MR VISSER: Perhaps I should start the ball rolling. Mr Chairman, before we go on with Ndaba's matter, you have been informed that there is another part-heard matter before Your Lordship's brother, Justice Mall, which was generally referred to in these hearings as the Quarry Road incident. In that matter Mr Webster appears for the family of the victims, or for some of the families of the victims and he anticipated that he wanted to call a witness called Breytenbach who was the Commander of the Reaction Forces during the chase in which 4 people were killed, for which amnesty is now being sought by South Africans and that matter stood down, Mr Chairman, until after the conclusion of the Ndaba and Shabalala matter. Mr Webster can inform you himself of what his position is, but he informed us this morning that he will not be able to proceed immediately, for reasons which he no doubt will tell you about. He spoke to us this morning and we told him and we told you in chambers, Mr Chairman, that that matter should properly be postponed awaiting Justice Mall's recuperation, by reason of the fact that the application has really been concluded for all practical purposes. The only evidence outstanding is that which Mr Webster might wish to call and seeing that matters of credibility have been raised during the hearing, Mr Chairman, it would be invidious for yourself to be placed in a position where you have to make credibility findings in that hearing.

Therefore, Mr Chairman, we will have no objection to the proposal by Mr Webster that the matter be postponed awaiting the come back of Justice Mall.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Webster, do you wish to say anything further? Or perhaps I could say something before you do. As I understand it from the discussion we had in chambers, you have not had an opportunity as yet of interviewing this potential witness. He is someone who would have to be subpoenaed, but I suggested and I suggest again that if the matter is now adjourned, you should endeavour to make contact with him, through his legal advisers, if he has them, to decide finally whether you wish to call him or not and if having had the opportunity of consulting with him, you do not propose to call him as a witness, I would then request that you inform the Committee because the matter would then, as I understand it, not require any further hearing and arrangements could then be made for argument to be delivered in writing. Do you agree with that suggestion?

MR WEBSTER: I agree with that, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: All that remains is to adjourn the matter to a date. Adjourn it sine die.

MR LAX: Perhaps he could tell us by Monday.

MR VISSER: We were informed, Mr Chairman that there is a statement that has been obtained from the witness Breytenbach and we would just like to have a copy of that before Mr Webster leaves with that, if it pleases you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I think it's already been made available to the Committee hasn't it?

MS THABETHE: Mr Chair, we only have one copy and we had a problem with the photocopier yesterday, that's why we couldn't make it available.

CHAIRPERSON: The Committee will make it available to you.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Webster can leave without waiting for them to mend the photocopy machine. When do you think you'll be able to give us any information, do you know how long it would take?

MR WEBSTER: Monday, I think Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, if you endeavour to let us know by Monday, we'd be grateful. Thank you.

MR WEBSTER: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: And the matter is adjourned sine die.

We now revert to the matter that we were concerned with yesterday and the cross-examination of Mr Maharaj will continue.

MR VISSER: May it please you, Mr Chairman.

SEPTEMBER ...(indistinct) MAHARAJ: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: (cont.)

Mr Maharaj, just to recoup. Yesterday at the adjournment my understanding of your evidence was to the effect that the applicants have come to this Committee with a concocted story about the reasons why Messrs Ndaba and Shabalala were killed and you stated that part of the reason why you said that it was a concocted story was because in your belief Mr Ndaba could not have been an informer of the Security Branch. Have I got that right?

MR MAHARAJ: Yes.

MR VISSER: In part you relied on some documents which you handed in yesterday to prove the point that Mr Ndaba could not, or would probably not have been an informer and I refer to Exhibit J. Is that correct?

MR MAHARAJ: That's right.

MR VISSER: Now we have had the opportunity of last night, reading through Exhibit J and I want to direct your attention specifically to Exhibit J 1 and I want you to explain to us very briefly by way of summary again, why you say Exhibit J1 proves that Mr Ndaba could not have been, or probably wasn't an informer of the Security Branch. Can you just summarise your viewpoint to us?

MR MAHARAJ: Thank you. Chairperson, my contention has not been that J 1 on its own should be seen as standing alone. What I've done is to put a set of documents which have a time sequence to it. That time sequence starts with J 1, which is the 14th of February 1988. The significance of J 1 is that it has a column on the front page which says who has submitted the report and the code number of the source. J 1 source is P 1666. What that report does is it identifies Charles Ndaba and has reference numbers which show that as at February he was a potential target of interest to the South African Security Forces and (b) that his reference numbers show that there was no indication that he was at that stage working for the South African Security Services. That's as far as that goes with the addition that I made that if we look at page 11, and in particular I drew attention to paragraph 41 where I said certain people's names appearing there were clearly marked as not of security interest. There were other instances in the same document, but not in that clause, which refer to agents with PN reference numbers.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: And Charles Ndaba has two reference numbers in addition to what appeared earlier in the document, one is the "Afdelings" reference number which has a PNV with a set of numbers which have slashes. That is the reference number of the division. The second reference number is a VHK and that I have looked at last night and tried to locate it from my knowledge of previous documents and work, is the "Veiligheids Hoofkwartier" reference number, and what is important there is it has an S prefix. The S prefix has a clue in this document in paragraph 40 where you will see that the ANC, Inkatha, and United Democratic Front have files beginning with S but they have a second number. A first number which distinguishes them, for e.g. the ANC has S9 and the Inkatha Freedom Party has S2229 and UDF has S 13. So that is as far as I had gone with J1, but J 1 must be seen together with the other documents.

MR VISSER: But just confining ourselves to J 1 at the moment. What you've just told me is that there are basically 3 reasons why you say J1 shows that Mr Ndaba was not an informer. The one is he's identified as a target. The second point is that there is no reference in that document, J 1 to show that he was an informer and thirdly at page 11 next to his name, it is not stated "not for security interest".

MR MAHARAJ: Yes and a fourth point that there is a commentary by Capt Botha attached to that report which begins at paragraph 37, Capt Botha as a processor of that report would have found a way, if Charles Ndaba was at that time his informant, to find a way to begin to secure his safety. By the comments that he's put, he has a comment starting 37. On paragraph 37.6 he deals with the identification of Charles Ndaba from a photograph. It is his comments I understand, that go through from paragraph 36 onwards to almost the end of the document. So if he was at that time the handler of Charles Ndaba, he would have found a way through his comments, to begin to disguise or shift attention from Charles Ndaba, or that's what I would have done.

MR VISSER: Alright. Now we're going to deal with those four issues, Mr Maharaj. First of all, just to bring some clarity in regard to what Exhibit J 1 purports to be. Would you agree with me that during the conflict of the past, one of the ways of dissemination information of Security interests was by way of Security reports made by the various divisions to Headquarters to be disseminated to other Security Branches who might have an interest in that information? You would agree with that Gen Steyn.

MR MAHARAJ: Yes, I would agree with that but that's within the Security establishment.

MR VISSER: Yes, obviously. This J 1 purports to be exactly such a security report. Would you agree with me that what this document professes is that Sgt Wasserman was the person who handed in the report?

MR MAHARAJ: That's what the document says.

MR VISSER: That's what it says. And that the report concerns information which he received from an informer whom he identifies as PN 666.

MR MAHARAJ: No, 664.

MR VISSER: No, Mr Maharaj, just look.

MR MAHARAJ: Oh, code number of source, yes.

MR VISSER: 666

MR MAHARAJ: Yes, right.

MR VISSER: And it concerns ANC activities in Durban and Swaziland and in the right-hand column, I put it to you that those Security Branches are the ones that it was thought would have an interest in the information. Would you accept that?

MR MAHARAJ: Yes.

MR VISSER: Alright. Now in paragraph 1 on that page, there's a reference to "Beruggewer PN 664".

MR MAHARAJ: Yes.

MR VISSER: And in parenthesis behind that there's B2 which is the rating of the value and reliability of the informer, you can take that for granted, but it has a reference to Maj A R C Taylor, which seems to suggest that that particular informer was the informer handled by Col Taylor, Major at the time. You would agree with that?

MR MAHARAJ: That would be a reasonable deduction.

MR VISSER: Alright. The report itself starts with paragraph 2, with a synopsis. The synopsis is given, obviously by Wasserman, dealing with what the report was and that report one finds at paragraph 3, at page 3. You would agree with that? So he's giving a summary,

MR MAHARAJ: Yes.

MR VISSER: Of the contents of paragraph 32, page 9, I believe it is, page 9 paragraph 35. That is what the PN 666 tells him and he now deals in paragraph 2 with the summary of that for the convenience of the reader, one would imagine. Alright. Paragraph 2.1. he starts off by summarising the information by saying that on the 12th of February 1988, PN 666 visited Swaziland in order to make a report on behalf of one MK Lucky and to receive instructions from the ANC Natal Machinery. So that is pretty obvious.

CHAIRPERSON: What paragraph is this?

MR VISSER: This is paragraph 2.1. Mr Chairman, when it's in parenthesis, I'm simply going to refer to it as 2.1 instead of, unless you, perhaps I should more accurately refer to it as 2(1). Mr Commissioner Lax certainly doesn't like that suggestion, so I'll refer to it as 2.1 That's at page 1 of Exhibit J 1, and he goes on to say from paragraph 2.2 onwards, gives a summary of what this man told him happened to him. He reported at the tavern hotel, he telephoned certain Mdu (M-D-U), which is identified as Mduduzi (M-D-U-D-U-Z-I) Milletus (M-I-L-L-E-T-U-S) Radebe (R-A-D-E-B-E), I'm informed one pronounces it Gadebe.

MR MAHARAJ: It depends whether it's Zulu or Xhosa.

MR VISSER: Well, I wouldn't know. But a reference number is given S4/44328, which obviously refers to Mr Radebe. Okay. Now if I may pause there to inform you what I have been instructed in regard to the abbreviations or the letters preceding numbers etc in this document. I am told that the S prefix refers to Security Headquarters. I am referred to also, that the initials F A, Freddy Allen if I may put it that way, refers to Photo album. That album is an album which contained hundreds if not thousands of photographs of people suspected of being ANC MK SACP Azapo, Azano supporters which were all in a bundle for purposes of identification. I'm informed that wherever there's a reference to NGN, November George November, NGN, it stands for "Nie geidentifiseer nie", loosely translated as not identified. And then you will find, Mr Maharaj, as you no doubt have observed, in the document there are references to V for victory as a prefix to other letters and numbers and you will sometimes find a V1 or a V2 or a V3 or a V4. Now I am told that what that represents is "Veiligheid" or Security and the 1 was the category dealing with whites. V2 was the category dealing with coloureds, V3 was the category dealing with Indian people and V4 was the category dealing with blacks, so that if you had a reference to a file and it was a black person, it would then in the division itself be referred to as V4 etc etc.

Precisely the same obtained as regard to Security Head Office references. The S would be followed by the equivalent of 1, 2, 3, 4, denoting exactly the same categorisation, according to race. So in this document or in these documents Exhibit J, contained in Exhibit J, you will find such references and when you do you will then know what that is intended to denote.

CHAIRPERSON: So far you've given very good evidence, Mr Visser, you haven't asked a single question.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I'm just, this is a question of background and if needs be the evidence will be presented to you. I've got to put it to the witness because ...(intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: He may be able to confirm some and not others. That's what I'm getting at. You're putting the whole thing to him and I think you should ask, does he know this, does he know that?

MR VISSER: Well, Mr Maharaj, I departed from perhaps an incorrect assumption that you wouldn't know this, that this would probably be news to you.

MR MAHARAJ: Well, so far the news has been the 1,2,3,4. I didn't know the extent to which race classification had followed them and I'm sure that V 4 or S 4 wasn't blacks it was Bantu.

MR VISSER: Or whatever, but black people then.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you know there were categories such as S and V?

MR MAHARAJ: S, yes I am aware, V was a bit puzzling to me, but I'm obliged to the counsel for that.

CHAIRPERSON: You accept it?

MR MAHARAJ: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And the others, do you accept what you've heard so far?

MR MAHARAJ: F A, Photo album, perfectly acceptable and something that one had guessed at.

CHAIRPERSON: N G N?

MR MAHARAJ: One was puzzled, I'm obliged to the information.

MR VISSER: And then coming to the last one which I wish to attempt to make clear is the PN was in fact, the PN prefixes was in fact as Gen Steyn had testified to yesterday, that was the category denoting people who had become informers, not initial informers, but if we may call it for want of a better expression, accepted informers, that would be a PN prefix together with a number or a series of numbers.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - mike not on) even more restricted, Mr Visser? Wasn't PN and informer to the Natal, Port Natal?

ADV BOSMAN: Absolutely correct, I should have qualified that. Throughout the country there were different prefixes, Soweto would have an SW, Eastern Transvaal might have had an ET, I'm not sure but the point is there would be a prefix plus a number.

MR MAHARAJ: With the only addition that I would make that in my analysis all PN, that is informers, started with a number which had , the first digit was 66, because, don't read 656, or 6664 to mean that they had 6 664 agents.

MR VISSER: Yes, Yes, alright well be that as it may, I accept that that might be the position.

MR MAHARAJ: That was.

MR VISSER: Now at one stage, and this is the last aspect of this code, if I may call it that, which appears from the Exhibits J, is that at some stage the racial classification was done away with and reference was thereafter not made to V 1,2,3 and 4 or S 1,2,3 and 4 but rather simply to V and S and in fact one can see this happening already in Exhibit J 1 if you refer to page 2, paragraph 2.6 for example where reference is made to Zandile, that is Filla Portia Ndwandwe, her reference number was V 6665. So there already the classification which we see at the top of that page in the right-hand column, the equivalent of S4, this wasn't V4 anymore, it had already been phased in.

MR MAHARAJ: Chairperson, I can't say anything about that matter. I think to suggest to me that I should accept that there was a transition in numbering from an English-speaking S for Security to an Afrikaans speaking V for Veiligheid is difficult for me to accept at this stage and nor would that be explanatory for taking a 4 digit number when the previous system had a 5 digit number and the number of informers and interests groups were increasing so rapidly, I would be puzzled by that and I would, they would have to produce something more substantial than your word.

MR VISSER: Mr Maharaj, not terribly much turns on this and I don't want to get involved.

MR MAHARAJ: Sorry, I was taking it very seriously .

MR VISSER: No. no. the point is, I think you might have misunderstood what I was trying to say. All that I'm trying to say is at some point in time the 1, 2, 3 and 4 being the race classification started falling away where previously you would have V 1, 2, 3 and 4, you would simply have V and where you would have S for Security Headquarters 1, 2, 3 and 4, you would simply have S, that's the only point. I'm not saying that Security Head Office was translated as to "Veiligheids Hoofkantoor" I didn't intend to give you that impression.

MR MAHARAJ: I did think that earlier you put it to me that V had a meaning of Veiligheid and S had a meaning of Security Headquarters.

MR VISSER: Yes, that is correct.

MR MAHARAJ: So I was connecting all that.

MR VISSER: Oh I see. No, I'm simply saying that, just in order to understand why at 2.6 you will only see 6665 and not V 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 6665, it was because that had been, there was, that was phased out, the classification and you already see this happening here.

MR MAHARAJ: Well I don't know that.

MR VISSER: Okay. Well I'm just putting it to you.

MR MAHARAJ: I cannot accept that at the moment.

MR VISSER: Alright, now.

CHAIRPERSON: Where is the S phased out?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I haven't found one in this document where you will see the S being phased out. The 1, 2 , 3 and 4 alongside the S being phased out Mr Chairman, but what I'm putting is that I'm instructed that that was the position and you can already see it happening at page 2 in paragraph 2.6 as far as far as the V is concerned, so the principle is the same...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Well where can you see V with any number?

MR VISSER: Well, Mr Chairman, with a number? Let me just see. I didn't check on that, Mr Chairman, there may or may not be such a ...(intervention).

MR MAHARAJ: Chairperson, if I may just say why I am reluctant to accept what the counsel is saying, normally I would not question it, because if you look at paragraph 40, S's first digit doesn't stop at 4 and I think counsel would have had to put to me S 1, S 2, right up to S 22, because there's an S 22 and I don't think there are 22 racial classifications ever under apartheid.

MR VISSER: Well, Mr Maharaj, let's just leave that. I was attempting to make it easier for you to understand this document with reference to what I've told you, that was the only intention.

Let's go on with Exhibit J 1. You see, the summary of what PN 666 tells Wasserman is that after he reported, he was picked up. Paragraph 2.4 they went to a flat at the campus of Swaziland, 2.5 from there they went to a double story flat and 2.6. says from there he, that is PN 666, accompanied this lady who picked him up, to a shopping complex, a supermarket near the University of Swaziland where an unknown black man and Zandile, who you thought was identical to Zakhele, but who is in fact Filla Portia Ndwandwe (N-D-W-A-N-D-W-E) picked them up.

MR MAHARAJ: May I apologise for that mistake, Chairperson? Yes, it is correct that MK Zandile is Filla Portia and Zakhele is Charles Ndaba, but at the moment I'm a bit puzzled, I'm listening to a long summary, I don't know what the question is going to be.

MR VISSER: Yes, I'm coming to the point directly. I'm just telling you that this really relates to the movements of PN666 in Swaziland and people whom he met, until you come to paragraph 2.9. There he says that he accompanied Zandile to the flat, number 7, at Mombeni where he was introduced to one black woman by the name of Jabo.

MR MAHARAJ: Oh is SV black woman?

MR VISSER: "Swart vrou".

MR MAHARAJ: Oh now S and V have different meanings. Okay.

MR VISSER: NGN, not identified. Now, the very next, or rather paragraph 2.11 there's another reference to the person MK Lucky.

MR MAHARAJ: Which paragraph?

MR VISSER: That's 2.11 at page 2, running over to page 3. The reference is to Lucky and again in 2.13 and now I want you to turn please to page 11. Now the first, or one of the points you make is that when the Security Branch had an informer they protected that informer by saying in their report, as I understand your evidence, that that person is not of security interest, have I got that right?

MR MAHARAJ: Yes.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: One of the ways.

MR VISSER: Therefore, Jabo and Lucky and Zondi, that's the last name among those names, would have been, on that interpretation, would have been informers.

MR MAHARAJ: No, for one reason or other, they are protecting the persons. It's a mechanism of protecting the informer, but not exclusively to protect an informer.

MR VISSER: But I thought that ...(intervention).

ME MAHARAJ: But it doesn't follow what I'm saying. I'm saying that the statement "not of security interest" is actually telling all the divisions through which it is circulated, please don't follow up on this, for whatever reason, for e.g. it says "Jabo, not of security interest".

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: The paragraph that you've drawn attention to where it appears, 2.9 page 2, tells me something is fishy. Why would they say this unknown person, don't take interest in him? Why would they say that, when my great, great, grand cousin would be raided in Port Shepstone because in some way they thought they were connected to me. Somebody who walked into my house on business would be followed because they would say, in case this leads to something. Now Jabo features here at the residence, a block of flats and where Jabo rented those flats and I would say the way they were paranoid, is this flat owner some way connected and until they have done an investigation to satisfy themselves that he has no clandestine links with the tenants, they wouldn't write him off. Now, if you look at the next one ...(intervention).

MR VISSER: Well, I'll come to that, please, but is that your explanation as far as Jabo is concerned?

MR MAHARAJ: So far you've given me summaries and I therefore have to challenge your summaries.

MR VISSER: No, no, no, I'll come to the next one. Is that your explanation as far as Jabo is concerned?

MR MAHARAJ: That's Jabo as a question mark.

MR VISSER: Yes. So, you say the fact that Zandile visited flat number 7, which was rented by a black lady called Jabo, who is not identified, should have made her of security interest in your book?

MR MAHARAJ: Yes, the way they had behaved themselves always.

MR VISSER: Alright, let's come to the next name, Zondi.

MR MAHARAJ: No, let's come to Lucky.

MR VISSER: No, no, I'll come to Lucky. Mr ...please I'm doing the questioning.

MR MAHARAJ: But you haven't asked me a question yet.

MR VISSER: Let's come to Zondi I say.

MR MAHARAJ: Chairperson, I need protection. No question is being put to me and I'm constantly being told, when facts are being put to me which I challenge, if it is a summary and I don't agree with the summary, I thought I must stop there and say "I don't agree with the summary."

MR VISSER: Can we now come to Zondi?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Visser, you are putting this as proof of the fact that this is why they used this "Nie van veiligheids belang".

MR VISSER: The fact that she wasn't of security interest.

CHAIRPERSON: No, you are now saying - now we dealt with that.

MR VISSER: No, no, no, I'm coming to that Mr Chairman. I'm dealing now with Zondi.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh I understood you said you've dealt with it.

MR VISSER: I will deal with Lucky, very specifically. I want to now deal with Zondi.

MR MAHARAJ: Okay.

MR VISSER: And you say that your inference is that Zondi, by these words "Nie van Veiligheids belang" next to his name, was being protected by the police.

MR MAHARAJ: I'm saying, to answer that question, just as you've patiently taken me through a paragraph where Lucky appears and Jabo appears, do me a favour, take me to the paragraph where Zondi appears.

MR VISSER: Paragraph 2.13 at page 3.

MR MAHARAJ: Paragraph 2.13 page so-and-so, page 3?

MR VISSER: Can I read it to you?

MR MAHARAJ: Hold on, I can read, but I don't see - oh yes, I see Zondi. Right. Good, got it.

MR VISSER: Well I want to read it to you and this will have to be translated:

Now, why do you say the police wanted to protect Zondi, at page 11?

MR MAHARAJ: I said, Chairperson, that the use of the words "Nie van veiligheids belang" is a technique that they would use, amongst others, to protect an agent. Here I would expect Zondi to be of great interest for the police to go and protect from kidnapping and that they would not write not of security interest. You've now got information, if it is correct that MK people want to kidnap Zondi, surely it is your duty as police people to now make him of security interest to protect him from being kidnapped unless you are saying because he was a black man, was he relevant to the police?

MR VISSER: Oh Mr Maharaj, let's leave racial prejudices out of this Mr Maharaj.

MR MAHARAJ: This is not a prejudice, this is a statement of fact because you've shown me a classification of 1, 2, 3 and 4. I didn't put that classification, you put it to me.

MR VISSER: Mr Maharaj, your evidence is that "not of security interest" would have been placed next to a name so that other security branch members would not target that person.

MR MAHARAJ: I have just said not exclusively as a technique.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: It was one of the possible techniques that they could have used.

MR VISSER: Yes, alright. You see I'm already going to suggest to you that this document does not support the inference which you wish the Committee...(intervention)

MR MAHARAJ: Well if you would now turn to Lucky you will see what happens.

MR VISSER: Let's go to Lucky. Alright. Lucky we know was an informer, PN 664. That we know from page 1, not so? Paragraph 2.1. At page 11, as you already ...(intervention).

MR MAHARAJ: How does that come from paragraph 2.1?

MR VISSER: I'm sorry.

MR MAHARAJ: You say there you know, how does paragraph 2.1 show that Lucky is PN 664.

MR VISSER: I'm sorry, Mr Maharaj, may I refer you page 10?

MR MAHARAJ: Oh, that one I agree with.

MR VISSER: May I refer you to page 10?

MR MAHARAJ: That one I agree.

MR VISSER: The bottom of page 10, paragraph 37.8 says:

and a little higher up that page, paragraph 37.1 says:

MR MAHARAJ: That's right.

MR VISSER: And now it is stated who he was. He is an askari. So, now with all due respect Mr Maharaj, what would have been the point of Botha or Wasserman or anyone else to try to conceal that evidence from Security Headquarters?

MR MAHARAJ: Let me tell you what would be the interest. One, they would reveal their askaris to each other because those are the people they would use to track down and to kill. Now those were, had become hired killers and trackers. You would make the askaris available as the evidence shows over the killing of Charles Ndaba and their arrest, it was an askari and he's identified. You have told us they had 9 askaris as professionals available to any division when they needed them. The askari is a paid staff member. You would only be interested in hiding his identity from the ANC and precisely because of the unprofessional way these reports were written, when I got them I was able to inform Lusaka that MK Lucky, who was operating in an area of Natal, whom we thought was still our man, is no longer our man and that was very useful to us, but within your establishment the statement "not of security interest" says, "general category, don't worry about him, started off informer, he's and agent but in fact he's and askari". Nothing to hide there amongst your own men.

MR VISSER: Mr Maharaj, askaris were registered with Head Office, would you accept that?

MR MAHARAJ: You know that, I don't know.

MR VISSER: Would you accept that? They had to be registered to be paid, surely?

MR MAHARAJ: But Gen Steyn was registered at the Headquarters but has a number for his force and maybe the number is prefixed by Natal because he's deployed in Natal. I don't know.

MR VISSER: I don't understand the answer. The point is this, why do you say was Lucky a security risk while he was an askari?

MR MAHARAJ: I am saying that the statement "nie van sekuriteits belang" is a technique that could have been used to disguise the identity of an informer.

