CHAIRPERSON: Morning everybody. I'm told Mr Wessels, that you're going to be proceeding with the cross-examination of Mr Barnard.

FERDINAND BARNARD: (s.u.o.)

MR BARNARD: Thank you, Chairperson. Mr Chairperson, just before I continue there is something that I'd like to rectify if it is possible, that I testified about it before. I received information over the weekend that indicated that that which I said was not quite the truth, or that it did not happen exactly like I said it happened. Can I just explain this to you in short.

It is with regard to the applications that the CCB brought to me under my detention under Section 29, and I said that the funds for them were given in cash to Calla Botha, and I testified about it and I was under the impression that that's how it worked, but after certain discussions with my father telephonically, I found out that it did not work like that.

The money was given to Scholtz and Botha, an attorney's firm from Florida and they contacted my father and told him that the costs have been covered. Additional to this, R4 000 was given to Brenda Mills, my girlfriend whom I shared a house with and they provided her with that amount of money every month. There were certain enquiries made about what her costs were and what she needed. It was approximately R4 000 that they gave to her every month. This was given by a firm Weavind and Weavind, situated in Pretoria. They handed over the cash to my father who then wrote out cheques to Brenda Mills, not to make it traceable and this was a Werner Burchill from the attorney's firm Weavind and Weavind. That's all that I'd like to say concerning this.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Barnard. Mr Wessels.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WESSELS: (Cont)

Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Barnard, after the shooting incident of Dr Webster, did you contact Lafras Luitingh and make an appointment with him?

MR BARNARD: Yes, that is correct.

MR WESSELS: Where was this appointment made?

MR BARNARD: It occurred at the Hyperama in Florida.

MR WESSELS: Where in the Hyperama?

MR BARNARD: In the parking lot.

MR WESSELS: I see. And you took Mr Botha with you?

MR BARNARD: That is correct, yes.

MR WESSELS: What did you tell him? What did you say to him, where must he hide or what must he do?

MR BARNARD: Mr Botha remained in my vehicle, I left my vehicle and went to Mr Luitingh's vehicle.

MR WESSELS: Did Mr Luitingh see where you came from?

MR BARNARD: I do not know, I cannot recall. He did not say anything about it.

MR WESSELS: Would he have been able to see Mr Botha?

MR BARNARD: It was a very busy parking lot, I cannot specifically recall what happened on that specific day and what the circumstances were, but I do not think that he would have been satisfied with it, because I assume he would not have been satisfied with it and he never mentioned anything to me about it.

MR WESSELS: Why did you take Mr Botha with you?

MR BARNARD: Because he was involved with me and I discussed the matter with him that I'm going to go and see Mr Luitingh and I wanted him to monitor the meeting between the two of us, because in the past I've heard a story where the CCB will send you to do a job and then afterwards they'd kill you. I did not think it would happen there, but I did take him with, I do not deny that.

MR WESSELS: So the purpose why you took him with was so that he can monitor or observe your contact with Mr Luitingh?

MR BARNARD: Yes, and also for my own safety.

MR WESSELS: Why for your own safety?

MR BARNARD: Sir, I just killed Dr Webster from a moving vehicle and the same thing can happen to me.

MR WESSELS: But did you think that they will shoot you in the parking lot?

MR BARNARD: I did not consider it very strongly, but it was a possibility.

MR WESSELS: And how would Mr Botha then have assisted you?

MR BARNARD: Mr Botha is a trained man or a person, he can see what's going on and if there's a problem he could have acted, he could have assisted me.

MR WESSELS: I see. And you say that you and Mr Botha drove in your vehicle and parked in the parking lot.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Did you have an arrangement with Mr Luitingh about where exactly you'd meet him?

MR BARNARD: Yes, Sir, we had a fixed point where we would always meet. We divided the parking lot into sectors, we would say: "I'll meet you at number one or I'll meet you at number 2" and he said: "Meet me at number one ... If you're on the one side you cannot see the other side of the Hyperama, so we met at point number one, I parked my vehicle and I walked to him there where he waited for me.

MR WESSELS: How far were you from him?

MR BARNARD: It's very difficult to recall, maybe 15 to 20 metres.

MR WESSELS: Were there other people in other vehicles between your two vehicles?

MR BARNARD: That is correct, yes.

MR WESSELS: Mr Barnard, you made two Section 29 statements.

MR BARNARD: I think it was three. One of them dealt with, that I made a High Court application and I stopped it halfway and withdrew it and certain pressure was placed on me to do it and I explained it at a later stage, but I also made a short statement that said that I did not want to continue with the application and I wanted to withdraw it.

MR WESSELS: In bundle B, Mr Chairperson, there are two statements which I'd like to refer to. The one was made on the 22nd of November and the other one on the 6th of December. This appears on page 141 and 99, the two last pages of the statements. The first statement begins on page 100 and the other one on page 82.

Now in your second statement you made mention of the fact that all the allegations in the first statement are not correct, is that correct?

MR BARNARD: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAX: Sorry Mr Wessels to interrupt you, there's another statement at page 82 of the bundle.

MR WESSELS: That's the one to which I referred.

MR LAX: Sorry, I thought it was 182 that you referred to. I beg your pardon.

MR WESSELS: Why did you in the first statement not give the correct version?

MR BARNARD: Sir, it's very obvious, I'm arrested by the police, I'm creating a story, I'm trying to get the police to think that I gave them possible correct information and that I have to get myself out of this situation.

MR WESSELS: And in your second statement you said now that the allegations that you made in the first statement are not correct and you are now making this statement and these are the correct facts.

MR BARNARD: It was once again not the truth.

MR WESSELS: Why did you not then make use of that opportunity to tell the truth?

MR BARNARD: Because I was still detained and I wanted to get out of there an as the police got information I realised the people are still putting pressure on me and I realised that they were getting more and more information and I wanted to give them things that seemed to be the truth and I wanted to get out of the situation, I wanted to con them.

MR WESSELS: Mr Barnard, in your evidence-in-chief you mentioned various people by name and you insulted some of the politicians.

MR BARNARD: That's correct, yes.

MR WESSELS: Was this part of the reconciliation process that you went through or was there another reason why you spoke about these people in this way?

MR BARNARD: No Chairperson, the reason why I did this was because I had no respect for them and I hated myself and I could not believe that I received instructions from people like Danie Phaal. He was the Head of the CCB, who came to me and told me exactly what I must do, but when he saw something that could possibly be a conviction or a charge against him, he drove to the Attorney-General to make a statement. And these are the same people who are recces who kill hundreds of people and even if it's a greenpeace overall that they find, they'll still run to the Attorney-General to testify against their comrades.

It was these people who were our recces. If tomorrow he ends up in a war situation and to protect our loved ones, then I'd say Sir, that person who is the big recce guy would sell us out for a tin of bully-beef. I have got no respect for them. The same counts for the politicians.

It's not about getting out of jail now or prison, I just want them to recognise me. I want them to say, "yes I know this person", as Siphiwe Nyanda did. Where's the threat? There's no more threat for these people, but they are still not doing it. The Bible says you have to forgive seventy times seven. I feel about it in this way, Kevin Woods and Eugene de Kock feel the same way, but they still deny it. We did everything on our own. Eugene de Kock took 18 people and attacked Lesotho. And the morning I woke up and I threw names in a hat and I pulled it out and I thought I'll kill David Webster today. It doesn't work like that and that is why I feel like this.

MR WESSELS: Mr Chairman, some of the documents that I required I'm told that I'm not going to get, I'm not entitled to it, so the others I will get in due course. I may or may not wish to cross-examine further once I've received those documents. At this stage, that concludes my cross-examination.

CHAIRPERSON: You're just reserving your right to put further questions after you've seen certain documents. Yes, thank you, Mr Wessels. Mr Bizos, do you have any questions that you'd like to put?

MR BIZOS: Yes, Mr Chairman, but I would like clarity, with respect, documents help the Committee in its task to ascertain the truth. If my learned friend is aware of documents which he says he was told he was unable to get, I think that they may be serving the interests of truth if he discloses to us who have a real and substantial interest in the truth coming out, what documents they are, who has them and why do they claim that Mr Wessels or the Committee are not entitled to them. It is not a matter that we can leave in the air, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wessels?

