--------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, I think we were waiting for Mr Schoon.

MR VISSER: That is correct Chairperson. Mr Schoon is in attendance, he is ready to take the oath and he wishes to address you in Afrikaans.

WILLEM F SCHOON: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Please be seated. Which language would you prefer to use, English or Afrikaans?

MR SCHOON: Afrikaans please.

CHAIRPERSON: I think you must change the channels. Are you all right now, please be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Brig Schoon, you are here to testify in an amnesty application, concerning an attack on a house of a Mr Nat Serache in 1985, on the 13th of February. Is that correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes, as far as my knowledge goes, Mr Chairperson, that is correct.

MR VISSER: You were not here yesterday at the hearing when we dealt with the application, where were you?

MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I was at a doctor to receive flue treatment.

MR VISSER: Did you feel very bad yesterday?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I did.

MR VISSER: I assume that you feel a little bit better today?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I do feel better today because of the tablets that I have been taking.

MR VISSER: Are you applying for amnesty for your role in the attack on the house of Mr Serache? Can you tell us first of all, we find your application on page 75 to 88 of the Bundle, do you confirm the information therein subject to certain changes that may occur during the hearing?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: In the general background to the amnesty applications, serving as Exhibit A, have you read this document and do you confirm that your knowledge is the same as it was put out in the document and that it must be incorporated in your evidence?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: You also received a Bundle beforehand, Exhibit B, it was a working from Brig Loots where he described the workings of the Western Transvaal Branch concerning MK activities in Botswana and liaisons with the government on both sides. Do you confirm that?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Can you then just tell us Brig Schoon, what is your memory with regard to the circumstances that led to the attack on the house of Mr Serache?

MR SCHOON: Mr Chairman, we had discussions, it was by the Military Intelligence, the Security Branch, it was on a farm between Zeerust and Mafikeng.

MR VISSER: Were you there, were you present there?

MR SCHOON: Yes. It was on a certain day ...

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Visser, when you were present, were you the person with the highest rank from the Police?

MR SCHOON: I do not believe I was, I think there was a General from the Defence Force that was present. Of the Police, yes, at that stage.

CHAIRPERSON: Who would have been that General?

MR SCHOON: Gen Liebenberg arrived the next day, but I assume that Gen Joubert could have been there.

CHAIRPERSON: But from the Police, were you the person with the highest rank?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that evening I was. On that evening.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Let us just begin again, at that stage, what was your position? Where were you stationed and what was your position?

MR SCHOON: I was the Security Branch in Pretoria, where I was the Group Head of Section C.

MR VISSER: Was that the so-called Terrorist Unit?

MR SCHOON: Yes Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And amongst others, Mr Eugene de Kock served under your command?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And he was at Vlakplaas?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: You said that on the first day you were present, and the question is now, was there an officer with a higher rank from the Security Branch that evening?

MR SCHOON: No Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What was discussed on that first evening?

MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, information was available that a certain Mr Serache who was in Botswana and that he managed a safehouse for MK members in Botswana and as far as I can recall, the information showed that at that same time there were people who were prepared or preparing to infiltrate South Africa.

MR VISSER: Very well. You have mentioned what branches of the Security community were present, but can you remember people, or by name, who were present?

MR SCHOON: There was Brig Loots, Gen Steyn and the Branch Commander of Zeerust, I think it was du Preez Smit and Mr Crause and various others whose names I cannot remember right now.

MR VISSER: In your opinion, how many people were at this meeting?

MR SCHOON: Approximately 20 I would say, it could have been more.

MR VISSER: Can you remember if the current Gen Erasmus was present?

MR SCHOON: It is possible that he could have been there.

MR VISSER: You cannot personally recall it?

MR SCHOON: I know that some of his people were there, and he possibly was present too.

MR VISSER: And then Brig Oosthuizen?

MR SCHOON: Yes, he was present.

MR VISSER: Col Muller from the Soweto Branch?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: In other words there were people there that you could not recall?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: If Gen Erasmus was present, would he have been your Head or would you have been the senior officer?

MR SCHOON: I would have been the senior officer.

MR VISSER: Although he became a General later on?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: You discussed Nat Serache. Did you also discuss other matters concerning MK activities in botswana?

MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I believe that there was other discussions, but mainly it was about Nat Serache.

MR VISSER: The Security Branch, did they convey the information that they had, to the others?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: What did you think will happen because of this planning?

MR SCHOON: It was very clear that the Special Forces will launch an attack on the specific house in Botswana.

MR VISSER: Mr Schoon, you were also involved in the establishment of a arms cache in Krugersdorp, is that correct? Was that also in 1988? I am sorry, I retract that, I am confusing two issues.

CHAIRPERSON: You may be asking too many questions then.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairperson, there is an easier way to make me - what was your role or ...

CHAIRPERSON: Do I have to talk to the Special Forces?

MR VISSER: You provided information, and what else?

MR SCHOON: According to my knowledge it was only the conveying of information.

MR VISSER: Did you hear anything else at a later stage concerning the planning meeting on the first day?

MR SCHOON: Yes, reports were given that the house was attacked in Botswana, but that nobody was injured or killed.

MR VISSER: We have heard in the document that was presented by the Investigation Team of the TRC, that people were injured in this attack. Were you aware of that?

MR SCHOON: No, but it is possible.

MR VISSER: And you then ask for it to be included in your application for amnesty? On the second day, what happened?

MR SCHOON: On the second day, Gen Liebenberg and Gen Schutte who were then at that stage Head of the Security Branch, also arrived at Ottoshoop.

MR VISSER: Were they informed about the meeting of the previous evening?

MR SCHOON: Yes, they were.

MR VISSER: Did Gen Schutte say anything?

MR SCHOON: Well, he said that he was satisfied, and that is about it.

MR VISSER: But you have already decided about the action, it was an authorised action?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR KOOPEDI: I have got no questions for this witness.

MR MALAN: Mr Schoon, just so that I can understand it better, it was a joint meeting of Security Branch members and Special Forces?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR MALAN: So the decision was made by both sections and was supported by both, but Special Forces would be the operators in this?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR MALAN: Mr Schutte just testified, he said that he will give his, he will agree what will happen?

MR SCHOON: Yes, but it was a ruling that Special Forces will not act across borders. Can you remember if he repeated it there?

MR SCHOON: No, he didn't.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Schoon, I know that we are here to talk about the Serache incident, can you remember what else did people talk about at this meeting?

MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, it is possible that we could have talked about other targets.

CHAIRPERSON: It must have been?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I believe so.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you remember?

MR SCHOON: No, I cannot specifically recall what it was about.

CHAIRPERSON: You see, the reason why I am asking this question is, I would like to find out what this meeting was about.

MR SCHOON: It was about deciding on targets and Nat Serache was the primary target.

CHAIRPERSON: Identified as the primary target, he was identified as one of the targets at that meeting?

MR SCHOON: That is correct yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Let us discuss the unwritten agenda. Did you just talk about targets or did you, or was one of the items on the agenda, just targets or was there anything else on the agenda, concerning policy, possible actions within the borders of the country, or did you just discuss targets over the two days?

MR SCHOON: According to my knowledge, it was just targets in Botswana that we discussed.

CHAIRPERSON: It was over a period of two days?

MR SCHOON: Yes. Different people from the Security Branch made an input and I believe from Special Forces there was also certain input.

CHAIRPERSON: Now we get to the nitty gritty of the question that Mr Malan just asked you. I am always under the impression of the evidence in this specific hearing, that the decision to do something to Mr Serache and his house or whatever, was made or completed in the Defence Force, and that is my impression.

During the evidence there was talk about this meeting that took almost two days. You as the Head, the most senior person of the Police, testified that but no one of the Defence Force testified. You will be in the best position then to tell us what this meeting was about. Now I ask you specifically, and you testified that only specific targets in Botswana were discussed during the two days.

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Remember that it seems to all of us that the decision to attack Serache's house or him personally and his wife, had been made. When you arrived at the meeting, the impression was created that that decision had already been made in the Defence Force, then what would you then discuss? If I am correct and if that decision had been made, what would you then have discussed?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I do not know if the Defence Force had already taken, or made that decision. They could only make that decision when their Commander was present and that was Gen Liebenberg, to then continue with such a decision.

CHAIRPERSON: But you were there, can you tell us what was discussed concerning Serache's attack?

MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I can broadly speaking say that we discussed targets.

CHAIRPERSON: But you testified that Serache was one of the targets?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And it was discussed?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: So what was discussed and what was the decision made?

MR SCHOON: Information was provided by different members of the Security Forces.

CHAIRPERSON: Let us look at both options or possibilities, when a decision was made or when you started this meeting to continue or not - if this decision had been made by the Defence Force, I can understand that certain aspects for example what car he is driving, where he lives, who does he live with and ultimately the people from the Police could provide them with such information.

If the decision had not been made at that stage, by any one, then the discussion had to be or would have been about more serious aspects concerning Serache, would you agree with that?

MR SCHOON: Yes Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: In that case, a decision would have been made that "look, here is a man and his wife who would be considered as two classic targets and they had to be eliminated", am I correct?

MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I cannot recall that his wife had been mentioned.

CHAIRPERSON: Maybe I am making the same mistake as Mr Visser, but in any case, whatever the target was, would you have discussed matters at that meeting and the Defence Force tell what they know about the target, as well as the Police, that if his deeds were of such a serious nature, that he had to be eliminated or not, is that how it happened?

MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, as far as I can recall, all the information came from the Security Branch's side, we handled sources that was connected with the MK members in Botswana.

CHAIRPERSON: Was this now generally speaking?

MR SCHOON: Yes Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: What contribution could the Police then make to this operation if the Defence Force had all of the information at hand?

MR SCHOON: Yes, they had the information.

CHAIRPERSON: And they conveyed this to the Defence Force?

MR SCHOON: That is correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Who would have made the decision then to kill or eliminate these people?

MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, it was a presentation that went to their Head, to Gen Liebenberg.

CHAIRPERSON: But there had to be a decision beforehand "look, we are going to go to the Head of the Defence Force and it seems as if, it looks as if this person had to be eliminated"?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is so.

CHAIRPERSON: So that decision that was made before it had to go to the Head, who would have made that, that would have been the most important decision concerning the life of that person?

MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, the information was placed upon the table and the next day it was presented to Gen Liebenberg and he took the decision.

CHAIRPERSON: So in that meeting no decision was taken?

MR SCHOON: Not to act, at that stage. The action had to be authorised or approved by Special Forces.

CHAIRPERSON: What was the purpose of the meeting?

MR SCHOON: To find consensus concerning Nat Serache as a target.

CHAIRPERSON: That is the point I am trying to make, who would then decide that he must be a target?

MR SCHOON: It was a joint decision.

CHAIRPERSON: Between the Defence Force and the Police?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: What if they did not agree on this?

MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, it was not in the hands of the Police to approve actions.

CHAIRPERSON: I am not talking about actions, I am talking about classifications and the classification of a person as a target or not. If there was not consensus, what would have happened?

MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I believe that there was consensus.

CHAIRPERSON: Everybody agreed?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that this is a target and it had to be presented to the Head of the Special Forces.

CHAIRPERSON: In all the cases?

MR SCHOON: In this specific case, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: I am talking about the whole meeting, all the other cases, certain names were mentioned, I do not know how many, it doesn't really matter, but if a person's name came up, together with all the information that the Security Police had about that person, did it always show that he was a good candidate for elimination, he or she? Was there never an instance where you did not agree?

MR SCHOON: Not as far as I can recall, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And that is how you got consensus?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: I am trying to, please tell me if I am correct in this, I am trying to make a conclusion concerning this aspect.

If the information of a person indicated from the Security Police that this person is a threat to the country, then in the eyes of the Security Police, he becomes a target, but we know now that the Police could not then go across the border to eliminate people, so this meeting was actually a meeting to convince the people who could cross the border, that that person is a target, according to our information, he had to be eliminated, is that basically what happened?

MR SCHOON: Correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: So who took the decision to attack Serache?

MR SCHOON: The decision to act was taken by Gen Liebenberg.

CHAIRPERSON: From the Defence Force?

MR SCHOON: Yes, from Special Forces.

CHAIRPERSON: But as a target for elimination, he was identified by the Security Police?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Is this the case with all those persons?

MR SCHOON: As far as I know, yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I see. Thank you.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Could I be allowed to ask some questions in re-examination? Can you recall at what time this meeting commenced on the first day?

MR SCHOON: I didn't hear properly.

MR VISSER: Can you recall at what time the meeting began on the first day?

MR SCHOON: It was quite late during the afternoon and in the evening.

MR VISSER: Yes, and on the following day the meeting continued, or what was the position?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, we were waiting for Kat Liebenberg to arrive.

MR VISSER: Did you continue with the meeting or were you simply waiting?

MR SCHOON: I think we continued, if I recall correctly. We continued with the discussion of general matters.

MR VISSER: There was also a division Military Intelligence, wasn't there?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: What did they do?

MR SCHOON: They made their contribution regarding what they knew.

MR VISSER: Were they also active in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson, they also acted there.

MR VISSER: And did they also have their own intelligence sources there?

MR SCHOON: Yes, they did.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: You are excused.

MR SCHOON: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that all the evidence, Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: That is the evidence in this matter, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you got any witnesses, Mr Koopedi?

MR KOOPEDI: No, no witnesses Mr Chairperson.

ADV STEENKAMP: No further evidence, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: It seems to be the evidence of this hearing. Mr Visser, have you got any argument?

MR VISSER IN ARGUMENT: Yes Chairperson, you have heard the evidence, it is fresh in your memory. We submit with respect that the applications in this case present no problem. It is clear that what had happened here was that there was a meeting which was a so-called target development meeting in which Mr Serache's name was tabled.

He was considered to be a very important MK man. There was the additional factor that as it was testified to by Brig Schoon and Gen Steyn, that there was intelligence that there were four cadres who were on the point of entering the Republic in order to commit acts of sabotage and terrorism, and that they were in the house of Mr Serache, and you will recall that Mr Steyn told you that there was an urgency in regard to Mr Serache and that he thought that it was that very same evening, after permission had been given, the go ahead had been given by Gen Kat Liebenberg, that the operation took place.

The applicants before you had no part in the practical execution of the operation and therefore cannot tell you what happened there, for obvious reasons, but it is clear that there was the operation. It is also clear that the house was destroyed or damaged and we know from the Investigation Unit's report that two people were injured, and we would submit Chairperson, that the applicants have complied with the provisions of the Act, and that you will consider granting them amnesty for any act, omission or offence committed by them in regard to this particular incident, and that would include their part in the discussions and their cooperation in the giving of information.

You will also recall that Gen Schutte and Gen Steyn told you in addition, that they were to assist where necessary on this side of the border, the recces who were going to go in. We would submit Chairperson that what we have here, is a conspiracy to commit murder and to destroy property, malicious damage to property and clearly none of these people afterwards, came clean on the actual events, and therefore they would also ask for amnesty in regard to defeating the ends of justice.

Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: May I raise two aspects with you, Mr Visser. All these applicants say they didn't know how the attack occurred, they had no party in deciding and planning the manner and the mechanism in which Serache, the target, would be eliminated, am I correct?

MR VISSER: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: They didn't know that they house would be bombed, and therefore could not have had any intention of committing malicious injury to property in respect of the bombing, because they didn't know that the bombing was going to take place. It could easily have been that he would have been shot?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, the evidence inter alia of Gen Steyn was quite clear. The facility was to be attacked and the people ...

CHAIRPERSON: Was that part of the plan or what?

MR VISSER: That is what his evidence was. His evidence was that that facility, the safehouse was the prime target and whoever was in it, that is exactly what he said.

Chairperson, it is a long time after that meeting today, where they have to give evidence, and clearly they cannot remember everything that was discussed there, but one must take a broad view of what must have happened there.

The probabilities are that they went for Serache and clearly that would have entailed by all accounts, damage to property.

CHAIRPERSON: Why does that follow?

MR VISSER: Well, because he ran a safehouse from where he accommodated infiltrators and we know that there were infiltrators in that house, according to what these applicants believed at that meeting. So clearly they were going to attack that house. If you attack a house, even in the slightest degree, there is going to be damage to that house. Even if the house is not the prime target, but in any event Chairperson, we come back to our submission and that is that if you are satisfied that there was an offence or a delict committed here, that we are perfectly happy if you consider granting amnesty for all offences and delicts which may appear from the evidence.

That would be in terms of the Act, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Defeating the ends of justice?

MR VISSER: Well, they obviously did not go to the press afterwards, or admit in public, or had anything done to prosecute people who had done this, and therefore there was a defeating of the ends of justice, that follows.

MR MALAN: May I just ask on this score, if you are guilty of the offence itself, can you at the same time be guilty of defeating the ends of justice?

MR VISSER: In my submission, very specifically yes.

MR MALAN: If you murder someone and you don't tell the authority, are you also guilty of defeating the ends of justice?