MR VISSER: Alright, so you are now saying it could have been.

MR MAHARAJ: I said so throughout this morning, not now.

MR VISSER: And I want to show you, I want to put it to you that by having gone through names against the background of the summary of what PN 666 told Wasserman, Mr Maharaj, this document by no means makes it clear that the words "not of security interest" shows that that person might have been an informer.

MR MAHARAJ: If I am to accept that, Chairperson, then I would have to accept on counsels questions and the paragraphs that he has made, that PN as a code number, also was not of significance to protect a person, because 664 is identified in this report by Capt Botha as MK Lucky, also known as Bongani, as an askari.

MR VISSER: No, 664 was.

MR MAHARAJ: Yes, 664.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: Is given as Lucky. So the PN drops, he's identified the man, he then says it is Bongani and he says it's 664 and he then says it's an Askari. So PN is destroyed as a mechanism of hiding the identity of an informer.

MR VISSER: No, Mr Maharaj that's where you're wrong. Where in this document is the true identity of Lucky given?

MR MAHARAJ: Ah, now we've come to another problem now. We've come to the next problem and let me take counsel through that one as he's taken me, with your permission Sir. It says there, paragraph 2.1., MK Lucky sent agent PN 664 to Swaziland with regards to activities in the Msinga region, activities of MK in order that the person convey a report and bring back instructions from the ANC Natal Machinery. That is saying, is virtually in command of Msinga region within the country. Then it goes on to say what discussions took place in Swaziland on the instructions of MK Lucky and then the reporter's report in paragraph 3 deals with all those discussions and instructions including a sketch of a DLB of weapons. Having gone through that part of Lucky, in the substance of the report, Cap Botha in processing it and commenting on it, then identifies Lucky as an agent of the South African Security Police as PN664 reporting and falling and says he's a rehabilitated terrorist. That tells you he's working for the South African regime. Then he goes on and says in paragraph 38.7 that he also has an MK name as Bongani. Now what have you told your entire division including your policeman in Msinga area? What have you told them? You've told them that this man must pass through any road block, don't worry but let him go through because he's our man, let weapons come through, he's our man and we have got two people, Lucky plus his courier, are both our agents. Now what are you doing? Violence erupts in Msinga area and who's doing the violence? Is it ANC or is it the Security Branch?

MR VISSER: Mr Maharaj, where you read all of that in Exhibit J1 I don't know.

MR MAHARAJ: I could take you through more ...(intervention)

MR LAX: We're missing a page. It's just struck me, the numbering - we're missing page 10 basically of that report because the numbering goes from 37.8 to 39.9. If you look at page 10 and page 11, there's an intervening page missing in the whole document. It just struck me now.

MR VISSER: Ours is complete, Mr Chairman. Oh, I see what you're referring.

MR MAHARAJ: There's no page 8.

MR VISSER: Just allow me, Mr Maharaj. Allow me to point out which seems to be the obvious, Mr Chairman and that is that the paragraph numbering at page 11 became out of sync. It follows the (8) with a (9) but it seems to go from 37 to 39, but you see the bottom, at the foot of the page it refers to page 11 following and it is indeed page 11 following, so it would seem that perhaps following my own example in my papers, the paragraph numbers went out of sync.

MR MAHARAJ: Yes, it looks like Vula sources were not doing there work properly in photocopying.

MR LAX: Sorry, I was just looking for the paragraph numbered 38 which reference was made to and I couldn't see one, it went from 37 to 39.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, you seem to have some difficulty still. We're referring to page 10, paragraph 37(8) goes over the page to the next page and then it goes on with 39 not 37.9.

CHAIRPERSON: All the other paragraphs, paragraph 37, if you look, 37(1), X(1), 37(2), S(2, X(4), X(5), X(7), X(8), 10, 11, suddenly you turn over and the Xs have gone.

MR VISSER: But you see Mr Chairman, the way we read the document, it only goes to X(11) and no further than that because if you look at the next page you'll find another reference to X11 Mr Chairman. It seems that that was the ultimate number that was reached and that is in paragraph 32.3 at page 9. You'll see that it only goes up to X11, or so it would seem, Mr Chairman.

MR LAX: What is the relevance of the X if you, did you find that out at all?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I can't tell you but I can attempt to find that out. I was under the impression that it referred to commentary, Mr Chairman, commentary on whatever, but I may be wrong, I'll find out what that stands for.

MR MAHARAJ: I would suggest the possibility that the X was a prefix attached to a document.

MR VISSER: Could be, could be, Mr Chairman, that is quite possible. I will try to find out, discover what precisely. Now you see, just to tie up this point, Mr Maharaj your point in your evidence was, with reference to page 11 of Exhibit J 1, that the fact that Mr Ndaba was mentioned there made him a target for elimination, possible elimination by members of the Security Forces and if he hadn't been, if he had been an informer, Botha would have seen to it that next to his name would have stood the words, "nie van veiligheids belang", that's basically your point.

MR MAHARAJ: No, you have not heard me clearly.

MR VISSER: Please take me through that again.

MR MAHARAJ: I said yesterday that emerging from this document are two techniques amongst many that he could have used. The one was to say "nie van veiligheids belang nie" or the second was to begin to attach a code number. A code number would disguise the identity of the person because that would be an informer and the reason why informers had numbers PN 665 whatever, was in order to disguise their identity when you distribute it because the issue that I'm dealing with is the assertion that the moment Charles Ndaba was promoted to Commander of the Natal Machinery, his handler instructed him to leave Swaziland because his life was now in danger at the hands of other Security Branch men and I say, you don't get an informer, suppose you made me into and informer as a Commander of Operation Vula, would you have said to me, leave the country? You'd have said, stay on.

MR VISSER: Well, that's another point. Surely Mr Maharaj, my question now turns on your evidence that you wanted to make something out of paragraph 41 and as I understood your evidence yesterday and today, the first point you wanted to make and we've dealt with that, was that where the Security Police for one reason or another, wanted to protect a particular person, they would do that simply by saying "not of security interest".

MR MAHARAJ: Chairperson, we are differing on just one word. These two forms are amongst the techniques that could have been used. I'm not saying they are the exclusive techniques, if I have given that impression yesterday, I have certainly throughout this morning made it clear that I'm not saying that these are the exclusive techniques, but I'm showing from the internal contents of the documents that they are possible techniques.

MR VISSER: Possible. So you're working with possibilities.

MR MAHARAJ: Obviously.

MR VISSER: But now you ...(intervention).

MR MAHARAJ: Unless I was a Security Branch man, I can't go more.

MR VISSER: Mr Maharaj but you went further, you see. You placed in contra distinction what was done with Mr Charles Zakhele Zwelakhe here in paragraph 41 as opposed to what was done as regards Jabo and Lucky and Zondi.

MR MAHARAJ: Yes.

MR VISSER: What was your point with that?

MR MAHARAJ: To establish that the technique could have been employed. Could have been employed. Not necessarily employed, I'm saying in this document there appeared to be techniques that could have been employed.

MR VISSER: Mr Maharaj ...(intervention)

MR MAHARAJ: And I'm showing it to you with Jabo. It makes no sense from the way they worked, to then find the owner of a block of flats and simply dismiss him as not being of security interest. How do you know he wasn't an ANC member owning that flat.

MR VISSER: I'm through with that point. I'm not going back to it. I want to move forward.

MR MAHARAJ: Thank you.

MR VISSER: And I put it to you that quite pertinently the impression you gave yesterday in your evidence was that by mentioning Mr Ndaba's name, attention was drawn by Botha to Ndaba and that he might have become a target of the Security Forces and he would not have done so, had he been an informer. That was your evidence.

MR MAHARAJ: No, Sir.

MR VISSER: You say that isn't your evidence?

MR MAHARAJ: My evidence, if that is the understanding, Chairperson, may I correct the impression?

MR VISSER: Alright. Let me then ...(intervention)

MR MAHARAJ: I am saying that Capt Botha, as the commentator to this report, had the opportunity to employ a variety of techniques to begin to cover the identity of his informant. Amongst those techniques that he could have used is to use the "nie van sekuriteits belang nie" or he could have used a code number.

MR VISSER: Right. Would you agree with me that it would have been crazy for him to suggest to Head Office that Ndaba was not of security interest particularly in view of the fact that Mr Ndaba was second in command of the MK Natal Machinery in Swaziland?

MR MAHARAJ: I don't know how crazy the Security Branch were. If I showed you the rest of the reports you'd find them totally crazy.

MR VISSER: Can we try to stick with the facts of the matter,

MR MAHARAJ: No but you asked me if they're crazy.

MR VISSER: Instead of being flippant. It would have been crazy for Botha to suggest to Head Office that the Commander of MK Natal was not of security importance? Do you agree?

MR MAHARAJ: Chairperson, here's a crazy thing in front of us that with all this PN664 spiels circulated to 15 sections, they have revealed that PN 664 is the Commander of MK at Msinga, they have revealed he's also Bongani, they revealed that he's also an askari and they revealed that it was his man that they sent to Swaziland and that he brought in the DLB. Absolutely crazy.

MR VISSER: So that's the best answer you want to give to my request. I'm going to leave it at that.

MR MAHARAJ: Let's leave it at that.

MR VISSER: Thank you. Mr Maharaj, I want to put it to you that apart from Lucky, who was at this time clearly an askari, not one single identity of one single informer is made known or is exposed in Exhibit J1 to J5. What do you say to that?

MR MAHARAJ: My response to that is...

MR VISSER: Well first of all, do you agree with that?

MR MAHARAJ: Let's start with your first question, because I'm busy thinking that one. Charles Ndaba, Commander, killed. Filla Ndwandwe, kidnapped killed. Who appeared before the TRC for amnesty for Filla Ndwandwe's killing? Capt Botha. Who has appeared for the killing of Ndaba? Capt Botha. Today he is saying, "I'm an applicant for amnesty, I killed this man. He was my agent" and he is saying, "I recruited him in 1988" and the substantive question that has risen, was he or was he not an informant of Capt Botha? This document J1 does not allow the conclusion to flow at this stage that Charles was recruited by Capt Botha.

MR VISSER: Nor does it say that he wasn't.

MR MAHARAJ: Does not allow the conclusion because it is on the applicant's responsibility to establish his case. It is not for the victim who is dead to establish that he was not an informant. We're dealing with people, victim's lives also.

MR VISSER: Mr Maharaj how is that an answer to my question to you?

MR MAHARAJ: (...(indistinct - talking simultaneously)

MR VISSER: How is that possibly an answer to my question?

MR MAHARAJ: Your question was that in this document no agent has been revealed except M K Lucky and therefore you want me to draw the conclusion that this does not say that Charles Ndaba was not an informant.. I'm saying this establishes at this stage that Charles Ndaba as at February 1988, was not yet an agent and I will show other documents together in the bundle to say right up to September 1988 he was, there's nothing to show that he was an agent and I'm saying that in September, he was out of Swaziland.

MR VISSER: Mr Maharaj, if your big point of your evidence is that Exhibit J1 to 5 does not show that Mr Ndaba was an informer, I'll happily concede it, because that's precisely my point. The Security Branch did not go around advertising the identities of their informers. Not in public or in Security reports.

MR MAHARAJ: I was able to identify their agents through their reports.

MR VISSER: Well maybe you were more clever than the rest.

MR MAHARAJ: No, not more clever, I was just banking on the stupidity of their reports.

MR VISSER: That may be that they were stupid. Mr Maharaj you seem to make a point of trying to deride the applicants. Fine. You're being allowed to do so, so I mean I'm not going to get into an argument with you about that, but I want to stick with the questions, let's stick with the questions. Do you agree with me that nowhere in Exhibit J apart from Lucky who was an askari, is the identity of a single informant revealed?

MR MAHARAJ: Correct.

MR VISSER: Thank you.

MR MAHARAJ: And there are only two agents referred to there.

MR VISSER: And there's a good reason for that, isn't there?

MR MAHARAJ: No, no, no. 664 and Lucky are the only two ones that appear in that report as agents.

MR VISSER: 664 is Lucky, Mr Maharaj.

MR MAHARAJ: Sorry and then 666.

MR VISSER: Who is 666?

MR MAHARAJ: You tell me.

MR VISSER: No, no, no, you say his identity is revealed.

MR MAHARAJ: No I say there are only two agents appearing in this report.

MR VISSER: Oh I see,

MR MAHARAJ 666 and 664.

MR VISSER: Can I refer you to J2, paragraph 2? PN684, PN677, PN678, PN689, PN 664, PN666, please Mr Maharaj, so you stand corrected?

MR MAHARAJ: No, no, no, we were dealing with J1. now you jumped to J2 to prove to me that there are 4 or 5 agents?

MR VISSER: I think my question was - I don't want to belabour the point but my question to you was very clear, is there anywhere in Exhibit's J1 - J5 where the identity of an informer was revealed and you already said there wasn't.

MR MAHARAJ: Chairperson, I'm now being forced to say, can we play that tape of this evidence? ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Mr Maharaj...(intervention)

MR MAHARAJ: Because counsel is putting to me a question , where so far he has dealt exclusively with J1 and when I tried to go to J2 and 3 he said "Don't, we're talking J1". Suddenly he says he put a question to me dealing with all the documents and I think that if this is going to be the attitude, I need the protection of the Court and let's listen to that recording.

MR VISSER: Alright, Mr Maharaj, the record will speak for itself and if I were unfair to you, certainly I'd be the first to apologise. Are you prepared to accept that?

MR MAHARAJ: I certainly will, I'm known for generosity.

MR VISSER: Alright. No, no, it's not generous, it's a question of fact. Now, there was very good reason, was there not, to protect the identity of informers on both sides, Mr Maharaj, not so?

MR MAHARAJ: Sure.

MR VISSER: It just made good sense. What's the point of divulging the identity of your informer, because he would be killed, more likely than not.

MR MAHARAJ: Sorry, the statement is being made so wide, that very good reason to protect informer, yes. The question here is protection within the Security forces.

MR VISSER: Yes, okay.

MR MAHARAJ: That doesn't with the general, this goes to clandestine work, need-to-know principle.

MR VISSER: May I then direct your mind to the broader picture? Would you agree with the general statement that it made good sense to protect informers in general, by both sides.

MR MAHARAJ: Sir, I don't know the relevance of that. ...(indistinct - talking simultaneously with Mr Visser)

MR VISSER: Don't you want to answer the question?

MR MAHARAJ: Well, I don't know the relevance of it.

MR VISSER: Alright. Do you refuse to answer the question?

MR MAHARAJ: No, I'm not refusing, I don't know what is the meaning of the statement that there's very good reasons why the identity of informers should be protected, from who?

MR VISSER: Right, I can't force it out of you Mr Maharaj, let's go on to the next question. You had an informer according to your own evidence in the Security Branch in Port Natal?

MR MAHARAJ: I never said an informer, I said informers.

MR VISSER: Right, many informers, alright, more than one informer. I think that's what's generally referred to as an owl, is it?

MR MAHARAJ: No, you got it wrong again.

MR VISSER: Oh, I'm sorry, I got it wrong.

MR MAHARAJ: There is no Intelligence jargon called an owl.

MR VISSER: Okay, you're absolutely correct and I withdraw that and I apologise. Are you prepared to tell us today who those persons were?

MR MAHARAJ: No, Sir, because I'm not the applicant here.

MR VISSER: No, no, no that's not the point. The point is that there's still good reason in your mind not to divulge the identity of those people, isn't that so?

MR MAHARAJ: I said, if I was the applicant here, I would give the names.

MR VISSER: Yes, well I'll leave that for argument.

MR LAX: Sorry, Gentlemen, can we get a move on here. Time is limited. I mean both of you, please. Let's stick to the facts, let's get through the issues as quickly as possible.

MR VISSER: I want to put it to you that Exhibit J1 and now I'm going back to J1 does not show that Mr Ndaba was not an informer by 14 February 1988. I put it to you, that document doesn't show it.

MR MAHARAJ: That he was not an informer? I disagree.

MR VISSER: Fact, it doesn't show that he was or he wasn't. It's totally neutral, as far as Mr Ndaba's concerned.

MR MAHARAJ: It's not that neutral when Capt Botha is the handler. It's not that neutral. Chairperson, the paragraph we're dealing with, Mr Botha's commentary, does not oblige a commentator to comment on every aspect of a report. He could have been silent on paragraph 37(6). There was nothing that obliged him to put that paragraph 37(6) into his commentary.

MR VISSER: Now let's just go, very briefly, through the balance of the exhibits which you placed before this Committee. I put to you exactly the same statement as far as Exhibit 2, 3, 4 and 5 are concerned. None of those show, or present any ground for arguing that Mr Ndaba was not an informer of the Security Branch. None of those documents.

MR MAHARAJ: Sir, I have produced these documents over a time sequence to show the manner in which Charles Ndaba was being reported upon, was to suggest that he was of intense interest to the Security Forces. I have also said that in other instances, Security Force members have testified that as late as June 1988 they were seeking to kidnap and/or kill him in Swaziland and within the country and I am saying that Capt Botha, centrally involved in all these reports of their processing together with Taylor, could have taken measures to show that he was protecting the identity of his informant, if Charles Ndaba was an informer. I cannot prove definitively that he was not an informant, but I can certainly help to shake the view put by the applicants which is the definitive statement that he was an informant and who say that they have no records because they shredded them.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: But I'm saying that these reports show that you would not handle it that way if you were a good Intelligence man and he was 17 years an Intelligence man.

MR VISSER: Mr Maharaj, how do you suggest that the Security Police in Durban in July 1990 know what the addresses of the safe-houses used by Operation Vula were, who the operatives were, who did they know to go and arrest, do you suggest? How did they come by that information?

MR MAHARAJ: Sir, they arrested Charles Ndaba fortuitously because one or two askaris either Ninela alone, or Ninela and Goodwill Sekakane, spotted him in a street, recognised him, arrested him. They then took him to C R Swart. Ninela's affidavit was, as an exhibit says, he was beaten up for 30 minutes in his presence, that he did begin to talk. Charles knew two safe houses, the Knoll and the flat at Brickfield Road. Charles led to the identification and arrest of Mbuso Shabalala. He was arrested sometime late on Sunday. He was also assaulted. Both of them were kept at the same venue, beaten up in each other's presence, as far as I'm concerned, and made to talk. In the course of someone's talking, they verified these two safe houses, they raided them, they arrested at 10 o'clock on the 12th of July, Pravien Gordhan and Anesh Shrinker at Brickfield. They arrested Siphiwe Nyanda around noon on the 12th. They arrested Raymond Lalla at the Knoll at 1 o'clock, they arrested Catherine Mvelase at 4.30 on the 12th at the Knoll. They arrested Susan Shabalala, I'm not sure where at around 5 o'clock. That is how they got to a set of documents which gave other safe houses, but they certainly did not have the safe houses in Johannesburg and they did not have all. So Charles gave them two safe houses, not all that you are claiming and Charles was not an informant. If he was I would have been arrested at a gathering of 30 top leaders within the country, clandestinely held at Tongaat on the 18th, 19th and 20th of May 1990 and it would have been the biggest scoop for the apartheid government, because Charles and company were in the logistics protecting that meeting. People came from Cape Town, Johannesburg, Eastern Cape to that meeting and F W de Klerk used it as he thought a trump card to put the ANC on the defensive at the Pretoria discussion and he failed, because he identified the Joe at Tongaat as Joe Slovo when the Joe was Siphiwe Nyanda.

MR VISSER: Are you finished?

MR MAHARAJ: You are asked for it.

CHAIRPERSON: You referred in that evidence to somebody's affidavit.

MR MAHARAJ: Yes, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Where is, what is this affidavit?

MR MAHARAJ: It's an affidavit by an askari called Ninela.

MR LAX: Annexure F.

CHAIRPERSON: Annexure F, thank you.

MR VISSER: Page 22, Mr Chairman. Incidentally that's not a matter that's ever been placed in dispute, Mr Chairman. Mr Maharaj seems to think that it was.

MR MAHARAJ: Well it was, the two witnesses, Capt Botha and Gen Steyn ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Mr Maharaj, so is it your short answer to my question that the police received the information which I put to you from Ndaba and/or Shabalala?

MR MAHARAJ: Under torture.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, would it be convenient?

CHAIRPERSON: Right, we'll take the short adjournment at this stage.

SEPTEMBER MAHARAJ: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - mike not on) evidence and cross-examination this morning about inferences that can be drawn from Exhibit J and that of course is something that we will have to decide.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: (cont)

Yes, Mr Chairman, I am just rounding up the examination about Exhibit J and perhaps with the assistance of the witness we might go quickly through the rest of these exhibits. Would you agree that Exhibit J2 is an exhibit that follows chronologically on Exhibit J3?

MR MAHARAJ: Not chronologically, it just happens to be stapled in that order, but the date is the 14th of the 9th month and the other exhibits, the next one J3 is the 7th month.

MR VISSER: Right. So J3 came first?

MR MAHARAJ: J3 is before J2.

MR VISSER: And J3 referred to an inquiry about a certain Ellen.

MR MAHARAJ: Sorry, a certain?

MR VISSER: Ellen, (E-L-L-E-N).

MR MAHARAJ: J2.

MR VISSER: J3.

MR MAHARAJ: J3.

MR VISSER: And at page 16 we learn that she was being seen regularly in the company of one Dubbie (D-U-B-B-I-E) Zwelakhe and Amelia Mya, paragraph 1.2.

MR MAHARAJ: Yes.

MR VISSER: And that was referred apparently, oh well, the most important thing that I wish to draw your attention to is that in paragraph 2 under "Uitkenning", identification, it says, Zwelakhe is identified with Zakhele Charles Ndaba and a photo album number 4190 is given and the Natal reference 4/V/139 is given. Is that correct? And the Security Head Office filed number S4/62573 is given. Do you agree with that?

MR MAHARAJ: Sorry I missed the question between FA and S4. Did you introduce another one?

MR VISSER: There are three identification references, the one is the photo album, the other is the division Port Natal and the other is Security Head Office.

MR MAHARAJ: I see.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: Yes.

MR VISSER: Now, the point about this, Mr Maharaj, is it not, is that this is a fax or a telex which originated in Middelburg in the Eastern Transvaal and sent to Port Natal. Do you agree with that?

MR MAHARAJ: Yes.

MR VISSER: Alright. So they know about Zwelakhe. Then you see, if you turn to Exhibit J2, there's a reaction to that telex and what it says is that the informers listed there, all identified MK Charles, number 2 and it says Z Ndaba and it gives exactly the same reference number. Do you agree with that?

MR MAHARAJ: Yes.

MR VISSER: So again, what is the inference you wish this Committee to draw from those two?

MR MAHARAJ: The inference, Sir, is that J2 is put in by Capt Botha. Now if you look at what is done there, it's simply a confirmation of the photo album and I'm saying that if I was the handler placed in the position of Capt Botha, I would be seeing all the report showing the interest of the Security Branch in different divisions on Charles Ndaba and that would alert him, if he is an agent, to begin to find ways to remove him from the profile of the attention that the Security Branch are giving.

MR VISSER: Yes, yes.

MR MAHARAJ: And I'm saying, attempts were made, this is 14th of the 9th, June, Eugene de Kock's unit sent in people to ambush and kill Charles Ndaba.

MR VISSER: I hear what you're saying Mr Maharaj, I'd like to just confine ourselves to J2 and J3 at the moment, but I hear what you're saying, but would you agree with me that Botha could not conceal the fact that Charles Ndaba was the man in photograph 4193?

MR MAHARAJ: Fair enough.

MR VISSER: He couldn't conceal that fact. In fact we know from J1 already that Ndaba had been identified by exactly the same references.

MR MAHARAJ: Okay.

MR VISSER: Yes, so all that he could do at any stage of the proceedings with his informer was to attempt to get him away from Swaziland because he wanted to remove him for fear of him becoming a target of the Security Forces. Don't you agree?

MR MAHARAJ: I don't agree with that Chairperson, with due respect. I don't know how to answer this question, when I'm asked to say that Capt Botha couldn't have taken action because I have had instances in the work of Operation Vula of making sure that a particular report disappeared from the files so that the action gets frozen.

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Maharaj, that would presuppose that Botha would have had to go to Headquarters, steal that file and make it disappear.

MR MAHARAJ: No, no. You don't have to steal. You just have to make sure that a file begins to go missing for a while.

MR VISSER: Yes, but aren't you forgetting something? Aren't you forgetting that it was a fact that he was the Commander of the Natal Machinery in Swaziland?

MR MAHARAJ: I'm not forgetting that.

MR VISSER: Well, how do you suppress that fact, Mr Maharaj?

MR MAHARAJ: Capt Botha referred to it in one instance in his evidence, he said ask Maharaj about the houses at Reservoir Hill and Chatsworth.

MR VISSER: No, no, please can we stay, stick to the question.

