--------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAIRPERSON: The Panel remains the same, the representatives remain the same I take it. Are we now continuing with Mr Coetzee?

MR VISSER: Visser on record Mr Chairperson, if it pleases you, yes. We call Mr Coetzee, but before I do so, before I do so Mr Chairman, may I briefly refer you to the documents which we handed up yesterday to you. You will have noticed that the one document entitled "Algemene Agtergrond tot Amnestie Aansoeke" is very similar to ones which you have in the past received from us. The reason why a fresh one has been handed to you Chairperson, is by virtue of the fact that this particular document does undergo some modifications and changes and additions as time goes by. The present modification which I wish to draw your attention to, you will find at page 24. May I immediately ask whether this can also be marked Exhibit A Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: A?

MR VISSER: Exhibit A, yes Chairperson. Mr Chairman and members of the Committee, we have elaborated slightly on the issue of Swaziland and Mozambique because of the hearings of this week and that of next week for your information Mr Chairman, and may I take you through it very briefly, it is very brief in fact as it is, but Chairperson what we do is we refer you in paragraph 74, to the conference at Simon's Town towards the end of 1980 beginning of 1981 and we have informed you previously Chairperson and as did Gen Johan Coetzee give evidence in the London bomb matter, if you will remember correctly, that there was this conference where it was decided that the army, the Defence Force was not to operate in Swaziland as it would do in all other neighbouring countries, but that Swaziland because of the good relations which there were between the Swazi government and the king on the one hand and the Security Branch of the Police and Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa on the other, that it was, there was an understanding that the Security Branch would operate in Swaziland. It was explained Chairperson, that that "operation" consisted of two aspects, one being the gathering of information of Intelligence and the other was to execute certain projects. The understanding was always Chairperson by both parties to this understanding that the Security Branch could act in Swaziland as long as Swazi citizens did not become affected in any way and of course Chairperson, as long as we can say that between the lines, as long as there were no scandals which would embarrass the Swazi government. Chairperson in 1982 we refer to in paragraph 76, there was something in the line of a formal understanding reached, nothing was ever put in writing, but the understanding was really a confirmation of the Simon's Town conference and that which I have already alluded to. Chairperson in 1977 the important point of this whole issue of Swaziland is that this agreement did not have the power of an inter-State agreement between two independent States as I have already said, there was no formal agreement entered into, but what happened Chairperson was that by virtue of perhaps how it was conveyed to the members of the Security Branch on the ground, it was a generally accepted perception among members of the Security Branch, that they were "entitled or authorised" to act in Swaziland. We know Chairperson, and we would emphasise the point, that any conduct, any action taken by any member of the Security Branch of South Africa in Swaziland, was per se illegal because it wasn't sanctioned by formal agreement. We emphasise the point Chairperson, in paragraph 18 where we refer to the perception among members that they were "geregtig" as it were, they were authorised to act in Swaziland. Chairperson, because of its proximity to Mozambique, Mozambique is also important and we make a brief reference in paragraph 81 of page 25, to Mozambique. What happened there was that there was a formal agreement Chairperson, in 1984 and we all know about the Nkomati Accord between the Republic of South Africa and Mozambique. The important aspect of that was that Mozambique, the Mozambican government in that Accord undertook that it will not allow its soil to be used as a springboard for terrorist activities from Mozambique into the Republic of South Africa. Chairperson, paragraph 82 is a summary of what the knowledge of the Security Branch Intelligence was at the time and that is that from Mozambique, though Swaziland, from time to time, an active role was played by prominent MK members in the planning and execution of political violence in the Republic of South Africa and we mention in paragraph 82(a) some names which will ring a bell because of previous amnesty applications which you have heard Chairperson. And of course, by virtue of the fact that weapons of war were infiltrated and people were taken out of the country through Swaziland for military training abroad, brought back, infiltrated back into the Republic of South Africa, thirdly that people who were taken out of the Republic of South Africa for brief crash courses in weapon's training and you will hear some of that in the present application Chairperson, and that an extended network of safehouses were conducted and operated in Swaziland Chairperson, where these activities were conducted from and where financial and logistical support was given to so-called terrorists leaving and re-entering the country. Chairperson, the information contained in this very, very brief summary, we say in paragraph 83 comes from 1982 when undercover agents Chairperson, were infiltrated into MK in Swaziland and where they came to know of the two machineries, the two main machineries that were operated in Swaziland, the one being the Transvaal Military machinery and the other the Natal Military machinery, both of which have featured in previous amnesty applications before you, Mr Chairman, and I am quite certain before the members of your Committee as well. The intention Chairperson, of the machineries, we have set out in paragraph (c), it is really common knowledge at this stage Chairperson, what they intended to do and what they were in fact busying themselves with. Chairperson, just by way of example, from Swaziland you have heard in Natal that Operation Butterfly and Operation Vula originated there and were operated from there and then Chairperson, lastly, from the ANC's own presentations to the TRC, we have for your convenience copied the various Committees, the Regional Political Military Councils from 1983 to 1985 at page 28 and 29 from 1985 to 1990 which appears to cover all the incidents for which amnesty is required before you. I do seem, while I am saying that, I do seem to remember that there was one in 1991, so perhaps I did not cover the whole field, but there was one matter in 1991, but apart from that one exception Chairperson with respect, these are the names and the organisations of MK and the ANC operated from Swaziland. Chairperson, thank you for allowing me that short introduction, this is really the only aspect which is novel in the new Exhibit A, and I will then ask Chairperson, that you will accept the other document being the evidence of Supt Willem Coetzee, as Exhibit B Chairperson, and I would ask to call him as a witness, he is available.

MR SIBANYONI: Can I take you back to page 24, paragraph 75, just the spelling of the Swazi king, it should be S-o-b-h-u-z-a. Thank you.

MR VISSER: I stand corrected, thank you Chairperson. While my attention has been referred back to paragraph 75, perhaps I should not have skipped over it so lightly, apparently Chairperson, and this is the point made in paragraph 75, King Sobhuza had a real problem with any military activity on his soil and that was basically the reason why he allowed members of the Security Branch of the police to act, but he wouldn't know anything about military activity on the Swazi soil. Chairperson, I then call Mr Coetzee with your leave.

MR SIBANYONI: Mr Coetzee, your full names please?

MR COETZEE: Willem Helm Johannes Coetzee.

WILLEM HELM JOHANNES COETZEE: (sworn states)

MR SIBANYONI: Please be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, if I may proceed. It is just a fused bulb apparently Chairperson, it is working. Mr Coetzee, you have previously given evidence before an Amnesty Committee, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You have also studied Exhibit A which serves before this Committee, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Have you studied it?

MR COETZEE: Yes, I have Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you agree with the contents of Exhibit A?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And do you request that the information embodied therein as well as the evidence which is referred to in Exhibit A be incorporated in your evidence and be considered by this honourable Committee when considering your amnesty application?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Will you proceed from page 2 and tell us about your knowledge about the current incident for which you apply for amnesty?

MR COETZEE: During the period January 1988 up to July 1989, I was attached to the Intelligence Unit, Security Branch Head Office, Pretoria, Group D and in this regard I resorted under the command and control of Brig Oosthuizen and Gen-Maj Erasmus. As a member of the above-mentioned office, my duties were amongst the following - ...

MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, please keep in mind that everything you say has to be interpreted and that you must please go a little bit slower and pause at the end of each sentence, just to give the Interpreters to catch up with you.

CHAIRPERSON: The same applies to you, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: I yet again stand corrected, Mr Chairman.

MR COETZEE: The management and handling of informers involved with the monitoring of political dangerous State organisations and groupings of activities in both the RSA and outside the country, both from this perspective of Intelligence collection and Court directed investigations, I monitored the activities of amongst others the undermentioned organisations or groupings - the South African Youth Congress, South African National Students' Congress, Congress of South African Students.

MR VISSER: If I may interpose for a moment, is what you are saying in paragraph 2 that the chief activity in which you participated was the collection of Intelligence for the purposes of Court directed investigations against these organisations?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Very well, continue.

MR COETZEE: In this regard I and members of my Unit under my command and control succeeded in successfully infiltrating above-mentioned groupings. Information indicated that underground cell structures in the above-mentioned groupings had manifested and escalated and that members of the above-mentioned groupings both on management and grassroots level, outside the country had visited in order to form part of existing MK underground cell structures amongst Cosas.

MR VISSER: May I just interpose, you have referred to Sayco, Sansco and Cosas and here in 4(a) you only refer to Cosas, is that the intention that it only has to be Cosas?

MR COETZEE: As mentioned above Chairperson.

MR VISSER: So it would be amongst Cosas, Sansco and Sayco groupings?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I do apologise the word "voortgeset" in that sentence, shouldn't be there.

MR COETZEE: Members of such cell structures, to channel members of such structures outside the country for military training and to arm cell structures for the purpose of military training.

MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, if we may just pause there, what you are saying here is that you received information about these activities and you say that, in 4(a) that this would form part of existing MK underground cell structures in Cosas, Sayco and Sansco, what does that mean?

MR COETZEE: Amongst their members who had already existed Chairperson.

MR VISSER: In other words, in Cosas, amongst the students and Sansco and Sayco, the idea was that by them an independent cell structure, MK cell structure would be established, is that what you are saying?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Will you please proceed?

MR COETZEE: Information which was obtained after arrests of certain persons, for example MK Lucky and one MK Joseph Mangwashe, Sgt C.L. Petse, page 152 of the Bundle.

MR VISSER: Yes, and what you refer to after that is that an amnesty application was lodged in regard to them?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson. It was that the ANC/SACP alliance had focused themselves on the activating and use of students in the revolutionary struggle in order to usurp the government, especially the tertiary education level, students were recruited.

MR VISSER: Since when did you notice this tendency?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, it had manifested since 1985 and because of information Brig Oosthuizen during August 1988, granted leave that a national workshop in Pretoria be held to focus on this problem and to discuss it. During this particular workshop the threat was analysed with the focus on the determination of preventative action. By the end of 1988, I succeeded by means of informers and agents, to obtain information with regard to the activities of Louis Mohale, also known as Tabo. Mohale at this stage was a managing member of Sansco's Transvaal's Regional Management. The penetration and accompanying monitoring of Mohale's activities brought to light amongst others the following, that Mohale was part of a core group within Sansco who popularised and supported the armed struggle in the RSA. He and others in Sansco had contact and liaison with Sayco and Cosas structures of which the particular members already had access or formed part of the armed MK underground structures in the RSA, in Soweto and Turfloop. He was an advocate of the idea that Sansco in its own right an independent underground MK structure had to be established at tertiary education level and be established. Sansco had to conduct discussions with MK outside the country in order to, so that such MK underground structures be established and broadened on tertiary level to channel Sansco members to outside the country for purposes of military training, establishing weapons cache points in the RSA for use by the particular MK underground structures. All information surrounding the intensifying of the particular threat, was promoted on a continual basis with Head Office. Col de Kock in his capacity as Commander of Vlakplaas and the application of askaris was a source of information which was of particular interest to my division. It is then obvious that from time to time, I would discuss with him with regard to the struggle in general and information in particular. On occasion I held discussions with Col de Kock at Security Head Office in Pretoria about amongst others the people's war concept and strategy, activities and conduct of MK command structures outside the country, the scope, manifestation and escalation of such structures and dangerous State threatened actions in South Africa, the role and function, fulfilment of armed MK underground structures in the RSA.

MR VISSER: Is it correct to draw the inference from what you have testified so far Mr Coetzee, that the establishment of underground structures where that may be, and especially on tertiary education level, was a great threat to the security of the country and the maintenance of internal security?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Please continue.

MR COETZEE: Early during February 1989 my informant, one Phineas Moshualiba, also an applicant in the current application for amnesty who had earlier penetrated Mohale's group in Sansco and had continually supplied information with regard to the group's activities, reported to me that there had been a change. According to Moshualiba, Mohale decided that he and members of his group would travel to Swaziland in order to implement his ideas as mentioned above. This information was of great interest because the visit to Swaziland could realise their objectives as mentioned above. This information was conveyed to Brig Oosthuizen by me and we discussed and exchanged ideas about the information which was obtained over a period of time and decided what the counter action would be. After reception of the information with regard to the plans of Mohale and his group, and after Brig Oosthuizen and I had discussed the situation, Brig Oosthuizen gave instruction that I continue with the planning of an action and that he in the meantime would speak to Gen Erasmus about the matter.

MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, you are still going too fast, would you please slow down.

MR COETZEE: I understand that Brig Oosthuizen will testify that he then discussed the matter with Gen Erasmus and had proposed to him that action be taken against the group and that Gen Erasmus would discuss this with Brig Schoon, but in the meantime he said we should continue with the planning. Afterwards Brig Oosthuizen and I visited Vlakplaas where we spoke to Col de Kock. We informed him about the following activities of activists and revolutionaries on tertiary education terrain, activities and objectives of Louis Mohale, the problem which emanated and the threat because of Mohale's planned visit to Swaziland. Several proposals were made and discussed with regard to action against the members of this group. In my application I had said that Col de Kock had proposed that action be taken in Swaziland, against these persons, but I am not entirely certain about the statement. The decision which was taken was that if the operation would be authorised by Head Office, the particular persons would be led into an ambush and be killed, although I did not have part of any further discussions at Head Office and I cannot comment from this perspective.

MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, I would like to interpose here, it may not be the correct place, but would you please briefly tell the Committee more about Louis Mohale, where he came to your knowledge for the first time, where he was and what he allegedly did there, very briefly?

MR COETZEE: In a nutshell Chairperson, he came to my attention already as a student at the University of the North, because of activities he was suspended from the University and amongst others Mr Chairperson, he was involved in matters of arson at the University during student unrests, where he had already had worked with MK underground structures.

MR VISSER: After he was suspended from the University, where did he go to?

MR COETZEE: He then established himself in Johannesburg Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Where you refer to Mohale and his group, you refer to their activities in the Johannesburg vicinity?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Would you please continue at paragraph 20, that is where I interrupted you.

MR COETZEE: In this regard, I wish to point out that the particular informants and agents for this purpose was managed by me, and that all information with regard to the particular operation, was co-ordinated on a continual basis with Brig Oosthuizen and Col de Kock. We foresaw a real problem that at that stage, possibly 10 to 15 political activists would travel to Swaziland if they would make use of a minibus. Furthermore the possibility could not be excluded that innocent persons may be in the bus as well and action in such regard, would lead to great loss of life. Because at this stage we had access to very well penetrated informers, Brig Oosthuizen proposed that we should take control over the operation by making a vehicle available and ensuring that only those persons whom we have already prioritised as those persons responsible for the student unrests and violence, would be in the vehicle. The idea was to rent a vehicle by means of a source. I then made available an Opel Kadett to the Mohale group.

MR VISSER: What kind of vehicle was it?

MR COETZEE: It was a Regulation 80.6, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What does Regulation 80.6 mean?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, a vehicle which was declared by the State.

MR VISSER: And then became State property?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR VISSER: You are now at paragraph 24.

MR COETZEE: The particular Saturday, the 12th of February 1989, I accompanied Brig Oosthuizen, Col D. Els and Col Snyman to Vlakplaas, during which the new information was conveyed to Col de Kock and we wished them luck. At the same time, I handed over a plastic bag to Col de Kock.