MR WESSELS: Yes Mr Chairman, I'm quite prepared to disclose that. I asked Mr van Eck acting for Calla Botha, for a copy of Calla Botha's statement and he informed ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Is that the third statement that you mentioned?

MR WESSELS: That is the statement made to the Attorney-General, apparently last year or before that. I'm told that apparently I'm not entitled to get that, the Attorney-General gave some instruction that I should not be forwarded an opportunity to peruse the statement.

MR VAN ECK: Mr Chairman, if I can come in at this point here. Mr Wessels approached me, I've indicated that Mr Botha made a statement to the Director of Public Prosecutions some time ago regarding the shooting of Dr Webster. I've taken this matter up again this morning with my instructing attorney, Mr Coetzee who is sitting here next to me, with Dr Pretorius of Pretoria, he has taken it up with his boss, Mr Sonn and we've been instructed that there's an investigation still pending, going on in that regard, and that they are not prepared to give permission that any of those documents at this stage may be released or disclosed to Mr Wessels, because according to them he's got no interest in that and there's still an investigation going on in that regard.

So I've informed Mr Wessels this morning that I've received instructions from Dr Pretorius after ...(no microphone) in this regard and on that basis we can not disclose those documents at this stage at all.

MR BIZOS: We will accept that, Mr Chairman. I believe that the Attorney-General has, the privilege rests with him, not with the witness, if I remember the cases correctly, in not disclosing the statement. If that is all, then I will not take the matter any further, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Bizos, you can proceed with your questioning of Mr Barnard.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Could you please have a look at bundle A, page 204, that's your application for amnesty, Mr Barnard. Now are you on page 204, Mr Barnard?

MR BARNARD: I am Sir.

MR BIZOS: You can answer the questions in Afrikaans.

MR BARNARD: I do understand that, thank you.

MR BIZOS: Now I see that your address given on that page is C/o David H Botha du Plessis, are those the same attorneys that are acting for Mr Wouter Basson, Mr Leon Maree and Staal Burger in these proceedings?

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Now try and remember as best you can, who drew your application for amnesty.

MR BARNARD: I think it was Mr Pietie du Plessis, the person sitting next to me, from the firm that you just mentioned.

MR BIZOS: The person acting for the other three persons that I have mentioned?

MR BARNARD: That is correct, yes, Mr du Plessis is also my instructing attorney for the Advocate Mr Fanie Coetzee, who is representing me in these hearings.

MR BIZOS: I see yes. How did you come to Mr du Plessis, was it on your own initiative or did one or other of your fellow policemen from, originally from Brixton, arrange that for you?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, during my detention under Section 29, they appointed a legal team, I had no control over this. After my release from the Section 29 detention and the Harms Commission that followed on that, the situation continued, people were appointed to me. It was not Mr du Plessis them. Then at a certain stage, I cannot exactly recall, that was approximately before the Webster post-mortem inquest took place, I had a discussion with Mr Calla Botha, who then told me that I must get away from those people because the organisation's controlling them. He then introduced Mr Pietie du Plessis to me and I then decided to work with him from them on.

MR BIZOS: Which organisation was controlling which lawyers?

MR BARNARD: The CCB appointed the former legal teams under Mr Hennie Goosen, Pierre Botha and Jenna Scholtz who were the instructing attorneys for the Harms Commission. They were people who were appointed and who were under control. That's how I understood it.

MR BIZOS: Did you ever pay those original attorneys or Mr du Plessis personally, did you pay any one of them before you made your application for amnesty?

MR BARNARD: No, Sir, I have never paid any legal costs, apart from my criminal case where I made use of the Law Council.

MR BIZOS: Yes, that was for the Webster killing.

MR BARNARD: No, Sir.

MR BIZOS: For what criminal case?

MR BARNARD: Please repeat, I lost the thread of the story.

MR BIZOS: You said that you paid, or you had counsel on a different basis for your criminal case, which criminal case are you referring to?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, I'm referring to the 34 charges from the High Court, for which I'm now serving a sentence. Amongst others, the Webster incident, all the political incidents and the non-political incidents that took place.

MR BIZOS: Now when you decided to apply for amnesty, I see that your application was filed on the 30th of September '97, was that a decision which you took on your own, or did you take it in consultation with the other people that applied for amnesty?

MR BARNARD: Sir, I think I was under detention and that was probably the last day on which I could execute this application and I decided to do it myself.

MR BIZOS: Did you know that the others who have applied for amnesty here were making applications for amnesty?

MR BARNARD: I assumed so, yes. I did not see them while I was locked up, but I assumed that they did make certain submissions or applications. And I think I was informed about it at a certain stage.

MR BIZOS: I do not wish to embarrass you by your early activities whilst at Brixton, but save for the purpose or really informing the Committee of how the Brixton Police covered the tracks for one another, did you do that?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, I was never involved in the Brixton Murder and Robbery Unit, although I worked closely with some of the members there. I was attached to the SANAB branch, the Narcotics Branch. I never worked or physically worked at the Brixton Murder and Robbery Unit, but in the environment in which I worked and I moved, especially if you were somebody who was involved in shooting incidents. It's almost like an exclusive club, everything is covered up, documents are manipulated, pocket book entries are manipulated, log book entries for vehicles are manipulated.

If there's a shooting incident and we have information that, for example, people are going to bring somebody to commit a crime, we will arrange it that the right officer is working, so that he can come out. So we are covering for each other, we did cover for each other.

MR BIZOS: Was there a spirit of one for all and all for one?

MR BARNARD: That is correct, Mr Bizos, particularly with reference to the exclusive club. You know in any specialist unit within the police there is a limited number of members who could be described as hardliners, people who would not hesitate to shoot or do the thing that needed to be done and particularly among those persons, that attitude would have been of application, yes.

MR BIZOS: And were there regular meetings in this exclusive club as to how you should defeat the ends of justice by altering evidence, by hiding evidence, by altering occurrence books, by even putting guns in the possession, in the hands of the deceased in order to justify claims of self-defence?

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Now by the time the bubble burst shortly before the Harms Commission, was your arrest a complete surprise to you or were you expecting it?

MR BARNARD: Are your referring to the Section 29 arrest? Sir, there a preamble to my arrest under Section 29. I followed the matter in the press pertaining to Aitchison, because I was involved in his recruitment and when it spilled over to Brixton and when the investigative team under Jumbo Smit came over to South Africa, he originally had information. A police officer had tipped me off about an investigative team at Brixton, and then at a certain stage I was traced by means of this false pager and I was called in for the first time for interrogation at Brixton Murder and Robbery.

I resisted the interrogation, I denied everything. I was asked if I knew anybody by the name of Joe Verster and I denied this and then I was asked to return to Brixton at a later stage, because they wanted some or other explanation from me for some or other General. This never took place, but there was definitely a preamble. It wasn't a complete surprise to me, I knew that they were investigating me and that I was a suspect and that there was a connection between South Africa and South West Africa.

MR BIZOS: When you had this forewarning and it became apparent to you that investigating officers had some knowledge, however sparse or imperfect it may have been, did you get in touch with the other people applying for amnesty in this case, in order to agree on a united front, so to speak, as to what you would say in order to protect one another?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, I made a report to Calla Botha and he took it to his cell region, to Staal Burger and the others. I never sat with them, although Calla Botha and I discussed the incident, the Webster incident because we had been involved in these things together. I made a report to him and he went to Staal Burger, and what they discussed there is unknown to me.

MR BIZOS: Well did you discuss with Mr Calla Botha anything as to how, if the investigation was taken further or if there was an order for your detention, what it was that you were to say, what you were to disclose and what you were to bury, as far as you and Calla Botha and Staal Burger and others were concerned?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, I assumed that the thing would be stopped at a higher level, that was the feedback that was given to me, that the matter would be taken to the highest level, that it would be taken to the Generals level and that it would be stopped there. I thought that that would happen, but on the contrary, when I went to Brixton upon the second occasion and a General was supposed to question me, as I was told, they said to me, no, the people have gone to Pretoria and it's not necessary anymore and I truly believed that the CCB had managed to stop the matter on a higher level.

MR BIZOS: So that what they meant is that it would go as high as the Generals, was that to implicate the Generals or to get the Generals to cover your back?

MR BARNARD: To get the Generals to cover our backs, and mine.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Bizos.