MR MAHARAJ: No, you asked me how? I don't know how can I explain that's why I said I have difficulty Chairperson in answering this question, except to show instances where files would disappear. Files would go frozen, files can get lost, files can be misplaced and reappear.

MR VISSER: Can we go to J4 and J5? You agree that these two telexes deal with detention of Mr Charles Ndaba by the Swazi police?

MR MAHARAJ: Yes, I go further to show the detention was as far back as 1987.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: And I show the co-operation therefore between the South African Security Branch and Swazis, you don't have to arrange his deportation left at Charles Ndaba's hands, you just have to do it through your agents in Swaziland Government to make sure he is deported.

MR VISSER: Yes, okay. The fact of the matter is that J5 refers to 1987.

MR MAHARAJ: J5 refers to 1988.

MR VISSER: I'm sorry.

MR MAHARAJ: J4.

MR VISSER: J4. Now according to the evidence of Botha, he only recruited Ndaba in 1988 as an informer.

MR MAHARAJ: Sure.

MR VISSER: So how is J4 relevant then?

MR MAHARAJ: It is relevant to show that the co-operation between the Swazi Security and police in governmental structures and the South African Security police were so close that if you needed to get Charles Ndaba to leave Swaziland as your informer, you wouldn't leave it to him to manipulate it, you would simply inform the Swazis and they would quietly make sure that he's deported.

MR VISSER: I see.

MR MAHARAJ: You don't leave your own man to suffer here and do extra work.

MR VISSER: Yes, the innocent explanation on this document that it is information which the Eastern Transvaal obtained that Charles Ndaba was arrested by the Swazis, didn't occur to you?

MR MAHARAJ: No, it's very simple. I don't believe in the innocence of people who were in this conflict. What I am trying to show is that you had access to the information and contacts and the statements made by Capt Botha that he instructed Charles to find a way to get out of Swaziland and get to Zambia was a very, very peculiar way. The deportation could have been arranged through your contacts in the Swazi governmental structures.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: That's what I'm showing here.

MR VISSER: To round up, I'm going to argue to this Committee at the appropriate time that your reliance on the whole of Exhibit j takes the matter no further and it does not support the inference which you wish the Committee to draw that Mr Ndaba was not, was never an informer of the Security Branch in Durban.

MR MAHARAJ: I think the court has indicated to us at the start of the session after this morning's break that the court will arrive at its view on the documents.

MR VISSER: Yes, alright. Can we go on to the next point please? You also stated, as a separate consideration, that Mr Ndaba could not have been, well I'm not so sure whether you say that any longer, after what you said this morning, that you were only kicking possibilities and no more, but you did mention the fact that he was screened very thoroughly and that he had military training, intense military training and as I understood your evidence, it was to the effect that such a person would not become an informer, or not probably become an informer. Did I understand you correctly?

MR MAHARAJ: No, Sir.

MR VISSER: Well, please tell us what you meant?

MR MAHARAJ: Sir, I put in the documents, together with other issues, so that the coinciding of all that information puts together the view that the applicants' claim that Charles Ndaba was an informer cannot be sustained by the applicants. I have never claimed that a senior person can never become an informer.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: I have known senior people, so badly tortured that they have become informers.

MR VISSER: Yes, alright. So that on itself, that is your evidence now, its not conclusive but you say you must put that in the pot with all the other considerations.

MR MAHARAJ: And when you put them in the pot, the conclusion you arrive at is (a) that the applicants' case that he's an informer cannot be sustained and (b) that the inference is more on the side that he was not an informer.

MR VISSER: Yes, I followed that. And to be fair to you, Mr Maharaj, the way I understood your evidence, the last aspect which you want to be put into this cooking pot, was that you referred to times being hard in Swaziland for ANC operatives, they were persecuted by the Security Forces, they had a lot of assistance from the Swazi authorities, you refer to the Umkomati Accord, and a subsequent agreement, sorry a prior agreement which made it easier for the Security Forces to make life a misery for ANC or MK operatives in Swaziland, do you remember that?

MR MAHARAJ: Yes, life more difficult is a euphemism for being murdered.

MR VISSER: My question to you is would that not have made it more convenient for an MK operative rather than, rather to start working with the enemy who is making his life a misery, rather than to stick it out?

MR MAHARAJ: Sir, with due respect, the number of people in the ANC who turned cold, were a very tiny proportion. Most, as things got more difficult, became more determined to come into South Africa and fight face to face with the enemy, so the repression and the harassment had two reactions. Some weakened, broke and deserted but the majority became stronger, more determined and more committed and wanted and pressured the ANC to say, "We want to get home to fight".

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Maharaj, we're not talking about the majority here, we're talking about one person.

MR MAHARAJ: One person would be assessed in that guess scenario, by saying would he fall more with the majority or would he be the exception and I have reason to believe from my knowledge of Charles Ndaba's background and the way he pursued his objectives, that he would fall in the majority.

MR VISSER: Alight. Now those are the considerations, did I leave anything out? The ones that we discussed this morning. Those were the considerations upon which you asked this Committee to draw the inference that Mr Ndaba was not.

MR MAHARAJ: No, Sir, those were not the only considerations. If you listened to my ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Well, will you just please tell us what the others are.

MR MAHARAJ: Please be patient. I'm trying to be, this time I went out during tea break and I said "Stop being arrogant, Mac, be courteous", but now if you become arrogant with me, I'll become arrogant again. I said that the sequence of arrests, the date of Charles Ndaba's entry into this country which the applicants conveniently are vague about, I've said he entered the country on the first week of February.

MR VISSER: We accept that.

MR MAHARAJ: I've gone on, please don't interrupt me, I'm trying to be co-operative with you. I've gone on to sketch a scenario of how he got arrested, I'm saying that if he had made contact with Capt Botha as he claims, 4 to 6 weeks before the 7th of July and he gave them the safe-houses and he gave them information about me, Siphiwe Nyanda, Ronnie Kasrils, Pravien Gordhan, I'm saying we would have been under surveillance, I'm saying a major meeting took place on the 20th of May which was a subject of Pretoria Minute, I'm saying that the action would have been taken, it would have identified, they would have photographed me entering the Brickfield Road Flat or the Knoll. They would have photographed my car, they would have followed me where I was going in Johannesburg and Cape Town and they would have picked up a whole network. They would have easily smashed Vula. So I'm saying if he was an informant, that sequence doesn't fit. The third aspect that I'm bringing in is I'm saying that Capt Botha and Gen Steyn deny that Charles and Mbuso were tortured, that is one bit of affidavit which you said you would not challenge by Ninela who says he was present when Charles was assaulted.

MR VISSER: No, no, with great respect.

MR MAHARAJ: I'm saying again, it doesn't fit in with the picture of Charles as an informer.

MR VISSER: Mr Maharaj, I must just make it absolutely clear that the allegation that Sekakane was present during the arrest of Mr Ndaba is not challenged. That was what we were talking about. We weren't talking about the assault. You know that the applicants say that he wasn't assaulted. That was never conceded.

MR MAHARAJ: Chairperson, with due respect this morning I did not talk about Goodwill Sekakane, I talked about the assault and torture of Charles and I said that Ninela's affidavit is there, it's in the exhibits, when Ninela says that he was present and saw the assault on Charles, there was not mention of Goodwill.

MR LAX: Sorry, Mr Visser, just to be fair to you and everyone, I certainly gained the impression from the way you said that is conceded, that you were talking about the statement in general and its contents.

MR VISSER: But Mr Chairman, that would negate all the evidence given so far. Surely it could never have been understood that that is conceded that he was assaulted for 30 minutes at C R Swart Square with great respect, but in any event, if that was what was understood by me, Mr Chairman, it was mistaken and I wish to put the record straight. The evidence is quite clear that he was never assaulted.

MR MAHARAJ: That's what I said this morning.

CHAIRPERSON: This affidavit, my reading, it's been a very superficial reading of it, is that he was slapped a couple of times, no torture in the normal sense of the word torture.

MR VISSER: But even that is denied, Mr Chairman. That is also denied. Alright, can we move on? Is it your evidence Mr Maharaj, I'm going on to something completely different, let me withdraw that, I'd rather ask you this. Mr Shabalala, was he military trained?

MR MAHARAJ: Mr Shabalala? Yes.

MR VISSER: Where?

MR MAHARAJ: Within the country.

MR VISSER: Was the equivalence of military training inside the country comparable, just as good as that received in Angola and in the German Democratic Republic?

MR MAHARAJ: The type of training received in Angola varied. The type of training in the GDR would have been far superior. There were crash courses conducted in Angola I would say that the training we gave in some instances was superior to the crash courses but not to the regular courses.

MR VISSER: Was Mr Shabalala one of these hand-picked operatives for Operation Vula?

MR MAHARAJ: He was hand-picked within the country.

MR VISSER: By yourself?

MR MAHARAJ: I was part of the team in the hand-picking.

MR VISSER: It just strikes me as strange that you should say that Mr Shabalala was Mr Ndaba's Commander. Are you sure of that fact?

MR MAHARAJ: Mr Charles Ndaba came in on February the 4th. You could not take a new person no matter how trained he was, and just impose him on an existing structure in a superior position. His familiarity with the terrain, with the individuals in the terrain and the conditions in that terrain, would require him first to serve within the structure under the structure's existing command and now once more, through his activity and performance rise, but you will create a complete disruption of the Machinery if you took Mbuso Shabalala who was heading a Machinery and put Charles there and just said "here's a stranger and he's now in charge".

MR VISSER: Did that also apply to the top command, such as yourself?

MR MAHARAJ: No Sir, I belonged to the National Executive and was sent in with a specific mandate and I did not establish my authority by saying "Lusaka told me I'm in command", I earned my stripes by getting the loyalty of the cadres through the leadership that I offered them.

MR VISSER: Yes. You gave evidence about a fall-back date and you said that the arrangement was for Ndaba and Shabalala to meet on Friday the 6th of July 1990, is that correct?

MR MAHARAJ: I think I said that there was a meeting that we tried to track down that was scheduled between Ndaba and others in the structure for the 9th. He hadn't fulfilled that appointment.

MR VISSER: Yes, I see. But did you not refer to a meeting that was scheduled between Shabalala and Ndaba, did I misunderstand that?

MR MAHARAJ: I said that they were supposed to be working together that weekend and that to the best of our reconstruction they were supposed to have met that Sunday afternoon.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: And I said that if the meeting did not take place there would always be a fall-back arrangement.

MR VISSER: Oh I see, I misunderstood you. I thought that you meant that the Sunday was the fall-back date.

MR MAHARAJ: No, Sir.

MR VISSER: Well, I just wanted to remind you of the evidence of Botha. Botha said that he was informed by Ndaba that his fall-back date for the meeting with Shabalala was Tuesday the 10th?

MR MAHARAJ: Could be, but it would - all I was making is that fall-back dates are very close to each other.

MR VISSER: Yes, alright, no problem. Now coming back very briefly to this whole question of Goodwill Sekakane, your evidence was that the fact that he assisted in the arrest of Ndaba was concealed by Botha. Do you remember saying that?

MR MAHARAJ: Yes.

MR VISSER: Why do you say that?

MR MAHARAJ: Let me just, Sir I just need to turn to his statement. Paragraph 17, Mr Botha - he is saying that when he went to CR Swart and met Charles, Ninela had arrested him.

MR VISSER: No, no, just read what the words say.

MR MAHARAJ: Hold on.

MR VISSER: You're wrong, Mr ...(intervention)

MR MAHARAJ: I need protection here. When you have summarised.

MR VISSER: It doesn't help you giving facts which are not facts of the case.

MR LAX: Sorry, let the man answer the question please. You've asked him a question, he's trying to answer it.

MR MAHARAJ: You see now, once more Chairperson, I've become obstreperous and I'm going to now translate the whole paragraph so that learned counsel listens to it.

MR LAX: Please there's no need for that. Let's just answer the question and let's get a move on. I understand you have another engagement and we'd like to try and get you there on time.

MR MAHARAJ: Thank you. The statement says here that Charles - Ninela was the arresting person, that he was present at C R Swart, no reference is made to Goodwill. Ninela says Goodwill was with him. Here it says:

He makes it hearsay. And I'm saying, Ninela is saying both were present when Capt Botha came there to Charles Ndaba. The only difference is that Goodwill is dead so he can't make a statement.

MR VISSER: You say, based on what you've just told the Committee, you drew the intention that Botha was concealing the fact that Ninela was part of the arrest, is that what you're saying?

MR MAHARAJ: No, he was concealing that Goodwill, because Goodwill eventually got killed by the Eugene de Kock unit on the basis that Eugene de Kock is saying he was asked to kill Goodwill because Goodwill was going to reveal about the treatment of Charles.

MR VISSER: Are you saying that Botha concealed the fact that Goodwill Sekakane was part of the arrest because of what is stated in paragraph 17?

MR MAHARAJ: Yes.

MR VISSER: Thank you.

MR MAHARAJ: He concealed the fact that Goodwill was present at the time that he got to C R Swart.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: Because Goodwill is dead and he wants to distance himself from the death of Goodwill.

MR VISSER: Would you turn to paragraph 59 please? Page 12 of Exhibit D.

MR MAHARAJ: Exhibit D, paragraph 59. Yes, Sir.

MR VISSER: Your evidence was, if I remember it correctly, that this clearly shows a concocted story. Your words were something to the effect of, were they not, "this is a give-away of a cover-up, a conspiracy" and you said "Ndaba left in 1988. What communications could there have been between Botha and him," or words to that effect, and then you went on to say that Botha himself said that there was no contact and therefore you say paragraph 59 is a conspiracy, is that what you say? Is that your evidence?

MR MAHARAJ: Paragraph 59 shows, testifies to the conspiracy.

MR VISSER: Yes, alright. Now you see, none of this was ever put to Botha when he gave evidence. Do you agree?

MR MAHARAJ: I was here for part of Mr Botha's cross-examination, I was not here for the rest.

MR VISSER: Mr Maharaj, did you not obtain a copy of Mr Botha's evidence before he gave evidence?

MR MAHARAJ: I obtained his evidence, yes, but I'm saying I was not present at the cross-examination. You are asking me, none of this was put to him.

MR VISSER: Did you tell either Mr Wills or Ms Poswa that you disagreed with that and that you think that is a concoction?

MR MAHARAJ: No, that didn't arise in the time that we had for our discussions.

MR VISSER: So you didn't consult about that?

MR MAHARAJ: No.

MR VISSER: I see. You see because my attorney spoke to Botha last night about this and he said, had it been asked of him in cross-examination he would have told the Committee what the situation was and I'm going to tell you now what he says it is. He says that when Ndaba left for Zambia, he gave, had given him, or gave him at the time, not sure when, the name and address and a telephone number of a person in Malawi as a contact person/courier. Can you deny that?

MR MAHARAJ: No, I can't, but the name of a person doesn't give an infrastructure.

MR VISSER: And also the name and telephone number of a person, contact person, in Swaziland. Can you deny it? That was something that was used by Mr Ndaba, or could be used by Mr Ndaba or could be used by him while he was still in Swaziland. He was aware of a name and a telephone number of a contact person in Swaziland, can you deny that?

MR MAHARAJ: No, and I presume that the name would be a codename.

MR VISSER: Botha says that it wasn't only Ndaba who made use of these two contact persons, but other informers as well. Can you deny that?

MR MAHARAJ: No.

MR VISSER: So once you can't deny any of that, how can you deny the contents of paragraph 59?

MR MAHARAJ: The contents of paragraph 51, Sir.

MR VISSER: 59.

MR MAHARAJ: 59, does not say that he knew the telephone numbers and the codenames of one person in Swaziland and one person in Malawi. It says he knew the infrastructure of communications and logistics in Zambia and in Swaziland. The name of a person in Malawi is not in Zambia.

MR VISSER: I see.

MR MAHARAJ: Hold on, the second point he says is that this communications and logistical network, not contact point, was known, was used by others. A telephone number and a name, is a far more different thing from what you call sophisticatedly an infrastructure.

MR VISSER: Yes. alright, so the difference is a semantic difference, you say its the difference between saying a network and giving the name of a person. I understand ...(intervention)

MR MAHARAJ: If semantics is interpreted to mean that by using the word infrastructure, he was magnifying the dangers here.

MR VISSER: Yes, alright. Now, I want to refer you then to paragraph 8 of Exhibit D.

MR MAHARAJ: Yes, Sir.

MR VISSER: Now, 8 and 9 in fact read together. Now you say that Mr Charles Ndaba didn't have this information, all of it and therefore that Botha says he got all of this from Charles Ndaba, he's lying. Now there are two permutations of possibilities here. One is that you are right, that Botha is incorrect when he supposes that he heard all of this at the time from Ndaba, that's the one possibility, the one that you're advancing, but isn't there also another possibility and that is that Botha is correct, because after all, with the information he got from Ndaba he smashed Operation Vula?

MR MAHARAJ: I am saying that the rules of the underground in such a top secret operation would be following very, very strictly to the rules and I am saying there is no way that Charles Ndaba knew of the communications system, absolutely none.

MR VISSER: Alright.

MR MAHARAJ: Hold on. I'm saying, no cadre was sent into the country on the basis, you are going for a long-term project. The rules were, you are going into the country, you will be met, you'll perform your duties according to what instructions you would receive on the ground. I'm saying that the purpose of Vula as described in paragraph 8 was never given to anybody, it is still the subject of commentator writing articles and books to try and work it out. I'm also saying that the identities of the top leadership would not be made known as Charles Ndaba and Botha has claimed that this information was given to him at the first meeting of Charles Ndaba and Botha within the country, 4 to 6 weeks before July the 7th and I'm saying that when they heard that so-called terrorists was crossing from Swaziland, they would set up an ambush and kill you at Piet Retief. They wouldn't say to Mac Maharaj and Siphiwe Nyanda, "no let them carry on, we'll just watch", they would have wiped us out.

MR VISSER: Next question. Do you agree that paragraph 8 and 9 set out the position regarding Operation Vula, basically correctly?

MR MAHARAJ: You put a loaded word, basically.

MR VISSER: Yes, I'm not going to say that he was absolutely perfectly correct with everything he says here.

MR MAHARAJ: No, it's described as a "Volks opstand" insurrection, it did not feature in the strategic objectives of Vula.

MR VISSER: Not at all.

MR MAHARAJ: It did not feature in the strategic objectives of Vula.

MR VISSER: Let's not play with words. I'm asking you not at all?

MR MAHARAJ: No, hold on. I'm talking as a military Commander. You say in the orders, paragraph 1, mission description, paragraph 2, strategic objectives, paragraph 3 the tactical space that you have to fulfil it. I'm saying in the objectives of Vula.

MR VISSER: Let's go to paragraph 4, political objectives.

MR MAHARAJ: Paragraph?

MR VISSER: You're talking about a paragraph 1 and a 2 and a 3, didn't you consider the political realities in regard to Operation Vula?

MR MAHARAJ: The strategic objectives of Vula were both military and political.

MR VISSER: Alright. Was that a five year plan?

MR MAHARAJ: No, it didn't have 5 years. We had given up that communist terminology.

MR VISSER: Was it never the intention that there would be a general revolt of the people, an uprising by which the South African Government and the Security Forces could be toppled and democracy established?

MR MAHARAJ: There was, the strategic objective of the ANC as spelled out at the Kabwe Conference, which was a people's war, not a people's uprising. The matter was being debated. Different people have different views, but the Conference decision was a people's war, not a 'Volks opstand".

MR VISSER: There was an article written by Mr Siphiwe Nyanda, perhaps you have knowledge of it. Let me just find it. It's part of Exhibit G.

MR MAHARAJ: Yes, it appeared in the African Communist.

MR VISSER: I'm sorry, I'm actually, I'm really referring to Exhibit B for Bravo, paragraph 10 which is at page 117. I'm sorry, page 116 and perhaps I must ask you this first of all.

MR WILLS: Sorry, what page was that?

MR VISSER: 116.

MR LAX: B starts on 110 and then it moves on from there. It's headed Chapter 17, sub-paragraph Operation Vula.

MR MAHARAJ: Chapter 17, Operation Vula, yes.

MR LAX: Then page 116, paragraph 914 (b) is what you're being referred to.

MR MAHARAJ: Sure, thank you.

MR VISSER: Sorry, before we get to that, were you here on Friday when, in the afternoon, Mr Steyn's evidence in chief was just concluded?

MR MAHARAJ: No, Sir.

MR VISSER: You weren't. Did your counsel, I'm not certain, one or both of your legal representatives or the legal representatives draw your attention to the fact that I specifically drew the attention of the legal representatives to Exhibit B at that time.

MR MAHARAJ: No, Sir.

MR VISSER: With a view of your evidence, which was then anticipated.

MR MAHARAJ: No, Sir, they did not mention that at all to me.

MR VISSER: They never mentioned that to you.

MR MAHARAJ: What was faxed to me was his evidence in chief.

MR VISSER: Unbelievable. Because you see I specifically, Mr Maharaj, drew the attention of Ms Poswa, if we can confine it to her then, to page 116 to 118 with the comment that if Mr Maharaj is going to give evidence, this is going to be relevant.

MR MAHARAJ: But it doesn't matter, I'm ready to answer.

MR VISSER: No, no, I know but that was not, never conveyed to you?

MR MAHARAJ: No.

MS POSWA: Mr Chair, can I just interject? I really don't remember that bit, can you remind me, was it said?

MR LAX: My recollection and I speak subject to, because I didn't make a huge note of it, but you asked specifically that that evidence be incorporated in Gen Steyn's evidence. Whether you indicated that it was of particular relevance to Mr Maharaj's testimony or not, I honestly have no recollection, but my fundamental recollection was that we wanted to avoid wasting time reading that into the record and it was incorporated by reference into the evidence of Gen Steyn.

MR MAHARAJ: That is what my note from Adv Poswa says, that in the fax that I received it had an N.B. at the bottom, it says:

but I did not have these files with me in Jo'burg.

MR VISSER: And Mr Chairman, Commissioner Lax is of course absolutely correct but what I also added was because Mr Wills and Ms Poswa had not been here during Deon Cele that we wanted to draw their attention specifically to that document in view of the fact that Mr Maharaj was going to give evidence about Operation Vula, but be that as it may. Now at page 116 of Exhibit B there's a reference to Siphiwe Nyanda, alias Kibusa, alias Carl and there's a reference to an article entitled "A Single Spark can start a Veld Fire - the perspectives of the armed seizure of power." Do you know of that article?

MR MAHARAJ: I don't recall the specific article at the moment, but certainly I would expect that there would be an article like that in the debates and discussions going on.

MR VISSER: I'm sorry, did you say that you would have become aware of it?

MR MAHARAJ: I say, I would expect such an article to appear in the debates and discussions going on in the columns of the African Communist.

MR VISSER: Yes, this was published, according to page 117 in the African Communist Journal of South African Communist Party Number 12, first quarter 1990, page 35 to 43. You would accept that?

MR MAHARAJ: Yes. I would accept that there's an article like that.

MR VISSER: Yes, that's all I'm asking you. And at the foot of page 116, would you accept that in that article there's a quotation which reads:

It goes on, talks about the sufferings etc and then it says:

and then I want to refer you to the words underlined further down,

My question to you is, was this something just in the mind of Mr Siphiwe Nyanda, or was this in fact part and parcel of the strategy and planning of Operation Vula?

MR MAHARAJ: Sir, Operation Vula commenced in 1986, it's strategic objectives would be defined by the Conference decision and National Executive decisions of the ANC. In the context of that, as developments went on, individual comrades in the ANC would have different views about the way forward. Siphiwe Nyanda, who was my Deputy Commander, had the view which he developed as events unfolded, that the great possibility was an insurrection. That was a view that he published in the African Communist for debate so that others could participate, agree, disagree and challenge his view. It was a public journal available on bookshelves around the world and with the unbanning of the Communist party on February the 2nd it would be available in the bookshops in South Africa, so that people could read and debate. it was a viewpoint he was advancing as his individual viewpoint here. Nothing in these quotations say this is the policy of the movement and that is how ideas grow, that is how correct tactics and strategies emerge.

MR VISSER: I want to put it to you Mr Maharaj that you are purposely playing it down and that in fact that this was the basis of the whole of Operation Vula and I'll tell you why I say so, that is the reason why you came into the country, to create structures, that is why you imported these masses of arms, all of that was directed at one purpose and that was at some point in time, there would be a spark to start a veld fire which would be the insurrection. I put it to you.

MR MAHARAJ: I put it to you, Sir, in response that if you have a closed mind and do not understand democratic functioning and debate,

MR VISSER: You can be derogatory to me, Mr Maharaj, it runs off my back like duck's water.