MR VISSER: No, but you must realise that these were all policemen that have acted, that have given evidence before you. They are there to maintain law and order and they have an obligation.

MR MALAN: They have an obligation to tell or to report crimes.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MALAN: But if they are the primary offenders, can you, I have never heard ...

CHAIRPERSON: A criminal, the perpetrator of an offence, I don't think has the intention of defeating the ends of justice, he has the intention of committing the crime.

MR VISSER: Yes, and thereafter?

CHAIRPERSON: So keeping it away from the police facilitates the commission of the crime?

MR VISSER: Yes, but now he is a policeman and the policeman is the man ...

CHAIRPERSON: Well, if he is the perpetrator, doesn't he then become a criminal whose act of committing a crime is his prime objective? How can he have the intention of defeating the ends of justice?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, yes, I don't want to waste too much time on this, but perhaps you have read Evil's case, where Chief Justice Roumpf as he was at the time - the facts in that case were that a person was assaulted in the charge office, in the presence of Evils and Evils didn't do anything, but the person who perpetrated - sorry Evils was the victim yes, but the point is ...

CHAIRPERSON: The person who assaulted Evils was not convicted of defeating the ends of justice?

MR VISSER: No, no, I know.

CHAIRPERSON: The other policemen who witnessed this was under obligation to charge their colleague, so we are talking about the perpetrator as opposed to a policeman with all the obligations?

MR VISSER: Yes, the observer wasn't a policeman in that case, but the attacker was. I am told that I am wrong, but be that as it may Chairperson. The fact is that Judge Roumpf ...

CHAIRPERSON: You said perhaps I read it, I have read it. The point of the matter is the assault took place in a charge office.

MR VISSER: That is right.

CHAIRPERSON: Where there were at least two policemen? One of the policemen assaulted Evils, the other ...

MR VISSER: Yes, that is how I had it, but I am told by my Attorney that I am wrong.

CHAIRPERSON: But any way for the purpose of the principle, his colleague, the policeman, watched this?

MR VISSER: Yes, and he didn't do anything.

CHAIRPERSON: He didn't do anything. He, who observed this, had an obligation to do something about it, and he didn't?

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: But the actual perpetrator who committed the assault, did not have any intention of defeating the ends of justice. He cannot have had.

MR VISSER: The judgement of the Court in Evils' case as I understand it and as I remember it, is that there is a legal duty on a policeman to report crime.

CHAIRPERSON: We will not quarrel with that.

MR VISSER: And what you are saying is, that is all very well, except if the policeman himself is the perpetrator?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, well ...

MR VISSER: Chairperson, it may or may not be. If you will favourably consider granting amnesty for any offence or delict committed by these applicants on the facts of the matter, that is what the Act expects of you and that is what, we don't expect any more, anything more of you, and that is all that we would ask.

CHAIRPERSON: Any way, do you submit that conspiracy, malicious injury to property, defeating the ends of justice would apply to all the applicants?

MR VISSER: Yes, the defeating of the ends of justice only comes later, obviously. That is not part and parcel of what happens before.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that what they are applying for in each application in this hearing?

MR VISSER: Yes, indeed yes, Mr Chairman. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Koopedi, do you have any submissions?

MR KOOPEDI: As indicated when we started Chairperson, we asked for an indulgence in the sense that as soon as I am able to consult with Mr Nat Serache, I will sit with him, use the transcripts and we will then together prepare written submissions. This should be some time next week, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: (Microphone not on)

MR KOOPEDI: My problem is ...

CHAIRPERSON: I am happy with the arrangement. You give me a date, I won't start working on the judgement until I receive your submissions, but you must tell me when?

MR KOOPEDI: I don't know when will I receive the transcript Chairperson. If I am given the transcript this week, the general conference is coming to an end over the weekend, so come next week, I will be able to consult and I would need only next week.

CHAIRPERSON: (Microphone not on) adequate time, would you accept that? I won't deliver this judgement until I have received your submissions, by no later than the 30th of August. You have about seven weeks.

MR KOOPEDI: I am happy with that Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: (Microphone), I don't receive it, I write the judgement without it. Is that fair?

MR KOOPEDI: What I will do Chairperson, should our decision be that there is no need to do any submission which is a very, which is a possibility, I will also indicate Chairperson, that we have decided not to furnish you with any submission, we won't leave you in the dark.

CHAIRPERSON: I will be happy with that, but all that I am saying is that if we agree on the 30th of August, at which date I will write this judgement. Whether or not I am in possession of your submissions, whether or not there are submissions that you have made, because I need to get done with my work. That is why I am asking you is seven weeks adequate time?

MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, seven weeks is adequate time, however, I need to have the transcript. If I am not given the transcript in seven weeks, I won't be able to make the deadline, but I ...

CHAIRPERSON: I am prepared to put the order on record now that you be placed in possession of a transcript of this hearing, this particular one, relating to Serache, by no later than the 21st of August.

MR KOOPEDI: I am indebted Chairperson, that will help me a lot. Thank you. I am indebted, that will help me a lot Chairperson, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp, will you see that the tape recordings or records go to the necessary people who type this record?

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, I will do so indeed. Maybe just for your information, there was also a previous ruling by yourself that if further submissions should be made in writing, whatever, they should be available within a certain time to all the parties as well, if they want to make further representations.

I am just mentioning it to you. That is on the first score. The second score, these proceedings are normally typed very quickly and they are available immediately on the website.

CHAIRPERSON: I am not talking about what normally happens, I am saying that it must be in Mr Koopedi's possession by the 21st and if they are busy with other work, they've got to drop that work, and do this.

I am not too sure what, Mr Visser, what is your attitude about receiving those submissions?

MR VISSER: Well Chairperson, there is very little I can say. I would have thought that Mr Koopedi would have been able to argue today, it is not his client that is going to argue? Secondly, the evidence isn't all that ...

CHAIRPERSON: I don't know what the nature of the submissions are going to be.

MR VISSER: Yes, well, I've got no answer ...

CHAIRPERSON: I undertake that if it is going to adversely, if it is going to be considered in any way adverse to your case, I will let you have a copy with the necessary time to respond to it.

MR VISSER: Well, with respect Mr Chairman, I want it in any event, whether you consider it to be adverse to my case or not, I want to decide about that.

CHAIRPERSON: That is what I asked you, what is your attitude?

MR VISSER: No, I thought that could be taken as written.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't know what you were thinking then, you want it in any case?

MR VISSER: Absolutely yes, please.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Koopedi, I want it with me by the 30th of August, hopefully by that time you would have been able to give a copy to Mr Wagner.

MR KOOPEDI: I believe I would have done that Chairperson, I would have submitted it to them before.

CHAIRPERSON: In other words what I am saying is, while it is an indulgence on the panel's part, we want all possible arguments by the 30th of August.

MR KOOPEDI: Yes, I will make sure that ...

CHAIRPERSON: And everybody connected here must come to our assistance.

MR KOOPEDI: I will make sure that I prepare the submissions...

CHAIRPERSON: I am going to write the judgement on the 30th, with or without the submissions. Am I clear?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, matters are getting more and more complicated. It seems that we are going to have no time in which to react to these written submissions if they do come?

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, let's be quite frank in this matter, how difficult can it be?

MR VISSER: It is not a question of how difficult, it is a question that I would need time to see what he says. I would also need a day or two at least. So if he gives the written submissions to you at the same time as he gives it to us, it gives us no time. Then he must give it to us, Mr Koopedi must give it to us a week beforehand Chairperson, beforehand.

CHAIRPERSON: That is what I have asked him, Mr Visser, I don't know if you understood my request to him. I asked him to come to our assistance because on the 30th I am writing the judgement.

It implies that he must get his documents to you or to Mr Wagner in good time.

MR VISSER: I would suggest a week beforehand. Aren't you prepared to make an order, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Why do you want to clutter the record with orders, Mr Visser? I mean we are trying to come to each other's assistance, I have come to your assistance in previous occasions and here we have an issue here that we need to assist certain people, and we are trying to do it in the most amicable way?

Now, if you really want an order, then I will make an order, but I didn't think that that would be the attitude? Do you want an order?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I thought you were busy making rulings, if you are not making rulings, let's leave it.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Koopedi, are you undertaking on record now to see to it that Mr Visser, let me not get involved in that, Mr Wagner's Attorney, that he is in possession of whatever submissions you are going to make, and if you are not going to make submissions, then you let him have that letter also?

MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, I undertake that a week before the 31st of August, I would have by then, I would have prepared the submissions if any, and I would have delivered them to Mr Wagner.

CHAIRPERSON: That is what I am getting at, Mr Koopedi. If I say a week before the 30th of August, people normally go and rely on that date. I was hoping that you would be able to do it before then? ...(indistinct)

MR KOOPEDI: But that is what I said Chairperson, by that time I would have. For instance if I get the transcript next week, I would be able to find time to consult, and I would be able to make a decision whether we are doing submissions or not, which would till be a long time away from the end, but I am prepared to put it on record that all parties will have the submissions or will have knowledge that there will be not be any submissions, timeously, long before you want, long before the 31st of August Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I will accept that and rely on that. We will reserve the judgement until then. What is the next matter, Mr Steenkamp.

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, if I may ask your indulgence, there is a matter I think that needs to be cleared up, between, in the next matter of Naledi. If will take us about three or five minutes.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct)

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, Mrs Naledi is not here yet. We have endeavoured this morning to trace her, she has been apparently a last - maybe you must use the earphones Mr Chairperson, I will gladly speak up.

Mr Chairman, the position is this, Mrs Naledi is not present here this morning.

CHAIRPERSON: We don't know why?

ADV STEENKAMP: Her legal representative is here, however, Adv Makhubele is present as Mr Wagner and Mr Visser is aware of. The position why Mrs Naledi is not here yet, was discussed briefly with Mr Wagner as well as Mr Visser.

Mr Visser's attitude was there is no way he will start with Naledi, he is ready and Mr Loots is only available for today while we are still putting matters on ...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp, let me just point out one thing and I am getting tired of this. ...(indistinct) the panel seems to be the people who have to react to the whims and fancies of everybody else. I am asking why the victim isn't here.

I am not concerned as to what was agreed upon between representatives, etc. Is there a reason why she isn't here?

MS MAKHUBELE: Thank you Chairperson, if I may address the panel. Apparently at the pre-hearing it was decided that the Naledi matter would proceed today, which is Tuesday. I am told that Mrs, unfortunately the victims were not informed of the arrangement. The letters that they have just state that between the 10th and the 14th.

Mrs Busang or Mrs Naledi came here yesterday, which was on Monday. Unfortunately she did not speak to Mr Steenkamp, she was informed by some person whom I don't know, that she should come on Wednesday. When I came here yesterday in the afternoon, I was told that she has already left, someone has told her to come on Wednesday. I tried to contact her by the telephone number supplied to me, she is not known at that address.

We have been trying this morning to call Cape Town, so they can confirm her physical address, so that someone may go and fetch her. That is the reason why she is not here, Chairperson.

If I may also point out there is a matter if Chairperson recalls that was before the Committee last Thursday, the Swaziland incident, the victims were not here too, only one came. I learnt yesterday that the reason they did not come was due to miscommunication, because one of the victims came here yesterday, which is the date which the victims had been supplied with.

I am asking an indulgence in the interest of the victims, Chairperson, because it would appear that victims are not kept up to date regarding the arrangements. They are given a date, when they come on that date, they learn that their matters have already been heard. Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: When were you briefed on this matter?

MS MAKHUBELE: I was briefed last week, I have my documents if I ...

CHAIRPERSON: Can't you tell us, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday or whatever?

MS MAKHUBELE: I cannot recall but I think it is a day before the pre-hearing. The pre-hearing was on Friday, I was briefed a day before, it was on Thursday.

CHAIRPERSON: The week before last, on the Thursday?

MS MAKHUBELE: I was briefed a day before the pre-hearing.

CHAIRPERSON: In a matter that was supposed to start today?

MS MAKHUBELE: Yesterday, the 14th, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Is there any particular reason why you are not able to communicate with your client?

MS MAKHUBELE: As I indicated, in the matter that appeared last thursday, I was only informed that Thursday morning, that the matter is coming before the Committee. I think Mr Steenkamp called me at about half past eight, and said the matter is proceeding at half past nine. I came here and that is when I met the lady who was from Swaziland.

I didn't have time to contact the other victims, because they knew that the matter was coming yesterday.

CHAIRPERSON: ... it would have been the first time you would have met this victim, yesterday. If no one told her that the matter is coming on Wednesday, starting on Wednesday, would it have been the first time that you met this victim, yesterday?

MS MAKHUBELE: No Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you met her before, Mrs Naledi or whatever her name is, that is not present today, who was told yesterday that the matter is only starting on Wednesday? When did, have you ever met her?

MS MAKHUBELE: I haven't met her, I had intended to consult with her, that is why I say the telephone number that was supplied to me, whenever I called, it was, they said they didn't know her. I was relying on her coming here, because I knew that during the course of this week, she would come here, that is the reason I came here yesterday to consult with her, only to be told that she had already left and she was told to come on Wednesday.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp, who told her that?

ADV STEENKAMP: I am not sure Mr Chairman. I am not sure who told her that, we have endeavoured this morning to see if we can find Mrs Naledi to proceed.

CHAIRPERSON: I am not asking about that, what has been done, I am asking who told her?

ADV STEENKAMP: I have no idea, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: ... starting tomorrow?

MS MAKHUBELE: Yesterday in the afternoon.

CHAIRPERSON: And who told you that that was stated to her?

MS MAKHUBELE: I don't know his name. If I can ...

CHAIRPERSON: See him? So you haven't consulted with her at all?

MS MAKHUBELE: No, I haven't.

CHAIRPERSON: So you don't know if the matter is being opposed or not?

MS MAKHUBELE: I don't know, but I have read the transcript and her submissions to the Committee, to the Human Rights Violations Committee on a previous occasion and ...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp, is there any other matter that we can start with?

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, we can start immediately with the arms cache, the so-called Krugersdorp arms cache.

CHAIRPERSON: Who are the representatives in that matter?

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Wagner and Mr Visser.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct)

MR VISSER: Yes Mr Chairman, we can continue with that. I just want to place on record, that we never said that Mr Loots is not going to be available tomorrow. This was what was agreed yesterday in your chambers, that is it.

CHAIRPERSON: And none of us were told about this kind of problem?

MR VISSER: ...(indistinct) but we will continue with the Krugersdorp case.

CHAIRPERSON: Before we carry on, we can continue the Krugersdorp matter, what is the position with Mrs Naledi now? What are we going to do?

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, I can maybe just speak, what I have discussed with my colleague, Adv Makhubele, that is if you look at the Bundle, there was testimony led by the mother of the late deceased, there is also a copy of the inquest record.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, that does not help us Mr Steenkamp, what are we doing to ensure that she is present? That is her right to be present?

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, we have already contacted Cape Town in order to find the correct telephone number. I have also asked our witness protection people to find out and clear out the address and if possible, to go out and pick up Mrs Naledi, apparently she is staying somewhere in Soweto. We have already done that.

Our people is already busy doing that. Just for the record, I may just place on record then, the indication I had with Adv Makhubele was that we can proceed with this matter, and if necessary, of course all the submissions by the victim is already in the record, and she indicated to me that she had no difficulty. That is the best I can do.

CHAIRPERSON: I think she has a right to come here, straight forward, for herself. In the previous matter, the victim chose to be somewhere else and it is our indulgence that is allowing him to make submissions if he so needs to or wants to.

In this case, this lady's rights were affected, not through her own fault. That is the important issue, we must respect her rights. How is the Advocate representing her, going to be able to conduct the matter if she hasn't consulted with her?

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, I can only, because as far as I remember, Adv Makhubele was appointed a long time back, the notice of the pre-trial was also faxed to her office. I am in the hands of the legal representatives, Mr Chairman, and over and above that, I would gladly do whatever is necessary to make sure the victim is here. I have cleared this up with her as well. That is the best I can do.

CHAIRPERSON: Whatever the case is, the lady's rights have not been complied with, she is not being assisted with exercising her rights, we need to do everything today to see to it that we put her in a position where she can exercise her rights, even if to tell us that she is not interested in the proceedings.

We cannot proceed on that matter, before we have done that.

ADV STEENKAMP: Sure, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I want to be kept updated about the progress in respect of locating Mrs Naledi today. That is not a request.

MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, may I be excused?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR KOOPEDI: Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't know who are more frustrated, me or you?

MS MAKHUBELE: Chairperson, I will be waiting here until I am wanted.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you not involved in any other applications Adv Makhubele?

MS MAKHUBELE: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Only that one?

MS MAKHUBELE: Only that one.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, the application now before you is the one of an arms cache that was created in Krugersdorp in March 1988. Please allow me a few remarks before we continue. Chairperson, you will hear certain differences of opinion as to relevant facts which occurred at the time.