MR VISSER: That must read an envelope, not a plastic bag, I handed over a plastic bag with an envelope in it?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson, I handed it over to Col de Kock and in the envelope there was a letter which was written in code, it was a fictional letter which had to serve to create the impression that the ANC had killed them.

MR VISSER: What was the idea with the letter?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, to make an allegation that they collaborated with the South African system.

MR VISSER: In his amnesty application, Mr de Kock also referred to a large group of people, I think on page 3 he refers to 16 or 17 people who were initially the focus, and you speak of 10 to 15, and you speak of the same aspect here. If a minibus was made available to them, then many people could have been in the mini-bus?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Some of the applicants allude to the fact that four activists at the end of the day was eliminated and the question which I would like to put to you is that in paragraph 20 you say all information was continually co-ordinated with Brig Oosthuizen and Col de Kock. After you had decided to make available a motor vehicle instead of a minibus, how many people did you expect then would travel with this vehicle to Swaziland?

MR COETZEE: If I recall correctly Chairperson, approximately five persons.

MR VISSER: And eventually, later you arrive at that, but eventually what was the amount of people who travelled from Soweto to Swaziland?

MR COETZEE: There were three of them Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Will you then continue at paragraph 25?

MR COETZEE: On the particular day, through Moshualiba I monitored the departure of the group. We were however not able to monitor the group's travel from Soweto to Oshoek. Moshualiba and I manned a telephone in Johannesburg, of which Mohale had the number too. At approximately 22H00 Mohale contacted us and spoke to Moshualiba, Mohale informed that he had established contact with other MK members, the identities unknown, in Swaziland and that he and his group would meet on a second occasion in Mbabane for the purposes of training in weaponry.

MR VISSER: So they departed the Saturday morning from Soweto as I understand you and the following that you heard from them, was when Mohale called Moshualiba from Swaziland?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: I think you may have mentioned it, but to make it absolutely clear, the Opel vehicle which was made available to Mohale and his people who went with him, by whom was this done?

MR COETZEE: It was by Moshualiba.

MR VISSER: Was the arrangement then that Mohale would contact Moshualiba at this telephone number which you refer to her in paragraph 26, to report to him and to tell him where they are with the vehicle?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: We will continue at paragraph 27, you also arranged that there be an attempt to monitor this vehicle from Soweto to Swaziland, will you then continue at paragraph 27?

MR COETZEE: Furthermore I arranged that two members, Col D. Els and Snyman at points, Witbank and Oshoek, man monitoring points in order to report if they saw the vehicle, a white Opel Kadett with which the group was travelling. The group had apparently followed another route because Els and Snyman did not observe them at all. Later I had heard that the three persons, Mohale and members of his group, had been led into an ambush and was eliminated in Swaziland. At all times, I associate myself with the action and I participated in the conspiracy to murder them. I am then apparently guilty of murder of whoever was killed in this action, and defeating the ends of justice by not reporting the incident. With regard to Col de Kock's amnesty application, I would wish to point out the following, the Monday after the incident, Gen Erasmus, Brig Schoon, Brig Oosthuizen and I held talks with Col de Kock at Vlakplaas, with Col de Kock I beg your pardon Chairperson, in order, with regard to a problem which emanated from the identification of the vehicle, which was made available to the group. I confirm that it was decided to duplicate the vehicle.

MR VISSER: So what you are actually saying is you agree with Mr Eugene de Kock's evidence in this regard?

MR COETZEE: Yes Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Will you please explain to the Committee what identification are you speaking of here, what happened to this Regulation 80.6 vehicle?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, this vehicle, I don't have an in-depth knowledge about this particular incident, but I am aware that a code number of the manufacturer or the code number was identified in the vehicle of the manufacturer, which was used to identify the ownership and year of manufacturer, which eventually led Chairperson, to the vehicle, and that the vehicle could be connected to the ANC.

MR VISSER: So you just decided to duplicate the vehicle?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR VISSER: So you could say but here is our vehicle, and that is not our vehicle there?

MR COETZEE: Yes Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't know if the interpretation, connected with the ANC, it was connected to the South African Police, wasn't it?

MR VISSER: No, it was a police vehicle and when it became traced, they duplicated the vehicle and said ...

INTERPRETER: I beg your pardon Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you sure that this was on the Monday?

MR COETZEE: I cannot recall the date or the time, it is possible Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I just think it a little unlikely if there was an ambush in Swaziland on the Sunday afternoon, that by Monday they would have checked the numbers of the vehicle and what have you? It does not matter.

MR VISSER: Col de Kock seems to recall it was the Monday, we don't really remember Mr Chairperson, but there was such a meeting.

CHAIRPERSON: There was a meeting later?

MR VISSER: There was a meeting and a vehicle was duplicated, yes. Will you please proceed with paragraph 31 and explain to the Committee how you saw the situation of the past and why you participated in this action?

MR COETZEE: These incidents took place in a war situation where the rules of normal conduct of war was not applicable. My action was aimed ...

MR VISSER: Please go slower.

MR COETZEE: My action was aimed against supporters of a liberation movement who were the enemy of the government and who managed their revolutionary onslaught from Swaziland, during which, amongst others innocent citizens were killed or injured and much damage to property occurred. In the light of the pressure which was placed on us in the Security Branch by the political leaders of the time, and the many speeches to which there was referred to the destruction of terrorists, I believed that such action was expected of me and that my action fell within the scope of my express or tacit authorisation. My participance in this incident was aimed in combating the revolutionary onslaught and was aimed at the protection and maintenance of the previous government, and the State dispensation, and to prevent chaos and anarchy in the country. As motivation for my participance in this action, I mention that I continually acted in the execution of my duties in the service of the SAP and in execution of orders which I received from senior officers. I believed that what I had done was expected of me as a policeman and that I had acted in the execution of my duties as a policeman, and that my actions fell within my explicit or tacit authorisation.

MR VISSER: I apologise for that Mr Chairman, it is my fault, it is a repetition of the previous paragraph. Please continue.

MR COETZEE: I humbly request that amnesty be granted to me for any offence or delict committed by me before, during and or after the incident with regard to the incident which took place at Mbabane, Swaziland on or during approximately the 12th or 13th of February 1989 during which one Louis Mohale alias Tabo, Derek Mashobane and Portia Shabangu were murdered.

MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, you did not go into Swaziland and you were not present during the ambush when the persons were eliminated, and consequently you do not know from first hand knowledge and from your own knowledge how many people were killed in the vehicle at the time when the ambush was executed. Is it your belief that it was only these three persons, from what you testified about the people who departed from Soweto that morning?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: If a fourth person was present, you would not know about it?

MR COETZEE: No Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, that is the evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Does anybody know including the person responsible for leading evidence, whether the Swazi police have been asked what their record shows, how many people were killed in this incident?

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, all the enquiries we made, unfortunately were negative, we could not trace any further information about this incident, whatsoever. I think there was information from the High Commissioner's office, I think we made enquiries to the High Commissioner as well in Swaziland, but no information could be forthcoming from that office as well.

CHAIRPERSON: It appears we have both a date and fairly accurate information as to the place where the ambush took place?

MR VISSER: That is the evidence-in-chief, thank you Chairperson.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, Hattingh on record. Mr Coetzee, singular aspects and I think you have largely dealt with it, I would just like to point out certain aspects, in paragraph ...

CHAIRPERSON: I don't know if it is really important, but I noticed the copy I have of the Exhibit B is unsigned, has a signed copy been handed in?

MR VISSER: No Chairperson, he has confirmed it under oath, but if you so choose, then he can sign a copy.

CHAIRPERSON: For the sake of keeping an exhibit, I think it might be as well if one were signed.

MR VISSER: Certainly, we will see to it that it is signed in the tea adjournment Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Coetzee, may I refer you to paragraph 8, 9 and 10 of your statement, I will not read it but in there you deal with discussions which you had held with Mr de Kock, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Is it correct when I say that such discussions took place on many occasions?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And it was not limited to information which you supplied to him with regard to this specific incident?

MR COETZEE: It is possible Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You also discussed other matters?

MR COETZEE: It is possible Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And you were also involved in other operations where Mr de Kock was also involved?

MR COETZEE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: It was also used, or it was also the norm in the Security Police to exchange Intelligence back and forth?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And certainly as you are sitting there now Mr Coetzee, you cannot recall which detailed information you supplied to him? You can only say that you discussed these things in general, as you mentioned it in paragraph 10? You don't have a recollection of exactly what you told him with regard to this specific incident?

MR COETZEE: No Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And then a few other singular aspects. Mr de Kock's recollection is that during the planning at Vlakplaas, your first visit to Vlakplaas, that Gen Erasmus and Brig Schoon were also present, what is your recollection?

MR COETZEE: That is possible Chairperson, although I cannot recall it.

MR HATTINGH: And then his recollection is also, he is not entirely certain about this, but his recollection is also that the day of their departure from Vlakplaas to execute the operation, that is the occasion when you say once again you went to Vlakplaas, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: His recollection is that Gen Erasmus and Brig Schoon were also present on that occasion.

MR COETZEE: No Chairperson. There I stand by the facts as mentioned, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Not Brig Schoon, I erred when I said Brig Schoon, Gen Erasmus and Brig Oosthuizen?

MR COETZEE: I recall the two Colonels and Brig Oosthuizen Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. And then with regard to the concession that you made in your statement, that you may be mistaken when you say that the idea, that the elimination had to take place in Swaziland, came from Mr de Kock. I have read the statement of Brig Oosthuizen and according to that, it would seem as if that decision was taken before Mr de Kock was approached to be of assistance with the operation?

MR COETZEE: That is possible Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And then in conclusion, one aspect, the discovery that the vehicle belonged to the police, and on page 6 or 7 Mr de Kock says he was contacted by Capt Johan Viktor of Pretoria and he says -

he is also not certain. He says, he puts it on the basis of a day or so later, it was established that the vehicle belonged to the police?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairperson, we have no further questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairperson, Booyens on record. Mr Coetzee, during this period of time in which the information was conveyed to Mr de Kock, the matter of whether or not these persons were going to Swaziland for training and whether they were going to bring arms back from Swaziland, was one of the more prominent aspects of your problem?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: In the language of the regular Security policeman, the man out in the field, a man would go out to a foreign country and obtain training and bring back weaponry and such a person would be described in normal police language as a terrorist, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Then I would like you to assist me with something which Mr Piet Botha recalls. He says you have already told us that you manned the telephone during the day, now in the first place can you recall whether the code name for the group which had moved through, this group of activists was their code name Flower Arrangement or The Flower Arrangement?

MR COETZEE: Yes, it is possible that we may have referred to them as such.

MR BOOYENS: You see, Mr Botha says that he and Mr Baker in Mbabane had to wait and see whether these persons would make contact with the askaris that they were supposed to make contact with, and that an approximate time was given and then these people did not arrive and it became late and they then drove out to a hotel which was a number of kilometres outside of Mbabane from where he made a telephone call and spoke to you and asked you where The Flower Arrangement was that was supposed to come through. Is it possible that such a telephone call was put through, that there was a query as to why these persons were late and that he contacted you to find out why they would probably have been late?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct, but I cannot recall who precisely made the call.

MR BOOYENS: Yes, that is understandable because Mr Botha still says that you asked him "who are you", because you did not recognise him. So you cannot recall, I am not saying that you know that it is him that put the call through, but you remember that somebody telephoned to say that the group was late?

MR COETZEE: Yes, I confirm that.

MR BOOYENS: Then just one further aspect, once again regarding the number of persons in the vehicle. A few moments ago you stated that there were approximately five, so is it possible that you may have told Mr de Kock and I assume as information became available on a consistent level, it was conveyed to the Operational Team, is it possible that you could have said that it was four or five to Mr de Kock and that this information would then have been conveyed similarly to the group out in the operational context?

MR COETZEE: Yes, it is possible.

CHAIRPERSON: You did not say they were five people in the vehicle, did you, I thought you said there could be five, but in fact there were only three?

MR COETZEE: Yes Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: And possibly just in conjunction with the Chairperson's question, did you convey your expectation of the number of persons in the vehicle to Mr de Kock?

MR COETZEE: Yes, I believe so.

MR BOOYENS: And it was only on that morning that you knew that the vehicle wasn't full, that there were only three passengers?

MR COETZEE: Yes, upon departure.

MR BOOYENS: And then it was too late, because you could no longer make contact with the persons in Swaziland to tell them that there were only three?

MR COETZEE: Yes, I assume that.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman, I've got no further questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Cornelius, Mr Chairman. I have just one aspect that I wish to clarify with you Mr Coetzee, with the regular footsoldier who would have been involved in such an operation, in the light that this was an external operation, which enjoyed the approval from the senior levels, there would have been no doubt in his mind that he was acting on behalf of the political dispensation against a political enemy?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: There could have been no doubt in his mind?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: It was the regular practice that all foreign operations enjoyed top senior approval and authorisation because it was such an extensive operation?

MR COETZEE: Yes, I would assume that.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I think there is information elsewhere, isn't there, that no foreign operations were carried out except with top level approval?

MR CORNELIUS: That is correct Mr Chairman, that was I think in the London bomb trial pretty prominent.

CHAIRPERSON: I think in some of the papers before us here, there is the same thing, do you agree with that?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR NEL: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no questions for Mr Coetzee.

MR ROSSOUW: Rossouw, Mr Chairman, I also don't have any questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOTHA: Thank you Mr Chairman, Botha. Just one aspect for the sake of clarity regarding a possible unclarity that may appear from the statement of Mr Snyders, my client. Indeed it is my instruction that according to his operation, there were three passengers in the vehicle. He stated at one point that three persons were killed, but in another part of his statement he says that there were four, is it your evidence that there were three in the vehicle?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR BOTHA: Thank you Mr Chairperson, no further questions.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Van Heerden Mr Chairman, I would like to request a short adjournment to take instructions on a certain aspect from the family of Mohale.

CHAIRPERSON: Does anybody else have any questions that they want to ask in the interim?

CHAIRPERSON: We will take the short adjournment now, then.

ON RESUMPTION:

WILLEM HELM JOHANNES COETZEE: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN HEERDEN: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Coetzee, in your statement on paragraph 2(c) you state the reason why the organisations were infiltrated and you also state that they were successfully infiltrated. Could you elaborate on that please?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, what I am implying is that there was also a variety of informers and agents elsewhere in the country who had been placed and who had accessed these organisations.

MR VAN HEERDEN: If you say accessed, what do you mean by that?

MR COETZEE: They had the capacity to closely monitor movements and actions.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Does that then imply that such persons became members of the organisations?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Did you personally have contact with some of these members?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Can you recall any of these persons with whom you had contact, who were also informers?

MR COETZEE: At this stage I have already mentioned the person, the others were agents or informers, whose identities I do not wish to expose.

MR VAN HEERDEN: The person whom you have mentioned, was he a member of the South African Police?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Which organisation did he infiltrate?

MR COETZEE: Sansco, Mr Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Just on, I don't know maybe your next question will be dealing with a different issue, this person, at the time he was at the University, was he already working for the Security Police?

MR COETZEE: Would you repeat the question please?

ADV SANDI: Yes, you have mentioned Mr Moshualiba who was at the University of the North, was he working for the police at the time he was there or did he join the police afterwards?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, since 1984 according to my recollection, he was involved in the SAP.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, there is a misunderstanding, it is Mohale that was at the University of the North, not Moshualiba.