MR MAHARAJ: I'm used to that. I'm used to that. Close minds always have water running off their backs. I am making the point that the ANC Conference Decisions and Resolutions are there for the record. Why single out one article and make it the view point and official line of the movement? I'm saying the mandate of Vula was written in 1986 against the Conference decisions at Kabwe, this is a viewpoint being put for discussion and I would read to you, I think we need a copy of the African Communist to see what it says. After saying it is a journal of the South African Communist Party, it says it is a journal for discussion issues. That is why people write in the African Communist. They don't write in the African Communist on what is the official policy of the ANC and Vula was an ANC operation. This article is being used from the writings of Kibusa to extrapolate and make it the official mission of Vula.

MR VISSER: Mr Maharaj, was it never the policy and strategy of the ANC to topple the South African Government through a people's war, which would lead to a people's insurrection? Was that never the policy?

MR MAHARAJ: The policy I'm saying adopted at Kabwe was a people's war. Two issues of a strategic nature were still issues to be thrashed out by events. Would it be an armed confrontation leading to the conquest of power involving the masses or would it be the form of an uprising? On the uprising questions, two issues arose, would it be a general strike or would it be an uprising of the people with arms in hand. Debates in the African Communist even had a viewpoint once that the task of the ANC was just to distribute arms to the masses. That discussion defeated that viewpoint. So this is an evolving thing, but I'm saying that the official Kabwe resolution, was a resolution supporting the strategy that we would be heading for a people's war.

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Maharaj, I understood you to say, to tell this Committee yesterday, that this was a secret movement, that it was, it came from the President Tambo himself, that a very few people knew about this, that you were actually the architect, putting all of this together and even the National Executive Committee knew nothing about this. I'm talking about Operation Vula. Now you're taking it back to Kabwe as if the ANC would have known, or would have prescribed to what you were doing in Operation Vula. Please.

MR MAHARAJ: No, Sir, I'm saying that I was a member of the ANC Operation Vula would be conducted and its strategy would derive from the Conference Resolutions, we would not put a strategy differing with Conference resolution. Operation Vula, we had weapons, you say, lots, we were training people. Why we were training? We should have been just sitting waiting for the spark.

MR VISSER: You were waiting for the spark.

MR MAHARAJ: No way. I say we were training people, not just waiting for a spark.

MR VISSER: I see.

MR MAHARAJ: We were conducting operations here.

MR VISSER: Alright, alright. I put it to you simply that a people's insurrection in this country was always the policy and strategy of the ANC.

MR MAHARAJ: When you say always, how many years you using?

MR VISSER: It was towards the end, if you wish to restrict it, but it was at one time, if you want to put it that way, it was official ANC policy.

MR MAHARAJ: After the unbanning of the ANC there was even a debate that went on in the African Communist in 1991 whether we should go for a Leipzig option or not a Leipzig option. Now, I don't know whether counsel really has read the history of struggle as a historical process or whether he's just picking things from Col Stadler who was Security Branch.

MR VISSER: Mr Maharaj, on a simple issue we have now spent probably 5 minutes, with respect. Can I ask you just to answer this one question? Are you saying that a people's insurrection was never part of the ANC struggle?

MR MAHARAJ: I have said that the issue policy decision was people's war, what form, whether insurrection would be part of that process was a matter also of debate and that even in the insurrection there were two strategic issues.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: Yes, but if you heard me clearly, you wouldn't be putting the question.

MR VISSER: What I hear from you is that a people's insurrection was never a part of the ANC policy.

MR MAHARAJ: No, you're forcing things down my throat.

MR VISSER: You don't want to answer, Mr Maharaj.

MR MAHARAJ: Because you don't want to look at the Conference Resolutions.

MR VISSER: Alright, can we go on?

MR MAHARAJ: Sure.

MR VISSER: I want to refer you to the contents of paragraph 10 and this is this Stadler now speaking, which you have just referred to:

and it says:

The said paragraph reads as follows, gives a reference:

That's the comment of Stadler

he doesn't know what that stands for,

You can explain just in a moment.

Alright, are there preliminary comments which you wish to make?

MR MAHARAJ: That's an invitation.

MR VISSER: You want to leave at 2 o'clock, Mr Maharaj.

MR MAHARAJ: Please don't stop me when I'm making the comments.

MR VISSER: You're the one that wants to leave on the plane at 2 o'clock.

MR MAHARAJ: If you ask me questions that are not pointed, you'll get answers that are very educative. So, this is a document, chapter 17 from Col Stadler's book. It claims that it has, it is an extract from the records of Vula communications. I would like the Committee to first indicate to me and guide me whether this falls within second-hand information or whether really it is accepted as Vula records?

MR VISSER: Well, just tell us whether you accept it as correct or not.

MR MAHARAJ: I don't.

MR VISSER: You don't. Alright.

MR MAHARAJ: Wait a minute, wait a minute, you asked me to comment. I would like to know whether Col Stadler has got a copy of the Vula communications, if as is being claimed that all records are destroyed.

MR VISSER: No, no.

MR MAHARAJ: It is they saying that the Vula records are available to Col Stadler, file those records.

MR VISSER: Mr Maharaj, it could never have been claimed that all records had been destroyed, certainly that can't be correct. Most of the records probably have been destroyed, but some records remain and if you want to see the print-out, the computer print-out, perhaps we could arrange for you to see it. If Stadler has that available, there's no reason ...(intervention)

MR MAHARAJ: I thought any filing of a record would need to authenticate that record and Stadler's quoting does not authenticate it.

MR VISSER: Yes, I take your point from a legal point of view, I take your point, but this is a Commission of Inquiry, we're inquiring into things. Now let us just test this.

MR MAHARAJ: Yes.

MR VISSER: Let's just test this. Do you recall an encoded message which referred to Ntaba and to the requirement of two pieces sent by you to Nyanda?

MR MAHARAJ: Hold on, hold on. Chairperson, your guidance please. Has it got any relevance to the application?

MR VISSER: Yes, I see you don't want to answer these questions, do you?

MR MAHARAJ: Not because I don't want to answer it, your conclusion here and Stadler's conclusion is that we were trying to assassinate Madiba.

MR VISSER: Who is Madiba?

MR MAHARAJ: Madiba is Mandela.

MR VISSER: Yes. Now some policeman.

MR MAHARAJ: Mandela, I served under Mandela, as his Minister, he appointed me but he has problems.

MR VISSER: Madiba is no policeman.

MR LAX: Just let's have one person talking at the same time, please.

MR MAHARAJ: Now, I'm saying I have no problems about answering on these matters when they are made relevant because I have waited for the day when you put this properly with the records of Vula. I'll show you how Stadler was, is really trying to do propaganda and he thought by putting this and putting his interpretation and putting a set of questions on page 118, he thinks he's putting me in the dock. Well I'm in nobody's dock. I'm not facing any charges, Mandela appointed me as his Minister and right now he and I remain the closest of friends. Stadler hasn't planted a seed of dissension between us.

MR VISSER: Yes, alright.

MR MAHARAJ: So he's completely wild.

MR VISSER: Alright, at page 118 of Exhibit B, paragraph 11, I just want to read that to you.

I'm going to read it as :

MS POSWA: Can I just interject Mr Chair. Should we incorporate this as well, or what is going on now? Does this form part of Mr Steyn's statement, or what is happening now?

MR VISSER: The whole of Exhibit B is before you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: What is the relevance of all this?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, we have witness here which has come to this Committee without any locus standi, except as a witness. He has come...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: When you said he does not accept this passage is correct, do you intend to call someone to prove the passage.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I've already accepted his evidence in that regard. I thought you were asking me about the basis of the questions. No, no, I thought I made it clear. If he said that he doesn't accept it, well we go on.

CHAIRPERSON: You aren't, you're now still questioning him on those passages.

MR VISSER: No, Mr Chairman, he didn't accept the passage which deals with the assassination of Madiba and the quotation which, of the encoded message by Stadler in his book "The Other Side of the Story", that's how I understood his evidence and that being so, I leave it. I leave it at that, Mr Chairman. I'm now on to something else, Mr Chairman, I'm going on. At page 118, paragraph 11.1:

MR LAX: Sorry, we've read all that, let's, we've got as far as the listing of what was found in the vehicle.

MR VISSER: Thank you, thank you Commissioner Lax. You see, I want to point out to you that one of the items that was found, it was the second one, 1 x optical night sight for the above weapon, that is for the 45 calibre sub-machine gun.

MR MAHARAJ: Who wrote "for the above weapon"?

MR VISSER: You say that is incorrect?

MR MAHARAJ: I want to show you Chair, I want to show you what is happening here by Stadler. You find an optical night sight and I want to tell you what optical night sight that was because I brought it in Vula in 1988, it was a NATO night sight, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation night sight.

MR VISSER: NATO night sight.

MR MAHARAJ: Yes, which we bought on the black market in Europe for Five thousand pounds.

MR VISSER: To do what with?

MR MAHARAJ: To shoot the enemy.

MR VISSER: And is this ...(intervention)

MR MAHARAJ: And the enemy was not Mandela.

MR VISSER: Yes, alright.

MR MAHARAJ: The enemy was the apartheid regime.

MR VISSER: I accept that.

MR MAHARAJ: Who put this "night sight for the above weapon"? That is Stadler.

MR VISSER: You say that's wrong?

MR MAHARAJ: He is building a case.

MR VISSER: I see, alright.

MR MAHARAJ: And then this sub-machine gun, nothing to do with this paragraph 2 weeks before my arrest.

MR VISSER: Alright.

MR MAHARAJ: Because he brought in the night sight two years ago. Our sub-machine gun, I don't know how many months before.

MR VISSER: Answer this question.

MR MAHARAJ: This paragraph which talks about enemy, I'll tell you there's only one people who've been my enemy. My enemy has been the apartheid regime.

MR VISSER: And the applicants in this application.

MR MAHARAJ: But Stadler, Stadler, reading into the word enemy group, suddenly wants to present as if to say the enemy of Mac Maharaj and Jacob Zuma is Mandela.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: You don't have the normal intelligence to read that ANC literature says enemy is the apartheid regime.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: So you play games there and you want to put me questions by Stadler. Propaganda.

MR VISSER: Mr Maharaj, can we try to get you on the plane at 2 o'clock?

MR MAHARAJ: I didn't know you were always so helpful to me.

MR VISSER: I really certainly want to finish.

MR MAHARAJ: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Did you at any stage ask Mr Nyanda to let you have a piece with an optical sight?

MR MAHARAJ: To ask Mr Nyanda? I don't have to ask him, he's my deputy.

MR VISSER: Could you have ordered him? Do you remember it?

MR MAHARAJ: I did not ask Nyanda to give me a piece. I did not ask Nyanda to give me a piece.

MR VISSER: I wouldn't suppose that you have a copy of The Other Side of the Story on the table before you?

MR MAHARAJ: No.

MR VISSER: Can I hand you a copy, please?

MR MAHARAJ: Welcome.

CHAIRPERSON: What are we going into all this about? I'm completely lost Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, we are dealing ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: We are investigating the application for amnesty arising out of the deaths of two people.

MR VISSER: Yes and Mr Chairman, I'm dealing with the credibility of this witness at the moment.

MR MAHARAJ: Oh.

MR VISSER: And, I'm finished, I just want to point to him some photographs contained in The Other Side of the Story and I want him to identify the firearm, Mr Chairman, he's given evidence about that.

CHAIRPERSON: What firearm are you talking about?

MR VISSER: One which they bought on the black market.

CHAIRPERSON: That is a night sight.

MR VISSER: They bought a night sight, yes.

MR VISSER: May I show the witness this photograph? I'm going to show you photographs. I'm going to show you photographs contained in "The Other Side of the Story" at page 198, the very last page, and I'm going to tell you what the background is. It is alleged that the articles which you see on that page in the photographs was confiscated from the possession of Mr Nyanda when he was arrested. On that assumption I want to ask you to look and see whether you can see a firearm on that, on any of the photographs?

MR MAHARAJ: Yes. No, but I see a firearm.

MR VISSER: Yes. Can you identify that firearm?

MR MAHARAJ: No, I can't.

MR VISSER: I see.

MR MAHARAJ: Chairperson, the firearm carries markings, it has numbers and if you tell me that just from this photograph I must turn round and say it's a particular firearm, I would be an incredible ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: If you want to tell us today that you can't say it's an Uzzi, or a Rocket Launcher, or a PMC, I'm happy to accept your answer?

MR MAHARAJ: Well, why doesn't he ask the question to say, is this, what make of firearm?

MR VISSER: Alright, what make of firearm?

MR MAHARAJ: Why say identify the firearm when he's trying to link me and says it's credibility, trying to link me with a weapon and trying to put it back into paragraph 10 of Stadler?

MR LAX: Sorry Mr Maharaj, if I could just cut this short, do you know what sort of weapon that is?

MR MAHARAJ: No, I don't know.

MR VISSER: I have no further questions to this witness, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Perhaps you'd just care to look at those photographs, Mr Chairman, and our submission in argument will be that they speak for themselves.

MR MAHARAJ: Sir, that night site too, there's a problem in that photograph. The NATO night site is a single piece, not a double piece. Single piece, it was state of the art in 1987. Huge developments since then, but the essential point that counsel has tried to say is that he's testing my credibility by saying that I was trying to assassinate Mandela.

CHAIRPERSON: I think you've said that several times and I don't think that counsel has in fact said it or put it to you, Mr Maharaj. Did you say you'd concluded.

MR VISSER: I never suggested it, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - mike not on)

MS THABETHE: No, questions Mr Chair.

MS POSWA: No re-examination.

MR WILLS: I have no questions, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR MAHARAJ: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - mike not on)

MR VISSER: With pleasure, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: You're excused.

MR MAHARAJ: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, just at the moment we have a little logistical problem and that is that the photocopy machine, upon which we have to rely heavily as well as the friendly assistance of Ms Thabethe to reproduce matters, we have not been able to get the copies of the statements which I drew over the weekend ready and it certainly will save time if we have it before us, could we perhaps ask you to stand down for a moment or even take an early lunch, I'm not sure which you will prefer, in order for us to see whether we can sort out this problem, so that we can go on and attempt to finish the rest of the witnesses this afternoon?

CHAIRPERSON: I don't know ...(indistinct - mike not on)

MR VISSER: Yes. We'll think of that.

CHAIRPERSON: ...We'll adjourn now till half-past one.

MR VISSER: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll adjourn now till half-past one.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: The procedure was so far that Mr Mac Maharaj was interposed and he was a witness on behalf of the victims. We have three witnesses left of the applicants, Mr Chairman. These witnesses are all operators, to call them that, for want of a better expression, who followed orders of Mr Botha. What we did, however, Mr Chairman, because you did not hear the evidence of Mr Botha who gave evidence about all the facts, we are going to lead Mr Wasserman slightly out of turn, Mr Chairman in order to give you some background and we will lead his evidence, not fully, but just to give you some background of the incident and we therefore call Mr Wasserman. He is available and ready to take the oath. He has no objection to taking the oath. He will give his evidence in English, Mr Chairman.

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Wasserman, you have given evidence before the Amnesty Committee hearing the incidents presently in this cycle here at Durban, although there was a different Chairman. Is that correct?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Sir.

MR VISSER: Do you repeat and incorporate your previous evidence and the references you made to other evidence also in your evidence today?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Your amnesty application appears in the Ndaba bundle at pages 40 to 54 where you deal with this specific incident at page 50, is that correct?

CHAIRPERSON: Correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: You have also drafted, or a document was drafted on instructions from you, setting out a synopsis of your evidence, which you now have before you and which, Mr Chairman, we beg leave to hand in as Exhibit K, do you also confirm the correctness of the contents thereof, subject to your evidence which you are about to give now?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Will you tell the Committee if you will, what you recall about this incident, in paragraph 1 at page 2?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir. Mr Chairman I'm reminded that the incident in question took place in the period 7 to 15 July 1990. I first became involved in this incident when I was summonsed by Maj du Preez to the C R Swart Square offices of the Security Branch in Durban. At the offices I found a person being held who had apparently been arrested by an askari. At some stage Col Botha requested to speak to us in another office. Present there were Col Taylor, Col Botha, Maj du Preez and myself. It may have been that van der Westhuizen might also have been present.

Col Botha informed us that the person held, i.e. Charles Ndaba, MK Zwelakhe, was his informant. I remember being surprised by this news in view of the high profile of Mr Ndaba. It was made clear during the discussion that Ndaba's arrest was a big mistake and that he would have to be released. Botha asked Taylor to ensure that the askari did not spread the story that he had arrested Ndaba for the fear that it might become known that Ndaba was arrested by the Security Branch and immediately released, thereby raising the question whether he might be an informer of the Security Branch.

It was decided to transfer Ndaba to a safe-house in Verulam which we made use of at the time. This was in order to allow for some time to pass in order to monitor the situation. and allow Botha an opportunity of briefing or debriefing Ndaba.

MR VISSER: At C R Swart Square, was Mr Ndaba assaulted in any way in your presence?

MR WASSERMAN: Not in my presence Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Could I ask you just perhaps to go slightly slower so that the interpreter can keep up with the interpretation, Mr Wasserman?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Please continue. Paragraph 7.

MR WASSERMAN: At some stage during the day we were informed that Ndaba had a prior appointment to meet with Mr Mbuso Shabalala and it was decided that he should keep the appointment. We went to the appointed spot with him in order to monitor the meeting in case Mr Ndaba's arrest that day, might have placed him in danger because we were not certain whether the ANC might have received information about it. At the time we suspected that there was an ANC mole who had been infiltrated into the Security Branch at C R Swart Square. This suspicion was later confirmed although not proved.

MR VISSER: Well, we know from the evidence of Mr Maharaj that this was in fact so.

MR WASSERMAN: Correct.

MR VISSER: Please continue.

MR WASSERMAN: At the appointed place, Col Botha, Sgt van der Westhuizen and Ndaba got out of the car and walked to the pre-arranged meeting place. They then disappeared from sight. We were then called on the radio by Botha who gave us the position and description of a car into which Ndaba had got into. Du Preez and I drove to a point where we could observe the car and stopped. We knew that a secret signal had been agreed upon in advance for Ndaba to give should he feel threatened.

At some stage Ndaba gave the signal and we immediately left our vehicle and approached the blue Toyota Corolla.

MR VISSER: Can I just stop you there? Did you actually see him give the signal or was it that you were told?

MR WASSERMAN: I never saw the signal being given myself.

MR VISSER: Were you told to move in?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes.

MR VISSER: By whom?

MR WASSERMAN: By Maj du Preez.

MR VISSER: By Maj du Preez.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Alright.

MR WASSERMAN: We "arrested" Ndaba and Mbuso Shabalala, who's MK name was Jack.

MR VISSER: Now can I just ask you for some clarification there? You see Mr Botha gave evidence to say that his recollection was that only Mr Shabalala was "arrested", but not Mr Ndaba. What was your impression? What was the situation there?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, at the "arrest" of Shabalala, Ndaba was also "arrested", it would appear as though he was arrested and he was taken away by Mr van der Westhuizen.

MR VISSER: Yes. Why did, in your mind, why was it important to make it appear that Mr Ndaba was also being arrested, together with Shabalala?

MR WASSERMAN: This would indicate that Mr Ndaba was not getting preferential treatment and he was also arrested.

MR VISSER: Yes, not to raise suspicions with Mr Shabalala.

MR WASSERMAN: That is the correct position.

MR VISSER: What precisely was your part in this "arrest"? Who did you deal with?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, du Preez and I entered the back of the vehicle and pulled Mr Shabalala into the back, where he was detained by us.

MR VISSER: Was he sitting upright, or what was the position, when you pulled him to the back?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, he was sitting upright Mr Chairman, then we pulled him over the seat, to us in the back of the vehicle.

MR VISSER: Yes. And after that had happened, was he then in an upright position of what?

MR WASSERMAN: He was placed down on the seat with this head down.

MR VISSER: Yes. Could he see outside what was happening with Ndaba from the position in which he was in?

MR WASSERMAN: He would be unable to see.

MR VISSER: Alright. What happened then?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, du Preez and I transported Shabalala in his vehicle to the safe-house on the instructions of Mr Botha. While Botha and Ndaba followed in Botha's vehicle.

MR VISSER: Shabalala's vehicle, what was that? What was the make and the colour of the vehicle?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, it was a blue Toyota Corolla.

MR VISSER: Right. What happened at the safe-house?

MR WASSERMAN: At the safe-house we locked Shabalala into one of the bedrooms. In view of the fact that Ndaba was already a Security Branch informer and given his status in MK, he was previously acting Commander of MK Natal Machinery in Swaziland, I was given to understand that we might not be interested in any information which Shabalala might be able to give us, nor were we told we had to attempt to recruit him as an informer. He was simply detained and as far as I know not seriously questioned. Neither Ndaba nor Shabalala were assaulted or ill-treated in any way throughout the period in which they were kept at the safe-house.

MR VISSER: Did you have conversations with Mr Shabalala?

MR WASSERMAN: Periodic conversations, yes, Sir.

MR VISSER: But not any attempt at interrogation or recruitment, as you said.

MR WASSERMAN: None at all, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Alright. Go on.

MR WASSERMAN: I was aware of a dilemma which was coming about as this arrest of Shabalala. We did not know whether Shabalala might not become suspicious that Ndaba had led us to him.

ADV BOSMAN: Mr Visser, can I just come in here? Mr Wasserman I would like you just to clarify paragraph 10, where you state that,

Are you aware of the members of C20 who questioned him?

MR WASSERMAN: I'm aware of the presence of C20 at that place but I didn't participate with them in any questioning.

ADV BOSMAN: Do you know whether they questioned him?

MR WASSERMAN: They did talk with him.

ADV BOSMAN: Thank you.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Thank you to Commissioner Bosman. Would you please continue then?

MR WASSERMAN: The problem became compounded when it appeared that Shabalala in fact suspected Ndaba of working with the police. I remember him saying as much an I might add that Shabalala was robust and aggressive throughout. During the period 7 to 14 July, du Preez, van der Westhuizen and myself guarded Shabalala and Ndaba in turn. At some point during the weekend, Col Botha briefed us that he had obtained information from Ndaba which pointed to a massive operation run by the ANC SACP to incite a people's revolt. It was clear that the information was of fundamental importance and that it would probably materially affect the negotiation process which was under way at the time.

On the 12th of July 1990, as far as I can remember, Maj du Preez and myself were conducting an observation.

MR VISSER: Now, perhaps you could just fill us in a little bit. Tell us about this observation. Where was it?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, we were observing a place called the Knoll.

MR VISSER: K-N-O-L-L?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Sir.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR WASSERMAN: And we were observing the movements of persons entering the premises and leaving them.

MR VISSER: Alright. And just continue then.

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman at the time of conducting an observation, at the time Mr Siphiwe Nyanda became aware of our observation and this necessitated his arrest for fear that he might warn others of the police, that the police were onto them and for fear that he might go into hiding.

MR VISSER: What, how did you arrive at the conclusion that your cover was blown, so to speak?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, we followed Mr Nyanda from the Knoll quite a long distance into town.

MR VISSER: Was he walking and you walking, or what was the position?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, he was in a Toyota Cressida. He was alone.

MR VISSER: And you followed him with what?

MR WASSERMAN: Du Preez and I were in a Nissan, Nissan Sedan.

MR VISSER: Yes. And what happened then as far as the arrest was concerned?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, we anticipated that Mr Nyanda had cottoned on to our surveillance and we then moved in, blocked his vehicle.

MR VISSER: Did you call other, did you call for assistance on the radio?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, there was a second vehicle accompanying us on the surveillance.

MR VISSER: Alright. You blocked him in.

MR WASSERMAN: We blocked him in on the road and du Preez and I alighted from our vehicle and he was formerly arrested and placed into our motor vehicle.

MR VISSER: What happened to his motor vehicle?

MR WASSERMAN: One of the members in the second vehicle of ours then commenced to drive that vehicle.

MR VISSER: And where did you go?

MR WASSERMAN: We proceeded directly to C R Swart Square.

MR VISSER: Now, just continue with what is stated in your statement.

MR WASSERMAN: Carrying on from the statement it states.

MR VISSER: He was arrested with?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir, he was arrested with certain weapons in his possession, photographs of which appear in The Other Side of the Story at the last page.

MR VISSER: Now, perhaps that does not set out the position accurately as it could have. When you say he was in possession of these weapons would you just explain to the Chairman how it came about that they were found and when they were found and where they were found.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman. And upon arrest, we transported Mr Nyanda in our vehicle to C R Swart and another member drove Mr Nyanda's car to C R Swart Square and the vehicle was cursory searched and gone through by myself, but no weapons were found in the vehicle during the cursory search. It was at a later stage that a thorough search was done on the vehicle and then the weapon was recovered and that is the one that appears on the last page of The Other Side of the Story.

MR VISSER: What kind of weapon is that?

MR WASSERMAN: I'm not sure of the weapon. No, I see it, I have heard, it's got a silencer on it and it's a 45 calibre, but the actual make, I don't recall.