We have attempted to find out what the true position is, without much success, so we are going to present that evidence to you as it is, for you to decide. There appears to be some misunderstandings in regard to this arms cache and one of them is that it is sometimes attached to the incident of the raid into Botswana in 1985.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct)

MR VISSER: No, that is one that you are going to deal with in future, I think in two weeks' time or so, that is a 1985 one, and it becomes very confusing. I don't want to spend too much time on it, but you will see that in your Bundle, at page 76, no, not 76, it is not in this Bundle. In fact it is in the 1985 Raid Bundle, I don't want to take up too much time. But he there refers to an attack on a house of representatives in Cape Town, which he says gave rise to the attack.

That is taken up by Mr Stiff in his book, the Silent War, and I just want to ...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Who? Mr Who?

MR VISSER: Mr Peter Stiff, I referred you to this book before. The only point about this is, I just want to warn you Chairperson, this arms cache had nothing to do with the 1985 raid, because this was in 1988 and there seems to be a huge amount of confusion about that.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that what you are going to attempt to show?

MR VISSER: No, we are just telling you this, because the evidence will be that this was in 1988 and obviously the 1985 raid could, this could never have had anything to do with that.

CHAIRPERSON: You are saying this arms cache was established in 1988 and any thought that it was related to a planned attack in 1985, cannot be chronologically correct?

MR VISSER: That is the first point. Then Chairperson, for what it is worth, this attack was planned and executed, there was a raid into Botswana in 1988, Mr de Kock in his amnesty application, and I am sure he will testify to that as well, stated that it was an air raid, and that is according to our recollection, the correct facts.

We have attempted, my Attorney has attempted through the University of the Orange Free State to obtain press clippings of that time because that was our recollection. Unfortunately their computers have been down for the last week and a half, week or week and a half, week, and he was not able, so that we could actually give you the evidence of what had happened. The point about that, Chairperson, is that this arms cache was not the reason, was not created to be a reason for an attack on Mr Naledi in Botswana, because you will observe that that incident took place on the 28th of March and Mr de Kock in his amnesty application says that there was an air raid into Botswana after the discovery of this cache, and he places that date on the 28th of March.

What we are trying to say is there is already a lot of confusion about this incident, but as far as we could ascertain, the arms cache had nothing to do with Mr Naledi, it had to do with an excuse for a full scale raid, and it was an air raid into Botswana. Incidentally, in that raid, nobody was killed. So we know that it wasn't Mr Naledi because there four people were killed.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, I don't know if you are able to answer the question I am going to ask. If the establishment of this cache was related to a subsequent air raid, were there any deaths occurring or gross human right violations in that air raid?

MR VISSER: No, none, nobody was killed. There may have been people injured.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct)

MR VISSER: That we don't know. As I say we attempted ...

CHAIRPERSON: Well certainly I think according to the Act, an attempt to kill is regarded as a human right violation.

MR VISSER: An attempt at any of the human right violations, in terms of the definition in Section 1.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct) air raid must have been committed with the intention of killing people, I would imagine?

Okay, fine, I am just trying to get this thing into perspective, before any more confusion occurs.

MR VISSER: I am afraid that you are going to hear confusing evidence in this matter.

CHAIRPERSON: Where will this confusion come from, the applicants or from where?

MR VISSER: Well Chairperson, the applicants don't all remember this matter the same. There are some differences as to where they were, did they go to Cape Town, who okayed the mission, etc, etc. We are going to say to you now Chairperson, that it really is detail. As far as the relevant material facts are concerned, there is no disputes, but there are confusion on the fringes regarding where this fits in, what raid was it that this was supposed to be the excuse for, and what were the targets that were really targeted in Botswana. I just mention them Chairperson, to attempt to avoid you being confused when you hear some of the witnesses give evidence about this.

But I again say that it is not relevant really to the material issues of the amnesty applications, what is relevant here is that there was a decision to create the arms cache, it was created and the press were told. The evidence is going to be as simple as that, but there is going to be some evidence as to people going down to Cape Town and getting authorisation and from whom it was given, etc.

CHAIRPERSON: Are they going to testify that they knew that this arms cache was being established with the view of that air raid?

MR VISSER: Absolutely yes, there was going to be a raid, and this was to be the excuse, yes. All of them will say that. Thank you Chairperson, Mr Schoon is the logical point to start.

W F SCHOON: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Brig Schoon, you are an applicant in this application, and you request amnesty for your share in the creation, the creation of an arms cache which would serve as a reason or an excuse for the South African Defence Force to launch a raid in Botswana in 1988, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Very briefly - I am sorry, Mr Hugo hasn't placed himself on record yet Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I apologise Mr Hugo.

MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairman, yes, I appear for applicant E.A. de Kock, it is Schalk Hugo.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson, if I may continue. You have already done so today, do you once again confirm that you incorporate Exhibits A and B in your evidence?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Mr Schoon, in 1988, were you still the Head of C1 at Security Head Office?

MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, as I understand his evidence, he says he is applying for amnesty in respect of his activities related to the establishment of the arms cache. What about subsequent crimes that were committed as a result, he knew why the cache was established?

MR VISSER: Yes Chairperson, I was going to try to explain that in the evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, you can do that, I just thought I would remind you.

MR VISSER: Yes, but certainly thank you Chairperson, yes, I am aware of that, because the line goes through to the actual raid, obviously, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, we will wait.

MR VISSER: But perhaps I should have, more correctly, immediately started with that. Brig Schoon, your application stretches further in that it is related to your knowledge of an attack in Botswana that would be launched by the Defence Force?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And this was part of the executive actions in preparation of that attack?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well. Chairperson, the application of Brig Schoon, you will find at page 201 to 215 and the actual application in regard to this incident, is at 210 of your Bundle.

Brigadier, let us begin with your application. You have it before you, you have studied your application?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: With the exception of any changes or amendments that you wish to bring to your evidence today, do you confirm the content of your application as true and correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well, let us then begin with the very first matter that you wish with the indulgence and leave of the Committee to change or amend. On page 210 under "nature and particulars", you have stated in your application that during 1988 you were called to Cape Town by Gen Johan Coetzee and during the afternoon, you along with Gen Coetzee and Gen Geldenhuys were in his office and that Gen Geldenhuys made certain requests to you there.

What is the position regarding that?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, in that regard it is all correct although it wasn't Gen Coetzee, but Gen de Witt. This introduction regarding the nature and particulars has to do with another incident and not this arms cache incident as such.

MR VISSER: Therefore, what do you say of your reference to Gen Geldenhuys, is that correct or incorrect?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: With reference to which other matter?

MR SCHOON: This visit to Gen Geldenhuys was confused with another incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Which also began with weapons or arms?

MR SCHOON: No Chairperson, that is something entirely different.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, we have begun early?

MR VISSER: Yes, I thought I would start with the worst side.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't understand what you have confused. You have stated in your written application that you were called by Coetzee to Cape Town?

MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: During that afternoon you and Geldenhuys and Coetzee were together in his office?

MR SCHOON: Coetzee should read de Witt.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that Gen Coetzee?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: In the second line of this introductory section, it is not Johan Coetzee?

MR SCHOON: It is Gen Johan Coetzee, but he was already on pension at that stage.

CHAIRPERSON: So during 1988 you were called by Gen de Witt to Cape Town?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Now the second question, you state that you made this error, because you were confusing this with another matter?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And in connection with the other matter, you were also called to Cape Town by Coetzee?

MR SCHOON: No, Chairperson, by de Witt also. I was not called to Cape Town during that matter.

CHAIRPERSON: Then why are you confusing the two?

MR VISSER: Would you allow me one question which will clarify your problem Chairperson, because that is the problem.

The entire reference to the visit to Cape Town before the establishment of this arms cache, is that correct or entirely incorrect?

MR SCHOON: It is incorrect Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Then tell us how it came to be that you became involved in the establishment of the arms cache?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I now recall that a meeting took place at Vlakplaas where certain targets in Botswana were discussed.

CHAIRPERSON: When did this take place, this meeting?

MR SCHOON: I believe it was in March 1988.

CHAIRPERSON: And therein you state a discussion was held regarding certain targets in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: May I take over from there Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry?

MR VISSER: May I take over? Did somebody from the Defence Force have a discussion with you on that day at Vlakplaas?

MR SCHOON: That is correct, Gen Liebenberg came to Vlakplaas.

MR VISSER: Is that Kat Liebenberg?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well.

MR SCHOON: He asked whether or not it would be possible for us to establish an arms cache in order to create the climate for them to plan actions in Botswana.

MR VISSER: Very well, did he request this during the meeting or what was the position?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I am no very clear on this point, I am not very clear as to whether or not I attended the meeting personally or whether Kat Liebenberg attended the meeting. But what is very clear to me is that Gen Liebenberg came with this request after the meeting had taken place at Vlakplaas, subsequently.

MR VISSER: So he did not request the meeting, he requested you?

MR SCHOON: Yes, he requested me personally.

CHAIRPERSON: Subsequent to the meeting?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Subsequent to the meeting at Vlakplaas?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Did he tell you, I think you have already testified that he wanted this to serve as some form of an excuse to launch an attack in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you told him that there shouldn't be a problem?

MR SCHOON: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: How would that have operated? I am sorry to jump around, but he wasn't involved in this sort of thing, how would this have served as a reason?

MR SCHOON: I don't really understand the question.

CHAIRPERSON: He told you to consider the establishment of an arms cache so that this would serve as a reason to attack people or property in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: How do you link the arms cache to Botswana, as a reason to invade Botswana?

MR SCHOON: This arms cache would then have been viewed as an arms cache belonging to the ANC, there was also a tremendous amount of weapons and the media would have exposed this and it would have been used as a reason to attack Botswana.

MR VISSER: Afterwards, when you said yes, what did you do then?

MR SCHOON: Mr Chairman, I immediately started working on this. I got Col de Kock and Naude and asked them to get the necessary weaponry and to keep it, so that we can go and bury it at some place.

MR VISSER: Where would the weapons come from?

MR SCHOON: These weapons were from the Eastern Bloc, which was in police possession.

MR VISSER: Where was it kept?

MR SCHOON: At the storage place in the Security Branch Head Office. The explosives were provided by the Explosives Unit at their buildings, and Col de Kock also had some weapons at Vlakplaas.

MR VISSER: Did you have the authority to get these weapons from the storage places, as well as the explosives and those from Vlakplaas?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: And was that the instruction that you gave them, that they must gather all these explosives and weapons and ammunition for an arms cache?

MR SCHOON: That is correct yes. Afterwards I contacted the Krugersdorp Security Branch ...

CHAIRPERSON: After you agreed that you would do this, did I hear you correctly, you then brought in Mr de Kock and explained it to him, what was necessary?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he agree?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Was he alone?

MR VISSER: It was Naude and de Kock and he gave them instructions.

CHAIRPERSON: Naude was from the Defence Force?

MR VISSER: No, he was from the Security Force, Section 2.

CHAIRPERSON: Is this another Naude?

MR VISSER: Yes, this is Martin Naude, he will still come to testify.

Mr Naude, just to - Mr Schoon, Mr Naude was also from the Security Branch?

MR SCHOON: Yes, he was from Group C2.

MR VISSER: Very well. You say in your application, and I just want you to comment on this, on page 211, some of these weapons and ammunition was borrowed. What did you mean when you said it was "borrowed"?

MR SCHOON: It was weapons that was in safe keeping, in the storage place at the Security Branch Head Office. I gave them the instruction to make these weapons available, signed for it and then later return them.

MR VISSER: That is the point that I would like to make. Was the intention that after the arms cache served its purpose, the weapons would then be returned?

MR SCHOON: Yes, they would be returned to the place where they came from originally.

MR VISSER: Let me ask you this, is this how it happened, were all these weapons transported back to where they came from?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: How did you organise that part of the plan?

MR SCHOON: I made contact with the Krugersdorp Security Branch and if I can remember correctly it was Gen le Roux who was then the Commander, he was not available and I think it was Major Jan Coetzee, that I called to the Security Head Office or to Vlakplaas, I cannot remember. These weapons were then handed over to him, it was in a trunk and he had to ...

CHAIRPERSON: Before we get to Coetzee, these weapons and what all the other items it was, it was put away at the Police Security Branch?

MR SCHOON: That is correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: There must have been somebody, there had to be somebody who was the Head of that section and who could arrange for these items to be signed out? Whether it was written in the book or not, was that person brought in and was he told what the plan was, to facilitate the transportation of the weapons from that place?

MR SCHOON: I gave the authorisation. The issuing of weapons fell under me and I spoke to the storage clerk, Capt Drury and I organised or arranged with him that he must make this amount of weapons available, and that is what he did.

CHAIRPERSON: You signed the documents?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I gave the authorisation.

MR VISSER: And Capt Drury, did he know what your intention was with these weapons?

MR SCHOON: No Mr Chairperson, I did not inform him about this plan.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, before we get stuck into the nuts and bolts of how it actually happened, I noticed it is already passed eleven o'clock, I don't know whether you want to take your adjournment now?

MR MALAN: Just we take the adjournment, the other reference to Gen Geldenhuys, was that a mistake? Geldenhuys disappears and Kat Liebenberg comes ...

MR VISSER: Geldenhuys disappears and any reference to Cape Town disappears. That's got to do with another incident.

MR MALAN: In other words the parties of the Police and the Defence Force in this case, Kat Liebenberg together with ...

MR VISSER: Brig Schoon?

MR MALAN: No, together with Brig de Witt?

MR VISSER: No, de Witt falls away as well. The problem is, this was confused with another incident, but in that incident it would have been wrong to refer to Gen Coetzee.

MR MALAN: I would just like to - de Witt did not know about this incident at all?

MR VISSER: No, he did not. The whole first paragraph, Mr Chairperson, in terms of this witness' evidence, is irrelevant. But we will again confuse you at a later stage when we deal with that.

MR MALAN: Maybe you shouldn't clarify it, maybe you should keep me confused.

MR VISSER: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: We will adjourn for tea.

ON RESUMPTION:

W.F. SCHOON: (s.u.o.)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: (continued) ... Vlakplaas in terms of the creation of an arms cache, not by de Witt or Geldenhuys in Cape Town, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: That is correct, yes.

MR VISSER: You then said that it is right, you would do it, you gave the instructions to Mr Eugene de Kock and Martin Naude from C2. Mr Eugene de Kock was at Vlakplaas to go and withdraw some weapons and you gave instructions or filled in the forms to do this, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: I do not know if I completed forms Mr Chairperson, but I did make the arrangements with the storage clerk to issue the weapons.

MR VISSER: Just before the adjournment you said that you tried to contact Johan le Roux at Krugersdorp, the Head of the Security Branch there, but you could not get hold of him and you spoke to Jan Coetzee?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: What happened then? Did you give him the instructions over the phone or what happened?

MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I called him in and when I personally spoke to him, I gave him the instructions and the weaponry was given to him by Col de Kock in a trunk in order for him to create an arms cache with these weapons.

MR VISSER: Is that how you remember it?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: You said this meeting took place either in Pretoria or at Vlakplaas?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Who handed it over to him?

MR SCHOON: It was Martin Naude and Mr Eugene de Kock.

MR VISSER: Brig Schoon, Mr Naude says and he will testify, that both of you went to Cape Town?

MR SCHOON: That is correct, yes.

MR VISSER: Can you explain that to us then?

MR SCHOON: I can. I think the next morning together with Kat Liebenberg and Gen Joubert ...

CHAIRPERSON: The next morning, in terms of when?

MR SCHOON: It was in terms of the day when Kat Liebenberg gave the instructions to me.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

MR SCHOON: We went with them ...

MR VISSER: Can you just repeat again, you yourself and Mr Naude ...

MR SCHOON: Mr Joubert ...

MR VISSER: He was from the Defence Force?

MR SCHOON: Yes. We went in a Mercurius plane to Cape Town.

MR VISSER: Is that a military plane?

MR SCHOON: Yes, it was.

MR VISSER: Very well. Can I put the question to you in this way, I do not want to lead you too much, but at the meeting, in which Mr Kat Liebenberg addressed you on this issue, were you asked to say something with Mr Naude at that meeting?

MR SCHOON: I cannot specifically remember Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: In relation with going to Cape Town?

MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, we did receive instructions from Gen Liebenberg to be ready in case he needed assistance in the presentation of the plan of the Defence Force.

MR VISSER: What was this plan about?

MR SCHOON: For an attack on Botswana.

MR VISSER: Where would this presentation, we know it would take place in Cape Town, but who would you make this presentation to?

MR SCHOON: I was not personally present with the presentation, but I do have a suspicion that it could either by the State Security Council or some parliamentary committee.

CHAIRPERSON: Why did you go to Cape Town then?

MR SCHOON: Kat Liebenberg asked me to accompany him and to be ready to support the presentation that he is going to make, in case he received any problems from the State Security Council or whoever he addressed it to?

MR VISSER: You were on standby then?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Can you remember what the building looked like where you were, that day in Cape Town?

