--------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAIRPERSON: I will put the Committee on record and then ask the legal advisors to do the same. The Committee consists of myself, Andrew Wilson, Chris de Jager, and I trust they will have noticed his status, and Mr Sibanyoni.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, I am P A Hattingh and I am instructed by Mr Schalk Hugo to appear for Mr de Kock.

CHAIRPERSON: When he appears, I gather you have had problems?

MR HATTINGH: Yes Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: You are sorting them out?

MR HATTINGH: Yes, we have sorted them out, he will only be arriving somewhat later.

CHAIRPERSON: But you have no objection to us continuing?

MR HATTINGH: No objection to continuing in his absence in the meantime, Mr Chairman.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman, my surname is Rossouw, I represent applicant Douw Willemse.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Chairman, Harry Prinsloo, I represent applicants number 10, Deetlefs and 12, F J Pienaar.

MS VAN DER WALT: Chairperson, I am Louisa van der Walt, I am appearing on behalf of applicant 9, S J Visser and 11, P J van Dyk.

MR VISSER: May it please you Mr Chairperson, my name is Louis Visser, I am instructed by Wagener Muller on behalf of Mr Chairman, if I may refer to the Bundle, number 3, number 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. Those persons, I don't know whether you want me to repeat their names, it is Ignatius Coetzee, Willem Coetzee, Lodewyk de Jager, Johannes van der Merwe, Marthinus van Wyngaard, Anton Pretorius and Willem Schoon. And if you will allow me Mr Chairman, I understand that congratulations are in order, as you are now joined by an acting Judge on the Panel.

CHAIRPERSON: Nobody representing victims or families or interested parties?

ADV STEENKAMP: No, indeed not, Mr Chairman. I can just maybe put on record that as far as requirements of Section 19(4) is concerned, it is my respectful submission those requirements have been met. No victims in this matter whatsoever, could be traced or identified in this matter. All reasonable steps were taken to locate them, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you arranged who will begin?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I take it that I will begin, Louis Visser on record. Mr Chairman, some documents have been placed before you and the first document is one that has been placed before you last week, matters then modified Exhibit A "Algemene agtergrond tot amnestie aansoeke". I am told by my Attorney that he has placed fresh copies before you. Judge de Jager has received a fresh copy Chairperson, and just for his edification, may I just mention that the material way in which this new Exhibit A differs from the previous one, is in regard to Swaziland and Mozambique, at page 24 I believe it was, Mr Chairman, yes page 24 to page 30. But other than that it is the document to which Judge de Jager is in fact accustomed. Chairperson, we have drafted also statements of the evidence of the applicants for whom we will appear. You will have a little bundle before you containing all the statements of the applicants. The bundle starts off with a little diagram Chairperson. May I just explain the diagram. This is intended to be a working document Chairperson, perhaps in the sense that it might make it easier for you when witnesses give evidence, with reference to the diagram to tell you where they were at the time of their entry of the house. You will see that there are two diagrams in fact Chairperson, the one is headed "Prior to the Entry" and you will hear evidence that the informer, or rather the agent SWT180 knocked on the door and this pretends to show where the people were prior to their entry into the house and when the door was opened, where they each went Chairperson. It is not necessarily correct, but the witnesses will be able to change that as we go along in the evidence and it is in the hope that it might be of some assistance to you. Chairperson, may the "Algemene Agtergrond" then serve again as Exhibit A before you in this hearing Chairperson, and this diagram of the inside of the Fountains' house, as Exhibit B? Chairperson, we intend to lead the evidence of Willem Helm Johannes Coetzee, Col Coetzee first of all. He was really the one that brought the information to the attention of the other, some of the other applicants Chairperson. We intend to lead him rather fully and thereafter the other witnesses will be in the position to merely confirm his evidence as we go along and that might save time Chairperson. We then call Willem Coetzee, Chairperson, Col Coetzee and may I ask that his evidence be marked Exhibit C? Chairperson, perhaps while we are about it, perhaps one could mark the others as well. The copies in front of you Mr Chairman, are all signed, except for Mr van Wyngaard, the last one, we haven't - to sign his statement, he will do so the moment he arrives. Perhaps if we could mark them, Mr Chairman, Coetzee will then be Exhibit C, Pretorius, Anton Pretorius could he be Exhibit D Chairperson. The following witness will be Col Lodewyk de Jager and may his statement then be Exhibit E. We then turn to Lt-Gen Ignatius Coetzee and that would be F Chairperson, and we then turn to Brig Willem Schoon, whose statement will then be Exhibit G and Gen van der Merwe will be Exhibit H and then van Wyngaard, the last one, Chairperson, Exhibit J with your leave. If you are satisfied Mr Chairman, I will then beg leave to call Col Coetzee to give evidence.

MR SIBANYONI: Your full names please Mr Coetzee?

MR COETZEE: Willem Helm Johannes Coetzee.

WILLEM HELM JOHANNES COETZEE: (sworn states)

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, you may be seated. Sworn in Chairperson.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, you are an applicant in this matter which deals with an incident which took place at or near Mmbabane in Swaziland during 13 - 14 December 1986, during which an attempt was made to murder one Glory Sidibe, MK name September, and during which one Pantsu Smith,

MK Pantsu, Sipho Dlamini, MK Sipho and Buzi Majola, MK Buzi, were murdered, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: We can find your application in the Bundle of documents or applications, page 21 to 39 and you deal with the incident which is at hand currently, from page 29 to 34, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm the content of your amnesty application which you submitted subject to the evidence which you intend to deliver before the Committee today?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Last week already you have requested an amendment of paragraph 7(a) and (b) of your amnesty form on page 21, or page 22 rather, and where so far necessary, you request that that amendment be brought about so that paragraph 7(a) will read "National Party" and 7(b) "Supporter", is that correct?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: If it pleases you Mr Chairman, my attention has just been drawn to the fact that he deals with the incident not at page 29, but at page 23 says my Attorney Mr Chairman, I beg your pardon for the mistake. You have studied the document, Exhibit A, which is the general background to amnesty applications, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you agree in essence with its content in so far as your knowledge?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR VISSER: And do you also request that that document, Exhibit A, as well as the evidence embodied therein, be incorporated with your evidence in consideration of your amnesty application?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Would you turn to page 2 and address the Committee regarding your knowledge of the background and circumstances of this particular incident, please Colonel.

MR COETZEE: During 1986 I with the rank of Captain, was attached to the Intelligence Unit of the Security Branch, Soweto. General, the then Brig Ignatius Coetzee, was then the Divisional Commander and the Head of our Unit was our Col Louis de Jager. Since the beginning of the 1980's, I had been involved in the tactical and strategic combat of the terrorist onslaught against the government of that time. I was directly involved in Intelligence gathering regarding the various illegal activities (defection, meetings, terror, murders, etc) of members of the following organisations, the South African Communist Party, the African National Congress.

MR VISSER: Colonel, would you proceed somewhat slower, all of this has to be interpreted.

MR COETZEE: Umkhonto weSizwe, Pan Africanist Congress, Azanian People's Organisation, Department of Intelligence and Security, DIS, Azanian People's Liberation Army, APLA, Black Consciousness Movement. An extensive Intelligence network was established by the Intelligence Unit of Soweto and was maintained and expanded. An extensive network of informers and agents was also established. Various infiltration and penetration oriented informers were handled by me during this period in time.

MR VISSER: Just to clarify this, you refer to informers and agents, what is the difference between an informer and an agent?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, with an informer we refer to those who were not members of the Force, whereas agents were indeed members of the South African Police Service.

MR VISSER: And the reference numbers of informers were SWT because you were in Soweto, SWT with a number?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And the agents were referred to according to what number?

MR COETZEE: RS.

MR VISSER: RS and a number, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.

MR COETZEE: Emanating from information which had been obtained from above-mentioned informers and various other sources of information, me and my fellow workers carried out the following policing actions among others, arrests, detention, personal searches, home searches, crowd control, Court oriented investigations. The Security Branch was under tremendous pressure to stabilise the ongoing situation of violence. Great numbers of residents and members of the South African Police from Tembisa, Daveyton, Wattville and Actonville were maimed and killed during this period in time, as a result of the revolutionary actions by the liberation movements. Information on regional, provincial, national and international level for the purposes of threat analysis was collected and sent through to Security Head Office. The information which was the area of focus primarily information concerning illegal revolutionary activities of among others the following revolutionary organisations - Umkhonto weSizwe, MK Military Intelligence, MK Special Operations, Department of Intelligence and Security, DIS, Azanian People's Liberation Army, APLA, Azanian National Liberation Army, AZANLA, South African Youth Revolutionary Council, SAYCRO, Congress of South African Students, COSAS, South African Youth Congress, SAYCO, Soweto Youth Congress, SOYCO, South African National Students' Congress, SANSCO and ....

MR VISSER: The final one is a repetition, you may disregard that, that is once again COSAS?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Proceed.

MR COETZEE: Since the end of 1981 and the beginning of 1982, information which had been collected by the Intelligence Unit of Soweto and which had been confirmed by other Security Branch offices and Security Head Office, indicated that a large scale infiltration of so-called advance detachments of particularly MK members to the Witwatersrand with Soweto as the primary so-called operational zone, was underway from within the RSA's neighbouring States, including Swaziland. These MK detachments consisted of various cells, Units and individuals who used the geographical location of Soweto and its thousands of inhabitants as shelter in order to plan and execute their acts of terrorism, recruitment of new recruits and intimidation. Over a period, these Units succeeded in obtaining safehouses, establishing stockpiles with weapons of warfare, establishing underground self-defence units, providing military training to recruits, recruiting collaborators and applying collaborators, establishing Intelligence networks which collected consistent information regarding the SAP, the SADF, government institutions, municipal institutions, launching acts of terrorism against identified targets such as Security Forces, council buildings and staff, railway lines, power stations and informants. It was clear that the ANC's people's war strategy was gaining manifestation because military and political action particularly in Soweto, were at the order of the day. Gradually the neighbouring States of the RSA began to enjoy more significance as a springboard for the terrorists and their activities, so too Swaziland played a particular role. In this regard, I refer to the chapter entitled "Swaziland, Mozambique" in Exhibit A.

MR VISSER: That is on page 24, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Proceed.

MR COETZEE: It was clear that these revolutionary groupings were busy with a total onslaught against the South African government dispensation and that the Security Forces had to establish a total strategy in order to combat the revolutionary onslaught. This led directly to the fact that the South African Police and particularly the Security Branch in conjunction with the South African Defence Force and particularly Special Forces, launched cooperative information actions and in certain cases, operational actions.

MR VISSER: You have now given us the background regarding your information network. Can you tell the Committee about Col Pretorius. Was he someone who had been involved with you in this Soweto Intelligence Service?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR VISSER: And was your knowledge also his knowledge regarding these matters?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well, continue with the facts.

MR COETZEE: I have been informed that the date upon which the incident took place, was approximately the 13th to the 14th of December 1986. Apparently I was mistaken in my amnesty application with the date, which I stated there, namely the 15th to the 16th of December 1986. During approximately November 1986, a woman was killed and a child was injured in a vehicle by a landmine explosion in the Eastern Transvaal. This incident was but one of various acts or incidents of terrorism which had been committed with explosives during this time, but the incident once again emphasised the urgency of the need for preventative action by the Security Forces.

MR VISSER: Yes, in paragraph 16 you have summarised certain references, let us refer to these as statistics and reference is made to certain explosions which took place. This has been done for the convenience of the Committee because it is actually a reference to what has already been stated on the Further Submissions and Responses of the ANC of the 12th of May 1997, pages 84 and 89, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Actually it is page 84 to 89 Chairperson. And indeed, this incident can be found on page 89 on the aforementioned Further Submissions and Responses under the date 2 or 4 November 1986, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed, it is not necessary for you to read all of that, it is quite obvious in itself.

MR COETZEE: Paragraph 17, during December 1986, Col L. de Jager gave me and Col A. Pretorius an order to attend a meeting with him at the Security Branch in Middelburg, Transvaal. As far as I can recall, I, Col de Jager, Col Pretorius, Brig Schoon, Brig Visser and Colonels de Kock and Deetlefs were present during the meeting. The escalating attacks of terrorism in the RSA particularly in the Transvaal by MK from Swaziland and Mozambique was discussed. Much information was tabled by the members who were present. Due to the extensive Intelligence network which was managed by me and Col A. Pretorius, we had information at our disposal with regard to the so-called Transvaal Military Machinery, which functioned from within Swaziland. We conveyed this information to the meeting. I was among others the handler of SWT180, an informer who is currently deceased. Col Pretorius and Sgt Mkhonza were his co-handlers. SWT180 had smuggled a consignment of weapons of terror in the backseat of his car, to the RSA shortly before the meeting. The weaponry was transferred by SWT180 from Swaziland under the order of the September Machinery under the command of Glory Sidibe, MK September, and was transferred from an ANC MK safehouse which was situated in Fountains, Mmbabane, Swaziland.

MR VISSER: Just with regard to the informer, SWT180, was this an informer who had been recruited or was this an informer who had been infiltrated, what was the situation with regard to SWT180?

MR COETZEE: He was a recruited informer, who already had access to certain individuals.

MR VISSER: And had he already established access to the Transvaal Military Machinery of MK in Swaziland?

MR COETZEE: At a later stage, yes.

MR VISSER: Very well. We have now referred to 1986. At that stage, he had already infiltrated?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.

MR COETZEE: The weaponry had been transported by SWT180 from Swaziland under the command of September Machinery under the command of Glory Sidibe, MK September, and was transported from an ANC MK safehouse situated in Fountains, Mmbabane.

MR VISSER: And as you recall, it consisted of two mini-limpet mines, four F1 defensive handgrenades, one SPM anti-personnel mine and one VZO hand machine-gun with ammunition, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR VISSER: What happened with this weaponry?

MR COETZEE: It was taken into possession by us.

MR VISSER: Did SWT180 inform you about the weaponry?

MR COETZEE: Yes, he was debriefed very close to the border.

MR VISSER: Who was present when the weaponry was found with him?

MR COETZEE: Col de Jager, Col Pretorius, those were the members who were present, at least I can remember their names.

MR VISSER: Were you present?

MR COETZEE: Yes, I was. I was there as the handler.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed with paragraph 23.

MR COETZEE: SWT180's order from the MK Machinery was to establish a weapon stockpile in Soweto with the objective of the establishment, training and arming of MK underground units. Col Pretorius and I informed the meeting regarding the information which had been provided by SWT180 regarding the September Machinery. Based upon the information that we had, it was our opinion that the September Machinery was a significant unit which fell under the umbrella of the Transvaal Machinery and operated in and from Swaziland. We addressed the meeting that the September Machinery's structure among others, consisted of the following externally military trained persons, MK September, Glory Sidibe, MK Mzala, MK Pantsu, MK Sipho, MK Buzi and MK Ben. Col Deetlefs confirmed certain aspects of the information and elaborated on the Transvaal Machinery's activities. During the meeting it became clear that the share of the above-mentioned Transvaal Machinery and particularly the share of the September Machinery in acts of terror in the Transvaal was significant. Those present at the meeting, were in agreement that it was of urgent necessity to launch an action against the members of the aforementioned Transvaal Machinery in order to attempt to prevent further attacks of terrorism and the extension of the people's war strategy of the ANC. I believed that such action against enemy bases in neighbouring States, was not only in agreement with the government strategy of prevention of the revolutionary onslaught, but that this was indeed part of my duties as a policeman, that it was expected of me and that consequently it fell within my express or implied authorisation to act as such. Furthermore, I was convinced that Swaziland was an area where with the approval of the South African government and the Swazi authorities, members of the Security Branch could act against revolutionaries who were operating from there.