MR VISSER: Is it not a common weapon that you were used to?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: That you're accustomed to.

MR WASSERMAN: No, it's not a common one carried by liberation forces.

MR VISSER: Alright. So in fact the weapons, to put it accurately, the weapon was discovered later not at the same time as the arrest, but it was discovered in Mr Nyanda's car?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Sir.

MR VISSER: Were you present at all when the weapons were taken out of that car?

MR WASSERMAN: I was not, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And you wouldn't know what exactly was found there?

MR WASSERMAN: I would not, Sir.

MR VISSER: Alright. Now there was evidence by Mr Botha and Mr Steyn that Head Office had given instructions, I believe it was on the 11th that there should preferably be no arrests before the 16th of July which was later on so that there could be time to notify various institutions, intelligence organisations, embassies etc. At the time when Mr Nyanda was arrested, had that instruction been conveyed to you?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Now, let us assume for a moment that you had an instruction, that you had received an instruction, that you should not go ahead with arrests. Given the circumstances as you experience them and as you've told the Committee now, what would you have done in regard to the arrest of Mr Nyanda?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, we would have gone ahead with the arrest of Mr Nyanda.

MR VISSER: Why?

MR WASSERMAN: Due to the fact that he had detected, his counter surveillance had proved positive, he had detected us and he would have warned other parties and they would have gone into hiding.

MR VISSER: They would have gone into hiding. Yes. Alright. Please continue.

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, at some stage Ndaba became anxious and indicated that he intended to divulge his role as an informer to the SAP, to the ANC. I was aware that Botha was making attempts to convince him to desist from the idea. Although I cannot remember the details or the date thereof, we were informed from time to time about the progress or rather the lack of progress which Botha had with these attempts.

The next important moment which I recall was when Botha informed us that Ndaba persisted with his intention of taking his chances with the ANC and as such could not be allowed to go free under any circumstances because of the knowledge that Ndaba possessed about other informants and couriers of the Security Branch. Botha informed us that there was no other option than to eliminate Ndaba. The decision that Ndaba was to be eliminated, changed the situation for Shabalala. Where previously he could not have been released for fear of him compromising Ndaba, that consideration fell away. Col Botha nevertheless decided that Shabalala should also be eliminated by reason of the fact that he would tell the ANC that he would be abducted by the police and that he was unlawfully detained and that he would also in all probability have told the ANC that Ndaba had been detained with him and of his suspicion that the police had killed him. During the period of time when negotiations were under way, these revelations would have caused a sensation that would have embarrassed the National Party and the Government.

We were thus instructed by Col Botha to assist with the elimination of both Ndaba and Shabalala.

MR VISSER: As we know, this took place during the day of the 14th of July 1990.

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Please continue.

MR WASSERMAN: I recall that on a particular night, we took Ndaba and Shabalala out of the house and drove off with them in a VW kombi on the North Coast road on the pretext that they were being moved to another safe-house. Van der Westhuizen, who had picked a spot earlier during the day, drove us to the river mouth of the Tugela River. We stopped near the bushes at the river mouth and van der Westhuizen and I got out under the pretext that we wanted to relieve ourselves. In fact, we went to the river mouth to make sure that the coast was clear.

When we returned Botha said that everyone had to go for a leak and seeing that we had a long road ahead of us. We got out of the kombi and I remember that I was close to Ndaba and Shabalala because after they had relieved themselves, I touched them both on the shoulders with a downward motion, and instructed them to sit.

MR VISSER: Where were you now? Were you still at the kombi, or where were you?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, we had walked 20 to 30 metres away from the kombi.

MR VISSER: Were you on the banks of the river mouth?

MR WASSERMAN: We were on the banks of the Tugela River mouth.

MR VISSER: Alright.

MR WASSERMAN: Virtually immediately two shots were fired, one by Botha who shot Mr Ndaba and the other by du Preez who shot Mr Shabalala, both in the head. Both died instantaneously. Each was given another shot to make certain that they were dead.

I went back to the kombi where van der Westhuizen was keeping observation and to the best of my recollection, he helped me carry the hessian cloth, concrete pole and wire to the scene whereafter he again went back to the kombi to keep observation.

MR VISSER: Now these articles, were they brought along with you from wherever you were before you went to the River Mouth?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman, they came from the safe-house.

MR VISSER: From the safe-house.

MR WASSERMAN: In Verulam.

MR VISSER: Alright.

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, we tied the pole and wrapped the hessian around the bodies of the two men with binding wire and they were placed in the water alongside the bank of the River Mouth. Before the bodies were placed into the river, their clothes were removed and placed in a black plastic bag which we took along with us back to the safe-house in Verulam. We remained a while to make sure that we cleaned up the area of all possible signs of what had happened and to make sure that the bodies did not come afloat.

We then returned to Verulam where we burned the clothes.

MR VISSER: Yes. I think Botha said you also burned some branches with which the blood was swept away. Do you have any recollection of that?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman, there was some branches, but some branches were thrown into the river.

MR VISSER: Alright. Please continue.

MR WASSERMAN: Later that same evening on the orders of Col Botha, du Preez and I took out the Toyota Corolla out of the garage and drove some distance to a dumping sight near the tarred road but in a rural area. There we searched the car and doused it with petrol and set it alight. We remained in the vicinity of the burning car just long enough to be certain that it would be burned out completely.

MR VISSER: Later Mr Wasserman, did you attempt to find this site again and to point it out to the Investigation Unit Inspectors of the TRC?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct, Mr Chair.

MR VISSER: Were you able to find this site?

MR WASSERMAN: We weren't able to find the site, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Alright. Please continue.

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, my attention has been drawn to allegations mad by one Thuzi and Zungu.

MR VISSER: Can you just stop there for a moment, please?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, we are referring to Exhibit G, page 15 where you will find a statement by one Zebron Thuzi. My attorney tells me its F. I'm sorry it must F, yes, I'm sorry Mr Chairman and also in F you will find at page 19 the statement of one Phillip Zungu (Z-U-N-G-U). These are the documents which are now being referred to Mr Chairperson. Perhaps, more specifically, I might draw your attention to, if we first look at Mr Thuzi's statement, there's a build-up at page 16 in paragraph 7 and 8 where he was told according to him by Taylor to go and sleep in a certain place and where the next morning he went to the workshop and he found Taylor, du Preez and Lawrie, which is an obvious reference to Mr Wasserman and the next paragraph Mr Chairman, is paragraph 9, where he talks of a chopped up vehicle which he describes as a light blue Toyota Corolla and then he goes on in paragraph 10 to say, the Monday in the afternoon, du Preez arrived with a white bakkie and although he says he helped him off load the chopped up spares, he's sure to have intended to say that he helped him load the spares which was chopped up, Mr Chairman and then in paragraph 11 there's a reference to the engine which stayed there for 2 or 3 weeks and he says that he took for himself the seat part of the rear seat and he says that he's still got part of it left Mr Chairman and also I think he mentions a carpet, which he also took.

That is a summary of his evidence and then page 20, Mr Chairman, and paragraph 6 there's a reference to spare parts of a motor vehicle, an engine and a gearbox and he makes the statement at the bottom of page 20 of Exhibit F:

Thuzi he says, made a report about the vehicle and then he saw that some of the parts were removed by du Preez and Wasserman in a White Isuzu bakkie, he says in paragraph 7 and that the engine remained behind for some time and later he himself helped to load the engine onto the same bakkie. Now that his what we are referring to now is it not, Mr Wasserman?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Sir.

MR VISSER: Now will you just tell the Committee, this place which is referred to as a place in Camperdown by these two witnesses, what transpired there?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, this was Col Taylor's headquarters. It was Col Taylor's askari farm.

MR VISSER: It was a farm was it not?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman it was a farm with two houses on it and a workshop.

MR VISSER: And who were accommodated there?

MR WASSERMAN: The askaris were accommodated there.

MR VISSER: And you say there was a workshop on the farm?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And did you ever visit that workshop?

MR WASSERMAN: I did, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And did du Preez also visit that workshop?

MR WASSERMAN: He did, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And what did you go and do there?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, there we worked on many motor vehicles. We resprayed them, we fixed them up. We would fix them.

MR VISSER: What was that in aid of?

MR WASSERMAN: In the course of our duties and infiltration methods we would change the appearance of vehicles and the colours of vehicle on numerous occasions, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Yes. And were some of these vehicles also used by the askaris?

MR WASSERMAN: They were Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Will you then just continue at paragraph 31?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I have no recollection of a blue Toyota being chopped up at the farm, but I cannot place it in dispute. What I can say, however, is that if that happened, it was not Mr Shabalala's vehicle because I am absolutely certain that that vehicle was destroyed by fire.

MR VISSER: What do you say about the allegation that you were present when certain parts of a chopped up vehicle was loaded onto a white Isuzu bakkie? Can you recall that to mind?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, that's incorrect.

MR VISSER: You say it didn't happen.

MR WASSERMAN: That didn't happen, Mr Chairman,

MR VISSER: Did you have anything to do with the loading of an engine at any point in time? Is that possible?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, yes I would, well, vehicle parts, tyres, jacks, that kind of thing.

MR VISSER: Engines?

MR WASSERMAN: Parts of engines, yes.

MR VISSER: Not whole engines?

MR WASSERMAN: Never a whole engine.

MR VISSER: Alright. Can you explain to the Committee why you were motivated to participate in these events?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, my actions to participate in the events to this incident and to associate myself therewith, were prompted by my complete belief that what I did, I did while executing my duties as a policeman, the way that I saw it, as my obligation during the time of conflict and political violence at the time. We were not engaged in a conventional war where the sides could be identified and attacks were limited against visible enemies. It was an unconventional war situation as was explained by Gen Steyn in his evidence. During this conflict, we as Security policemen were conditioned by speeches of politicians and directions by our senior officers, to do everything that was in our power to confront the revolutionary onslaught at all costs. There were times when in terms of the prevailing legislation of the time, it was not possible to solve all the problems that came one's way. The present case is perhaps an example of such an instance. in view of the above, I was of the bona fide belief that what I did in the present instance in order to combat or derail the revolutionary onslaught and to protect the government and National Party from political embarrassment, fell within my express or implied authority. I did not participate in the events for any personal gain, or driven by personal spite or malice and I received no reward.

MR VISSER: Mr Wasserman, can I just briefly refer you to Exhibit J which was handed in by the previous witness, Mr Maharaj? Mr Chairman, if it would meet with your satisfaction, I do not intend to go through each of those items with Mr Wasserman, I'm simply going to ask him whether he agrees with what I put to the witness, yea or nay, but if you feel that I should, then I'll go through the exercise, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, has he gone through them?

MR VISSER: Mr Wasserman, were you here during the cross-examination of Mr Maharaj?

MR WASSERMAN: I was, Sir.

MR VISSER: Were you present when I put to him certain explanations of what certain letters of the alphabet that precede numbers and other letters in Exhibit J mean?

MR WASSERMAN: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Did you agree with the evidence which I put to him about the meaning of those letters?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman, as best as I heard.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I can go through them all again if you require that. Not much turns on it, Mr Chairman, with respect.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, there's one I would like to ask him about. We haven't been told about.

MR VISSER: Yes, certainly.

CHAIRPERSON: What is PNV for?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, PN is the division of Port Natal, V for Veiligheidstak, Security Branch, V.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry?

MR WASSERMAN: V is for Veiligheid. So that identifies, that prefix shows that its Port Natal Security Branch.

CHAIRPERSON: And the 4?

MR WASSERMAN: The 4 means Black, the subject that you are about to, that reference is going to be the reference number of a black man.

MR VISSER: And PNV 1 would have been a reference to what?

MR WASSERMAN: A Port Natal subject, Security subject, white.

MR VISSER: And 2?

MR WASSERMAN: Would be the same, but a coloured subject.

MR VISSER: And three?

MR WASSERMAN: Port Natal, Security Branch, coloured subject, Indian, 3 would be Indian.

MR VISSER: Did that always remain the position, or did that change at some point?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman that was countrywide but the prefix in front would change for the relevant division.

MR VISSER: Yes, but the 1, 2, 3 and 4, the racial classification if I may call it that, did that remain the same or did that change?

MR WASSERMAN: It was a national referencing system, it stayed the same.

MR LAX: Just while we're on the subject, so the V therefore refers to a Security subject, Veiligheids onderwerp? Would that be correct?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR LAX: In other words somebody who was

MR WASSERMAN: Enjoying the attention of the branch.

MR LAX: Under the attention of the branch?

MR WASSERMAN: That's correct.

MR LAX: Yes. And if one looks at page 11 of that annexure.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chair?

MR LAX: If you look next to the name Ndaba, in the second line of that entry after the photograph reference, under "Afdelings verwysing" PNV4 what's the stroke V for?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, that indicates that that V before the number, that that was an interim file, so PNV4, Port Natal Security Branch, 4 - black, the V is an interim file and as that file grows the V would drop away and get the next figures after that 4 stroke, would then be what the new file would be.

MR LAX: So this implied that that person was newly brought to your attention?

MR WASSERMAN: Not necessarily, Mr Chairman, sometimes the V would remain for a considerable period of time, it was merely an administration thing.

MR KNIGHT: And why, I'm just interested, the next entry in respect of Zandile, has the same reference. Both at a regional level and at an H Q level. The only difference is that at an HQ level, there's no PN in brackets behind it.

MR WASSERMAN: I can point that out, Mr Chairman. What happened round about this period of time, a new computer system, reference system was being installed at S H Q and they were doing away with the 1, 2, 3, 4 reference numbers and everybody was just getting a V, for Veiligheid and then the next number would just be how the computer would get it and the PN would show the division or the region from which the suspect emanated from, so if that was OTV then you'd know that Ndwandwe came from Oos Transvaal.

MR LAX: Okay.

MR VISSER: Perhaps just to add to the question which Commissioner Lax has just put to you, to make it absolutely clear, wee files kept by the Security Branch only on suspects or on a variety of people?

MR WASSERMAN: On a variety of persons, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Because at page 11 of Exhibit J1 one has Buthelezi, Gatsha, for example, who also has a file. Both at divisional level as well as at Security Head Office.

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Sir.

MR VISSER: Yes. Now you applied ...(intervention)

MR LAX: Just one last aspect, before we move away from there. If you could just clear up an aspect that occurred to me at any rate. On page 12 there's a "Verspreiding" heading and items 1 to 5 indicate obviously departments, items 6 to, I can't read the others but 12 at any rate look like file references, is that correct?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, the first five, L1 and L2, were desks at Headquarters.

CHAIRPERSON: Were what?

MR WASSERMAN: Desks. Security desk at Headquarters.

MR LAX: So what would L stand for and A?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman.

MR LAX: You've got L1 and A1.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman, I think section A was ANC general affairs and L, I forget what it was, I think it might have been an analytical section.

MR LAX: Alright.

MR WASSERMAN: I don't - there were many of those.

MR LAX: But the others are clearly some of the same reference numbers as appear in the previous list.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman, then the O Transvaal, Northern Natal, that would have been the other regions that this report was distributed to, then after that, NV9/126 Swaziland, that Port Natal, Security Branch 916 was the number for the ANC, that was our reference number for ANC, then the numbers underneath that, PN 666, that would be a copy to the source file of the agent, PNV 22/29/16 was the Inkatha file, so there would have been a copy made for that, for some reason, it will be in the contents of the report, I can't comment now.

MR VISSER: Would that have been an Inkatha file kept by the Security Police, or kept by Inkatha?

MR WASSERMAN: No that's the Security Branch's code reference for Inkatha.

MR VISSER: Alright, continue.

MR WASSERMAN: PNV 13/436, that was, now I can't recall but I heard today maybe the UDF file, so a copy would have been placed in that. PNV4/35 as we've seen now, was Mangosotho Buthelezi's personal file, so copy 10 would have gone into that. Copy 11, PNV4/V/139, was the intermittent file for Mr Ndaba and then number 12SV 665 Port Natal was Zandile's file, that would have been filed in that file.

MR LAX: ...the evidence of Mr Maharaj is this went to 15 different departments and in fact it only went to about 3 other stations, the rest are all sub-files within your own filing system.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir, all at Port Natal, PNB.

MR LAX: I just wanted to correct that apparent inaccuracy.

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Chairperson we did in fact draw attention to the very fact that you mentioned, that Commissioner Lax mentioned, when we cross-examined Mr Maharaj, because that appears from page 1 to which regions the report was sent, where you will find Oos Transvaal, Natal and Noord Natal in the right-hand column, Mr Chairman, but I didn't realise that there might be a problem with that.

CHAIRPERSON: Just let's go on to the next one. V6665/PN. Would that be an informer.

MR WASSERMAN: Page, please Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Page 12, the list you've just been looking at.

MR LAX: That's Zandile. She's Filla Portia Ndwandwe.

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, at that stage PN following a V number it merely says Port Natal, subject of Port Natal.

MR VISSER: That was the file of whom?

MR WASSERMAN: The one we're referring to now was of Zandile. Filla Ndwandwe.

MR VISSER: Ndwandwe, yes. And reference, Mr Chairman, has previously been made to that very reference and you will find the first one at page 2, paragraph 2.6 of Exhibit J1.

MR LAX: Can I just round this off?

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I'm confused, the one I was looking at is on page 1, it's only two sixes, 665.

MR VISSER: Yes, but that is...

CHAIRPERSON: I got the numbers confused.

MR VISSER: Yes, but that's preceded by PN which denotes an informer as I understand it.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but I wondered if in the filing system you put the, you might put the informer behind, because its a four letter number against the three for informers, so no its a different.

MR VISSER: Mr Wasserman ...(intervention)

MR LAX: Sorry Mr Visser, just one last aspect. It's also clear from the front of that annexure on page 1 that a copy went to DNI and AMI.

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman.

MR LAX: It didn't go to them?

MR WASSERMAN: No, we excluded them.

MR LAX: You excluded them. I just wanted to be clear about that.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman its not going to National Intelligence, not going to military Intelligence.

MR LAX: Thank you.

MR VISSER: It says "Beperk" Mr Chairman, it means excluded. So they didn't get it. Just one aspect which I didn't understand correctly and I did not put quite correctly to Mr Maharaj and to which you have drawn my attention, the synopsis given in paragraph 2 I put to Mr Maharaj, was done by yourself, is that correct, or is that incorrect? I'm talking about Exhibit J1.

MR VISSER: Was that synopsis written by you or by someone else?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, it wasn't written by myself.

MR VISSER: Was that also done by?

MR WASSERMAN: Capt at that time Botha.

MR VISSER: Capt Botha.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes.

MR VISSER: I'm sorry about that Mr Chairman, I was under the impression that this was done by Wasserman, but I was clearly incorrect, he's drawn my attention to that. And what follows thereafter in paragraph 3 and following is what the information was that you received from the informer, clearly.

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct, yes, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: So Botha being your Commander is the person that receives this information and from then on he's got to deal with it?

MR WASSERMAN: On this occasion that's how it happened, Mr Chairman, he processed the report and the Intelligence ...(indistinct).

MR LAX: Sorry could I just be clear about this? So you didn't actually draft this report? You compiled the information in a sense and reported it to Botha. You prepared this document?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct, yes, Mr Chairman.

MR LAX: Thanks Mr Visser, I just wasn't clear about that, I just wanted to make absolutely sure.

MR VISSER: Yes, but I must concede Mr Chairman, that I gave rise to the uncertainty because I misunderstood it myself. Yes. Would you then look at page 1 of Exhibit K? You applied for amnesty for the abduction or man stealing or the unlawful arrest of Mr Mbuso Shabalala, the unlawful detention or deprivation of liberty of both Mr Ndaba and Mr Shabalala, the murder of both these gentlemen and well, what weapons were used at the time to assassinate Mr Ndaba and Mr Shabalala?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, use was made of two Scorpions, sub-machine gun pistols.

MR VISSER: For so far as it may be accepted or assumed that you were as it were also in possession of those weapons, you also apply for amnesty in regard to the unlawful possession of such ammunition and weapons as were with you on that particular evening.

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: You apply for malicious damage to property in regard to the Corolla vehicle in regard to the vehicle of Mr Shabalala.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir.

MR VISSER: And any lesser offence or delict which may be supported by the facts, is that correct?

MR WASSERMAN: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, would you allow me a moment?

Yes, perhaps you may be able to shed light on this and perhaps not, please say what your knowledge is. Do you know who of Mr Nyanda and Mr Gordhan was arrested first on the 12th of July? Do you have knowledge of that?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr chairman, I'm of the firm opinion that we arrested Mr Nyanda first.

MR VISSER: Would the information about that have gone out to other people, about that arrest?

MR WASSERMAN: It would have, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Did you know where van der Westhuizen was on that particular day, what his duties were?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, he was doing a surveillance and observation at Brickhill Road.

MR VISSER: Brickhill Road?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WILLS: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Mr Wasserman, I take it, from the evidence, that you were one of Col Botha's most trusted and selected operatives?

MR WASSERMAN: I think so, Mr Chairman.

MR WILLS: Yes, he chose to divulge the very secrecy of the fact that this person was an informer, the fact that Mr Ndaba was an informer to you and he wouldn't have divulged that even to the general of the police at that time.

MR WASSERMAN: Well, I don't know what he said to the General, Sir, but he divulged it to me.

MR WILLS: Yes and he also involved you in his scheme to hide the fact of the arrest of these two comrades from the other police members. is that correct?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman there was only one really arrested, the other party was a charade arrest.

MR WILLS: Mr Wasserman, I'm not wanting to play with words, I'm talking about the two people that you had arrested, detained, illegally abducted, kidnapped whichever you want to phrase it, but the two people Mr Shabalala and Mr Ndaba, my question is that the fact that you had these people was only revealed to you and you were trusted to assist in this plan to hide this fact from other policemen?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct.

MR WILLS: Were you told to hide this fact from other policemen?

MR WASSERMAN: It was a unit, yes, it was to remain a secret.

MR WILLS: Yes, because Gen Steyn has conceded during his cross-examination that the members of de Beer's unit, of de Beer's investigation team who were investigating on a national level the Operation Vula, were looking for these people and so you were part of the plan to tell these people that you didn't know where they were?

MR WASSERMAN: That's correct.

MR WILLS: Did you stand guard or did you stay, should I rather say, at the safe-house in Verulam, from the time of arrest of Ndaba, that is the 7th of July 1990 until their murder?

MR WASSERMAN: Intermittently so, Mr Chairman.

MR WILLS: Where did you sleep at night during that period?

MR WASSERMAN: In the same house, Mr Chairman.

MR WILLS: Yes, and the only time you left the house was for the operations.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR WILLS: Now it's glaringly apparent from your affidavit and also from your application which just refers to Botha's application and I think, I'm not sure but it was Botha's and possibly Steyn's, that you were not involved in surveillance operations prior to the arrest of Ndaba in regard to the safe houses that are mentioned, Brickhill Road and Knoll.

MR WASSERMAN: Sorry Sir, when was I involved with them, the surveillance?

MR WILLS: After the arrest of Ndaba.

MR WASSERMAN: Was I involved with surveillance after the arrest of Ndaba?

MR WILLS: No. Sorry if I'm confusing you. It seems to me that the only time you got involved with that surveillance operation was after the arrest of Ndaba, after the 7th of July in other words.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir, that's so, my personal involvement yes.

MR WILLS: Yes, now who else was in your unit, this select unit? I know that it must have involved the other applicants and they are Mr du Preez, Mr van der Westhuizen, but there must have been more persons than that because you were observing two houses, is that not so? So who were you observing, the Knoll, the safe-house known as the Knoll with after the 7th of July?

MR WASSERMAN: I was with Mr du Preez.

MR WILLS: And you said that you had a second car.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you go on, you said a few minutes ago you only started after the 7th of July. How long after the 7th? For how long had you been observing this house when the arrest took place?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I'm not too sure, it was a couple of, me personally, it was a couple of days on and off.

MR LAX: Sorry, can I just clarify something that's arisen, if you don't mind? You only got involved on the 7th?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes. Mr Chairman, I got involved when I was called to CR Swart.

MR LAX: And it was only after the 7th that you began to observe anything?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman, I continued with my normal duties, predominantly Swaziland operations.

MR LAX: You say you continued with your normal duties?

MR WASSERMAN: I was continuing with my normal duties.

MR LAX: Up until that time?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir.

MR LAX: Now, in terms of the observations that you went on, can you recall when those were and how many there were?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, it was many evenings, it was quite a few evenings and afternoons and I would relieve and be relieved.

MR LAX: Yes. Now who was working with you on all those observations besides du Preez?

MR WASSERMAN: It was principally du Preez and there were, I think once or twice or maybe even thrice the chaps from C20 were asked to come and accompany the Durban guy.

MR LAX: And those are the people who are mentioned in the papers who were present at the safe-house?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct.