So Mr Barnard, is your answer to Mr Bizos' question that you and Mr Botha didn't make up a story as such, to enable you to say the same thing in the event of being arrested?

MR BARNARD: No, we definitely did it, from the beginning we said that we denied everything and that we didn't know anything. We also did that.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) with Mr van Zyl?

MR BARNARD: That is correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: Did you get in touch with Mr van Zyl, in order that you may present a common front?

MR BARNARD: No, I had faith in the organisation, that they do what they promised us they would do, that they would indeed squash the matter. I didn't go to everyone that I had been involved with and try to work out a cover story with them. I knew that if Mr Botha reported it and if I was pulled in for questioning by Brixton, it would be brought to the attention of Mr Slang van Zyl, by nature of the situation.

MR BIZOS: Now if you had had such an opportunity to discuss it with Mr van Zyl, would you have agreed to present a common version at that time?

MR BARNARD: Yes, I'm certain that we would have done so.

MR BIZOS: Yes. And insofar as there are material differences between Mr van Zyl's version in the Section 29 statements made by him, and versions made in your Section 29 statements, is that ascribed because you did not have an opportunity or because you thought that the matter would be squashed, you didn't meet in order to present a common version?

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Now I want to deal with the suggestion that has been made to you that you were a loose cannon, that you were not employed by the CCB, that you made up this story or implicating CCB people recently in order to make friends in high places and get some benefit out of your giving evidence in the manner in which you did in this case. Now let me try and deal with that suggestion in some detail by asking you a number of questions. Firstly, your application was filed in '97.

MR BARNARD: That is correct, Sir.

MR BIZOS: This when you were in detention.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Shortly after your arrest on a number or criminal charges.

MR BARNARD: Correct.

MR BIZOS: And on page 2 of that application, on page 205, could you please turn to that.

MR BARNARD: I have it yes.

MR BIZOS: "

That's quite a twister, but I think it's meaning is clear despite all the strokes. Now your answer to that is:

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: And then:

and then your answer is:

MR BARNARD: Yes, I see that.

MR BIZOS: Is that the truth?

MR BARNARD: It is the truth.

MR BIZOS: Now this was before - well it hasn't been suggested to you that you wanted to make friends in high places at that stage or you were being untruthful at that stage.

MR BARNARD: No, it wasn't.

MR BIZOS: But let us turn to some of the details of what really happened in fact, in order that the Committee may decide on the evidence, whether or not you were an employee of the State, either on a permanent or what we call on ad hoc or piecemeal basis. May I just return on what Mr Kahanovitz reminds me. Mr du Plessis, did he draw this document?

MR BARNARD: The amnesty application?

MR BIZOS: Yes.

MR BARNARD: Yes, I'm assuming so.

CHAIRPERSON: The handwriting that appears there, is that yours?

MR BARNARD: It is Mr du Plessis' handwriting.

MR BIZOS: And was Mr du Plessis a stranger to your doings or had you taken him into your confidence in at least your conditions of employment and the basis upon which you did things? Did he know that from a long association with you?

MR BARNARD: No, Mr du Plessis was aware that I had been a member of the CCB and DCC at the relevant times, as I stated. Not Mr Verster's version, but my version.

MR BIZOS: Yes. And it was on the basis of that which you no doubt confirmed at the time that you were in detention, by signing under oath that that was the truth?

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: And Mr du Plessis acted for the other CCB members at that time.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: So he had their information to back up your claim presumably that you were connected with the CCB?

MR BARNARD: I'm assuming so.

MR BIZOS: Alright. You were not challenged in any way by our learned friend Mr Wessels, that you were regularly paid a salary, do you confirm that it was a salary?

MR BARNARD: It was definitely a salary.

MR BIZOS: Whose money were you getting?

MR BARNARD: Defence Force money. It came from the Defence Force. My own money that I worked for.

MR BIZOS: Now let us just have a categorical statement, if you would. From when to when were you getting R4 000 a month as a salary?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, I received this salary from my time of joining the CCB, which was officially June 1988, it continued until my Section 29 detention which was late in 1989. I cannot recall the precise date, but it was towards the end of 1989. And only during the weekend when my memory was refreshed by telephonically consulting with my parents, I heard of the R4 000 per month which was paid out to Brenda Mills, because my father wrote out cheques to give to her. He is prepared to testify about it here and the record regarding the cheques is available if the Committee wishes to consult it.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Barnard, do you know for how many payments, for how long Brenda Mills got paid in such a manner, R4 000 a month?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, I was under Section 29 for approximately three months and twenty one days, so it would have been for that duration of time. And as I have already testified, after my discharge I was asked what my needs or requirements were and I think that it was approximately R6 000 that I compiled a list of and I was told that I could obtain R12 000 the following day with which I was supposed to go on holiday, and this money also came from the CCB.

MR BIZOS: We also know that you received various bonuses. Now I'm not going to ask you to estimate the amount that you received in bonuses because you have given detailed evidence of the approximate amounts that you received from time to time and that we will add them up for the purposes of argument, so you don't have to worry about the amount. But whose money did you get as bonuses?

MR BARNARD: From the Defence Force, from the CCB.

MR BIZOS: And you were given how much? If I recall, R30 000 for a motor car?

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: We have heard from Mr van Zyl that he received a similar amount, was that as far as you know, the upper limit that a member or associate member of the CCB was entitled to for a motor car?

MR BARNARD: That is correct. May I just confirm? In terms of discussions with Mr Calla Botha, that he received a similar amount, Mr Calla Botha, and that I was also told at that time that I could purchase a more expensive vehicle. However, R30,000 would be the amount that the company would provide and I would have to be responsible for the deficit if I wanted to purchase a more expensive vehicle than that for which the funds that they made available to me allowed for.

MR BIZOS: And whatever label that they may want to put on you, did you feel that you were treated in a substantially similar manner as the other members of the CCB?

MR BARNARD: Sir, with regard to employment benefits, salary, medical benefits, policies, annuities, in that fashion yes, but with the exception of my handling after I was incorporated into the organisation, they dealt with me differently, I didn't for example undergo the courses that they had, it wasn't necessary, the CCB knew what they wanted with me. But with regard to my recruitment by Mr Joe Verster, I cannot understand that people are still trying to prove that I was an unconscious member, because wouldn't that have been the mother of all security breaches if Joe Verster had recruited me in contravention of all the rules and regulations? I enjoyed all the salary benefits and everything else, we discussed this with each other. Calla Botha and I saw each other on a daily basis, we discussed these matters. I saw that the was driving a car, I saw that he had a pager and I had all these things as well. We shared the same benefits. That is how it worked, precisely the same as all the other members.

MR BIZOS: Now was there any discussion amongst your fellow CCB members that Mr Verster and/or Mr van Zyl or others may have wanted to use you as the hitman for matters which they may not have wanted to put through the system, so to speak, and particularly behind the back of Gen Joubert in the first instance and Gen Webb, thereafter?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, it was never discussed as such, although I believe that Mr Calla Botha and I would have speculated regarding it and I believe firmly today that that is precisely what occurred. I have no doubt about it although I do not have any factual basis upon which to base this, but in light of everything that occurred and everything that happened to me, I am convinced this is exactly what occurred.

MR BIZOS: What was there that Mr Verster might have been referring to or knew that you may have been able to give evidence in order, to use a euphemism, to fix the General?

MR BARNARD: I deduced that Mr Verster wanted me to make an insinuation or an allegation during these proceedings that I had received the Webster instruction from Gen Webb, which was not the truth. His words to me were: "Fuck the General up, fuck him up."

MR BIZOS: Now you were asked why you didn't speak about Webster, the other crimes that you committed at the time that you applied for amnesty.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: And particularly in relation to the Webster killing, what is it that prevented you from applying for amnesty for that, because we'll work on the assumption that our learned friend, Mr Wessels is correct when he says it would have been an appropriate case for you to apply for amnesty? Why didn't you do it?

MR BARNARD: I didn't know what evidence the State possessed during my arrest, which persons would say that I made unlawful admissions, I didn't know what was going on with regard to that. Furthermore, I didn't trust anybody because I found myself in a situation where I was locked up. The same persons who provided hundreds of thousands of rands for my defence with, for example, the inquiries and the post-mortem inquiries into Dr Webster's death, were not available or accessible anymore.