MR VISSER: This matter is addressed in Exhibit A, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Please continue.

MR COETZEE: This plan of action would first have to be submitted to Security Head Office for clearance. In my amnesty application I stated that the plan had to be cleared with the government, but this was my mistake. I accepted that Brig Schoon would obtain the necessary approval. During the meeting, Brig Schoon appointed Col de Kock as the Operational Commander of the action, should it realise. After the completion of the meeting, Col de Kock spoke to me and Col Pretorius and said that until we had received the final order, not much could be planned. He proposed that Col Pretorius and I obtained the precise location of the September Machinery's underground house in Fountains as well as a sketch plan of the rooms of the house as quickly as possible. Col de Kock also wanted to know whether we could trust the relevant informer, SWT180 and we pointed out to him that the informer had been working for us for quite some time and had up unto that time, always provided reliable and correct information. I informed him that Col Pretorius and I could not stand in for the action of the informer during the operation, but that Col Pretorius and I would take full responsibility for the informer.

CHAIRPERSON: Could I interrupt for a moment. Mr Visser, in paragraph 19 on page 5 there is reference to a Col A. Pretorius, here we have in paragraph 31, Col W. Pretorius. Were these different people?

MR VISSER: No, the "W" is a clear mistake, Chairperson, I didn't even notice it and I do apologise for that, it is Col A. Pretorius. Thank you for pointing that out Mr Chairperson. That will be the next witness, yes, Mr Chairman, we do apologise.

MR COETZEE: Paragraph 33 Chairperson, the initial planning was that the participants in the operation itself, would have to get to Swaziland themselves and that we would most probably rendezvous at one of the Holiday Inn hotels. After this, we returned to Soweto and immediately began to make preparations with SWT180 for a visit by him, to the aforementioned September Machinery in Swaziland. We told him that we would visit him in Swaziland. SWT180 was never previously informed regarding the operation. Because Col Pretorius and I had already visited Swaziland on various occasions, SWT180 did not find it strange when we began to make arrangements to visit him in Swaziland.

MR VISSER: That is you and Pretorius?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well.

MR COETZEE: On Friday the 12th of December 1986, Col de Jager informed me and Col Pretorius that the operation had been approved and that we could make the final arrangements to deploy SWT180 in Swaziland and that we had to meet Col de Kock the following day at a certain time, I cannot recall exactly what time, in Swaziland, at a Holiday Inn hotel. The final planning was executed by me, Col Pretorius and Col de Jager. I would enter Swaziland via Nersden border post with SWT180, while Col Pretorius and de Jager would enter Swaziland via Oshoek.

MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, how would you have driven, just indicate to the Committee what vehicles you had or what the situation was with the vehicles?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, Col Pretorius and Col de Jager would enter Swaziland with a vehicle, I myself, would enter with a vehicle at a later stage while SWT180 would enter Swaziland with his vehicle.

MR VISSER: Yes, and this vehicle that he was supposed to enter Swaziland with, was this a vehicle which had been made available for his use every time he travelled to Swaziland?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR VISSER: So that the MK could be used to the idea that this was his vehicle?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR VISSER: So he would enter the country with that vehicle, which was his vehicle?

MR COETZEE: Correct.

MR VISSER: Proceed.

MR COETZEE: Paragraph 37, Sgt Mkhonza would assist SWT180 in this regard. He had to wait in a vehicle on the RSA side until after the operation had been completed and then return SWT180 to Soweto. The plan was that SWT180's vehicle would be left behind in Swaziland to be retrieved later. This would not create any suspicion if SWT180 and Mkhonza were to be noticed together in a vehicle by ANC members, seeing as both of them were agents or informers. However, we could not take the risk that SWT180 be seen with police members in the same vehicle. I must add that Mkhonza had no knowledge of the murder of the MK members in Swaziland. On Saturday the 13th of December 1986, I saw to it that SWT180 entered Swaziland via the Oshoek border post with his vehicle. I entered Swaziland with my own vehicle and a false passport and later that afternoon of Saturday the 13th of December 1986, joined Col de Jager, Col de Kock, Col Deetlefs, Capt Paul van Dyk, Warrant Officer Freek Pienaar and Sgt Douw Willemse at the kwaLoseni Hotel.

MR VISSER: In Swaziland?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct. I must just add Chairperson, kwaLoseni, I may be mistaken in terms of the precise rendezvous point of that afternoon.

MR VISSER: But it was at a Holiday Inn hotel?

MR COETZEE: Yes, as far as I can recall.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.

MR COETZEE: Col Pretorius was also already present. Pretorius and I then went to meet SWT180 at a pre-arranged rendezvous point. The rest of the group waited for us at the hotel. During the meeting SWT180 stated that he had met the following members of the September Machinery namely MK Mzala, MK Pantsu and MK Sipho.

MR VISSER: Was this after he had entered Swaziland via Oshoek in his own direction and after he met you, he told you that he had already met these persons, is that what you mean?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.

MR COETZEE: He confirmed that the meeting had taken place at the underground house in Fountains Mmbabane. Furthermore he informed us that the group just wanted him to drive them around to go drinking and had not discussed any underground work with him whatsoever. According to SWT180 it was clear that these persons would come to rest much later that evening and that he would have to return to them, before they became suspicious. SWT180 was once again questioned regarding the precise location of the safehouse and it was put to him that he should possibly indicate the house to us later that evening. A later rendezvous point was then arranged with SWT180. Col Pretorius and I returned immediately to the hotel where we informed Col de Jager and Col de Kock and the rest of the team. We also reported to them that SWT180 could not remain away from the group for very long, and that there had therefore not been enough time for him to indicate the safehouse to us. We also informed them that we had arranged a follow up meeting with SWT180 for later that evening. While we were waiting for the next rendezvous with SWT180, the team at the hotel discussed the operation and among others, our withdrawal after the operation. Col de Kock indicated that we should follow him to near Oshoek, where we would take a detour which would take us through the border fence. General security measures were also discussed on this occasion and it was suggested that we should move around as little as possible so as not to fix any attention on us. During this occasion, I realised from discussions by Mr de Kock and his staff, that other unknown members of Col de Kock's Unit were also in Swaziland.

MR VISSER: That would be with the exception of those that you were involved with there?

MR COETZEE: Correct. Col Pretorius and I later once again left the group in order to wait for SWT180 at the rendezvous point. While we were waiting, he drove passed us with his vehicle full of persons, approximately five. Col Pretorius and I realised that SWT180 was going to be late for our meeting and decided just to wait there. SWT180 arrived much later and reported to us that the September Machinery members had kept him very busy, but that he had dropped them off. He also stated that MK Ben had also been in the vehicle when he drove passed us. SWT180 reported that he had dropped the group off at the safehouse in Fountains and this group consisted of MK Mzala, MK Pantsu and MK Sipho. Furthermore he said that he had been instructed by the September Machinery members to return to their house early the following morning, so that he could discuss operational matters personally with MK September.

ADV DE JAGER: What happened to MK Ben who had been with them in the vehicle?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, later in our statement, we address precisely where MK Ben went after he had been dropped off.

ADV DE JAGER: Was he dropped off with them?

MR COETZEE: Yes. Col Pretorius and I instructed SWT180 to accompany us and to indicate the safehouse in Fountains to us. On the way to the house, SWT180 compiled a sketch plan of the house as per our request. I was convinced that SWT180 at this stage, had begun to suspect that one or other operation regarding the safehouse was underway. I realised that we could not let SWT180 leave our control because it would endanger the lives of our entire team.

MR VISSER: I beg your pardon, that is a typographical error, will you just scratch the last sentence Chairperson, this is obviously a typing error. Please proceed.

MR COETZEE: Paragraph 48, after SWT180 had pointed out the safehouse to us, we immediately returned to the hotel and instructed SWT180 to wait for us in the vehicle. The safehouse was approximately 20 kilometres away from the hotel. Col Pretorius and I explained the location of the safehouse, the sketch plan and the presence of the September Machinery members in the house, to Col de Jager, Col de Kock and the rest of the team. Because we could not be entirely certain whether MK September would be present in the house that evening, we held a discussion during which we discussed whether or not we would act that very same night or postpone the operation. The following aspects were considered in this regard - due to the fact that SWT180 had arranged a meeting with MK September early the following morning at the house, we suspected that he would spend the night at the house, but we could not be certain of that. It would be too dangerous to wait till the following morning, because then the operation would have to be executed in daylight and by nature of the circumstances, more persons would be moving around, who could observe us. Apparently the MK members had not suspected anything up to that point, but anything could happen the following day. We were also concerned regarding the safety of SWT180. We specifically concealed the planning of what we wanted to do, from SWT180 because one could never completely trust an informer, even though he provided reliable information. We did not know who he would react were he to surmise what we were planning. According to me, he had already become suspicious when he was asked to indicate the safehouse and to set up a sketch plan. Furthermore Col de Kock had illegal weapons and ammunition in his vehicle and the discovery of this by the Swazi police would have created a great problem. It was decided nonetheless to continue with the action that very same night, even though we were not certain that MK September would be in the house. Col de Kock began after this, to establish an operational deployment and deployed members with regard to the various rooms in the house.

MR VISSER: That is incorrect, how should it read?

MR COETZEE: It should read Col Pretorius and Sgt Willemse were appointed to secure the bathroom in the house.

MR VISSER: And what was your job?

MR COETZEE: To see to the informer and to act in cooperation with Col Deetlefs from the Eastern Transvaal.

MR VISSER: Very well, we will deal with that, continue.

MR COETZEE: Col de Kock stated that the planned action could only be executed after SWT180 had obtained confirmation that the relevant September Machinery members were still in the house. I had to ensure that SWT180 would knock on the front door with an excuse for his return, in order to determine whether MK Pantsu, his immediate MK handler, was indeed in the house.

MR VISSER: What was the excuse?

MR COETZEE: That his vehicle had broken down.

MR VISSER: Very well.

MR COETZEE: Should there be a negative reaction to SWT180's knock, we would withdraw.

MR VISSER: Then there is a repetition in that.

MR COETZEE: In order to plan alternative action and to coordinate as such.

MR VISSER: What do you mean by a negative reaction, would that be if it was not clear whether or not there were MK members in the house?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct. We drove in a convoy from the hotel to Fountains. As far as I can recall, there were approximately five vehicles in the convoy. It was already late at night, early morning. On the way to the house, Col Pretorius and I explained the situation to SWT180 and discussed the plan of action with him. He was informed that he had to knock on the door and he was also told what to do. It would be highly improbable that MK Pantsu would not be there, seeing as he and the others had been dropped off there late that night by SWT180 and they did not have any transport and the house was situated far away from the town.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, we are now going on to the approach and the attack on the house, Mr Chairman, perhaps it might be a convenient time at this stage, to break at this point and to go on from there, after the adjournment.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, we will take the short adjournment now.

ON RESUMPTION:

WILLEM HELM COETZEE: (s.o.u )

CHAIRPERSON: We got to paragraph 54, hadn't we, we had just finished paragraph 54, page 12.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, may we perhaps ask for an indulgence to take off our jackets?

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly, I have said at the commencement of this hearing that the ventilation here is such that if you want to take off your jackets, please do.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, and may I make one correction in Exhibit C, at page 8, paragraph 36, the second sentence must read "I would go with SWT180 via Oshoek", not Nersden, Mr Chairman, it is Oshoek in paragraph 36. That much becomes clear in paragraph 38.

CHAIRPERSON: (Microphone not on)

MR VISSER: Pretorius and de Jager went through Nersden, Mr Chairman, and Coetzee and SWT180 went in through Oshoek. In paragraph 36, that is incorrect. It really, in paragraph 36, the Nersden and the Oshoek should just be changed around, Mr Chairman, it has just been pointed out. The last sentence -

Those two have just been swopped around, Mr Chairman, I do apologise for the error. Then it is in order Mr Chairman. As you have pointed out, Mr Chairman, we have reached paragraph 54 and we are going on to paragraph 55, Mr Coetzee.

MR COETZEE: Approximately 500 metres from the safehouse we stopped, we all disembarked, upon which I received the sub-machine rifle fitted with a silencer. As far as I can recall, the weaponry was hidden in a blue coloured minibus by Col de Kock. I cannot recall who handed the weapons over to me. Col Pretorius was armed with a similar sub-machine gun and in a short period of time, we had to ensure that the weapon was in order to shoot with. We approached the particular safehouse on foot. I took up position next to one of the walls close to the front door, along with Sgt Willemse, Col de Kock, Col Pretorius, Col de Jager and SWT180 and waited on SWT180's knock.

MR VISSER: If you have regard for Exhibit B, there are two diagrams of the same house. The first one deals with the situation before the house was entered, is that more or less correct as it is indicated there, the names at the bottom of the first part of Exhibit B?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Very well, please continue.

MR COETZEE: After SWT180 had knocked, someone spoke to him from inside the house, I could hear how the key was turned in the lock. The next moment Col de Kock and de Jager followed by Capt van Dyk entered the house, and shots were fired immediately. The entry of the house took place within a few seconds, no lights were on within the house and we switched on our torches, which was attached to our firearms with sellotape.

MR VISSER: Did you do this beforehand?

MR COETZEE: Yes, we did Chairperson. Col de Kock shot the person who had opened the door, immediately, and he fell there. It would seem later that this was MK Sipho. Several shots were fired within the house during this entry. Myself, Col Deetlefs, Pienaar and SWT180 moved around the house to a glass door on the side of the house. I did not fire any shots that evening.

MR VISSER: That is also indicated in Exhibit B under the heading "After Entry" if you look on the right hand side of the diagram?

MR COETZEE: That is correct. The shooting was over within seconds, upon which we established that the three persons were fatally wounded. The particular three persons were positively identified by SWT180 as MK Pantsu, MK Sipho and MK Buzi, all members of the September Machinery. The house was briefly searched thereafter and an amount of arms were seized. The precise amount I cannot recall, SZ6, S3 demolition mini-limpet mines, F1 handgrenades and a variety of propaganda material like Mayabuy's, Umzibenzi's, Dawn's and documents of underground military cell structures in Soweto amongst which there was a biography of one Magomotsi Mogodeli, a COSAS member from Diepkloof. This indicated the connection between COSAS and the September Machinery. Col Pretorius took photo's of the deceased persons and the weapons that were found. The photo's were later used to confirm the identities of the MK members.

MR VISSER: How did you do this?

MR COETZEE: By means of identifications and showing the photographs to agents and informers who had access to MK members across the border at that time.

ADV DE JAGER: I beg your pardon. Could you establish their true identities? You had their MK names and now you had photo's, could you then establish their true identities?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, all that I can remember is that we only confirmed that their MK names and that they were MK members, Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: So from the photo's you could not establish who they were indeed, except for the, we have one name here Magomotsi Mogodeli?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson, but this was only an autobiography in which they had referred to Magomotsi Mogodeli which was a newly recruited MK member in an underground cell structure.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, but I would just like to hear from the Evidence Leader if any of these persons' families have been contacted?

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, as far as I understand, as far as we could establish, no victims in this matter could be traced at all. Certain steps were taken to investigate this matter, and no information could be forthcoming.