MR LAX: McCarter, van Zyl, I think it is and others. I can't remember all the names, but it's not that relevant right now.

MR WASSERMAN: It's them.

MR LAX: I think there's four of them. Now, on the day you picked up Nyanda, who was in the other car?

MR WASSERMAN: It was members of that C20. I recall only one person's name and that's Roeland.

MR LAX: And the four of you were staked out there observing this place, the Knoll?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir.

MR LAX: Carry on Mr Wills, sorry to ...

MR WILLS: Thank you.. Now you say you have knowledge that another person was at the other house in Brickhill Road. I'm sorry, I didn't get the name of that person.

MR WASSERMAN: That was van der Westhuizen.

MR WILLS: Van der Westhuizen and who was he with?

MR WASSERMAN: I don't know.

MR WILLS: And I would assume that it's probably that there was also a second car there?

MR WASSERMAN: I have no idea at all what the logistics would have been for that surveillance.

MR WILLS: Yes, I'm not asking you from your personal knowledge, I'm asking you from your experience as a security policeman and it would seem to me to be a likely scenario that you would have a back-up. I mean you had one, so the chances are that they also would have had one.

MR WASSERMAN: The chances are, but I think he was surveilling a residence.

MR WILLS: Yes.

MR VISSER: If it can assist my learned friend, I can tell him now, Mr Chairman, that van der Westhuizen's evidence will be that he was there alone, if it can assist at all.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I interrupt for a moment. What is the Knoll?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, it was a house and the Knoll was the address where it was.

CHAIRPERSON: Not a residence?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, it is, it's a double storied residence.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh because I thought you were distinguishing, because you were saying van der Westhuizen was observing a residence, so were you, you were both observing residences?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes.

MR WILLS: I'm sorry are you not wanting to comment on my question? My question was that in all probability there would have been a back-up at that stage.

MR WASSERMAN: I would have presumed so, Sir.

MR WILLS: Yes. And in probability if a back-up was used, because this was such a secret operation, that it would have also been these trusted people from C20? We're talking about after the 8th of, or after the 7th of July now.

MR WASSERMAN: Sorry, are you referring to van der Westhuizen's surveillance.

MR WILLS: Yes. I'm saying the chances are, I know that you've already indicated you don't have previous knowledge, or personal knowledge. Well let me phrase it another way. Do you know of any other person other than yourselves, the applicants in this matter in other words, the five applicants, that's Gen Steyn, Col Botha, Mr du Preez, Mr Steyn and yourself and those people at the safe-house in Verulam, C 20, who had anything to do with the two abductees from the 7th of July till the time of their death>?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, I know of no other persons involved.

MR WILLS: Yes. And do you know of the involvement of any other persons in operations relating to those persons that were conducted by Col Botha or were orchestrated by Col Botha?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Sir.

MR WILLS: And can I assume that you would have known of other people had this been the case?

MR WASSERMAN: No, that would not necessarily be correct.

MR WILLS: Now your evidence is relating to the arrest of Shabalala, is very different to the evidence that was given by Mr Botha. You've alluded to that already. I mean basically the difference is that he testified to the effect that it would have been abundantly clear to Shabalala that Ndaba hadn't been arrested, whereas you're saying that you conducted the operation in such a way that both persons would have assumed that they were arrested.

MR WASSERMAN: That was my presumption.

MR WILLS: Yes. And Botha makes no mention of you climbing into the back of the car with your colleague and pulling someone, or pulling Mr Shabalala over the back seat, rather he says that he put a gun, I think it was him who put a gun, Botha put a gun into the stomach of Shabalala. Do you recall that happening?

MR WASSERMAN: I didn't see the gun in the stomach, but I did pull Shabalala with du Preez over the seat into the back seat and held his head down.

MR WILLS: Yes.

MR WASSERMAN: That was my part in that action.

MR WILLS: So it would have been pointless really and possibly pretty dangerous for all parties concerned to pull someone over the back seat of the car, or pull someone over the front seat of the car into the back, if he'd had a gun in his stomach at that time.

MR WASSERMAN: Dangerous to whom?

MR WILLS: Well, first of all the detainee and secondly it could have knocked the gun anywhere and the gun could have gone off, or wouldn't you have noticed that?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I didn't even see Mr Botha with a firearm.

MR WILLS: Well, I'm suggesting that had that been the case, you would have seen it, because you'd be trained to look out for the position of weapons and the position of everybody in this arrest situation. I'm suggesting had that been the case, you would have seen it and you would have noticed it.

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I didn't notice.

CHAIRPERSON: What was the time, was it daylight?

MR WASSERMAN: It was lunchtime, I think, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: You got into the back of the car and you grabbed this man?

MR WASSERMAN: du Preez got in the one side and I got in the passenger side of the vehicle.

CHAIRPERSON: And you would have wanted to make very sure that he didn't suddenly pull a gun on you?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, I was watching Mr Shabalala.

CHAIRPERSON: You were watching carefully. Yes.

MR WILLS: Thank you Mr Chairperson. Something that I wanted to clear up, I know it was a long time ago, I want you to try to the best of your recollection to remember the times for me. I want to know the time when you were called first of all to C R Swart when you saw Ndaba at C R Swart.

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chair, I can't be specific at all. I think that was also round midday.

MR WILLS: And then how long, my understanding from the evidence is that you were one of the first people on the scene when these askaris had arrested and then Mr Taylor came later and then Col Botha came later, is that right?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Sir, I seem to recall I came one of the last. I think these senior gentlemen were there already.

MR WILLS: Okay. So you couldn't have seen what happened prior to Botha arriving, obviously?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Sir, I didn't see what had happened.

MR WILLS: And the two arresting officers, that is I think Ninela and Sekakane, were they in the office at the stage you arrived?

MR WASSERMAN: I recall Mr Ninela there Sir but I have no recollection of Sekakane at all on that day. Perhaps he was away.

MR WILLS: Yes, alright. But Ninela was in the same office at the stage you arrived?

MR WASSERMAN: This is all happening at the end of the passage. I think he was in the office or out in the passage, but he was there.

MR WILLS: Yes. Can you tell me how long you were at C R Swart before you left to go to the safe-house at Verulam, approximately?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I'd hazard a guess of an hour, an hour or two.

MR WILLS: And then the drive from C R Swart to Verulam. Can you hazard a guess as to how long that would take?

MR WASSERMAN: Approximately 30 minutes, Sir.

MR WILLS: And then it was there that Ndaba was ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Before you go on, is that to Verulam or is that to the safe-house itself?

MR WASSERMAN: The safe-house, Sir.

MR WILLS: Thank you Mr Chairperson. And then the debriefing of Ndaba commenced at that stage and were you involved in that at all?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, Mr Botha kept us on the side, that was his baby.

MR WILLS: So you didn't even hear anything, what was said at that stage?

MR WASSERMAN: He didn't allow me to.

MR WILLS: Now, how long did you stay at the safe-house in Verulam?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, perhaps another hour, hour and a half, or so.

MR WILLS: And then you would have taken another half an hour ride approximately back to Greyville?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir.

MR WILLS: And then you say you arrived at Greyville at about what time?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, not so reliably but perhaps 4 o'clock, half-past 4.

MR WILLS: You would have been briefed or, I don't know what the military term is, maybe you can help me, you would have been told what was expected of you at Greyville. An operation would have been planned.

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Sir.

MR WILLS: And what were you told?

MR WASSERMAN: I was informed that Ndaba was due to meet somebody from his unit. The meeting was to take place sometime during the course of that afternoon. It was decided that the meeting should be attended by Ndaba and we were to monitor the meeting and if everything was to go smoothly we would leave it. If the agent gave the sign and Botha informed us that the sign was to be the touching of the head, it would mean that the source presumed he was in danger and then Botha would tell us how to react and 90% of that reaction would be to affect an arrest of the parties that were all around the source at the time.

MR WILLS: Sorry there's a few things. You say that at the stage that the signal went, it was only then that Botha would tell you how to react?

MR WASSERMAN: That was my understanding.

MR WILLS: Yes. So you didn't know what to do if the danger signal was given?

MR WASSERMAN: React.

MR WILLS: But you'd have to wait for instructions first.

MR WASSERMAN: That's correct, Sir.

MR WILLS: Were you told at any stage to make sure that if the danger signal was given that you were to react in such a way that you wouldn't cast suspicion, or you wouldn't create suspicion in the mind of the informer, Ndaba?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir, we were informed to try and protect the fact that Ndaba was involved in the information leading to that, by our actions.

MR WILLS: And when were you told of this?

MR WASSERMAN: On departure for the operation.

MR WILLS: Why didn't you tell me that when I asked about your instructions earlier?

MR WASSERMAN: I answered that question as relevantly as I did, when I got it.

MR WILLS: Now you then arrested Shabalala and you say you and one of your colleagues took him back to the safe house in his car. Who was driving that car?

MR WASSERMAN: That was van der Westhuizen. He drove the blue Corolla, Sir.

MR WILLS: And what did you do?

MR WASSERMAN: I stayed in the back holding Mr Shabalala's head down, so he couldn't see anything.

MR WILLS: Were you injuring him at that time?

MR WASSERMAN: No, I wasn't injuring him at that time?

MR WILLS: Were you pointing a firearm at any part of his body at that time?

MR WASSERMAN: I hadn't drawn my firearm. I wasn't pointing my firearm, Sir.

MR WILLS: And can you demonstrate how you were holding him down?

MR WASSERMAN: He was now, he had been pulled over. He was on the back seat and I had my arms around him and I was holding him. His head was between my legs and I was holding his head down onto the floor of the vehicle.

MR WILLS: And when you got to Verulam, the safe-house, you say you locked him in a room?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Sir.

MR WILLS: And what happened to Ndaba?

MR WASSERMAN: I don't know what happened to Mr Ndaba. Once we did that action with, at the Corolla, Ndaba went with Botha.

MR WILLS: Yes, but the evidence has been that he was also brought to that safe-house. Were you not aware of that?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, I was aware of it once I was at the safe-house. Yes, Sir.

MR WILLS: Well, sorry if I wasn't clear in my question. When did you first see Ndaba again?

MR WASSERMAN: At the safe-house.

MR WILLS: And what happened to him?

MR WASSERMAN: He was taken to a separate room.

MR WILLS: Was he also locked in the room?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, he was.

MR WILLS: And who went into that room?

MR WASSERMAN: I went into the room. Botha went into the room.

MR WILLS: So you directed your attentions towards Ndaba?

MR WASSERMAN: No I was giving both parties my attention.

MR WILLS: I understood from your evidence that you left Shabalala in the room, locked, unattended.

MR WASSERMAN: If he was locked unattended, I would doubt that. Perhaps I had secured him, I handcuffed him.

MR WILLS: Yes. What I'm trying to establish is that he was alone. My inference from your evidence and correct me if I'm wrong, was that you locked him in the room and he was alone at that stage? I would assume that you would at least have restrained him in some manner.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir I did, I handcuffed him formerly.

MR WILLS: But he was alone in the room?

MR WASSERMAN: Initially I stayed with him, until other members came and then I would leave.

MR WILLS: So you were alone in the room with him?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir.

MR WILLS: The two of you, and you locked the room with you in the room alone with him?

MR WASSERMAN: No, I secured him in the room Sir. I see what the statement says, but I secured him in that room and if I had to leave that room, I would lock that room.

MR WILLS: Yes and you say you asked him no questions.

MR WASSERMAN: No I had nothing to ask him.

MR WILLS: You in fact go further than that and you say you were instructed or advised that he was of no value, don't bother to ask him questions, that's how I understand.

MR WASSERMAN: At the time that we were briefed of the operation there was no information, or nothing to ask him. I was briefed as such.

MR WILLS: And who briefed you as such?

MR WASSERMAN: Capt Botha briefed me.

MR WILLS: Yes. Now you then, it seems, must have left him in the room and gone with somebody else into the room where Ndaba was? Is that right?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I mingled in between the two throughout the course of the time.

MR WILLS: Well let me get to the point. Were you involved in the room where Ndaba was questioned?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Sir.

MR WILLS: So you don't know how Ndaba was questioned?

MR WASSERMAN: No.

MR WILLS: You were never throughout the week involved in any situation where Ndaba was being questioned or interrogated by anybody?

MR WASSERMAN: No, further during the week I was. I thought you were talking about still that day.

MR WILLS: Yes, okay, well let's establish. That day you weren't and further on during the week, when did you question Ndaba?

MR WASSERMAN: During the week, well I spoke and interviewed with Ndaba. I never really questioned Ndaba.

MR WILLS: What were you talking about?

MR WASSERMAN: I would talk about personalities in Swaziland.

MR WILLS: What about? Them playing golf?

MR WASSERMAN: No, them being MK.

MR WILLS: Yes. And why, I mean are you implying that this is not interrogation?

MR WASSERMAN: I'm saying it wasn't interrogation.

MR WILLS: It wasn't. What is your definition of interrogation? Just so that we can speak the same language, what is your definition of interrogation? When I ask you the word, interrogate, what is conjured in your mind by that?

MR WASSERMAN: What you are doing now, Sir.

MR WILLS: Is this interrogation? This isn't interviewing?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Sir.

MR WILLS: Now, you asked him about MK people in Swaziland. Is that right?

MR WASSERMAN: Amongst other questions.

MR WILLS: What else did you ask him? I'm trying to find out what you asked him.

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, it's many years ago, I would have been asking questions pertaining to my desk of MK Intelligence. I can't recall for the life of me one question pertinently.

MR WILLS: So as I understand it, the focus of your questions was more to establish what he knew about what was going on in Swaziland in MK structures?

MR WASSERMAN: That's correct, Mr Chairman. I wasn't that aware of what was going on in Operation Vula at this stage.

MR WILLS: And later on? When did you become aware of Operation Vula?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Botha would then, he then brief me more fully on what was happening in this particular instance.

MR WASSERMAN: And when did that briefing occur?

MR WASSERMAN: That took place intermittently after we had been at this house. He then took me into confidence and started to tell me more and more what had been happening since he had been handling Ndaba.

MR WILLS: And this was obviously prior to the death of these people?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir.

MR WILLS: So can I assume that you were fully appraised of the situation in regard to the seriousness of Operation Vula prior to the death of these two individuals?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, Mr Botha briefed me as he deemed fit, I don't know if I was fully appraised with all the facts, but he briefed us to what he deemed necessary for us to know.

MR WILLS: Well, let me rather rephrase that and say that you were aware that these two people were involved in this people's revolt, or this insurrection that it was termed later and the seriousness of the situation prior to their death?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes Sir.

MR WILLS: And you were aware that both of these people were involved in this?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir, according to Mr Botha's debrief.

MR WILLS: Yes. So did you question Mr Shabalala about his involvement?

MR WASSERMAN: No Sir.

MR WILLS: Why not?

MR WASSERMAN: I was informed not to speak to him and not to try and recruit him.

MR WILLS: Who told you that?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Botha told us.

MR WILLS: So who spoke to him?

MR WASSERMAN: I have no idea.

MR WILLS: Did anybody?

MR WASSERMAN: Members of C20 might have spoken to him.

MR WILLS: Do you know if any of your colleagues spoke to him, let's say Mr du Preez?

MR WASSERMAN: He may have, Sir.

MR WILLS: Mr Steyn?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Sir, Mr Steyn never came there.

MR WILLS: Mr Steyn never came to the Verulam house?

MR WASSERMAN: No.

MR WILLS: What about Mr van der Westhuizen?

MR WASSERMAN: Not in my presence, Sir.

MR WILLS: Have you questioned people to get information out of them before?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes. Sir.

MR WILLS: I would imagine that's quite a big part of your job being a Security Policeman?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Sir.

MR WILLS: Now, you see what my question is, Mr Wasserman, and what my problem is, is that you become aware of this person who's involved in this major operation which might even involve the overthrow of the negotiations and destabilisation of everything that was going on at the time, and he might have a lot of information, but you don't question him?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, I had been informed that there were sources inside there and we were told by Mr Botha to play it gently and leave it at that.

MR WILLS: But wouldn't it be a fair assumption for me to make that the chances are that Shabalala would have information about Vula that might have helped you?

MR WASSERMAN: That's a fair assumption.

MR WILLS: Yes, and isn't it also a fair assumption to make that if you speak to two people and get information from two people, the chances are you can have more information as a result of that just speaking to the one?

MR WASSERMAN: That's a fair assumption.

MR WILLS: And isn't it a fair assumption to say that Shabalala might have been extremely valuable to you in regard to getting information about this operation?

MR WASSERMAN: That is a fair assumption.

MR WILLS: Yes, so didn't you think it strange that you were asked not to talk to him?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman there was apparently information emanating from this operation. Mr Botha had told us and that what his reasons were for not engaging in an operation with Mr Shabalala he never made clear.

MR WILLS: No I'm not asking you whether Botha gave reasons at this stage, I might later. I'm asking you didn't you feel that it was strange that you got this specific instruction not to talk to this person?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Sir I didn't see it as strange.

MR WILLS: This valuable, this potentially valuable source?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Sir it wasn't strange.

MR WILLS: Well I put it to you, I find it very strange.

MR WASSERMAN: It's not a strange thing.

MR WILLS: Can you tell me why, you see there's a - can you tell me why, or rather let me phrase it in a different way. Were you under the impression that Shabalala was giving no co-operation?

MR WASSERMAN: After a couple of days, I was, Sir.

MR WILLS: How did you come to that conclusion?

MR WASSERMAN: If I went into his room to see how he was and things like that and for food, his body language and he wasn't interested in us at all.

MR WILLS: Do you expect the Committee to believe that?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, he had nothing to say to me, he wouldn't engage in any discussions with us, he was not interested, he had nothing, absolutely nothing to say to me.

MR WILLS: But you've just indicated to the Committee that you had instructions not even to talk to him, not even to ask him questions.

MR WASSERMAN: I didn't ask him questions.

MR WILLS: No, but I'm saying how can you, if you are, if what you say is true, that you were given orders not to even talk to him and your evidence is that you obeyed those orders, how can you yourself testify to the effect that this person wasn't co-operating?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, as you've said, I have spoken to people on many occasions. He wasn't to co-operate and I wasn't to question him, therefore everybody was at a position where we knew where we stood.

MR WILLS: What do you mean, he wasn't to co-operate? How did you know that if you didn't even speak to him? That's my point.

MR WASSERMAN: I never spoke to him.

MR WILLS: Then how did you know he wasn't co-operating?

MR WASSERMAN: I don't have to speak to you and you can see that I'm not co-operating.

CHAIRPERSON: But you arrested this man.

MR WASSERMAN: It's a human thing. There was no reason, I was told not to speak to the man.

CHAIRPERSON: You've arrested this man, you've taken him to a strange house, you have handcuffed him, you have locked him in a room and then you walk into the room and you don't speak to him, you walk out. You walk into the room, you don't speak to him, you walk out. How do you expect him to react?

MR WASSERMAN: Perhaps in the uncooperative way that he did, Sir.

MR WILLS: You see, in Mr Botha's application he referred to the person as uncooperative and my understanding is that his lack of co-operation was one of the factors in the assessment of Shabalala, that contributed to the decision to kill him, is that accurate?

MR WASSERMAN: Well, I made no decision to kill him.

MR WILLS: No I realise that, but you've been here hearing the evidence. I'm asking you on the basis of the evidence that you heard.

MR VISSER: Well, I must object to that Mr Chairman, that wasn't even nearly the evidence, with great respect. Far from it. Botha gave his reasons very explicitly, they're contained in Annexure D, Exhibit D, and it certainly does not contain the consideration that the man was uncooperative. It had to do with the protection of Ndaba, Mr Chairman.

MR WILLS: I'll rephrase, Mr Chairman. Had, surely it would have been a bonus for you if Shabalala had said, "Okay, I don't want to get killed, I'll join you guys and I'll tell you everything you want to know." That would have been a useful thing to have occurred.

MR WASSERMAN: It would have been, yes Sir, but it didn't happen.

MR WILLS: Yes and had he agreed to go into your askari situation, it would have been a distinct benefit to you and in those circumstances, it seems to me that it would have been strange to put, to make- sorry if I rephrase - had he gone, if he co-operated with you and become an askari he might have been very valuable in your investigations of this Operation Vula?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir.

MR WILLS: And it is unlikely in those circumstances that he would have been killed, that any person would have taken the decision to kill him.

MR WASSERMAN: I can't comment on that Mr Chairman.

MR WILLS: No, but I mean, if, surely logic dictates, let's escape from this particular situation. You capture an ANC person, you interrogate him or interview him, he decides to come over to your unit and assist you in your operations, you keep him on. If he becomes uncooperative and you don't want, and he just indicates clearly that he's not going to co-operate, then the chances are that something else is going to happen to him, possibly he'll be killed.

MR WASSERMAN: That's not necessarily how it happened always.

MR WILLS: Yes. I'm looking at probabilities here. If he had co-operated with you and told you at that stage that I am going to be one of your askaris, the chances are he wouldn't have been killed? The probabilities are.

MR WASSERMAN: The probability exists, yes.

MR WILLS: Yes. So then, it seems likely that at some stage he would have been asked whether or not he wanted to become an askari or not, and I use the word asked very generously.

MR WASSERMAN: Well I never asked him that.

MR WILLS: No I'm not saying you did, but I'm talking about your experience as a Security Policeman, that's the probability.

MR WASSERMAN: It's a probability.

MR WILLS: Yes. And the probabilities are that he refused, because he was killed.

MR WASSERMAN: That's a probability, Sir.

MR WILLS: Yes. So the probabilities are that his refusal to become an askari were one of the factors that led to his early demise?

MR WASSERMAN: No, I don't think that was so, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: You've been kept - Counsel is asking you again and again about him becoming an askari, isn't the normal practice, if you arrest, detain somebody like this, to talk to him, to see what information you can get from him, if he starts giving information, if he starts co-operating with you, only then do you suggest that he becomes an askari?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, yes.

MR LAX: Can I just be clear? Your evidence so far is that you don't know anything about any of the questioning that happened to him, if it happened. As far as you know, there was no questioning of him.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman. I didn't question Mbuso Shabalala at all.

MR LAX: And no questioning of him took place in your presence, that's been your evidence today.

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, there was no sessions of questioning in my presence at all to Mr Shabalala, at all.

MR LAX: So when the C20 people questioned him, you don't know anything about that?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, I don't know if he co-operated or what the situation would have been.

MR LAX: You don't even know that they did, in fact.

MR WASSERMAN: I was informed that they did.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understood you and I may have been mistaken, you said, we were told not to question him.

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, that's myself, du Preez and van der Westhuizen.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. The three of you who were in the unit.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes. Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: None of you, you were all told to leave him alone, not to question him.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Not to try to turn him.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, correct, Sir.

MR WILLS: Mr Chairman, just to set the record straight, I want to refer Mr Visser to paragraph 18 of Mr Botha's initial affidavit where he says one of the factors concerning the options relating to Mr Shabalala was the fact that he gives no co-operation. It's listed as the first factor. It's on page 18 of the first application to amnesty of the bundle. Now, did...(intervention)

MR VISSER: I'm sorry, allow me Mr Chairman to apologise and to say that I stand corrected, but that wasn't his evidence here, but I read it here and it is under the heading of Mbuso Shabalala. "Geleen geen samewerking. Nie bereid om te getuig nie. Nie bereid om beruggewer te word nie" So it would appear that Botha did in fact talk to him about that.

MR WILLS: Thank you. Were you aware of any of the background of Mr Shabalala, as far as his involvement in the UDF goes?

MR WASSERMAN: No, I wasn't Sir.

MR WILLS: Because you used the phrase in your second statement that he had the name "Jack". Are you sure of that?

MR WASSERMAN: I was informed of that by Mr Botha's debrief of Ndaba, Mr Chairman.

MR WILLS: Well, my instructions are that Jack was the MK name given to Mr Shabalala's brother, Vuso Shabalala and that Mbuso Shabalala, the person you killed, his MK name was David. Can you dispute that?

MR WASSERMAN: I cannot dispute that, Mr Chairman. I thought Mr Shabalala's brother was Rexel, that's the MK, or the code name that I knew. But there were many names, some persons had four or five.

MR WILLS: Wee you under the impression that Mr Shabalala was operating outside the country or only inside the country? Did you know at that stage?

MR LAX: Which Mr Shabalala? Sorry, Mr Wills.

MR WILLS: Sorry, the detained Mr Shabalala, the deceased.

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I'd never heard of him operating externally.

MR LAX: Were you aware of him prior to this incident?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I'd heard of him vaguely via UDF desk discussions, but he'd never come to my attention in the MK ...that I was responsible with.

MR WILLS: Now, you've heard the evidence of both Mr Botha and Mr Steyn. you've also read the affidavits and so you are aware of the fact that they flew off to Pretoria on a number of occasions during that week from their evidence?

MR WASSERMAN: I'm aware from their evidence, yes.

