo as well known as Semane, on the 22nd and 23rd of November 1987; attempted sabotage of power installations in the Vaal Triangle on the 7th of March 1988, bomb explosion at Marine Parade, Durban and the provider of the explosives there was Lekotho Pule; attempted sabotage of Sterland property in Pretoria, Odirele Maponya was arrested or was killed on the 15th of April 1988 during this instance. Just to provide clarity, if I recall correctly, he was in the process of setting up a limpet mine. The following instance was a skirmish between insurgents and Security Forces close to the RSA/Botswana border on the 11th of August 1988 where Constable N.C. Claassen was killed. The following instances were explosions in the Western Cape, Ngunwana, Tawana and Sibeka. Furthermore attempted sabotage, a shopping centre at Parow by one Petani during 1986; the following instance Mr Chairperson, is the Chamberlain Road substation at Jacobs in approximately November 1985. Because of a second delayed explosion, caused the death of a Colonel of the South African Police.

MR VISSER: This is the instance I believe where Mr Gordon Webster was involved with?

MR LOOTS: If I recall correctly, that is indeed so. Attempted sabotage of Meyville substation by Webster, sabotage of the Nottingham Road transformers at Camperdown and sabotage of the Westville substation in Durban. Chairperson amongst others, in 1988, by means of statements, I had tried to establish an image whereby one could provide the role of Botswana and certain ANC figures in Botswana and the attitude of the Botswana government was set out. This document deals with the time period between 1984 to 1988.

MR VISSER: Would you please pause there. Brigadier in Bundle 1, on page 681 there is a statement of Wikus Johannes Loots and this goes to 666 if I recall correctly?

MR LOOTS: Yes, it runs up to 666 if the annexures are added to it.

MR VISSER: Is this an extract from a larger Bundle which was compiled by yourself and amongst others - 655 Chairperson, it runs up to 655.

MR LOOTS: Then some annexures which run up to 666, that is correct Chairperson, the annexures had been added and it runs up to 666.

MR VISSER: I would just like to know from you, this is a statement to which I refer Chairperson, and this statement and the annexures, were these which you had added to your application?

MR LOOTS: Yes, Chairperson, it was the men from Cape Town and other places who had also placed ...

MR VISSER: ... at the last amnesty hearing concerning the Silent Valley and the Nietverdiendt 10, as stated before, we in an attempt to cut down on reproduction costs and so on, decided that we were not going to ask for this to be reproduced for you again. What we have done is in the statement which Brigadier Loots has just read to you, we have given you a summary of those incidents, so that really comes directly out of this thick Bundle. The various statements by other people, are contained in this Bundle. We don't intend to make too much point of it, or to rely too heavily on the other statements, except in so far as they from their own knowledge in their statements refer to the incidents which you have at pages 5 and 6 on the statement before you. So on that basis, we did not think that we were going to encumber the record with yet another Bundle.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Visser. Can you just take me to the document that you got the witness to refer to? I think he was referring to page 655, which Bundle is that, I am trying just to locate it.

MR VISSER: Bundle 1.

CHAIRPERSON: Bundle 1.

MR VISSER: Bundle 1, Chairperson, and that is where the amnesty application is found. For some reason, Loots is bound into Bundle 3 and I just can't seem to get used to it, but sorry, yes. The page number starts at 618 and if you turn to that you will see Chairperson, that it is a statement that starts "I, the undersigned ..."

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

MR VISSER: It starts with the words "I, the undersigned number W36919K, Colonel W. Loots ...", that one, that runs up to page 655, the statement itself where he signs the statement on the 21st of October 1988 and there are certain annexures to which he refers in his statement, also attached from page 656 to page 666. We won't be referring to those Chairperson, it really just presents proof of what he is saying in his statement, and again, we have attempted to summarise all of that, or most of that, at pages 5 and 6 over the weekend, in his statement before you, in order to make it more manageable.

ADV DE JAGER: The reference to the Silent Valley, was which Bundle in the Silent Valley incident?

MR VISSER: ... where this whole Bundle had been reproduced. Now, if we've got this so-called original one before us, if you want insight in it, of course you are most welcome to page through it, to get the feel of the document if you wish to, it is available. You have said that this document to which we have referred, deals with the time period from 1984 to 1988, is that true?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Would you please continue on page 7?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, certain examples of the activities of the ANC/SACP alliance in Botswana is referred to in the abovementioned document. From there one can form the impression of the problems that had emanated from Botswana and the high level of activity of known ANC, MK activists which changed periodically from persons known as Abubaker Ismail, his MK name was Rashied, Lambert Maloyi, the third person Johannes Mnisi, Lester Dumakhode and then Lekotho Pule and others in Botswana.

MR VISSER: You refer to Lekotho Pule, this person has the same surname is Sadie Pule, is there any connection between the two of them?

MR LOOTS: They are brother and sister Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Continue with number 11.

MR LOOTS: The Security Branch at Western Transvaal was aware during 1986 of the activities of two MK Commanders namely MK Take Five and Sadie Pule, who had worked together to establish weapons caches and to smuggle it into South Africa as well as smuggling trained terrorists into South Africa to commit acts of terror and to be of assistance to people who want to leave the country to receive military training abroad.

MR VISSER: You describe them as high profile targets?

MR LOOTS: Without any doubt Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Please continue.

MR LOOTS: These persons were deemed dangerous and were a source of great concern because of their part in the revolution. I might just add here Chairperson for clarity sake, that their names at several occasions had been given to the Botswana Police during visits there.

MR VISSER: Please continue with 12.

MR LOOTS: The problems that I refer to above, is repeatedly by the South African government brought under the attention of the Botswana government. We went so far as to give addresses, telephone numbers, registration numbers, names and other information to the Botswana Police. However, no real steps were taken by the Botswana government to stop the activities of MK in Botswana. The security situation in the RSA forced the government to on the 21st of July 1985, and on the 12th of June 1986, announce emergency situations and this was renewed yearly until on the 8th of June 1990, it was ended except for Natal where it was ended on the 18th of October 1990. Apart from the additional competencies that were created by the regulations, the safety situation got worse and the government and the Security Branch were first to take drastic measures to stop the revolutionary onslaught. This led to the members of the Security Branch feeling more obliged to take certain steps in certain instances, that would fall outside the ambit of the law, but that they saw as their duty, especially concerning Botswana. There was a need to act drastically so that the threat that came from there, could be countered more effectively.

MR VISSER: Just to go off the document for an instant, do I understand you correctly in saying that the threat from Botswana got bigger and bigger? Attacks occurred right across the RSA with weapons that come from Botswana. To complain with the Botswana government does not help. Is this the background that you are trying to create for us?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And in the meantime what did the politicians and the Generals expect in this country, what did they expect you to do?

MR LOOTS: That law and order should be maintained, Mr Chairperson at all costs.

MR VISSER: You had to normalise the position?

MR LOOTS: Absolutely Chairperson.

MR VISSER: If we can now get to the current incident. Can you please read from paragraph 16 first in your amnesty application. You refer on page 593 of Bundle 3, excuse me 594, 605, pardon me Mr Chairperson, 605 you refer to 31 October 1986, is this date correct?

MR LOOTS: The correct date should be 31 December Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Please can you then please continue on paragraph 17.

MR LOOTS: On the 31st of December 1986 information was received that MK members Take Five and Sadie Pule were at a safehouse in Ramotswe, Botswana and that they would stay there that evening.

MR VISSER: Who gave you this information?

MR LOOTS: Officer Modise who was stationed at Zeerust, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did he report this directly to you or to his Commanding Officer?

MR LOOTS: To his Commanding Officer.

MR VISSER: And who was this?

MR LOOTS: Captain Wehrmann at that stage, but in the meantime he has unfortunately died.

MR VISSER: Wehrmann Chairperson, he was there for the time being in the absence of Brigadier Smit. And this information was given to you?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Please continue.

MR LOOTS: It was known that they didn't often stay for more than one evening at a specific place, for the night and this was information was of great value for the Security Branch. Take Five and Sadie Pule were members of the Special Operations Group of the ANC and they regularly sent weapons and explosives for use by the MK members to the RSA by means of couriers. I went to Zeerust myself to go and investigate the situation and I accompanied Modise and Captain Wehrmann to a place between Zeerust and the Botswana border where I heard the source to be able to acquaint myself with this information. I was satisfied that this information was reliable and that there could be acted upon this information. I informed Brigadier Willem Schoon per telephone and he considered the matter and I proposed that steps be taken to eliminate the two MK members and after this, he gave me to make the necessary steps with Commandant C.J. Naude of the South African Army. At these steps I can remember that the following members were involved, myself, Brigadier Loots, Commandant Charl Naude, Colonel Du Preez Smit, then still a Captain, Lieutenant Colonel Wehrmann, then a Lieutenant, Captain Flip Crause and Warrant Officer Modise together with a team of Special Forces people, I think they were three if I can remember correctly.

MR VISSER: And you do not know their names?

MR LOOTS: No, not at all. The members that were to take part in the operation, arrived at a desolate farm in the Nietverdiendt area where I informed Naude of the situation. From this moment on, the moment was executed by Special Forces of the Defence Force. The only part that the Security Branch had after this, was that Modise had to show the members of the Special Forces, this specific house so that a wrong house would not be attacked. This house was apparently situated very close to the border. With arrival at the border, it was found that the Ramotswe river was full of water. Seeing as Warrant Officer Modise could not swim, I asked Warrant Officer Crause to help him through the water. Warrant Officer Modise knew the environment very well and he showed the target to the couple of members of Special Forces and I can just point out that Colonel Charl Naude and myself waited on the RSA side. It is just Crause, Modise and the three members of Special Forces that crossed over the border. After midnight they attacked the target and upon their return, it was reported to Commandant Naude that people were killed.

Later from information and newspaper articles, it came to light that a black woman was killed. Information came to light that an unknown man was quite possibly also killed in the attack, but I do not have any further information concerning this.

MR VISSER: Yes Brigadier, this information that you are talking about, is Exhibit M. Exhibit M on the first page, has a note that was sent by Warrant Officer, or written by Warrant Officer Flip Crause, is this correct?

MR LOOTS: Yes, this is.

MR VISSER: He must actually testify about this, but while you are now here, can you please address this document, Exhibit M?

MR LOOTS: What he says here is that Take Five's correct name is Aaron Mkwanazi.

MR VISSER: Is it relatively safe to deal on this information?

MR LOOTS: I accept it like that Chairperson.

MR VISSER: According to him and he will testify to this, this name comes from the Vula Documents that are not in front of the Committee. Are you prepared to accept that Take Five was Aaron Mkwanazi?

MR LOOTS: I am 90 percent sure, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Very well, and then it would appear from the so-called clusters Chairperson, we have duplicated this document exactly as we received it, we did not want to retype it, we preferred to leave it in the original state. If you look at page 2, unfortunately it is not numbered, oh yes, it is, at the top it says P02, if you look at page P02, you read -

And then it is spoken of what happened further and then -

this is not important and then at the bottom of the page -

it is very difficult Mr Chairperson. I think it is a fullstop there and then the sentence stops there, and then it is said on page P03, they talk about an apartment and what happened on the 1st of May 1987. We can skip that and then on page P06 it is said, if we can just start with the third line Chairperson -

According to information that the ANC had at their disposal, this is what happened? That caused suspicion and that is why they weren't there that evening?

MR LOOTS: That is what I can assume.

MR VISSER: And then the last sentence of -

What would MM stand for would you say, or don't you know?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I am not sure.

MR VISSER: The next sentence -

and it ends there. What would hardware refer to?

MR LOOTS: Hardware is definitely explosives and weaponry.

MR VISSER: And then lastly, in this document I am just trying to find it, it is on page P05, it is referred to, or it refers to "Chairperson, this is the first ...", the sixth line which starts with Makelakhi. A certain Makelakhi apparently were questioned by the Botswana Police and it is said here that -

in reference to the house of Materu, if you start on the fourth line, I just made a mistake, sorry, I should have started with -

and then the sin which I have read, apparently there was a crate of arms in this house. Chairperson, this is the only reason why we handed in this document, to provide some background of aspects of which the applicants have no knowledge, but that come from a different source, to maybe sketch a better picture of what happened that evening. Page 1 of Exhibit M is actually a summary of what you referred to on these different pages?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE : May I just ask, this document came into the possession of Mr Crause when?

MR VISSER: Some time ago, I did not ask him precisely when, but it is some time ago after Operation Vula was uncovered. As an information exercise, extracts from those documents were sent all over the country to Security Branches, so he must have had it for some time.

ADV GCABASHE : Ex post facto?

MR VISSER: Oh yes, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Will you lead him on this stuff Mr Visser? Will you lead him? ... (tape ends) ... the questions, because I am not quite clear on the document, but you will lead him on this one.

MR VISSER: Of course. Brigadier Loots can deal with the document, so perhaps you should ask him the questions and if there is anything that he doesn't know, then perhaps Mr Crause. Chairperson, there is one thing that I forgot about, you would have noticed in the various applications of the present applicants before you, there was a great uncertainty as to how many people might have been killed or injured. Two of the applicants refer to two persons and the others to one. Now also in that regard, there is indication, there is an indication in Exhibit M, it refers to there to Materu herself and an unknown man and that you find at page P02. It says from the bottom, it is the fifth line on the right hand side it says -

That adds a little bit to the confusion as to whether it was Materu herself or a man and a woman, but I am just drawing your attention to that. It may have been two people, we don't know. Brigadier Loots, can you please tell us exactly what the status of this document, Exhibit M, except for the first page is, from page P02 further, where does it come from, what is the status of this document?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, this document was found during the arrest of I think it was 1992 or 1993, I speak under correction, but during the arrest of Siphiwe Nyanda and the current Minister Mac Maharaj in Durban. During the seizure of a few computers by the Durban Security Branch, this and a lot of other information was taken from this computer.