I knew that I was being handled in a unique way. I had no substantiation for any disclosure made in an amnesty application. With regard to Lafras Luitingh and Joe Verster there was a typical CCB conspiracy against me after Joe had walked the whole way with me. You will remember that I was contacted by means of Mr Luitingh and I was brought to the Braamfontein Protea Hotel and a document was shown to me and the effect of the words which were typed on that page were that he denied any knowledge or involvement of or in the matter. He pointed at it with his finger and told me that that was his attitude.

All of those things built up to the time that I was arrested. All along everyone denied everything and all of a sudden Joe Verster and the others incriminated me during the post-mortem inquest. I didn't have someone in the system, such as Calla Botha or Slang van Zyl who could support me. They were always with me on a one on one basis.

I had a background of crime, I had been in prison, so I was discredited to a great extent. And if I were to disclose or expose everything in an amnesty application, all the Defence Force had to do was to deny it, which is what they did. Theuns Kruger said: "I don't know what the man's talking about, come and look at my office, I'm an auditor, look at my books" and there I would be and then there would be allegations and incriminations against me and the chances were very good that they would turn around and testify against me again if charges were brought against me.

I had absolutely no substantiation. I didn't have a rigid proforma which could substantiate my presentation or the approval or the budget that I received, there were no signatures. I was handled in a unique way and that made me afraid and uncertain because I could see that I was standing alone.

MR BIZOS: Yes, we understand that. I want to ask you a few more questions about the inquest in which his Lordship, Mr Justice Stegman held the inquest into the Webster killing. You're aware, I read it out here, that Judge Stegman said that, going through the evidence of the CCB people was trying to unravel a difficult puzzle, because you were careful to make the plausible denial, that is, admit only the things that may be proved patently and deny involvement. Would you agree with that assessment of the whole lot of you, by Judge Stegman, as to how you misled him?

MR BARNARD: That is correct, I would agree with that, yes.

MR BIZOS: Now you were asked why you didn't apply for amnesty for Webster, working on the assumption of the correctness of your evidence that you did it on the orders of Verster, did anything come out in those discussions as to why Verster would not apply for amnesty for the killing of Webster?

MR BARNARD: I cannot give any facts which would explain why Mr Verster did not apply, except from within my own personal opinion on him. He is so rigid in this thoughts that it is clear to me that they would not admit to anything that was going on in South Africa, except that which was know. For example, the Athlone bomb and the baboon incident, that which Slang van Zyl had already disclosed, they would admit to. I'm convinced within myself that other things must have taken place, I don't know exactly what, but what has been mentioned thusfar is merely the tip of the iceberg, that's for sure.

MR BIZOS: What reason did your colleagues in the CCB, do you believe, have in wanting to bypass Gen Webb?

MR BARNARD: Sir, I have spent much time thinking about that in my cell, I think that the CCB was highjacked from the inside by Joe Verster. I sat here and it was a revelation for me to see that Gen Webb had other duties and other activities except the CCB. He was the figurehead to me, but the CCB was actually Joe Verster. I think it turned into a monster where one person became so power hungry. If you play God for long enough you'll end up believing that you are God. And that is my personal opinion on what really happened here. However, I cannot substantiate my opinion with facts. I would say that Joe Verster highjacked the CCB from the inside and what the reason for that is, I don't know.

MR BIZOS: When you were recruited, were you informed that no life or attempt to take a life should be made without the authority of the Chairman, be it Gen Joubert or Gen Webb?

MR BARNARD: Mr Bizos, they never put it to me that directly in the beginning. At a later stage I became aware from discussions with Calla Botha, that things were submitted to the Chairperson. I wasn't completely involved regarding the length of the line and where it ran to, I knew I had to go through my Co-ordinator and through Joe Verster. What happened on the higher levels, I thought that there would be submissions but no-one told me specifically that everything had to be approved by the General. As I have told you, to me it was that Joe Verster was the CCB, if he said to kill a man, then I would kill him.

MR BIZOS: Remind us what Mr Verster said to his Lordship, Mr Justice Stegman about the killing of Webster and you.

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, I was not present when Mr Verster gave evidence, so I don't know, all I know is that he incriminated me. But I'm not certain, I don't know.

MR BIZOS: And were you present when Mr Luitingh gave evidence in the inquest?

MR BARNARD: No, I was not present with Mr Verster, Mr Luitingh or Mr Botes' evidence.

MR BIZOS: Was there any reason why you were excluded?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, I'm speaking under correction but if I recall correctly, especially with regard to Mr Verster, it was as such that I was not permitted to be present while he gave evidence. I was under the impression that Mr Verster was in disguise and if he wasn't in disguise, they managed to smuggle him in and out of the court in some or other way. I was not allowed to see him and I think that the court was also evacuated during his evidence.

MR BIZOS: He gave evidence in camera.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: He gave evidence under disguise at the Harms Commission.

MR BARNARD: Yes, that I know for a fact.

MR BIZOS: His identity was protected at all costs.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Now was there any attempt by anyone to suggest to you what you should say and what you should not say at the Webster inquest?

MR BARNARD: I did not have contact with the persons from the CCB anymore, so I simply did what came naturally and denied everything, because the only guideline that was given to me regarding the attitude of the organisation was that Joe Verster was in the hotel room, in the Braamfontein Protea Hotel, when he showed me what his attitude was. He pointed with his finger to the section of the page that stated that he denied everything regarding the Webster incident. So at all relevant times, I was under the impression that the CCB would deny everything regarding Webster.

MR BIZOS: Now you were asked whether you had cleared your use of Mr Calla Botha to help you with the murder of Dr Webster, from what had gone on before, did you think that anyone would have any objection to your using Mr Calla Botha for the purpose which you did?

MR BARNARD: I didn't really think about it in that way, the man was also a member of the organisation and I assumed that they did the same work that we did and I wanted to take someone with me who I could trust. I didn't think that there would be an objection, but I didn't go ahead and volunteer the information as such.

MR BIZOS: Was it only yourself that you wanted to protect by not disclosing that you had killed Webster, or did your close relationship with Mr Botha influence you in any way?

MR BARNARD: The fact remains that I wanted to protect Calla Botha at all costs.

MR BIZOS: Now you were also cross-examined as to your weapon of choice in order to kill Dr Webster and that you used your own shotgun which you modified in relation to length, in the manner in which you described. What number pellets did you use for the killing of Webster?

MR BARNARD: I cannot recall anymore today, it was either SG or SSG.

MR BIZOS: Those are heavy duty pellets, there are between 16 and 18 in the package are there not?

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: And at close range there are as lethal as any bullet.

MR BARNARD: I would say that it would be more effective than a bullet. If one shot someone from close enough it would have the effect of firing six or eight shots with a 9mm at a person, because the pellets in the casement were almost as big as the size of a 9mm bullet head.

MR BIZOS: And is a shotgun an advantageous weapon from the point of view of detection, as compared to bullets?

MR BARNARD: I don't really understand.

MR BIZOS: Can forensic experts ...(intervention)

MR BARNARD: Are you referring to the ballistics?

MR BIZOS: Yes.

MR BARNARD: One would not be able to connect ballistically if a shotgun was used, it's much more beneficial to use that sort of firearm than using a handgun or a hand firearm or any other type of gun.

MR BIZOS: Yes, the pellets, be they in the body of the deceased or on the motor car or in the near vicinity, could never be connected with any particular shotgun.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Unlike the other firearms that assassins use.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that one of the reason why you chose a shotgun, or not?

MR BARNARD: No, the reason why I used it was because I would be firing at close range and I wanted one shot to go off, not a variety of shots. If it had to take place during the day or something like that, the sound of the single shot would be the same as a car backfiring. And there was no opposition from Mr Verster and the others when I suggested that I wanted to use a shotgun.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Bizos.

Did you use both barrels simultaneously?

MR BARNARD: No, I only fired one shot.

MR BIZOS: I want to now turn to your instructions to Mr van Zyl, in relation to Mr Omar's attempted murder. Now you're aware that Mr van Zyl says that you received instructions only to monitor Mr Omar, what is your categorical answer in relation to that?