MR WILLS: Yes. Did you not know at the time that they flew to Pretoria from time to time?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, I was a sergeant, I didn't know, I didn't have to know if they were flying to Pretoria.

MR WILLS: And you evidence seems clear on the point that at no stage did they call you together and appraise you of the fact that they'd got these instructions not to arrest by the 16th?

MR WASSERMAN: No I wasn't informed of that.

MR WILLS: Yes. And I take it that you weren't informed of the extent to which this Intelligence travelled, that it went as far as the State President.

MR WASSERMAN: No.

MR WILLS: Or intended to go to the State President.

MR WASSERMAN: No, Sir I wasn't informed of that.

MR WILLS: Yes. You had no knowledge of the fact that prosecutions would not be instituted against these people?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Sir, I wasn't informed.

MR WILLS: You had no knowledge that Col Zen de Beer had been appointed to investigate Operation Vula from a national perspective?

MR WASSERMAN: I became aware of that shortly, yes, that one I was informed of.

MR WILLS: And how did that information come about, can you tell us?

MR WASSERMAN: Col Botha informed us that a national team would be appointed, members from all over the country would come and de Beer, the local Durban man, would head up that.

MR WILLS: And what did he say you must do with de Beer? I mean, obviously you knew your position with these two people from Operation Vula?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I had nothing to do with de Beer at all.

MR WILLS: Why not?

MR WASSERMAN: I had nothing to offer him. I had no information to give him.

MR WILLS: Were you not told specifically not to co-operate with de Beer?

MR WASSERMAN: We would never have even got to that Mr Chairman, I would not have anything to do with him anyway, I had nothing to give.

MR WILLS: Well, you had knowledge of the fact that you had two operatives under your control, that seems by all accounts were connected to Operation Vula, surely that would be useful for him?

MR WASSERMAN: I think Mr de Beer was after the information Sir, and I had nothing to give him, so I had nothing to deal with.

MR WILLS: You had information about the whereabouts of two people.

MR WASSERMAN: Correct.

MR WILLS: That is information. That is vitally crucial information to somebody who's trying to solve or to get information on an operation, not so?

MR WASSERMAN: If I had information, it would have been, but I had no information to give Mr de Beer, therefore I didn't even see him.

MR WILLS: What I'm suggesting is that you were told not to co-operate with de Beer, is that not so?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, I understand the question now, Sir. Yes, Mr Chairman, we were informed not to mention anything about those arrests and those activities, yes.

MR LAX: But hang on a second Mr Wasserman. You wouldn't have needed to be informed not to co-operate with, this wasn't your first operation that you were involved in unlawful activities.

MR WASSERMAN: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR LAX: This is in fact almost your last operation.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir, that's why I didn't understand ...(intervention)

MR LAX: You been involved in a stream of killings and unlawful activities all of which you kept hidden for years.

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Sir, that's why I didn't understand exactly what the question coming from Mr Wills was.

MR LAX: But your evidence is that you were actually told to keep it quiet? That's so improbably. You guys didn't need to tell each other to keep it quiet, you knew jolly well that you'd broken the law and this thing had to remain a secret.

MR WASSERMAN: No, that's correct. But I didn't understand exactly where Mr Wills was coming from.

MR LAX: Yes, but that's why I'm puzzled by your evidence that you would have got an instruction to keep it quiet. You would have known very well, you were an experienced policeman, you may be a sergeant, but you were a very experienced policeman.

MR WASSERMAN: That's correct, Sir, I would not have mentioned it anyhow.

CHAIRPERSON: ...indistinct) at that stage. All they were doing was detaining somebody.

MR LAX: But even if you hadn't have killed him, you knew that the detention was unlawful.

MR WASSERMAN: Correct Sir.

MR WILLS: I just want to dwell on that for a very short while longer. It seems to me from the evidence of both Mr Botha and Mr Steyn, that there was an active decision taken to conceal, it wasn't just a case of hiding the information, there was an active decision to conceal your activities in relation to the arrests of these two people from de Beer, and that is what you were told. That is what was told to you, not, to actively not co-operate with de Beer and to actively conceal the fact that you had these two people from de Beer. Sorry. I'm sorry.

MR WASSERMAN: I don't understand you sir.

MR WILLS: Sorry, I'm tired now, Let me try and rephrase. You had a, it seems from my understanding of Botha's evidence is that he made an active decision to conceal the information that he had these two people at the house in Verulam from de Beer. Did you hear that evidence?

MR WASSERMAN: I heard the evidence yes.

MR WILLS: Now what I'm asking, is because you were in his select unit, he had opened, you were privy to this operation of his, but he also told you not to tell de Beer anything about that, about the fact that you had these people?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes.

MR WILLS: And did you ever have any communications with Mr Steyn, Gen Steyn?

MR WASSERMAN: No, I didn't. Sir.

MR WILLS: So it was always, the only communications that came from Steyn, was via Botha?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir, that's correct.

MR WILLS: I want to turn now to the last days, the last day. Did you see Ndaba and Shabalala on Saturday morning, the 14th?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir.

MR WILLS: How wee they?

MR WASSERMAN: They were fine, Sir.

MR LAX: They were fine?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes.

MR LAX: They weren't shaken up, scared, terrified?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman to me no not, although Mr Botha had told me Mr Ndaba was an anxious personality.

MR WILLS: Yes, but to you he looked fine?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes.

MR WILLS: To you, you didn't notice anything strange about him?

MR WASSERMAN: No.

MR WILLS: You wouldn't have come, told us that he was shaken up, trembling or anything like that?

MR WASSERMAN: No, he wasn't, whilst he was with me, no Sir, he wasn't.

MR WILLS: You then say to them, or how was it, who communicated to them that you were going to remove them to another safe-house?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Botha was taking the lead in that.

MR WILLS: Yes, did you witness that communication?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Sir.

MR WILLS: What happened, tell me how? I mean, from your point of view, I want you to go into as much detail as you can and I want you to be sensitive to the fact that I'm asking this question because the loved ones of those two people are here, they want to know what happened to their loved ones. What happened that morning? You got - what time did you go to work, or what time did you wake up from the safe-house?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I can't recall if I stayed at the safe-house that night, but I do know that we took Shabalala and Ndaba to a kombi, station wagon kombi.

MR WILLS: And who told you to do this?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Botha told us to do it.

MR WILLS: And when had he told you this?

MR WASSERMAN: Earlier on in the day, before the evening.

MR WILLS: What time are you talking about? When did you get into the kombi? What time?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I can't recall the time but it was night time, late night.

MR WILLS: Late night?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir.

MR WILLS: On the Saturday night, the 14th?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes.

MR WILLS: And when had Mr Botha told you to put them in the kombi or take them to the kombi?

MR WASSERMAN: That was minutes- when did he tell me to put them in the kombi?

MR WILLS: Yes. Or should I rather say, when did you know, you've told us that you got an order, you got an instruction from Mr Botha that you were to assist in their elimination, when did that order come?

MR WASSERMAN: That was earlier on in the evening.

MR WILLS: Earlier on in the evening?

MR WASSERMAN: I can't recall, it was on the day, late afternoon, evening.

MR WILLS: Okay. And then sometime at night you put these people in the kombi. Did you lead? Did you lead to the kombi?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, before that Mr Botha told me and then I prepared, he told me how he was going to - he decided to take them to the Tugela, then I got hessian sacking and some Watcrete concrete pole standards and some wire, some binding wire and I put that in the kombi. I then, I had pre-cut strands of wire into predetermined lengths.

MR WILLS: You had all of this equipment at this house in Verulam?

MR WASSERMAN: It was a farmhouse.

MR WILLS: You had it all there?

MR WASSERMAN: It was all there yes.

MR WILLS: Yes.

MR WASSERMAN: I cut wire up in predetermined sizes and also loaded that into the kombi, then when that was all ready, we took the parties out of the house.

MR WILLS: When you say we, I want you to tell me, who did you take out?

MR WASSERMAN: I'm unable to state which member I took out, Sir.

MR WILLS: Were you all three of you involved at this stage, or all four of you? By that I mean all applicants except Gen Steyn?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes.

MR WILLS: Were their hands cuffed?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes they were, Sir. They were handcuffed and blindfolded.

MR WILLS: Okay. And where did you put them in the kombi?

MR WASSERMAN: They were led into the back of the kombi, through the sliding door, into the back of the kombi.

MR WILLS: As I understand your evidence, you weren't present at the time it was communicated to them that they were going to be moved to another safe-house.

MR WASSERMAN: I don't recall that I was present Sir, although I knew that would be the legend given to them, but I wasn't present when Mr Botha said it.

MR WILLS: Yes. Now did they show any signs when you were moving them from the room in that house to the kombi that they knew that they were going to be murdered?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Sir, nothing visible was shown to them. I think that they still believed that they were going to go to another house.

MR WILLS: Yes, okay, you got them into the car and who was driving the kombi?

MR WASSERMAN: I recall van der Westhuizen drove the kombi Sir.

MR WILLS: And where did you sit?

MR WASSERMAN: I sat behind the people, Ndaba and Shabalala.

MR WILLS: So you sat in the third row of seats.

MR WASSERMAN: The third or the second, Sir, I don't know, I can't recall if the kombi had two or three rows.

MR WILLS: My understanding of a kombi, unless it's been modified, it's got a font seat, it's got a middle seat and it's got a back seat and behind the back seat is the shelf with the engine underneath and a place on the top.

MR WASSERMAN: That's it, then I was in the middle.

MR WILLS: And where were the deceased?

MR WASSERMAN: They were in the front.

MR WILLS: In the front with van der Westhuizen?

MR WASSERMAN: No, in the front of the back. In the front portion.

MR WILLS: Oh, so you were in the back seat of the kombi, they were in the middle seat and van der Westhuizen was driving?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir, correct.

MR WILLS: And where was Mr Botha?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I don't recall exactly where he was in the kombi.

MR WILLS: And the other applicant?

MR WASSERMAN: No I don't recall. I think Botha might have been in the front with van der Westhuizen, but that's speculation.

MR WILLS: Yes.

MR WASSERMAN: And du Preez and I were sitting with, in the rear for sure.

MR WILLS: Yes. And It's about an hours drive to the turn-off, maybe 15 minutes?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Chair.

MR WILLS: And what was said in the kombi?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, there was no conversation.

MR WILLS: Now I understand this, this is when the old road was in operation?

MR WASSERMAN: That's correct.

MR WILLS: So there's about a 15 kilometre stretch on dirt from the turn-off at Mandini to the Tugela Mouth, might be 12 kilometres, but at least 10?

MR WASSERMAN: I think it is, yes, Sir.

MR WILLS: Yes, it is and what did you tell them when you were turning off the road?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, both parties were unable to see where they were going so there was no reason to say anything.

MR WILLS: You didn't pre-warn them that you were going to stop in order to relieve yourselves?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Sir.

MR WILLS: You just turned off the tar road and turned, drove seemingly the 15 kilometres or so, or the 10 kilometres to the River Mouth on the Northern side of the Tugela River?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir.

MR WILLS: And that was a dirt road, that is a dirt road still today.

MR WASSERMAN: I think it's still a dirt road, I haven't been lately.

MR WILLS: But it was a dirt road at the time?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Sir.

MR WILLS: Was there any discussion in the car with the applicants?

MR WASSERMAN: No.

MR WILLS: What happened when you stopped?

MR WASSERMAN: When we stopped van der Westhuizen and I got out of the vehicle.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, may I ask. Seeing that we're trying to complete this incident by tomorrow, what the point is of repeating all the evidence in chief in cross-examination? With great respect. If there's a point, obviously I don't have any problem, but aren't we just wasting time,? We're going through exactly the same evidence as he's given before Mr Chairman.

MR WILLS: Mr Chairperson, I am asking additional questions. I don't recall there being any questions asked about conversations taking place, who was sitting where, what was said to the parties, this is to my mind, fair in the circumstances. This is the only evidence that the families are going to hear about the last day.

CHAIRPERSON: I think you should bear that in mind Mr Visser that it was explained that it was explained that they are appearing for the families of the people and they wished to know exactly how their sons had died and we are getting.

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Chairman, I'm not getting sensitive to that but Botha also already gave the evidence. But I leave it in your hands, Mr Chairman.

MR WILLS: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir. Must I ...

MR WILLS: Yes, you see, what I'm trying to suggest is that surely at that stage, when you told them that they must get out and relieve themselves, that any person in those circumstances would at least get a suspicion or be at least a little bit scared that something was going to happen to him then,

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, it wasn't evident, perhaps both parties were apprehensive but they never stated, they never said anything and they didn't openly show anything, but I don't know what their feelings would have been at the time.

MR WASSERMAN: And you said that they must relieve themselves?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman, we all did.

MR WILLS: Yes, did you take their handcuffs off?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, they were handcuffed in front of themselves, not at the back.

MR WILLS: So who helped them undress, or was it possible with handcuffs on?

MR WASSERMAN: No, it's possible with handcuffs, Mr Chair.

MR WILLS: Did you take their blindfolds off?

MR WASSERMAN: No, they remained blindfolded, Sir.

MR WILLS: You say you then led them, or somehow they got to the river bank, I'm assuming that the, I think you indicated that it was about 20 metres away from the car. How did they get there? Who led them there?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I am of the opinion that maybe Mr du Preez and Botha perhaps led them that way. We all went. The two of them and the three of us, but not van der Westhuizen, he stayed with the vehicle.

MR WILLS: At all stages?

MR WASSERMAN: At one stage, after the shooting..(intervention).

MR WILLS: No, I'm talking about before the shooting. I realise what happened, what he did after.

MR WASSERMAN: Before the stage, yes Sir.

MR WILLS: Yes.

MR WASSERMAN: No, when we got there initially, he took me from the vehicle to this place, 20 or 30 metres or so, then came back and then he stayed there.

MR WILLS: And you say you made them sit down?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, I did.

MR WILLS: And how did you do that?

MR WASSERMAN: Well after relieving, we all relieved ourselves, then after that I suggested, "Let's sit here, we're not ready to move yet", then even I sat down. All of us sat down and then the two gentlemen were shot on either side of me.

MR WILLS: Yes, but the evidence has been to the effect that you made them sit down. Did you ask them to sit down and they co-operated, or did you push them down? Sorry, I know that I was concentrating on something else when you gave this evidence in chief.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman, we had discussed with Botha that I would attempt to get them to sit down.

MR WILLS: Yes.

MR WASSERMAN: Surreptitiously and I said "listen, we are not ready to leave, let us sit down" and I placed my hands on their shoulders.

MR WILLS: Both of them at the same time?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir, and started to sit downwards and they sat down with me. Then very, very shortly after that both shots went off, Sir.

MR WILLS: So even when you were making them sit down, surely then they would have at least gasped or indicated something, because they must have been terrified?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I think that they were not aware that they were about to be shot.

CHAIRPERSON: When did Botha tell you that you should try to get them to sit down?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, he had made this plan up at the house, at the house in Verulam.

MR WILLS: We've heard of how you disposed of their bodies, I won't dwell on that. You had given evidence, or there has been evidence that you operated in a number or you had a number of farms at your disposal. You had at least two that I know of, the one in Camperdown and the one in Verulam. Is that not so?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct, Sir.

MR WILLS: Now it seems to be strange that you go to the trouble of taking them all the way to the Tugela River where you could have just done the same job at the farm.

MR WASSERMAN: That's correct, Mr Chairman and even to me that decision was strange when it came.

MR WILLS: Yes, it's strange to me as well.

MR LAX: You see, particularly in the light of the fact that you already killed somebody on that farm before and buried them there.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman, I had no idea where this plan of the river had come from, it was totally out of normal context.

MR WILLS: Prior to your application, did you become aware that there was a unit investigating this killing that was under the auspices, I think it was known as the d’Oliveira Unit, under the auspices of the then Transvaal Attorney-General?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR WILLS: This was prior to your amnesty application?

MR WASSERMAN: I'm not too sure if it was prior but I knew Mr d’Oliveira was working on this one.

MR WILLS: Now I've spoken to the Investigating Officer, Mr Holmes and I was hoping at this stage to have the statements and I've just spoken to him. Did you know that Capt Holmes was the Investigating Officer?

MR WASSERMAN: No, I didn't know that.

MR WILLS: Well, I've spoken to him telephonically and unfortunately I'm not in a position to verify this with documents, but at this stage he says to me that he has information that Ndaba and Shabalala were not killed at the same time. you deny that obviously?

MR WASSERMAN: I deny that emphatically.

MR WILLS: He also indicated to me that he had information and I don't know what the state of this information is, but that Ndaba was taken out in a Natal Parks Board boat and his body was blown up some miles off the coast.

MR WASSERMAN: No, that's incorrect, Sir. That's nonsense.

CHAIRPERSON: This evidence appears to be vital to the whole application. If it is true, if there is such evidence, it is quite clear there has not been full disclosure. What arrangements are being made to have this evidence made available to the hearing?

MR WILLS: Mr Chairperson, I've asked Capt Holmes to give me that evidence. I spoke to him on Friday last week. he indicated to me that he would have this evidence available by Monday afternoon. Unfortunately when I got hole of him, I only traced his number down on Friday, when I got hold of him on Friday afternoon he was in some operation in the Eastern Cape and he was expected back to his offices on the Saturday. He indicated to me that on the Saturday he would look through the information and give it to me. I spoke to him on the Monday morning, he indicated that he'd been delayed in the Eastern Cape but that he would endeavour to give the information to me. I'm still expecting it Mr Chairperson. I have asked the Truth Commission, in the form of Ms Deborah Quinn, to assist in this process but we haven't been successful at this stage and that's, I don't have any power to get hold of this information other than that. I am expecting affidavits to come through. Mr Chairperson I didn't, I raised this information at this stage obviously because it would be fair for me to put this to this witness. The information I've just revealed now was given to me as a result of a telephone conversation with Capt Holmes on Monday morning after the cross-examination of Mr Botha had been completed, but I would certainly appreciate assistance from the Committee as far as getting Holmes here. It would assist me greatly.

CHAIRPERSON: It seems to me that if there is such evidence, it should be made available, it should be put to the witness. Is it possible to continue his cross-examination on other aspects and to continue, we will do all we can to make sure such evidence, if it is evidence, is made available and can be put before the Committee. Obviously it's something which should be put to Botha certainly if it's going to say that his version is completely false and we have to put to the other applicant.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairperson, we agree with you. The - Please allow me say that it is startling that after two years down the line when everybody knew in the TRC of these applications, that we should be faced with this 90% through our, or 80% through our applications. It is just really unacceptable, but Mr Chairman, as usual we will not complain, we will fall in, because clearly we want to know what the truth is and we agree with you, but can my learned friend just tell us everything that Holmes told him? We now know of two things. Is there more, may we ask, Mr Chairman? And what's - surely my learned friend must have asked him, "But why do you say this, what is this based on? Is there somebody that can tell us?" I mean surely there must be more information?

MR WILLS: The only, I mean I don't know if I'm obliged to answer questions about consultations I have with witnesses but be that as it may, the only information that I have got related to that, but related to the two facts that I've given and to my recollection of the telephone conversation I had with Holmes, the impression I gained was this was through his investigations and I assumed it was through information contained in the dockets. I did request that statements be faxed to me to the number at, in the media room.

MR VISSER: May we assume that this is then all that he said? These two points.

MR WILLS: At that stage, yes.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, may I ask, I don't see that there should but could there be any objection to my attorney talking to him so that we can find out exactly what he's got and when it can be brought to you because Mr Chairman, we can't just keep on postponing the completion ...(intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: I want our investigator to take over now through our Leader of Evidence and we will be responsible for such evidence then being made available.

MR VISSER: I suggest that my learned friend completes the cross-examination of this witness, pending on whatever may come out from Mr Holmes.

MR WILLS: Thank you Mr Chairperson, I've just got one issue that I want to raise which is related, that is, in your experience as a Security Policeman, surely, or isn't it common practice that when you have an informer who supplies you with information about persons who may at a later stage be arrested, that it would be a common practice to keep that informer in order to communicate with that informer to corroborate information that is gleaned from the persons who are arrested or detained by some other means?

MR WASSERMAN: That would be a usual practice, yes Sir.

MR WILLS: Yes, so it would be quite an unusual thing to have killed this informer at this stage?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct, Sir.

MR WILLS: Do you know why? Are you able to advance any reason to the Committee why this unusual step was taken?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, personally I am unable to really know why this step was taken.

MR WILLS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR LAX: Mr Wills, can I just clarify something? The two issues that arose from your discussion with Mr Holmes were that they weren't killed at the same time and which of them was allegedly blown up at sea?

CHAIRPERSON: Ndaba.

MR WILLS: Yes, Ndaba.

MR LAX: I just wanted to be clear, so my note is correct, thank you.

MR WILLS: That completes my cross-examination, thank you.

MS POSWA: Thank you Mr Chair.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS POSWA: Mr Wasserman, you state in paragraph 4 that you were surprised by the news of Mr Ndaba's arrest in view of the high profile. Can you explain what you mean by this?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, not the arrest.

MR LAX: He was surprised that he was his informant, not by the arrest. Sorry, just to get the question right.

MS POSWA: What do you mean by high profile?

MR WASSERMAN: Well Mr Ndaba was a high profile, according to my knowledge, he was a high profile MK Commander from MHQ.

CHAIRPERSON: He was Commander of the operations in Natal, wasn't he?

MR WASSERMAN: He was at one stage, then he retreated.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you also know that Mr Shabalala was high profile, similar high profile?

MR WASSERMAN: No, I was unaware of his status, Sir.

MS POSWA: When did you come into contact with the name Ndaba? When did you first come into contact with his name?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I can hazard a guess. It would have been in my Swaziland Operations, probably 84/85, at a guess.

MS POSWA: Oh you were in Swaziland 84/85?

MR WASSERMAN: No I operated in Swaziland, but I was in Durban basically.

MS POSWA: Okay. Now you say that, to your knowledge, no assault took place at C R Swart?

MR WASSERMAN: Not in my presence.

MS POSWA: Not in your presence?

MR WASSERMAN: No.

MR LAX: Sorry your mike please.

MS POSWA: Sorry, and you were in the presence of these two all the time that they were there?

MR WASSERMAN: No, I was not in their presence all the time.

MS POSWA: You were not? Okay.

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chair.

MS POSWA: Now you say when you proceeded with the arrest of Shabalala at the meeting-place by Greyville Racecourse, you explained how the whole operation occurred, but I'd just like to highlight the fact that Mr Botha in his evidence, said that what he had, what your objective had been at that stage once Ndaba gave the signal, it was to protect Ndaba, would you agree with that? Your objective, your common objective, once the signal had been given by Ndaba that he was in danger?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman, any action taken by us was to protect Ndaba.

MS POSWA: Your objective of the whole action? But your account here has just been that your, the object of your, of the whole operation was to arrest both of them?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, that's the wrong impression, I hope that's not the impression ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Well, I gathered from the evidence, that he said the intention was to create the impression that they had arrested both of them after it had gone wrong.

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct, yes, that's the impression Sir.

MS POSWA: Okay, so you wouldn't agree with Botha's assertion that in fact Ndaba could have gleaned, Shabalala could have gleaned from that whole operation of arrest, that Ndaba was not being arrested?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, it is possible that he did glean that, that we were attempting to stage a charade that he would not glean that.

MS POSWA: Thank you. We have evidence from Mr Botha yet again that Shabalala refused to be recruited, what do you say to that?

MR WASSERMAN: That's very possible and I was not present when Botha even tried once to recruit him.

MS POSWA: I don't think I got the reason precisely why you were told not to try to recruit him. Why was that?

MR WASSERMAN: That reason was never given to me.

MS POSWA: In the usual course of your business of arrests you would have tried to turn a person over, would you not?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman we would have engaged in a questioning session should the reaction of that person be as such, then one might have tried a recruiting job on that personality.

MS POSWA: Had you previously been told not to try and recruit an arrested person?

MR WASSERMAN: Many times.

MS POSWA: You have been.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes.

MR POSWA: And you never questioned it?

MR WASSERMAN: No, not at all.

MS POSWA: Okay. On paragraph 12 you say that Shabalala was robust and aggressive throughout, can you just expand on that?

MR WASSERMAN: Well, Mr Chairman, if I attempted to have anything to say to Mr Ndaba, correction, to Mr Shabalala, he would have absolutely nothing to say to me.

MS POSWA: Is that aggression?

MR WASSERMAN: Well, perhaps not in the strict sense of the word, however he would have nothing at all to do with me.

MS POSWA: Is that what you mean by robust and aggressive?

MR WASSERMAN: Perhaps abrasive is another word, but it was definite from his reaction that there would be no dealings between the two of us.

MS POSWA: This just doesn't add up. You were told not to have anything to do with Mr Shabalala but you are able here to assert that he was robust and aggressive. The two just don't tie up.