MR VISSER: How did you get this information?

MR LOOTS: The Security Branch of Durban referred it to us? MR VISSER: Because it was relevant to our region?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, that is the only reason why we came into possession of it.

MR VISSER: If the panel wants further information, they will probably ask you about this. In paragraph 27 you deal with the suggestion that one gets from Exhibit M that it is Materu that could have been killed. You yourself do not know if it is her or someone else?

MR LOOTS: I am not sure Chairperson. According to newspaper articles there was a woman killed, I am not sure of the name.

MR VISSER: We have already looked at Aaron Mkwanazi, could you please continue with 29?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, these handlings that I did, I did in executing my official duties and as part of my opposition to the struggle, and it was aimed against the supporters of the freedom struggle. What I did, I did to protect the government and the National Party's interest and to stop the revolutionary onslaught. I humbly apply for amnesty for what I did in this relation.

MR VISSER: At the end, you did act upon orders of Brigadier Schoon?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, that is the evidence in chief, which we wish to place before you, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you Mr Visser. We will take the tea adjournment, and we will reconvene in 15 minutes.

ON RESUMPTION:

WIKUS JOHANNES LOOTS: (s.u.o)

CHAIRPERSON: Exhibit M, do we understand correctly that this is an excerpt from the contents of the computers that was in the possession of the ANC members?

MR VISSER: It was brought to my attention that it was 1990 and not 1992, as I have stated previously.

CHAIRPERSON: This is an extract dealing with this incident in Botswana?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it a type of report which was drawn up internally for the purposes of the ANC in this format?

MR LOOTS: We received it in this format from Durban Chairperson, I was not present where the copies were made from the computers, I would assume that it was printed from the computer in this format.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, and then regarding the contents, is this the type of internal report of the ANC itself or what is the position?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, if I recall correctly, at the Northern Transvaal Security Branch, there was a member who printed ANC reports as well as in Durban and reports which we circulated from Western Transvaal. It was in secret crypt, it fell into the hands of the ANC and it was placed on the computer along with their comment, that is my interpretation.

CHAIRPERSON: This is then their record of this incident?

MR LOOTS: Absolutely Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Mohlaba, do you have any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair, I've got a few questions. Brigadier Loots, if I can refer you to paragraph 13 of Exhibit L where you deal with having received information about Take Five and Sadie Pule, that they would overnight at a particular house, may I just find out from you what was your rank during this period, the 31st of December?

MR LOOTS: I assume it is paragraph 17 that he refers to Chairperson?

MR MOHLABA: Yes, my question will be, in fact I just want to get some clarity in respect of that paragraph, that is why I want you to look at the paragraph. I just want to know what your rank was?

MR LOOTS: Is it paragraph 13 or 17?

MR MOHLABA: 17, yes.

MR LOOTS: My rank? At that stage I was a Colonel.

MR MOHLABA: We know the rank of Modise, what was Modise's rank at that time?

MR LOOTS: If I recall correctly, I don't think he was a Warrant Officer at that stage, he was possibly a Sergeant, I am not sure Chairperson.

MR MOHLABA: You have mentioned of you having received information from Modise, how was this information communicated to you, was it telephonically, can you just explain?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, on that day if I recall correctly, there was a funeral at Zeerust, one of our members, Warrant Officer Gerber, this was the day of his funeral, I attended his funeral and that is the main reason why I was in Zeerust.

MR MOHLABA: My question was did you meet with Modise and talk to him and him explaining, giving this information to you?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, it was Modise and Lieutenant Wehrmann.

MR MOHLABA: I understand that but still I am not answered, I want to know did you sit with them, I want more information about that, was this mentioned by one of them or you sat and discussed the matter in detail that these people were to overnight there, etc, etc?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, practice was that Modise would usually after he had discussions with his source, he came to the office and in the office the thing was discussed by myself, Wehrmann and Modise.

MR MOHLABA: You have mentioned of you having attended a funeral at Zeerust, was this discussion taking place at the funeral or was it in an office at the Police station, just explain?

MR LOOTS: No, it was at the Security Branch Chairperson.

MR MOHLABA: The people present when this discussion was taking place were yourself and Modise and somebody else, you were only the three of you?

MR LOOTS: Yes, that is correct.

MR MOHLABA: Can you explain to this Committee, did you know these people, Take Five and Sadie before this discussion with Modise?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, specifically Sadie Pule, except for Sadie it was her brother Lekotho who was a member of Special Operations. The Pule family as such was known to us, not personally but by photo's which appeared in the official photo album as well as photo's which were found in the possession of arrested persons where they were identified positively as well as more recent photo's of Sadie. Take Five as such, if I recall correctly, his photo album number was 2447, but I never met him personally or Sadie Pule.

MR MOHLABA: But you heard of them as knowing their activities, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: Their names were mentioned on a regular basis, not only from sources from Western Transvaal but also from Durban as well as Cape Town. Their activities were reported frequently. And for the sake of clarity, I would like to mention that Lekotho Pule was so well known at some stage that when I communicated with Adolph Herschfeldt, he was the Commander of Botswana Special Branch, when I referred to Lekotho he referred to Galaxy Man. This was based on information which was given to us at a stage where he would receive a telephone call from Durban and he was arrested in the possession of a pistol and to summarise Chairperson, I can say that the Pule's over a long period, were active in Botswana.

MR MOHLABA: ... receiving this information from Modise as you have indicated, what did you do to try and confirm, was anything done to confirm or to establish whether the information was correct?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, with the highest exception, it happened in the past that Officers would have personal conversations with their subordinate sources and the confidentiality aspect was of such a nature that we knew our members and based on the information which such a source gave to us, a value would be attached to such a source and a source then would give us reliable information over the time, but in the light of my suggestion to Brigadier Schoon to act drastically, emanating from several discussions with the Botswana Police, I deemed it necessary to confer with Modise and we met with this source between Zeerust and Botswana and we had a discussion with him. I confirmed with this discussion with this source, that there was no doubt that these persons would be at this facility that evening.

MR MOHLABA: ... in Botswana, in the particular house where an unknown elderly woman was killed, did it take place a day after you had received the information, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the information I received before eleven o'clock of that morning, and the same evening, just after twelve o'clock, the attack was launched.

MR MOHLABA: Do you know whether any steps were taken before the attack to establish whether the people you were after, were actually in that house at the time of the attack?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the South African Police had no jurisdiction in South Africa firstly. Secondly, when we went to the border that evening, we had infra red equipment. The driver had infra red equipment so that we should not use the headlights of the vehicle and as it emanates from the Exhibits which was received from Vula, it would seem that two unknown persons went passed this particular house on bicycles, but without our knowledge and this was the cause, this caused Pule and Take Five to leave the house and they went somewhere else. I can also mention Chairperson, that such action by MK members was after the attack of the 14th of June 1985, this was something of a general nature. Barry Gilder in a book by the name of "Living on the Frontier" describes these circumstances and during the June 1985 attack, he was directly opposite one of the targets that was attacked and afterwards he says that they moved from house to house on a regular basis, which also happened in this instance.

CHAIRPERSON: You mean it is available in any library, you said chemist?

MR LOOTS: Excuse me Chairperson, library not chemist.

MR MOHLABA: Were you subsequently briefed of the developments after this attack at this particular house?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, yes the team returned and they did indeed report to Colonel Naude, it was dark and if I recall correctly they said that a man and a woman were killed.

MR MOHLABA: So the report was given on the 1st of January 1978?

MR LOOTS: The early hours of that morning, yes.

MR MOHLABA: And to learn that the people you were after, were not at that place at the time of the attack, what was your response, how did you respond to that?

MR LOOTS: Could you please repeat the question?

MR MOHLABA: After you have learnt that the people you were looking for, the people whom you sought to attack were not at the house at the time of the attack, how did you

respond to that?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, all that I can say is that it was a great disappointment to us.

MR MOHLABA: According to the information which you had at your disposal, who did you, rather, did you know who the house which was attacked, belonged to? Did you know the owner of the house or the tenants there?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the persons who normally occupied the house, I did not know them personally. According to information the house was inhabited by an elderly woman, usually.

MR MOHLABA: So it occurred to your mind at the moment that Sadie Pule and Take Five did not own that house and they were not the normal residents thereof?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR MOHLABA: Was any steps taken to ensure that persons other than Take Five and Sadie Pule were not killed or injured in that house?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, no, the moment after the information was conveyed to Special Forces, they were in command of the operation or in control of the operation and it is difficult to determine beforehand who would be in the house.

MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair, I've got no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Mohlaba. Ms Thabethe, do you have any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS THABETHE: Yes, Mr Chairperson. Thank you. Mr Loots, according to your evidence you had a meeting before the actual attack took place, in this meeting, did you discuss the plan, did you have a plan on how you were actually going to attack the house or on how you were actually going to attack the targets?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, under normal circumstances I would just like to emphasise that Sadie Pule and Take Five were well known in Security circles, several Forces from the Security Branch reported their activities and a second aspect, the house that Modise pointed out as a target was also in the past used for accommodation. We had information to that effect. I don't know if that answers your question.

MS THABETHE: Not really, what I wanted to know is did you have a plan on how you were actually going to attack them? The means that you were going to use for attacking them, that is my question?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I am not aware of the plan. The normal practice would be that when such a team goes into the area, we had no doubt that Take Five and Sadie Pule would be there and no specific plan was established. If I recall correctly, it was a one or two roomed house, I have no more detail other than that.

ADV DE JAGER: It does not mean that whether you had a plan of the house in the sense whether it was a one or two roomed house or where the kitchen or whatever was, but whether you had, there was planning as to how the attack would take place?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, no. Special Forces act independently of the SAP, they do their own planning as to how such an operation would be launched.

MS THABETHE: Exactly what did you finalise at this meeting, how were these targets going to be killed so to say?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, once again Take Five and Sadie Pule their activities were reported regularly to us in the past. We refer to Trevits, the list of targets and in Special Forces, also gathered information independently through the DCC, the Directorate of Covert Collections and they knew who we referred to and the type of weapons they would have in their possession and therefore we cannot prescribe to them as to how to act. They take their own decisions, this is Special Forces.

MS THABETHE: I don't know whether I am hearing correctly, are you saying whoever had to carry out the killing, had orders that they had to kill Take Five and Sadie Pule, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

MS THABETHE: It as entirely up to them how they did that, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

MS THABETHE: According to your evidence, you say you did not prescribe to them how they should go about killing these people?

MR LOOTS: No Chairperson.

MS THABETHE: The order that you gave is that Sadie Pule and Take Five should be killed, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

MS THABETHE: So I guess you wouldn't be in a position to respond about the fact that why maybe they didn't break into the house to find out whether Sadie Pule and Take Five were present?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, it is difficult to comment there on, because the person at the scene is the most important person and in the light of information to which a whole team had available, that both Take Five and Sadie Pule regularly had weapons in their possession, this would place them in a very difficult position. It is a matter of ...

MS THABETHE: Because I don't think answered, exactly who were the people who went there to carry out this order?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the Commander was Colonel Charl Naude of Special Forces, his subordinates were unknown to us, for security reasons they wore balaclavas and for security reasons they are also not known to us.

MS THABETHE: You see Mr Loots, what I am trying to determine, and maybe you can't comment on it, is the fact that since they had direct orders, specific orders to kill Sadie Pule and Take Five, and since it was well known that the house that was targeted, wasn't their house, they were not the only people who lived there, why didn't they break into the house to ensure that the intended target was hit? That is my question.

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I find it difficult to answer that question, I was not at the facility when the team of Special Forces arrived there. We had no information as to what type of weapons they had available and that is the only explanation which I can give, that such circumstances makes it very difficult for a person who has to act against a well known enemy.

CHAIRPERSON: Did they know who they were to attack?

MR LOOTS: Regularly Chairperson, with regards to the photo album that we had, we exchanged information as to who the targets were.

CHAIRPERSON: So Special Forces would have known who these two persons would have been?

MR LOOTS: Colonel Charl Naude would have known.

CHAIRPERSON: They had access to photo's of the two targets?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson. In all fairness I have to add that some of the photo's in the album, were quite old because it was difficult to acquire recent photo's regularly of these persons.

CHAIRPERSON: But I mean they had a reasonable idea as to who the targets were? For example Sadie Pule, if I understand you correctly, would not be an elderly woman as the owner of that house?

MR LOOTS: No Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So therefore they would know they are looking for a woman, they know it is not an elderly woman, they have an idea of what she looks like although it is not a recent photo that they had access to and they have a photo of Take Five?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson. I would like to add that this happened so quickly, it is either you or him. There is no doubt about that.

CHAIRPERSON: That is understandable.

MR LOOTS: And for that reason it is difficult for such an operative to have a look first, it was dark, it was dark moon that evening, there was no moon.

CHAIRPERSON: Did they have the night sight equipment, the operatives?

MR LOOTS: I am not sure what equipment they had. They had a separate conference before they left.

CHAIRPERSON: So you are not sure about the equipment?

MR LOOTS: I am not sure Chairperson, but I would assume that they did.

MS THABETHE: Thank you Mr Chair. Was it reported to you Mr Loots after the attack, how the attack was done?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, once again, this team when they return, they report to their Commander not to us. I cannot recall any detail as to that, but what I can recall it was close to the border, I heard an explosion and afterwards there was fire. There was more than one explosion in any case.