MR BARNARD: It is false. My express instruction from the very first moment when I went to discuss the incident with Mr van Zyl, I knew without any doubt that I was being tasked to murder Mr Omar, not to monitor him but to murder him. I was told that there were gangsters and other people in the Cape who were not performing. This is before I left Johannesburg to go to Cape Town, the information was already known to me. So from the very first day that I was approached I knew that I would be responsible for the killing of Adv Omar. There was absolutely no doubt in my mind about that.

MR BIZOS: When were you given the weapon?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, I was instructed to fly to Cape Town, which I did, I booked into the hotel there. Mr van Zyl joined me at a certain point. There was a meeting with Peaches Gordon and there was another meeting which was arranged for later in the evening, where all three of us were present. It was me, Peaches Gordon and Mr van Zyl. And upon this occasion Peaches Gordon took out a flat box which looked like a chocolate box and he gave the firearm to me, in the presence of Mr Slang van Zyl.

MR BIZOS: Did that firearm come out of the possession of Peaches?

MR BARNARD: It came from the possession of Peaches and upon Slang van Zyl's instruction he handed it over to me in the presence of Slang van Zyl.

MR BIZOS: What was the make of the firearm that you were given and what peculiarities did it have?

MR BARNARD: It was a Makarov pistol, a Russian manufactured Makarov with a silencer.

MR BIZOS: And you are absolutely certain that it came from Peaches' possession?

MR BARNARD: I have no doubt about that.

MR BIZOS: You heard the evidence of Mr van Zyl, that the Makarov that he had given Peaches was left with Peaches with instructions that he, Peaches, should destroy it, what do you say about that evidence?

MR BARNARD: The last time I spoke to Slang van Zyl at the Woodstock Holiday Inn, he told me that, or I told him that I didn't want to shoot because there was a woman with Adv Omar, and I told him that I wasn't prepared to continue on this basis, that it was like playing Russian roulette, hanging around there all the time in a stolen vehicle day after day, in a place where I stuck out like a sore thumb, and until there was specific pinpointed information regarding a meeting with Mr Omar, or any place where Mr Omar would be, I was not prepared to continue with the operation. At that point I handed back the weapon with the silencer that I had in my possession, to Mr van Zyl. I don't know what he did with it, but I really cannot imagine that Mr van Zyl would have given it back to Peaches Gordon to destroy, because that wouldn't make any sense. I cannot understand why he says that.

MR BIZOS: Well you must also take it into the context of Mr van Zyl's evidence, who denies that he ever gave you the gun or that he instructed you to kill Adv Omar, at any stage.

MR BARNARD: That is correct, his evidence was when it came to the allegation that I had the Makarov with the silencer and Brenda Mills' allegation, Mr van Zyl said the Lord only knows, but it isn't only the Lord that knows, Mr van Zyl and I know where I go the Makarov from.

MR BIZOS: When we were here during the June/July hearing, did you have friendly discussions with Mr van Zyl, in and around the hearing room or did he visit you during the adjournments where you kept apart by your guards?

MR BARNARD: Sir, what happened was that Mr van Zyl did not really want to meet with me in the first sitting, in the second sitting things changed. I think the cross-examination started worrying him and then he went to some trouble to go up to me and meet me and greet me. That made me feel a bit uncomfortable, but I wasn't quite sure what he was planning because it only happened afterwards, so I did talk to him. I think it was the third sitting when he came to me to greet me, I told him to fuck off because he's a two-face. It was the morning here when I was here the first time. And there's a reason why I did this.

MR BIZOS: Did you ever ask him why at your trial apparently in your favour where you were charged with the attempted murder of Adv Omar, his evidence was that you did not give him a Makarov or he did not instruct you to attempt to kill Adv Omar? Did you ever ask Van Zyl why he had departed from the truth before his Lordship, Mr Justice Els?

MR BARNARD: No, I did not ask him. I had no contact him at that stage.

MR BIZOS: You were in custody.

MR BARNARD: Yes, I was in custody and I saw Mr van Zyl the morning he walked in and as I told you, he was cold and calculated, he went to the box and gave me 10 years. He did not want to do me any favours. He stuck with the statement of 1988, where he said he made all the revelations or disclosures. It was with that statement of that time that he did not want to veer off from that. I was already in maximum prison, there was no access to me by him.

MR BIZOS: In relation to this strongly stated suggestion that other people got packages but you because you were differently treated, did not get a package because you were not a CCB member, how did it come about that you joined a new organisation after the supposed dissolution of the CCB? Please give us some detail, because I don't believe that anyone has canvassed this in any detail. Was it or was it not a payoff?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, I see it as a payoff because what happened was that I returned from holiday but I had an instruction to go and see Witkop Badenhorst, to phone him at a specific number. Upon my return I spoke to him, it was a C30 vehicle phone, and there was an arrangement made that I would see him at Adv Hennie Coetzee's offices or Hennie Goosen's office in Pretoria. An arrangement was made and I saw him there and at that same time he had some litigation of a private nature in his offices and with my first interview with Witkop Badenhorst he told me that people will contact me and will then appoint me at Military Intelligence. You can probably see it as a payoff, I haven't thought of it in that way, but I was transferred from one Defence Force organisation to another in a period of two weeks. It was an internal transfer.

MR BIZOS: With what benefits in the new position?

MR BARNARD: I was told from the beginning that I will be dealt with in a covert nature, because of the background of the CCB and the media coverage that I've already enjoyed at that stage. I became a bit frustrated so I wrote them a slightly sarcastic letter where I said I'm not willing to do this work, to be treated as an informer, I wanted to know what my tasks were and what my benefits were. I had a girlfriend who was pregnant, I wanted to make a career of this. I thought of it in a very serious light. They then appointed me as an agent and then at a later stage as a chief agent.

MR BIZOS: To do what?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, initially it was about collecting information, but people once very strongly requested me to sharpen my criminal contacts. They concentrated on the MK which ran together with the criminal world. They systematically changed it into a dirty tricks department, as I described in my evidence-in-chief.

MR BIZOS: Did the dirty tricks include killings?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, yes, but I was not directly involved in any of the murders, but I do have knowledge of two which I did not mention in my evidence-in-chief. If you want me to, I can mention what I know about it, I had indirect involvement in one of them, apart from the Francis incident where I was directly instructions.

MR BIZOS: Which are the two?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, the one was Jan Shoba who was a PAC/APLA Commander. What happened there was that it was during the time of the Waverley House, and in one of my co-ordinating sessions there was a computer printout, Mr Jan Shoba's name was on it and there was another brochure from a Hancock person, I cannot recall the rest of the details. I received certain tasks. I had to go through all this documentation, it was about their movements in and out of the country. It was the normal information from an intelligence computer.

Three days later I read Die Beeld and then I saw Jan Shoba was killed in Atteridgeville in a drive-by shooting, I think it was an AK47, and just after I read it, because I thought here I'm sitting the documents and this was a burning issue then and now suddenly this person is killed, I read his name in the newspapers. Half an hour later Eugene de Kock and his whole team of askaris arrived and some of these members arrived at the Waverley House and I could see that they did not sleep, they were unshaven, they worked right through the night. I called Mr de Kock to the side and I asked him if they killed him and he said no, he did not know of it. I did not think he'd say yes. I told him: "Yes, well I received this documentation and now I see in the newspaper that this persons was killed, tell me if you were involved or not". He said no, he just went to go and burn a house. But Rieg Verster did admit to me at a later stage that they killed him, that he was personally involved, I do not in what capacity, but that they killed him.

Then there was another incident and if you want me to I will describe it to you.

MR BIZOS: Yes, please let's have it.

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, I was contacted one evening at approximately 2 o'clock in the morning by Mr Verster, not Joe Verster, Rieg Verster, I was told to go to a specific point close to the Ultra City where he'd meet me, from there we drove. It was on the Morula Sun road. I had to go and steal a vehicle. What happened was that they killed a person who was a double-agent. He was in possession of a bakkie or pick-up which can be traced back to the DCC. It was a bakkie that he was issued with. They killed him and what happened was that he was outside of the vehicle when he was shot and in some way or another he threw away the keys and they could not find it in the dark and I was then contacted to remove the vehicle. I took the pick-up and I drove behind them up to Oom Gert se Gat, where it was stored and the vehicles were used in abductions and it was also stored at that house.