MR SCHOON: Mr Chairman, I can now remember that it was a tall white building behind the Parliament building. It was a relatively old building, I think it was in a Cape Dutch style.

I think at that stage they were doing restoration work on it.

MR VISSER: Very well. Were you supposed to do anything in Cape Town, while you were there?

MR SCHOON: No Mr Chairperson. We were asked to wait in a room, myself and Major Naude.

MR VISSER: Is that all that you did in Cape Town?

MR SCHOON: That is all that we did, yes.

MR VISSER: Very well. We will hear from the other witnesses what happened, but then a "fund", they found an arms cache, weapons and ammunition and then an attack also occurred in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Can you remember how long after or the same day, this is now in relation to the discovery of the weapons, this attack took place?

CHAIRPERSON: Major Jan Coetzee came to fetch these weapons?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: It was handed over to him by de Kock and Naude?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: What was he supposed to do with it?

MR SCHOON: He had to go and bury it at a certain place, where it would then serve as an arms cache that will then be found by the Police. Then that would then make known to us certain public interest and we would then get the media to come and cover this.

CHAIRPERSON: You then went to Krugersdorp?

MR SCHOON: I asked him first of all whether he had a suitable place to do this, and he said yes, there was a worked out mine in the area where he can do this, and it is relatively safe. This was also a pre-requisite that these weapons had to be safe, that any other person cannot just go and stumble upon it.

MR VISSER: Just to add to that, would Major Coetzee then report to his Commander, le Roux, concerning these instructions?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: We know that such an arms cache was then found, it was - who discovered this arms cache?

MR SCHOON: I do not know who did the discovery of it, I think it was left in the hands of Mr Jan Coetzee.

MR VISSER: You will hear that evidence from the other witnesses.

CHAIRPERSON: Who brought in the media?

MR SCHOON: I think it was Gen le Roux.

CHAIRPERSON: You do not know?

MR SCHOON: No, I do not know exactly.

CHAIRPERSON: I cannot understand this, Mr Schoon. The way in which I understand your evidence is that apart from Liebenberg and possibly Joubert, you were now in charge of the whole plan, to execute the whole plan?

MR SCHOON: That is correct yes.

CHAIRPERSON: In my opinion you also had to be in control of when this discovery had to take place, when do you bring in the media to make the story believable to the South African citizens?

MR SCHOON: That is correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And that is why I am asking you this question, who made the discovery and who brought in the media, you had to know who and when this will take place?

MR SCHOON: This matter was considered very seriously and if I can recall correctly, we gave instructions to Jan Coetzee, that it had to happen as soon as possible.

CHAIRPERSON: How long after you phoned him to tell him to come and see you, were these weapons handed over to him?

MR SCHOON: It was a few hours.

CHAIRPERSON: And then you went to go and put it in this worked out mine, and how long after he received the weapons, was the discovery made?

MR SCHOON: I think that the discovery was made the day when I went with Liebenberg to the Cape.

CHAIRPERSON: That was the next day, after Kat Liebenberg spoke to you?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: In other words, am I correct if I say that Kat Liebenberg, after a meeting at Vlakplaas asked you or informed you that he would like to know if can execute this plan. You agreed, you go back to your office or wherever, you go to the storage room, you give the authorisation that certain weapons may be issued and then you phone Coetzee to come and see you?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that the same day that Kat Liebenberg asked you to do this?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And then Coetzee came to you. I assume that you at that stage had already spoken to de Kock?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And then you handed the weapons over to him?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And Coetzee then received the instructions to go and put it away, as a matter of urgency and he must ensure that it is discovered?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: I assume that Coetzee understood the plan, he was informed about it?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: So he understood the urgency of it? And he had to ensure that the weapons must be discovered and that the media had to be called in?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And this took place the next day?

MR SCHOON: Yes, as far as I can recall.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, continue.

MR MALAN: Just before you continue, just on this point. If I understand you correctly the discovery was, if it was done on the same day or occurred on the same day, it was part of the planning to whoever had to authorise it in the Cape, to convince him that it was necessary?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that was the whole idea of this issue.

MR MALAN: So if I understand you correctly, it was rather to convince whoever had to give the authorisation, to convince, he had to mislead the person who had to give the authorisation?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: In other words the person who had to authorise this, did not know the truth?

MR SCHOON: I do not know Mr Chairperson, if they were properly informed.

CHAIRPERSON: Then why do you say to Mr Malan that that person was misled?

MR SCHOON: It is a possibility, I was not present when this presentation was made.

CHAIRPERSON: But you testified that that was the plan, the plan was to mislead them?

MR SCHOON: No Mr Chairperson, the broader plan was that the broader public had to be misled by this so-called finding or discovery.

CHAIRPERSON: When Mr Malan asked you about the person who had to make the decision in the Cape, this discovery, as it was put to you, had to ensure that he would be convinced about the urgency of the matter, and then Mr Malan asked you that that person specifically was then mislead, and you said "yes, that was the plan."

MR SCHOON: That is a possibility Mr Chairperson, but I wasn't present at the presentation that was made.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Let us just try to clarify this matter. Brig Schoon, what did you think what was the reason for the creation of this false flag operation, this arms cache?

MR SCHOON: Firstly it had to be given to the media and then the public would be misled in that this arms cache was erected by the ANC.

MR VISSER: Was there any other purpose to it?

MR SCHOON: It also had to serve to convince those who had to give the permission.

MR VISSER: That is the conclusion that you made?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is.

MR VISSER: Just the last aspect ...

MR MALAN: Sorry Mr Visser, so you do not know if the permission or the authorisation was given before the arms cache was created?

MR SCHOON: No Mr Chairperson, I think it was given afterwards.

MR MALAN: Can you just try to tell me if you must think back, why did you have to go with them? You said that you had to be available, but why, what information could you provide Liebenberg with, that he could not present them with?

MR SCHOON: Mr Naude had the necessary information which would strengthen the hand of the Defence Force, to give permission. It would be the presence of MK cadres in Botswana and their activities.

CHAIRPERSON: Should the arms cache not play a role when you went to Cape Town to convince people that there is action needed in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: It is possible Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: But if that, you say it is a possibility, if it was used and weapons were found in the mine and it was the property of MK members, and that they used them, and it is very urgent now, they have got weapons, they are ready and they are in the country, would you not then provide that type of information to the person who had to make the decision?

MR SCHOON: I do not know Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: But what kind of standby were you in then, you had to be briefed about what you were supposed to say if it was necessary, that is now the person that you were trying to convince?

MR SCHOON: The person who had the information was Major Naude.

CHAIRPERSON: But you said that you went with, as your Advocate put to you, on a standby basis and that was to try and help them convince the person?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: If you were then called in, while you were on standby and said "come and give this person the necessary information to help them or assist them in making this decision", what would you have told them?

MR SCHOON: I would have told Mr Naude to tell them, because he had the facts on paper.

CHAIRPERSON: I would just like to cover one last aspect. You talked about a plan that was going to be used in this journey to Cape Town, what plan was this? You mentioned a plan in answer to a question of Mr Muller.

MR SCHOON: The plan was that the weapons be found and would then serve as a motivation to approve a request from the Defence Force to attack in Botswana.

CHAIRPERSON: Who would you have then said would have created the arms cache, the ANC or would you have said "no, it was us who did it"?

MR SCHOON: All indications had to point to the ANC.

CHAIRPERSON: And would you then have given the information that the arms cache was the ANC's, would you then have conveyed this to the person who had to make the decision?

MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I was not present.

CHAIRPERSON: No, but what would you have said, what information would you have given to this person, if you were asked?

MR SCHOON: I would possibly have said "yes, it was created by the ANC", otherwise ...

CHAIRPERSON: You wouldn't have had the authority to do what you had planned to do?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: In other words you would have misled them?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that the plan?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And was this plan then discussed amongst yourself and the others before you went to Cape Town?

MR SCHOON: I presume it would have been, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: You are on standby, if you are called in, this is what you have to say?

MR SCHOON: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Can we then deal with the last correction on page 211, that the media was allowed to visit the scene and take photographs, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: And you said that yourself and Martin Naude also visited the scene?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I do say so in my application, but it is wrong. I was confused here with the visit of another investigation that we were involved in.

MR VISSER: What investigation was that?

MR SCHOON: That was the investigation against a Hanekom.

MR VISSER: Was that a high treason case?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: What did you do during that investigation with Martin Naude?

MR SCHOON: This Defence Force member, a young man, we accompanied him where he indicated to us a hiding place where he hid documents, which is on the other side of Krugersdorp.

MR VISSER: Is this all that you could add to this matter, Brig Schoon?

MR SCHOON: That is all.

MR VISSER: Do you then apply for amnesty for any act or delict that was committed and that was in relation to this incident?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: What is that specifically, Mr Visser, possibly he does not know?

MR VISSER: Well Chairperson, it is obviously fraud. The whole plan has to be seen in the light of the attack which took place. You will hear that in fact the attack took place on the very same day, from the other witnesses. The attack that took place in Botswana which was obviously intended to kill people although nobody was killed, there may have been people injured, but obviously the intention was to murder people and to destroy property, and property was in fact destroyed.

We saw that on the television, I remember that well. But nobody was killed. It would include obviously connivance to murder and to damage property. In this case Chairperson, there was a clear, there was a clear defeating of the ends of justice as well. Certainly, well if you talk about fraud, I don't suppose you have to talk about defeating the ends of justice as well, but that is also a possible offence committed by the applicants.

Chairperson, my Attorney just mentions an interesting point, and that is the question of whether they should not apply for amnesty for transportation and possession of illegal arms, ammunition and I believe when he mentions it, Chairperson, I believe that in this case ...

CHAIRPERSON: Were there explosives there too, I don't know?

MR VISSER: Yes, Brig Schoon seems to remember that he obtained weapons and ammunition from Vlakplaas and from the store clerk, but he also authorised explosives from the Explosives Department, which is another department.

CHAIRPERSON: It was an air raid?

MR VISSER: Well, it was, they went in with airplanes, but they didn't bomb the place with the airplanes. They went in with helicopters, and they let down troops from the helicopters.

CHAIRPERSON: So we don't know if explosives were used or do we?

MR VISSER: They would have been, there is no question.

CHAIRPERSON: So they have contravened the Explosives Act as well?

MR VISSER: Absolutely, but of course one mustn't forget Chairperson, we are dealing here with the arms cache and there were definitely explosives.

CHAIRPERSON: Contravention of two Acts, the Arms and Ammunition and the Explosives Act?

MR VISSER: Yes Chairperson. With great respect, we would prefer it if you simply worded it any contravention in regard to the possession and transportation of arms and explosives because there are very many provisions and there is no way we can ever tabulate all of them here today, and I don't want the Attorney-General to say "you didn't get amnesty for that one".

CHAIRPERSON: Do you think he is likely to do it?

MR VISSER: Absolutely.

CHAIRPERSON: I thought those types of Attorney-Generals have retired?

MR VISSER: That is the evidence from Brig Schoon, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: With your permission Mr Chairperson, I would just like to follow up on something with Mr Schoon. Your Advocate has led you regarding the building and you said that you recall that it was a long white building, somewhere behind parliament. Would you be able to say to day which building you think it was?

MR SCHOON: It was a long white building, about two to three storeys high and it dated from the early days of the Cape, because they were busy restoring the place, and there were all sorts of photographs and museum pieces inside the building if I recall correctly.

MR MALAN: The reason why I have asked this is because I cannot imagine any other building in my mind, than Tuynhuis, or do you not know where this is? Was it on the mountain side of parliament or the ocean side of parliament?

MR SCHOON: I think it was in the direction of the mountain.

MR MALAN: But you don't know who they went to see and to whom they made the submission?

MR SCHOON: I suspect that it may have been the SSC or some or other parliamentary committee.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the next witness is ...

CHAIRPERSON: Before we, Mr Hugo, do you have any questions?

MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairman, thank you that you are looking after my interests here.

CHAIRPERSON: I unfortunately forgot you in the beginning, I am not going to make the same mistake.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairman, there are just two aspects. Brigadier, you have just said that the first meeting which took at Vlakplaas, was among others attended by Gen Kat Liebenberg. You would have noted in Mr de Kock's application that he also mentions Gen Joubert.

What is your recollection regarding this meeting, whether or not Gen Joubert was present?

MR SCHOON: I think he was present Chairperson.

MR HUGO: Yes, that is Mr de Kock's recollection, that Gen Joubert was indeed present. Then Mr de Kock also states that his recollection is somewhat vague regarding these aspects and he doesn't necessarily want to cross swords with you about it, however, we must place it on record that he recalls that the weaponry came from Vlakplaas and that he cannot recall that he was at Head Office to go and fetch the weapons there?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, if I recall correctly, Major Naude obtained the weapons from Head Office, however there were definitely weapons which came from Head Office.

MR HUGO: Whatever the case may be, you would concede that a substantial number of these weapons came from Vlakplaas?

MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson.

MR HUGO: Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp?

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

ADV SIGODI: These weapons that you had from Head Office, where did the State get them from?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, these were weapons which had served as exhibits in criminal cases regarding MK cadres, who had been charged, and who had been captured within the country in possession of these weapons. These weapons had then be sent to Head Office for safekeeping.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, now that

Mr Hugo has had the opportunity of putting what Mr de Kock is going to say, the one thing he has not put is a matter which is raised by Mr de Kock at page 60 to 61 and perhaps I should just ask Mr Schoon about this. I suspected that it might be covered in cross-examination, but my learned friend says that I can deal with it myself.

Brig Schoon, Major de Kock has stated in his amnesty application, that at a certain stage a request was made to him by an Army Colonel for more weapons which had to be added to the original group of weapons, and that he had discussed it with you, and that you had approved it, and that he fetched two or three Macarov pistols from Vlakplaas and added this to the group of weapons. Do you recall anything about that?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I can recall vaguely that the enquiry as to whether he, Mr de Kock, could take weapons was related to the material which the recces brought back from Botswana, to be submitted as evidence, representing weapons which had been found in Botswana and brought back to the Republic.

I do not think that it really had anything to do with the arms cache at Krugersdorp. That is the only logical inference that I can draw from this.

MR VISSER: Is it correct that you do not have a very good recollection of the matter?

MR SCHOON: No, but it is very possible that I may have told Col de Kock.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Schoon, you testified that the person who would have given you the authorisation to enter Botswana or any place, would be misled with this planned story of yours, and that he would not be informed that in actual fact, this arms cache had been planned by you to give the public the justification to take action in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, as I have already testified, I observed the request from Gen Liebenberg and what he was going to do afterwards, had nothing to do with me.

CHAIRPERSON: You testified that the story which would be given in Cape Town, was planned?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And primarily it would not have been truthful? What I want to know is, why you didn't want to present the truth to whoever you had to present it to, and why was it necessary to present a fabrication? You were aware that there were ANC members who were the enemy, there in Botswana and in other places, and that they presented a threat towards the country and that they were busy infiltrating the country and that they were busy with all sorts of activities, which were detrimental to you, but you decided that you would take them on and that you were going to do this and that to them, because it was a situation of warfare for you.

Why then was it necessary to plan to lie to the person who was supposed to give you the authorisation?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, it was the Defence Force's plan and by name, it was Gen Liebenberg and Gen Joubert, who devised this plan.

CHAIRPERSON: But you were there as backup. I want to know why you had to lie to that person? Why wasn't he told the truth?

MR SCHOON: I don't know what Gen Liebenberg told them, I wasn't present.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I know that, but I am referring to the stage prior to this when you were still planning not to tell the truth to those people, when you decided what you were going to tell them in order to obtain authorisation, at that stage you must have known why you were not going to tell the truth in Cape Town.

I simply want to know why it was feasible not to tell the truth to those persons? You would have obtained the authorisation, you were seeking authorisation, why was it necessary to lie?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I don't know whether or not lies were told.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I want to know about the plan, why was the plan to be untruthful? You yourself testified that if you were called in, you would be there as backup, if you had been called in there to assist in persuading this person or these persons, would you also have lied, and furthermore you conceded that you knew that you had to be able to lie in that situation and the possibility of that was discussed.

I want to know why was it necessary to betray that person or those persons in order to obtain authorisation for the Botswana attack?

MR SCHOON: It is very simple Chairperson. They had to be persuaded that these were the facts, and that on the strength of these facts, they had to grant permission for an official attack in Botswana.

CHAIRPERSON: But why wouldn't they have received the truth and by means of the truth, have extended their authorisation?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, perhaps they would not have granted authorisation.

CHAIRPERSON: How was that discussed amongst you? Why did you think that if you tell the truth, you might not have obtained authorisation?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, the idea of an arms cache came exclusively from the Defence Force.

CHAIRPERSON: So?

MR SCHOON: And I was simply instrumental in the execution of these orders.