MS THABETHE: My last question to you Mr Loots is, since the wrong victim was targeted or was killed eventually, how would you justify that politically, how would you justify the act of killing the wrong woman, how would you justify that politically? That is in relation to your application for amnesty?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, all that I can say is that when something of this nature happens, it was traumatic to me personally in the sense that no person, no person would like to kill innocent persons. Personally I feel very sorry. Just as Chairperson, we can refer to many instances in this sad country, the church bombs, the Church Street bomb, how many innocent people were killed there, I feel sorry for those people because us as members of the Security Police were tasked to prevent it, and we could not. That is my answer. Personally I feel very sorry. I wish I could erase it with an eraser, but I cannot.

MS THABETHE: Thank you Mr Chair, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Ms Thabethe. You say that you contacted the source personally?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Was this in the early hours of the morning?

MR LOOTS: It was before eleven o'clock, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So you spoke to the source personally?

MR LOOTS: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And what convinced you that these two people would overnight in that specific house?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, as I have said previously that this house, this was not the first time that the house was used as a facility and secondly it was New Year's Eve and according to information which we received on a regular basis after the 14th of June 1985, concerning several targets in Botswana, it is true that the MK members were really frightened for their security and on a regular basis, they moved from facility to facility and I interpreted it as that they were far away from Gaberone in a rural area and this would be the ideal place for them to overnight on a New Year's Eve, under safe circumstances.

CHAIRPERSON: According to your information at that stage, regarding these two people Pule and Take Five, were they people who were rather mobile, did they move around a lot? If I heard you correctly then your evidence is that they almost never, that they never stayed more than one evening at the same place?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, yes, that is a fact. I don't know on how regular a basis they personally moved from place to place, but that it was the case, cannot be doubted. I would not say every evening at a different place, but on a regular footage. As the one Exhibit does indicate of the two people, we don't know who these people are that went passed the house, it is definitely of our people and these two, they were jittery enough if I can put it that way, that even two people that passes the house on a bicycle is enough to drive them out of the house. If I, by means of retrospect, then I would also do the same.

CHAIRPERSON: But it would appear as if there was no planning for the operation itself, for the steps that would be taken itself between where you could make an inset and to say these people are people that are very nervous and that they move around a lot, in other words you did not have an opportunity where you sat down with Naude and did some planning?

MR LOOTS: Naude Chairperson, to give you an idea, only arrived in the evening and in other words there wasn't much time. There wasn't much time.

CHAIRPERSON: Between yourself, you were in control of the Security Police?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And you were in control, and he was in control of Special Forces and between the two of you, the two senior people, there was no planning that took place?

MR LOOTS: The only thing that we could offer him, we could not offer him a plan, follow this road and turn right here, for that reason, Modise was taken through the river. The second aspect Chairperson, that I would like to mention in this regard is that the nature of the information that this specific source had given over a long time, was so reliable that I had absolutely no doubt that those two people were going to be there.

CHAIRPERSON: In other words you relied completely on what the source said?

MR LOOTS: On the reliability of the source, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: You did not deem it necessary to take any independent steps or to ...

MR LOOTS: We did not have any other methods, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And that was the morning that you had received the information?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And the house was never placed under observation?

MR LOOTS: No Chairperson, not from our side.

CHAIRPERSON: And the attack occurred about 13 hours later, you say it was about before eleven o'clock in the morning and did you have this conversation with the source then?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And the attack happened just after twelve o'clock at night?

MR LOOTS: That is approximately 12 to 13 hours later then.

CHAIRPERSON: What did you do in the meantime then?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the terrain from Zeerust to the place where we had to cross the border, is very bushy, thorn trees, lots of thorn trees and it is not a general open road to the border. We also had to use a casspir vehicle which moved relatively slowly and this also was quite time consuming.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you have this conversation with the source in Zeerust?

MR LOOTS: Between the Botswana border and Zeerust.

CHAIRPERSON: And then from there, you moved closer to the border, after you had this conversation?

MR LOOTS: We were at a safe farm where we waited for Naude and from there, we moved to the point where they had to cross the border.

CHAIRPERSON: But you see Naude, after dawn he arrived there and it was already getting dark when you moved away from the safe farm? In other words you didn't know when the operatives or Special Forces went over the border, you had no idea how they were going to execute this operation?

MR LOOTS: No.

CHAIRPERSON: And Naude also did not tell you what they had in mind?

MR LOOTS: In later cases evidence will be given about the Kangwane operation where 10 targets were attacked, the SAP gives the information and the Defence Force does the attack, we have absolutely no insets about who, what or where they should do something.

CHAIRPERSON: But you and Naude waited on the RSA side while the operatives executed the order and you never spoke amongst each other and said "see Naude, we are going to do this" or something like this? He gave you no idea how they were planning to execute this operation, for example to determine if Pule or Take Five or both of them were in the house, to for instance knock on the door?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, once again the dilemma and this is my own interpretation, if you arrive at such a target, then it is people about whom reliable information had been gotten over a long time and the problem is you don't know what that person has in his possession. If you had to knock first to ensure then you would be the casualty. This was our dilemma Chairperson, in this kind of operation.

CHAIRPERSON: In other words does one have to understand, I know you weren't there, but the picture that you sketch is one of an attack where you kick the door open and you start shooting, is this the kind of image - I accept that there was a window broken and a handgrenade was thrown in and I also accept that the image that you have then, is an attack without any warning?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: It is then a surprise attack?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Then the people would hopefully be sleeping, the targets?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And they would then not be in a position to fight back?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You don't have any idea about who was in the house at the time?

MR LOOTS: According to our information, it was an elderly black woman that stayed in the house Chairperson, that is the only thing I know.

CHAIRPERSON: You did not receive any information about ... (tape ends) ... they came back and they mentioned to Naude that a man and a woman was killed. Did they say that those were the only people in the house or what?

MR LOOTS: That is the only thing that I can remember Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The order to them was to kill a man and a woman?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Good. But you say that you had no idea, you don't even know if the alleged owner of this house, Materu, if this is the person that was killed?

MR LOOTS: No. This only became clear out of a Botswana newspaper article, the person that was killed.

CHAIRPERSON: But it was a person that wasn't known to the Security Police?

MR LOOTS: We did not know her Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You did not aim to kill her?

MR LOOTS: Never Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, and we are not sure if there was a second person killed as well.

MR LOOTS: It could be or it could not be, it is possible. From the Vula documents it looks as if it is possible, it looks as if it is possible that a man was also killed, but his identity I am not sure of.

CHAIRPERSON: If we suppose that it is indeed so that another man was killed, then he would be in the same position as the old lady?

MR LOOTS: Yes Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE : The reports you got, did it indicate whether the operatives went into the house to check on what damage might have been caused, how many were injured, if there were other people in the house, etc, etc?

MR LOOTS: Could you please repeat it for me.

ADV GCABASHE : The operatives who carried out the operation, did you get a report on who they might have found in the sense of it was an old lady because we went into the house to check. There were no other people because we went in to check. This damage was sustained because we were there and we went in, I just want that kind of detail please.

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, if I remember correctly then they did report to Colonel Naude, those three people and they reported that a man and a woman was killed in the house. The age and the descriptions, it was dark and so on and it was simply impossible for them to ascertain the ages and as far as I can remember, it wasn't even mentioned.

ADV GCABASHE : ... a general report, not a detailed one?

MR LOOTS: No, not a detailed one.

ADV GCABASHE : ... with a detailed report would be Mr Naude, because he got it directly from his operatives?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE : But he reported to you as soon as the operation was completed?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE : And you were actually close to the border at the time of the operation, you heard the explosion?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE : ... help me in terms of Geography, Ramotswe, you know I can find my way from Zeerust to I think Gaberone border gate, Lohloweni, Ramotswe, which side of Lohloweni border gate would Ramotswe be?

MR LOOTS: It would be, can my colleagues help me just here, is it the Western side? To the Western side, thank you.

ADV GCABASHE : To the Western side?

MR VISSER: (Microphone not on)

CHAIRPERSON: Would you mind if we confiscate that and mark it, give it a reference, Exhibit N, thank you.

ADV GCABASHE : This is the house that Mr Modise would obviously have surveilled over a period of time, I mean he knew a lot about what happened at this house, is that so?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE : When you had your discussion with Mr Modise on the night of the 31st going into the morning of the 1st, did he indicate to you how often Pule and Take Five visited this particular house?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, no. No, all I can say to you is that different sources had reported about Ramotswe. Just to give you an indication, from the 11th of May 1984 up to the incident of that night of the 1st of January 1987, 13 different groups had infiltrated and during that same period Chairperson, in 17 occasions, they verbally and telephonically as I have given evidence, given telephone numbers, addresses and registrations to the Botswana Police and to answer the question, Modise as such did not on a regular footage receive information that Materu's house is used, but also from other sources.

ADV GCABASHE : As I understood your evidence it was just per chance that you were in Zeerust that weekend, the chance being the funeral of a colleague, yes?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE : Where would you normally be stationed, Pretoria?

MR LOOTS: Potchefstroom.

ADV GCABASHE : Had you not been in Zeerust on Sunday, was that a Sunday, well, had you not been in Zeerust on the 31st, would you have received this report?

MR LOOTS: I would have Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE : Would they have telephoned you in Potchefstroom?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE : You know, what I am really trying to probe is the urgency in dealing with this issue there and then, why you had to immediately react without getting the opportunity to verify in any other way that the targets were the targets you were after, because it now transpires that you did not get the targets that you were after?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the reason why we reacted speedily, hastily was based on the fact that after 14 June 1985, after the attack on ten different targets, Barry Gilder refers to this, MK members were especially those moving underground in Botswana, were in a difficult situation to such an extent that on a regular basis, they changed houses and the quality of the information that we had received from this specific source, that was very reliable over a long period and I had no doubt, even if I had received it telephonically, I would have made this proposition to Brigadier Schoon so that he can consider it?

ADV GCABASHE : Coming back to the Special Forces, was it standard practice for you to ask them to execute operations like this for you?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE : Had you, because this was your region, had you asked them to do this before?

MR LOOTS: Before?

ADV GCABASHE : Yes?

MR LOOTS: Yes. I am referring to the Gaberone attack on the 14th of June 1985.

ADV GCABASHE : And where would they get the authority to do as instructed by you, would they again have to check with their own command structures before they took an order that you had given to them?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson, their own command structure.

ADV GCABASHE : So Colonel Naude would have been told that Colonel Loots is going to give you an instruction, you execute that instruction? He would have been told by his superiors? How did it work, I really don't know how it worked?

MR LOOTS: Colonel Naude under these circumstances, I clarified it with Brigadier Schoon and Brigadier Schoon asked me to inform Charl Naude and on his turn, he gets authorisation from his Commanders and this is how it worked in the past Mr Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE : You see, you indicated that the Special Forces, that the military, the Defence Force, had their own information on activities in Botswana and certainly had information on the Pule family. I heard you correctly?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson. DCI, Directorate of Covert Intelligence was specifically tasked to gather information about specific activities of certain individuals and normally we pool this information to see how it relates to each other and to see how we can support each other.

ADV GCABASHE : When you had a discussion with Colonel Naude about the information from your source. Was he able to verify that maybe they had the same information, was he able to exchange his own information base with you, I mean what was the nature of that discussion?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, no, they had no additional information.

ADV GCABASHE : They did not even have the same information?

MR LOOTS: No Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE : But there really wasn't time any way to check on what other information they might have received, because Mr Modise had just recently, that very same day or a day before, received this information?

MR LOOTS: Yes, it was very difficult.

ADV GCABASHE : In the time that you were the Commander in that region, how many times did you have this type of mistaken killing, you know, wrong killing?

MR LOOTS: This was the only one.

ADV GCABASHE : In your time?

MR LOOTS: The only one that I know of.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I just have a follow up question Mr Loots, when Naude conveyed to you what his operatives had said, what was your reaction, did you think that the operation was successful?

MR LOOTS: We accepted that we had hit the right targets, Chairperson, I was under that impression. It was a disappointment and a shock to us when we were proved wrong.

CHAIRPERSON: When did you find out that you were wrong?

MR LOOTS: The Botswana newspapers reported it firstly and then from the source as well.

CHAIRPERSON: The source also came to tell you that you had killed the wrong persons?

MR LOOTS: I cannot recall how long afterwards, but it was also on the Botswana radio as well.

CHAIRPERSON: And the source also confirmed that the wrong people were killed?

MR LOOTS: That is indeed so Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You never found Pule and Take Five?

MR LOOTS: Never again, no Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, thank you. Re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Just one question Chairperson. Brigadier Loots, let us just get clarity over this point, when you decided along with Brigadier Schoon as to what action to take along with Special Forces, did you realise that the possibility existed that innocent persons could be hit in this operation?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson yes.

MR VISSER: And did you reconcile yourself with this?

MR LOOTS: Yes, I did Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Thank you. Then just a final point, I think you understood Commissioner Gcabashe's question incorrectly, I think what she wants to know from you Brigadier Loots is simply the following - when these operatives returned and reported to Naude, please tell me first hand, were you within hearing distance or did he come and tell you?

MR LOOTS: No, I was within earshot of them.

MR VISSER: What the Commissioner wants to know is did they report that they went into the house after the attack or not?

MR LOOTS: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Before or after?

MR LOOTS: After.

MR VISSER: Did they say that after the incident they went into the house?

MR LOOTS: That is as I recall it Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE : Are you saying you still don't know who the other person is who was killed, you know Materu was killed because of the report. The other person's, the identity?

MR LOOTS: No, Chairperson, I do not know.

ADV GCABASHE : The reports in the papers did not identify that person?