MR WASSERMAN: Well, Mr chairman, I would have had to go and see that he was okay in the room, that perhaps he needed to relieve himself, we had to take him food, we had to take water, so those were the dealings that I routinely would have had with him, but I never had discussions over activities and actions that he might be doing.

MS POSWA: So, in hiss aggression what did he do, did

he refuse when you said you may go and relieve yourself?

MR WASSERMAN: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you have to be present when he had to relieve himself?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, there was no toilet facilities right in that room, so he would have had to be taken to do his ablutions and we took them.

CHAIRPERSON: And have his handcuffs taken off?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: It must have been most humiliating.

MR WASSERMAN: I think so, Sir.

MR LAX: Sorry, sorry if I may interpose. The word robust, what do you understand by the use of that word? Why did you choose that word?

MR WASSERMAN: I think it should have been rather more proud and forthright, but robust was selected.

MR LAX: Because robust means to be physical, to be more than just body language, which is what you used in evidence in chief.

MR WASSERMAN: Then perhaps it's the wrong word, I didn't understand robust to be that.

MR LAX: And aggressive has a similar denomination.

MR WASSERMAN: It's words selected in consultation.

MR LAX: It's just that the impression imparted by the use of those two words together, gives one the impression that he might even have tried to physically attack you back.

MR WASSERMAN: No, Sir, he didn't.

MR LAX: At no stage?

MR WASSERMAN: No.

MS POSWA: Thank you. We'll go now to the observation at the Knoll. Can you just clarify? Where was Gen Nyanda arrested?

MR WASSERMAN: He was arrested going up the road towards Overport, I don't recall the name of the road.

MS POSWA: And before the arrest you were observing the resident, called the Knoll.

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Mr Chairman.

MS POSWA: When he left the Knoll, you followed him?

MR WASSERMAN: That's correct.

MS POSWA: Why had you been asked to observe that place?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Botha had informed us that this was a safe-house for the ANC.

MS POSWA: An ANC safe-house?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes.

MS POSWA: Had he told you who to observe there?

MR WASSERMAN: I don't recall which names he mentioned, but we were to record all particulars of all personalities exiting and leaving.

MR POSWA: Did you know Gen Nyanda?

MR WASSERMAN: I knew Kibusa.

MS POSWA: I knew the name Kibusa and I knew Kibusa was Gen Nyanda.

MS POSWA: Okay..

MR WASSERMAN: And I knew the face, Ma'am.

MS POSWA: Okay. So I didn't quite get what you said he did that made you, alerted you to the fact that you were onto him. What did he exactly do?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I think his counter surveillance procedure, because he's a highly trained man, I think his counter surveillance procedures had picked us up. His driving mannerisms appeared to both du Preez and I that he was starting to take slightly evasive action and we both came to the conclusion that perhaps he had cottoned on to us.

MS POSWA: Can you just explain the driving mannerism, what was he doing? Swerving the car, going faster, slower?

MR WASSERMAN: Nothing as dramatic as swerving the car, however, I seem to recall perhaps and indicator, showing going left and then not going left and then an indicator

going right, to see if we were responding behind. That's routine anti-surveillance procedures and it appeared as though those were being practised.

MS POSWA: And then you went on to say that a particular weapon was discovered in the car whereas you had searched the car and not found the weapon. How do you explain that?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, my search was very, very cursory. We didn't strip that car at that stage for secret compartments, it was merely a physical search of the vehicle as it was standing there per se.

CHAIRPERSON: I tend to recollect, but I'm not sure, if it was in this case or something else, that the weapons were found in a secret compartment in the fuel tank?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I was just looking, I think it was in Gen Steyn's Exhibit H, where he recounts the judgment of the Magistrate in Mr Nyanda's application for bail, but I'm not entirely certain. I'm just looking through that now, Mr Chairman and if I find it, I will alert you.

MR LAX: It's on page 5 of that annexure.

MR VISSER: Thank you Commissioner Lax. I'm just looking. I see there's something on page 6 as well about explaining that tanks of a Mercedes and a Cressida, well he was driving a Cressida, was used to smuggle arms. I'm just looking again, Mr Chairman. I'm not sure where at page 5 you're referring to.

MR LAX: No, in fact you're correct there. It's the second-last sentence of that first paragraph on page 6, talks about:

CHAIRPERSON: It would appear to indicate, if one looks at the sentence just before that the modified petrol tank were found at the house. It may be somewhere else.

MR VISSER: Yes, certainly this does not narrow it down to a secret compartment in a car, Mr Chairman. My attorney has just pointed out to me something else here and that is at page 96 on The Other Side of the Story where the photographs which I referred to earlier, page 198, I dealt with and it says at page 97:

So according to these commentary Mr Chairman, apparently it's the middle photograph and I'm going to hand it to you again so that you look at it, it would appear to be the seat turned upside down with some sort of compartment. My attorney can just show that to you, Mr Chairman, it gives him something to do as well.

MS POSWA: So Mr Chair, we can proceed on the assumption that the weapons were found under the seat in a secret compartment. Thank you, Mr Chair. Can I continue? You say that you were told that Ndaba was anxious and indicated his intention to turn himself over the ANC. Would you normally be privy to such information?

MR WASSERMAN: As Mr Botha wished, I could have received such information yes.

MS POSWA: Earlier on you said he had not permitted you is some discussions, well which discussions were those? In discussions with Ndaba. You said earlier on that he had not permitted you in the room when he was discussing with Ndaba yet he walks out of the room and gives you the exact information Ndaba gave him, does that make sense?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, it makes Ma'am. Then I cannot put questions to Mr Ndaba.

MS POSWA: Pardon?

MR WASSERMAN: That means I would not be able to question Mr Ndaba on information.

MS POSWA: Okay, if you're in the room you would, it would have been assumed that you can question Ndaba, but if you're outside, you couldn't?

MR WASSERMAN: That's right.

CHAIRPERSON: And if you're outside, you are relying only on what you are told by Botha.

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct, sir.

MS POSWA: When was the decision taken to eliminate Ndaba?

MR WASSERMAN: I'm not sure when that was taken Mr Chairman, but I was, my participation came about earlier on the day in question.

MR LAX: When were you informed of that decision and, well let's just first, when were you informed of the decision? On that day? What time of day, can you remember?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chair, as I answered before I cannot give the time but it was earlier on the same day.

MR LAX: Was it in the morning, was it in the afternoon, was it early evening?

MR WASSERMAN: Somehow I recall sort of eventide.

CHAIRPERSON: You said earlier didn't you, afternoon, early evening?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Late afternoon, early evening.

MR LAX: And as a consequence of that you had certain preparations to perform?

MR WASSERMAN: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR LAX: And that entailed getting hessian sacking, it entailed getting the Watcrete poles, according to your evidence it entailed cutting bits of bailing wire to certain lengths and so on, is that right?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman, once I'd been informed that it's been decided that they were to be placed in a river and what my part would be I then prepared, on grounds of that instruction.

MR LAX: And where did you get all that material from?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman at the farm at Verulam, there was an old Hulett’s farmhouse, there was much poles, wire, hessian bagging and all of that stuff was at the farm.

MR LAX: Please carry on, sorry to interrupt you.

MS POSWA: Thank you. Now did the repercussions that this would have, the fact that Ndaba and Shabalala were to be eliminated on the National Party as explained in paragraph 18, did you reach this conclusion on your own, or where did you get this information?

MR LAX: I was just reminding you to put the mike on, you did it as I mentioned it to you.

MS POSWA: The concerns raised in paragraph 18.

MR WASSERMAN: Sorry Mr Chair, I just missed the gist of that question.

MR LAX: You're being asked, these concerns that you raise here in paragraph 18 about the way the decision was taken and the basis for that decision, where did you, how did you come to know about these concerns? Have I put the question correctly? Did you ...(indistinct- mike not on).

MS POSWA: Were you personally concerned about the repercussions that the elimination of Ndaba and Shabalala would have on the National Party?

MR WASSERMAN: I was aware that there would be repercussions, should it be established what had happened.

MS POSWA: Were you concerned about those repercussions as stated in paragraph 18?

MR WASSERMAN: What repercussions exactly?

MS POSWA: Should I read out the paragraph? Paragraph 18 of his statement.

MR LAX: Mr Wasserman, you can see paragraph 18, it's pretty obvious that there are a whole range of issues contained in it.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes Sir, I'm aware of the issues but are those repercussions?

MR LAX: Well during the period of time when the negotiations were under way, these revelations would have caused a sensation and would have embarrassed the National Party and the Government. Those are the repercussions she's talking about.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, I concur with that.

MR LAX: Yes, but the question you're being asked is, did you personally have a worry that that in fact would be the result?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, I did.

MS POSWA: You were not told this by Mr Botha?

MR WASSERMAN: I believe that I was also told this by Mr Botha, but I did further concur with it by myself.

MS POSWA: How far did you say the safe-house was from the Tugela River?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, distance wise...

MR POSWA: An estimation will do, Mr Wasserman.

MR WASSERMAN: 80 kilometres. 80/90 kilometres.

MS POSWA: So your testimony is that for 80 to 90 kilometres, you drove 80 to 90 kilometres in total silence to the Tugela?

MR WASSERMAN: I didn't speak at all to either Ndaba or Shabalala.

MS POSWA: But you spoke amongst yourselves?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, we spoke amongst yourselves.

MS POSWA: What would you say the mood was amongst yourselves as you proceeded to carry out this mission?

MR WASSERMAN: The mood was a sombre mood but we were going at lengths to show that it was not abnormal. Like that, there was nothing, I'd deem it as a normal trip.

MS POSWA: That is you wanted to conceal it from the two people you were with, Mr Ndaba and Mr Shabalala?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Ma'am.

MS POSWA: You wanted to conceal it?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes.

MS POSWA: If the Chair will bear with me. Now your evidence has been that you did all this in the course of your duties.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman this is really, I haven’t opposed or objected to this before, but really it's a question of legal argument. The learned Commissioner Lax has already put this to Mr Wills before. It's a matter of legal argument and frankly Mr Chairman, a lot of time might be saved if my learned friends would read the Khotso House judgment, because that is where this issue was dealt with by the Amnesty Committee Mr Chairman. We're really just wasting time with these questions. This witness can't answer legal questions.

MS POSWA: Mr chair, I do not believe that, I would like to know the mind-set of the applicant when he is carrying this out. Did he believe that he was carrying out his duties, was he aware that the instructions were unlawful in the circumstances?

MR VISSER: I have no objection to that question.

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I was aware that these were unlawful instructions.

MS POSWA: But you carried them out anyway?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Mr Chairman. It was my belief that I was still fighting the war and the conflicts of the past to the best of my ability.

MS POSWA: What, under normal circumstances, were you required to do when given unlawful instructions by a senior policeman?

MR WASSERMAN: I beg your pardon. Would you just say that again?

MS POSWA: What were you required to do once given an unlawful instruction?

MR WASSERMAN: Usually one would not comply with such an instruction.

MS POSWA: Why in this case did you?

MR WASSERMAN: I saw it as part of my duties in fighting the onslaught that we were faced with at the time.

CHAIRPERSON: The acts were unlawful, they were against the common law of our land, but did you believe these instructions were coming from the government, from the top? Not directly, but the authority was derived from them?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, I did so, Sir.

MS POSWA: No further questions, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Any questions?

MS THABETHE: Yes, Mr Chair, I do have questions, thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS THABETHE: Mr Wasserman, at paragraph 10 of your statement, you say that in view of the fact that Ndaba was already a Security Branch informer, you go on and then you say:

What does that mean? I don't quite get the meaning of that statement, "I was given to understand that we were not interested in any information which Shabalala might be able to give us"?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I was of the opinion that as Botha was handling Ndaba as an agent, we were not to be, not to go for Shabalala for information as Ndaba was already able to feed on to Botha the information that Shabalala might have been in possession of.

MS THABETHE: When you say we, who are you referring to?

MR WASSERMAN: I'm referring to that unit that was involved. That'll be du Preez, van der Westhuizen and myself.

MS THABETHE: And who gave you that information that Shabalala might not be able to give you an information?

MR WASSERMAN: That was Botha.

MS THABETHE: Botha?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes.

MS THABETHE: So Botha gave you an instruction that you shouldn't worry about Shabalala because you wouldn't be interested in the information that Shabalala would give?

MR WASSERMAN: Not to worry about Shabalala, Ndaba has the information.

MS THABETHE: Right. Now, my next question is, if Botha thought that Shabalala would not have any information that would be of interest to you, you in plural, why was Shabalala detained in the first place? What was the purpose of detaining Shabalala, because Ndaba had already given the information and as far as your evidence goes, Botha said you don't need Shabalala.

CHAIRPERSON: Shabalala was detained, wasn't he, to save Ndaba?

MS THABETHE: Sorry Mr Chair, Shabalala was detained to save Ndaba?

CHAIRPERSON: He gave the signal in the car, didn't he?

MS THABETHE: That was the reason for detaining Shabalala?

MR LAX: Do you mean his continued detention?

MS THABETHE: Yes.

MR LAX: Okay, well that's subtly different.

MS THABETHE: Okay, okay, thank you Mr Lax.

MR WASSERMAN: Now I'm, now I'm mixed up.

MR LAX: The question is, if Shabalala was of no use to you, because all the information was going to come from Ndaba and that's what you were told and that's what you surmised you told us, what is the point in holding Shabalala, continuing to hold him? Have I put the question correctly?

MS THABETHE: Yes, Mr Lax, thank you.

MR WASSERMAN: Well, Mr Chairman, I really don't know the particulars why we held onto Mr Shabalala that long. Mr Botha might know why he was kept behind for so long.

MS THABETHE: Mr Wasserman, in your evidence you have indicated that Mr Shabalala's head was down when he was arrested. Would you say he saw what happened to Ndaba thereafter?

MR WASSERMAN: He wouldn't have seen what happened after I had his head down.

MS THABETHE: Right. Then my question with regard to that is, on paragraph 12 of your statement, you say the problem became compounded when it appeared that Shabalala in effect suspected Ndaba of working with the police. When did Shabalala - and then you go on to say, "I remember him saying as much", when did Shabalala say this?

MR WASSERMAN: It would have been one of the nights, or one of the days, a couple of days after we had taken him to the safe-house in Durban.

MS THABETHE: And to whom did he say this? Did he say this to you? Or were you present when he said this?

MR WASSERMAN: He said it to me. I believe he said it to some of the other people that were there as well.

MS THABETHE: Maybe I'm confused a bit, I thought your evidence had indicated you did not speak to Shabalala and Shabalala did not speak to you back, so I'm just a bit confused, at what stage did Shabalala speak to you and say that he's suspecting Ndaba might be working with you?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, after four days, some form of chatting did take place, but there was nothing - there was no questioning on MK activities or anything like that. There was - within four days one has to say something to one another, but it wasn't discussions, interrogations, interviews, it was nothing like that.

MS THABETHE: Yes, I must say I've got difficulty understanding that, that - I don't know where you say it, but you say he did not co-operate with you, you went in and you went out, there was no conversation and then all of a sudden he says that he suspects that Ndaba is working with the police. Do you have any response to that?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I cannot recall, I don't know if other people said to me that they've spoken to Shabalala and he's of the opinion that he was set up by Ndaba. I really don't recall. I spoke to hundreds of MK operators. I cannot exactly recall who said what here but whilst in that house over that period of time, I was informed or I came to the conclusion that Shabalala did indeed at one time have an conclusion that Ndaba may have set him up for an arrest.

CHAIRPERSON: It wasn't that Ndaba was an informer, but that Ndaba had set him up, but from the facts that Ndaba was the person who apparently led the police to him.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir, as an informer yes.

MR LAX: Can I just raise something here? You may have formed that impression. I'd like to suggest to you that its highly unlikely he said to you he suspects Ndaba. no operative's going to give away the fact that he suspects the other guy you've got there. It's highly unlikely. You see, the reason I say this is that you didn't question Shabalala.

MR WASSERMAN: No Sir.

MR LAX: And all you heard about were the attempts by the C20 people to ask him certain questions. He was very uncooperative.

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Sir.

MR LAX: Why would he then admit that he suspected Shabalala? Sorry that he suspected Ndaba of selling him out because by doing that he's automatically admitting to being in a certain position. Do you see what I'm saying?

CHAIRPERSON: Setting him up.

MR LAX: Same thing, setting him up, it works the same way both ways.

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I cannot really put a state of affairs before the Committee of exactly what happened there. During those couple of days I was informed exactly how, or if the question came to me, but Shabalala had formed the opinion or the conclusion or been told by a slip up of C20, I don't know, I cannot pass comment, but that Ndaba was involved in his capture and therefore working with us.

MS THABETHE: Except that Mr Wasserman, unless this paragraph doesn't give the clear picture. You see this paragraph 12 says:

And then you go on to say:

So it suggests that you actually heard Shabalala saying this.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, it does suggest that, but it might have been somebody saying to me that he had said that.

MS THABETHE: So it's not true that you actually heard him yourself saying it?

MR WASSERMAN: I cannot give that evidence before the Committee, that I specifically heard that.

MS THABETHE: Now my other problem that I would like you to clarify for me with regard to this is, how could Shabalala reach that conclusion or on what basis would Shabalala reach the conclusion that Ndaba was working with the police because when he was arrested, he did not see what happened to Ndaba and the evidence is that they were both detained in the same safe house, so my question is on what basis would he reach this decision because he did not see Ndaba being arrested. He did not see what happened to Ndaba and he might have known that Ndaba is detained in the same safe-house with him. I don't know whether I have to repeat my question. My question is on what basis did Shabalala reach that conclusion that Ndaba is working for the police?

MR WASSERMAN: No Mr Chairman, I am not able to state on what basis if it was in fact so. I don't know on what basis Shabalala would have known that.

MS THABETHE: Thank you Mr Chair, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Any re-examination?

MR VISSER: No re-examination, Mr Chairman.

MR LAX: You said that when you first saw Ndaba, you didn't - he wasn't ever assaulted in your presence. What was his condition on that morning or that afternoon, early afternoon?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, when I arrived there, he was sitting in a chair, no signs of assault.

MR LAX: Now, you've told us about what happened to Shabalala when Ndaba gave the signal and you all converged on the vehicle and what happened to Ndaba in that moment of convergence?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, I'm unable to say where he was. I entered straight away into the vehicle at the back, so I don't know what happened to Mr Ndaba, whether he walked away, ran away, I don't know, I didn't visibly see what happened to him, I was putting all my attention onto Mr Shabalala.

CHAIRPERSON: Had he not been in the vehicle? Had he been standing next to the vehicle?

MR LAX: No he was sitting in the front passenger seat.

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, he was in the vehicle Sir.

MR LAX: So, you don't recall how he got out of the vehicle, if anyone took him out, if any words were spoken to him?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, he was the subject of Mr van der Westhuizen's attention, not of mine.

MR LAX: When did van der Westhuizen then get into the vehicle?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, he got into the vehicle after Mr Shabalala was in the back with myself and du Preez.

MR LAX: And Botha?

MR WASSERMAN: I never saw him until the safe-house.

MR LAX: So you have no recollection of what Botha did during this "arrest"?

MR WASSERMAN: After du Preez said "we've got the order, let's go, the signs been given" even prior to that I hadn't seen Mr Botha, Sir.

MR LAX: You see Botha's evidence was that he approached the driver's seat. He approached and he stuck his hand through the window, he had his firearm in his hand and he told him words to the effect of "Be calm, don't do anything silly".

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, I recall that evidence being heard.

MR LAX: But you have no independent recollection of that?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr chairman, I don't recall seeing him, however, he must have placed himself on the spot.

MR LAX: And as far as you were able to, you didn't see what he did? As far as you're concerned. Your own testimony. You heard him give that evidence, that's one thing. You have no recollection of what he did whatsoever?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, I don't.

MR LAX: Now, you've said that on the 12th van der Westhuizen was busy with observation due to his Brickhill Road, is that correct?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir.

MR LAX: And you and du Preez were at the Knoll?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Sir.

MR LAX: And we've heard the evidence of Botha that it was only the three of you that were guarding these two, so who was guarding them on the 12th when you were busy with your observations?

MR WASSERMAN: The C4 members, I believe.

MR LAX: I beg your pardon?

MR WASSERMAN: I believe perhaps the C4, the C20.

MR LAX: You see, he told us that only the three of you were guarding. It's also his evidence that the C20 people had no idea that these people were - anything unlawful to do with them. Now they were never left there unattended at any stage, that's self-evident. How could the three of you be out on other duties, when according to his evidence, you were supposed to be guarding them? At lease one or two of you?

MR WASSERMAN: Well, Mr Chairman, perhaps he was referring to the Durban members, but if we were not there at all at the time, then C20 were also policemen and they could also do the guarding but they were really, I would presume, to be out responsibility as Durban members.

MR LAX: Now Botha's told us that the C20 people had no knowledge of the unlawfulness of their detention. What legend did you give them? They stayed there for a couple of days.

MR WASSERMAN: That's correct, Mr Chairman, I never saw fit to give them any explanation. I'm not sure what Mr Botha would have said.

MR LAX: But listen, I've been to that house. Let me tell you straight, I've been, I've seen its layout, I observed the exhumation there, it's not a huge house, it's a relatively small house, it's about four or five rooms at the most, if I remember correctly. Are you talking about the house where the body was buried?

MR WASSERMAN: I don't believe I am, Mr Chairman.

MR LAX: Pumuza Ncweni? he was exhumed on that farm.

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, no, sorry Sir, it's a different house.

MR LAX: Is this a different place?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes.

MR LAX: So there were two safe-houses in the Verulam area?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, there were two.

MR LAX: Fair enough, I won't take that aspect any further. If the layout of the house was different, and we're talking about two completely different places, so be it.

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I think Mr Botha said Blackburn, in his evidence, did he not?

MR LAX: I think he did.

MR WASSERMAN: Different house to the other one, which is also at Verulam.

MR LAX: I think the other one was called Churchill or something like that.

MR WASSERMAN: Waterloo.

MR LAX: Waterloo, that was it. Thank you. The last aspect I wanted to just touch on was, surely the fact that nobody questioned Shabalala and that he was not being interrogated would give him the impression that something was strange here?

MR WASSERMAN: I don't dispute that, Sir.

MR LAX: Because yesterday Gen Steyn conceded that the whole conduct towards Shabalala would have increased the chances of him suspecting Ndaba and was totally out of sync with what you normally would have done in those circumstances. Would you agree with that?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir, it was wrong and it was out of sync.

MR LAX: Now, if it was the intention from the very beginning to simply eliminate these two people, then it wouldn't have mattered whether they realised Ndaba was an informer or not, whether Shabalala realised, and what it might be argued is that your conduct and the conduct of all of you present there, is consistent with that course of action, in other words with the intention to kill from the outset.

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, no, I had no idea that there was going to be any elimination on the outset, I was led to believe that Ndaba was in fact an agent of the branch. It would never have occurred to me that we were to eliminate an agent of the branch.

MR LAX: Did the fact of Botha's eliminating his own agent not strike you as strange? That he did it himself?

MR WASSERMAN: It struck me as very strange, Mr Chairman, very strange indeed.

MR LAX: Thank you Chairperson.

ADV BOSMAN: I'd just like some clarification on one issue Mr Wasserman. When you were instructed to keep surveillance at the two safe-houses of the ANC, let me first ask you this, who gave you the instructions to go there and to keep observation there?

MR WASSERMAN: It was Mr Botha.

ADV BOSMAN: Now did it come up at all that it might be at some stage or other, become necessary to effect any arrests there?

MR WASSERMAN: No, no, it never became evident upon instructions of arrest, because as far as I was concerned it was to be an Intelligence operation.

ADV BOSMAN: So there were no guidelines, or no directives given to you in regard to possible arrests?

MR WASSERMAN: Nothing given to me.

ADV BOSMAN: How did you consider your position? Did you think that you could arrest or that you should be careful in effecting arrests?

MR WASSERMAN: We knew that the first principle was to observe and identify all parties visiting these premises and it was a very intricate SACP ANC operation, but as for specifics of arrest, I personally was never instructed one way or the other.

ADV BOSMAN: The reason why I'm asking you this question, Mr Wasserman, is because it did seem strange to me that Mr Botha did not deem it fit to sort of warn you about not making arrests and he seemed to indicate in his evidence that he was quite comfortable that no arrests would be made. Do you have any comment on that?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, perhaps, he was the colonel on the spot, perhaps he should have given a clear instruction one way or the other.

ADV BOSMAN: Thank you. Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, it seems that we've come to the end of this day. Perhaps, Mr Chairman if we might take up a little bit of your time by seeing you in chambers and try to arrange our lives for tomorrow, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, we're going to have to adjourn. Till what time should we adjourn?

MR VISSER: Tomorrow morning 9.30 Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Well we're now adjourning till 9.30 tomorrow morning.