CHAIRPERSON: There was evidence as to their proper names, wasn't there?

ADV STEENKAMP: Yes Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: Not from the ANC offices?

ADV STEENKAMP: No information could be obtained, Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: Thank you. I beg your pardon, Mr Coetzee, you may continue.

MR COETZEE: Early the morning of the Sunday, the 14th of December 1986 ...

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, can I disturb for the benefit of my learned friend, page 174, at the bottom of the page they give the proper names.

ADV STEENKAMP: Indeed, thank you Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, in the Further Responses, sorry the statement to the TRC by the ANC, at page 94, there is a reference under point 16 to a Buzi Majola which appears to be the correct name Chairperson, and not an MK name. It gives a date of the 11th of June 1986, which doesn't make any sense to us Mr Chairman. It may or may not be the same, it seems that it is a little too coincidental that it won't refer to the same name, but it is possible that it refers to the same person.

CHAIRPERSON: It seems odd that the names appear in certain of the affidavits and not in others, it appears also at page 161, at the top of the page, this is Deetlefs giving the names.

MR VISSER: These are the Eastern Transvaal members of the Security Branch, perhaps they could tell us what they know about this, Mr Chairman, it seems to be the same name which was given at page 174 in fact.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Yes, we don't have further information unfortunately Mr Chairperson. Very well, you have referred to Magomotsi Mogodeli and the photo's that were taken and you say that the total operation was completed within approximately 10 minutes?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What happened the next day?

MR COETZEE: Early the morning of Sunday, 14 December 1986, we left Swaziland in a convoy close to the Oshoek border post illegally and before sunrise, reported to Brig Schoon and Gen Ignatius Coetzee at Oshoek border post.

MR VISSER: Did they stay there as far as you know?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson. The weapons which we received from Col de Kock, we returned these weapons after we were back on the RSA side and before I went to Oshoek, I returned SWT180 to Sgt Mkhonza so that they could proceed ahead.

MR VISSER: Was SWT180's vehicle left in Swaziland that vehicle?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Where exactly did you leave it?

MR COETZEE: I cannot recall exactly, but I think we hid it in a place close to the hotel where the public had access to. The found weapons and arms were shown to Brig Schoon and Gen Ignatius Coetzee, Pretorius and I immediately thereafter returned to Soweto. According to media reports, the Swaziland police only became aware of the attack three days after it had taken place. I confirm that Col de Kock proposed to me that evening to kill SWT180, I refused and said that I will be able to handle SWT180.

MR VISSER: Was Col de Kock concerned about the reliability and trustworthiness of SWT180?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson. Col de Kock also wanted to attack another house which was shown by SWT180, because MK Ben would possibly be there at that house, because he and the others were left there late that evening by SWT180 and I was of the opinion that this was too much risk and we were not certain as to whose house it was or who would all be present, and this fell outside our mandate.

MR VISSER: I see there are some diverse problems with this paragraph, what was the situation with MK Ben? Where did SWT180 drop him off?

MR COETZEE: According to my knowledge Chairperson, that particular evening, he was at the house, at the safehouse where we launched the operation. He was dropped there that evening.

MR VISSER: And this other house, what is this that you refer to?

MR COETZEE: This is the residence where MK Ben was present from time to time Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And was there a suspicion that he later that night went there?

MR COETZEE: Yes, because after the operation, he was not present at the house.

ADV DE JAGER: I beg your pardon Mr Visser, the phrase "because he and the others were dropped of there late that night by SWT180, has to be deleted."

MR VISSER: As it pleases you Chairperson, this is totally confusing. It has to be omitted from this paragraph, because MK Ben was left with Pantsu at the safehouse and because he was not present there later, it was accepted that he went to his own residence which was another house, which was apparently pointed out by SWT180. We apologise for that. Please continue.

MR COETZEE: I need to point out further that SWT180 after this operation, had worked for myself and Col Pretorius for quite some time, because of the mentioned operation, we deemed it safer to withdraw him from Swaziland and to apply him in Botswana and here SWT180 once again infiltrated underground MK structures. SWT180 did exemplary work in Botswana in exposing the MK underground structures there and providing information about MK's planned acts of terror. Because of unforeseen circumstances SWT180 was exposed as an informer during an undercover operation in Botswana, he was abducted and taken to Botswana where he was detained by the so-called Mboko of DIS in the notorious Quattro Camp and was tortured as well. SWT180 was one of a number of 32 persons which were released from Quattro and after his release he told me because of his torture, he was obliged to expose the operation in Swaziland to the ANC. He also told me that during his detention in Quattro Camp, he was an eyewitness to various gross human rights violations. The Moshinyani Commission into the activities of Quattro in 1992, 1993 has to be read along with this.

MR VISSER: Would you please tell us what your objectives were and what the circumstances were with this operation? If you would proceed with paragraph 75?

MR COETZEE: This is to provide the background to the Committee. At that stage, beginning with paragraph 75, very well. These actions took place within a war situation where the rules of normal warfare were not applicable. My action was aimed against the supporters of a liberation movement who were the enemy of the government and who managed the revolutionary onslaught from Swaziland amongst others, innocent citizens were killed or maimed and much damage was done to property. In the light of the pressure that was placed upon us in the Security Branch by the political leaders of the time, and the speeches in which it was pointed to the wiping out of terrorists, I apparently - where it was pointed to the wiping out of terrorists, I truly believed that such actions of mine were expected and that my actions fell within the ambit of my expressed or tacit authorisation. My part and involvement in this incident was aimed at combatting the revolutionary onslaught and it was aimed at the protection and maintenance of the previous government and State dispensation and to prevent the land falling into chaos and anarchy. For motivation of my participation in this action, I mention that continually I acted in the execution of my duties in the service of the South African Police and in execution of instructions which I received from senior officers.

MR VISSER: In this particular instance, who would you say approved this operation?

MR COETZEE: It was Head Office Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Please continue.

MR COETZEE: I believe that what I had done, was expected of me as a policeman and that I acted in the execution of my duties as a policeman and that my actions fell within my explicit or tacit authorisation. I request humbly that amnesty be granted to me for any offence or delict committed by me before, during and after this incident in regard to the incident which took place at Mmbabane, Swaziland on or approximately during the 13th to 14th of December 1986, which will include attempted murder of one Glory Sidibe, MK September, conspiracy to murder and the murder of one Pantsu Smith, MK Pantsu, Sipho Dlamini, MK Sipho and Buzi Majola, MK Buzi, transgression of applicable border control regulations or legislature, any illegal act or omission in regard to the possession and use of firearms and ammunition, defeating the ends of justice and or any offence or delict which might emanate from the evidence.

MR VISSER: This Buzi Majola, was this a man or a woman?

MR COETZEE: According to my knowledge Chairperson, it was a woman.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, that is the evidence which we wish to present.

CHAIRPERSON: In the light of the discussion last week, are you still asking for amnesty for the murder?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, we - with reference to our submissions which seem to have found favour Chairperson, we don't. We ask for amnesty for any offence or delict committed in this incident Chairperson, and which is supported by the evidence, with respect. As far as the murder is concerned Mr Chairman, that is included because of the issue of delicts, Mr Chairman, which we know, which we spoke about last week during argument.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, that comes under (f)?

MR VISSER: Yes Chairperson, may it please you Mr Chairman.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, Hattingh on record. Mr Coetzee, singular aspects which need to be cleared up with you. As was the case in the incident which we heard last week, did your division once again gather the Intelligence which led to the operation, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And as it would seem from your submission, you had comprehensive Intelligence with regard to this person who was involved with the struggle of the past?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And then you say just to clarify Mr de Kock's position, you say there was a meeting during which you and if I speak of you, I do not refer to only you, but during which the Intelligence which you had available, you submitted to the persons present there?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And all agreed that it was necessary that action should be taken against these persons?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And on that occasion, you said Brig Schoon appointed Mr de Kock as the Operational Commander?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And once again, here we have the situation where Security Branches collects Intelligence and Vlakplaas is then brought in to act as the operational arm?

MR COETZEE: That is how I see it Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. And then you also say in paragraph 35 of your submission, you say -

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: That information that the operation had been approved, was this also conveyed to Col de Kock?

MR COETZEE: I suppose so Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: So according to you, you had instructions from Head Office to continue with the operation?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson, via my immediate Commander, Col de Jager.

MR HATTINGH: But you understood that the instruction came from Head Office?

MR COETZEE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And it was also clear what the operation would entail, namely the elimination of persons in Swaziland?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: At the conclusion of this operation, I don't think you were involved, you did not go to Gen Coetzee's house after the operation?

MR COETZEE: No Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And a few singular aspects where Col de Kock differs from you in certain instances, I am not saying that it might be relevant detail, but just for in case it might be a point of dispute. Can you recall that he, that the plan was that the door of the house would be opened with the help of a heavy hammer?

MR COETZEE: That is possible Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And at a later stage when you approached the house on foot, he decided that SWT180 would knock on the door and pretend that his car had broken down?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You drove with the vehicles to approximately 500 metres from the house and parked the vehicles there and then continued on foot?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And can you recall that there where you parked the vehicles, that Mr de Kock climbed into the vehicle in which SWT180 was and I suppose you were also in the same vehicle?

MR COETZEE: That is possible Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And then he would say, I don't know if you observed it, but he would say that he could see that SWT180 seemed to him as if he was under the influence of some or other substance and he said that he smelt marijuana in the vehicle?

MR COETZEE: The observation of the Colonel, I cannot comment on that, but I did not observe it at that stage. It is possible Chairperson, that he may have taken a drink. I believe that he may have taken a drink.

MR HATTINGH: He and the three persons who were killed in the house, moved around that night and only arrived later that evening, later than you expected them?

MR COETZEE: That is so Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did SWT180 at that stage, not propose that you postpone the operation to another date?

MR COETZEE: I cannot recall Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: But that is Mr de Kock's recollection and then he then took out his firearm and pointed it at SWT180 and said that you will accompany us to this house, otherwise I will kill you right here and now, can you recall that?

MR COETZEE: No, I cannot Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And afterwards you walked to the house where the operation had taken place?

MR COETZEE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: At an earlier stage, in the planning stage you say in your statement, Mr de Kock made some enquiries about the reliability of SWT180?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Was it clear to you as if Mr de Kock had thoughts about to his reliability?

MR COETZEE: That is possible Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And if you could not trust him, this would be a great risk to you?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson, indeed.

MR HATTINGH: You yourself say that you did not completely trust him at that stage?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And that is why it was important for him to establish whether this person could be totally trusted?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And Mr Coetzee, Mr de Kock says that he does not have any recollection after the operation, he proposed that SWT180 be eliminated. He says according to him, that was not necessary. Is it possible that you might be mistaken, that you are confusing it with something he might have said before the time?

MR COETZEE: I may confuse this aspect Mr Chairperson, but on occasion the proposal was tabled. I can however not recall the detail as to how we managed the situation afterwards, Mr Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And you can also not recall in detail as to which time this proposal was tabled?

MR COETZEE: As I have said, according to me, if the proposal was tabled, it was during and with the planning of the operation Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, we have no further questions.

MR ROSSOUW: Rossouw Mr Chairman, I have no questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PRINSLOO: Chairperson, Prinsloo. Mr Coetzee, when you refer to the September Machinery, this would be a component of the Transvaal Machinery, it was only a name appointed to September as the Commander of that Unit?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR PRINSLOO: No further questions, thank you Chairperson.

MS VAN DER WALT: Louisa van der Walt Chairperson. Only a singular aspect, you have testified about the information which you had at your disposal. If I put it to you that there was a name by the ANC, that the Christmas that would follow, large scale acts of terror were planned, which they named and I think it is called in (indistinct) as the Black Christmas?

MR COETZEE: That is possible, I recall that reference was made to such a period of time.

MS VAN DER WALT: No further questions, thank you Chairperson.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: Mr Coetzee, you say this agent informed you that, that is on page that you refer to, on page 74, I am sorry on paragraph 74, you said that this person, this agent told you that he witnessed some gross human rights violations in Quattro Camp. At what stage did he tell you?

MR COETZEE: After he was released and was back in the RSA, Chairperson.

MR SIBANYONI: Do you remember when was that?

MR COETZEE: Approximately 1992, the end of 1992, beginning of 1993 Chairperson.

MR SIBANYONI: You say he is now deceased, when did he die?

MR COETZEE: I heard Chairperson, that Col Pretorius would be able to give you that information with regard to the time period, I would say approximately nine months ago Chairperson.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Just one point I would like to clarify or amplify perhaps. You have told us that you supplied a great deal of information at the meeting?

MR COETZEE: Yes Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it correct that part of this information was confirmed by Col Deetlefs?

MR COETZEE: Yes Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: That he also had knowledge of these operations?

MR COETZEE: Yes Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Just one aspect, perhaps with your leave, in re-examination Mr Chairman. Mr Coetzee, did you also have other agents and sources who also supplied you with information with regard to the September Machinery, except for SWT180?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson, and this was also supported by Division Eastern Transvaal.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

MR SIBANYONI: Maybe just one question, Mr Coetzee. I see in some instances, a name of an agent is mentioned and in other instances, the name is not mentioned. Where do you draw the line?

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson, one is a member of the Force and one is a member of the public, Chairperson. In those cases where we refer to names, the particular member at that stage was applied covertly and later placed into the open system and that is why we identify him by his name.

MR SIBANYONI: Like the one we had last week, Finnias Moshualiba?

MR COETZEE: Yes Mr Chairperson.

MR SIBANYONI: The reason why his name is mentioned is that eventually he was placed in the employment of the ...

MR COETZEE: Into the open structures, yes correct.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Perhaps we can explain it further, if you will allow me Mr Chairperson. The situation was also the same with regard to askaris, is that not true? Askaris who, after they were applied covertly and were registered as askaris at Head Office, you would in reports refer to them by their names?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And not to members of the public who were recruited as informers?

MR COETZEE: No Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Or not after their deaths because they may have families and that might place these families in jeopardy?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson. Mr Chairman, Commissioner de Jager will recall that in the Nokuthula Simelane matter, this person Mkhonza actually came forward himself and he identified himself in the press, with statements which he made in the press at the time, so there is no need for the witness then to, under those circumstances to try to protect his identity where he, himself, made his identity known.

ADV DE JAGER: The same was the case with Williamson?

MR VISSER: Exactly the same was that, yes Mr Chairperson. Perhaps Mr Chairman, if I may be allowed to add the last aspect, Mr Finnias Moshualiba was in fact an applicant in the incident, so that was also a reason why his identity would have had to be disclosed.

MR VISSER: May Mr Coetzee be excused under the normal conditions, Chairperson, and may I then call Col Pretorius to give evidence? You will observe Mr Chairman, that much of the evidence in the statements, the amnesty statements in your Bundle, between these two witnesses are identical. We have shortened it with a mere reference, cross-reference Mr Chairman, in order to save time where we could.

ADV DE JAGER: It appeared to me as if the wrong one has been attested to when I said that it was actually with regard to Pretorius and that the two have been switched.

ON RESUMPTION:

MR VISSER: Would you rise please.

ADV DE JAGER: Your full names please?

MR PRETORIUS: Anton Pretorius, Mr Chairperson.