MR LOOTS: Not as far as I recall Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE : So it could have been a citizen of Botswana or it could have been a South African, you just have no clue at all?

MR LOOTS: It could have been Chairperson. I do not have any confirmation, strictly speaking when such a person is killed, his identity is made known, but I cannot recall it. There were indeed rumours.

ADV GCABASHE : You know, knowing that Materu facilitated the work of the ANC in your region essentially, why did you not do something about this before? What made you act, I know these two people were important, is this the only reason you acted on this particular day?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, in the light of, I refer to 13 infiltrations and 17 discussions with Security Police of Botswana and also the involvement of the Pule family, we then decided that the information came from a reliable source and even their own brother, Abraham Pule was arrested after he came into the country from Botswana, so the Pule family was over a long period, involved. I made the proposition to Brigadier Schoon and that is the only answer I can give you.

ADV GCABASHE : Thank you Chair, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Adv De Jager, have you got any questions?

ADV DE JAGER: This brother Abraham, was he before this incident or after this incident, was he arrested?

MR LOOTS: I cannot recall, maybe some of my colleagues at Zeerust could recall because they were involved there.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, have you got anything else?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I am just informed that Ms Thabethe has just handed us a document, I haven't seen it before, I don't know what it is about. I am not sure, perhaps before you release this witness, may we quickly scan through it and see if we've got to deal with it through this witness? In order to save time, Chairperson, I just have it in front of me, perhaps I should go through it aloud with you, in order to save time.

MS THABETHE: Sorry Mr Chair, can I just clarify, I gave it to Mr Wagener, it is a human rights violation statement that was made by Take Five, but why I give it to him is because it clarifies who the victim was on the day.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, why is it handed to me at the end of my witness' evidence, why couldn't it be handed to us before?

CHAIRPERSON: Can't you, I don't know, there may be some assistance forthcoming from the document to identify possible witnesses. Can you do that by agreement or something?

MS THABETHE: Sure. Mr Chair, if I can clarify for Mr Visser, there is no new information in the document, it is just newspaper cuttings which clarify that there was one victim.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I have a real problem with a document being handed to me at the end of my witness' evidence, which I never saw before. Really I don't want to criticise anybody, but Ms Thabethe should give us these things beforehand. It could save time, it could make a huge difference. I don't know, she says there is nothing in it, I don't know about that. Really with great respect, could we ask you to perhaps, it might be an idea if I may suggest it Chairperson, that we take the lunch adjournment until quarter past two so that I can have time to look at this document?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. No, I think it is fair enough, you should have a look at the document and perhaps we can take the lunch adjournment, but not until quarter past two.

MR VISSER: Quarter to two?

CHAIRPERSON: All right, we shall do that, we shall adjourn and you can use the time to look at it and we will reconvene at quarter to two.

MR VISSER: As it pleases you Mr Chairman.

ON RESUMPTION:

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, I don't know whether you have made mark on your original map, could you perhaps mark ours too please?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Visser?

WIKUS JOHANNES LOOTS: (s.u.o.)

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: (cont)

Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, first of all may I suggest to accept the document handed to us before the lunch adjournment as Exhibit O. There is quite a lot that appears from this document, for one thing we have an identification of the deceased. We believe that it is best to be dealt with in argument. The witness can't really take the matter any further and it would be a waste of time for me to go through the document with him. Under those circumstances, we have no further questions for Mr Loots, thank you Chairperson. I am sorry, perhaps incorrectly.

MR VISSER: I am sorry, perhaps incorrectly I just assumed that you would be provided with copies of the document.

MS THABETHE: I have given it to (indistinct).

MR VISSER: Yes, thank you Chairperson. Perhaps there might be one question which does arise from page 4, paragraph 9, which I might just put to Brigadier Loots for his general comment. Brigadier, there is a statement in Exhibit O from one Aaron Mkwanazi, the house that was attacked on New Year's Day was a house in Ramotswe that belonged to an elderly lady and then he also says -

Thus far you have believed that she might have been an innocent person?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: But now we do know that she was indeed and from further remarks from this Exhibit that she was a collaborator and an ANC activist?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: With regard to all this documentation, have you a better idea as to how many people were killed in this operation?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, no. In the statement mention is made of four persons. ... people, a man, woman and child have been killed. There are newspaper extracts attached to this, but nowhere in this newspaper extract is it mentioned who these people could have been and I do not know.

MR VISSER: ... page 4, paragraph 10 Chairperson. You will see right at the bottom he says -

But when I have the opportunity to address you in argument, I will point out to you that in the rest of the documentation, there is no reference at all to anyone except the old woman. Incidentally what has now also appeared, is that the Botswana Security Police went to this premises the next day, where they discovered the arms cache to which reference was made on Exhibit M P02 and when they lifted the arms cache, there was an explosion in which five of them were seriously injured. That is at page 15, you will find that Chairperson. I must say if I may be allowed to say so, it helps to have this kind of information when you hear amnesty applications, in order to gain some of the background. At page 15 it is an article in the Daily News, it reads like this, the middle column, the second last and the last paragraph, it says -

It doesn't talk about an arms cache, but it talks about an explosion. It seems to tie in with what Exhibit N tells you. Chairperson, if there are no further questions to Brigadier Loots, may I then call Brigadier Schoon?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Loots, you are excused.

MR VISSER: Oh, I am sorry.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

ON RESUMPTION:

MR VISSER: Chairperson, the evidence of Brigadier Schoon as you know, is in Volume 1. The specific incident is dealt with from page 90 onwards. It is very brief in fact, Chairperson, and his evidence will probably also be very brief. May he be considered to still be bound by his previous oath Chairperson?

WILLEM FREDERIK SCHOON: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Brigadier Schoon, you have already given evidence previously and you have already requested the Committee to incorporate certain evidence in your evidence, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: If we could arrive at the incident, it is the incident which is known as the Take Five and Sadie Pule incident in Ramotswe, Botswana. Did you - you dealt with this on page 90 of Bundle 1, under incident 17. You have given the date there as the 31st of October 1986. Did you find this date from somebody else?

MR SCHOON: I received this date from Brigadier Loots.

MR VISSER: He is incorrect and therefore you are also incorrect?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: So do you accept that it is the 31st of December?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I do.

MR VISSER: What do you recall of this incident Brigadier?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, on that specific day if I recall correctly, it was during the afternoon after lunch, I received a telephone call from Brigadier Loots. He informed me that they had fresh information that two terrorists who were active in Botswana and maintained quite a high profile there, would be at a specific house that evening and would overnight there. He did mention there names and they were Take Five and Sadie Pule who at that stage were well known to the Security Branch. Their names frequently presented itself in reports and they were active in Botswana and were of assistance to terrorists and other recruits.

MR VISSER: Have you heard the evidence of Brigadier Loots this morning with regard to the profile of Take Five and Sadie Pule?

MR SCHOON: Indeed Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Does this concur with the information that you had at Head Office?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: He also said that they regarded them as targets?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What did Brigadier Loots tell you?

MR SCHOON: He suggested that the information which is available to him, he had regarded it as very reliable and I think it was then Major Charl Naude of Special Forces, he conveyed this information to them, and he requested him to launch an operation at this specific house where these persons would overnight.

MR VISSER: Which would mean that they would attack this house?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: With the purpose of killing the people inside the house?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What did you do then?

MR SCHOON: He convinced me that the information which was available to him, was very reliable and that they had to act that same evening if they wanted to use this information. I told him that I had no problem, he could convey the information to Major Naude and then request him to launch an operation.

MR VISSER: When you say that you had no problem, do you in the light of your knowledge from the Security Branch, did you have knowledge, according to your knowledge of these two persons, did you regard them as such persons that they could be targeted?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: In this decision that you had taken, you have heard Brigadier Loots' evidence this morning with regard to the situation which the Western Transvaal Security Branch found themselves in, meaning that they had all these insurgents and weapon smuggling and there were explosions all over the country and that the Botswana government was not very anxious to be of assistance in arresting such persons, you have heard that?

MR SCHOON: I did Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And we know during those years and I would like to ask you whether it played a role, during the middle 1980's there was a great amount of pressure in the Security Branch to normalise the situation?

MR SCHOON: That is so indeed, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: The pressure and the speeches of politicians, where they spoke about the elimination of terrorists, how did you interpret that?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I understood that all necessary methods and sources had to be used to combat this problem. In other words to stop the terrorists in their tracks.

MR VISSER: Did you understand that what was expected of you, was to kill terrorists?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: That is the evidence Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mohlaba, any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MOHLABA: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Schoon, can you, you have mentioned that you were telephoned by Mr Loots and advising you that he had some information about terrorists, why was he phoning you, were you his senior, was he your subordinate at that time?

MR SCHOON: I was his senior Chairperson and I was attached to Security Head Office.

MR MOHLABA: And the reason he phoned you, was it because procedurally he was supposed to seek sanction from you before such operations can be carried out?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Chairperson.

MR MOHLABA: What were you expected to do, that is did you have a responsibility to verify the information before you give a "go ahead" to them?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson he convinced me that the information was very reliable and he also said that we had to act on it.

MR MOHLABA: Was it your responsibility then to ensure that the information is in fact reliable? Was it your responsibility, were you the last person to be satisfied that the information given to me, is reliable before you give instructions to go ahead with the operation?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, yes, I believe that he did see it so, although it was standing practice during those years that if the Security Branch had any information then it was our duty to share it with the South African Defence Force if they also had an interest there. In other words this was the policy.

MR MOHLABA: Other than approving or giving them a "go ahead" to proceed with the operation, did you contribute anything, that is the logistics, planning or suggesting to them?

MR SCHOON: No Chairperson.

MR MOHLABA: You have mentioned the surname Naude, it escapes my comprehension what role did he play there and what was he?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, at that stage he was a Major, I think he was a Major in the South African Defence Force and he was attached to Special Forces, Special Operations.

MR MOHLABA: Did you yourself have any contact with Naude or was it only Brigadier Loots who communicated with him?

MR SCHOON: With this specific instance, I had no contact with him, Chairperson.

MR MOHLABA: Did you obtain a report after this operation was carried out, and if so, from who?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, if I recall correctly, a few days afterwards reports did come in which had said that there was indeed an explosion and persons were killed.

MR MOHLABA: Can you remember who gave you the report?

MR SCHOON: I do not recall Chairperson. It would have been written reports in the form of a print telegram or in some form of crypt.

MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Mohlaba. Ms Thabethe, questions?

MS THABETHE: No questions, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Which persons did you give permission for to be killed?

MR SCHOON: Not for any specific persons, they only asked approval to convey the information to Special Forces and a request to launch the operation.

CHAIRPERSON: Did Mr Loots not ask you if he could kill people?

MR SCHOON: No Chairperson. He just asked if he could convey the information to Special Forces and request them to launch the necessary operation.

CHAIRPERSON: Is this that the information, that these two persons would be in a specific house?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And you gave him permission to convey this to Naude and to have Naude launch an operation?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you know whether people would be killed?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I believed that it was a great possibility.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you not ask him specifically about targets?

MR SCHOON: No Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you know who these persons were that were discussed here?

MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson, I did because at that stage they were prominent figures in Botswana, in the ANC network there.

CHAIRPERSON: Did Loots not tell you what he planned?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, no he did not tell me, he said that they would plan an operation.

CHAIRPERSON: But he did not give you any particulars?

MR SCHOON: No Chairperson. At that stage I believed that the killing of these persons would be one of the possibilities.

CHAIRPERSON: But you yourself were not involved with any planning of the specific operation?

MR SCHOON: Not at all Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

ADV GCABASHE : Thank you Chair. One question, I hope. You are saying that you did not authorise these particular people to be killed, is this what you are saying?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, no. I said that he could give the information to Naude and ask Naude to act upon this information or plan any steps that he would deem necessary because we could not tell Special Forces what to do. We could give them the information and that was then for them to decide what they would do with the information.

ADV GCABASHE : If you had instead wanted to have them abducted and brought to South Africa, you know, there are different possibilities, would you then have said "we want you to abduct them?" I am just trying to understand what you were communicating to the Defence Force?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, yes, then if I was in Loots' position, I would have said "first see if you can't bring these people out before you make any other plans."

ADV GCABASHE : I am trying to understand what exactly you authorised. Did you simply authorise a communication with Naude and the execution, the steps would be left to Naude, is this what you are saying?

MR SCHOON: Exactly like that Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE : Are you saying it is the Special Forces chaps who took the decision to kill these people or are you saying it was Mr Loots' decision, whose decision was it?

MR SCHOON: I don't believe that Loots could have done that, he could only have conveyed the information and possibly he could have suggested something, but he could not have said "you must go and kill those people."

ADV GCABASHE : He would have to get that authority from you if he said that?

MR SCHOON: No, because I could not give that authority to him because it was not within my possibilities.

ADV GCABASHE : So really, if we wanted further information about why these people were killed, we would have to talk to Mr Naude, essentially?

MR SCHOON: Absolutely Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I just want to make sure, do you say that we know that there is at least one person killed there, do you say that you never gave an order that that person had to be killed?

MR SCHOON: No Chairperson, I did not.

ADV DE JAGER: Is the reason why you did not give that order, what is the reason why you did not give that order for the person to be killed or something had to be done to the person?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I did not have that authority and that is not why Loots contacted me.

ADV DE JAGER: Why did you not have the authority, is it because it was in a foreign country?

MR SCHOON: No, because it would have been an illegal act.

ADV DE JAGER: But you gave orders for other illegal acts?

MR SCHOON: I did Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: But why did you have the authority then and not in this case?

MR SCHOON: I did not have the authority to give an order for an illegal act to be carried out.