ADV SANDI: Yes, but Moshualiba is the one who was working for the police, not so.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but he was not at the University of the North.

ADV SANDI: He was not at the University?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Okay, thank you.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Can you say how it is possible for a person who wasn't a student to become a member of such an organisation?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, this member of the Force was tertiary placed.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Does that then imply that he was a student?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR VAN HEERDEN: For what length of time did he study, that would be at the University of the North?

MR COETZEE: I would just like to rectify something, Moshualiba to whom we have referred, was not placed at the University of the North.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Where was he placed?

MR COETZEE: He was placed in Sebokeng Mr Chairperson, and in Soweto respectively.

MR VAN HEERDEN: When did you hear for the first time about Tabo Mohale?

MR COETZEE: I cannot specifically recall the date, but as a result of his activities at that stage, in 1988, 1989, he had drawn much attention to himself.

MR VAN HEERDEN: How did he manage to draw this attention?

MR COETZEE: As a result of his involvement in tertiary activities.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Could you elaborate on the concept tertiary activities?

MR COETZEE: In other words that would be within the context of Sansco's objectives Mr Chairperson.

MR VAN HEERDEN: And this Mr Moshualiba, the police officer, was it in 1988, 1989 that he had contact with Mr Mohale?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VAN HEERDEN: In paragraph 6 of your statement, you mention the workshop which was arranged and emphasis was placed upon the determination of precautionary measures, could you elaborate on that?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, I can no longer recall precisely what was discussed with and during the workshop, but I would imagine that one of the points of discussion would have been the identification of so-called underground cell structures which operated from a tertiary level within the country.

MR VAN HEERDEN: What would the precautionary action have involved?

MR COETZEE: The establishment of informers and agents within existing structures within the country.

MR VAN HEERDEN: How regularly did you have contact with Mr Moshualiba?

MR COETZEE: I would just like to rectify something, I am referring to Mr Moshualiba.

MR VAN HEERDEN: I beg your pardon, that is my mistake.

MR COETZEE: On a consistent basis Mr Chairperson.

MR VAN HEERDEN: In paragraph 7(a) you state that Mohale was a member of a core group which supported and popularised the armed struggle, how large was this core group?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, I can no longer recall precisely, but what I can confirm however is that the persons who ultimately accompanied him, was part of his group.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Would that be the group in general or the core group?

MR COETZEE: The core group, Mr Chairperson.

MR VAN HEERDEN: In paragraph 11 you state that a change came about in the group's activities and that they would travel to Swaziland. Could you perhaps elaborate on this change that this group underwent?

MR COETZEE: What I have referred to Chairperson, would be initiatives from Mohale to go abroad in order to realise the objectives as already stated, the objectives of this core group.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Where in Swaziland would they have gone?

MR COETZEE: I cannot recall precisely to whom, Chairperson, but I can recall that mention was made of Manzini.

MR VAN HEERDEN: How far away from the border was Manzini, how far from the nearest access route?

MR COETZEE: I would assume Chairperson, that it may have been Oshoek, which is approximately 40 to 50 kilometres away, I may be mistaken in this regard.

MR VAN HEERDEN: You state here that you consulted with Brig Oosthuizen and also through him with Gen Erasmus and that you also spoke to Col de Kock and that various proposals were put forward regarding action against members of the group. Can you recall what proposals were put forward?

MR COETZEE: At this stage I can only remember still that we had to act in order to prevent that these persons succeed in their objectives of returning to South Africa with arms as well as the creation of a military capacity.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Can you recall which proposals were made in order ... (electricity failure) ... the discussions that Mohale held with the agent? Could innocent persons have been in the mini-bus?

MR COETZEE: It is highly possible that persons may simply have accompanied the group for the purposes of a tour or a holiday.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Now when Brig Oosthuizen suggested that control be assumed of the operation, could you explain how one goes about taking control of an operation?

MR COETZEE: In order to prevent that innocent persons become involved in a cross-border visit, and then also by means of the vehicle, to restrict the number of persons that could really make use of the vehicle, in order to make a smaller vehicle available and in so doing, take preventative action and place Mohale in the position to leave the country only with his core group.

MR VAN HEERDEN: To whom was this vehicle, the Opel Kadett given?

MR COETZEE: If I recall correctly, it was given to Mohale himself.

MR VAN HEERDEN: By whom?

MR COETZEE: By the agent, Mr Chairperson.

MR VAN HEERDEN: What did Tabo Mohale do during 1988 and 1989?

MR COETZEE: He was a student.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Where?

MR COETZEE: If I recall correctly, at Unisa.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Derek Mashobane?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, I do not have much knowledge regarding the latter mentioned person.

MR VAN HEERDEN: You say you do not have much knowledge, what do you know?

MR COETZEE: Except that he was part of Mohale's core group.

MR VAN HEERDEN: And Portia Shabangu?

MR COETZEE: I would confirm the same regarding her.

MR VAN HEERDEN: That she was also a member of the core group?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Earlier you stated that Tabo Mohale was a student of the University of the North, did I understand you correctly?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR VAN HEERDEN: When was this?

MR COETZEE: I can no longer recall all the data and periods of time.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Furthermore you stated that he had been expelled as a result of cases of arson during unrest situations?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR VAN HEERDEN: It is my instructions from the family of Tabo Mohale that he was never a student at the University of the North?

MR COETZEE: That is the information that I had available, Mr Chairperson.

MR VAN HEERDEN: In paragraph 24 of your statement, you state the latest relevant information which was conveyed to Col de Kock. Could you elaborate on that?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, the arrival of the other two persons to whom we have referred was among others at that stage, conveyed to Col de Kock as well as the possibility of a further one or two persons who may possibly have undertaken the journey as members of the core group, but who at that stage, was still unknown to us.

MR VAN HEERDEN: How many persons would have been in the vehicle, according to you?

MR COETZEE: If I understand or recall correctly, Chairperson, between five to three, that was the regular number that was used with regard to the vehicle.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Furthermore you spoke of a fictitious letter which was supposed to create the information that the ANC had killed them? In your evidence-in-chief you stated briefly that the content of the letter was about the fact that they had dealt with the RSA system, can you elaborate on that?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, I can no longer recall the detail of the letter which was compiled or composed, but I can recall that ultimately in other words, we wanted to place the responsibility for the deaths at the ANC and furthermore the letter contained data which would ultimately create the impression with the Swaziland police of where these persons came from and what the purpose of their visit was.

MR VAN HEERDEN: What code was used?

MR COETZEE: Identical codes which were used by the ANC MK structure on a consistent basis with the underground cell structures.

MR VAN HEERDEN: In paragraph 25 you say that the departure of the group was monitored by means of Moshualiba, how was it monitored?

MR COETZEE: What I meant by that Mr Chairperson was the delivery of the vehicle and the physical departure of Mohale and the others from Johannesburg or Soweto. I am not entirely certain of the precise address or the precise situation of the address from where they had departed.

MR VAN HEERDEN: How did you plan to monitor the group from Soweto to Oshoek?

MR COETZEE: By means of the placement of the two members to whom I have already referred.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Before the departure and during your discussion with Col de Kock, did you discuss any details regarding the operation?

MR COETZEE: I cannot recall, I would assume Chairperson that at that stage the operation had already been finalised, although details of the operation were not known to me, if I recall correctly.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Did you have no share in the planning of this operation?

MR COETZEE: I would believe that when we were involved in discussions with Col de Kock, we would participate in general in the planning of the operation.

MR VAN HEERDEN: What do you mean that you would participate in general?

MR COETZEE: That Col de Kock would manage the operational component and then according to his own planning, would have implemented the operation Mr Chairperson.

MR VAN HEERDEN: How many persons departed from Soweto?

MR COETZEE: If I can recall correctly, as I have already stated, only three of which I was aware at that stage.

MR VAN HEERDEN: In paragraph 26 you state that you and Moshualiba on that particular day, manned a telephone of which Mohale had the number. Where was this telephone?

MR COETZEE: I assume Chairperson, that it was at a safehouse.

MR VAN HEERDEN: How many telephone calls were made to that number that evening?

MR COETZEE: I can only recall one telephone call from Mohale from Swaziland.

MR VAN HEERDEN: In paragraph 28 you state that later you heard that these three persons were led into an ambush, when were you informed about this?

MR COETZEE: I would assume that it was on the Sunday or the Monday subsequent to the incident.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Who told you about it?

MR COETZEE: I would imagine that it was Brig Oosthuizen who informed me.

MR VAN HEERDEN: I have nothing further.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

ADV SANDI: Is there any reason why Mr Mohale was not arrested for conspiring to send people away to Swaziland to receive military training, even before he had actually sent those people away?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, at that stage we would have had to expose our agent.

ADV SANDI: The agents would have been Moshualiba, who were those agents?

MR COETZEE: It is Insp Phineas Moshualiba, at that stage he was a Sergeant.

ADV SANDI: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, no thank you, but perhaps if you will allow me through the Chair, could we ascertain from Mr van Heerden whether there is objection to the applications and if so, on what basis Chairperson, so that we don't have the same problem as we had last week in Natal, not having been informed beforehand.

CHAIRPERSON: What is the attitude of the family Mr van Heerden?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Mr Chairman, my instructions are that they've got no objection in principle to amnesty, provided there is a full disclosure and that the political motive is disclosed. That is the basis of the presence of the family here.

MR VISSER: That is fair enough Mr Chairman, thank you. I have no questions in re-examination, might the witness be excused if you are finished with him, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: On the same basis as usual, if something arises, you will arrange for him to return?

MR VISSER: He has been informed to be in attendance, Chairperson.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------MR VISSER: The next witness Mr Chairman, is Brig Oosthuizen who I wish to call. We have a statement for him as well, which we hand in as Exhibit C with your leave Mr Chairman, it has been signed by the applicant. Brig Oosthuizen is available to take the oath Chairperson, he has no objection to take the oath, he wishes to give his evidence in Afrikaans.

MR SIBANYONI: Will you rise please. Your full names?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Alfred Oosthuizen.

ALFRED OOSTHUIZEN: (sworn states)

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, please be seated. Sworn in Chairperson.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Oosthuizen you are an applicant in this amnesty application for any illegal or unlawful act or omission which was committed during, before or after an incident which took place in Mbabane in Swaziland during February 1989, during which the victims were killed?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Your application appears in the Bundle on page 239 and specifically you deal with this incident from page 232 to 235?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm the correctness of the content of your formal amnesty application?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: In your application with paragraphs 7(a) and (b) you stated not applicable and the Chairperson has heard on various occasions what the explanation for this would be. What would be the correct answers with regard to paragraph 7(a) with regard to you support of any political party?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: It is correct that I was a supporter of the National Party.

MR VISSER: Very well, and you then request that your application form be amended as such?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, it is the same reason as has been advanced before, Mr Chairman, with respect. Furthermore you have also studied the documents which has been marked as Exhibit A, is that correct?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you concur from within your own knowledge with the information contained therein, as true and correct?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR VISSER: And do you request that that evidence as well as the evidence to which is referred to in Exhibit A, be incorporated in your application?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: This is the first occasion upon which you will be giving evidence before the Amnesty Committee during an amnesty hearing?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Will you then proceed from page 2 and address us on what your particular share in this matter was. Perhaps we could curtail it with the permission of the Chairperson, during 1988, in January to July 1989, you were connected to the Intelligence Unit of the Security Branch, Head Office in Pretoria which was known as Group D for Delta, is that correct?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR VISSER: And that during that period of time, you resided under the command of Maj-Gen Erasmus?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR VISSER: He is also an amnesty applicant, and he will give evidence after you, and you state that as a member of the aforementioned division or group and by nature of your duties, you participated in among others, information management and co-ordination and the management and handling of information which was of security interest as well as the monitoring of political organisations and groups, who were dangerous to the State within the RSA and abroad. Could you state which groups are of relevance for the current application?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Sansco.

MR VISSER: That would be the South African National Students' Congress?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Please proceed.

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Shall I read from paragraph 3 onwards?

MR VISSER: No, 3. The others would be Sayco?

CHAIRPERSON: Does he need to read it all Mr Visser, can't he merely confirm it?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, with your leave ...

CHAIRPERSON: You can ask him to amplify any paragraphs that you wish.

MR VISSER: Yes, with your leave I would like to do that to save time, until we come to paragraph 7 Chairperson with respect. It was the student organisations of Sayco, Sansco and Cosas in which primarily although not exclusively, there were students who underwent tertiary studies, they were members of these organisations?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And these groups or these organisations were infiltrated as Col Coetzee has submitted to the honourable Committee, you had information and knowledge about it, is that correct?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And as he has given evidence, at a stage reliable information came to light which indicated that some of these underground structures had multiplied within the aforementioned organisations and wanted to establish contact with groups abroad in order to become part of the existing MK underground cell structures within the organisations, and that they wished to establish MK underground cell structures within the RSA and they wanted to send or channel members of such underground structures abroad for the purposes of training as well as for the purposes of bringing arms in from abroad?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You have also heard the evidence of Mr Coetzee indicating that great emphasis was placed by the ANC/SACP alliance on the recruitment of students in order to fortify the revolutionary onslaught in South African?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And then you confirm the evidence of Mr Coetzee regarding the national workshop as well as the information which he made available to you regarding Mohale?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And then with the permission of the Chairperson, I would just like to reiterate that the existing information indicated that Mohale was a member of a core group in Sansco which wanted to enter the arms struggle within the RSA and that he or his core group wished to establish contact with structures beyond the borders of the country, particularly in MK and then for the purposes that you have already summarised with regard to underground structures, they wanted to establish stockpiles and they wanted to obtain training?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Is it true that all this information was thoroughly checked and monitored on a consistent basis with Security Head Office?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Then could you begin with paragraph 10 on page 4 and explain to us how you entered the picture?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Paragraph 10 - during approximately the first week in February 1989, Lt-Col Willem Coetzee made a submission to me with regard to the political activities of political activists connected to the South African National Students' Congress, Sansco. At that stage, he was the Group Head of an Intelligence gathering Unit which was under my direct command.

MR VISSER: Here you refer to Col Coetzee?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct. Col Coetzee informed me that an informer, one Phineas Moshualiba ...

MR VISSER: Please repeat.

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Col Coetzee informed me that an informer, one Phineas Moshualiba, also an applicant in the current application for amnesty, who had previously penetrated Mohale's group in Sansco and had consistently provided information regarding the activities of the group, had reported to Col Coetzee that a change had come. According to Moshualiba Mohale had decided that he and members of his group would travel to Swaziland during the weekend of 11 - 13 February 1989 in order to establish liaison with MK structures, to receive military training and to smuggle weapons to the RSA in order to establish an underground cell and to enter the armed struggle. (1) To hold discussions with members of the African National Congress, the ANC, to co-ordinate student activities on a national level in order to promote the creation and extension of the people's war strategy. These discussions would also among others focus on a planned national protest actions, boycotts, and so forth.

MR VISSER: Yes, and then it is merely a repetition of what you have already stated, to undergo quick training and handling of weapons. Please continue, page 5.