There was a basement where you could pull the vehicles in. Nobody gave me the person's name, but they told me that he was a double-agent that was eliminated. There was also blood against the vehicle and also a bullet hole in the bodywork.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Bizos, if I could just ask a question before it slips my mind.

When you were employed or worked for the DCC, did you receive a monthly salary?

MR BARNARD: Yes, I received a fixed salary and hundred percent medical coverage.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos referred you to your amnesty application earlier on, on page 205, and your answer to one of the questions was that you worked for the South African Defence Force during the period '88 to '89, either as a member or employed for specific purposes, what did you mean by "or employed for specific purposes" when answering that question?

MR BARNARD: Sir, that was because I was treated in a unique way, I was employed for this type of work. People recruited me right from the beginning to kill people. The establishment of an information network was not the issue, they employed me to kill people and I accept that they used me as a hitman to do that kind of work.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: Whilst we are dealing with the DCC, how did your benefits differ from the benefits you were getting from the CCB?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, I received a basic salary, I had hundred percent medical coverage. I was not provided with a vehicle because I had a vehicle. What happened was that the system that I built up snowballed so quickly that the operational costs grew a lot and when I was appointed as a chief agent I received an increase in salary and even my Colonel who handled me at that stage, it astonished him that I got so much money. And this came from Witkop Badenhorst himself, because they increased my salary with approximately R3 000 a month, but that's how it went.

MR BIZOS: What was Mr Badenhorst's position at the time? Was he a General?

MR BARNARD: Yes, he was a General, he was Head of the Military Intelligence and somebody in a very powerful position. If he spoke people jumped.

MR BIZOS: He didn't pay you his own money?

MR BARNARD: I beg your pardon?

MR BIZOS: He didn't pay you his own money?

MR BARNARD: No, it was Defence Force money.

MR BIZOS: Did anyone ever ask you to return the car that you had bought with the R30 000 that was given to you by the CCB, whilst you were on DCC business?

MR BARNARD: No, Sir. At the end of the day I traded that vehicle in and bought a new one. Nobody ever asked me for it back.

MR BIZOS: Did you have a credit card?

MR BARNARD: No, Sir.

MR BIZOS: Were there others that had a credit card?

MR BARNARD: At DCC they did work with credit cards left right and centre, but I myself did not work with it. They received specific cards that were issued to people. Some of them, I got the impression that they were limitless, the credit on them that is.

MR BIZOS: Were you with people on DCC where cards were used?

MR BARNARD: Yes. Mr Geoff Price, another Frans, Rieg Verster, they all used the cards.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Did you know that the discovery of the DCC came about as a result of the use of the credit card by the Goldstone Commission's investigators in Pietermaritzburg? Were you involved in any way in Pietermaritzburg?

MR BARNARD: Sir, Mr Eugene Riley, the former member of the Narcotics Unit in Johannesburg, I recruited him. He was appointed on a trial basis and later he was appointed on a permanent basis as an agent. He resorted under me but he had his own establishment, his own financial structure, etcetera, and from that there was certain information concerning weapons from a Mozambique citizen. It was either the ANC or MK, I'm not quite sure, that they stored these weapons in Natal. An excursion was arranged where Eugene Riley and his informant and also Frans, a senior member from DCC, and various other people then came to Pietermaritzburg to work on that information.

MR BIZOS: Is that what led to the appointment of the Steyn Commission and the forced resignation of the 23 Generals?

MR BARNARD: I assume so, yes, because there was a raid on the ARAQ offices, which would then be the Head Office of the DCC, they found a document that I wrote and that whole document is a dirty tricks document concerning the framing of MK into criminal situations or circumstances, and you can dirty somebody's hands by planting something at a specific place or framing them, and because of that Judge Goldstone made a press release which enjoyed international coverage and I agreed to a press interview where I denied everything on behalf of the Defence Force. I asked my Advocate concerning that document, because it would support my evidence here. I attempted to get hold of that document where I gave the layout of the dirty tricks department, what plans we had, but I could not get hold of it. It would have supported me in what I'm saying now.

MR BIZOS: Did your activities cease after the resignation of the 23 Generals?

MR BARNARD: Yes approximately the same time, maybe a bit before that, but it's around that time.

MR BIZOS: There's one other I want to ask you. Were there askaris used in the DCC operations?

MR BARNARD: Yes, Sir, there were askaris used. There was close co-operation between DCC and Mr Eugene de Kock them at Vlakplaas. Myself and Mr Eugene de Kock were personal friends, we interacted on a social basis and at a certain stage when Vlakplaas was down-scaling and they worked on the political aspects. Mr de Kock knew things were changing and he came to me with his askaris and his top operators and he offered them to me and I then took them in. Mr Henry van der Westhuizen who also used agents, he was the specialist in the ANC, the Anti-propaganda Unit, but we did not recruit askaris ourselves as Vlakplaas did it, we got them in other places but there were some who worked with us, yes.

MR BIZOS: Now were these askaris used in order to disrupt the election process?

MR BARNARD: The election process in '94? I heard about it ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Or the period leading up to it.

MR BARNARD: Yes Sir, I was involved in it myself.

MR BIZOS: Please tell us about that and on whose orders you did that.

MR BARNARD: What happened was that we took askaris and I recruit criminal elements, like from Soweto/Eldorado Park, Ennerdale, etcetera. I recruited criminal elements to disrupt mass actions and marches, I recruited them to commit criminal offences. If they participated in these marches, then the government or the Defence Force would then give it a lot of media coverage. They would run down a street, damage vehicles, break shop windows. I personally paid these criminal elements.

Maybe you can recall that there were such allegations in the media and on television that the ANC held a march and people ran down the streets and people robbed shops and people were injured, and I paid those, half before and half afterwards. I think in two of those incidents, as I just explained it to you, we decided to stage a false one and this was done to strengthen the Defence Force hand in terms of actions in the Coloured areas, concerning roadblocks, house to house searches, etcetera. Then we entered false information into the system, it was given to the media, in that we received information that, for example members of the ANC who were involved in these marches will hijack white women, take them to black areas to rape them. We'd already built up a background with regards to the criminal elements in these marches.

And then you'd recall that it was given a lot of media coverage, helicopters were used, an operational office was set up and manned by a General, they held roadblocks, the did block searches, house to house searches because of this, and it was all a campaign against the ANC. It was just before the elections.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, when it's convenient, when you get to the end of a theme we'll take the short tea adjournment.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) the askaris.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Now you and Mr de Kock had access to AK47s, did you not?

MR BARNARD: That's correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: And were these AK47s given to the various askaris that you had recruited?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, when I took over some of the askaris from Mr de Kock, specially two of them who had AK47s, I did not take it off them but I did not hand it out, but if they'd asked me I would have given one.

MR BIZOS: Now we know that hundreds of people were killed on trains, what do you know about that, Mr Barnard?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, I've only got limited knowledge concerning that, except that at a certain stage Vlakplaas members told me that they handed over weapons to the Zulus at the hostels, to commit those crimes. At a certain stage I was at the Three Sister Restaurant in Hillbrow with Chappies Kloppers, who then testified at a later stage against De Kock and Willie Nortje, and then Chappies Kloppers told me that they had to go and deliver a certain amount of weapons, I think it was in Tokoza, and I had to accompany them, but I was then busy with something else. It was not that I was scared to accompany them, I did these things every day, but I had something else going, so I could not accompany them. It was the same with the Boipatong massacre, a days few before that they also told me that they were handed over a large amount of weapons by Vlakplaas members and that will be used where the Zulus or the ANC will attack people, and I assumed it was for the Boipatong massacre, although I cannot prove this. But it was only a few days before the event.

MR BIZOS: It may be convenient, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We'll take the short tea adjournment now for approximately 20 minutes.

FERDINAND BARNARD: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: (Cont)

In the CCB and the DCC that you took part in, what was the attitude in relation to killing innocent people, if it served the purpose of the organisation?

MR BARNARD: Sir, I can answer as follows. If someone presented a threat to the organisation or the government of the day, he could be killed. Mark Francis was killed with the exclusive purpose to silence him because he was about to expose the scene in Johannesburg.