ADV DE JAGER: I don't know what meaning you give to authority, but in other cases you did give the orders that you gave testimony to.

MR SCHOON: But that was illegal.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, that was illegal, but ... (tape ends) ... and in this case you also did it, why didn't you say in this case to Loots, "tell Naude, they must go and that those people are people who are fighting against us and that they should go and kill those people, eliminate those people?"

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, we were never prescriptive when it came to the Special Forces. They made their own decisions. ADV DE JAGER: If those people were inside South Africa, what would your attitude have been then?

MR SCHOON: In that case, we would have arrested them Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: Then you would have killed them?

MR SCHOON: Not necessarily Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: But you saw that there would be an operation against them?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I did see that.

ADV DE JAGER: What did you understand would happen to them, what did you expect would happen to them?

MR SCHOON: I expected that the Special Forces would be involved in a skirmish.

ADV DE JAGER: And that they would be killed?

MR SCHOON: Most probably Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: Special Forces did not capture people, did they?

MR SCHOON: Not as far as I know Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I will maybe just ask you, do you know what happened to Charl Naude?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, as far as I know he is still here. The other day, on the TV I saw that he was at one of the other hearings and that he was giving evidence at one of those hearings.

CHAIRPERSON: In front of one of the amnesty hearings?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is true.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.

MR VISSER: I did intend to address you and give you some background about the SA Defence Force.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you got any re-examination Mr Visser?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Just one, perhaps just for clarity sake. Brigadier, I couldn't help but get the impression that you and the Committee leaders are speaking passed one another, could you just please try and listen to the question. The question here is when Brigadier Loots contacted you, did you know that the permission that you were giving, involved the killing of Sadie Pule and Take Five?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, at that stage no.

MR VISSER: But you say that you cannot be prescriptive to the Special Forces, what do you mean by that?

MR SCHOON: We cannot prescribe to them go and kill so and so. That is a different Department and they have their own structure.

MR VISSER: All you could do to them is give them the information and they had to act?

MR SCHOON: They had to act, yes.

MR VISSER: If they were arrested, then you would have accepted it like that, if they had gone and arrested the people, then you would have accepted it like that?

MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: They went there and they tried to kill the people, do you accept it like that?

MR SCHOON: I accepted it like that Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Visser. Can I just ask you something that I just thought of, it appears as if - your testimony - that there was someone killed in this process. What is your attitude at this moment about this incident?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I am sorry that this incident happened, it is very clear that the correct people were not targeted and I am very sorry about this.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, is there anything else?

MR VISSER: Not from this witness, thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I interrupted you, but you wanted to ask for him to be excused. You are excused Mr Schoon, thank you.

MR VISSER: I neglected to say this morning that for the next witnesses, they are brief witnesses, Mr Chairperson, and I did not draw written statements, I hope you will forgive me, especially Commissioner De Jager.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

FREDERIK CRAUSE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser?

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, we refer you to Bundle 1, page 164. The actual incident is at page 174 Chairperson. Mr Crause, you applied for amnesty in relation to the incident that is now handled, is that correct? Do you have your amnesty application in front of you?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm the correctness and the truth of this as far as your knowledge is concerned?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: In 1986, in December, where were you stationed then?

MR CRAUSE: I was at the Safety Branch in Zeerust, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And is it correct that Mr Du Preez Smit was your Branch Commander and that he was on leave and that Lieutenant Wehrmann stood in in his place then?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: What can you tell us of your knowledge of this incident?

MR CRAUSE: Chairperson, the day of the 31st of December 1986, I received a telephone call from Lieutenant Wehrmann where he told me to depart to a place in the area of Nietverdiendt.

MR VISSER: It is a farm?

MR CRAUSE: It is a farm yes, Chairperson, and that an operation was being planned there in Ramotswe vicinity in Botswana.

MR VISSER: What did you find on this farm?

MR CRAUSE: Chairperson on the farm, I think I was first on the farm if I am not mistaken, but later on Brigadier Loots, Lieutenant Wehrmann, Colonel Smit, Inspector Modise or Warrant Officer Modise and members of the Special Forces of the Defence Force arrived on the farm.

MR VISSER: Can you remember how many members were present?

MR CRAUSE: Chairperson, the Special Forces members were four, along with Mr Naude.

MR VISSER: Very well, did you personally hear what was being said there with regards to information or what was being planned?

MR CRAUSE: I only made a deduction Chairperson, that MK members during the same evening in Ramotswe in a specific house, that they would be staying there for that evening.

MR VISSER: Did you know what the planning involved and that an operation would be carried out against this specific house and what would it mean if you carry out such an operation?

MR CRAUSE: That the house would be attacked, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you have any part further and if so, what was your part?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct Chairperson. I went with the group, this includes Brigadier Loots, Colonel Smit, Lieutenant Wehrmann, Modise.

MR VISSER: The people that you mentioned before?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR CRAUSE: And the Special Forces group. At the border post at Ramotswe, we went Chairperson.

MR VISSER: We know from Brigadier Loots that Modise had to go and identify the house for the Special Forces?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What happened then?

MR CRAUSE: Upon our arrival at the border, we found that - I am not sure, but I think that it is the Ramotswe river - that it was in flood, seeing as it rained a lot the previous day. Mr Modise was afraid to go into the water or to walk through the river and Brigadier Loots gave me an order to take Mr Modise through the river.

MR VISSER: Did you then help Mr Modise through the river?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What happened on the other side of the river?

MR CRAUSE: On the other side of the river, Mr Modise led our group to where we found a tar road. We walked alongside the tar road for about 500 metres. He pointed out a house to us. Myself and Modise then in reaction to a Commander of the Special Forces, we hid about 30 metres away from the house in a ditch, about half way from the house, about 30 metres I would say Chairperson. It was dark, it could have been closer or maybe a little further and it was not very deep ditch, it was just a ... The three Special Forces members then went to the house. The next moment I heard a window break, I heard an extreme explosion after that, I accepted that it was a handgrenade that had been thrown into the house. I then heard several shots of automatic rifle fire. After a while the three Special Forces members returned. I asked their Commander "did you find them" and he said he shot two people dead, a man and a woman in a bed.

MR VISSER: Could you see if the Special Forces members had gone into that house?

MR CRAUSE: Chairperson, I accept that they had gone into the house because the automatic shots sounded as if it was being fired inside the house and definitely not from outside the house.

MR VISSER: When they returned, what did you do then?

MR CRAUSE: We immediately moved back to the border and once again joined Brigadier Loots.

MR VISSER: Did you report to Brigadier Loots about what you had seen?

MR CRAUSE: I think I just told him that the person told me that he had killed two people, a man and a wife.

MR VISSER: Mr Crause, when before the operation, you heard about the operation and that the house was going to be attacked or would be attacked, did you realise that people could be killed?

MR CRAUSE: Absolutely Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Was it told to you who those people were that were targeted?

MR CRAUSE: It was Sadie Pule and Take Five Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you know what their part in the struggle was?

MR CRAUSE: I did know that Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you agree with this operation?

MR CRAUSE: Absolutely, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: I forgot to ask you Exhibit A, you did look at it, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: Exhibit A, that is the background document, I did study it Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You say that as far as you were concerned, this is what happened before 1983 or that what happened before 1983 is not relevant to you and you don't have personal knowledge of that, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You also do not have personal knowledge of the incidents regarding Lesotho and Swaziland which appears in that document, Exhibit A?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you acknowledge that the rest of Exhibit A is also applicable to you and do you ask that the Committee considers this evidence with its consideration of your application?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You would then ask for amnesty for the murder of a person or persons in this house, conspiracy to murder, damage and so on, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And lastly, there is a document Exhibit M, which has appeared in front of the Committee this morning, the first page of Exhibit M, what is that?

MR CRAUSE: It is a page that I set up after I had read the pages Chairperson, and I made a short excerpt of what is important with relation to this incident.

MR VISSER: It would appear as if your comment on Take Five's correct name be Aaron Mkwanazi is correct, because we have a declaration from him?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct sir.

MR VISSER: And the rest of this document, we understand this to be excerpts of information printed out from computers that were confiscated from certain ANC people?

MR CRAUSE: That is positive sir.

MR VISSER: Do you personally from your own knowledge, know how many people indeed died in this operation?

MR CRAUSE: I do not know Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And regarding information that later came to light, it was either a woman or a woman and a man?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you are now applying for amnesty for both?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: That is his evidence in chief, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Visser. Exhibit M, the annexures, this is directed at the Attorney, was this in your possession?

MR CRAUSE: I received it from Brigadier Loots.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you still a Police Officer?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, I am Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Where are you stationed?

MR CRAUSE: I am stationed at Potchefstroom.

CHAIRPERSON: In which division?

MR CRAUSE: I am the Provincial Commander of the Explosives' Desk.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you an Explosives' person?

MR CRAUSE: I do the bomb cleaning up Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: When did you receive this information from Brigadier Loots?

MR CRAUSE: I think the date is on top of the document, the 30th of April of this year. If you see at the top of the document, I had drawn it up the same day and then I faxed it to Mr Visser.

CHAIRPERSON: At the moment you do not have access to this documentation?

MR CRAUSE: No Chairperson, I do not.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Loots is retired?

MR CRAUSE: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he tell you where he received this documents from?

MR CRAUSE: I did not ask him Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Mr Mohlaba, any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chairperson. Mr Crause, you said that you received a telephone call on the 31st of December 1986 from Lieutenant Wehrmann, what time was it approximately?

MR CRAUSE: Chairperson, it is difficult to say, but I would assume that it was about three o'clock in the afternoon.

MR MOHLABA: You subsequently went to a farm which you referred to as Nietverdiendt, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: That is positive Chairperson.

MR MOHLABA: Who owns this farm?

MR CRAUSE: I am not sure Chairperson. It was rented from somebody, I do not know who was the owner.

MR MOHLABA: It was rented out by, it was rented out to?

MR CRAUSE: To the SAP.

MR MOHLABA: And did the reason for ordering you to go to Nietverdiendt, was that explained to you over the telephone?

MR CRAUSE: They did not give any reason, it was just told to me that I had to go to Nietverdiendt.

MR MOHLABA: And you mentioned that you were the first one to arrive there and subsequently other people whom you mentioned by name, joined you. What was discussed when they arrived if anything was ever discussed?

MR CRAUSE: Chairperson, there was discussion between Brigadier Loots, Wehrmann, Colonel Smit and Mr Naude. I did not follow the discussion because I was in and out of there. The attack on a house in Ramotswe was discussed.

MR MOHLABA: So you did not participate in this discussion, did you?

MR CRAUSE: I heard some of it, but I did not participate in the discussion.

MR MOHLABA: Are you able to give account of what was discussed or can't you?

MR CRAUSE: I know it was mentioned that there was information that Take Five and Sadie Pule would spend this specific evening in a house in Ramotswe, Chairperson, and that the house would be attacked.

MR MOHLABA: Before you left to carry out this attack, was there a discussion of a role you and Modise are going to play and who was to do the actual attack on the terrorists there or the occupants of the house?

MR CRAUSE: Chairperson, Special Forces' persons would attack the house and Modise would point out the house.

MR MOHLABA: The reason for you going there, what role were you intending to play there?

MR CRAUSE: Chairperson, it is a known infiltration route and we also worked in teams when we worked there.

MR MOHLABA: Yes, I understand that, my question is, I am asking this on the background that Modise had a specific duty to do there, he was to point out the house and certain people were to carry out the attack. What were you assigned to do?

MR CRAUSE: As I have said previously, when we arrived at the border, the river was in flood and Brigadier Loots told me to take Modise through because he was afraid to enter the water.

MR MOHLABA: So the main role why you went across is because Modise was not able to swim, he could not cross unassisted, is that the only reason?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, was the only reason why I went through the river.

MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chairperson, I've got no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you Mr Mohlaba. Ms Thabethe, any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS THABETHE: One question Mr Chair. Exactly where were you when the attack took place, when the attack took place?

MR CRAUSE: When they attacked, I was about 30 metres from the house that was attacked.

MS THABETHE: So you did not participate in any way in the attack?

MR CRAUSE: No.

MS THABETHE: No further questions, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Could you see the house from where you were?

MR CRAUSE: Yes Chairperson. Chairperson, it is a type of suburb, but the houses are not close together. I would describe it as a traditional black township in that area, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you have a look at the house, you saw the three walking?

MR CRAUSE: I did Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And did you see them moving towards the house?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, I did Chairperson, they moved around the house.

CHAIRPERSON: This is the specific house which Modise had pointed out?

MR CRAUSE: Undoubtedly it was the house that he had pointed out Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So you would say the three operatives moved around the house and they were out of sight?

MR CRAUSE: Yes Chairperson, they were out of sight.

CHAIRPERSON: Is this towards the back of the house or towards the front of the house?

MR CRAUSE: Chairperson, we were to the back of the house and they went around to the front.

CHAIRPERSON: Were the lights off in the house?

MR CRAUSE: The lights were all off in the house, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you hear the operatives saying anything before you heard the window?

MR CRAUSE: No Chairperson, not at all, I heard the window breaking and then I heard the explosion.

CHAIRPERSON: And immediately after the explosion?

MR CRAUSE: I heard the automatic fire.

CHAIRPERSON: So it would seem that they went and attacked first with a handgrenade and then went into the house and fired shots inside the house?

MR CRAUSE: Absolutely Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: This all happened very quickly?

MR CRAUSE: Yes Chairperson, very quickly.

CHAIRPERSON: Did the operatives know who they had to shoot?

MR CRAUSE: I do not know Chairperson, but I would assume that they did know because Take Five and Sadie Pule was indeed mentioned there.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you see whether they saw any pictures of Pule and Take Five?