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Paragraph 12, because the tertiary educational terrain had already been destabilised and unrest and violence existed on a broad basis already, the visit to Swaziland in terms of all available confirmed information ... (tape ends) ... on campuses within the RSA, drastically, consequently this information was of the utmost importance, seeing as the proposed visit to Swaziland would open up a whole new dimension in the struggle, which had to be prevented at all costs. I had no reason to question Lt-Col Coetzee's motive, information or credibility because he was an experienced Intelligence operator and possessed credibility with regard to the correctness of information. Col Coetzee suggested to me that a controlled covert offensive operation be launched with regard to the political activists who were going to Swaziland. He motivated this by raising the following points - normal legal actions or options with regard to arrest and court oriented action against student leaders, were basically out of the question as a result of intimidation of witnesses and fears which were created by informers and police officers. Furthermore any action against these leaders would create a focus point of new activities such as protest actions and boycotts, which in either event, would increase the intensity of unrest and violence even further. Furthermore it was the experience that detention of activists, gave them a very high stature and prominence. Liaison with the ANC in Swaziland had to be discouraged, because instant training in weapons could lead to large scale violence in the RSA. The smuggling of weapons to the RSA by means of these student leaders, had to be avoided at all costs for obvious reasons. Given the intensity of the political instability with the accompanying unrest and violence which at that stage still reigned in the RSA, I realised thoroughly that a direct liaison through the student political activists with the ANC in Swaziland, could have extensive consequences for the security situation in the RSA.

MR VISSER: Mr Oosthuizen, if I could just take you back to paragraph 15. Mr Coetzee was examined by Commissioner Sandi regarding why you simply did not arrest Mohale and or members of his group and then the following question would have been why didn't you arrest and detain them? How would you have reacted to such a suggestion?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: There were two reasons, Chairperson. The first as already stated in paragraph 15(1) and then the other very important reason was in order to protect the Intelligence network and not expose the informers.

MR VISSER: Are you saying that in order for you to charge them, you would have required a witness and the only witness who would have known about their activities or their offences, would have been the informer?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well.

MR OOSTHUIZEN: I continue with paragraph 17.

MR VISSER: Yes, you agreed with Col Coetzee and everything possible had to be done in order to prevent this Swaziland liaison, is that correct?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR VISSER: And did you also agree that a controlled operation had to be planned and it was controlled in the sense that they should not be allowed to arrive in Swaziland by their own means but that you should make a vehicle available to them and attempt to maintain contact with them as they went to Swaziland?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And did you then undertake towards Coetzee that you would consult Head Office regarding the authorisation for the operation?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: In paragraph 18 you state that at that stage you foresaw that if a minibus were made available to them, a larger group of people may have gone, which would not necessarily have formed part of the core group of activists and that the possibility existed that innocent persons could in such a case, be struck?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And then at some stage the suggestion was made that a smaller vehicle be made available to Mohale and his core group by means of Moshualiba, is that correct?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that suggestion made by you?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: During discussions with Coetzee?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well, please continue, page 6, paragraph 20.

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Furthermore I advised Lt-Col Coetzee to prepare a proper coverage legend so that if the operation was successfully completed, the informers would still be capable of maintaining their penetrated positions within the political structures. The latter mentioned was of vital importance seeing as information was of cardinal importance. Furthermore, any exposure of informers would necessarily lead to their death.

MR VISSER: Was this your experience during that period of our country's history?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well, please proceed, paragraph 21.

MR OOSTHUIZEN: During the afternoon, in the absence of Lt-Col Coetzee, I submitted the entire operation to Maj-Gen Erasmus, my immediate superior as well as the Group Head of Group D for approval.

MR VISSER: You are referring to the same person in his various capacities?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct. I also submitted all documentary support and Intelligence reports with regard to student unrest and violence, the profiles of suspects, ANC objectives as well as established liaison between members of the ANC and student leaders. After consideration of all the relevant information, he informed me that in principle, he held no objection towards the operation, but that he would have to clear it with Head Office first, however he informed me that we could continue with the planning of the operation. Lt-Col Coetzee and I went to Vlakplaas the following morning where we discussed the content of the proposed operation with Col de Kock. We discussed the political motivation for the operation and after that, the proposed execution. Lt-Col Coetzee and I agreed that the groundlevel arrangements would be given to Col de Kock.

MR VISSER: That should actually read left over?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is right, it should be left over to Col de Kock. We agreed that Lt-Col Coetzee would liaise further with Col de Kock regarding the arrangements, vehicles, time, coverage legends and so forth. Maj-Gen Erasmus called me to his office that afternoon and informed me that the operation had been authorised. I informed Lt-Col Coetzee that the operation was authorised and that he could continue with the planning and liaison with Col de Kock. I did not form any further part of the planning. I am not aware whether it was Lt-Col Coetzee or Col de Kock's staff who participated in the operation. During the weekend I received feedback that the operation had been successfully completed and that three or four persons had been killed.

MR VISSER: Can you recall precisely what the feedback was that you received, whether it was three or four or can you not recall?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Chairperson, I cannot recall.

MR VISSER: Very well, please proceed.

MR OOSTHUIZEN: On the day of the action, 98-02-12, I accompanied Col W. Coetzee, Col D. Els and Col Snyman to Vlakplaas, during which the latest information which was available, was conveyed to Col de Kock and they were wished luck.

MR VISSER: Was this before their departure?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes, it was the morning just before their departure.

MR VISSER: Do you recall the content of the information which was conveyed that morning, today?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: No, I cannot recall it.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.

MR OOSTHUIZEN: The manner of action in Swaziland, was not discussed during this meeting by Col de Kock with us, that would be me, Col Coetzee, Col Els and Col Snyman.

MR VISSER: Yes, and later you were informed what the result of the action had been?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: What do you say in paragraph 30?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: With regard to Col de Kock's amnesty application, I wish to confirm that I, Brig Schoon, Gen Erasmus, Col Coetzee had indeed held discussions with him at Vlakplaas because the Opel Kadett had been traced back to the SAP and the decision was taken to duplicate the vehicle.

MR VISSER: Therefore your evidence would be the same as that of Col de Kock and Mr Coetzee in this regard?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Please proceed with paragraph 31.

MR OOSTHUIZEN: At all times, I associated myself with the action and I participated in the conspiracy to murder them, therefore I am probably guilty of murder of whoever died during this operation and I am also guilty of defeating the ends of justice because I did not report the matter.

MR VISSER: And how do you motivate your action in terms of the stipulations of the Act?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: This action took place in a situation of warfare where the rules of normal warfare were not of application. My action was aimed against supporters of a liberation movement who were the enemy of the government and who were waging a revolutionary onslaught against the State dispensation, during which among others innocent civilians were killed or injured and much damage was brought to property. The struggle that we combated, was a political struggle and everything that I did, was done in the execution of my duties as a policeman in protection of human life and property and in maintenance of the State dispensation of that time and in support of the National Party and to prevent that the country fall into chaos and anarchy. In the light of the pressure which was exerted upon us within the Security Branch, by the political leadership of that time and the many statements and speeches during which reference was made to the obliteration of terrorists, I truly believed that such actions were expected of me. In motivation of my participation in the action, I state that at all times I acted in the execution of my duties as a policeman in service to the SAP and in the execution of orders which I received from senior officers. I believed that what I did, was expected of me as a police officer, that I acted within the execution of my duties as a police officer and that my actions fell within my express or implied authorisation. In no way did I benefit or was I rewarded for the action and I drew no personal advantage there from.

MR VISSER: Thus you request that the Amnesty Committee will consider your amnesty application favourably with regard to any crime or delict which was committed by you before, during or after the relevant incident with regard to the incident which took place near or in Mbabane in Swaziland during which the mentioned persons in paragraph 38 of your Exhibit C were killed, is that correct?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Hattingh on record, Mr Chairperson. Mr Oosthuizen, with regard to paragraph 23 of your statement, on page 6, when you and Mr Coetzee went to visit Vlakplaas the following day, did you inform Mr de Kock of the fact that you had discussed the matter on the level of Gen Erasmus?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: I did inform him Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And that you had his approval with regard to the planning of the operation?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And that he, Col Erasmus, undertook to clear the operation at Head Office?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Do you know whether he meant that he would clear it with Brig Schoon?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Your recollection of this visit to Vlakplaas, Mr Oosthuizen, is that it was only yourself and Mr Coetzee who went there, is it possible that Gen Erasmus had accompanied you?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Chairperson, I cannot recall exactly. The meeting to which I refer to, I did all the talking, it may be that other meetings were held that I cannot recall.

MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock was informed of the fact that this was an operation which was authorised from Head Office?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And that he received instruction to execute the operation?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And if Gen Erasmus was not present during this discussion which you referred to in paragraph 23, he would have deduced the fact that it had the approval of Head Office, could he have drawn the inference from the visit to Vlakplaas by Brig Erasmus and Brig Schoon when it was established when the vehicle was traced back to the police?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And the final aspect Mr Oosthuizen, Mr de Kock will testify that he was entirely certain that only three persons were in the vehicle and all three of them had been killed, and that was the feedback that he gave back to you, is it possible?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: I accept his word because he was on the scene.

MR HATTINGH: He is certain about it, because at the scene, he went to each of the deceased, and because they did not want to use any torches and betray their presence in the vicinity, he touched the eyes of all the deceased, to see if there was any reaction from their eyelids in order to surmise whether these persons were still alive or not, and that is why he was certain that there were only three?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: I do not question that at all Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, we have no further questions.

MR BOOYENS: Booyens, Mr Chairman, I have no questions, thank you.

MR CORNELIUS: Cornelius, for the record, Mr Chairman, I have no questions.

MR NEL: Thank you Mr Chairman, Nel, I have no questions.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman, Rossouw, I have no questions.

MR BOTHA: Botha, I've got no questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN HEERDEN: Van Heerden, Mr Chairperson, I've got a few questions. Mr Oosthuizen, did you know Tabo Mohale or did you know of him?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: I did not know him Chairperson, I only knew of him by means of information which from time to time, became available to us.

MR VAN HEERDEN: What did you know of him?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Chairperson, at this stage I cannot recall in detail, although I can recall with the submission and before the submission, information was available to us that he was a political student activist.

MR VAN HEERDEN: What do you know of Portia Shabangu?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: I cannot recall any information at this stage with regard to that person, Chairperson.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Derek Mashobane?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Similarly no information, but I would accept that they were part of the core group of Mohale. At this stage, I cannot recall exactly what the information was.

MR VAN HEERDEN: The submission that Mr Coetzee made to you, what nature did this take on?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: It was an oral submission Chairperson, supported by reports. At our office we had access to all types of information in the Security Branch and in his submission, his submission consisted of oral submission as well as, direct oral reports as well as written reports.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Can you recall with whom these reports dealt with?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Chairperson, at this stage I cannot recall the exact content of the reports, but I recall that it was about this incident and it was in regard to Mohale and his grouping.

MR VAN HEERDEN: So in effect at this stage, you don't know anything of the other two persons involved?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: At this stage, I cannot tell you in detail what the content was, but at that stage, the information was submitted with regard to Mohale and his group who was to go to Swaziland. If you at this stage ask me what the exact information was, then I cannot recall.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Do I understand you correctly that this submission was in general about this grouping?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: The submission at that stage was in regard to the Mohale group and it was not the first submission, we on a weekly basis, information was analysed, not only at tertiary level but also at other levels and the threat was analysed. It was not the first time that Mohale's name came about and that specific submission was in regard to Mohale and his grouping who had a specific objective and wanted to go to Swaziland. That is what the submission was all about.

MR VAN HEERDEN: In paragraph 11 you mention that the grouping, that Mohale and his members would travel to Swaziland in order to establish liaison with the ANC to assist them in the smuggling of arms. Why was it such a problem that the MK structures in Swaziland, I assume that there were MK structures in the Republic as well?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes, there were MK structures in the Republic on a covert basis, it was part of the Security Branch's task to try and lift out these structures on a continual basis and at that stage, with regard to the student structures, they were absolutely isolated and it was a matter of urgency for us to allow ANC activities on campuses or have them form part of the total underground structures.

MR VAN HEERDEN: So it was impossible for these persons to form part of MK structures within the Republic?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes, it was impossible for them to part of structures in the Republic.

MR VAN HEERDEN: And the matter of the arms?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: I think the word impossible is a bit too strong, I would rather use the word improbable, because MK structures were on self-forming and the one cell with regard to the other cell, worked on a need to know basis, whereas the cell structures outside the RSA, were very easily reachable for persons within the RSA, who wanted to undergo training and who wanted to obtain weapons.

MR VAN HEERDEN: In paragraph 13 you mention that the visit to Swaziland would open up a whole new dimension in the struggle, how would a visit by only three persons open up a whole new dimension?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Chairperson, at that stage, Sansco itself were busy with student activities, political activities and if we allow MK structures on campuses and allowed them to undergo training, it would fortify the political activities in universities.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Were there structures outside Swaziland?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Please repeat that?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Were there structures outside Swaziland where such training could be undertaken in the neighbouring States?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct Chairperson, all the machineries, the ANC machineries were managed from neighbouring States and there were structures in those countries.

MR VAN HEERDEN: How many persons at Head Office would have to give authorisation for an operation of this nature?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Chairperson, one cannot say how many persons, it depends how many Units participate. In this regard two Units, the Intelligence Unit and the Operational arm, it would be the Heads of those two Units who would have co-ordinated and have given their approval and authorisation.

MR VAN HEERDEN: In paragraph 18 you refer to the use of a minibus by these political activists, where would this bus have come from, do you have any information with regard to that?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: The minibus would possibly have been made available by us, there was no certainty at that stage as to where the minibus would come from, and the whole idea was a controlled operation and by controlling it we mean that we would most probably make the minibus available.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Paragraph 20, you refer to a covering legend which would be prepared by Mr Coetzee, can you please elaborate on that?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: The purpose of the cover legend would have been firstly to negate the tracing back to the Security Forces and secondly to give the Swaziland police an indication that these people were of the ANC and thirdly to create the impression that the ANC had themselves eliminated these persons.

MR VAN HEERDEN: The planning of the operation as it is mentioned in paragraph 22, what was your part therein?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Firstly my role was that I authorised Col Coetzee to continue with the operation while waiting for authorisation from Head Office, secondly I accompanied Col Coetzee to Col de Kock, held discussions and also told Col de Kock that I associated myself with it and they could continue with the planning while we await authorisation from Head Office and thirdly the morning before the operation, before the departure of all the Vlakplaas members, I visited Vlakplaas and gave them my full support and received feedback after the operation had been executed. After the operation had been executed and the problem emanated with the particular vehicle, and not directly but indirectly assisted in the duplication of the vehicle and as a whole, I fully associated myself with the operation and I formed part of the decision that was taken.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Was it necessary for you to personally go to Vlakplaas?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Chairperson, I would say so, yes, I was in a position of command, and Col de Kock was also in a position of command and it is practice that Commanders speak to each other.

MR VAN HEERDEN: The morning before the departure of Col de Kock, did you ask any questions there with regard to the exact manner in which the operation would be executed?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: No Chairperson.

MR VAN HEERDEN: May I ask you why not?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: The operation had already been fully planned by then, and at that stage, no arrangements were made, it was a matter of we convened and they would depart from there, the operation was not discussed during that meeting.

MR VAN HEERDEN: You, as a senior official, were you not interested in the manner in which the operation would take place?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Chairperson, it is not a matter that I was not interested or I did not want to know, Col Willem Coetzee resorted under my command and his was in liaison with Col de Kock and there was also a fulfilment of the role with regard to what Col de Kock's part would be and our part. Our part was the Intelligence part and Col de Kock's would be the execution. With regard to the Intelligence, I was aware, but with regard to the execution, the operational, with regard to the operational planning, I was not aware. I saw some of the members the morning before they departed, but I was not aware of the exact detail of the operation.