ANTON PRETORIUS: (sworn states)

ADV DE JAGER: Thank you.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Pretorius, you are also an applicant with this application and we can find your application in the Bundle, from page 97 to page 127. You deal with this incident from page 113 to page 126?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You have had the opportunity to study Exhibit A and you confirmed this, do you once again confirm this document Mr Pretorius?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you request that your evidence, which is embodied therein and also with reference to any other evidence in that exhibit, be incorporated with your current evidence today?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You have also previously given evidence in amnesty applications with regard to the assault of one Nokuthula Simelane, is that correct?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And that application is still pending, it has not been completed?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Would you begin on page 2 and briefly address the Committee regarding your share in the incident?

MR PRETORIUS: Paragraph 1? Very well, introduction, during 1986 I was a Lieutenant and I was attached to the Intelligence Unit of the Security Branch, Soweto. General, the then Brig Ignatius Coetzee, was then the Divisional Commander and the Head of our Unit was Col Louis de Jager. I closely cooperated with my immediate senior, Colonel, then Capt Willem Coetzee. As such I had knowledge of the information to which he has referred in his evidence before this Committee and I am able to confirm it. As such I confirm the evidence of Col Coetzee with regard to paragraph 3 to paragraph 13 of the summary of his evidence which has been submitted to the Committee, that is Exhibit C.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.

MR PRETORIUS: The facts - I have been informed that the date upon which the incident took place, was on or approximately the 13th to the 14th of December 1986. Apparently I was mistaken in my application for amnesty with the date which I stated there, namely the 14th to the 16th of December 1986. Furthermore I confirm the information contained within paragraph 15 to 35 of Col W. Coetzee's statement of evidence.

MR VISSER: Exhibit C, very well, proceed.

MR PRETORIUS: Final planning was executed by me, Lt-Col Coetzee and Col de Jager. I would enter Swaziland with Col de Jager via the Nersden border post, while Lt-Col Coetzee would ensure that SWT180 would safely enter Swaziland via Oshoek. Sgt Mkhonza would assist Lt-Col Coetzee with SWT180 in this regard. I cannot recall precisely what his role and function would have been, but refer to the evidence of Col Coetzee in this regard.

MR VISSER: You are now referring to the role and function of Sgt Mkhonza?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.

MR PRETORIUS: I must just state that a vehicle was made available by us to SWT180 which he himself would drive in Swaziland. After the operation, the vehicle would be left in Swaziland to be picked up later. On Saturday ...

MR VISSER: Please proceed somewhat slower.

MR PRETORIUS: On Saturday ...

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, the witness has just confirmed that he confirms what Mr Coetzee has stated and what he is submitting to us here, is precisely what Mr Coetzee has stated already. Is there anything new that he is going to add and if so, can we deal with that? Is it necessary for us to reiterate everything?

MR VISSER: From paragraph 7 onwards, he submits his own share in the matter and from that perspective, it is different to the evidence of Col Coetzee, with regard to his perspective.

MR PRETORIUS: I proceed with paragraph 7. On Saturday, 13th of December 1986, Col de Jager and I entered Swaziland via Nersden in the Unit's minibus. The reason why Col de Jager and I entered via Nersden border post, was in order to avoid unnecessary attention, seeing as most of the other members would move through the Oshoek border post. I had my issued service pistol with me and I took it over the border without declaring the weapon and the ammunition.

MR VISSER: Would that constitute an offence?

MR PRETORIUS: Definitely.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.

MR PRETORIUS: Late that afternoon of Saturday, 13th of December 1986, Col de Jager and I joined among others Col de Kock, Col Deetlefs, Capt Paul van Dyk, Warrant Officer Freek Pienaar and Sgt Douw Willemse at the kwaLoseni - I have mistakenly stated kwaLoseni Hotel here, but I cannot recall which one of the Holiday Inn hotels it was where we met them.

MR VISSER: Later the previous witness, Col Coetzee, joined you there, is that correct?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And do you then confirm the meeting that you had with SWT180 along with Col Coetzee?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And the information that he conveyed to you?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And was it then arranged that there would be another rendezvous with him later on that evening?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed, paragraph 10.

MR PRETORIUS: SWT180 was once again questioned regarding the precise location of the safehouse and it was put to him that he should possibly point out the house to us later on that evening. A later rendezvous point was arranged with SWT180.

MR VISSER: Now, did you and Coetzee then return to the hotel and as he has already testified, report back to those who were waiting at the hotel?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Would you proceed, paragraph 12?

MR PRETORIUS: While we were waiting for the following rendezvous with SWT180, the team at the hotel discussed the operation and among others, our withdrawal after the operation. Col de Kock stated that we should follow him to a point near Oshoek where we would take a detour which would take us through the border fence itself. General security measures were also discussed on this occasion and it was suggested that we should move around as little as possible, so as not to draw unnecessary attention.

MR VISSER: Did you also come to the conclusion that there was a possibility that other members of the Security Police were present in Swaziland and that this emanated from what was said during the discussion?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And is it correct that you and Col Coetzee later left that group at the hotel to meet SWT180?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And is it correct, according to his evidence, that you had to wait for quite some time for him to arrive?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Please proceed with paragraph 15.

MR PRETORIUS: SWT180 arrived much later and reported to us that the September Machinery members had kept him very busy, but that he had dropped them off. He also stated that MK Ben had also been in the vehicle when he drove passed us. SWT180 reported that he had dropped off the group consisting of MK Mzala, MK Pantsu and MK Sipho at the safehouse in Fountains. Furthermore he stated that he had been instructed by the September Machinery to return to the house early the following morning so that he could personally discuss operational matters with MK September. From this we deduced that MK September would possibly spend the night at the safehouse.

ADV DE JAGER: Here I would just like to know if you could clarify this, what happened to MK Ben?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, he also dropped him off at the house that night and we suspected that he must have walked from there to the second house, to which Mr Coetzee has referred in his statement.

ADV DE JAGER: But in this statement you say that he dropped only three persons off at that house? That is why I want to know whether Ben's name shouldn't be incorporated with that? "The group consisting of Mzala, Pantsu and Sipho were dropped off at the safehouse."

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is correct Chairperson, I really cannot recall precisely what SWT180 told us that evening with regard to what happened to MK Ben.

MR VISSER: Just to attempt to clarify this, who was MK Mzala?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, he was one of the Machinery members of the September Machinery.

MR VISSER: Yes, but as it later appeared, he was not there that evening.

MR PRETORIUS: He was also not there.

MR VISSER: But it was reported to you by SWT180 that he was indeed dropped off at that safehouse?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is what I recall.

MR VISSER: Very well, is that the best that you can recall regarding these persons?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Now you accepted that MK September would possibly be there and I think that it has already been stated by Col Coetzee in his evidence that you then went with SWT180 so that he could point out the safehouse in Fountains to you, is that correct?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And that a sketch plan of the house was also drawn up?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Who was the person who drew up the sketch plan with SWT180?

MR PRETORIUS: It was I personally.

MR VISSER: Did you also indicate on Exhibit B which was served before the Committee today, did you also indicate how it was supposed to be drawn up?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: Is that what the interior of the house resembled, according to your recollection?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: Then you state that after SWT180 had pointed out the safehouse to you, you returned to the hotel immediately, that is paragraph 18.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you agree that the safehouse was approximately 20 kilometres from the hotel where the other members were waiting, is that correct?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And the sketch plan was then discussed there, is that correct?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And furthermore it was discussed whether or not you would continue that very same evening or whether you should postpone the matter to the following day?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You also mentioned the same considerations in your statement, Exhibit D that Mr Coetzee mentioned in his statement for motivating why you decided to act that very same night?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And then finally, do you also agree with Col Coetzee regarding the orders and instructions which Col de Kock issued, that it had to be determined that MK Pantsu at least was in the house otherwise the operation could not continue?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed with paragraph 23 then, I beg your pardon, paragraph 24.

MR PRETORIUS: We drove from the hotel to Fountains in a convoy. As far as I can recall, there were approximately five vehicles who were all driving in a convoy, it was already late night, early morning. On the way to the house Lt-Col Coetzee and I explained the situation to SWT180 and discussed the plan of action with him. He was informed that he was to knock on the door and what he was supposed to do. It would be highly improbable that MK Pantsu would not be there, seeing as he and the others had been dropped off there late at night by SWT180, they didn't have transport and the house was situated far from the town. Approximately 500 metres from the safehouse, we stopped. All of us climbed out, upon which I received a sub-machine gun with a silencer.

MR VISSER: Yes, and you repeat the evidence of Col Coetzee?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: That these weapons were concealed in a blueish minibus which Col de Kock had apparently travelled with?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: That these weapons were concealed in a minibus?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: How were they concealed in the minibus?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, it was only after the withdrawal from Swaziland that I noticed where the false compartment was, it was above with the roof. If one climbed into the minibus, there was a false panel which was in the roofing over the driving area of the minibus. We approached the safehouse on foot. I took up position with Sgt Willemse next to one of the walls near the front door, with Col de Kock, Col Coetzee, Col de Jager and SWT180 and waited for SWT180 to knock. Col Coetzee, Deetlefs, Warrant Officer Pienaar and SWT180 would move to a side door of the house in order to secure it during the entry.

MR VISSER: What would you have done?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, there is a paragraph here which is important here, Sgt Willemse and I were instructed by Mr Coetzee to secure the bathroom in the house, that was my order.

MR VISSER: That is paragraph 21?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Is the bathroom indicated on Exhibit B, approximately according to its location?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: Please proceed with paragraph 29.

MR PRETORIUS: After SWT180 had knocked, someone spoke to him from within the house. I could hear how the key was being turned in the lock. The next moment Colonels de Kock and de Jager, followed by Capt van Dyk, entered the house and immediately opened fire. The entry of the house took place within seconds. There were no lights which were switched on within the house and we created light with torches which had been attached to our firearms with tape. Col de Kock immediately shot dead the person who had opened the door and he fell down there. It later appeared to be MK Sipho. Various shots were fired in the house during the action. Willemse and I followed shortly on their heels and we found that there was no one in the bathroom. When I turned around, I saw a figure running in the direction of the glass door, on the side of the house, where Col Willem Coetzee and the others whom I have mentioned, were.

MR VISSER: Would you pause for a moment and look at Exhibit B, under the heading "After Entry", that would be the second diagram. There you see a name at the door of the bathroom, it is your name and Willemse's name, is that your recollection of how things took place?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you stated that you then saw someone running?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: From where did you see this person run?

MR PRETORIUS: On the plan which indicates "bedroom 1", from the door of bedroom 1, this person ran in the direction of the glass door on the right side of Annexure B.

MR VISSER: Did you enter bedroom 1 yourself?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: Was anyone with you in bedroom 1 as far as you can recall?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: Who was there?

MR PRETORIUS: Mr de Kock was with me at that stage.

MR VISSER: Did you find anyone there?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: Who was it?

MR PRETORIUS: After the incident SWT180 indicated that it had been MK Pantsu who was in bedroom 1.

MR VISSER: What took place there with Pantsu?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, if I may explain. After the first person ran out of the door, I was very close to the door and I noticed that there was another person in bedroom 1, if I may refer to it as such, and at that stage, Mr de Kock was right next to me. We shot the person who was on the bed, who was getting up.

MR VISSER: Mr de Kock also states that you and he opened fire simultaneously at this person, and that he was shot dead there?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: But you deal with this is paragraph 33, is that correct?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: You state as Mr Coetzee has stated, that subsequently the three persons who had been killed there, were positively identified as Pantsu, Sipho and Buzi, is that correct?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And by the way, I don't know if you stated this, but what happened to the person who ran out of the door of bedroom 1 in the direction of the glass door, what happened to him?

MR PRETORIUS: It was the lady, Buzi, Chairperson. Where "lounge" is indicated on Exhibit B she collapsed.

MR VISSER: Do you know who shot her?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, from the corner of my eye I noticed that Col de Jager, Louis de Jager, fired shots at this person. That is what I saw.

MR VISSER: Very well. And the rest of your statement, Exhibit D consists of paragraph 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and then to an extent 42, 43, 44, 45 which is in agreement?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm that the evidence to which you have referred, is true and correct and a reflection of the true facts?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you also confirm that with regard to paragraph 46, you were acting in a situation of warfare where the rules of normal warfare were not of application, that your action was aimed against supporters of a liberation movement who were the enemy of the government and wanted to destroy the State dispensation by means of a revolutionary onslaught?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And that what you did, you regarded as part of your duties as a policeman in protection of human life and the constitutional dispensation and that you believed that what you did, you did in execution of your express or implied authorisations and duties as a policeman?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And then you request amnesty for any offence or delict committed by you during this incident which has been summarised by your evidence?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, in this regard, attempted murder of one Glory Sidibe, was there an attempt to murder this person or simply a conspiracy?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, it is a problematic question. The whole idea of the action as I have understood it with respect, regarding this meeting was that action had to be taken against Glory Sidibe and if we get to the evidence of Gen van der Merwe and Brig Schoon, you will hear from them, that the authorisation which was granted was to kill any member of Glory Sidibe's group, whoever may be found. One could argue theoretically about it in terms of when it is an attempt and when it is a conspiracy. It is clearly a conspiracy, but they went there, they had information that Glory Sidibe would possibly be there.

CHAIRPERSON: They had no information he was there?

MR PRETORIUS: We had.

MR VISSER: Well, Mr Chairman ...

CHAIRPERSON: They didn't go there with information, they thought he might be there, because he was going to be there early the next morning. That cannot possibly be an attempt, Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, that again brings us back to the argument which we had in Pietermaritzburg, with great respect Mr Chairman, once it is accepted that one cannot break up the various offences and delicts, Mr Chairman, this matter will take care of itself, with great respect. If amnesty is granted for any offence or delict with regard to this incident, Mr Chairman, then really the problem sorts itself out.

ADV DE JAGER: I just think that even though there was planning, there was never an actual attempt which was directed at that person to shoot him dead, there may have been a conspiracy?

MR VISSER: No, it is probably so. Whether the AG would later agree with this, is of course another question. We don't know. That is why we are putting it in the most general possible terms, that is why amnesty is requested in the most general possible terms, because if you are satisfied that the requirements of the Act have been met with, amnesty will be granted and while Commissioner de Jager was absent, we conducted an argument with regard to this in Pietermaritzburg, which we submitted to the Honourable Chairperson. I believe that Commissioner Sibanyoni was also present, where we discussed exactly the problems that one experiences with the respective amnesties which have been granted.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, well, I don't think that we should begin to argue this point, I have simply mentioned it and I think we can leave this for argument.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, at the end when we argue, I would briefly like to address the chief points of the argument from Pietermaritzburg, because we are very well aware that Commissioner de Jager has previously entered into a debate with us regarding the specificity of the offences and delicts and we would like to deal with that once again, very briefly in argument. I did say that that is the evidence that I wish to present, Mr Chairman. I am not sure whether you are waiting for me.

CHAIRPERSON: I was.

MR VISSER: I do apologise, Mr Chairman.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, Hattingh on record. Mr Pretorius, were you also in the vehicle in which SWT180 travelled when you were on your way to the house to execute the operation?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You have heard what I put to Mr Coetzee regarding Mr de Kock's recollection of the events in the vehicle, just before you left the vehicle, do you have an independent recollection thereof?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, I cannot recall that I was in the vehicle when Mr de Kock entered the vehicle as he put it, but what I say is that it is possible that he entered the vehicle.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, and that you were not present when the discussion took place in the vehicle?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You also mention the fact that Mr de Kock would have proposed after the operation, that SWT180 be eliminated, is it possible that this discussion may have taken place earlier, not that Mr de Kock recalls ever having made such a suggestion, but he definitely questioned the reliability of SWT180?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is correct, his reliability, but I was present when Mr de Kock said at the scene that SWT180 should be taken out.