MR BIZOS: What I have in mind is that, for instance those who were mandated to kill, whether the Security Police, the CCB or the last organisation that you worked for. Let us take the Ribeiro killing for instance. There has been no suggestion that Mrs Ribeiro was in any way connected, but it would appear that if you were a hitman and you had to kill, you might as well kill the witness as well.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Whether the witness was involved or not.

MR BARNARD: It is precisely as I testified during my evidence with regard to the Adv Omar incident, I was asked why I didn't floor the woman as well.

MR BIZOS: Would that have been, killing Mrs Omar, would that have been in accordance with the way in which you would achieve the objectives of the CCB?

MR BARNARD: Correct. In the same breath I can tell you that with regard to my evidence regarding the Webster incident, when the vehicle behind us kept on approaching, I prepared myself to fire at that vehicle, and ten to one it would have been a completely innocent person in that vehicle who had absolutely nothing to do with politics. I was prepared to kill him if need be.

MR BIZOS: We had other examples, for instance in the Goniwe killings, one of the four in the car was on the finding, an innocent passenger, you couldn't kill the three and leave the - within their own idea of innocence and guilt, you couldn't kill the guilty and leave the innocent alive, because the whole game would have been up. So killing innocent people was not something contrary to the way in which the CCB did its killings.

MR BARNARD: I agree with you.

MR BIZOS: Now with that in mind, were you surprised that Van Zyl told you why didn't you kill her?

MR BARNARD: No, I wasn't surprised.

MR BIZOS: What did you say to him?

MR BARNARD: I told him that I didn't do it that way and that I wasn't prepared to do it that way. I had a personal problem with doing it that way.

MR BIZOS: What was the driving force against it?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, I was raised in such a way that women and children should be respected, and after the incident with Dr Webster took place, the thing that upset me the most wasn't the fact that I had shot Dr Webster dead, what upset me the most was to see what Ms Maggie Friedman had experienced in the press and personally as I saw her. I cannot explain to you what it feels like to sit during a Commission of Inquiry and to sit with a post-mortem inquest and not be able to look that women in the eye. The fact that she was present makes it more humiliating for me. The process of shooting someone in the presence of his or her loved one, it was a cowardly act, it was not the same as the Special Task Force in the Police, who did penetration actions and knew exactly who would be in a building that they were about to penetrate. To shoot a man in the presence of his loved one was cowardly, it is not something that made me feel good, it upset me. The aspect pertaining to Maggie Friedman, I began drinking uncontrollably after that incident, morning, noon and night, after I had seen that she was present, because I did not physically see her during the incident.

MR BIZOS: In some of these cases it has been said that it's unfortunate if people get killed in the crossfire, now I don't know apt an expression that is where there's only one side that's doing the shooting, but was it used as a justification, this expression: "Well you get caught in the crossfire", if you killed innocent people standing by?

MR BARNARD: Yes, I assume that it would be put down to part of the war that we were waging, it was justifiable.

MR BIZOS: Now with that background I want ask you questions, having regard to your knowledge of how the CCB worked. From your understanding, if people actually or on false information given, were responsible in the mind of Verster or of Van Zyl, of putting bombs at the Magistrate's Court, at the post office and if they thought that they were going to plant other bombs in which people would have been killed, how did you expect the CCB, from what you knew, to deal with such people?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, to quote the motto of the CCB, it would be to disrupt them on the maximum level and to kill them. It was the same thing with Bishop Tutu, we could just as well have played knock-knock or thrown stones on the rook, we could have blown down the tyres of the security guard's bicycle, that really would have disrupted and upset Bishop Tutu. It doesn't make any sense, if these persons were identified as terrorists, if an activist such as Dr Webster could be shot dead, then so more could stricter action be taken against those who were planting bombs, for example. They would have been killed.

MR BIZOS: The fact that there was information that it was a whole committee that was going to meet at the Early Learning Centre, within the practice of the CCB, would the killing of 10/12 people on this committee, possibly the night watchman that was there, other people that may have been there, would that have been a deterrent affect on the CCB to blowing people up?

MR BARNARD: No, it wouldn't Sir, to my understanding.

MR BIZOS: Now please tell us precisely, insofar as you are able to, what Van Zyl said to you about the Early Learning Centre.

MR BARNARD: I contacted Mr van Zyl that morning and informed him regarding the Lubowski incident that I'd viewed on TV, and he told me that I should speak to him later that day in the hotel where I was booked into in Woodstock, the Holiday Inn. He told me that the bomb which had exploded towards the end of August had been his project and that it had successfully been completed in certain aspects but not in others. I asked him to explain and he said that the objective had been to kill all the occupants or to maim all the occupants in the hall and that the project had not been successfully completed because the remote control device was faulty and by the time it had been repaired and activated, most of the people had left the meeting hall. That is what he told me. And that it had been an order from the very top. He also stated that he had attached either 4 pounds or 4 kilograms worth of nails to the bomb with masking tape, in order to produce a better shrapnel effect.

MR BIZOS: That he had added to it?

MR BARNARD: That he had done it.

MR BIZOS: And you then told us that you discussed this with Calla Botha.

MR BARNARD: At a later stage, I cannot recall when, I had contact with Mr Calla Botha and I discussed it with him.

MR BIZOS: Now you told us that he differed with Van Zyl in his report to you, to what extent was the report different?

MR BARNARD: Mr Botha was upset, he was indignant, he said that he didn't know why that man was saying such things, he said that he was living in a dream world, he said that he, Mr Botha, had personally inspected the bomb, that he was the last one to view the bomb, that he doesn't know how he was implicated in the whole matter and that it was possible to teach a monkey to activate the button in ten seconds. He also denied the aspect of the nails. He also denied that the people had to be killed, he stated emphatically that on the contrary, the direct instruction had been that no-one should be killed. I myself was not involved in the bomb incident. If I could give you the details of what exactly was said, I would. Mr Botha denied it, but Mr Slang van Zyl looked very serious when he told me all the details. I don't know why this is.

MR BIZOS: Did Mr Calla Botha express any reluctance to being involved in that operation?

MR BARNARD: I wouldn't say that he was reluctant, but when I made this report regarding the nails to him, he said that he didn't know why they involved him in the first place, because it wasn't his project, that he was working independently, but they needed him when they wanted to use him, that was when he would be good enough for them to use. He said that one could teach a chimpanzee in ten minutes to activate the button which would detonate the bomb. That was his attitude.

MR BIZOS: You've heard the evidence of Gen Webb, Mr Verster and Van Zyl, that this was merely to frighten people.

MR BARNARD: That is correct, I heard it.

MR BIZOS: How consistent is that with the way in which the CCB did its business?

MR BARNARD: It's not consistent at all, it's inconsistent. To my mind.

MR BIZOS: Let us turn to the operation, Apie as it's referred to in the papers. Now you have given evidence to the effect that you were told by Van Zyl that this was the third step of five which would have led to the death of Archbishop Tutu's son.

MR BARNARD: That is correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: In the statement that you made at the time you were detained in terms of Section 29 before the Harms Commission, you mention that fact as well.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: In your dealings with Van Zyl after that, did he ever deny it or did he ever tell you how did you come to say this?

MR BARNARD: No, he didn't, I was never confronted with it. In my Section 29 statement, if I recall correctly, I also concealed Mr van Zyl's identity in that it would come from someone else, I created a fictional person by the name of Dirk, who was actually Mr van Zyl in reality, but with my second Section 29 statement I stipulated that it was indeed Mr van Zyl and not this Dirk that I'd referred to.

MR BIZOS: So that when you mentioned it the first time you attempted to ...(intervention)

MR BARNARD: To cover for Van Zyl.

MR BIZOS: To cover for Van Zyl.

MR BARNARD: That's correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: But in your second statement you came out with it.

MR BARNARD: That's correct yes, Sir.

MR BIZOS: That too was said before you are alleged to have given unfavourable evidence towards people in order to make friends in high places.

MR BARNARD: Yes Sir, I think my attitude towards that remark is clearly on record.

MR BIZOS: The Members of the Committee and particularly the Chairman, has asked why were you treated differently and there are one or two questions that I want to ask you about that, Mr Barnard. What was Luitingh's job as far as you were concerned?

MR BARNARD: Mr Luitingh had other duties that I was not involved in, but his work with regard to me was to act as my Co-ordinator. All my information went into the system via him and I received my tasks from him as well.