MR VAN HEERDEN: If we look at one of the points and that is the smuggling of weapons from Swaziland to South Africa, would it not be possible to set up a routine roadblock, to search the vehicle when they returned?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Chairperson, it is possible to set up a roadblock or whatever, but the manner in which these things were done at that stage, and the false bottoms and hiding places, would make it difficult, because that is how arms got into the country. It was not just a matter of setting up a roadblock. Secondly with regard to when that motor vehicle went through to Swaziland, we lost control of the vehicle.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Why are you saying that control was lost of the vehicle?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: I refer to the Intelligence angle, we did not have any more control over the vehicle. Another aspect which has to be considered is if they returned with the vehicle and we found the arms as I have said in evidence-in-chief, we ran the risk that tracing could be established and as such, the informer or informers could be exposed, so the purpose was not to establish roadblocks and find weapons, our objective at that time was to eliminate these people.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Thank you, no further questions Mr Chairperson.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination?

MR VISSER: No re-examination, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you wish this witness to be excused as well?

MR VISSER: Under the same conditions, yes, thank you Mr Chairman.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------MR VISSER: The next witness is Gen Erasmus. Mr Chairman, may his exhibit be marked Exhibit D, Exhibit D for Delta, Mr Chairman, I wouldn't assume to say Exhibit D for Donkey.

MR SIBANYONI: Your full names Mr Erasmus?

MR ERASMUS: Gerrit Nicholas Erasmus.

GERRIT NICHOLAS ERASMUS: (sworn states)

MR SIBANYONI: Please be seated, sworn in Chairperson.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Erasmus, you are an applicant in this application for amnesty. You have previously given evidence in amnesty applications, amongst others before members of this Committee and amongst others before the Chairperson of this Committee, in the matters of Kondile Mthimkulu, Cosatu House, Khotso House and the incident of Stanza Bopape, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You have also studied Exhibit A, do you agree with the contents of Exhibit A and do you confirm it in so far as you know?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, I do Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you request that that evidence as well as other evidence to which is referred to in Exhibit A, be incorporated in your evidence in the consideration of your application, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You have also completed an application which appears in the Bundle, on page 183 to 193 and you deal with the current incident from page 185 to 188, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm the truth and correctness in so far as your insights go of this document?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, I confirm so Chairperson.

MR VISSER: In your amnesty application, on the amnesty application form, you referred to the amnesty application of Brig Schoon. Mr Chairman, I refer you to page 183 I believe it is, 185 Mr Chairman, where you will find that under 9(a)(iv), the first paragraph. In your document, Exhibit D, you dealt with this incident. Will you please address the Committee with regard to this incident and as to how you referred to Brig Schoon's amnesty application? You may start from paragraph 1 on page 2.

MR ERASMUS: I have read the statement of Brig Schoon and can confirm that during the initial amnesty process, there was great doubt with me and other members of the Security Branch about the honesty of the new government and the unbiasedness of the amnesty process. Several meetings were held by members and were addressed by Gen van der Merwe, the previous Commissioner of the Police in which he attempted to lay to rest the fears of the SAP and to convince them to participate in the amnesty process. Generals van der Merwe and Johan Coetzee received several undertakings from the Chairperson and vice-Chairperson of the TRC on grounds of which many members, including myself, decided on number 99 to liaise application forms for amnesty. Unfortunately the incidents led to the fact that there was not much time to hand in applications before the closing date. I have a clear recollection that Brig Schoon during December 1996, spoke to me with regard to this incident and that he informed me that he would apply for this incident. My recollection is so clear in this regard, that when I wrote my amnesty application, I referred to Brig Schoon's amnesty application on the assumption that he would apply. I am now informed that an error had been, there had been an error in that one incident had been doubled and it seems that there is no application of his, in this regard. I can only testify that Brig Schoon was definitely of the intention of applying for amnesty for this incident.

MR VISSER: We will address the Amnesty Committee later with regard to this, but Gen Erasmus, is it correct that you are a retired General from the South African Police?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And that you amongst others in your period of service, that you were the Commander of Group D at Head Office in Pretoria during 1988, 1989?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: During this incident which we believe took place on the 12th or 13th of February 1989, who was then the Group Commander of C1?

MR ERASMUS: Brig Schoon.

MR VISSER: And as such, Vlakplaas would resort under his command?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And a little further detail, Gen van der Merwe at that stage, was the vice-Commissioner of the police and Gen Basie Smit was then the Head of Security?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You have heard the evidence of Mr Coetzee and Mr Oosthuizen and do you associate yourself with the contents of their evidence in so far as you know?

MR ERASMUS: I do so Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Is it also correct that what Mr Oosthuizen testified that during the first week of February 1989, he made a submission to you with regard to the political activities of certain political activists, whom were attached to student organisations?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You mentioned to him, or mention was made that the persons wanted to go to Swaziland in order to establish contact with the ANC MK in Swaziland in order to further the people's war strategy and to entrench and promote this amongst the students in South Africa?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And amongst others, this would also include boycott actions and other focus points for actions which would be discussed in Swaziland by this group of students?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And that they wanted to undergo and receive instant training in the use of weapons and also to smuggle in weapons of terror or to make arrangements that such weapons be sent to the RSA, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Paragraph 16 on page 4 you said that Sansco at that stage was the most important political organisation, which promoted destabilisation, unrest and acts of violence on tertiary education level, was this information which you received from sources and informants and agents?

MR ERASMUS: Yes Chairperson, information was gathered throughout the country and some of it appeared on my desk. Was it also your experience because of this information which was promoted to Head Office, that during this time period 1988 to 1989, there was a serious destabilisation amongst students and specifically on tertiary educational level and that unrest levels increased right throughout the country?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And in the light thereof, you agreed with Mr Oosthuizen as he had testified that it was of import to you from a viewpoint of security, that no such liaison be established between students and MK in Swaziland?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Mr Oosthuizen testified that he orally reported to you, supported by Intelligence notes and profiles and written reports of the leaders of Sansco which was submitted to you, can you today recall any detail thereof?

MR ERASMUS: Not at all Chairperson, I do not recall the detail of the discussion.

MR VISSER: But at that stage when it was submitted to you, were you convinced that it was a matter of utmost importance?

MR ERASMUS: That is so Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You say in paragraph 19, will you please tell the Committee where your part comes about?

MR ERASMUS: Brig Oosthuizen had proposed to me that a controlled covert offensive operation be launched in order, with regard to the political activists who wanted to go to Swaziland. He motivated it in the following manner, experience taught that detention of activists ... (tape ends) ... combating political violence, normal legal options with regard to the detention and arrest of student leaders, indicated that it had an unwanted affect in that the focus point of new activities, for example protest actions and boycotts were established, which increased the intensity of unrest and acts of terror. There was no evidence that the group had already been guilty of any offence which could be proven in order to establish prosecution. Any prosecution which was needed, would make necessary the use of informers and because of intimidation, informers could not act as witnesses and this would endanger their lives. Liaison with Sansco and the ANC had to be discouraged because instant training in weapons and the supply of weapons to members of Sansco could lead to large scale acts of terror and bloodshed. The smuggling of weapons to the RSA, given the fact that at that stage, weapons had already been smuggled from Swaziland by trained terrorists and collaborators, had to be prevented. Given the intensity of political destabilisation with the accompanying unrest and violence which reigned at that stage, I realised that a direct liaison by student political activists with the ANC, in Swaziland, would have far reaching consequences with regard to the increased political de-stability in the RSA. I accorded with Brig Oosthuizen that everything possible had to be done in order to prevent liaison between members of Sansco and the ANC in Swaziland. I undertook to discuss this with Brig Schoon, I will repeat I undertook to enter in discussion with Brig Schoon with regard to the execution of the operation. Brig Oosthuizen later informed me that the political leaders of Sansco planned to travel with a minibus to Swaziland and that innocent persons would possibly be present in the vehicle. He proposed that a vehicle be rented by an informer in order to establish a control and to ensure that the wrong persons not be eliminated. I shared Brig Oosthuizen's concerns and in principle agreed that the vehicle had to be rented. During the course of the day, I discussed the operation with Brig Schoon. We reached a consensus that the operation was necessary in order to combat unrest and violence in the RSA. I ensured Brig Schoon that I had previously asked with regard to the facts and information with regard to the planned visit of Louis Mohale and members of his group to Swaziland, to be controlled and confirmed to ensure that the information was reliable. I was under the impression, I was brought under the impression of the urgency to take a position of possible actions in the matter. I informed Brig Schoon of the information that the members of the Sansco group wanted to form part of existing MK underground structures amongst Cosas to establish MK underground cell structures in the RSA through Cosas, Sansco and Sayco led members. Members of such cell structures would be channelled to the neighbouring countries for military training, to arm cell structures for the purpose of military training, to enter into the armed struggle by attacking police members, so-called traitors and State property, to increase the revolutionary climate. I ensured Brig Schoon that I was convinced that these persons were not to be enticed and that they would go to Swaziland on their own in order to establish contact with MK structures there, in order to receive military training and weapons. The plan of Brig Oosthuizen to supply a vehicle to the group, in order to maintain the trust of the informer, was sketched. I also explained that the informer in this manner would be able to maintain contact with the group when they went into Swaziland. Both Brig Schoon and I agreed that if the group were in Swaziland, they would make contact with MK structures and weapons and training would be received and their movements would be difficult to monitor. We also agreed that the group had to be eliminated as soon as they were in Swaziland. Brig Schoon and I also agreed that in the light of these circumstances, there was no other way out, but to eliminate them. The possibility of arrests, Court directed actions or detention was discussed, but because of reasons mentioned above, we came to the conclusion that that would be no answer to the problem. Brig Schoon proposed that he would take up the operation with Col de Kock. I contacted Brig Oosthuizen and informed him that discussions were held with Brig Schoon and that the planning at groundlevel would be discussed with Col de Kock and then he would come back to me. Afterwards Brig Schoon contacted me to say that they would continue with the operation. I have no knowledge whether Brig Schoon discussed the matter with anybody else. I played no further role in the planning or execution of the operation on 13-02-1989. Brig Oosthuizen contacted me and informed me that the operation was successful and that three persons were killed. With regard to Col de Kock's amnesty application, I wish to point out the following, Col de Kock errs in his recollection that I attended any planning meeting at Vlakplaas. He is correct in his recollection that Brig Schoon and I did indeed hold talks at Vlakplaas with him, Brig Oosthuizen, Col W. Coetzee with regard to the problem which emanated because the Opel Kadett was traced back to the SAP and he is also correct in his recollection about the meeting where the decision was taken how to solve the problem. In so far as Col de Kock notes that he is not certain as to why the persons could not be arrested, I refer to what was said above. At all times I associated myself with the action and my participance in the conspiracy to murder them.

MR VISSER: You were also a co-decision maker to eliminate them?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: With regard to the legal prerequisites, you have listened to the evidence of Mr Coetzee and Oosthuizen when they informed the Committee that as they saw the matter, these were incidents which took place during a war situation where the normal rules of war were not applicable and their actions were aimed at supporters of a liberation movement, who was the enemy of the State and who wanted to launch a revolutionary onslaught against the State dispensation and caused much damage and injury and deaths, do you agree with that statement?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, I do.

MR VISSER: And the struggle which was fought be police officers and the political struggle, and what they did as they saw as part of their duties as police officials in order to protect and maintain internal security, and also in support of the National Party and the government of the day, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You have previously testified in various applications about pressure which was applied from above, on members of the Security Branch, we won't refer to that again, but consequently you will agree that because of the pressure which was placed on you, members of the Security Branch believed that what they had done, fell within their explicit or tacit authorisation and that it was something that was expected of them, which they had to do, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You did not receive any benefit or reward for your participance in this incident, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you request amnesty from the Amnesty Committee before whom you appear now, for any offence or delict which was committed by you before, during or after the incident, during which Mohale, Mashobane and Shabangu were murdered, close to Mbabane on the 12th or 13th of February 1989?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, Hattingh on record. General, just one aspect, page 7 of your statement, paragraph 36, subparagraph 2 thereof, you say there Mr de Kock is incorrect when he says that you attended a planning session at Vlakplaas, may I ask you the following question, during this period, shortly before, during or after this incident, and the discussions which you were involved with at Head Office, did you during that time visit Vlakplaas?

MR ERASMUS: It is very possible Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And if you had visited Vlakplaas, is it possible that you may have discussed this incident with Mr de Kock?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Chairperson, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

MR BOOYENS: Booyens, no questions, Mr Chairman.

MR CORNELIUS: Wim Cornelius, Mr Chairman, no questions.

MR NEL: Thank you Mr Chairman, Nel, no questions.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman, Rossouw, no questions.

MR BOTHA: Thank you Mr Chairman, Botha, no questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN HEERDEN: Thank you Mr Chairman, I've got some questions, van Heerden. I see it is more or less one o'clock, Mr Chairman, should I proceed?

CHAIRPERSON: How long do you think you will be? I think it is seven minutes to one?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Excuse me Mr Chairman, I will then proceed. Mr Erasmus, I have asked this question previously, but I will ask it to you as well, did you know Derek Mashobane and did you know what he did?

MR ERASMUS: I did not know him. The only way I could have known him, was through reports. I did not do any field work myself.

MR VAN HEERDEN: What did you know of him?

MR ERASMUS: All that I can recall at this stage was that he was a student political activist and as it was informed to me by means of the information which was obtained.

MR VAN HEERDEN: And then Portia Shabangu?

MR ERASMUS: I cannot recall Chairperson. Only in the submission that it was said that Mohale and his core group, I cannot recall that this name was given to me.

MR VAN HEERDEN: And then Tabo Mohale?

MR ERASMUS: Tabo Mohale?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ERASMUS: Similarly, I did not know him.

MR VAN HEERDEN: So all that you knew was that these were political activists?

MR VISSER: That is unfair Mr Chairman. The evidence is quite clear that there was a very complete profile on these people, he cannot remember today the witness says, what that was, but at the time, he had no doubt as to what their activities were, so that is not a fair statement.

CHAIRPERSON: (Microphone not on) He said he didn't know the man, there is no suggestion that he did. He has said that he relied on the information supplied to him to say carry on with the operation.

MR VISSER: My point exactly, Mr Chairman.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VAN HEERDEN: May I proceed Mr Chairman? A further aspect which I wish to discuss with you, this was a reasonably complicated operation which was executed in Swaziland. Why was it decided to do it in Swaziland and not for example in South Africa?

MR ERASMUS: Because it was a covert operation Chairperson, and from such an operation, if it had taken place, there would have been large scale investigations, and the other point was to blame this on the ANC, that is why it was done there, and the people were on their way to Swaziland, they were going to Swaziland any way.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Thank you, I have no further questions, Mr Chairman.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: General, you said the group proposed to have a, to visit Swaziland, to travel on a kombi, was this kombi not an idea of the police, was it the original idea of the group?

MR ERASMUS: As far as I know and I only deal on information which is submitted to me, more of these persons would go and a larger vehicle would be required. I don't know whether it was the idea of the police, all that I know is that it was conveyed to me that this group wanted to go to Swaziland for reasons as I have set out.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: I have two questions which I should have perhaps asked somebody earlier and not left it to you, they may be a little unfair. The first one is, wouldn't it have been better if you were going to eliminate these people, to do so before they had got to Swaziland and had a chance of discussing what was going on with the Umkhonto people there because it appears they had already had one meeting with the Umkhonto people in Swaziland and had arranged another one on the Sunday morning for weapons training?