CHAIRPERSON: However, you went with to Cape Town?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: You went with to obtain authorisation or approval from a person or persons to take action within Botswana and to blow up a place there, or whatever the case may be? I can understand the reasons for it, the real reasons and for the purposes of the public, this additional plan or contingency plan, was put into operation in order to indicate to the public "there are our enemies, they are armed, we have the right to attack them", isn't that correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Furthermore I understand that authorisation had to be obtained in Cape Town as well from whoever it may have been, I am not certain who it was.

Previously it was planned that you would be there as a standby person to assist in convincing these persons or this person, to grant authorisation. We know that that person, or that body of persons, would have to be betrayed in order to obtain authorisation. Why was it necessary to betray them and not tell them the truth?

MR SCHOON: I don't know Chairperson, it was the plan that the Special Forces came to us with and we fell in with the plan, and did what they asked us to do.

CHAIRPERSON: But when you discussed it, when you discussed the fact that you will tell them this story in order to obtain authorisation, certainly you must have discussed the reason why you are not going to tell the truth and the reasons why it was necessary to betray them?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I cannot answer that.

CHAIRPERSON: You don't know?

MR SCHOON: No, I don't know.

CHAIRPERSON: But you were prepared to go and lie there?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: One question relating to your application, you provide your history that you were a member of the South African Police from 1949 onwards, you also sketched how you were promoted and so forth. You state that you were also a member of the National Party at that stage, you were a regular member?

MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: On behalf of who did you act in all these cases?

MR SCHOON: On behalf of the Police, on request of the Defence Force.

CHAIRPERSON: From what political prospective did you act?

MR SCHOON: From the perspective that the ANC at that stage, was our enemy and I found it acceptable for them to be attacked.

CHAIRPERSON: But did you act on behalf of a political party, in the interest of any political party?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I acted in the interest of the South African Police and by nature of the government which I served.

CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps you can assist me Mr Visser, that would be Exhibit A in which it was stated that the government of the day had to be protected?

MR VISSER: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: That is how you acted in order to protect the interests of the country and the interests of that government?

MR SCHOON: That is what I believed at that stage.

CHAIRPERSON: As a policeman you acted from that political perspective.

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: These persons who had to provide the authorisation for action in Botswana, they were members of the government?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: From that perspective you could understand the importance of the question, why was it necessary to lie to them or to the person, whoever it was, because then if you had lied, it could be argued that you did not act in the interest of, or for the approval of that government because it was necessary to lie to them? Do you understand the question?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I understand it Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: It is in that regard that I have put the question, because it is very significant. I have to consider it, I don't know what our decision will be, but it is extremely significant. Do you have any comment on that?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I have put the facts to you as I recall them, and I believe that I acted in the best interest of the country at that stage and time. There is nothing more.

CHAIRPERSON: No, but in the interest of a party is also important, it was in the interest of the government, is that also your evidence?

MR SCHOON: The National Party was in power.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, basically speaking they were the government.

MR SCHOON: I acted in the best interests of their maintenance of power, by combatting the ANC.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but why did you lie to them when you sought their authorisation, because those were the rules, you had to obtain approval. The question is this action in Botswana, along with all the sophisticated planning, did it enjoy approval?

If you lied to them, then the question would be whether or not they gave the correct approval and the question which follows from that is whether or not these persons then acted in the best interests of the country or the government?

MR SCHOON: I wasn't personally present when authorisation was extended for the action and I don't know what was said to those persons by Gen Liebenberg.

CHAIRPERSON: But you must have had a fair idea of what they were going to say before they went in, because you were there as a backup person, and you knew that they would be lying. That was part of the plan?

They couldn't have spoken to you if they had said that they were going to call you in to provide backup details to whoever it was that they were making these submissions to, for example the State President, if they wanted you to come in at a certain stage to assist in persuading him to give the permission to take action in Botswana.

You would have told lies. We know that now. The question then arises, to what extent was the action in the best interests of the country or the government at that stage?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, it would have strengthened their hand to give permission for the Defence Force, to proceed with an overt operation in Botswana.

CHAIRPERSON: Then why weren't they told the truth, why would they not have been told the truth in order to be able to arrive at the correct decision, whatever that decision may have been ultimately?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, as I have already stated, I was not present, and it may be that Gen Liebenberg then told them the truth, that this cache wasn't really a genuine ANC cache, that it had been rigged.

MR MALAN: Mr Schoon, I don't know whether or not you have studied Mr de Kock's application?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I have.

MR MALAN: On page 61 of the Bundle, and I ask you the question now, because you will already have been excused once Mr de Kock gives evidence, he states in the middle paragraph on that page -

Do you see that sentence?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR MALAN: Now before I continue to examine you, would I be correct to understand that Mr de Kock's only involvement was that he went to fetch certain weapons at Vlakplaas, and made them available to Major Coetzee?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is how I recall it Chairperson.

MR MALAN: But it would appear here as if Mr de Kock was also informed regarding the reason for the establishment of this arms cache?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR MALAN: Because he mentions the Department of Foreign Affairs, so it would appear that in his mind he understood that the Defence Force and the Police, most probably were of the opinion that an invasion of Botswana was necessary?

MR SCHOON: I would agree with that.

MR MALAN: According to Mr de Kock, and we will examine him about this, but according to information that he must have received, and that he could not have received from anyone other than you or Liebenberg or Joubert, if they had spoken to him there at Vlakplaas, there must have been an indication to him that Foreign Affairs did not want an invasion in Botswana? Doesn't it appear to be so from Mr de Kock's document and that the persons who were misled had to be misled, or had to be placed in a predicament and that these persons were the Department of Foreign Affairs, because they had to be notified before there was a cross-border action because that would lead to a diplomatic situation?

The Defence Force reasoned that they could no longer cooperate with Foreign Affairs and they decided to create a certain scenario. In other words this arms cache and you stated that this was to strengthen the hand of the government upon a question which was put by the Chairperson, Should we not infer from that, that it was necessary to strengthen the government's hand partially in order to bully Foreign Affairs, so that they could not veto an invasion of Botswana. Can you not recall anything like that?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, that is a strong possibility.

MR MALAN: That is not the question, I want to know whether or not you can remember that, because Mr de Kock clearly has such recollections, in actual fact he expresses his frustrations in the following paragraph, the last sentence of that paragraph where he states that he really does not know who was in control of the country any more, whether it was the Police or the politicians or the politicians, he wasn't sure who was making the decisions any more.

I have never heard such evidence from him, and he has presented many applications before us, where I have been part of the panel who heard him. In fact Mr de Kock has always blamed the politicians, but here it is clear that we have a converse approach. Here he feels that the Defence Force and the Police have cooperated in order to obtain a certain decision that they wanted from the government. Can you not recall anything like that, that during that period in time, it was said to you that it was actually about having a decision made to invade Botswana and to tie the hands of Foreign Affairs. Don't say it is possible, I want to know if you can recall this.

MR SCHOON: I cannot recall this at this stage.

MR MALAN: Very well, I will put it to Mr de Kock.

MR SCHOON: There were always problems between the Security Forces and Foreign Affairs. I know that there were such problems.

MR MALAN: But you cannot link this to this incident?

MR SCHOON: No.

MR MALAN: Then I will examine Mr de Kock about it furthermore, thank you.

ADV SIGODI: Mr Schoon, you are also an applicant in the Nat Serache matter, what I want to know is what was the difference when you went to attack Nat Serache's house in Botswana and this instance, where you had to get some authority because there you decided the matter on your own on the farm, and then you decided to go and attack Nat Serache's hose?

MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, yes, the Serache incident was a covert operation where the Defence Force could decide themselves to give permission, and they did not need any other authorisation. Such covert operations or operations different from this covert operation, needed authorisation from the State Security Council.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Schoon, I am not quite sure that you are right, because we have heard other matters and decisions or heard of decisions and it was explained to us who must ask whom for permission, but that is now another matter.

I am still worried about the question I put to you and Mr Malan gave you an example out of Mr de Kock's application. The question still stands, this action, the whole plan, was that done with the correct authorisation and in the interest of the government of the day, what do you say?

In the light of the lies that you had to, or that you planned to tell?

MR SCHOON: I believe so Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. You are excused.

MR SCHOON: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, may I ask in the case of Brig Schoon, whether he can go back to bed? Thank you Chairperson, he will be available if he is needed to come back.

The next witness I wish to call is Mr Martin Naude. His evidence you will find at page 118 to 128 and he deals with the application in the present case at page 121, Chairperson. He is not Charl Naude, he is Martin Naude.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAIRPERSON: What language would you prefer, Mr Naude?

MR NAUDE: Afrikaans, please.

MARTIN J NAUDE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Please be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Naude, you are an applicant in this incident, and you also apply for amnesty, the same as for what Brig Schoon is asking for?

MR NAUDE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You have done this before, but do you once again ask that the general background to the amnesty applications, Exhibit A must be included into your application?

MR NAUDE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You have also received Exhibit B and you had the opportunity to go through it, does it also correlate with your experience and information that you had during this period of time as it appears in Exhibit B?

MR NAUDE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Can you then confirm it and ask that it be incorporated into your evidence? Your application, did you go through your application and can you confirm that it is true and correct as far as your memory goes?

MR NAUDE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: What was your position in 1988 in the South African Police?

MR NAUDE: I was then working in C2, it is an integral part of C2, where we did research concerning acts of terror in South Africa.

MR VISSER: The research, what did this entail?

MR NAUDE: Research that we worked with was everything that - from the training of the freedom movements, all of them, the type of training that they underwent, the facilities that they used, the routes that they used to infiltrate South Africa, different workings of different ANC machineries and everything that had to do with the onslaught.

MR VISSER: Did you yourself handle informants or was it somebody else's task?

MR NAUDE: C2 was not personally involved with the handling of informants, but to a greater degree, we did recruitments. We infiltrated members of the freedom movements and we interrogated people in detention concerning the training and the facilities of the organisations outside of South Africa.

MR VISSER: Did you also receive security reports?

MR NAUDE: Yes, in the nature of the work or the group, I received these reports.

MR VISSER: Did you coordinate information?

MR NAUDE: Yes. Personally we did not generate it to such a great extent, it worked on the principle of an ant heap in which Military Intelligence and the Security Branch added it, or put it in the same basket at Trevits where we then worked through it and then tasked it to different individuals.

MR VISSER: Did you have a place in Trevits?

MR NAUDE: I was never part of, or I never played an integral role at Trevits, but I did make presentations, yes.

MR VISSER: Did you also work with the National Branch and provided them with information?

MR NAUDE: Under correction, no, I don't think so.

MR VISSER: Can you just explain or tell the Committee what your memory is concerning the circumstances in the light of the creation of or establishment of an arms cache in 1988.

MR NAUDE: During that specific day, that was in the late afternoon, I attended a briefing session at Vlakplaas, that was attended by Trevits members of the Defence Force, and at this briefing a target was identified.

CHAIRPERSON: What meeting was this?

MR NAUDE: It was a meeting, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Continue.

MR VISSER: You said at this meeting a target was identified by the Defence Force?

MR NAUDE: Yes, from where the last group of infiltrators allegedly will then infiltrate and it was identified over a period of time as a known ANC facility from where infiltration took place.

MR VISSER: Who gave this briefing?

MR NAUDE: I am not quite sure. The meeting was mostly the Trevits and the representatives from the Defence Force who did this presentation.

MR VISSER: Trevits generally speaking is reconciled with target development?

MR NAUDE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: So this was Trevits busy with what they were supposed to do, that is target development?

MR NAUDE: That is correct, yes.

MR VISSER: Was Brig Schoon present?

MR NAUDE: I cannot remember if the Brigadier was present at this specific presentation.

MR VISSER: But can you remember what happened at this meeting?

MR NAUDE: Well, during this meeting, or after it was concluded, but during meetings with Trevits tasks were given to, especially for the group for which I was responsible, for example if there was a place abroad that you are not quite sure of, you pertinently in following interrogation, attempt to get more information about that specific target so that that target can be developed over a longer period of time.

After I attended the briefing, I left the farm and went to my office in town.

MR VISSER: On page 122 you also refer to the fact that you received an instruction. What was that?

MR NAUDE: After I arrived at the office, there was a message for me that Brig Schoon asked me to come back to the farm.

MR VISSER: That is Vlakplaas?

MR NAUDE: Yes. My colleague Jan Meyer, I asked him to accompany me to drive back to the farm.

MR VISSER: He is also an applicant?

MR NAUDE: Yes.

MR VISSER: What happened there?

MR NAUDE: When we arrived on the farm, I met Brig Schoon and Eugene ...

MR VISSER: Please use the surnames.

MR NAUDE: I beg your pardon, I met Mr de Kock and Schoon outside. De Kock then told me, or there were weapons laying on a wall next to them, and Brig Schoon said I must take these weapons to Krugersdorp and hand it over to Coetzee and he would be able to know what to do with them.

MR VISSER: Very well, continue.

MR NAUDE: Myself and Capt Meyer picked up the weapons, we drove to the Explosives Unit where I picked up explosives.

CHAIRPERSON: According to instructions that you received from Schoon?

MR NAUDE: I cannot recall if it was on instruction from Schoon.

CHAIRPERSON: Why would you then go and pick up explosives?

MR NAUDE: If I remember correctly Mr Chairperson, it was just the weapons and then I went to the Explosives Unit where I got mine.

MR VISSER: But the question is why did you go there, unless somebody told you to go there, why did you go to the Explosives Unit?

MR NAUDE: It could be possible that Brig Schoon told me to get further items at the Explosives Unit.

MR VISSER: Whatever it may be that you collected, the weapons or explosives, what did you do with it?

MR NAUDE: We then put the material in a trunk and I took this to Krugersdorp where Col Coetzee met me at the police station.

MR VISSER: Can you remember how late that was?

MR NAUDE: I am not quite sure, but it was approximately ten or eleven that evening.

MR VISSER: You then handed it over to Coetzee?

MR NAUDE: Yes, after he met us there, we went home early the next morning, then he took us to a place, where we buried the material together.

MR VISSER: So you were present when this material was buried?

MR NAUDE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you informed at that stage when it was buried, what the plans were?

MR NAUDE: Mr Chairperson, I attended the briefing, but I did not know what was going to happen with the weapons, but after I spoke to Col Coetzee in Krugersdorp, I knew what was going to happen.

CHAIRPERSON: Who told you?

MR NAUDE: Col Coetzee told me about this.

MR VISSER: Were you also present when the weapons were "discovered"?

MR NAUDE: No, I was not present when the weapons were "discovered", after we buried it, we returned to Pretoria. I took a shower and caught a flight to Cape Town.

MR VISSER: You showered and flew to Cape Town?

MR NAUDE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Why did you do that?

MR NAUDE: During the meeting it was decided that myself and Brig Schoon must represent the SA Police at the meeting because regular Trevits representatives were not at the meeting.

MR VISSER: What meeting was this where the Trevits members were not present?

MR NAUDE: It was that meeting where the transit house target was identified.

MR VISSER: At Vlakplaas?

MR NAUDE: Yes.

MR VISSER: So you are saying that it was only the Defence Force and the Police and not the other members of Trevits, is that what you are saying?

MR NAUDE: Yes, I am not quite sure if there were members.

MR VISSER: You use abbreviations, can you just tell what NIA stands for?

MR NAUDE: The National Intelligence Service people.

MR MALAN: I do not think it as National Intelligence Service, I think it was just NI, National Intelligence?

MR NAUDE: Yes.

MR VISSER: That will be a whole different name.

MR MALAN: I hear you talk about the SA Police and the SA Defence Force, it is the old acronyms?

MR VISSER: What did you do in Cape Town?

MR NAUDE: During the meeting that took place on the farm, we decided that we had to make a presentation from the Defence Force ranks.

MR VISSER: What was the purpose of this presentation?

MR NAUDE: I heard what was testified before and I can make no other conclusion, and I also agree that it had to be sanctioned.

MR VISSER: What operation is this?

MR NAUDE: The cross-border action on the transit house.

CHAIRPERSON: Why did you go to the Cape?

MR NAUDE: As I said Mr Chairperson, my group was to a great extent responsible for the generating of information. So if there were any doubt about that facility, I had the capacity to get the record of that facility and say that so many freedom fighters infiltrated the country and the most recent information we got yesterday, that the next group would possibly infiltrate South Africa, and the time.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that all that you would have said if you were asked?

MR NAUDE: If I was asked in the Cape?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes?

MR NAUDE: I would have been able to give them the historical use of the facility as well as the current facility. I wouldn't say two hours ago, but the last interrogation that we had.

CHAIRPERSON: But that would have been the truth concerning the information that you had?

MR NAUDE: Yes, that is the truth.

CHAIRPERSON: And you accepted it as the truth?

MR NAUDE: Yes, I did, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Continue.

MR VISSER: What happened, well, can you remember where in Cape Town you were? You heard what Brig Schoon said, what do you say?

MR NAUDE: Well Mr Chairperson, I also heard the questions that the Committee asked the Brigadier about the building. If you are in the narrow road behind the parliament, before you go into the parking lot, it is on your immediate right.

MR VISSER: Do you know what meeting it was that took place there?