MR HATTINGH: What was the reaction to this?

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Coetzee said no, he was not going to do it, his precise words according to my recollection were "we will be able to handle 180".

MR HATTINGH: You say that this was at the scene immediately after the incident?

MR PRETORIUS: During and after the time. I cannot recall the precise period, I wouldn't want to say that it was during the penetration aspect of the operation, it was shortly after the penetration.

MR HATTINGH: And if Mr de Kock had made the suggestion which he cannot recall, no execution was ever given to it?

MR PRETORIUS: No, it was not.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Chairperson, nothing further.

MR ROSSOUW: Rossouw, Mr Chairman, I have no questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PRINSLOO: Chairperson, Prinsloo on record. Mr Pretorius, you refer in paragraph 8 of your statement to the kwaLoseni hotel?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR PRINSLOO: According to my clients, Mr Deetlefs and Mr Pienaar, this hotel was known to them as the Royal Swazi?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, I would concede to that.

MR PRINSLOO: Thank you Chairperson, nothing further.

MS VAN DER WALT: No questions, thank you Chairperson.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: I've got no questions Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: No questions, thank you.

MR VISSER: May the witness then be excused Chairperson, and may I call the next witness, Col de Jager, his statement is Exhibit E.

ON RESUMPTION:

MR SIBANYONI: Your full names please?

MR DE JAGER: Lodewyk de Jager, Mr Chairperson.

LODEWYK DE JAGER: (sworn states)

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, please be seated. Sworn in Chairperson.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Col de Jager, you are an applicant in the current matter, is that correct?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And your application appears in the Bundle, from pages 40 to 60, where you deal with the particular incident on page 49 to 59, is that correct?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm the contents of that statement subject to the submission that you will make to the Committee now?

MR DE JAGER: Yes, I do Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You have also studied the "General Background to Amnesty", Exhibit A, do you agree with that and do you request that that information and evidence be incorporated into your evidence?

MR DE JAGER: I do so Chairperson.

MR VISSER: During 1986, December, you were attached to the Security Branch at Soweto, is that correct?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you were attached to the Intelligence Division?

MR DE JAGER: I was the Overhead Commander.

MR VISSER: You were the Divisional Commander, you were saying the Divisional Commander was Ignatius Coetzee?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And the previous two applicants, Pretorius and Coetzee, were they directly under your command?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You have heard the evidence of Colonels Coetzee and Pretorius, with regard to the information as to the Intelligence which the members of Soweto had at their disposal and the meeting that was held in Middelburg, Transvaal, is that correct?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm the correctness of the evidence as far as you recall, as to what the two gentlemen testified here this morning?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And in paragraph 5 you have given the names of the persons as far as you can recall, who were present during that meeting, is that correct?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Is it correct that what was discussed there at that meeting, was the severe increase of explosions and political violence in the country and specifically in the Transvaal?

MR DE JAGER: Indeed Chairperson.

MR VISSER: The informer or the agent SWT180 was known to you?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And because of information which Pretorius and Coetzee supplied, especially with regard to MK's activities in Swaziland?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you were also familiar with the activities of a group of MK members in Swaziland, who grouped themselves under the name MK September?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And in paragraph 10, according to your knowledge, you have set out who the members were according to information which you had at your disposal, is that correct?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And the information to which was testified by the previous two applicants, Coetzee and Pretorius, according to an answer of Col Coetzee on a question by the Honourable Chairperson, as to the members who were present during this meeting?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What was the feeling at the meeting, Colonel, when all this information was tabled with regard to the violence in the Transvaal, what was the decision that was taken? How did they feel about this action and so forth?

MR DE JAGER: We agreed that we would launch a preemptive strike and that the persons involved had to be eliminated.

MR VISSER: Yes, and in your application, you have also said that the government would firstly ask for clarity before an action would be launched, is that correct?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct, and indeed I meant the Security Head Office and not the government.

MR VISSER: At paragraph 17, would you please proceed from there and tell the Committee what your recollection was with regard to the run up to this incident?

MR DE JAGER: I accompanied Gen Ig Coetzee to Head Office where we held a meeting, where briefly the whole matter was discussed and Gen van der Merwe gave approval that members of Soweto in cooperation with Col de Kock's team would launch the operation as soon as possible, in order to prevent any further loss of life and acts of terror.

MR VISSER: Colonel, what was the position of Gen van der Merwe at that stage?

MR DE JAGER: Gen van der Merwe was the Head of Security.

MR VISSER: Against whom would this action be launched?

MR DE JAGER: It would be against the September Machinery under the command of Glory Sidibe and any other members who were present.

MR VISSER: So whoever you found there, who according to you were members of this cell, would be the target of this action?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: The decision or the authorisation of Gen van der Merwe, you deal with that in paragraph 19. Will you please tell the Committee, was it something that was decided upon quickly or was it discussed over a period of time, what is the situation?

MR DE JAGER: With respect, it was not a decision that was taken lightly. We submitted it in detail to Gen van der Merwe and there was a discussion with regard to the whole incident, but I am not able to say as to how long it took for the decision to be made, but it was not something that was made lightly.

MR VISSER: Was it then decided that immediately the following day, the action would be launched?

MR DE JAGER: Yes Chairperson, we decided to act as soon as possible.

MR VISSER: Would you then submit to the Committee what you recall?

MR DE JAGER: Gen Coetzee, Ig Coetzee and I returned to Soweto where we conveyed the news that the operation was approved to Col Coetzee and Pretorius and told them to arrange to go along with SWT180 to Swaziland. The arrangement was that all of us would participate in the operation, and we would convene on the Saturday, the 13th of December 1986 at one of the two Holiday Inns in Mmbabane. Col Pretorius and I entered Swaziland via Nersden border post with false passports. Col Coetzee would go into Swaziland via Oshoek on his own, because he would have to manage SWT180 from Oshoek border post. In order to eliminate any suspicion, SWT180 moved on his own in a vehicle.

MR VISSER: As Col Coetzee had testified this morning, you during the course of the day, arrived at this Holiday Inn and met with the other members amongst others, Col de Kock, Capt Paul van Dyk and Deetlefs and Pine Pienaar from the Eastern Transvaal and Sgt Douw Willemse was also there, is that correct and there you discussed the matter and is it also correct that from there, Colonels Coetzee and Pretorius on two occasions, went for meetings with SWT180, is that correct?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And they returned to you to report to you with regard to the status quo, is that correct?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you agree with the evidence that you have heard here of Col Coetzee as to what was reported to you and that you discussed it that day in the hotel there?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And eventually the decision was taken to act the very same evening, rather than waiting for the following day for reasons as put forward by Col Coetzee?

MR DE JAGER: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And at some stage you then moved from the hotel room to the safehouse, is that correct?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And at this stage, a sketch plan was drawn up. Would this concur with what you have before you, Exhibit B?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: According to your recollection, this was basically the layout as it appeared on Exhibit B, the layout of the house?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you concur with the evidence that Col de Kock gave instructions that the action would be launched only if it was determined that at least MK Pantsu would be present in the house, so that they would have the surety that members of MK September Machinery were present in the house before they acted?

MR DE JAGER: That is so Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Who was in command in Swaziland during this operation?

MR DE JAGER: Col de Kock was the Operational Commander, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Were you senior to him?

MR DE JAGER: I am not certain where we were on the list of seniority, Chairperson, but I would assume that we had the same rank.

MR VISSER: However that may be, he was the Operational Commander and as such you served under his command during the operation?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You are saying on page 5, on paragraph 33 of Exhibit E that the operational planning was done by Col de Kock and you mention the conditions of the action there. Would you please proceed to paragraph 34 and submit to the Committee what your role was?

MR DE JAGER: The members were deployed, using the sketch plan of the house. Capt van Dyk and I had to secure one of the bedrooms.

MR VISSER: Which bedroom was this?

MR DE JAGER: That would be "bedroom 1" on the sketch, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you concur with the first sketch of Exhibit B while SWT180 knocked on the door, you would be more or less where you are indicated here?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And after the door had opened, you immediately went into the room, directly behind Col de Kock. Did you see whether Col de Kock did anything?

MR DE JAGER: He shot the person who opened the door.

MR VISSER: And later it seemed that that was Sipho?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And from there, where did you move to?

MR DE JAGER: I stormed into bedroom 1, along with Capt van Dyk and in the doorway I observed a figure, and I fired on the person.

MR VISSER: What was the person doing?

MR DE JAGER: The person was standing upright and tried to run passed us into the lounge. I fired on this person, I am not certain whether Capt van Dyk also fired a shot, but the person ran passed us and where the word is "Buzi" in the lounge, the person fell down.

MR VISSER: This was a female person?

MR DE JAGER: This is what we determined later.

MR VISSER: Can you recall how many shots you fired?

MR DE JAGER: I cannot recall Chairperson, it was several shots.

MR VISSER: But is it possible that you could have hit the person and killed the person?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And now you are saying that several shots were fired in the house, in paragraph 37 of page 6 of Exhibit E and you say that SWT180 identified the persons as MK Pantsu, MK Sipho and MK Buzi directly after the shooting incident as it is also indicated in Exhibit B?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And all three of them were members of the September Machinery according to your knowledge?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And the specific conduct of yourself, you put this forward in paragraph 38, in paragraph 39 you refer to ANC/SACP propaganda material which was found, is that correct?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And certain weapons, what happened to the material and the weapons?

MR DE JAGER: With the assistance of the present members, it was loaded into the minibus and I drove it out of Swaziland.

MR VISSER: Very well. In paragraph 41 you say that you also heard that evening that there was a proposal that SWT180 be eliminated?

MR DE JAGER: I would imagine something like that Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Can you recall who made that proposal?

MR DE JAGER: I would want to believe that it was Col de Kock.

MR VISSER: There was apparently a problem whether the person SWT180 could be trusted, was that also your impression?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Will you proceed with paragraph 43?

MR DE JAGER: Early the Saturday morning, 14 December 1986, we left Swaziland, close to the Oshoek border post in a convoy illegally, afterwards we reported to Brig Schoon and Gen Ig Coetzee, where they waited for us at Oshoek border post. After we reported, I was told by Brig Schoon to follow Col de Kock to the house of the Commissioner of the SAP, Gen Coetzee, next to Brooklyn police station in Pretoria. I drove the minibus with the items in there. Brig Schoon briefly reported to Gen Coetzee that we had launched an action against terrorists and that three of them had been killed, and that we had confiscated weapons and propaganda material. Gen Coetzee was very much interested in the propaganda material and he congratulated us with our successful operation.

MR VISSER: Can you recall at which time, at what point in the day did you arrive at Col Coetzee's house?

MR DE JAGER: If I recall correctly, it was in the vicinity of breakfast, it was Sunday morning. It may have been nine o'clock Chairperson, it may have been later.

MR VISSER: I apologise Mr Chairman. Please proceed.

MR DE JAGER: On a later occasion, I was present at a function at Vlakplaas where we and other colleagues of the Security Branch were thanked on behalf of the government by Min Adriaan Vlok, then the Minmster of Law and Order.

MR VISSER: The reason why you mention this in paragraph 55, that this action was indeed in 1986 in December, is that not so, and we have already heard evidence from Min Vlok about - and coincidentally the three members who sit now on the panel, were involved in the London bomb incident and the Khotso and COSATU House incident, that Min Vlok had indeed twice visited Vlakplaas, once on occasion when computers were confiscated during the Operation Vula incident and the other occasion was in 1989, at a year end function, and the point being, I would just like to assist you if you thought that Min Vlok referred to this particular incident, it would seem that you are mistaken, would you accept that?

MR DE JAGER: I would accept that.

MR VISSER: In any case, that was your viewpoint that politicians and or senior officers were aware of actions which were launched in a similar manner and as for example, this operation and that it carried their approval?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You have repeated the same political motivations, do you confirm what you say in your application with regard to the political objective as well as Exhibit E and do you request that the Committee considers this when considering your action during this incident?

MR DE JAGER: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And then you request amnesty for any offence or delict committed by you in this incident, on the mentioned date at Swaziland as it may seem from the evidence?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, Hattingh on record. Mr de Jager, I observe that you mention that you crossed the border with the assistance of fraudulent passports, is that correct?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: We have already heard that such passports were issued to members of Vlakplaas, were these also issued to other members of the Security Branch, specifically members who managed sources and informants across the border and this was officially issued to you, with the approval of the seniors?

MR DE JAGER: The passports were received from Head Office, I would accept that they had knowledge.

MR HATTINGH: In paragraph 18 of your statement, may I just refer you to that, where you mention the meeting along with Gen van der Merwe and you say there it was possible that Mr de Kock was present, do you not have a clear recollection whether he was?

MR DE JAGER: No Chairperson. He was there in all probability if we keep in mind that he was the Operational Commander and that he would lead the operation, I would not have a problem if he says that he was not present.

MR HATTINGH: That is his problem, he cannot recall whether he was there or not. You do not have a recollection?

MR DE JAGER: No.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. And then finally with regard to reporting back to Gen Coetzee, after the operation, did you also report to him that this operation was carried out in Swaziland?

MR DE JAGER: The speaker of our group was Brig Schoon. I did not report myself.

MR HATTINGH: But the persons who reported to him, was it reported to him that the operation had taken place in Swaziland, was he aware of that?

MR DE JAGER: I cannot say that the word "Swaziland" was used, but I see no reason as to why it was not used.

MR HATTINGH: That is correct and if he had asked where the operation had taken place, then there was no reason as to why you would not tell him the truth?

MR DE JAGER: No, because it was an operation sanctioned by Head Office.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, we have no further questions.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Chairperson, Rossouw, I've got no questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PRINSLOO: Prinsloo, Chairperson, Mr de Jager, the two applicants whom I represent, Pienaar and Deetlefs will testify that they were also present when report was made to Gen Coetzee by Brig Schoon, do you confirm that?

MR DE JAGER: I will not dispute that, it is very possible.

MR PRINSLOO: Thank you Chairperson.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS VAN DER WALT: Thank you Chairperson. Exhibit B, the sketch plan which was handed up on your behalf, you have testified that you went to bedroom 1 after you entered the house?

MR DE JAGER: Yes, my name has to be ...

MS VAN DER WALT: I see your name is mentioned at the door, because Mr van Dyk confirms your evidence that you were undoubtedly along with him in the room. Thank you Mr Chairperson.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: I notice that Buzi's MK name is reflected as Buzi, does it mean that Buzi was her actual name?

MR DE JAGER: The MK name is normally the pseudonym which an operator would use in order to disguise his or her real identity Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: But would you say then that the name Buzi Majola refers to her actual name?

MR DE JAGER: That could be so that the person might then in fact have been using the same as the MK name, I did not do the actual identification per se myself before or after the operation, so that might possibly be so.

MR SIBANYONI: Usually an MK name would be a name totally different from the actual name, so as not to give any clue for example if the actual name is Sipho Dlamini, his MK name will not be Sipho. Do you agree with me?

MR DE JAGER: You said usually, yes, Mr Chairman, but there might be the exception too. I really cannot seriously comment on that, I apologise.

MR SIBANYONI: In fact what I am trying to find out, were all these people MK people including this woman?

MR DE JAGER: If I might just elaborate on that with the permission of the Chairman, in my position as the Commander of the Intelligence Unit, I had access to all reports and I followed this whole let's call it investigation from day one, when SWT180 initially made contact with the group, and in all those reports, this person came through as a possible trainer, a probable trainer and also a person who might have given instructions. What I would like to stress to the Committee is that I was sure the day that we went in there, that this person would not be an innocent, sir.