MR CRAUSE: I was not present when this was done Chairperson, I cannot confirm it therefore.

CHAIRPERSON: From this discussion, you just moved with these persons. Did you, from the discussion, did you deduce that they knew exactly who they had to kill?

MR CRAUSE: I think that the leader of the group knew who they would shoot, but he spoke in a language which I did not know, but they were just along to launch the attack.

CHAIRPERSON: The other two, did they speak in a foreign language?

MR CRAUSE: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: In a black language?

MR CRAUSE: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And the leader of the group?

MR CRAUSE: Afrikaans Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he sound like a white person?

MR CRAUSE: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You did not know the leader of this group?

MR CRAUSE: No Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it the leader that said that he shot two persons in a bed?

MR CRAUSE: The leader told me that he had shot a man and a woman who were laying in a bed.

CHAIRPERSON: What type of firearms did they have?

MR CRAUSE: Chairperson, it looked like R4's.

CHAIRPERSON: Is this the type of shots that you heard inside the house?

MR CRAUSE: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Automatic and semi-automatic?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And it is just that as you have heard it, it would seem it was only the R4? Did it not seem that there were any other shots fired?

MR CRAUSE: No Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: But it would seem that the people in the house did not fire back?

MR CRAUSE: No Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: When you accompanied the group, what specific image did you have as to what would they do?

MR CRAUSE: Chairperson, I believed that they would attack the house and that they would eliminate two MK members.

CHAIRPERSON: Pule and Take Five?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So this was in your mind that the attack was aimed at these two people and that they would be eliminated?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And as we have heard during the discussions, was it also the impression of your colleagues at the scene?

MR CRAUSE: Yes Chairperson, although we were all aware that innocent people or other people could be injured with the use of automatic firearms.

CHAIRPERSON: The attack was launched against Pule and Take Five.

MR CRAUSE: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And when you departed from the scene and the leader told you, were you under the impression that it was Take Five and Pule?

MR CRAUSE: I was absolutely under the impression that it was the two of them, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And your colleagues? When you left after the attack, were they under the same impression?

MR CRAUSE: I believe that they were under the same impression Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: But you did not form the idea that they were dissatisfied with this operation?

MR CRAUSE: Not at all Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: They were satisfied?

MR CRAUSE: Yes Chairperson, they were satisfied that these two persons had been eliminated.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, thank you. Mr Visser, have you got any re-examination?

MR VISSER: None, thank you Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Crause, you are excused, thank you very much.

APPLICATION NO: AM 4386

--------------------------------------------------------------------------ON RESUMPTION:

MR VISSER: I call Mr Du Preez Smit. You will find his amnesty application in Bundle 1 at page 186 and in his case, I also don't have a statement prepared, but his evidence is very brief.

CHRISTOFFEL JOHANNES DU PREEZ SMIT: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Smit, you have given evidence previously, you must please correct me, I forget in which amnesty application it was, was it the Nietverdiendt 10?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: No, it was the Silent Valley incident.

MR VISSER: You have had regard for Exhibit A, the general background document and you have studied it?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you are in agreement with the contents thereof?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And do you request that this be considered and be incorporated in your application?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: In 1986 you were the Branch Commander of Zeerust, is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Where were you in December, at the end of December?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: I was on leave, but I was at home Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And during the time that you were on leave, who acted in your absence?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Lieutenant Hans Wehrmann, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Please refer us back to New Year's Eve 1986, on page 195 and please tell us what you know of this incident.

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: On this New Year's Eve day I received a telephone call from Brigadier Loots with regard to the information that Sadie Pule and Take Five were at a specific house in Ramotswa, that an attack would be launched against this house that same evening and they requested that I accompany them to Nietverdiendt. At Nietverdiendt it was Brigadier Loots, myself, Wehrmann, Captain Crause, Modise and members of Special Forces also joined us.

MR VISSER: Was this on the farm?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That was on the farm at Nietverdiendt, that is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you know what was discussed there?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: I was present during the discussion, it was decided that the house would be attacked where Sadie Pule and Take Five would stay for the evening.

MR VISSER: Were you aware of who Sadie Pule and Take Five was at that stage?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you agree with the evidence of Brigadier Loots with regard to Botswana and in particular, to these two persons?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you reconcile yourself with the fact that an attack would be launched against them to kill them?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you regard them as targets?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you also realise that other persons may be killed in such an attack?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you reconcile yourself with this?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: I did Chairperson. After our departure to Ramotswa, we stopped on the South African side, right opposite Ramotswa, we arrived there and it was determined that the river had water and Modise had to point out the house. He was afraid, he did not want to go through the water and Captain Crause was told to accompany him and after they had waded through the water, I heard an explosion as well as some rifle fire. The group returned and a report was made that two persons had been shot dead in the house.

MR VISSER: This house which you mention, was it known to you at that stage?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: As what was it known to you?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Chairperson, it was a safehouse for ANC members who arrived in Ramotswe, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: A transit facility?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And as such that house could also be considered as a target without the presence of Pule and Take Five?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Was it reported to you what had happened there on the other side?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Not in detail Chairperson, but only that two persons had been killed there.

MR VISSER: Today you are not sure whether it was one or two persons and what their identities were?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: On page 196 you say that later you had heard that a citizen of Botswana was killed in the attack?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And none of the MK members, they were not present during the attack on these premises?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you request, well, you did not play any role?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Except that you accompanied them to the border?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And on those grounds you request amnesty for conspiracy to murder, perjury, etc, anything that might emanate from this act?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Visser. Mr Mohlaba, any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MOHLABA: Please, thank you Chairperson. You mentioned that this house which was attacked, could be regarded as a target even if Pule and Take Five were not there, is that correct?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct.

MR MOHLABA: Why would you regard it as a target?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: We had already received information with regards to this house, that MK members were using this house.

MR MOHLABA: When did you receive the information about the MK members living in that house, was it when you were called to a meeting at Nietverdiendt or did you acquire this information at an earlier stage?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: With regards to MK's who had used the house, I had already previously known that it was used and that day I heard of Sadie Pule and Take Five.

MR MOHLABA: Yes, can you still remember when you came to gain the knowledge that the house is used by the MK members?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Chairperson, I cannot recall the specific time, but this was, I was stationed at Zeerust during 1982 and this information came through periodically to me.

MR MOHLABA: These, let me take you back to the meeting which was held at Nietverdiendt, can you explain whether it was sort of a formal meeting which was chaired or it was just a discussion where everybody was just contributing on an informal basis?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Chairperson, no minutes were taken, Chairperson, if I can describe it as such.

MR MOHLABA: Do you remember who was, that is who introduced the matter, the reason why you were called to that farm?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: It was Brigadier Loots.

MR MOHLABA: The nature of the operation, the way it was to be carried out, was it discussed in full details at this meeting?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Not in my presence Chairperson. I would believe that the Army did their own planning and took their own decisions there.

MR MOHLABA: When you arrived at this farm, Nietverdiendt, had the discussion started already, you joined in, or when this meeting started, you were already present?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Chairperson, I could imagine that everybody was present before the discussion took place with the Army members.

MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chairperson, I've got no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Mohlaba. Ms Thabethe, have you got any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS THABETHE: Just one Mr Chairperson. Mr Smit, when you were approached to go to the place where the incident was going to take place, what was going to be your role there?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: My role?

MS THABETHE: Yes, why did you go there, what were you going to do?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Chairperson, as Captain Crause had said, it was known infiltration routes, we regularly operated along that border.

MS THABETHE: Are you saying you went there to give directions, is that what you are saying?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: No Chairperson. It was to go as a group, this was a known infiltration route. We knew that people infiltrated through that area and I think that it was because we were in a group, that if we encounter another group, we could defend ourselves.

MS THABETHE: No further questions, Mr Chair, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you armed?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: We did have arms Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yourself?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Yes, I was armed.

CHAIRPERSON: With what?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: If I recall correctly it was with an R1.

CHAIRPERSON: You were actually the Commander of Zeerust?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The other members could not give you any instructions?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So you were actually the most senior Security person at the scene?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Chairperson, except for Brigadier Loots who was my Provincial Commander.

CHAIRPERSON: The person who was acting Commander in your place, you were the most senior Zeerust Security person and he was second most senior person?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And it is, he is the one who invited you along?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: No, it was Brigadier Loots who gave me the order.

CHAIRPERSON: You did not say "it is New Year's Eve", you are on leave, are there no other members?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Chairperson, the circumstances at that stage led to the fact that this was not a strange request that while I was on leave, that I had to accompany them. I would have accompanied them any way.

CHAIRPERSON: If this house was indeed a target, what do you mean by that?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Meaning that we were aware that MK members were using the house and if at some stage, other MK members would have been in the house, the same operations would have been launched.

CHAIRPERSON: So it is not to say that you mean that you can attack the house just like you wanted, because you knew that the house was used amongst others as a transit facility, to use that term?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: But it was probably lived in by the owner?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: Let's say for instance that they were not there, this is a useful house for them, let's say it was an empty house, would you have destroyed it or could you have destroyed it?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Chairperson, if that was the plan, it could have happened. But the specific house was attacked on that day, because we had information that these people would be there. The risk of attacking an empty house in Botswana, this would entail a huge risk on our ... (tape ends) ...

ADV DE JAGER: Then you please have to explain to me, why is it more dangerous to attack an empty house that was used as a base rather than it would be more dangerous than attacking a house that had persons in?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Chairperson, the profiles of Sadie Pule and Take Five was of such a nature, they were high profile persons and that is what I base my statement on.

CHAIRPERSON: You see, the attack was launched at Pule and Take Five?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So you would not go to the house on a New Year's Eve just to attack something in Botswana?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And you also did not go to specifically attack any other people, you went there to attack those two?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: If other injuries would be dealt with to other people, would you take that risk?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The operatives of Special Forces, according to you, according to your observations, did they know what this whole action entailed?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: I believe that the person who was in command or the two others who went in, and this is my personal opinion, that they were informed as to who Sadie Pule and Take Five were, they knew what it was all about.

CHAIRPERSON: Would it not be stupid to send people in to say that they had to eliminate Pule and Take Five and then you send in people who did not know who this was, it does not make sense? Can one accept that these persons would have known who, or that the operatives had known who was to be targeted?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you speak to Charl Naude at the scene?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: We might have had a discussion.

CHAIRPERSON: What type of impression did you have, did he also know what the story entailed?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Did it seem as if he knew of Pule and Take Five?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: It would seem that he was a person who closely worked with the Security Police?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Smit.

ADV GCABASHE : I am just looking at this statement that we now call Exhibit O, the HRV statement, and in it Mr Mkwanazi says that he arrived in Botswana, paragraph 4, page 3, he says he arrived in Botswana in 1986 and ostensibly on the 16th of December 1986. My impression is that you have been monitoring his activities any way. Would this have been before the 16th of December 1986?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: I assume so Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE : So what you believe is that he did not arrive in Botswana on the 16th of December 1986, he had been there previously?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: It is possible that he arrived there on the 16th of December, I cannot comment as to when he arrived there.

ADV GCABASHE : From what he says he left South Africa and only came back to Botswana in 1986, so this was the first time he was in Botswana since 1980 when he left South Africa?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: It may be Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE : I am trying to understand your Intelligence, you know the monitoring you did, what you know about Pule and Mkwanazi, Take Five, on having just received the statement quite recently as well and from what I am seeing here, he had only been in Botswana for two weeks, and if he was going to visit his family really. So your monitoring was only a two week monitoring, that would be right?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Chairperson, I speak under correction, but long before the 16th, we were aware of him. We knew that there was a Take Five.

ADV GCABASHE : Can you recall where you would get that information from, where you gleaned that information about Take Five? I know it is long ago?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Yes, information was gathered through out the whole country and us at the Security Branch, regularly received information surrounding the movements of people who had left the country.

ADV GCABASHE : So it is not necessarily information you got during the time he was in Botswana from the 16th to the 31st?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE : Very roughly? Coming back to the meeting at Nietverdiendt, at the farm, you were privy to what was discussed by Mr Loots, the Special Forces chaps, Mr Wehrmann was there as well, was the discussion solely to go into Botswana, to go to the house and attack it? That is what the nature of the discussion was?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE : What I am trying to understand was whether there was a decision, a firm decision taken to go and kill these two targets in that house, to go and try and abduct them or whatever other alternatives might have been discussed. Was there broad discussion or just one single objective, go in and kill them? Do you recall?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: I would imagine the instruction that was conveyed to the Army was that these two people were there and that they had to be killed.

ADV GCABASHE : So that would have been Mr Loots as the most senior person in the Security Branch, because it was just these two parties there, really, and what you understood him to communicate is go in there, there are these two targets, we know them, kill them?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE : So your understanding is that Mr Naude and his team was simply carrying out an instruction from the Security Branch, but they did it the way they understood best in terms of the logistics and who would do what exactly?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Yes. The Police cannot give any instruction to the Army, the facts were put on the table before him and the message that he got was that these persons had to be killed, but we cannot give him any instruction as to "do this or do that."

ADV GCABASHE : Yes, I think that is where my difficulty is because I am trying to and maybe it is not possible to decide on who gave, or who decided that they should be killed, rather than abducted or whatever else, that is really what I am trying to understand here. I understand you to say that you couldn't give them an order to do a particular thing, but they went in to kill people. Who made that final decision, that is really what I am trying to understand, to kill and not to abduct or whatever else?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Chairperson, I cannot say who specifically gave the order, but I can say that it was a joint decision.