MR NAUDE: I have no idea, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: If you had to speculate, what would you say?

MR NAUDE: If I had to speculate, I would say that somebody very high up had to sanction this operation.

MR VISSER: Well, we know that the weapons were found at this arms cache?

MR NAUDE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: What is your recollection, where were you when this happened?

MR NAUDE: That is correct, this weapon or ammunition cache was found I think in the early morning while we were on our way to the Cape, that is when the news broke that they found this ammunition cache outside Krugersdorp.

MR VISSER: Just before the meeting, so that this can also be discussed at the meeting?

MR NAUDE: I do not know if it was before or after, but yes, it happened at the same time.

MR VISSER: As far as your knowledge goes, authorisation was then given for this attack in Botswana?

MR NAUDE: That is correct yes. If I can recall correctly, the operation took place the next morning.

MR VISSER: In your application you say just like Mr de Kock, that this was the 28th of March?

MR NAUDE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Are you quite sure of that date?

MR NAUDE: I am not sure, but because I was involved from A - Z I can put it in order of what I know, I cannot say that is definitely this date or that date.

CHAIRPERSON: I understand that. Maybe they will ask you what time it was, too.

MR VISSER: Mr Naude maybe you can just assist us then, if we accept that the attack took place on the 28th, it would then have meant that that evening of the 27th of March, you left for the Cape in this military plane?

MR MALAN: No Mr Visser, I think he said he left in the morning, the early morning.

MR VISSER: In relation with the 28th, if that is the correct date, when was the meeting at Vlakplaas, would it have been the 27th?

MR NAUDE: I am going to try and make it easier for myself, let us say the meeting took place this afternoon, then we went that evening to prepare the arms cache, the next morning we went for the briefing and the next morning the air operation took place.

MR VISSER: So the meeting was probably on the 26th?

MR NAUDE: Yes, most probably.

MR VISSER: And what did you do, did you do it out of the conviction that it fell within your task as a policeman, that you were doing your work as a policeman?

MR NAUDE: Definitely yes. As a member of the Security Branch, yes, I do not know about a policeman at that time.

MR VISSER: Do you also confirm your political motivation as you put it out in your application?

MR NAUDE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: As far as you know, were there any person that was killed or injured in this attack that followed afterwards?

MR NAUDE: No, not as far as I know.

MR VISSER: Can you remember anything of that attack or how it happened?

MR NAUDE: As far as my knowledge goes, it was an operation that was launched with choppers.

MR VISSER: With helicopters?

MR NAUDE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Were there any members of the Security Branch that accompanied them to Botswana?

MR NAUDE: No.

MR VISSER: Was it purely Special Forces of the Defence Force?

MR NAUDE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

MR HUGO: Mr Chairman, I see it is about five to one and I want to take instructions just on two or three aspects, would it be possible for us to take the short adjournment now?

CHAIRPERSON: We will take the adjournment, and start at quarter to two.

MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairman.

ON RESUMPTION:

MARTIN J. NAUDE: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Naude, you say that from time to time, you had session on Trevits' meetings, is that correct? You would agree that Mr de Kock in his capacity as Commander of Vlakplaas, never had session at the Trevits meetings?

MR NAUDE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HUGO: And I will accept that you would agree with me, that according to your perception, he was applied as an operative in the broader sense of the word?

MR NAUDE: That is correct.

MR HUGO: Just to clarify some unclarity in my mind, it would appear that the activities that took place at Vlakplaas, or the meeting that took place at Vlakplaas was on the 26th of March, it wasn't a brief meeting that was concluded swiftly, it was a consistent meeting which took place over quite a long period on that day?

MR NAUDE: Yes, it may be so, because as I have attempted to explain, there was a continuous development of targets and if there were any gaps or problems, it had to be approached from an overall perspective, there was continuous analysis of the developments of certain aspects.

MR HUGO: And with regard to these discussions, Mr de Kock did not have session or participation, it was only at a later stage that he was given instructions by Brig Schoon?

MR NAUDE: That is correct.

MR HUGO: Then I would like to ask you the following, did you have any perception that Foreign Affairs specifically was obstructive with regard to the proposed cross-border operations which were to be launched?

MR NAUDE: If I have to give you an honest answer, I would have to say that I do not know, because I was never exposed on that level, and I am not precisely clear regarding Foreign Affairs' position on cross-border operations and the like.

MR HUGO: So you were not present during a discussion? Mr de Kock will testify that Mr Joubert specifically told him that Foreign Affairs were obstructive regarding the proposed cross-border operations?

MR NAUDE: I would not be able to comment on that, I was not present.

MR HUGO: Very well. And then I would like to ask you the following, your general perception regarding the prevention or the observation of orders which were given by the command structure, how did you view it at that point?

MR NAUDE: Along with my amnesty application, I included a description of Unit C's task and function and our orders which were issued to us, had to be observed.

MR HUGO: You would not have considered disobeying these orders?

MR NAUDE: Not.

MR HUGO: And you would agree with me that firstly you thought it was in the best interest of the country, and secondly that it would have been detrimental to your career if you had considered disobeying these orders?

MR NAUDE: Well, whether or not it would have been detrimental to my career, is difficult to say, what I can agree with what you put to me.

MR HUGO: By the way, what was your rank during the commission of this operation?

MR NAUDE: I was a Major.

MR HUGO: Mr de Kock was also a Major?

MR NAUDE: Yes, I am speaking under correction, but I do think so.

MR HUGO: Thank you Chair.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions Mr Chairman, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: As I have understood your evidence, although you went to Cape Town, were you not aware of a plan to mislead the government in order to obtain approval for the attack in Botswana, you were not aware of any such plan?

MR NAUDE: No Chairperson, but with your permission, because I have heard the evidence given by the Brigadier, I would like to comment on that.

CHAIRPERSON: Go ahead.

MR NAUDE: The facts regarding the cross-border operation were clinically correct, the facility had been used over a long period of time.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I understand that.

MR NAUDE: When I came to Krugersdorp and went to Col Coetzee and we went to bury the arms, I realised for the first time that we were actually busy with a STRATKOM action so to speak, and a STRATKOM action, according to our training, was the manipulation of facts in order to create a certain situation.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I understand that, but you did not know of a plan to mislead the government.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. You are excused.

MR NAUDE: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the next witness is Mr Meyer. His application is to be found in the Bundle, at page 106 through to 117 and his application appears at page 108.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Meyer, do you prefer to speak Afrikaans?

J C MEYER: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Meyer, you are also an applicant and do you also request the same amnesty as the previous witnesses, is that correct?

MR MEYER: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, you may proceed directly to his share in the incident.

MR VISSER: Would you accept Chairperson, that all the persons for whom I am appearing, incorporates Exhibit A and B in their applications, then we could proceed swiftly.

Mr Meyer, I understand that you were ill, that indeed on the 25th of April last year, after a rugby match, you suffered a cardiac arrest, is that correct?

MR MEYER: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And were you medically treated for that?

MR MEYER: Yes, I was.

MR VISSER: And did you receive an affidavit from Dr Josef Jacobs in which it is summarised that you were left with a memory problem and that the chances are that this memory problem might last for a number of months to come or indefinitely?

MR MEYER: Yes, he mentioned to me that this could be so and he gave me that letter. I don't know whether it is actually an affidavit as such. No, it is not an affidavit.

MR VISSER: No, this is simply an authentic copy of a letter. I request leave to submit this, for what it is worth and can we mark it as Exhibit C. We do not have copies available, but I have already read out on the record what appears on the document, so we will table it now.

Mr Meyer, what can you recall regarding the events? I beg your pardon.

CHAIRPERSON: Is the certificate for the client?

MR VISSER: I do apologise. Mr Meyer, what can you recall of the events pertaining to this arms cache?

MR MEYER: Chairperson, it was during March 1988 when I was at the office when my Commander, Mr Naude, came to me and told me to accompany him.

MR VISSER: Just tell us what was your rank at that stage?

MR MEYER: I was a Lieutenant or a Captain, I am not entirely certain.

MR VISSER: By the way, while we are on the question of ranks, in your amnesty application you state or it is stated on page 107 of the Bundle, that you joined the Police in 1996 and you have stated that that is incorrect, it should be 1969.

In which division were you, were you with Mr Naude?

MR MEYER: Yes, I was with him in Unit C2, of which he was the Commander.

MR VISSER: He came to you and requested you to accompany him?

MR MEYER: Yes, I don't know what the circumstances were at the office that day, but I did accompany him.

MR VISSER: And then what happened as you can recall?

MR MEYER: I recall that we went to Vlakplaas, where we obtained the arms. It was quite late that afternoon and after we had received the arms, we went through to Krugersdorp where we found the then Captain Coetzee.

We went to bury the arms.

MR VISSER: Were you present when the arms were buried?

MR MEYER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you have anything further to do with the matter subsequently?

MR MEYER: No, after we had buried the weapons, we returned and the following day I proceeded with my usual duties.

MR VISSER: Did you know the purpose of the burial of these arms?

MR MEYER: I wasn't entirely certain of the purpose, but my inference was that there must be something as what has already been mentioned, which could take place.

MR VISSER: In other words it served as a motivation for some form of action?

MR MEYER: Yes.

MR VISSER: But nobody informed you pertinently?

MR MEYER: No.

MR VISSER: But subsequently you discovered that that was the case?

MR MEYER: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

MR HUGO: I have no questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

ADV SIGODI: Who discovered the arms?

MR MEYER: Who discovered the arms? Chairperson, I am not entirely certain. I cannot recall who precisely discovered the arms the following day.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you not present?

MR MEYER: No, I was not present.

ADV SIGODI: But do you know who was told where you had put the arms?

MR MEYER: No, I cannot recall how it came to be and I wasn't there, so I wouldn't know how it occurred.

ADV SIGODI: Who chose the spot where the arms would be buried?

MR MEYER: If I recall correctly, it was Capt Coetzee at that stage.

ADV SIGODI: Were there landmarks by which you could identify where these arms were buried, for somebody to discover them?

MR MEYER: Chairperson, I don't believe there were any actual landmarks as such, but it was very spacious in terms of bushes.

ADV SIGODI: Okay, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, in connection with which charges would this application be made?

MR VISSER: The illegal possession of arms, the transportation of arms. He himself states that nobody informed him before the time, but that he subsequently knew what the purpose of this exercise was, which places him in the same category, although his knowledge came after the fact or after the event. It is very much similar, there is nothing that really distinguishes his actions with the exception of the time frame.

CHAIRPERSON: When you removed the arms from wherever and took them to Krugersdorp, did you know that what you were doing, was illegal or did you act according to instructions?

MR MEYER: Among others Chairperson, I was also acting under instructions, but I would not be able to say now that I was completely certain that it wasn't illegal.

CHAIRPERSON: What did you do to transport the arms? Why did you think they were doing this?

MR MEYER: I must have thought that it was for a reason.

CHAIRPERSON: An illegal reason or a legal reason?

MR MEYER: I would not say completely illegal reason.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, thank you, you are excused.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the next witness is Mr Coetzee, whose application is at page 67 to 79. The incident is dealt with at page 76.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAIRPERSON: Mr Coetzee, do you prefer to speak Afrikaans?

MR COETZEE: Please Chairperson.

J C COETZEE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, you are also an applicant in this incident. What was your rank in 1988 and where were you stationed at that time?

MR COETZEE: I was a Major and I was stationed at the Security Branch, Krugersdorp.

MR VISSER: Who was your Commander?

MR COETZEE: Gen le Roux.

MR VISSER: Le Roux?

MR COETZEE: Yes, le Roux.

MR VISSER: Were you second in command or what was the position?

MR COETZEE: I cannot recall precisely.

MR VISSER: Very well. What can you recall regarding this incident?

MR COETZEE: What I can recall is that on a certain day I was telephonically contacted by Brig Schoon, and told to come and see him in his office in Pretoria. If I recall correctly, it was more or less at midday.

MR VISSER: You may continue.

MR COETZEE: Once I had arrived at Brig Schoon's office, he informed me that the South African Defence Force were looking for a reason to launch an operation against an ANC facility in Botswana.

He requested me to return to Krugersdorp and to find a suitable place where I would be able to create an arms cache or fabricate an arms cache whatever the term may be, and that later during the course of the day or the night, arms would be supplied to me, which I would then have to conceal in that case.

MR VISSER: Just a minute, before you proceed. What had to happen with the arms cache, once you had buried the arms?

MR COETZEE: This arms cache would once again have to be discovered that night, I had to fabricate an excuse to find the arms cache and then the usual procedure which would be followed with such a discovery, had to be followed. That would be the Commanders of the various police departments and all other relevant bodies or structures had to be informed.

MR VISSER: Very well. What did you do then?

MR COETZEE: I returned to Krugersdorp and I found a suitable place in a mine heap, where the ground wasn't as hard and I telephonically contacted Brig Schoon and told him that everything was ready, that he could send the arms through that we agreed.

That evening, at approximately eleven o'clock or twelve o'clock, I were to meet members from Head Office at the Krugersdorp police station and that they would have the arms.

MR VISSER: Did you inform your Commander?

MR COETZEE: Yes. My Commander had been out previously during the day, but once he returned, I told him the whole story and informed him that at some or other point during the night, I would be disrupting his night's rest and that we would have to do the necessary so that the Public Relations department of the Police and all other persons and the press and the media would be alerted.

MR VISSER: You said you found a place where the ground wasn't as hard, did you dig a hole there or had you not yet done so?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, as far as I can recall, we dug a hole, but at that stage I didn't know the quantity of arms which would be given to me.

MR VISSER: Very well. Were any members of the Security Branch with you?

MR COETZEE: Yes, there were persons with me.

MR VISSER: Can you recall who they were?

MR COETZEE: I really cannot recall who they were. Since then I have made enquiries from certain members and they have said that it wasn't any of them.

I know that there was at least one other member with me.

CHAIRPERSON: When was this, when you went to dig the hole?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: You returned and reported back to Brig Schoon and then, on that evening, did anything further take place?

MR COETZEE: Yes, later that night, at the agreed time, there were a number of men who arrived at the police station at Krugersdorp. They arrived in two vehicles, I think one was a bakkie and the other was a normal motor vehicle.

MR VISSER: Yes?

CHAIRPERSON: Which men?

MR COETZEE: There were quite a number of members from the Demolitions Unit in Pretoria and from C.

CHAIRPERSON: Approximately how many?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, I really cannot recall.

CHAIRPERSON: Two, 10, 20?

MR COETZEE: I would say about three or four.

MR VISSER: Can you recall the names of some of them?

MR COETZEE: I can recall Mr Naude. I am not certain whether Josh Hammon from the Demolitions Division was there, or whether it was du Preez. I really cannot recall.

MR VISSER: Very well. Mr Meyer stated that he was also present. Can you recall him?

MR COETZEE: I cannot recall him, and he told me today that he had been present there.

MR VISSER: Very well. What did you do then?

MR COETZEE: We went to the place at the mine heap and took out the arms from the car and buried it in the place, the quantity was so big that we had to widen the hole. I had to go and fetch spades from my house.

We buried the items and the members who came subsequently from Pretoria, returned.

MR VISSER: Did they assist with the digging of the hole?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR VISSER: And then they left?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: What did you do then?

MR COETZEE: I waited for a few hours, until about three or four o'clock that morning, then I telephoned Gen le Roux as had been agreed and informed him telephonically of the arms cache which had been found, due to information that we had obtained.

He had to deal with the rest and notify everybody.

CHAIRPERSON: He must have been expecting the call?

MR COETZEE: Yes, he was expecting it.

CHAIRPERSON: Why did you phone him? He would have known what was going to happen?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, that was part of the agreement, that this thing had to appear to be genuine. You couldn't concoct something and then it wouldn't operate properly. Under normal circumstances it would have worked like that, if I had found something like that at night, I would have telephoned him, that is why I phoned him.

CHAIRPERSON: But those were circumstances during which he wouldn't have known about it before the time?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: But in this case he knew about it prior to the time, why did you phone him?

MR COETZEE: To make it all appear genuine.

CHAIRPERSON: For who?

MR COETZEE: I don't know if there were any persons who were tapping telephone lines, or anything like that.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you also do so?

MR COETZEE: Yes, of course we did. Section 118 of the Postal Act authorised us to do so.

CHAIRPERSON: But I wouldn't have thought that you people in the Security Police would have tapped each other's phones?

MR COETZEE: One could never say that, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And were members of the press then present at the scene the following morning?

MR COETZEE: Yes, the following morning Chris Olckers and his team arrived there and there were many reporters.

CHAIRPERSON: Did Mr le Roux ensure that they were called in?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You were busy telling us that Chris Olckers and his team were there. Was this broadcast on television?

MR COETZEE: Yes, it was.

MR VISSER: And regarding you, there was extensive media coverage?

MR COETZEE: Yes. We took everything out and packed all the items on blankets. They took photographs and everything looked lovely. The plan had worked.