MR SIBANYONI: I was just trying to find out, clear up, whether was it not merely a girlfriend to Pantsu, because according to the sketch here, she was in the same room as Pantsu?

MR DE JAGER: Yes, but there were only two bedrooms. I really cannot comment on that Mr Chairman, I apologise.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you.

ADV DE JAGER: In paragraph 14 you refer that you believed that it would be cleared with the government, were you always under that impression or at any stage, were you under the impression that this type of operation, had received government approval?

MR DE JAGER: If you would allow me to put it in broader terms, before this operation, there was the operation in Botswana where 12 persons were killed, where the government acknowledged the operation and it was on TV and before that there was the Matola operation, and in my position I met with senior people and I had no doubt whatsoever that this operation had the approval of the government of the day, no doubt whatsoever.

ADV DE JAGER: Thank you. I think reference was made to a Black Christmas, was this during this year that the plan was that there would be a Black Christmas?

MR DE JAGER: I can recall that there was a planned Black Christmas, I cannot say whether this would have been this year, but I will not be able to dispute it.

ADV DE JAGER: I know Mr Pik Botha also referred to it in his submission that he made and questions that he asked?

MR DE JAGER: That is probably so, because such names were given to these operations.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR DE JAGER: Thank you sir.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, this witness comes from Cape Town, I think, and we were wondering whether it would be possible perhaps for him to be excused, Mr Chairman. He is also one of those exceptionals that still works, Mr Chairman. His evidence is covered by the evidence ...

CHAIRPERSON: I cannot see anything that he is a single witness on?

MR VISSER: No. His evidence seems to be covered by the evidence of ...

CHAIRPERSON: It seems to me also, subject to what you gentlemen have to say, that in this type of hearing, the same as last week, if there is any point you wish to raise, it could perhaps be done by fax and affidavits, rather than recall a witness?

MR VISSER: Yes. Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, you are excused.

MR DE JAGER: Thank you sir.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And it seems that we have gone three minutes passed your time of lunch, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: We will now adjourn until two o'clock.

ON RESUMPTION:

MR VISSER: If I may proceed, I beg leave to call Gen Ignatius Coetzee, to give evidence.

MR SIBANYONI: Mr Coetzee, your full names please?

MR COETZEE: Ignatius Coetzee.

IGNATIUS COETZEE: (sworn states)

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, you may be seated. Sworn in Chairperson.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, you are also an applicant in this matter, and you have completed a proper application, which was submitted before the cut off date to the TRC, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Your application can be found in the Bundle, from page 11 to 20 and you deal with this incident from page 12 to 14, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Have you studied Exhibit A and do you agree with the content thereof and do you also request that Exhibit A be incorporated with your evidence and be regarded as read in, when your amnesty application is considered?

MR COETZEE: Yes, I confirm this.

MR VISSER: Do you also confirm your formal application which we have briefly referred to, subject to the evidence that you will deliver before the Committee here today?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You have compiled a statement which has been submitted as Exhibit F in which you provide further details regarding your knowledge and participation in this incident, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And do you also then request that the statement which is Exhibit F be regarded as portion of your evidence?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: General, in 1986 you were the Divisional Commander of the Security Branch, Soweto, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Do you agree with the other officers who have already testified here and their positions below you in the Intelligence Unit of the Security Branch in Soweto, about which they testified here?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: In your initial statement for amnesty you stated that the events surrounding this incident are vague in your recollection, but that you recall that you were called to the Security Head Office where you attended a meeting on a certain day?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Before we proceed, I would just like to ask you whether you as Divisional Commander, had knowledge regarding information which had been obtained regarding security matters by the Intelligence Division of the Soweto Branch?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And did you possess information and knowledge regarding the activities of the members of the MK cell named September Machinery in Swaziland?

MR COETZEE: Yes, I did.

MR VISSER: Were you informed at that stage regarding a meeting which took place in Middelburg in the Transvaal where the security situation and the activities of the Transvaal Machinery, the September Machinery in Swaziland, was discussed and was any report made to you regarding what was discussed and decided during the meeting?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Who reported this to you?

MR COETZEE: It would have been Col de Jager.

MR VISSER: If we could get to this meeting which took place in Pretoria, can you recall the date?

MR COETZEE: It was on a Friday.

MR VISSER: Who was involved in the meeting? Perhaps you can just refer to paragraph 4, just to expedite matters?

MR COETZEE: I shall do so, paragraph 4. Do you want me to read the names?

MR VISSER: Just read the paragraph.

MR COETZEE: Gen Johan van der Merwe, Brig Schoon, Col de Kock, Col de Jager and me.

MR VISSER: You have heard that Col de Kock cannot recall whether he was present during this meeting, what is your recollection, do you have a clear recollection of his presence there or is your recollection regarding this matter, also vague?

MR COETZEE: No, he was definitely there.

MR VISSER: You can recall that Col de Kock was present during the meeting?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: What took place during this meeting?

MR COETZEE: I refer to paragraph 5, the necessity and advisability and practical viability of the action was discussed. The urgency of the proposed action against the particular group, was also discussed. Viewed in the light of their probable share in the tremendous spate of political unrest and violence which was at the order of the day during that period of time in the Transvaal.

MR VISSER: Proceed.

MR COETZEE: According to reliable information, the group consisted of the following persons - Glory Sidibe, MK September who was the Commander, MK Mzala, MK Pantsu, MK Sipho, MK Buzi and MK Ben.

MR VISSER: Did you know any of these persons by any other name?

MR COETZEE: No, not at all.

MR VISSER: And then at the end of the discussions, at paragraph 7?

MR COETZEE: I read further, at the end of the discussions, Gen van der Merwe expressed his approval for the action to continue. It would involve the elimination of Glory Sidibe and as many of the other members of the September Machinery as possible, if they could be obtained. Col de Kock would be the Operational Commander for the operation.

MR VISSER: After the meeting, there was a discussion between you and Brig Schoon?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And arrangements were made and the following day, you went to the Oshoek border post?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And did you spend the Saturday night into Sunday morning, at the Oshoek border post?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And where, in what building at the Oshoek border post did you spend the night?

MR COETZEE: I would imagine that it was a guest house.

MR VISSER: Who spent the night there with you on that Saturday?

MR COETZEE: Brig Schoon, Col van Wyngaard and myself.

MR VISSER: How did Col van Wyngaard become involved in the matter?

MR COETZEE: I was new in the Transvaal, I did not know the way and on the Friday after my return from Pretoria, I instructed or requested him to accompany me to Oshoek the following day.

MR VISSER: On the way to Oshoek, did you inform him about the proposed action?

MR COETZEE: Yes, I did.

MR VISSER: And did he associate himself with that?

MR COETZEE: Correct.

MR VISSER: Can you recall whether Brig Schalk Visser spent the night there at Oshoek, what is your recollection?

MR COETZEE: I cannot place him in my recollection of having been there with me, but according to logic and the course of events, it would have been highly improbable if he had not been there with us.

MR VISSER: So you would accept if he says that he was there?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And the following morning, in paragraph 12, you state - who reported to you?

MR COETZEE: Col de Jager who was accompanied by a group of members. I can recall Col de Kock, but I cannot recall the other members by name.

MR VISSER: Then continue with paragraph 13 regarding what they reported.

MR COETZEE: I can no longer recall the precise particulars of what they reported, but the overall core of it was that MK September, or Glory Sidibe was not at the safehouse itself and that three other terrorists who were present in the house during the action, had died at that particular premises. I also recall that a number of propaganda documents or literature and weapons among others, limpet mines, which had been found at the relevant premises and taken into possession, were shown to us.

MR VISSER: After you received the report, did you go anywhere?

MR COETZEE: Shortly thereafter, we departed upon the request of Brig Schoon. We went to Pretoria to the home of Commissioner Johan Coetzee.

MR VISSER: And what happened there at his residence?

MR COETZEE: I read from paragraph 15 - at Gen Coetzee's residence in Pretoria, Brig Schoon instructed me and Col van Wyngaard to wait with our vehicle. Brig Schoon accompanied by a number of other members, among others as I recall correctly Col de Jager and Col de Kock, entered Gen Coetzee's residence thereafter. Shortly afterwards, all the aforementioned members re-emerged from the residence after which Brig Schoon told me that we could go.

MR VISSER: You have heard the evidence this morning of Messrs Coetzee, Pretorius and de Jager, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Is there anything regarding their evidence that you do not concur with?

MR COETZEE: No, not at all.

MR VISSER: And at all times you were aware that the plan was to eliminate MK September and as many members of her Unit as possible?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Did you associate yourself with this action?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR VISSER: And what was the reason why you went to Oshoek?

MR COETZEE: It was primarily to offer moral support to the members and to address any problems that may have occurred. Brig Schoon and I would have addressed such problems.

MR VISSER: After the operation, you did not report it as an offence, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR VISSER: And do you agree or do you confirm what you state in paragraphs 21 to 24 with regard to the circumstances of the time and your political motivation for your participation in this action?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You then request amnesty with regard to (a) as Commissioner de Jager has correctly indicated, perhaps it would be more relevant to say that it was conspiracy to murder Glory Sidibe and conspiracy to murder Pantsu Smith, Sipho Dlamini and Buzi Majola. Did you cross the border?

MR COETZEE: No.

MR VISSER: So (c) is not applicable? (d) you did not participate in the action itself, so (d) is also not of application to you, however, you are applicable for defeating the ends of justice and or any other offence or delict which may emanate from the evidence?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: Just by the way, the heading of this application ...

MR VISSER: It is in line with the argument that we submitted to the Amnesty Committee the week before last.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, Hattingh on record, I have no questions for this witness, thank you Mr Chairman.

MR ROSSOUW: I also don't have any questions, Mr Chairman.

MR PRINSLOO: Prinsloo Chairperson, no questions.

MS VAN DER WALT: No questions, thank you Chairperson.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions Mr Chairman, thank you.

MR SIBANYONI: I've got no questions Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: There being no questions, this witness is released on the usual terms.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry not witness, applicant.

ON RESUMPTION:

MR VISSER: May I then beg leave to call Brig Schoon to give evidence.

ADV DE JAGER: Your full names please?

MR SCHOON: Willem Frederick Schoon.

WILLEM FREDERICK SCHOON: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Schoon, on diverse occasions you have testified before the Amnesty Committee, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And the cases regarding which you testified have been stipulated in Exhibit G under paragraph 1 thereof?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Your application can be found in the Bundle from page 128 to 141 and particularly from page 137 onwards, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm the content of your amnesty application as well as the content of Exhibit A which you have already confirmed on previous occasions as well as the content of Exhibit G which has been served to the Committee and do you request that that evidence be incorporated into your evidence here today?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Now in 1986, you were as we know from other evidence, the Head of C-Section at Security Head Office?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And as such you were also the Head of Vlakplaas which was C1 as it was known?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And Col de Kock served under your command?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Now, this morning we have heard in light of the evidence which was given by particularly Col Coetzee but also that of Colonels Pretorius and de Jager, that a meeting took place in Middelburg, Transvaal, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you agree that during this meeting, the tremendous spate of terrorism and violence which at that stage was at the order of the day, was discussed in order to determine whether any actions could be launched in order to combat this?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Is it correct that you requested Col de Kock to attend the meeting?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I did.

MR VISSER: And is it also correct that it was your objective for an operation to be launched?

MR SCHOON: Yes, all indications were that this would have to take place.

MR VISSER: From page 3, paragraph 7, could you submit to the Committee?

MR SCHOON: I also arranged that members of the Intelligence Unit from the Security Branch, Soweto, would be present due to the fact that it was known to me that they had already achieved a high level of success by means of informers and agents in penetrating the MK structures in Swaziland.

MR VISSER: During this meeting in Middelburg, Mr Coetzee and Pretorius also tabled information which was information with regard to actions and activities of MK among others, MK Transvaal Machinery and then particularly September Machinery, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you agree that the information which they have submitted to the Committee this morning, as you can recall, is the same information which was conveyed to you during the meeting?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Is it also correct that you received information from the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch which connected with the information conveyed by Coetzee?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And we have also heard this morning that during this meeting, you stated that if there were to be an action, if it was approved by Head Office, Col de Kock would be appointed as the Operational Commander of such an operation? Is that correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Then could you proceed from paragraph 12?

MR SCHOON: As a result of discussions between me and Gen van der Merwe, a meeting was arranged and held on the Friday before the action at Security Head Office in the office of Gen van der Merwe. If my memory serves me correctly, the following persons were present upon my request during the meeting - Col de Jager, Col de Kock, Brig Visser and Brig Ig Coetzee, who is now Gen Coetzee. The necessity, advisability, practical viability of the action was consistently discussed, the urgency of the proposed action against the particular group, was also discuwsed, viewed in the light of the information regarding their probable share in the tremendous spate of political unrest and violence which at that stage, was the order of the day in the Transvaal.

MR VISSER: Yes, and you have given the names there, we know who they are, it was Glory Sidibe, MK Mzala, MK Pantsu, MK Sipho, MK Buzi and MK Ben, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: And at the end of the discussions, you state in paragraph 16 ...

MR SCHOON: At the end of the discussions, Gen van der Merwe expressed his approval that the operation could continue. I would involve the elimination of Glory Sidibe and as many possible of the other members of the September Machinery as could be obtained.

MR VISSER: And did you convey these instructions to Col de Kock?

MR SCHOON: As far as my memory serves me, Col de Kock was present during those discussions where the order was given and consequently it was not necessary for me to convey the order to him as such.

MR VISSER: But with regard to you, no one who participated in this operation, would have doubted that Gen van der Merwe had authorised the operation?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you have listened to what Brig Coetzee gave evidence about, that you arranged to meet at Oshoek where you spent the night in Oshoek in a guest house?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And the following morning, what took place?

MR SCHOON: The following day, I gathered at the Oshoek border post in the company of Brigadiers Ig Coetzee and Schalk Visser and Col van Wyngaard.

MR VISSER: Proceed with the next paragraph.

MR SCHOON: Early the following morning, which was a Sunday, Colonels de Kock, de Jager, W. Coetzee and A. Pretorius and possibly still other members, reported to us regarding the operation. We were informed that three terrorists who were members of the September Machinery, had been killed, and that weapons and documents had been taken into possession. Afterwards I attempted to contact Gen van der Merwe from Oshoek to inform him, but the telephones were out of order. I then departed with some of the members and went to the residence of the Commissioner of the SAP in Pretoria, to inform him so that he would be capable of dealing with any queries which may be directed at him, from Foreign Affairs. We anticipated this. At the General's home, I, Colonels de Jager and de Kock and possibly still one or two other members, went to the General. I explained to him that three terrorists had been killed in Swaziland and that documents and weapons had been confiscated. We did not spend much time there. Later I would also have reported to Gen van der Merwe although I cannot recall the event precisely.

MR VISSER: You have testified on many previous occasions regarding the period of time of warfare in which our country found itself, and your political motivation. Do you confirm the summary thereof in paragraphs 22 to 27?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I do.

MR VISSER: And then, with regard to paragraphs (c) and (d) of paragraph 28, it would not be of application to you, however you do then request amnesty for any offence or delict which may be committed by you with regard to this particular incident?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I do so.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Hatting on record Chairperson, we have no questions for this witness, thank you.