MR ERASMUS: Chairperson, yes, I concede that is possible that it could have been done, but as Mr Oosthuizen and Coetzee had already mentioned and the evidence which was given by them, the danger of disclosure of the agent was the greatest concern.

CHAIRPERSON: And the second question, did anybody ever tell you that weapons were found in this car?

MR ERASMUS: Chairperson, as far as I can recall, not. I only heard that the operation was executed successfully and that is as far as I know, and what happened afterwards.

CHAIRPERSON: It is now one o'clock, we will take the adjournment. Do you wish this witness to be excused, this applicant, sorry, on the same basis?

MR VISSER: If it pleases you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, would you allow me to hand up to you an affidavit by Brig Schoon, in order to support an application which I intend bringing at two o'clock before you, thank you Mr Chairman.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, with the Commission's permission, I have spoken to my learned colleagues and none of them have an objection. I would like to call the applicant Mr Botha, who was one of the footsoldiers, but he's got commitments and unfortunately that makes it very difficult for him, and with the Commission's permission, I would like to call him at this stage. My learned friends have indicated that they've got no objections.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you.

MR SIBANYONI: Your full names, Mr Botha? Your full names?

MR BOTHA: Pieter Hendrik Botha.

PIETER HENDRIK BOTHA: (sworn states)

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, you may be seated, sworn in Mr Chairperson.

EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairperson. Mr Botha, your amnesty application commences on page 327 of the record, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And you deal with this incident specifically from page 346?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You are applying for amnesty for all offences which may be related to the elimination of the four who you refer to as the four unknown cadres at that stage?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: For the sake of completion, we will lead your evidence later, but do you know how many persons actually died there, from your own knowledge?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR BOOYENS: Was it hearsay that you thought that there were four persons?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

INTERPRETER: The applicant's microphone is not on.

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm the correctness of your application up to and including page 345?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR SIBANYONI: Mr Botha, your microphone.

MR BOOYENS: I think I better start again, Mr Chairman, thank you. Mr Botha, you have the amnesty application before you which appears from page 327, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And you summarise your background on page 345?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm the correctness thereof?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I do.

MR BOOYENS: And then on page 346 you deal with this particular case?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And you are applying for any offences, omissions or deeds which may emanate from the eliminate of the four unknown cadres as you put it, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Did you have any personal knowledge of the number of persons who died during the incident?

MR BOTHA: No, I did not.

MR BOOYENS: So it was hearsay?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: On page 347 you state that it was during 1987, 1988, when you made your application, did you know what the correct date was?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR BOOYENS: You have heard the evidence of Brig Oosthuizen who states that it was during February 1989, do you accept that as correct?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I do.

MR BOOYENS: At that stage you were stationed at Vlakplaas, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And a number of you were called together at a stage by Col de Kock, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And what did Col de Kock tell you, why was he convening you?

MR BOTHA: He said that we should prepare ourselves for a cross-border operation in Swaziland and that the objective of the operation would be to eliminate ANC terrorists. Do you want me to address you about my particular share in this matter?

MR BOOYENS: No, just continue with what Mr de Kock told you.

MR BOTHA: Upon that, we departed, after we had packed everything, we went through the Oshoek border post and used false passports.

MR BOOYENS: Just a moment, he said that you were supposed to set up an ambush for a number of ANC terrorists?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: At that stage, did he provide any particulars about what these persons were doing, just briefly?

MR BOTHA: Well, he told us that they were ANC terrorists, who were going to infiltrate the country and that we had to stop them from doing so.

MR BOOYENS: Did he say anything about an order which came from a higher level?

MR BOTHA: Yes, he said that it was an authorised operation.

MR BOOYENS: Very well. You have given evidence during other hearings as well, but let us just re-examine this. You were a member of Vlakplaas, what was your rank?

MR BOTHA: Warrant Officer.

MR BOOYENS: Was there any way in which you could study the Intelligence which would have come from D-Section?

MR BOTHA: No, it was not possible for me.

MR BOOYENS: Did you work on the pre-supposition that information which came to you from the Intelligence section was correct and verified?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You received the order, you were told what it was, that they were ANC terrorists who wanted to infiltrate the country, and were you satisfied then that under those circumstances, it would be the sort of operation that fell within the operational field of Vlakplaas?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I was satisfied with that.

MR BOOYENS: Very well. You then went through the border post with false passports, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You are aware of the most recent decision by the Appeals Court?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: However, I think it might just be advisable just to describe briefly the role that you played, if anybody else wishes to put anything to you about it, they may, is it correct that you and Mr Baker were basically in Mbabane to observe when the persons who were coming through from the Transvaal, would make contact with the askaris?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: The contact persons that they had to make contact with, were apparently ANC persons but actually askaris who pretended to be ANC members?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You and Mr Baker were supposed to contact Mr de Kock and the others via radio as soon as contact had been established?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: These persons were late, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And it has already been put, did you then take any steps to contact Mr de Kock and the others by radio?

MR BOTHA: Yes, initially we tried to contact them by radio, but if I recall correctly, we were in Manzini. We could not establish contact, it was a mountainous region, and therefore we had to drive around in the vicinity, in the scene of the incident in order to find a place to make contact with them from.

MR BOOYENS: I put this to Mr Coetzee this morning, you may have heard that at one stage he was called by telephone and asked where the persons were?

MR BOTHA: Yes, after we had made contact, our instructions were to contact the Johannesburg number to determine what had happened. I made the call and I spoke to Capt Coetzee, he told me that the code name Flower Arrangement, was late.

MR BOOYENS: Very well, did you return to Manzini?

MR BOTHA: Yes, we did.

MR BOOYENS: And what happened then, just very briefly?

MR BOTHA: In Manzini, we saw somewhat later, how they established contact and we also saw the Opel Kadett being led away on the road which had been indicated to them.

MR BOOYENS: Led by whom?

MR BOTHA: By two of our members.

MR BOOYENS: In another vehicle?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And did they then drive in the direction of the scene of the ambush?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Did you and Baker drive passed them?

MR BOTHA: Yes, we had to at one point.

MR BOOYENS: Did you then give the radio signal that the people were being led in?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Apparently Mr Baker knew where they were supposed to turn off?

MR BOTHA: Yes, he knew where the scene was and he also managed the radio because I did the driving.

MR BOOYENS: You then drove passed the point and stopped?

MR BOTHA: Yes, we drove passed the point and then stopped after we had made radio contact.

MR BOOYENS: Did you see them turn off?

MR BOTHA: No, we did not see them turn off.

MR BOOYENS: But they were no longer behind you?

MR BOTHA: No. We accepted that the other vehicle which was driven by the askaris, would lead them to the place.

MR BOOYENS: That is the last that you had to do with it?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And then the following day you went back over the border post?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm the rest of your amnesty application?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I do.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Hattingh on record, Mr Chairman, we have no questions, thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Thank you Mr Chairman, Cornelius on behalf of implicated party, Vermeulen. I refer you to page 348 of your amnesty application, if you look at the second last paragraph where you say that if you are not mistaken, you mention a list of names of persons who were involved in the incident, I assume that this was quite some time ago and you may be mistaken as to Mr Vermeulen's presence or not.

MR BOTHA: Do you want to know if I am mistaken?

MR CORNELIUS: Yes.

MR BOTHA: Yes, it is possible.

MR CORNELIUS: If Snyman had been there, it would sound more correct?

MR BOTHA: That is correct. Yes, I confirm it as such.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR NEL: Nel, Mr Chairman, I've got no questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman, Rossouw. Mr Botha, may I refer you to page 348 as well, the very same paragraph to which Mr Cornelius has referred you to, there you state the name of Warrant Officer Nortje. Is it possible that with regard to his presence, you may also be mistaken?

MR BOTHA: Yes, it is also possible.

MR ROSSOUW: Very well, and then just for the purposes of the record, Mr Chairman, I am in possession of an affidavit by Mr Nortje, which states that he was not involved in the planning or the execution of this operation, and I will hand it in to the Committee at a later stage, once copies have been made available for all my colleagues. Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

MR BOTHA: Botha, Mr Chairman, I've got no questions.

MR VISSER: Visser, Mr Chairman, neither do I, thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN HEERDEN: Van Heerden Mr Chairman, I've got one question. Mr Botha, how many persons were in the Opel Kadett vehicle?

MR BOTHA: As I have stated earlier, I will have to rely on hearsay when I say that three were shot dead there. It is my understanding when we left the scene, that there were four persons, but at the stage when we passed the vehicle, I was driving at a very high speed and I cannot really tell you whether there were three, four or maybe even five persons inside the vehicle.

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is all I want to know, I just want to know if you know how many people there were in the vehicle, thank you very much Mr Chairperson, nothing further.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: Mr Botha, I don't know whether I misunderstood you, you said these ANC people in actual fact met the askaris, they didn't meet the ANC?

MR BOTHA: Well, sir, if I have to elaborate on that, when they met the people at the post office in Manzini, the two askaris that met them, was as far as they knew, were ANC members. That is all I knew, and that is all they could have known.

MR SIBANYONI: And these askaris were from Vlakplaas?

MR BOTHA: Yes, they were.

MR SIBANYONI: Would you say they were completely set up, it was not an actual meeting between the students and the ANC?

MR BOTHA: Well, as far as I know it was an interception of them, how the planning worked, I cannot elaborate. What I do know is I knew them connecting with them and taking them from there.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I am a bit confused. Had they just arrived from South Africa?

MR BOTHA: Sir, I really don't know whether they had just arrived. We just knew they would come along that point.

CHAIRPERSON: But you were waiting for them there?

MR BOTHA: Yes, we were.

CHAIRPERSON: And when they didn't come and they were late, you phoned up Johannesburg and were told they had left late?

MR BOTHA: Yes, then we were told they left late.

CHAIRPERSON: So it would appear they were on their way in from South Africa?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And they met these askaris and were taken straight to the point of ambush?

MR BOTHA: Yes, that is the way I saw it, sir.

ADV SANDI: I take it that from what you have just said, you are not able to say as to whether these ANC activists from the Republic of South Africa had met any other person before meeting the two askaris at the post office?

MR BOTHA: No, I am unable to say sir.

ADV SANDI: If it had happened, would you have known?

MR BOTHA: No, there is no way I could have known sir.

ADV SANDI: Thank you.

MR BOOYENS: No re-examination, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: You are excused on condition that if it should become necessary to recall you, arrangements can be made.

MR BOTHA: Thanks a lot sir.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I am indebted to the Committee for the indulgence granted to me.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------MR VISSER: May it please you Mr Chairman, and members of the Committee, may I refer you Mr Chairman, to an affidavit, brief affidavit, which I handed up before lunch and which I would ask you to mark Exhibit E, if it pleases you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, allow me to explain the reason for this affidavit being placed before you. Brig Schoon, as you know, has applied for a number of incidents for amnesty to the Amnesty Committee, he set out in his affidavit, Mr Chairman, exactly what Gen Erasmus had told you earlier today and what you had heard on many occasions beforehand, and that was the doubt under which members of the Security Branch of the police laboured at the time when the amnesty process was introduced and was getting off the ground. We know Chairperson, from the evidence of Gen Johan Coetzee in the London bomb matter and in other matters, especially also the Bopape incident, how he went about obtaining undertakings, if not guarantees, from the Chairman and the vice-Chairman of the then TRC, Bishop Tutu and Dr Boraine, with which he allayed the fears of members of the Security Branch. At the end of the day, the result Chairperson, is a matter of record, and that is that a large number of members of the Security Branch, ex-members and even present members, still of the Police Services, applied for amnesty. At that stage, Mr Chairman, as Brig Schoon explains in paragraph 5, that when a decision had been reached for amnesty to be applied for, there wasn't sufficient time. Now, we know Mr Chairman, and may I deal with that point immediately, it has been suggested before when an issue like this was raised before a Committee, but you were then the maker of your own urgency, well, of course that is true in a sense, but Mr Chairman, I would ask you to have some sensitivity of the important step it was for these people to take the decision to apply for amnesty and I would submit with great respect, that it is quite understandable that they wanted as many assurances beforehand as was humanly possible. Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is Mr Chairman, that against this background, the Attorney who is now my Instructing Attorney, did not have sufficient time to deal with more than 100 ...

CHAIRPERSON: Isn't the problem Mr Visser, that for reasons best known to themselves, a number of the senior police officers relied on your Attorney's services? They were convinced that your Attorney knew precisely the best way of handling the matter, and understandably in those circumstances, they all wanted to use him so a great burden was put onto him and they didn't do as they could have done, go to some other Attorney, but they might have had to spend so much time explaining to the other Attorney, that it wouldn't have been in time any way? I think as members of the Committee, we have discussed that, we appreciate the pressures that Gen Schoon was under at the time, and the reasons therefore, you needn't bother any further on that.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I am indeed indebted to yourself and the members of your Committee for having that insight against the background. Mr Chairman, what happened here at the end of the day and we have attached to your affidavit, extracts from the amnesty application of Brig Schoon, and if you would look at that document Chairperson, page 59 thereof, not the whole amnesty application has been included, but there is a typed page 59, it in facts starts ...

CHAIRPERSON: Page 73 and he couldn't even get the two of them right, so close together?

MR VISSER: That is the point. Chairman, really in my respectful submission, it is quite clear that but for the dates and for the substitution of Col Lodewyk de Jager, with Brig Oosthuizen, really this application would have been in order, and quite clearly where he intended to apply for two incidents, the one incidentally is the one that is going to be heard by you next week Chairperson, and that is the one that is dealt with at page 72 under Incident 15, where you will see at page 74, he actually mentions the name Pantsu, Sipho and Buzi. That is the application of next week. At page 59, under Incident 12, Chairperson, if it had said February 1989, and instead of Col Lodewyk de Jager, Oosthuizen, in our respectful submission Chairperson, and if no reference was made as is as page 59 to September machinery in Swaziland, because that is the Glory Sidibe matter which is coming on next week, then it would have been in order, but it isn't strictly in order before you and that is the reason why we apply Chairperson, and may I motivate it on this basis, it is not as if he is applying for an additional incident for which he hasn't applied before. The simple fact is he intended as he says in his affidavit, to apply for both these incidents, they appear to be a duplication the one of the other, and we would ask you Chairperson, and we have agonised on what order we have to ask you, but in the end, the order I would assume with respect, is for you to accept that he intended to be an applicant in the present application, and to allow his application to be heard.

CHAIRPERSON: The only problem we have is that you haven't put up an amended application. Before we hear the application, we must have the wording of the application, which is I think - it would have been easier to change page 73, but if you want to change page 59. If you changed page 73, you only have to change the date and the name, don't you?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, not if you have regard to 74, because there the names of Pantsu, Sipho and Buzi are specifically mentioned.

MR VISSER: You've got to change both. Well, change one or the other.

MR VISSER: Well, 12 has to be changed.

CHAIRPERSON: How do you change it?

MR VISSER: Simply Chairperson, under Section 9(a)(ii) which says ...

CHAIRPERSON: And what about (i)?