MR VISSER: And furthermore, we know that apparently authorisation had to be extended because an attack took place?

MR COETZEE: Yes, I am not entirely certain about the course of time, but on that very same day or the following morning, I heard over the news that there had been an attack in Botswana on an ANC facility.

MR VISSER: You state on page 76 of your application, the final paragraph you refer to this attack and you say that it was a residence and that a number of persons were killed in the process? What was your information regarding this, because thus far we have no information about any fatalities. Perhaps you have information that could shed some light on this?

MR COETZEE: The only explanation that I can give Chairperson, is that as a member of the Security Force, I was involved in quite a number of things, I may have confused it with other attacks in Botswana.

MR VISSER: Perhaps you are correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes, I may be correct, that is how I recall it.

MR VISSER: Very well. Thank you Mr Chair.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CHAIRPERSON: You say that this is how you recall it, but how would you have discovered this, because you weren't there in Botswana?

MR COETZEE: No Chairperson, I heard on the news that there was an attack

CHAIRPERSON: And that people had been killed?

MR COETZEE: I cannot say that it was said that people were killed.

CHAIRPERSON: Let us assume that you say that this is how you recall the story, that persons were killed. Where would you have obtained that information or how would you have obtained such information?

MR COETZEE: As I have said, I may be confusing this incident with another incident, either prior or subsequent to this incident in which I was involved.

CHAIRPERSON: You are not certain that persons were actually killed during this attack?

MR COETZEE: I am not certain, I was not there.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

MR HUGO: I've got no questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, Mr Chair.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, the last witness from my side, is Gen Johan le Roux. His application is at page 80 to 92. He deals with the application at page 88. He is ready to take the oath and he prefers to address you in Afrikaans.

JOHAN H LE ROUX: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr le Roux, you are also an applicant. In your application on page 88, you have stated that you cannot recall whether the incident took place in 1987 or 1988, are you satisfied to accept that it took place in March 1988?

MR LE ROUX: Yes, I accept it as such, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: At that stage, what was your position in the Security Branch?

MR LE ROUX: I was the Divisional Commander of the West Rand Security Branch.

MR VISSER: Where were you stationed?

MR LE ROUX: Krugersdorp.

MR VISSER: Was Mr Jan Coetzee one of the members who served under you?

MR LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Can you tell the Committee what you recall of this incident?

MR LE ROUX: Chairperson, that Major Coetzee came to me apparently during the afternoon, and that he informed me that Brig Schoon had requested him to establish an arms cache in our area for the purposes of a Defence Force cross-border operation.

MR VISSER: You have referred to a Defence Force cross-border operation, what do you mean by that?

MR LE ROUX: That the Defence Force was aiming to launch a cross-border operation.

MR VISSER: And how would the arms cache have formed part of this?

MR LE ROUX: The arms cache had to appear to be an ANC arms cache and we had to disclose this with much publicity so that it would truly appear to be a genuine ANC stockpile.

MR VISSER: In order to provide a justification for the attack?

MR LE ROUX: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well, you have just heard that there was a Security Head Office order, what was your viewpoint?

MR LE ROUX: I agreed with that.

MR VISSER: Did you associate yourself with the execution of this fraudulent exercise with the idea that an attack would be launched in Botswana?

MR LE ROUX: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you know who would launch the attack in Botswana?

MR LE ROUX: No.

MR VISSER: Who did you suspect it would be?

MR LE ROUX: I suspected that it would be the South African Defence Force. I cannot recall that it was specifically told to me who and what would be responsible for it.

MR VISSER: Did you later discover who indeed it had been?

MR LE ROUX: No, on the following day however, I also heard about it on the news. I heard that there had been an attack. I do not believe that it was specifically mentioned who or what was responsible for the incident.

MR VISSER: Were any of your members or were you in Botswana?

MR LE ROUX: No.

MR VISSER: With the execution of this operation?

MR LE ROUX: No.

MR VISSER: Very well, what was your task?

MR LE ROUX: My task was to create as much publicity as possible.

MR VISSER: What happened during the night?

MR LE ROUX: Chairperson, at a certain stage, as it was agreed, Maj Jan Coetzee the now Col Jan Coetzee, telephoned me and stated that this discovery had been made and the orders were then for all the service officers to be notified as well as the media liaison officers, and I did so.

MR VISSER: What took place the following day?

MR LE ROUX: Basically we went to the scene immediately and then the media liaison officer arranged that among others Chris Olckers from the SABC, people from the press and other members of publicity teams would be there.

MR VISSER: This media liaison officer, I think it was Mr Tienie Greyling?

MR LE ROUX: I think it was him, yes.

MR VISSER: Whatever the case may be, regarding you, you state that with both the establishment of the cache and during the attack, no persons were killed or injured?

MR LE ROUX: Yes, that is my recollection.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chair.

MR HUGO: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you are excused.

MR LE ROUX: Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that all your witnesses?

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Chairperson, as far as I've got it.

MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairperson, I then call Mr Eugene Alexander de Kock, he will testify in Afrikaans.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAIRPERSON: It does not matter, he can remain seated there.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Please be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairperson. Mr de Kock, you are the applicant in this matter, your application appears on page 1 to 58, where you deal with the background and political motivation, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HUGO: And then you deal with the incident from page 59 to 66 of the Bundle, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HUGO: And just for clarity sake you would just like to refer to the supplementary document that deals with Vlakplaas, the way it was established and the workings thereof, and you would also like it to be included into your application?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, yes.

MR HUGO: And just for clarity sake, it is also completed as it is here?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HUGO: Concerning the incident itself, you left the date open but out of evidence given here that the run up to and the incident itself, the attack in Botswana took place on the 28th of March 1988, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairperson, I would consider it as correct.

MR HUGO: You say in your application that Brig Schoon approached you, can you maybe just in your own words tell us what the date was and what happened in this discussion.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, one morning approximately two mornings before this happened, Brig Schoon and members of the Defence Force, senior members of the Defence Force, amongst others Kat Liebenberg, Gen Joubert, Brig Serfontein also from the Defence Force and then two senior Colonels from National Intelligence arrived at Vlakplaas where discussions were held concerning the creation or establishment of an arms cache.

Brig Schoon requested me to get a certain amount of weapons from an Eastern bloc or Russian origin as well as handgrenades, also from a Russian origin, as well as limpet mines and landmines. He gave me the instructions that if I needed any weapons, I must go and pick it up at Head Office from Col Drury.

I did go and pick up weapons from Col Drury, it was only a few AK47's with a fold-up butt, AKM, the ANC only used AKM, they did not use the normal AK47's. The rest of the AK's, we got from Vlakplaas' own storage. We also ensured that it was Russian ammunition. For each weapon we gave two or three magazines.

Then we took ten landmines with detonators, we prepared them. I can remember them, because we had to clean the landmines and wash them out, to get all the sand off them, sand that was found in Ovamboland and to take off, also to remove all the fingerprints off them. We then sealed them, the limpet mines as well as the landmines, we also had to clean.

There was also sand stuck to them. The magazines we also washed and cleaned. We then, I then handed this over to Martin Naude.

MR HUGO: Just before we continue, concerning what happened afterwards, you now say that Gen Kat Liebenberg and Gen Joubert were present at Vlakplaas. Did you have any discussions with them while they were there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairperson, at one stage I spoke to Gen Joubert. I know Gen Joubert from Ovamboland where he was my Commander from Section 10. I also worked closed there with the Defence Force with the Commandoes and also other members of the Special Forces.

Gen Joubert mentioned to me that there is political pressure on the Defence Force to act against the ANC, but that Foreign Affairs was objecting, and is against this in that it bears any relation with the establishment of the arms cache.

MR HUGO: Very well, after you had gathered all the weapons, what happened then?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, I handed it over to Mr Naude. I did not know, I knew that it was going to the Rand, but I didn't know if it was going to the West Rand or the East Rand, the whole operation was compartmentalised. The day when it happened, there were no indications of any actions, but the next morning, approximately ten o'clock, Maj Naude was called to the office of Special Forces, where we went through documents and amongst others, I had to go through a briefcase that was found at a person that was shot, and Prinsloo, that was at Speskop stationed, asked me if I found anything subversive in this briefcase, then I said to him, it seemed as if it was a person from Water Affairs, from Botswana. He mentioned to me that this person and a nine year old child was killed in a vehicle.

It was then asked that we should liaise with Brig Schoon and that we have to provide weapons like pistols and we have to provide them with a token or the weapons that we found in this air raid, I think then that I found three Macarov pistols from a Russian origin and gave it to him, so that this can be shown to the press. I never received these weapons back, and I never saw the weapons from the arms cache again.

MR HUGO: What came up during the discussion with Gen Joubert, why did this operation, what was the reason for it to be launched in Botswana?

MR DE KOCK: Gen Joubert said that there was political pressure placed on the Defence Force to act against the ANC. If my recollection is correct, during that time there were attacks on shopping centres and amongst others, there was a Wimpy Bar that was targeted with a limpet mine and if I can remember correctly, it was linked to that. It could have led to the actions taken.

MR HUGO: Did you associate yourself with the goal of Gen Joubert and the other senior officers?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I knew that they would attack the ANC, that was the purpose and goal, and the ANC was a common enemy of the Security Forces, and it was classified as a terrorist organisation and we also saw it in that way and that is how we acted.

MR HUGO: Did you during the meeting that took place at Vlakplaas, were you present during this meeting?

MR DE KOCK: No Mr Chairperson, I was busy with the arrangements for the weapons, but from time to time, I did attend with Gen Schoon, Liebenberg and Joubert.

MR HUGO: What was your rank when this incident took place?

MR DE KOCK: I was a Major.

MR HUGO: How did you feel concerning the following of instructions of both Joubert and Brig Schoon?

MR DE KOCK: I didn't have any problems with it, I accepted their instructions.

MR HUGO: And the presence of the Head of the Defence Force, Gen Kat Liebenberg, what perception did this create with you, concerning the sanctioning of this operation?

MR DE KOCK: I think he was then second in command of the Defence Force and Gen Joubert was the Head of Special Forces. I just accepted that the authority is good enough to adhere to.

MR HUGO: And you then ask this honourable Committee to give you amnesty for amongst others fraud and the illegal possession of ammunition, defeating the ends of justice, damage to property, possible conspiracy to murder unknown people in Botswana and any other delict or crime that could have occurred in the execution of this operation.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairperson, no further questions.

MR VISSER: I have no questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, Mr Chairman.

MR MALAN: Mr de Kock, you heard what my question was to some of the other members. I would just like you to look at page 61, where I read, from the paragraph in the middle of the page.

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

MR MALAN: Can the Interpreters hear me now? Can the Interpreter follow me on this one?

INTERPRETER: Yes, I can hear you.

MR MALAN: Okay. Mr de Kock, I would just like to repeat, on page 61 of the Bundle in your application, in the middle paragraph you say specifically that the Department of Foreign Affairs was misled by the Police and the South African Defence Force?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairperson, that is correct.

MR MALAN: Do you then talk about officials or on the level of officials?

MR DE KOCK: No Mr Chairman, I would say the whole department, because in this case, the way I understood it was that it was only them who was an obstacle.

MR MALAN: Can you remember whether reference was made to politicians or only to the department?

MR DE KOCK: What I can remember is that there was political pressure on the Defence Force to launch attacks, but the Department of Foreign Affairs was the objectors, they had an objection.

MR MALAN: Can you describe that political pressure further, or was only that told to you?

MR DE KOCK: I cannot take it further.

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is off. I cannot hear the speaker.

MR MALAN: (Microphone not on)

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR MALAN: I will tell you why I am asking this, you say specifically that you understood that there was political pressure put on them?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct yes.

MR MALAN: Then we can make the conclusion that it was the political heads that made this?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR MALAN: And that Foreign Affairs made an objection to it?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR MALAN: Mr Chairperson, if it carries on like this, it would seem like a press conference.

CHAIRPERSON: I hope it is not the same press.

MR MALAN: I would just like to make sure of the fact that you understood that it was a struggle between political heads of Departments, or what did you mean when you said political pressure and Foreign Affairs?

MR DE KOCK: Well Mr Chairperson, there was political pressure placed on the Defence Force to execute this operation against the ANC, but Foreign Affairs was an obstacle in their way.

The establishment of this arms cache then neutralised the argument of Foreign Affairs.

MR MALAN: You cannot describe this political pressure in more detail, it could have been from the general public, it can be from debates in parliament, it can be political Heads from State Departments, you cannot describe it in a better way?

MR DE KOCK: No, unfortunately I cannot. This is how I understood it, or recall it. I do not want to speculate, I can only say what I can recall, and that is also why I mention it in this way.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you are excused.

MR DE KOCK: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Are there any other witnesses?

MR HUGO: No other witnesses.

ADV STEENKAMP: No further evidence, Mr Chairman, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp, do you have any argument?

ADV STEENKAMP: No submissions, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser?

MR VISSER IN ARGUMENT: Mr Chairman, this is a case where...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, we would just like to hear you concerning Mr Schoon. The others we do not want to hear.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairperson, you are probably referring to the misleading of the people?

CHAIRPERSON: Specifically how he acted on behalf of the government of the day?

MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, let me answer the question in such a way. Firstly the requirements of the Act is geared that the act or delict must fall within the parameters of a political motive, but now where the law or the Act prevents a person to mislead anyone, there is no provisions concerning this.

A lot of parents lie to their children, because they think it is on their behalf. I am using this as an example, Mr Chairperson, here you've got a case where Schoon sought in the interest of the country and of the government, to uphold the values of the government by acting against the people in Botswana, but if the government because of political pressure did not want to agree with what his idea was of what was supposed to happen or what Kat Liebenberg's idea was, then it would surely have been to assist this process in some way. That would have happened, indeed.

If you forget for a moment what Brig Schoon said, we know and you heard evidence in the Lesotho attack of the "Lavender Boys", the men did not want the Police or the Defence Force to act or to act on a military basis, because that created a lot of problems for the Department of Foreign Affairs and they were the obstacle. You heard Pik Botha, Niel van Heerden and Niel Barnard who also said the same thing.

Here we sit today with the same situation, and Mr Eugene de Kock confirms this, that his recollection of that time is, and I have no doubt that he and the suggestions behind the questions that Mr Malan put to him, that this is exactly what happened in 1985, for five years, they attempted to get the government to give permission for actions. When it did appear, it was at the end of a very frustrating process for the Security Branch and you know that this is what the members of the Security Branch in the Western Transvaal testified about.

CHAIRPERSON: All that you are saying now is that ...

MR VISSER: But that, we know that this was the facts?

CHAIRPERSON: But would he have carried any knowledge of these facts, and he would have testified about it?

MR VISSER: He testified about it.

CHAIRPERSON: Let me just finish. This assistance in the process as you mention it, do you expect that he shouldn't have testified about it here, or should not testify about it?

MR VISSER: If you had listened to his testimony you can gather that he doesn't remember what happened or he doesn't remember the details, it was a few years ago. Evidence was placed on record about his bad memory and to now tie him down to what he tries to recall and what conclusions he tries to draw from what happened 12 years ago, will not be fair.

Even if you take him on his word of what he says, he says that or Kat Liebenberg told him that they must mislead the government in order to get the permission. At the end of the day that it was not in the interest of the government to prevent MK members from infiltrating the country, in the nature of this case, it was part of the struggle.

CHAIRPERSON: If you are doing something against the wishes of the government, what is the suggestion then?

MR VISSER: There were no suggestion ever that it was against the wishes of the government. It is on the contrary, the opposite.

CHAIRPERSON: Why did they then want to mislead the person who would give them permission?

MR VISSER: Well, we do not know if it happened.

CHAIRPERSON: That is what he wanted to do, and that is what he testified about.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairperson, this is what Willem Schoon is telling you, this is what was put to him. That was the whole purpose of creating the arms cache.

If you want to draw that principle through, then you will not be able to give amnesty for the arms cache, because the purpose of it was to mislead the people. What you are suggesting now is that the people would have gone to the State President and said that this arms cache was planted. It would not have happened.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, I am very serious. I am asking these questions, I am not fooling around.

MR VISSER: I am not fooling around, but what is your question?

CHAIRPERSON: The question is what is his political position when he acted and wanted to mislead those who were supposed to give the permission for the attack? On whose behalf did he act?

MR VISSER: He acted on behalf of the State, because just like all the other witnesses testified, they were to attack the basis in Botswana in order to provide law and order in the country. They are applying for fraud.

CHAIRPERSON: If they had told the truth to these people and have said, they would have said "no, we do not give permission", what would they have done then?

MR VISSER: Apparently they wouldn't have been able to do anything.

Chairperson, I would just like to repeat that in subsection 2(b) this falls under what Mr Schoon testified about, it falls within the parameters of this Section and with respect, in so many cases that has appeared in front of the Amnesty Committee, it has been pertinently said and the original Amnesty Committee also said in many instances operators lied to those working or in senior ranks, above them.