ADV GCABASHE : Of course the question of abduction was not discussed at all?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE : Just to get that one out of the way. Thank you. Thank you Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Your behaviour was actually initiated by the Security Police?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Not Special Forces?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: As you understood it, what was the wish of the Security Police?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That Sadie Pule and Take Five had to be killed Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And that is what you understood from your discussion with Mr Loots?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: That is what it handled about that evening, that you must come along?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Any re-examination Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: None, thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Smit, you are excused.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, may I be permitted to refer to a matter which I raised with you in Chambers this morning and this afternoon in the presence of my learned friends, and Ms Thabethe, concerning the witness Modise. Chairperson, you heard the evidence of Loots that he received information from Mr Modise on Old Year's Day 1986 and that he with his permission went and spoke to his source, to confirm the information which was that Sadie Pule and Take Five would stay over in a particular house that night. Mr Crause gave evidence as to what role Mr Modise fulfilled on the evening in question and that was to go and point out a house which he says he did in his company. May I respectfully submit Chairperson, that it does not seem, unless there is something else, there does not seem to be any compelling reason why Mr Modise should be called personally to give evidence? The reason why I say all of this Chairperson, is that Mr Modise is a retired Officer of the South African Police, he was a member of the Security Branch and he lives in a black neighbourhood and he has certain fears, very real fears, that harm might come to him and his family or their possessions, should his identity become known and certain things have happened here today, which we informed you about, which strengthens that feeling of his. We would ask you Mr Chairperson, this has happened before, in similar circumstances, where other witnesses had given evidence, which really covered the evidence that a particular applicant can give, whether you would not be prepared to excuse him from giving evidence before you? Unless there is a special reason why he should?

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, but his identity is known, it has been mentioned here, his role had been mentioned. I believe even the proposed victims or one of them at least, is present, so he has been identified? Isn't the harm done?

MR VISSER: It may well be Chairperson, but as we sit here until now, we are not aware of any photographs having been taken of him, he hasn't been on television cameras. Once he steps into the witness box, all that will change and it will certainly increase the danger if there is a danger right now, it will certainly increase it. We didn't think it was a situation where we should ask you for a hearing to be held in camera because in any event the victims or their relations are entitled to attend in camera hearings. It is only in that event, from our understanding of Section 33 that you could make an order in terms of Section 22, that no photographs or other identifying information be made available. Chairperson, I place it before you, he has a concern and we would follow whatever directions you give obviously.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Visser, we obviously are sensitive to all these kind of questions that do arise around these proceedings. We obviously want to, as far as it is possible and within our authority, our statutory authority, to be of assistance. We have given the matter some thought pursuant to our earlier discussion and there are some aspects of the application of Mr Modise on which my panel would like to hear him on. He had made out a case on paper which in a sense personalises his application in some respects, my attention has been drawn to certain sections of his application, so you know, in this particular instance, it appears that he is not just one of those people that can just sort of tag along, that wouldn't really add very much to the enquiry. That is something that weighed with us and we had thought that if the question that you raised, which is also a very serious one, does not totally outweigh the other considerations, we would prefer to hear him. In fact we also had a debate whether we had statutory authority to actually release him, but that might not necessary to argue that at this stage.

MR VISSER: That is why I prefaced my remarks to you by saying unless there is something that you want to specifically hear from him. Once that is so, well then Chairperson, then I call him as a witness. He will address the Committee in Tswana.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you Mr Visser, is Mr Modise here? Yes?

MR PRINSLOO: Excuse me Mr Chairperson, are we going to continue with the other case still today?

CHAIRPERSON: No, I am sorry, I didn't keep my eye on you. I did indicate to you that we will not expect you to sit here all day long, if it is clear that we will not reach you, but we can excuse you at this stage. We will adjourn until half past nine tomorrow morning, so you may return tomorrow morning. Very well. Mr Modise, perhaps if you could put on the headphones so that you can hear the translation. Mr Modise, we just want to check whether you can hear, do you hear the translation?

INTERPRETER: He can hear me clearly.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wagener, can you just help him to - can you give your full name for the record please.

MR MODISE: Moses Mohalani Modise.

MOSES MOHALANI MODISE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may sit down Mr Modise. All right Mr Visser?

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Modise, you are an applicant for amnesty before this Committee, is that correct?

MR MODISE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And it concerns a matter which occurred on Old Year's Eve of 1986 at Ramotswa in Botswana?

MR MODISE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you have your amnesty application before you, at page 178 of Bundle 1, Chairperson.

MR MODISE: Yes, I can see it.

MR VISSER: Is that the application which you handed in to the Amnesty Committee and which you signed?

MR MODISE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And are the particulars contained therein, to the best of your knowledge true and correct?

MR MODISE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Have you - has Exhibit A been discussed with you and explained to you, that is the background document? I am just told by my Attorney that that is not relevant here Chairperson. During 1986, is it correct that there was a struggle going on in this country and that people were fighting with each other?

MR MODISE: That is so sir.

MR VISSER: Yes, and is it correct that the ANC/SACP alliance attempted to overthrow the then government?

MR MODISE: That is true.

MR VISSER: And did you as a Security Policeman consider it your duty to fight that revolutionary onslaught?

MR MODISE: That is true.

MR VISSER: Now what happened at the time that gave rise to this incident, Mr Modise?

MR MODISE: I got information that there are some people in a house at Ramotswa and I told my colleague, which was my Station Commander about this.

MR VISSER: That you got information about?

MR MODISE: It was my informer, my source.

MR VISSER: What did your informer tell you?

MR MODISE: He or she told me that there were freedom fighters in Ramotswa at a certain house.

MR VISSER: Can you remember the names of those freedom fighters?

MR MODISE: Yes, it was Sadie Pule and Take Five.

MR VISSER: And what were they going to do at that house?

MR MODISE: They were staying there.

MR VISSER: Were they going to stay there that night?

MR MODISE: According to my source, they have been staying there, but they were going to be there that night.

MR VISSER: Who was your Commander that you spoke about, that you told about this information?

MR MODISE: I told Lieutenant Wehrmann.

MR VISSER: All right, and what happened after that?

MR MODISE: After having told him, he contacted Brigadier Loots and shared the news. They asked me to go to my source and to establish these facts.

MR VISSER: Yes, what happened then?

MR MODISE: We arranged a meeting and he told them exactly what he or she had told me.

MR VISSER: That is the source told Brigadier Loots and Lieutenant Wehrmann what he had already told you? Is that what you are saying?

MR MODISE: Yes, I was in their company when he or she told them.

MR VISSER: What happened as far as you are concerned, what happened thereafter?

MR MODISE: We went to the office and I was no longer at their side, but they made a call and thereafter they told me to come to Nietverdiendt.

MR VISSER: Did you go?

MR MODISE: Yes, I did go.

MR VISSER: What happened there?

MR MODISE: On my arrival at Nietverdiendt, I found Brigadier Loots and Colonel Smit and Lieutenant Wehrmann and three other black men and two other white men.

MR VISSER: What was discussed there?

MR MODISE: On my arrival I was told that "these are the men who are going to carry out the operation that we were discussing during the day, they don't want to make any mistakes, therefore they want you to go out and point out this house."

MR VISSER: What did you understand that operation to be?

MR MODISE: According to my understanding, I saw that they were determined to attack this house and with the intention of finding Take Five and Sadie Pule.

MR VISSER: What to do with them?

MR MODISE: The intention might have been to kill them, but they were targeted because they gave South Africa trouble.

MR VISSER: Yes, so you realised that the operation included possibly killing Sadie Pule and Take Five?

MR MODISE: Yes, it is so.

MR VISSER: Did you also believe that other people might get injured or killed in such an operation?

MR MODISE: I didn't have that in my mind, it did not cross my mind.

MR VISSER: Just to go back one step, you told us who you remembered who were present and you said Loots, Smit and Wehrmann. Can you remember whether Mr Crause was there as well?

MR MODISE: He had not arrived yet.

MR VISSER: I see, all right. So what happened after this discussion and after your understanding was formed, what happened then?

MR MODISE: In the evening, we went on board a casspir and we drove towards the border.

MR VISSER: You were now going to point out the house, is that correct?

MR MODISE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you go and point out the house?

MR MODISE: Yes, I did.

MR VISSER: Yes, did you see Mr Crause there?

MR MODISE: Whilst we were still at Nietverdiendt, he arrived and he came with. He was also present when we left for the border.

MR VISSER: At the border, did he do anything?

MR MODISE: The river was full and I was scared because I cannot swim. On arrival at the border, he was given instructions by Brigadier Loots to help me cross the river as I was scared of swimming.

MR VISSER: All right, when you got to the other side, did you then go and point out the house to the Special Forces' people?

MR MODISE: Yes, I did that.

MR VISSER: Are you certain that you pointed out the correct house?

MR MODISE: Yes, I showed them the right house.

MR VISSER: What happened then if you can remember?

MR MODISE: When we got there, I pointed the house and the one white gentleman took me and Mr Crause and he told us to keep a distance, to stay in hiding and once his mission is over, he will come for us.

MR VISSER: This person, was he also a Policeman? This person and the others that went with you and Crause, were they Policemen or what were they?

MR MODISE: I do not think so, I did not know him, it was the first time seeing him.

MR VISSER: All right. What did you see happen at the house?

MR MODISE: As we were laying there, I heard a very loud explosion and I got very frightened and I heard some fires being shot extremely, and I got very scared and frightened.

MR VISSER: You said you heard some fires being shot, what are you trying to say?

MR MODISE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Gunfire?

MR MODISE: Yes, it was gunfire. Firstly it was a high explosive, I am not sure whether it is a bomb or a grenade and thereafter it was gunshots.

MR VISSER: All right, did you see the people come back to you then that went to the house?

MR MODISE: Thereafter they came to us and told us we must go.

MR VISSER: All right, did they say anything else about what happened in the house?

MR MODISE: I was so frightened that I didn't want to hear anything. We just proceeded back.

MR VISSER: Right, and is that all that you had to do with this incident?

MR MODISE: There is nothing else other than that.

MR VISSER: And you were involved in it because you were ordered by Brigadier Loots to go and point out the house?

MR MODISE: That is true.

MR VISSER: Did you think that you had to obey that order as part of your duties?

MR MODISE: There was no alternative, I had to obey the order, whether you like it or not.

MR VISSER: And the attack as you understood it, was against supporters or members of the ANC, is that correct?

MR MODISE: That is true.

MR VISSER: Who was the enemy of the previous government?

MR MODISE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Visser. Mr Mohlaba, questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MOHLABA: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Modise, did you before this incident know Sadie Pule and Take Five?

MR MODISE: No, I did not know them.

MR MOHLABA: And have you, did you hear those names before, other than knowing them personally, the names?

MR MODISE: Yes, I knew about their names and their operations through the other reports that we got from other stations.

MR MOHLABA: After you had obtained information from your informer, you said you passed it to Lieutenant Wehrmann, is that correct?

MR MODISE: That is true.

MR MOHLABA: Can you remember when did you communicate this information to Lieutenant Wehrmann?

MR MODISE: It was in the morning, just after nine o'clock. It was on the 31st of December 1986.

MR MOHLABA: And where was that, that is were you with Lieutenant Wehrmann in one place or did you communicate that information to him telephonically?

MR MODISE: I met my source and then I told my source to wait for me whilst I go and hand over this information and hear what my Commanders have to say.

MR MOHLABA: And you went to meet your Commander, is that correct?

MR MODISE: That is correct.

MR MOHLABA: Where did you meet this Commander of yours?

MR MODISE: In the office.

MR MOHLABA: Where, where, is it in Botswana or South Africa?

MR MODISE: In Zeerust.

MR MOHLABA: The identity of your informer, can you disclose it?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, with great respect, it is not a question that is ...

MR MODISE: No, I cannot.

MR MOHLABA: Thank you.

MR VISSER: I am sorry, if I may interrupt, it is not that he doesn't know who it is, he knows who the identity is, but he says he can't disclose the identity for other reasons, as long as that is understood by my learned friend. He knows who it is of course.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that seems to be the (indistinct) of the answer. You've got that Mr Mohlaba?

MR MOHLABA: Yes, thank you Chair. Is there any reason why you cannot disclose the name of this person?

MR MODISE: It won't help us to reveal that person.

MR MOHLABA: I believe that it will assist the victims to know the truth and it will also assist you to pass the full disclosure test.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Mohlaba, we have already heard that this witness, according to what his Counsel said, he is worried about his own safety. Should we really involve the threat of the safety of another man also and there was a number of applications for informers to be disclosed on various sides, and there was a ruling that informers' names wouldn't be disclosed. I think for the safety of this person, I would ask you, but if you want to make a formal application, you could do so.

MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair, I was not aware of such a ruling, I am indebted to the Chair. When did you receive information from this informer of yours?

MR MODISE: It was on the 31st of December 1986.

MR MOHLABA: Can you explain to the Committee how it came about, did you go to this informer and solicit certain information or the informer came to you and volunteered information to you?

MR MODISE: He telephoned me for a meeting and we did meet and that is when he gave me all the details which I forwarded.

MR MOHLABA: And you mentioned that the information was that certain, there were freedom fighters in a particular house there. Were these freedom fighters mentioned by name?

MR MODISE: He said it is freedom fighters, but I went to pick up a photo album so that he should be able to point them out to me.

MR MOHLABA: So you had photographs of - whose photo's did you have in that photo album?

MR MODISE: In that photo album Take Five was in there and Sadie Pule.

MR MOHLABA: So the photo's of Take Five and Sadie were pointed out to you by your informer, is that correct?

MR MODISE: Yes, he pointed them out.