MR VISSER: Sorry, (i), that is to be changed Chairperson, in line with the amnesty which is being asked on behalf of the other applicants, and that will be application for amnesty for any deed. Chairperson, in fact I may save you a lot of trouble by handing up his affidavit to you because it is already contained there.

CHAIRPERSON: Where?

MR VISSER: Not the affidavit, his evidence Chairperson. Apparently it has been placed before you, the evidence Chairperson. If you look at page 1, between the tramlines, Chairperson, just under the name of Schoon, we would submit that that is the correct prayer for the application by Brig Schoon.

CHAIRPERSON: Well it is the deed that we are supposed to be putting in in 9(a)(i), which should be the ...

MR VISSER: It should be the murder of three ANC activists.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: And their names Chairperson, being Louis Mohale, Derek Mashobane and Portia Shabangu and then perhaps Chairperson, if under (ii) the date of 12/13 February 1989, could be inserted Chairperson, Swaziland would be correct and then under (iv), I am sorry, I only referred to de Jager, but it is Lt-Gen G. Erasmus and Brig A. Oosthuizen, the previous witness Mr Chairman, Alfred Oosthuizen. Chairperson, that would bring it in order although at page 60 Chairperson, under (i) at that page, the names are now known and those could be, the same names should feature under (i) and that would take care of it, Mr Chairman. Oh yes, I am sorry, and then at page 61 Chairperson, page 61 Mr Chairman, you will see under 11(b) that Gen van der Merwe gave the instruction. That applies to next week's case, not to this one, here Brig Schoon himself gave the order. (b) would have to read "I myself (perhaps together with Lt-Gen Erasmus) ..."

CHAIRPERSON: Well, no ...

MR VISSER: It is not really necessary, but "I gave the order myself" would be sufficient Chairperson. If you are satisfied Chairperson, I would respectfully move for ...

CHAIRPERSON: Well, let me read them out and see if you agree. We are now going to amend Exhibit E in the following way, at page 59 we are going to strike out the words "optrede teen September masjinerie Swaziland 1986" from paragraph 9(a)(i) and replace them with the words "the murder of three ANC activists", and then it goes on "and any other deed, act or omission."

MR VISSER: That would be in order.

CHAIRPERSON: Paragraph 9(a)(ii), the date is struck out and the substitute therefore is 12/13 February 1989, paragraph 9(a)(iv) the names Lt-Gen Ignatius Coetzee and Col Lodewyk de Jager are struck out and substituted therefore the names Lt-Gen G. Erasmus and Brig A. Oosthuizen. On page 60, paragraph 9(c)(i) the word "unknown" is struck out and the names Louis Mohale also known as Tabo, Derek Mashobane and Portia Shabangu are inserted and at page 61, paragraph 11(b), the words "I understand that the operation was approved by Gen J.B. van der Merwe" and substituted therefore the words "I myself gave the order"?

MR VISSER: May it please you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, under those circumstances, may I then call Brig Schoon to give evidence before you Mr Chairman. His statement of evidence, will then be F if it pleases you, Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: Your full names please?

WILLEM FREDERICK SCHOON: (sworn states)

MR SIBANYONI: Please be seated, sworn in Chairperson.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson. Brigadier, on previous occasions, on various Amnesty Committees, you have given evidence and you have also testified before the Human Rights Violations Committee of the TRC, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Over and above the opportunities which have been indicated in paragraph (b)(ii) on page 1 of Exhibit F, being Cosatu House, Khotso House ... (tape ends) ... I beg your pardon, that was in Johannesburg, the Pillay abduction from Swaziland, the incident regarding Mbali who was abducted from Lesotho, the murder of two unknown ANC terrorists at Kopfontein, the murder of two PAC terrorists in the Eastern Transvaal, the incident regarding Messrs Pule and Take Five in Botswana and the Cosas 4 group which was eliminated in Krugersdorp, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Previously, you have incorporated Exhibit A into your evidence, regarding the amendments which have been brought to A, have you studied this?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: And do you still wish that the content of Exhibit A be confirmed and do you request that this be incorporated with your amnesty application?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I request that.

MR VISSER: Mr Schoon, with the permission of the Chairperson, I will simply lead you to the point where you become personally involved. During this incident, you were the Head of Group C at the Security Head Office in Pretoria, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you go on, you have named a number of incidents, were all these heard as separate incidents, didn't quite a number of them fall under the Marius Schoon application?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the recollection of both my Attorney and myself is that they were all separate incidents. It may be that when some of them ...

CHAIRPERSON: What was the Marius Schoon application? What was he applying for?

MR VISSER: For attempted murder Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Of whom?

MR VISSER: Of Mr Marius Schoon, and I see that we have left that out.

CHAIRPERSON: No, you've got Marius Schoon.

MR VISSER: No, it is in the typed version, yes. Yes, but Mr Chairman, although they were heard in succession after or before after other, they were all heard separately.

CHAIRPERSON: Were they?

MR VISSER: Yes, yes Chairperson, and the ones that we have just given you, were all heard in Johannesburg in any event, and not before you, I may add, yes. It won't be necessary to take that any further Chairperson, you have heard the evidence of Brig Schoon prior to this date, and he gave no different evidence in the other matters, so you can accept that. Gen van der Merwe was at the stage February 1989, the Deputy Commissioner of the South African Police, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: And Gen Basie Smit was the Security Head?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And as we have heard, Gen Gerrit Erasmus was at that stage the Head of Group D?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And we have heard that Group D was the Intelligence section?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You state that your recollection regarding the events is quite vague, and you also state in paragraph 4, perhaps you should address the Committee from paragraph 4 onwards regarding your recollection of the incident please, Brigadier.

MR SCHOON: My recollection regarding the events is very vague. I recall that Gen Erasmus discussed the matter with me, in my office. The matter regarding the Sansco members. I cannot recall when it took place, but I infer from the evidence from the other applicants, that this must have been early 1989. Unfortunately I can also not recall the full detail of the discussion, however I believe that the background as testified to by Colonels W. Coetzee and A. Oosthuizen, was discussed in depth during my discussion with Gen Erasmus. Gen Erasmus assured me that he had previously requested the facts and the information regarding the proposed visit of Louis Mohale and members of his group to Swaziland - were requested by him and that he was satisfied that the information was reliable.

MR VISSER: This morning you have listened to the evidence given by Coetzee, Oosthuizen and Erasmus. Are you prepared to accept the correctness of their recollection regarding the background of this incident and the events leading up to this incident?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Would you proceed with paragraph 7?

MR SCHOON: The revolutionary struggle was still on a very high level of intensity during this period of time and much political violence appeared all over the RSA, during which many persons were killed and injured and property was damaged. In 1989 the position of the former government and the National Party hung in the balance, and the ANC/SACP alliance was successful in its propaganda campaign against the government, particularly abroad. Pressure from abroad which was exerted by the international community on the government, to leave its policy of apartheid, became unbearable. In their struggle to render the country ungovernable and to commit political violence, the ANC/SACP alliance had since the late 1960's recruited more and more scholars and students to participate in the struggle. Particularly on the tertiary educational level. The activities of students were quite alarming. Due to the above-mentioned circumstances, it became clear that we as members of the Security Branch who were the final line of defence, would have to do more and make greater sacrifices in order to maintain the status quo and particularly to prevent that the attempts of the ANC/SACP alliance, to create ungovernability within the country, succeed in placing the country in a state of total lawlessness and anarchy. Against the background of these conditions, I was of the opinion that the Security Branch could not allow the establishment of a new underground combat unit under the leadership of MK in the RSA. We had already experienced much problems to combat the tide of infiltration of terrorists and weaponry from neighbouring States.

MR VISSER: You have heard the evidence of Col Coetzee and Brig Oosthuizen regarding the background and the events leading up to the situation, you state that you were brought under the strong impression that the situation was critical. Was this as a result of the fact that the information indicated that these persons were definitely going to Swaziland?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you have also summarised the same evidence given by Gen Erasmus and that would be that the Mohale group intended to establish an underground structure of Cosas members and MK members in the RSA and that this structure would be established by students in Cosas, Sayco and Sansco and that they wanted to send or channel members of these structures abroad for the purposes of military training and for the purposes of arming the cell structures so that they could in so doing, enter the armed struggle whereby the revolutionary climate would be intensified, do you agree with that?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I do.

MR VISSER: Very well, please proceed with paragraph 13.

MR SCHOON: I was convinced in the light of certain assurances given by Gen Erasmus, that the group had not been enticed in any way and that it had been their own decision to (a) go to Swaziland, (b) in order to establish contact with MK structures already in existence, and (c) in order to receive military training and weapons there.

MR VISSER: Now did Gen Erasmus inform you that the idea was to maintain control over their movements by means of making a vehicle available to them?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And that the arrangements would be made for the informer to attempt to establish contact with them, so that they would contact him as soon as they arrived in Swaziland?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well, please proceed with paragraph 15.

MR SCHOON: Both Gen Erasmus and I were in agreement that once the group was in Swaziland, and once they had made contact with MK structures there, and had received weapons and training, it would be more difficult to monitor their movements after that. We were in agreement that the group had to be eliminated in Swaziland.

MR VISSER: Very well. One of the witnesses here was asked why exactly in Swaziland and I want to put it to you like this, you state here that you and Gen Erasmus were in agreement that once they were in Swaziland, it would be a done deal, is that exactly what you said?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: But it is conceivable that on the way to Swaziland, before they had crossed the border, they may have re-thought their actions and turned around?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And what would then have happened to them?

MR SCHOON: Nothing.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed, paragraph 16.

MR SCHOON: Gen Erasmus and I were also in agreement that in the light of the circumstances of the matter, there was no other exit other than to eliminate them. Arrest and court oriented action was not possible because it was dubious whether or not they had committed any crime before their departure, and furthermore if they had committed an offence, the informer would necessarily have had to be used to give evidence against them, in which case the life of the informer, would be jeopardised and the Security Branch would then be deprived of a well-placed source's services within the various student organisations. Furthermore, on the presumption that they had already committed an offence for which they could be prosecuted and if there was a usable witness, the high intimidation of witnesses and the fears of informers and police officers, had to be borne in mind. Mere detention in terms of Emergency Regulations under the State of Emergency or in terms of Section 29 of the Internal Security Act, were also not viable. Against popular public opinion, persons could not simply be detained for unlimited periods of time, there were strict regulations and requirements which had to be fulfilled in both cases. Furthermore, it was the experience that detention of "relatively unknown" activists would give them a status of honour and fame among the black masses, consequently they would not be detained for very long, based upon the evidence at our disposal. Should they be released, they would be able to negotiate with authority with MK in Swaziland, due to the probable familiarity and status that they would have achieved.

MR VISSER: The point that you are trying to make is locking them up and automatically he would obtain status which would give him better access and conviction with regard to the organisations themselves?

MR SCHOON: That is correct. After the discussion between me and Gen Erasmus, I gave Col de Kock an order to act as the Operational Commander during this action. I tasked him to liaise with the people from Group D in order to obtain the relevant information and to undertake the necessary strategic and operational planning and to execute this in co-operation with those from Group D. After I had conveyed the action to de Kock, I contacted Gen Erasmus and informed him that the operation was to go ahead. Later I was informed that three or four persons had been lured into an ambush in Swaziland and had been killed.

MR VISSER: You were not present during the ambush?

MR SCHOON: No.

MR VISSER: Because it now appears as if there were only three persons within the vehicle, so would this be in agreement with your recollection of what you were informed?

MR SCHOON: I cannot dispute that.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.

MR SCHOON: As far as I can recall, I took this decision on my own, without reference to any higher authority. With regard to Col de Kock's amnesty application, I wish to make the following remarks - Col de Kock is mistaken in his opinion, in his recollection that I attended any planning session at Vlakplaas.

MR VISSER: Is that with regard to this matter?

MR SCHOON: Yes, with regard to this matter. He is correct in his recollection that Gen Erasmus and I were indeed at Vlakplaas to hold discussions with Colonels Oosthuizen and Coetzee and himself with regard to a problem which had originated when the motor vehicle which had been made available to the group, was later traced back to the SAP. He is also correct in his recollection regarding what the meeting decided to do in order to solve the problem. In so far as Col de Kock remarks that he is not certain why the persons could not be arrested, reference is made to what has been said above.

MR VISSER: Yes. Brigadier, when Gen Erasmus spoke to you and shared the facts and information with you, and you decided that there was no other way but to eliminate these persons as soon as it appeared that they were in Swaziland, let me just ask you the following, did you prescribe to any person how this operation was to be executed, or what is the situation?

MR SCHOON: No, not at all. I tasked Col de Kock and all the accompanying arrangements were left over to him personally.

MR VISSER: You have paragraphs 25 to 28 of Exhibit F before you and you have studied this and this is also a reflection of the information that you gave to us as your legal team. Do you confirm the content of these paragraphs and your insight and political motive with regard to your participation in this incident?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I confirm that.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, if you are satisfied with me doing it that way, in order to conserve time, I would then move for amnesty to be granted to Brig Schoon in terms of his amended application, as has been amended by yourself and your Committee, for any offence or delict committed by him before, during or after the incident in Mbabane or near Mbabane, Swaziland, on the 12th to 13th of February 1989 in which Louis Mohale alias Tabo, Derek Mashobane and Portia Shabangu were killed. Thank you Mr Chairman.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, Hattingh on record. Brigadier can you recall with reference to paragraph 19 of your statement, as to when you gave instructions to Mr de Kock and where you gave the instruction to him and where you were when you gave the instruction to him?

MR SCHOON: I do not recall that Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Is it possible that it was at Vlakplaas where you gave him the instruction?

MR SCHOON: I cannot recall Chairperson, whether I discussed this matter with him at Vlakplaas, but that is not excluded.

MR HATTINGH: The instruction was clear that these activists had to be eliminated?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall whether you supplied him with the political objectives and political motivations, did you tell him why the decision was taken?

MR SCHOON: I do not recall that Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, we have no further questions.

MR BOOYENS: Booyens, no questions, Mr Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Cornelius on record, no questions, Mr Chairperson.

MR NEL: Thank you Mr Chairman, Nel, I've got no questions for Brig Schoon.

MR ROSSOUW: Rossouw Mr Chairman, I have no questions.

MR BOTHA: Botha, Mr Chairman, I've got no questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN HEERDEN: Van Heerden, Mr Chairman, I've got some questions. Brigadier, what was Tabo Mohale's role in Sansco?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I had nothing to do with the persons themselves. The operation was only submitted to me and that is as far as my participation reaches, when I gave permission. Their roles were sketched to me by Gen Erasmus, but what it exactly entailed, I cannot recall any more.

MR VAN HEERDEN: And does the same apply for Portia Shabangu?

MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson.

MR VAN HEERDEN: And Derek Mashobane?

MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson.

MR VAN HEERDEN: At this stage you cannot recall what their roles were?

MR SCHOON: Except that it was conveyed to me by Gen Erasmus.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Paragraph 12 of the application, you mention that -

Can one infer from there that Mohale had played a leadership role?

MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson, I believe so.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Paragraph 13, you mention there that there were certain assurances by Gen Erasmus that the group was not enticed. Was it a problem that someone may have enticed them to go to Swaziland?

MR SCHOON: No Chairperson, he gave me the assurance that they out of own motivation, wanted to go to Swaziland and that they had not been lured there.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Was this aspect specifically addressed by yourself?