One of the reasons was that they did not want to expose themselves and one of the other reasons was that they did not want to involve that person in the illegal act that he was busy with. This does not differ from them, with respect, this is my submission.

If Mr Schoon believed that it was expected of him to lie to the State Security Council about who was responsible for this arms cache, he does not take away from what he wanted to achieve, he wanted to assist the Defence Force to get sanctioning to attack Botswana. In my submission that falls within the parameters of the Act.

Pardon? Yes, well, unless you want me to argue the whole thing, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: ... on this matter. Who is next?

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, I am informed that the next matter will be the Naledi matter. Apparently Judge, if I may ask for a five minute adjournment, so that we can just change seats quickly, if that will be possible.

J W LOOTS: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may be seated. Ms Makhubele, are you appearing on behalf of the families?

MS MAKHUBELE: Chairperson, I am appearing on behalf of Ms Busang, who is the mother of MK Naledi.

CHAIRPERSON: I didn't get that. Can you just repeat that please?

MS MAKHUBELE: I am appearing on behalf of Ms Busang, who is the mother of MK Naledi, the deceased.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Makhubele, is the application being opposed?

MS MAKHUBELE: No Mr Chairperson, the family does not oppose the application, they just want the full disclosure.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Visser?

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the person known to us as MK Naledi, appears to be a person by the name of Patrick Sandile Mvundla or Sandile Patrick Mvundla. That information appears from page 66 of Bundle, there are two bundles here, perhaps I should refer to them as Bundle 1 and Bundle 2. I now don't find a page 66, my note says page 66.

Oh, I see, it is page 64 which is a certificate - yes, I will refer to that in a moment, but at page 64 of the second Bundle, he is referred to as Patrick Sandile Mvundla and at page 66 of the record, that is a statement made by Ms Busang, the mother of Sandile before the Human Rights Violations Committee, it is stated right at the top of the page as Sandile Patrick Mvundla, but there should be no difficulty with the identification.

Chairperson, may I draw the attention of you and your Committee to the ANC presentations, to the TRC, where some more information appears. First of all, in the August 1996 presentation at page 93, there is a reference to him under 22 - Vundla, Patrick S, so it is Patrick S. Vundla, it is not spelt the same as we've got it, but it gives the date as the 28th of March 1988, under the heading "Assassination, Raids and Bombs in Botswana", so that is where we got the date of the 28th of March from.

Chairperson, as to his status, reference can be had to the may 1997 presentation of the, written presentation of the ANC, where at page 49 under "Botswana RPMC, 1983 - 1985", Mr Naledi, together with two other persons, the one called Dan and the other I cannot pronounce, Mtintso, being persons who led the military machinery in Botswana and then as far as the relevant period of time is concerned, after 1986, he is referred to as a military representative, Mr Naledi.

There are other references as well, except that they say no more than what I have already told you. Mr Loots, in 1988, where were you?

MR LOOTS: I was the Commander of the Western Transvaal Security Branch.

MR VISSER: Were you familiar with Mr Naledi?

MR LOOTS: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Since what point in time had you become accustomed with his existence and his activities?

MR LOOTS: It was in 1985, 1986 approximately.

MR VISSER: So that would be approximately three years before the time of his death?

MR LOOTS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Is it also correct that among others, you attended a meeting between Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa and the Minister of Foreign Affairs from Botswana at a certain stage?

MR LOOTS: Yes, that is correct. The meeting took place on the 25th of February 1986.

MR VISSER: And was Mr Naledi discussed as a problem case for the South African government?

MR LOOTS: His name was given by me to the Botswana delegation.

MR VISSER: And the Department of Foreign Affairs issued a warning to Botswana?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: What was said?

MR LOOTS: A call was made to Botswana to use their capacity to limit ANC activities from Botswana to the RSA as much as possible.

MR VISSER: And if this was not done?

MR LOOTS: Then the RSA would regard any ANC activities from Botswana to the RSA as an act of aggression.

MR VISSER: Very well. Coming to the facts, we are aware that all indications show that on the 28th of March 1988, Mr Naledi along with two other persons died in Gaberone in Botswana as a result of an attack. Did you participate in that attack?

MR LOOTS: No Chairperson, I did not participate physically in the attack.

MR VISSER: Who executed the attack?

MR LOOTS: Col Joe Verster from Special Forces. I informed him personally.

MR VISSER: What was the events that preceded this attack?

MR LOOTS: Four armed MK members on approximately the 25th of March 1988, infiltrated the RSA from Botswana. Three of these persons were killed by the South African Defence Force. It has now come to my attention that there are also affidavits which were made by those particular members of the Defence Force, who were involved in the shooting incident with the MK members.

MR VISSER: That is Bundle 2, page 19. Please continue.

MR LOOTS: One of the four was arrested, one Vuyo.

MR VISSER: V-u-y-o? What happened to him?

MR LOOTS: Brig Schoon issued an instruction for him to be handed over to me at Western Transvaal.

MR VISSER: Why was that?

MR LOOTS: As it had already been explained in the past, Western Transvaal was responsible for coordination with regard to ANC targets and safehouses and so forth in Botswana. Therefore we did the necessary interrogation and he also pointed out the safehouse where Naledi, who was his superior, was living.

MR VISSER: Did he say that he acted under the command of Naledi, when he infiltrated?

MR LOOTS: Without any doubt.

MR VISSER: We are aware that there is an Exhibit B, that is a document that you have compiled yourself and it has been incorporated in the Naledi Bundle. On typed page 18 - 19 of Exhibit B, you also made mention of Mr Naledi's activities, is that correct? And you state on page 19, under paragraph 18 ...

MR LOOTS: I do not have the correct document.

MR VISSER: Paragraph 18, just below the half line of the page?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: There you refer to this particular incident?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER:

is that correct?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, yes.

MR VISSER: Did you personally participate in the interrogation of Vuyo?

MR LOOTS: Yes, and the deceased Col Weerman were involved in the interrogation.

MR VISSER: What did you do with the information that you obtained from Mr Vuyo?

MR LOOTS: Due to its urgency, it was directly reported to Mr Joe Verster.

MR VISSER: Was this part of the general instruction which was issued to you, the instruction that you had to share information or intelligence with other Security institutions?

MR LOOTS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Where was this information conveyed to Joe Verster?

MR LOOTS: On a safe farm near Nietverdiendt, which was used by the Zeerust Branch.

MR VISSER: That is in the Western Transvaal?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And what information did you convey to him?

MR LOOTS: On the contrary Chairperson, they themselves had also spoken to Vuyo and in the light of certain air photos of Gaberone, the safehouse where Naledi was living, was identified.

CHAIRPERSON: Wasn't your question pertaining to the contribution that the witness himself made?

MR VISSER: Yes, that is actually the question. Any information that you withdrew from Vuyo, which was conveyed to Joe Verster, can you recall what this information involved?

MR VISSER: Briefly it indicated that three of the four had infiltrated under the command of Naledi and that Vuyo, who had been arrested, had indicated the safehouse from which they had infiltrated. In other words the information regarding where Mr Naledi was in Botswana, emanated from your interrogation?

MR LOOTS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: What was your impression ...

CHAIRPERSON: I beg your pardon, so actually you told Verster where they could find this person?

MR LOOTS: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And he was the target?

MR LOOTS: Naledi was the target.

CHAIRPERSON: What about his cohorts?

MR LOOTS: According to Vuyo, they were a group of four who had infiltrated and MK members would use this particular house which had been identified from time to time, as a safe overnight place. But he couldn't tell us at that stage who else would be there, apart from Naledi.

CHAIRPERSON: (Microphone not on)

MR LOOTS: The facility, the address and the fact that Naledi was living there.

MR VISSER: What was your impression when Verster and his men were there with you in the Western Transvaal during these discussions, what was their intention?

MR LOOTS: Naledi was an absolute target, and it was their objective in the light of existing rules and instructions, that they would attack the target in a covert manner.

MR VISSER: In the light thereof, did you convey the information to Mr Verster, the information that you had just mentioned?

MR LOOTS: Yes.

MR VISSER: And you knew that this information would be partially applied in order to conduct an operation to eliminate Mr Naledi?

MR LOOTS: On the contrary, Vuyo was handed over to Mr Verster, and he went with the team to Botswana where the house was identified.

MR VISSER: But this is not actually the question, the question is did you know that the information that you had disclosed to Mr Verster, would be applied for the purposes of an operation that was aimed at eliminating Mr Naledi?

MR LOOTS: Definitely.

MR VISSER: As far as you know, did an attack take place?

MR LOOTS: Yes.

MR VISSER: And it was executed by Special Forces?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you hear subsequently whether or not anybody had been injured during the attack or whether any property had been damaged?

MR LOOTS: Mr Verster shared on Nietverdiendt safehouse with us that night and the attack was executed in the early morning hours, after one o'clock, it was reported to Mr Verster via radio and approximately one hour later, they made a further report to him that they had driven into a tree stump with their vehicle, and that they had to travel back to the RSA by foot from that point onwards.

MR VISSER: What did they report regarding the results of their attack?

MR LOOTS: That a man or two men and one woman had been killed in the house.

MR VISSER: Let me just refresh your memory, on page 7 of the Bundle, "as far as I can recall Naledi and an unknown man (which would make it two men), and a woman"?

MR LOOTS: Yes.

MR VISSER: That would make it two men and a woman. I would just like to establish that. Very well. They were killed in the operation?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: However we know from what Ms Busang has told the TRC, that she went to Botswana for Naledi's funeral and according to her, Naledi and three women were actually killed?

MR LOOTS: I had sight of that document.

MR VISSER: Are you in any position to dispute the correctness thereof?

MR LOOTS: No.

MR VISSER: Would you accept that?

MR LOOTS: Yes.

MR VISSER: The target of Special Forces, would it be only to kill Mr Naledi or would it also have been to destroy the facility and everybody inside it?

MR LOOTS: I would say the facility and all occupants.

CHAIRPERSON: Was the place destroyed?

MR LOOTS: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know?

MR LOOTS: I am not certain, but I don't believe that it was completely obliterated or flattened as such.

MR VISSER: But it was the target?

MR LOOTS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, just allow me a moment, I believe I have referred you to all the relevant parts of the evidence. Yes, that is the evidence, thank you.

Perhaps for the benefit of Ms Busang, Mr Chairman, we just wish to say that I hope she understands that Mr Loots was not one of the operators who went into Gaberone and that Mr Loots cannot tell today who those specific persons were that went and executed the operation, but it was on orders of Col Joe Verster, and that is the closest that we can bring it.

Perhaps I should ask Brig Loots just to explain one further thing. Were you present when the people entered Botswana, did you see who they were?

MR LOOTS: I do not know the team members.

MR VISSER: You don't know them?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Therefore you cannot assist the family with the names of persons?

MR LOOTS: With the exception of Col Joe Verster, but regarding the operatives, they are unknown to me.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chair.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS MAKHUBELE: Thank you Chairperson. Ms Busang understands that Mr Loots is not the one who personally carried this, but the attack, there is just one issue I wish to clarify here.

Mr Loots on page 6 of the Bundle, there is talk of, the first Bundle, this MK Vuyo, having been captured in the "Verre Noord", that is Pietersburg, but then when we go further, on page 31 of the, I think it is the same Bundle and also the statements by the police officers who captured him, it would appear he was arrested in Derdepoort, which is in the Thabazimbi/Rustenburg area?

MR LOOTS: Yes.

MS MAKHUBELE: Is this one and the same person, this Vuyo?

MR LOOTS: Vuyo was arrested, they infiltrated near Derdepoort, and he was arrested there, that is correct.

MS MAKHUBELE: Is it one and the same person as the one referred to on page 6?

MR LOOTS: Vuyo?

MS MAKHUBELE: Yes, MK Vuyo?

MR LOOTS: Vuyo is the person who was not killed during the infiltration. It has to be the same person.

I do not know of any other Vuyo.

MS MAKHUBELE: Do you know if this MK Vuyo is still alive?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, he returned with the team from Botswana, what happened to him subsequently I would not be able to tell you out of my own recollection, I don't know where he is.

MS MAKHUBELE: I have nothing further.

ADV STEENKAMP: No further questions Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Chairperson, perhaps I should just clarify something, with your leave. Derdepoort/Thabazimbi, at that stage, which division of the Security Branch did this fall under?

MR LOOTS: Far Northern Transvaal.

MR VISSER: Is that why you refer to Pietersburg Far North?

MR LOOTS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

MR VISSER: I have no further witnesses.

CHAIRPERSON: Any witnesses?

MS MAKHUBELE: Thank you Chairperson, Ms Busang has prepared a statement which I can just read.

CHAIRPERSON: Is she comfortable with you reading it?

MS MAKHUBELE: That is what we agreed on.

MS MAKHUBELE: The statement starts here -

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Is that all?

MS MAKHUBELE: That is all Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp, is there any witnesses that you want to call?

ADV STEENKAMP: No further witnesses Mr Chairman, the family is fully represented. Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, are you going to present any submissions?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, if you wish me to, I will of course argue.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct) Ms Makhubele, have you got any submissions to make?

MS MAKHUBELE: No Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp?

ADV STEENKAMP: No, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, what is your client asking for, what amnesty?

MR VISSER IN ARGUMENT: Well Chairperson, clearly here the target was Mr Naledi, so Mr Loots' conduct will be tantamount to being an accomplice, being an accessory before the fact, being part of conspiracy to commit murder, and as well as destruction of property. He told you that he thought that the facility itself was also a target.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, isn't he in a different position, isn't he guilty of murder? He participated in a decision and pointed out in terms of his information, where the deceased could be found.

MR VISSER: Yes, technically one could possibly argue that when Special Forces arrived there, they had already taken the decision to eliminate this person, that is why I thought perhaps an accomplice.

CHAIRPERSON: He was a contributor and facilitated the actual...

MR VISSER: Yes, Chairperson, you are probably correct. It would then be murder, alternatively culpable homicide. We are not given any information as to whether there may have been people who might have been injured, but that would be covered under murder and the alternative competent verdicts.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, now, what happens to those other two? Is he making application for the other two or not?

MR VISSER: The other three, yes, obviously they are involved. We don't know who they were, but Mr Loots' evidence was that the facility and everybody who was in it was the target.

So clearly ...

CHAIRPERSON: And the facility, we don't know whether it was damaged or not?

MR VISSER: We don't know Chairperson, unfortunately I am sitting only with one applicant, and nobody else to attempt to obtain information from. There is nothing on record to show that there was, but clearly there was a conspiracy to cause damage to property Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Which was fruitful, which was carried out and eventuated?

MR VISSER: I haven't got evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: I am talking about the murders?

MR VISSER: Oh, the murders were carried out, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: We don't exactly know how it was done?

MR VISSER: No.

CHAIRPERSON: There was a conspiracy to commit malicious injury to property?

MR VISSER: That is what I would submit to you, yes, Mr Chairman.

My Attorney has just found one piece of evidence in Ms Busang's evidence before the Human Rights Violations Committee which indicates that there was a bomb that exploded in Botswana, but one doesn't know whether it is a loose reference to a bomb, or whether it was actually a bomb, so it doesn't really take the matter any further.

CHAIRPERSON: Precisely, yes.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: So you are comfortable with three counts of murder and conspiracy to commit ...

MR VISSER: Well, four counts of murder. It is Mr Naledi and three women. There were four in all that were killed in that house. That is according to Ms Busang's evidence, she was there and she actually gave evidence to say that they were all buried in a communal grave, all four of them.

She made it very clear that there were four people that was killed.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, the other three may not have been actual targets, they were caught in the crossfire?

MR VISSER: Either that or they were targets, we don't know. But it matters not to your decisions.

CHAIRPERSON: On this evidence, we don't know whether the other three were targets, but they were at the very least caught in the crossfire of a political act.

MR VISSER: Either that, yes Chairperson, or they were in a house at the wrong time, at the wrong place. It matters not, the one way or the other.

MR MALAN: Excuse me Chair, Mr Visser, I think your Attorney is correct and he probably referred you to page 69 where Ms Busang gave evidence that the people were killed because the house was being bombed, with three girls and her son. There must have been damage to the property?

MR VISSER: One must accept that, yes Chairperson. As I submitted before, in the previous application, even if one assumes that no explosives were used, but the mere fact that one shoots with automatic fire as is usually done, there will be damage to property, they shoot the door down and they break the door down, etc.

It is always part and parcel of such an operation.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we will reserve judgement on this.

Is that the roll for the day Mr Steenkamp?

ADV STEENKAMP: Unfortunately Mr Chairman, the other matter was roughly scheduled also for today, I have been informed about half an hour ago by Mr Koopedi telephonically, that he is not in a position to proceed today, Mr Chairman. At the earliest, he will be ready by tomorrow morning. That is the undertaking he gave already.

That is the best I can do, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I frankly don't know how people are going to do a proper job, when they are appearing for certain people, if they are going to consult on the morning. We will adjourn until tomorrow morning at nine o'clock.