MR MOHLABA: You then went to your office in Zeerust and spoke to Lieutenant Wehrmann about that, is that correct?

MR MODISE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: I am sorry, whilst you are on that point, how many freedom fighters did the informer tell you were in this particular house?

MR MODISE: He said there were two.

CHAIRPERSON: And he then pointed out Take Five and Sadie Pule from the album?

MR MODISE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, sorry Mr Mohlaba.

MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chair. I was still asking you that you subsequently went to your office in Zeerust and communicated the information to Lieutenant Wehrmann, is that correct?

MR MODISE: That is correct.

MR MOHLABA: Was it Lieutenant Wehrmann alone that you talked to about this incident?

MR MODISE: When I told him this, he was alone.

MR MOHLABA: Do you know whether somebody else was subsequently told that in your presence that is, you say when you told him, he was alone, but did somebody come and join you?

MR MODISE: Brigadier Loots came and he told him.

MR MOHLABA: Whilst you were there?

MR MODISE: Yes, I was present.

MR MOHLABA: And you mentioned that you were sent back to your informer to go and verify certain things, is that correct?

MR MODISE: No. Firstly I had come to tell Lieutenant Wehrmann that my source had pointed out these people and whilst we were busy talking, Brigadier Loots arrived and Brigadier Loots requested that we all go to my source so that he should personally enquire from my source and I agreed.

CHAIRPERSON: I am sorry Mr Mohlaba to interrupt, when your source pointed out these two people in the photo album, did you know who they were?

MR MODISE: ... (tape ends) ... when I checked them out, I realised that they were well known people, I only knew their names. I but I didn't link the names and the faces at that time.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh, I see, so you had heard these names Take Five and Sadie Pule, but you didn't realise that it was them when this source pointed out these two people in the photo album, would that be correct?

MR MODISE: I only knew about them.

CHAIRPERSON: You didn't know when the photographs were pointed out by the source, you didn't know them oh, he is pointing out Take Five and Sadie Pule?

MR MODISE: When he pointed them, I knew that it was Sadie Pule and Take Five, in the album there are names written as well, so when he pointed them out, I knew then.

CHAIRPERSON: You had to look up the names in the index?

MR MODISE: That is correct, I had to look up the names in the index of the album.

CHAIRPERSON: ... could he give you the names or what?

MR MODISE: He knew them in any other way he or she might have, he knew them facially. He just pointed them out.

CHAIRPERSON: ... know their names, is that right?

MR MODISE: He knew Take Five, he knew them, both of them. They were known to him or her.

CHAIRPERSON: ... the question, did he give their names to you?

MR MODISE: He just pointed them with a finger.

ADV DE JAGER: Before he saw the photo's, could he, did he come to you and say I have seen two MK members there, I know them, the one's name is this and the other one's name is this, or didn't he?

MR MODISE: No, he did not mention their names, he just said there are two people staying at such a house. That is when I fetched the photo album and he or she then pointed them out and I discovered their names in the index.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he get paid for that sort of thing if he comes to you with information about freedom fighters, do you pay him?

MR MODISE: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Didn't you pay him for the information he brings to you?

MR MODISE: I never gave him or her anything.

CHAIRPERSON: So this wasn't a paid informer?

MR MODISE: No, I have never seen him or her being paid anything.

CHAIRPERSON: All right, perhaps you wouldn't know. Mr Mohlaba?

MR MOHLABA: Thank you Chairperson. Did you try and establish how did your source know that these two persons were freedom fighters?

MR MODISE: I had told him or her to find out if there are any freedom fighters that he might have spotted or not, because they were called refugees then. They didn't call them freedom fighters, they called them refugees.

MR MOHLABA: So in other words you went to this source and asked this source to be on the look out for refugees so that he or she could come and advise you, is that correct?

MR MODISE: That is correct.

MR MOHLABA: You were still telling us about Lieutenant Wehrmann and Brigadier Loots requesting to go and meet with your source. Did you subsequently go and meet your source?

MR MODISE: Yes, I did.

MR MOHLABA: And can you recall the time approximately when you met with the source?

MR MODISE: If I can recall clearly, it might have been eleven o'clock.

MR MOHLABA: Where did you meet with this source?

MR MODISE: In the Zeerust vicinity.

MR MOHLABA: Was it in an office or in the veld, can you explain?

MR MODISE: It was just in the open veld.

MR MOHLABA: And this source was interviewed by, was he or she interviewed?

MR MODISE: He was questioned by Brigadier Loots.

MR MOHLABA: Thank you, I've got no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Mohlaba. Ms Thabethe, any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS THABETHE: Yes, Mr Chair, thank you. Mr Modise, you speak about an album that you saw or that your source identified Take Five and Sadie Pule, what was this album about, why were their photo's in that album?

MR MODISE: It is an album of people who went for military training and they would come back fully trained and fight inside the country.

MS THABETHE: So would it be correct for me to say they were wanted people?

MR MODISE: Yes, in other words they were wanted.

MS THABETHE: You also say, you have also testified that when you received the information about the so-called refugees, you went to Wehrmann, you reported this to Wehrmann, what was his response?

MR MODISE: I went in there, told him and showed him the photo album and we all knew that they were freedom fighters.

MS THABETHE: No my question was, what was his response? What did he say when you showed him this, these photo's and when you told him what the informer had told you?

MR MODISE: He rejoiced and he decided to phone Brigadier Loots, but fortunately he had just walked in, Brigadier Loots, and that is when he shared the news with him.

MS THABETHE: Thank you Mr Chair, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Modise, that first meeting with the source, just remind me, where did that take place?

MR MODISE: We met in the Zeerust vicinity.

CHAIRPERSON: In the Republic of South Africa?

MR MODISE: Yes, in the South African Republic.

CHAIRPERSON: And your subsequent meeting where Loots was also present, was that also in the Zeerust vicinity?

MR MODISE: Yes sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Also in the Republic?

MR MODISE: Yes sir, also in the Republic.

CHAIRPERSON: What did the source tell you about the whereabouts of these refugees, the two refugees?

MR MODISE: He or she told me that they are staying at such and such a house.

CHAIRPERSON: What does that mean, stay at such and such a house? What did the source tell you?

MR MODISE: It was a house in Botswana.

CHAIRPERSON: Where, where in Botswana, exactly what did he tell you, or she tell you? What did he or she tell you?

MR MODISE: He or she told me that there were two refugees who were staying in a house at Ramotswa in Botswana.

CHAIRPERSON: ... is that a town?

MR MODISE: It is a village.

CHAIRPERSON: In Botswana?

MR MODISE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Where in the village, what did he tell you?

MR MODISE: Yes, it is a village in Botswana.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but what did he or she tell you, where in this village or did he just say in the village of whatever the name is?

MR MODISE: He or she had drawn a sketch showing directions from the Botswana border and he told me that I will have to pass a (indistinct) on the road and walk 500 metres or so and the house will be on the right hand side, it is the first house on the right hand side.

CHAIRPERSON: So you didn't know where this house was, he or she had to explain to you?

MR MODISE: Yes, he or she had explained to me precisely where the house is so that I should be sure.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he or she give you a sketch or did he or she just explain to you how to get to this house?

MR MODISE: He or she drew a sketch for me about the exact location of the house.

CHAIRPERSON: You have never been to this particular house before in your life, would that be correct?

MR MODISE: I had never been there before, but when he showed me with his sketch, I realised where the house is because I am familiar with the Ramotswa village.

CHAIRPERSON: So you then on the strength of what this informer or source had told you, and on the strength of the sketch, you then went to point out a house in the dark, is that right?

MR MODISE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: How did you know it was the right house?

MR MODISE: It is the house because he or she told me it is the first house on your right hand side.

CHAIRPERSON: ... right house, I am trying to test that.

MR MODISE: It had a wire fencing as he or she had described it. Also it was built of iron zinc.

CHAIRPERSON: Corrugated iron?

INTERPRETER: Yes, corrugated iron sheets, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: So you then went on this information and how close did you get to this house that you pointed out eventually?

MR MODISE: I stood by the gate when I pointed it out, right at the gate and I told them this is the house.

CHAIRPERSON: Was Crause with you?

MR MODISE: Yes, he was with me.

CHAIRPERSON: At the gate?

MR MODISE: Yes, he was with me at the gate.

CHAIRPERSON: What did these - let me first ask you, how many were they, the others that were with you and Crause, how many were they?

MR MODISE: They were three.

CHAIRPERSON: Three? So what did they then do when you pointed the house out?

MR MODISE: After pointing the house out, they took me and Crause and left us at a distance from the house.

CHAIRPERSON: I am sorry, I am going to have to just, you said - I think you were trying to explain that you went somewhere else. I am going to go back. When you pointed out the house to these three, what happened then?

MR MODISE: The white man who was with the others, he took me and Mr Crause and left us at some distance from the house. He instructed us to stay there until he is finished with his mission and he will come and fetch us.

CHAIRPERSON: When he walked with you and Mr Crause, what did the other two that were with him, what did they do?

MR MODISE: When he went back, I heard a very high explosive, it sounded like it was a handgrenade and then I heard gunshots.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Modise, did you want to see anybody killed there on that scene?

MR MODISE: No, I did not want to see anybody killed.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you, what were you thinking, were you involved in some political fight at that time, was that part of a political fight that you were fighting, your actions?

MR MODISE: It was a political fight.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you have political enemies at that time?

MR MODISE: I was a Policeman.

CHAIRPERSON: I am asking you now, you can tell us, did you have any, you Mr Modise, did you have any political enemies at that time?

MR MODISE: Yes, I was a Security man and nobody wanted nor liked Security men at that time.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I am not talking about it from the other side, I am talking from your own side, the way you saw things, did you have any, did you regard any other people as your political enemies perhaps to make it more clear?

MR MODISE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Which people?

MR MODISE: Freedom fighters.

CHAIRPERSON: You regarded freedom fighters as your political enemy?

MR MODISE: That is true.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you know whether anybody was killed in this particular house?

MR MODISE: I heard reports that there was somebody who died.

CHAIRPERSON: Who was that, was that a freedom fighter or who was that? Was it part of your enemy or who was it that died?

MR MODISE: I do not know. I do not know the person.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh, you don't know the identity of the person who got killed?

MR MODISE: I heard thereafter that it was the owner of the house that was killed.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you have anything against that particular person?

MR MODISE: No sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you regard that person as your political enemy?

MR MODISE: No sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps they have asked you but perhaps I must just ask you again, did you expect that people could get killed here or not?

MR MODISE: Please repeat your question.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you expect that people would get killed in this incident?

MR MODISE: Yes, I was expecting that possibility.

CHAIRPERSON: All right, thank you.

ADV GCABASHE : Thank you Chair. Just two brief issues. The one, Mr Modise, stems from my reading of Exhibit O, the report you got from your source was that these two refugees had been staying in this house for a while and I would call that for about two weeks, is that what you were told?

MR MODISE: I do not know how long had they stayed in that house, but I just learnt that there were refugees staying there.

ADV GCABASHE : Staying there, but the report was not that they had just arrived, would spend the night and would be leaving the next day, I just want to be absolutely clear about the report?

MR MODISE: No, that is not what I heard.

ADV GCABASHE : Okay, now the other area is the area of the political motive, political objective, if you look at page 181 of Volume 1, Bundle 1, your statement, paragraph 6 and 7 thereof and if you just read that very quickly.

MR MODISE: To fight for the right for myself, my family and the general public, to carry on existing in South Africa as our forefathers had lived, with special reference to our heritage, background, culture and political lifestyle.

ADV GCABASHE : Point 7?

MR MODISE: To try to conserve everything that was created on the South African soil and to see to it that the status quo continues.

ADV GCABASHE : ... the question is when I read that, I wasn't sure I understood what you meant by this. If you could just help me understand what you, Mr Modise, means by this, if anything at all, I don't know. What are you saying to us essentially here?

MR MODISE: To fight for the right for myself and my family and the general public, to carry on existing as our forefathers had lived.

ADV GCABASHE : Please explain what you mean by this, that is all, in your own words, what is it that you are saying to us about your political objective and what is stated here, just help me out.

MR MODISE: I was fighting against all the unrest in order to bring peace, people shouldn't be killed any more.

ADV GCABASHE : By preserving the South African State as it was in 1986, you felt you were fighting to preserve peace and avoid unrest, is this what you are saying? That is what you believed then?

MR MODISE: That is true.

ADV GCABASHE : The culture, the political life style, all of that, those were things that you wanted to maintain at that particular time of history, you wanted to maintain those things you had, the position you were in at that time?

MR MODISE: Yes, at that time.

ADV GCABASHE : But you are also saying that you were acting as a Policeman, you are saying those two things. You were also executing your duties as a Policeman?

MR MODISE: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE : And there isn't the one thing that was valued higher by you than the other, your job or your motivation that you were happy with the status quo as it was and believed that you wanted to maintain it, is there a sense of which had greater value, a sense of priorities at all? No?

MR MODISE: I just wanted to bring peace.

ADV GCABASHE : Thank you Mr Modise, thank you Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Any re-examination Mr Visser?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Just one question, Mr Chairperson, thank you with your leave. Was it within your knowledge that the ANC/SACP regarded Policemen as legitimate targets to be killed?

MR MODISE: That is so sir.

MR VISSER: Did that then make them your enemy as well?

MR MODISE: That is true sir.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Visser. Mr Modise, thank you very much, you are excused.

MR VISSER: Might he be excused from further attendance Chairperson, he comes from rather far and he is being fetched every day and it would save some expenses if he could. Those are all the witnesses, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that is in order. We will adjourn and reconvene at half past nine tomorrow morning.