MR SCHOON: I think he mentioned it to me Chairperson. You know we are here talking of things that happened 10 years back.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Would you have questioned him about this aspect?

MR SCHOON: I may have questioned him.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Paragraph 18 of your application, approximately the final sentence there, you say they would have been able to liaise with authority in Swaziland because of the status which they would have had because of their detention. Would this have bettered their position if they went to Swaziland?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, after a person had been detained and was released, he leaves the place of detention with a greater stature than what he had when he was detained in the first place. In other words, his status has risen, he has done something for the liberation struggle.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Would they have negotiated with minor authority in this regard?

MR SCHOON: I don't know Chairperson, but they would have definitely arrived there with greater stature and they could have said "listen, I was detained, I spent 14 days or 28 days in detention on behalf of the struggle."

MR VAN HEERDEN: I have no further questions, Mr Chairman, thank you.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, Mr Chairman, thank you.

MR SIBANYONI: No questions Mr Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Just one question, Mr Chairman. Mr Schoon, how often did it happen that your colleagues came to you to ask for permission to eliminate a certain person for whatever reasons they are giving you?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, could you please repeat the question a little louder? My hearing is not of the best.

ADV SANDI: Can I ask the question now? Can you hear me now Mr Schoon?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I can hear you sir.

ADV SANDI: As I understand you, you say in this particular case, you were approached for permission that these people be eliminated, am I correct?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: And you did give the permission that they be killed for the reasons that were supplied to you?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, Gen Erasmus came to me with this proposal that these persons be taken to Swaziland where an ambush would be set up for them and in which they would be killed. He supplied reasons as to why they thought this and I accorded with it.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't know if it was a slip of the tongue, but you said Gen Erasmus came to you with the suggestion that these people be taken to Swaziland?

MR SCHOON: No Chairperson, he came with the proposal that they be eliminated, and I accorded with it.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, you were correct, I heard the same, it was obviously a slip of the tongue.

ADV SANDI: My question Mr Schoon, is how often did it happen? Was that something that would happen regularly that people who worked under you, people like Mr de Kock for example, that they would come to you and say "we are asking for permission to kill so and so and these are the reasons why we want to kill him"?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, as far as I know, this was an isolated case and I think why I took the decision that day, there was no one else at Head Office to whom Gen Erasmus could speak and I was just about the senior man.

ADV SANDI: Thank you. Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The same did not apply to the other three people who were killed in Swaziland?

MR SCHOON: No Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Or in any of the other occasions for which you have asked for amnesty, this was the only occasion people came and asked your permission to eliminate someone?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, there was one other incident which was handled in Johannesburg, where Potchefstroom's people telephonically contacted me, I think a day before Christmas where there was also no one else who could give them permission and I gave them permission that they launch a cross-border operation to Botswana. These are the two instances that I can recall where I was involved where I personally granted permission.

ADV SANDI: ... incident which you might have forgotten Mr Schoon?

MR SCHOON: I didn't hear the question properly Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Okay, you can just leave it Mr Schoon.

RE-EXAMINATION B] MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman. My Attorney and I have an uneasy feeling that Mr Sandi is correct. We had been looking at the list and as far as we can recall Chairperson, the case of Pule and Take Five who were killed in Botswana, may have been such an instance, but the one I remember is MK George and MK Brown. If my recollection is correct, that is a matter in which Mr Schoon gave the authority, or the order.

MR SCHOON: No.

MR VISSER: He seems to disagree with me Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, we can check up on those.

MR VISSER: We can check Mr Chairman. In fact I will check tonight, and I will let you know tomorrow.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that all?

MR VISSER: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Where is Mr Schoon at the moment? No ...

MR VISSER: He lives in Pretoria, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Because if you come back with information tomorrow, we may wish to recall him then.

MR VISSER: Yes, yes certainly.

CHAIRPERSON: So perhaps he can be released now, but come back tomorrow morning.

MR VISSER: Come back tomorrow morning, yes, he will be here in any way, thank you Mr Chairman.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------MR VISSER: I beg leave to call the next witness which will be Supt Jakobus Johannes Snyman.

MR SIBANYONI: Your full names Mr Snyman?

MR SNYMAN: Jakobus Johannes Snyman.

JAKOBUS JOHANNES SNYMAN: (sworn states)

MR SIBANYONI: Please be seated, sworn in Chairperson.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, if I may refer your attention to the document that has been handed up under the name of this witness, and ask you to mark that Exhibit G, being a summary of his evidence which we will give before you, his application is in the Bundle, at pages 240 to 247 and the specific incident is dealt with at 241 to 243. Mr Chairman, for the same reasons as advanced previously, could I ask for an amendment also in his case, of paragraph 7(i) of the amnesty application to read "National Party" and paragraph 7(b) to read "supporter"?

CHAIRPERSON: His application will be amended in that regard.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Snyman, you have studied Exhibit A properly?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Are there any part in Exhibit A to which you don't have personal knowledge?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, with regard to the background in Lesotho and Botswana.

MR VISSER: Lesotho and Botswana you don't have any knowledge of, and the rest, do you confirm this from own evidence, from own knowledge and from what you have received from informers and sources with regard to the balance of Exhibit A and do you request that this be regarded as incorporated into your evidence?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Mr Snyman, I do not want to take too much time with you, is it correct that in 1989 you were attached to Group D at Security Head Office and that your Commander was Brig Oosthuizen, actually we should start with Col Willem Coetzee who had given evidence first this morning and after that, it was Brig Oosthuizen who was above him and then the Chief of the Group, Gen Erasmus, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You refer to the testimony of Brig Schoon and Oosthuizen and Col Coetzee which was delivered here today before the Amnesty Committee, you have previously studied their statements and you say you agree with their viewpoints of the struggle of the past and the circumstances during the time period and the run up to the incident in the current matter?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Paragraph 4, Mr Chairman, would you please read from there?

MR SNYMAN: My specific role under instructions from Col Coetzee, was to man a static point on the main road to Swaziland at Oshoek border post. My task was to monitor the suspected vehicle, I refer here to the Opel Kadett vehicle, if it should pass there. The vehicle however, at no stage passed that point.

MR VISSER: And that was your total role which you played in this incident?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you know beforehand that it was intended and that an instruction was given that as soon as the persons whom we are referring to here, entered Swaziland, there would be an operation to eliminate them?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And did you according to information which you had, it was in the interest and the maintenance of the State dispensation and people's lives and government property and did you associate yourself with this conduct and you say that in paragraph 6?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You yourself, did not have any part in the discussion and decisions which were taken in this regard and you were informed by Col Coetzee that the operation was authorised by Maj-Gen Erasmus and Brig Oosthuizen?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And we also know that Brig Schoon had indeed taken the decision, but you would not know about that?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: With regard to the prerequisites of Section 20 of the Act, paragraph 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 of your application, is this information with which you agree and which you wish to use to establish your political motivation and political objective?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And do you then request amnesty for any offence or delict which was committed by you before, during or after the incident of the 12th to 13th of February 1989, close to Mbabane where Louis Mohale, Derek Mashobane and Portia Shabangu were murdered, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Hattingh on record, Mr Chairman, we have no questions, thank you.

MR BOOYENS: Booyens, no questions, Mr Chairman.

MR CORNELIUS: Cornelius Mr Chairman, no questions.

MR NEL: Nel Mr Chairman, no questions.

MR ROSSOUW: Rossouw Mr Chairman, no questions.

MR BOTHA: Botha Mr Chairman, no questions.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Van Heerden Mr Chairman, no questions.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: I've got no questions Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: May the witness be excused under the same conditions as the previous witnesses, Mr Chairman? Thank you Mr Chairman.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------MR VISSER: Next I call Deon Andre Els, whose application you will find in the Bundle, on page 174 to 182 and in regard to which...

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, could I ask one question to the previous ...

MR VISSER: Yes, could he just be recalled.

CHAIRPERSON: I just would like to confirm what you say in your application, if you still agree with it, that one of the reasons for you monitoring the border post at Oshoek was to make sure that Mohale didn't travel with a larger group of people than was expected?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: You were specifically there to make sure that only the expected three people travelled through in that vehicle?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson, for drawing the attention to that, I have forgotten about that. That is important.

CHAIRPERSON: I think it is relevant.

MR VISSER: It is very relevant. I should have mentioned it.

MR SIBANYONI: Your full names please?

MR ELS: Deon Andre Els.

DEON ANDRE ELS: (sworn states)

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, please be seated, sworn in Chairperson.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I am instructed by my Attorney that he has a summary of the witness' evidence which I would ask you to kindly mark Exhibit H, it is I that we have a problem with, H. Mr Chairman, if I may lead the witness then. Mr Els, you are an applicant and you request amnesty with regard to the incident which took place on the 12th/13th of February 1989 in Swaziland, for your participance before, during or after the incident?

MR ELS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Your application is in the Bundle and the incident is dealt with on page 176 to 177, is that correct?

MR ELS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And in paragraph 7(a) and (b) of your amnesty application, which is indicated to you now, you gave the answers "not applicable"?

MR ELS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What is the correct position there? Were you a supporter of a political party in this regard?

MR ELS: That is correct, of the National Party.

MR VISSER: May I ask for an indulgence again to ask for a similar amendment for 7(a) to read "National Party" and 7(b) to read "supporter".

CHAIRPERSON: Granted.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman. You have studied Exhibit A, is that correct?

MR ELS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Is there any part of Exhibit A which you do not have any personal knowledge of?

MR ELS: No Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you request that the evidence embodied in there as well as the evidence to which there is reference made to in Exhibit A, be incorporated in your evidence?

MR ELS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: This is the first time that you give evidence before the Amnesty Committee?

MR ELS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Similarly as Mr Snyman, you were in the same group, Group D during 1989 at Security Head Office, attached to Group D, is that correct?

MR ELS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And there you were an Intelligence Co-ordinator?

MR ELS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And your Commander immediately above you was Col Willem Coetzee, the first applicant this morning, Brig Alfred Oosthuizen the second applicant and the third applicant, Maj-Gen Gerrit Erasmus, is that correct, who was the Head of the Group?

MR ELS: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: You have had insight into the statements of Brig Schoon and Col Coetzee with regard to the facts and background which is the run up to this incident?

MR ELS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you request that that evidence be incorporated into your application?

MR ELS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: In paragraph 5 you say during the first week of February you formed part of an Intelligence Unit who collected Intelligence with regard to actions and movements of certain leader elements in Sansco, you are referring to these three persons here now?

MR ELS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You were informed that an operation would take place against these persons in Swaziland and this entailed their elimination as soon as they arrived in Swaziland?

MR ELS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you then associated yourself with this decision from the viewpoint of what you regarded as your task as a police official and in the light of the political struggle of the past?

MR ELS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Please refer to paragraph 5, what your specific role was in this operation?

MR ELS: Chairperson, my specific role under instructions from Lt-Col Coetzee was to man a static point on the main road to Swaziland at Delmas. My task was to monitor the suspected vehicle, if it should pass there.

MR VISSER: Was it also part of your task to control the occupants of this vehicle?

MR ELS: Chairperson, my task was only to monitor the vehicle because the vehicle would pass me at a great speed and to see if I could see how many occupants were in the vehicle.

MR VISSER: And did you have to report the number of occupants then?

MR ELS: Yes.

MR VISSER: Who would you report this to?

MR ELS: I would report this to Col Coetzee.

MR VISSER: Were you aware of where you could find him on this day?

MR ELS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Was a description of the vehicle given to you?

MR ELS: Yes, it was.

MR VISSER: I beg your pardon, please continue.

MR ELS: A white Opel Kadett.

MR VISSER: And did this vehicle pass you at any point in time there at Delmas where you manned this stationary point?

MR ELS: Chairperson, the vehicle at no stage passed me.

MR VISSER: Did you at any stage after this incident, visit Vlakplaas during February 1989?

MR ELS: No Chairperson. The morning of the operation, I did visit Vlakplaas, the morning before the operation.

MR VISSER: Very well, and what was the purpose of that visit?

MR ELS: Chairperson, the purpose of that visit was to supply the newest information to the staff there. My specific function during that visit was one of accompaniment and during the planning and discussions, Mr Snyman and I waited outside.

MR VISSER: Who else besides yourself and Mr Snyman went to Vlakplaas on this morning?

MR ELS: Brig Andre Oosthuizen, Col Coetzee and Snyman.

MR VISSER: It was the four of you?

MR ELS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Were you at all involved on the level of management in the giving of instructions and taking decisions at that stage?

MR ELS: No Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Was it mentioned to you that the operation was authorised?

MR ELS: Yes.

MR VISSER: And who told you authorised the operation?

MR ELS: Brig Oosthuizen as well as Col Coetzee informed me about it.

MR VISSER: Was it told to you who gave the authorisation in Group D? That is paragraph 10 of your statement?

MR ELS: That it was authorised by Gen Erasmus.

MR VISSER: And you had no doubt, you had no reason to doubt this?

MR ELS: Not at all Chairperson ... (tape ends) ...

MR VISSER: ... at the stage and the political objective which you had when you participated in this incident and your association with the elimination of these persons, and committing or defeating the ends of justice, that is where you set it out and do you confirm that under oath, that that is still your evidence and that you request the Committee to consider it as such when considering your application with regard to Section 20 of the Act?

MR ELS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR HATTINGH: Hattingh Mr Chairman, no questions, thank you.

MR BOOYENS: Booyens, no questions, thank you.

MR CORNELIUS: Cornelius, Mr Chairman, no questions.

MR NEL: Nel Mr Chairman, no questions.

MR ROSSOUW: Rossouw Mr Chairman, no questions.

MR BOTHA: Botha Mr Chairman, no questions.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Van Heerden, Mr Chairman, no questions.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I have a question. You were waiting for this vehicle to pass you near Delmas?

MR ELS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: What time did you expect it to arrive?

MR ELS: Chairperson, in our analysis I departed just after seven, and waited along the road. As far as I know it would have been between eight or nine of the morning that the vehicle would pass there.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you leave Vlakplaas at about seven o'clock?

MR ELS: Chairperson, it may have been before seven, but my vehicle was in the centre of town and I had to get to my vehicle in order to get to Delmas. We departed to Vlakplaas in one vehicle and afterwards we drove back to our vehicles again.

CHAIRPERSON: So you had been to Vlakplaas and returned by the time you left at seven o'clock in the morning?

MR ELS: Chairperson, if I am not mistaken about the time, but I believe that is more or less the time.

CHAIRPERSON: And you expected them at eight or nine, did you say?

MR ELS: Between eight and nine o'clock, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: But they did not come and you had to eventually report they hadn't passed you?

MR ELS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: You weren't told anything about them being delayed?

MR ELS: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, in the chronological order of things, you have now been taken right up to the boundary but not over the boundary, and I assume that the logical first person to go now, would be Mr Eugene de Kock to tell you what happened there.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, I call Mr de Kock.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't know what you gentlemen think, but we seem to have done very well, time wise, so far, do you want to start him now or ...

MR HATTINGH: Not necessarily Mr Chairman, in fact I would prefer to start tomorrow if possible.

CHAIRPERSON: What is the attitude of the rest of you?

MR BOOYENS: I would be happy with the suggestion by Mr Hattingh?

MR CORNELIUS: I agree as well.

MR VISSER: I would welcome it Mr Chairman, give my cough a rest.

CHAIRPERSON: Half past nine, gentlemen? We now adjourn until half past nine tomorrow morning.