MR ROSSOUW: Rossouw Mr Chairman, I also don't have any questions.

MR PRINSLOO: Prinsloo on record Chairperson, no questions.

MS VAN DER WALT: No questions, thank you Chairperson.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: I've got no questions, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: No questions, thank you.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I am running out of witnesses, except one, that is Gen van der Merwe. Mr van Wyngaard will be here tomorrow morning, I am told Mr Chairman, but he won't be available today. We are going a bit quicker than we anticipated, but we would ...

ADV DE JAGER: Full names please?

MR VAN DER MERWE: Johannes Velde van der Merwe.

JOHANNES VELDE VAN DER MERWE: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Gen van der Merwe, similarly you have given evidence on many previous occasions before the TRC and the Amnesty Committee, is that correct?

MR VAN DER MERWE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: You request that your evidence from previous matters during which you testified, be considered in the consideration of your amnesty application, also with regard to this matter?

MR VAN DER MERWE: Yes, I do so.

MR VISSER: In your amnesty application, on page 61 we can find your application from page 61 to 69 and on page 61 when you compiled your amnesty application under paragraph 7(a) and (b) you responded with the words "not applicable", however you request of the Committee as you have requested before, that your amnesty application form be formally amended to reflect that 7(a) is "National Party" and 7(b), "supporter", is that correct?

MR VAN DER MERWE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: We move for such amendment, Mr Chairman. You have studied Exhibit A which has been served before the Committee?

MR VAN DER MERWE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you were also instrumental in the amendment of the chapter with regard to Swaziland and Mozambique as it currently appears on page 23 and following?

MR VAN DER MERWE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you also request that the information embodied therein and the evidence which is referred to in Exhibit A and H which is a summary of your evidence, be accepted as a part of your evidence before this Committee?

MR VAN DER MERWE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: In the year 1986, during the struggle of the past, how would you describe the appearance of violence in that period of time?

MR VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, as I have already testified on previous occasions, violence, killing, car bomb explosions, limpet mine explosions, and various other forms of violence, were basically a daily occurrence and the Security Branch was involved in a daily struggle for life and death.

MR VISSER: Is it also correct that on the 12th of June 1986, a general state of emergency was announced, which was of application to the entire country?

MR VAN DER MERWE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And in the course of studying reports which came to Head Office, did you become aware of the so-called Transvaal Military Machinery which operated from Swaziland?

MR VAN DER MERWE: Yes, that is correct, I was familiar with their activities.

MR VISSER: Did you also come to hear of a group by the name of September Machinery?

MR VAN DER MERWE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: What was your position in 1986 in the Security Police?

MR VAN DER MERWE: I was the Security Head of the Security Branch of the SAP.

MR VISSER: Is it correct that you were informed during 1986 approximately November/December of a meeting that was held in Middelburg in the Transvaal during which a decision was taken for something to be done to attempt to curb the violence?

MR VAN DER MERWE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You stated in paragraph 6 of Exhibit H that upon a certain Friday of which you cannot recall the precise date, but that you believe it to have been the 12th of December 1986, a meeting was held in your office at Security Head Office in Pretoria?

MR VAN DER MERWE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Can you tell us who you recall as having been present at this meeting?

MR VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, my recollection about this is rather vague, but as far as I can recall, Gen Ig Coetzee, who was then a Brigadier, was present, as well as Brig Schoon, Col de Kock and some of the other members, who have been mentioned here, although I cannot remember their names.

MR VISSER: What was discussed during the meeting?

MR VAN DER MERWE: During the meeting, a planned action which had already been proposed regarding the group September Machinery, in Swaziland, was discussed and the group reported to me about a possible action against this group. We discussed the necessity and all factors which was significant in the whole matter as well as the practical viability of this operation and it was clear to me that it was necessary for the Security Branch to take urgent action against this particular group in an attempt to prevent any further commission of violence by them. And consequently I came to the conclusion that such an action, under those circumstances was necessary and advisable.

MR VISSER: You have heard the evidence of Colonels Coetzee and Pretorius and de Jager who gave evidence here this morning, before the Committee, is that correct?

MR VAN DER MERWE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you also listen to the events and the information leading up to this incident which gave rise to the planning and the execution of this operation?

MR VAN DER MERWE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Is it today your recollection that the information which was conveyed to this Committee was similar to the information which was conveyed to you in 1986?

MR VAN DER MERWE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: We know who the persons were as you have stipulated in paragraph 9 and you state that after the discussions and after thorough consideration, it became clear to you that action was necessary?

MR VAN DER MERWE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you then express such authority?

MR VAN DER MERWE: Yes, I expressed the authorisation for the action.

MR VISSER: Was this an easy decision or what was your position?

MR VAN DER MERWE: No Chairperson, under the circumstances of that time, and particularly with the fact that we were going to act in another country, it was quite a weighty decision, but if one considers that at that stage we were embroiled in a struggle for life or death, where acts of violence were committed on a daily basis, I had no other choice but to come to the conviction that such an action was necessary and so doing, expressed my authorisation for it.

MR VISSER: And was it also your opinion according to Col Coetzee's evidence here this morning, that there was a tremendous spate of attacks with explosives in 1986 and that the sentiment was that the probability was that these acts had found their origin in Swaziland?

MR VAN DER MERWE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Upon diverse occasions, you have set out your political motivations, some of them have been considered in certain decisions made by the Amnesty Committee, do you once again confirm these statements?

MR VAN DER MERWE: Yes.

MR VISSER: And do you request that the Amnesty Committee consider your application favourably with regard to any offence or delict that you may have committed before, during or after the incident in Swaziland during which persons were killed? Technically Mr Chairman, also at page 4, paragraphs 18(c) and (d) will not be applicable, and attempted murder will be conspiracy, Mr Chairman, for as far as that may be necessary. Thank you Mr Chairman, that is the evidence from this witness.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, Hattingh on record, I have no questions, thank you.

MR ROSSOUW: No questions, Mr Chairman.

MR PRINSLOO: No questions, thank you, Chairperson.

MS VAN DER WALT: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: Just one question, Mr van der Merwe. On page 63 in your motivation, you say just in the middle there, you say "to fight for and to protect that which I knew to be a normal Westernised democratic way of life and to ensure its continued existence". I reckon that you were supporting the National Party because it was ensuring its continued existence, will you now say that because it is a new government, what you were protecting, is no longer in place?

MR VAN DER MERWE: I beg your pardon, could you repeat.

MR SIBANYONI: Would you say what you say here, you say here on page 63 you were protecting, now that there is a new government and the government which was protecting it, is no longer in place, that normal Westernised democratic way of life, is no longer the order of the day?

MR VAN DER MERWE: No Chairperson, but one must bear in mind that at that point in time, we were not aware of how the new government would appear and for all practical purposes, between the ANC and the SACP, there was a very close alliance, and it may have been that after such a violent take over which we from our side wanted to prevent, we may have sat with a communist government. It doesn't necessarily mean that that which we have today, was really what we wanted to prevent at that stage in time.

MR SIBANYONI: Some of the applicants have in other applications conceded that their motivations was influenced by what they regard today as the propaganda of the past, that there was this "Rooi Gevaar"?

MR VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, I don't think it was only propaganda, it was a real danger. If one looks at the role that communism played in the entire process, it was definitely more than just propaganda.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, no further questions.

ADV DE JAGER: General, the command structure basically stopped at you, according to your evidence?

MR VAN DER MERWE: Yes, that is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Did you believe that what you did, would enjoy approval from above?

MR VAN DER MERWE: Correct.

ADV DE JAGER: At that stage, what was the pressure which was exerted on the police by politicians and government officials, opposition members, economists and so forth?

MR VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, as we have already testified upon various occasions, there was tremendous pressure from all these institutions which was exerted on the police and particularly on the Security Branch to curb the violence and to combat the mass action which the ANC had established to a certain point at that stage, and to ensure that the attempt to achieve the violent take over, be stopped. It was not only something which was expressed during political speeches, but at every possibility, it was emphasised that it was expected from the Security Forces, and particularly we in the police, to invest everything in the struggle, and that we would have to use everything in our power, to protect the dispensation of that time, and everything that went along with it.

ADV DE JAGER: In cases during which people were killed in landmine explosions or when infiltrations took place, were you blamed or were members of the police blamed for not doing their job and seeing to the safety of the people?

MR VAN DER MERWE: Very much so. Every time such an incident took place, over and beyond the pressure from the government which escalated in such a case, the media and the community would also throw stones and say that the police was incapable of providing the necessary support.

ADV DE JAGER: Why then did you not regard it as necessary to consult persons on more senior levels or even to consult the political leadership of the time?

MR VAN DER MERWE: Firstly I regarded it as part of my task, it was our task, the task of the Security Branch, to combat terrorism. Secondly, it Commissioner and the Minister had no legislative authority or capacity which I didn't possess and I did not regard it as necessary to consult them. It was part of our usual action, we were involved in operational actions on a daily basis, I did not regard the situation as unique. If one regards the situation with the former South-West Africa or the current Namibia, we were involved in a full-scale, full-time war where we dealt with insurgents and we regarded cross-border actions in the very same light. Under these circumstances, I did not regard this as anything different to my usual tasks.

ADV DE JAGER: Do you accept responsibility for what took place here?

MR VAN DER MERWE: Yes, I do accept full responsibility.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Any questions?

MR VISSER: No re-examination, thank you Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, that brings me to the end of my available witnesses.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, may I with your leave, call Mr de Kock as the next applicant.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, there is a request that the microphones might just be changed before we continue.

MR SIBANYONI: Your full names Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: Eugene Alexander de Kock.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (sworn states)

MR SIBANYONI: Please be seated, sworn in Chairperson.

EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, Mr de Kock apologises for his unshaven condition, it is attributable to administrative problems that he experienced with the Department of Correctional Services, this morning, Mr Chairman. Mr de Kock, you are an applicant for amnesty in this matter, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Your application appears in the Bundle, from page 1 to page 10, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Do you confirm once again the supplementary affidavit which you have made about Vlakplaas as such?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Which has been handed up at several occasions to the Committee?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, correct.

MR HATTINGH: Do you confirm the correctness of the allegations embodied in the application?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Hattingh, there were pages ...(end of tape 2B) ... page 84 was omitted and we requested that it be found. Is it available.

MR HATTINGH: Pages 84 and 85 were omitted from my copy and the Chairperson's secretary has handed over copies to me. I accept that she handed copies to you as well, Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, I have it, thank you.

EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock, you have heard the evidence of the other applicants in this matter.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Do you confirm that you attended a meeting at Middelburg, during which the problem was discussed?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And do you confirm that the information which they say was submitted in the meeting, as far as you can recall?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: In your application you mention the MK name of one of the activists, MK Pantsu.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, he was a prominent operative and this was attributable to his activities. Not only Eastern Transvaal and Soweto reported about it, but Port Natal also reported about it. He was in the logistical line and he was extremely active. Daily reports came in about him.

MR HATTINGH: So despite the information which was conveyed during the meeting, you also had information about this person's activities?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And although you could not recall the names of the other persons in your statement, do you confirm that other names were mentioned to you?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And do you accept that these were the names mentioned to you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And do you accept that it was said during this meeting that it was necessary to act against these people?

MR DE KOCK: Undoubtedly, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: For the purpose of which they had made the recommendation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And do you confirm that Brig Schoon then appointed you as operational commander for this operation?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And that authorisation would be received from head office firstly?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And do you confirm, as far as you know, that head office did provide authorisation and permission to continue with the operation?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: You cannot recall who attended the meeting?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I don't have any independent recollection, but the probability is so high that I would conceded that it is undoubted.

MR HATTINGH: Did you attend many more meetings at Gen van der Merwe's office?

MR DE KOCK: I was at such meetings, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And do you accept that if you were present at the meeting, that you had permission from the Head of Security to continue?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You have also heard the versions of the other applicants as to how the operation was executed. I will ask you to tell us your version of the operation, from the time that you arrived in Swaziland.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, my group and I moved through at the Oshoek border post. I think we had two vehicles, of which the one was a minibus, a Volkswagen, which had hidden panels in which we had hidden a variety of arms fitted with silencers. We hid them in these panels.

MR HATTINGH: Was this the same vehicle which was used in the matter which the Panel heard last week? Last week was the other operation in Swaziland, during which the three persons were lured into an ambush.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, this was another kombi.

MR HATTINGH: So you had more than one vehicle at Vlakplaas, which were equipped with hidden panels?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Please continue then.

MR DE KOCK: We went to the Royal Swazi Spa, my people and I, we rented rooms there and it was also the point where we awaited the members of Soweto and we met there. In one of the rooms which was set up as an operational room we waited for tidings of this terrorist from the informer. The managing was done by Col Pretorius and Coetzee from Soweto.

MR HATTINGH: While you are at it, you have made a schematic representation of the persons who, according to your recollection, were involved in the operation, according to rank structure, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, I have copies. May I hand up to you copies of this document which Mr de Kock prepared here in the Committee room a few moments ago.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. And for this operation you placed Gen Johan Coetzee as Commission at the top and under him, Gen van der Merwe and below him, Brig Schoon.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And then there was Gen Coetzee.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Ignasius Coetzee from Soweto Security.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And below him, Col de Jager, Lt-Col Coetzee and Lt-Col Pretorius.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And you also mentioned there that van Wyngaard you cannot recall his rank.

MR DE KOCK: I cannot recall him at all, Chairperson, I cannot place him anywhere.

MR HATTINGH: And if you accept that he was present, could you recall what his rank was at that time?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he may have been a Major or a Colonel, I'm not entirely certain.

MR HATTINGH: Directly under Brig Schoon it is then Vlakplaas, with you as the commander.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And below that members of C1 under command, which include Capt van Dyk and Sgt Willemse, who were specifically involved in this operation.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And then on the right-hand side we have the men from the Eastern Transvaal.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Under the command of Col Visser.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And below him, Col Deetlefs.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And below him, W/O Freek Pienaar.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. You have now said that you found accommodation in Swaziland. Were talks held there, was information exchanged, what happened there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, on a regular basis, Capt Coetzee and Pretorius left the room and attempted to liaise with the source and on occasion they were successful in this contact and reported back. At a stage they returned from the source with a sketch of the house that was the target.

MR HATTINGH: Do you agree that the floor plan of the house is as it is set out on Exhibit B?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is a correct version of it.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, please continue.

MR DE KOCK: And at that stage a time was given to us whereupon this source would wait for us. It was a pre-arranged place in that area. As I read later, it was Fountains and we would meet the source there.

At that stage there was no certainty whether we would move ourselves to the house or whether the source would take us there. Later that evening we moved out after I had made arrangements and had laid out the plans for the penetration of the house and as to how we would travel to the house, radio contact etc., and then we moved from Swazi Spa to the Fountains area, which was in Mbabane.

MR HATTINGH: May I just ask you, one of the previous applicants says that he had the impression that more members of Vlakplaas were present in Swaziland during this operation. Did you have any other members except Mr Willemse and van Dyk in the country, in Swaziland at the time of this operation?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson no, I don't have any recollection of it, but it would not be irregular that I would have rented an extra room and would have kept two or three persons in reserve if the need should arise that there were extra terrorists in the house or in the event of us experiencing a problem and that those persons would then take over. So there was always an action to fall back on. It is possible. I would have mentioned it if I had done so, but I will just mention that for the sake of completion.

MR HATTINGH: So you did not have such people on this instance?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I cannot recall that I did.

MR HATTINGH: Please continue.

MR DE KOCK: On our arrival at the rendezvous point at the Fountains area, residential area, we pulled just on the side of the road and I in my memory the three of us, Col de Jager and Col Coetzee and I moved to the minibus. I think it was a minibus, it was like a taxi-type vehicle, where we found a black man who was the source.

MR HATTINGH: Did you know this source before this incident, Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, and also not afterwards.

MR HATTINGH: So this was your first contact with him?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I spoke to the source and he sat on the seat in the kombi just behind the driver's seat and I climbed in next to him and I spoke to him. The discussion was about the last operational detail. We expected three to five people and there may be twenty in the house. We had to clear up some of these aspects.

MR HATTINGH: Could you observe anything with regard to this person's appearance?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the kombi smelt of dagga. I spoke to him and his eyes were very bloodshot and his breath smelt of dagga. He then said that he had dropped the people off there, but that we had to launch the operation the following day or the following evening, which would be a more suitable time. I then - the weapon which I carried, it was Pachette. It was a British silent weapon, it had an integrated silencer and was based on the sterling. I pressed it against his head and said "Either I will shoot you now or we will go to the house".

The reason therefore, Chairperson, was that I could not arrive at the house and then I walk into an ambush and the source is missing, or I arrive there and the Swazi Police are waiting for us, or we strike the house and we are inside and somebody 30 or 40 paces away from there detonates a bomb in the house. This has happened previously and I was not about to underestimate my enemy.

MR HATTINGH: The observation which you made with regard to the dagga, did this emanate any feeling from you with regard to the reliability of this person?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, I would not say that I did not expect that a person would not drink liquor or use dagga, by nature of the situation he is a source and he has to do more of his group does, but this made me unsure of his motives as to why we had to come back the next or the next evening and I did not want to run that risk. And in that regard, I was the operational commander and I made that decision.

MR HATTINGH: Did you ask any of the other persons about the reliability of the source?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, by nature of the planning one tries to gain appreciation for the source, so that one can evaluate the source, as to whether one is certain about the information which the source will supply and whether one has to verify it and do some longer observation and send more people in. There are a myriad of aspects which one has to study.

MR HATTINGH: The person then walked with you to the house?

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, he did not have a choice.

MR HATTINGH: How far did you walk from the vehicle to the house?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would say in-between 300 to 500 metres. We moved in the dark, the weather was not so good at that stage, which made it easier for us with regard to wind and visibility and that is an operative's dream.

MR HATTINGH: And when you arrived at the house?

MR DE KOCK: When we arrived at the house the persons took up their positions as per prearranged and we went to the front door. I had the source with me. I stood in front, Col de Jager behind me and behind him was Paul van Dyk and behind him was Willemse and Pretorius. I considered breaking the lock on the door with the 15 pound hammer that we had. I think either I or Willemse carried it, I am not certain. And at that stage I decided to ask the source to knock on the door and say that he has had a flat tyre and that he required assistance.

After he knocked on the door a person stood up in the room, I would say adjacent to the wall where we were standing and I heard the person walking and then the person unlocked the door and I stormed in. He tried to close the door, I fired two shots in his chest, he fell down and I stepped over him and I ran into bedroom number two, which was the room I was appointed to. I went alone to the room because I had the element of surprise on my side and I expected another terson. The other persons went to their prearranged rooms. I know Mr Willemse went directly to the bathroom.

MR HATTINGH: As indicated on the after entry part of Exhibit B.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Yes?

MR DE KOCK: So that after all the members came in he controlled the passageway and he had a view of the street as well.

We moved through to the lounge. There was a woman lying who was shot. I don't know at that stage who shot her. I moved to room two where we found the person Pantsu.

MR HATTINGH: On the sketch it's bedroom one.

MR DE KOCK: I beg your pardon Chairperson, it's bedroom one.

And there I found Mr Pretorius and we found a person there. The person was trying to rise and both he and I shot him. I shot him head among others and I think Mr Pretorius shot him in his body. He was also identified as Pantsu. I have a vague recollection that the source identified him as Pantsu, him being the head target "afgesien van Glory Sidebe, wat se MK September was".

MR HATTINGH: Talking of the source, where was he during the penetration of the house?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, one of the persons who stood at the garden gate next to a tree to watch the road in case the Swazi Police of someone pitches up, the source stood by him, so that he was out of our way and out of our shooting range.

MR HATTINGH: And after the persons were shot in the house he was brought inside to identify the people?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you find anything else in the house?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, in the lounge there was a type of divan and there was a metal trunk and we found some explosives there. The numbers refer to the kilogram of charges. SPM limpet mines were found and we found propaganda material and training material, that one would give out when one gives lessons. There were also handwritten documents. I don't know who wrote it, but this also dealt with training and it dealt with infiltration, methods of hiding and so forth.

MR HATTINGH: Did you confiscate all these items?

MR DE KOCK: We tried to collect everything and I had no doubt that there was more weapons and documentation, but I have us two minutes to strike the house, one extra minute for searching the house and then we had to leave.

MR HATTINGH: And you then left?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You have heard the evidence that immediately after the house was penetrated, instruction or a proposal was made, as one of the applicants mention it, that the source be eliminated. Do you have a recollection of that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I do not have that recollection but it will not be improbable. I would like to mention that on occasion after this incident I made enquiries with Col de Jager and with Col Coetzee at time, whether the source was still alright, as we would say, because he saw them and he saw me and it is a matter to keep the way clear behind one.

MR HATTINGH: Did you still act inside Swaziland after this incident?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And did you have any fears that if the source was not on your side that this would be a danger to you?

MR DE KOCK: That was possible, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you - from there you left Swaziland.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, we left Swaziland and we went back to the Oshoek border post and we moved illegally through the fence. A way from the border post we pressed the fence down and we went across there.

MR HATTINGH: Now before we continue, my attention is being drawn that it was said that you proposed that another house be attacked where MK Ben could probably be found. Do you have a recollection of such a proposal?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson no, it would not have been a problem for me to do it, but we didn't have a sketch of that house, or such a premises. I will not dispute it, it may have been raised, but the fear is also always that one might not see the neighbours but the neighbours might see you and people will be informed afterwards. I would just like to mention that that area was a more affluent area of Swaziland and most of the houses had guards, security guards supplied by organisations and who were managed by security institutions.

MR HATTINGH: So you then crossed the border. And you have heard the evidence that you went to Gen Coetzee's house.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you report to him?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Completely?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And were you present when the report was made to him?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson. I would just like to mention here, I want to confirm that in terms of Sidebe, who's name was MK September, after we had abducted MK September out of the prison from Swaziland, and this will be heard later, he during his revelations revealed that the persons who had killed there were identified as members of his group as well as their names. This was done to Section C2 who do the questioning.

Later I had a discussion with him at Vlakplaas after he had arrived there and I asked him what was his reaction when he arrived at the house, and he said indeed he had arrived the following morning at the house and that he saw bullet holes, because some of the shots ricocheted through the window, and immediately he departed from there and went directly to Maputo in Mozambique.

MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock, you have heard the other applicant's political motivation, do you accord with that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Was this also your political motivation?

MR DE KOCK: Indeed, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, I don't know if you wish to give this document that was handed up to you an exhibit number.

CHAIRPERSON: K.

MR HATTINGH: K. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

You then request Mr de Kock, amnesty for conspiracy to murder.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And for any possible unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition for those firearms.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Of transgressions in regard to the crossing of the border between South Africa and Swaziland.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And you also request amnesty for any unlawful act which might emanate from your conduct during this operation.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

MR DE KOCK: I would just like to mention, Chairperson, that I take responsibility for my conduct and for the members who were under my command at that stage, Chairperson.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW: Thank you, Mr Chairman, Rossouw on record.

Mr de Kock, singular aspects with regard to the members who fell under your command, specifically Mr Willemse. Is it correct that he was the most junior person in rank during this operation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: A person like him did not attend these planning meetings at Security Head Office and Middelburg, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: And he would depend on the information which you would convey to him during the instructions you would give for the execution of the operation.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: And his amnesty application on page 219 says that the objective of the operation was to eliminate trained terrorists before they could enter the country to commit acts of terror. Would you say this is in agreement with the information which you conveyed to him?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: You have also heard that the evidence was given this morning that this operation was a preemptive strike, would you agree with that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: And just one final item. The false passportw which were issued, were these issued officially to members of C1?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. May I put it as follows, the passport is not false, the name is false on the passport, but the passport is a proper genuine passport issued by the Department of Internal Affairs. So the name would be incorrect, but the passport itself is not a false document.

MR ROSSOUW: But this was issued through the official channels of the Security Branch, that those documents be made available to your members?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I've no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR ROSSOUW

CHAIRPERSON: It's not only the name, is it, there's a photograph on a passport.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes. If one looks at it in that manner, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Whose photograph was it, yours?

MR DE KOCK: It would be my photo, Chairperson, but ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: The department prepared carefully the passports, they didn't just give you blank passports to write names on?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, that is not possible.

MR PRINSLOO: No questions, thank you Chairperson.

MS VAN DER WALT: No questions, thank you Chairperson.

NO QUESTIONS BY MS VAN DER WALT

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr de Kock, where is Glory Sidebe today, do you know?

MR DE KOCK: I have heard that he is deceased, Chairperson. After Vlakplaas he went to DCC and I think in 1992 he passed away.

MR VISSER: I understand because of natural causes, or do you not know?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, I have my own opinions but I won't view them because it's just speculation.

MR VISSER: No further questions, thank you Chairperson.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Mr Chair.

MR SIBANYONI: No questions, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR DE KOCK: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And thank you for preparing this.

MR DE KOCK: Very well, thank you, Chairperson.

WITNESS EXCUSED

--------------------------------------------------------------------------MS VAN DER WALT: Chairperson, with your permission we

call applicant Mr S J Visser.

ADV DE JAGER: Your full names.

SCHALK JAN VISSER: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MS VAN DER WALT: Mr Visser, your amnesty application is embodied in the bundle before the Honourable Committee and the official form appears from page 142 to 144 and the incident is from page 145 to 146, and the political motivation and background is annexure B, from page 147 to page 154, is that correct?

MR VISSER: That is correct, Chairperson.

MS VAN DER WALT: And you have already previously on many occasions given evidence before the Committee, is that correct?

MR VISSER: That is correct, Chairperson.

MS VAN DER WALT: And you have also studied and confirmed the contents of Exhibit A, which serves before the Committee.

MR VISSER: That is correct, Chairperson.

MS VAN DER WALT: During this incident, Mr Visser, what was your rank?

MR VISSER: At that stage I was still a Colonel, Chairperson.

MS VAN DER WALT: And where were you stationed?

MR VISSER: I served as Divisional Commander of the Division Eastern Transvaal of the Security Branch.

MS VAN DER WALT: You have also heard the evidence of the other applicants here today. There is one aspect in your application as well as the applicants from Eastern Transvaal, which mentions that this incident had taken place in 1987 and you have now heard that the other applicants mention 1986, what do you say with regard to the date?

MR VISSER: I would like to put it, Chairperson, that I may be mistaken in my date and I accept it as the members who had previously given evidence stated it.

MS VAN DER WALT: When you drew up the application, did you and the other applicants decide together that it may have possibly been in 1987 and you were not certain?

MR VISSER: Yes, Chairperson, these were only members attached to Security Branch Eastern Transvaal who collectively applied and during that action the date was decided upon.

MS VAN DER WALT: Mr Visser, you became involved firstly during the meeting at Middelburg, as has been led here?

MR VISSER: That's correct, Chairperson.

MS VAN DER WALT: And at this meeting, is it correct that Mr Deetlefs who is also an applicant, elaborated on the acts of terror in Eastern Transvaal?

MR VISSER: That is correct, Chairperson. And certain of the information which was supplied by Soweto was confirmed from Division Eastern Transvaal's side.

MS VAN DER WALT: During the period of 1986, what was the situation with regard to the acts of terror in Eastern Transvaal?

MR VISSER: We were plagued by landmine incidents, limpet mine incidents and then general acts of terror in the vicinity of Eastern Transvaal/Swaziland border Chairperson.

MS VAN DER WALT: According to the information which was supplied to you, from where did these instructions come? The attacks in the Eastern Transvaal.

MR VISSER: Intelligence information indicated that the Transvaal machinery which operated from Swaziland, were responsible for the planning and execution of these attacks, Chairperson.

MS VAN DER WALT: I note in you application on page 145, paragraph 2, you make mention that it was necessary that action be taken against Pantsu because information indicated that the ANC had planned a black Xmas for South Africa. Was it only against Pantsu, or what is your recollection?

MR VISSER: It was not exclusively against Pantsu, it was against the Transvaal machinery of which he was a member and it was general propaganda that during that time the ANC, that period being Xmas, that the ANC had planned intensive attacks, Chairperson.

MS VAN DER WALT: As the other applicants have testified, you went to the border post, is that at Oshoek?

MR VISSER: That is correct, Chairperson.

MS VAN DER WALT: You never crossed the border, is that correct?

MR VISSER: No, I did not, Chairperson.

MS VAN DER WALT: And is it correct that after the incident a report was made to you and the other applicants who did not cross the border?

MR VISSER: That is correct, Chairperson.

MS VAN DER WALT: You also then request that the other applicants' applications be incorporated in your application and you confirm this.

MR VISSER: Yes, I make such a request, Chairperson.

MS VAN DER WALT: Did you believe when you participated in the planning with the other members, that this fell within the course of your duties ...?

MR VISSER: I was convinced, Chairperson, that it was my task among others, as a member of the Security Branch and member of the Security Forces, to combat the revolutionary onslaught against the Republic of South Africa and I believe that I acted correctly.

MS VAN DER WALT: Did you receive any personal benefit from this incident?

MR VISSER: Not at all, Chairperson. I did not receive any reward for my part.

MS VAN DER WALT: You then apply for any offences or delicts which might flow from this action.

MR VISSER: I do so, Chairperson.

MS VAN DER WALT: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS VAN DER WALT

MR HATTINGH: Hattingh, Mr Chairman, I have no questions, thank you.

MR ROSSOUW: Rossouw, Mr Chairman, no questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PRINSLOO: Prinsloo, Chairperson, a few questions.

Mr Visser, Mr Deetlefs, who is your co-applicant was the Branch Commander of Ermelo.

MR VISSER: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR PRINSLOO: And he was tasked with the collection of intelligence from Swaziland, which was close to Ermelo?

MR VISSER: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR PRINSLOO: And he had intelligence and information about what was on-going in Swaziland?

MR VISSER: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR PRINSLOO: And with regard to Mr Pienaar, your co-applicant, he was the Branch Commander of Piet Retief?

MR VISSER: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR PRINSLOO: And in his circumstances he also primarily worked with Swaziland activities?

MR VISSER: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR PRINSLOO: No further questions, thank you, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Visser, Mr Chairman, no questions thank you.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: I've got no questions, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

MS VAN DER WALT: My following applicant is Mr van Dyk.

MR VISSER: ...(indistinct - no microphone) so well with the witnesses, you gave us an half an hour off, Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: Your full names, Mr van Dyk.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you requesting that we adjourn now, Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, it would certainly assist me, I'm feeling rather poorly right at the moment, Mr Chairman, and we have been doing well.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR VISSER: No, we'll definitely finish tomorrow, Mr Chairman, it seems. I'm indebted to you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll now adjourn till nine thirty tomorrow morning.