MR BIZOS: And that's the man that you got most instructions from and that's the man where you got most of the bonus money from.

MR BARNARD: That's correct yes, Sir.

MR BIZOS: Can you explain, if you can, why a Region 6 was not chosen for that purpose but apparently someone who was under the direct control of Mr Verster?

MR BARNARD: For what purpose is that, Sir?

MR BIZOS: Why were you handled by a person who had direct access to Mr Verster and not by one of the people that was a member of Region 6?

MR BARNARD: I think that's obvious, in order to establish a cut-off point. You must remember that Verster and Luitingh at no stage were aware of the fact that I knew their identities, according to them there was an absolute watertight cut-off point, that being themselves. I had a pager of one David Klopper, with which I contacted Lafras Luitingh. I knew him as Louis Yssel and I had a pager by which I contacted him, which was registered in the name of David Klopper. I believe it was to establish a cut-off point. And I think that is also the reason why I was handled in such isolation, as an individual unit, I alone.

MR BIZOS: Why, if you were going to be merely a hitman, why were you not treated like Peaches or Hardien?

MR BARNARD: I don't know, I cannot explain it. I don't know if they were looking for someone who would be a conscious member, but would function on his own, given my background. I had a police background, I knew how to circumvent investigations, I knew how to get out of situations. I'd managed to get out of many tight spots in my lifetime and it was well known.

MR BIZOS: You've mentioned Badenhorst as running the DCC, was he the only person in DCC that you came across, or were there others?

MR BARNARD: No, at a certain stage I also had liaison with Brig Tol Botha, he was the Head of DCC, but Gen Witkop Badenhorst was the overall Commander of Military Intelligence. Military Intelligence, viewed in general, had various branches and some of the branches were overt, others were covert and underground structures, but Brig Tolletjie Botha was generally in command, then there were Col At Nel and Geoffrey Price who was a Major, and as I've already stated there was Col Gerrie Borman, and Rich Verster.

MR BIZOS: Do you know whether Aitchison is still alive?

MR BARNARD: No, but I doubt it, I myself doubt whether he is still alive.

MR BIZOS: Why would that be?

MR BARNARD: I just think so, because I never heard from him again. At a time I saw, a few years ago, that he was still making statements in the media and in the press, that he even spoke to the foreign media at one point. I recall seeing an interview that he had with Dirk Coetzee, during which it was said that he was also tasked to kill Dirk Coetzee and then he just became quiet, I never heard anything else of him.

MR BIZOS: He wasn't a person to keep quiet about things.

MR BARNARD: No, after his release, on the contrary he set press interviews, he was the sort of man who would do anything for money. If the press paid him, he would tell them a lie.

MR BIZOS: And how did Peaches come to be killed?

MR BARNARD: I don't know, I followed the story in the papers and I saw that he had been killed. I must just say that the CCB was very unhappy with him, due to the revelations that he made, and in particular, Mr Slang van Zyl, because Slang van Zyl and I discussed it at one point. Peaches Gordon came to point me out while I was in Section 29 detention, he slapped me on the shoulder and pointed me out and identified me in Brixton, so I wasn't very happy with him either. There was a lot of sensitivity surrounding the fact that he led Slang van Zyl around by the nose with regard to work that he didn't do and money that he took from him. I'm not saying that Mr van Zyl has something to do with it, what I am trying to say is that he, Mr van Zyl, was very unhappy with Peaches Gordon.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, I have no more questions at this stage, but we would like to reserve any further cross-examination that, or examination as a result of anything that may emerge when our learned friend Mr Wessels has another opportunity.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you, Mr Bizos. Mr Hockey, do you have any questions you'd like to put to the applicant?

MR HOCKEY: I don't have any questions in addition to that asked by Mr Bizos, so thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Rheede, do you have any questions that you would like to put?

MR RHEEDE: None, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Martini, you indicated earlier that you would be reserving any rights to put questions, do you wish to put questions at all?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MARTINI: Thank you, Chairperson, just one question.

Mr Barnard, just flowing from what Mr Bizos asked you, I just want to understand your evidence, if it's correct. In your Section 29 statement, the '89 statement, November '89, you created this fictitious person, Dirk, is that correct?

MR BARNARD: That is correct, Sir.

MR MARTINI: And I take it that was designed to protect Mr Slang van Zyl?

MR BARNARD: That is correct, and also to create as much confusion as possible, to give the police without really giving them anything at all.

MR MARTINI: Yes, yes, but on the issue of the "vyf punt plan", you original said it was Dirk.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR MARTINI: Because you said in your evidence that Mr van Zyl told you this was part of a five point plan, correct?

MR BARNARD: That is correct, Dirk does not exist. He never existed.

MR MARTINI: Correct. So at that point in time you created this surely to protect Mr van Zyl on the issue of the Apie.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR MARTINI: Then are we to assume you then made another statement, December '89, correct?

MR BARNARD: I assume so.

MR MARTINI: And there you said you wanted to correct certain falsehoods that you'd made previously, correct?

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR MARTINI: Well you say you "neem so aan", if you just check bundle B, I thought Mr Bizos dealt with that with you, if you can look at page 99 of bundle B, Mr Barnard. Do you have it?

MR BARNARD: Yes I do, thank you.

MR MARTINI: You see that statement's dated the 6th of December 89, correct? Page 99, bundle B.

MR LAX: In fact the later statement comes before the first statement, the earlier statement.

MR MARTINI: Sir, I don't want you to assume, I want you just to tell us if it's correct.

MR BARNARD: Could you please put the question again.

MR MARTINI: Do you agree with me that at page 99, bundle B, that statement is dated 6th of December '89?

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR MARTINI: Now the first statement where you dealt with Dirk, where you created the fictitious person, where you said Dirk told you about this five point plan, was done in November '89, correct?

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR MARTINI: Now in December '89, I take it then you no longer wanted to protect Mr van Zyl.

MR BARNARD: I exposed him, if I recall correctly.

MR MARTINI: Correct, that's my point. Well that's what you say, you say well he even identified ...(indistinct). In your statement, if you look at 93:

MR BARNARD: Yes, I can see that.

MR MARTINI: So can we accept that in your second statement, December '89, you then wanted to expose Mr van Zyl?

MR BARNARD: Yes I did expose him, but my second statement also contained lies, but this is the truth.

MR MARTINI: Ja, but what I'm putting to you is, you've now corrected it, you said: "Look, there was no such a person as Van Zyl, it was Dirk", now comes a month later you now want to expose him, because you now identify him, correct?

MR BARNARD: That's correct.

MR MARTINI: Because you wanted to expose him. You went as far as now identifying Mr van Zyl.

MR BARNARD: That's correct.

MR MARTINI: Thank you, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. At this stage, unless anybody's got any further questions, that concludes your testimony.

MS COLERIDGE: Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Oh sorry, there was no intention Ms Coleridge. Please go ahead and ask questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS COLERIDGE: Thank you, Chairperson, just a few questions I'd like to ask Mr Barnard in relation to the Webster incident.

Mr Barnard, did you contact Mr Verster after the Webster incident? Did you make a report to him?

MR BARNARD: No, I only reported to Lafras Luitingh when I contacted him and he didn't get back to me directly. I finally managed to get hold of him two to three days later and upon our meeting I reported to him and also wanted to know if damage control was necessary. I was worried about the press and media coverage of the incident.

MS COLERIDGE: And then in relation to Calla Botha, at which stage did Mr Verster know of Calla Botha's involvement in the Webster incident?

MR BARNARD: I cannot say specifically when it became known or when it was reported, but possibly on the morning of my meeting with Lafras Luitingh, I could have disclosed Calla Botha's involvement in the incident to him. I cannot remember precisely. I've spent much time thinking about it, unfortunately I cannot answer you precisely.

MS COLERIDGE: And did Mr Calla Botha at any stage inform you that he had told Joe Verster of his involvement in the Webster incident?

MR BARNARD: I don't know if he reported to Joe Verster, but at a certain stage he disclosed the facts to his Co-ordinator and his regional management.

MS COLERIDGE: Is that Wouter ...(intervention)

MR BARNARD: That is Wouter Basson and Staal Burger. Although I cannot say whether it was both of them or only one of them, but he did report it to his cell. There was a stage where he would have had to report it.

MS COLERIDGE: Was this immediately after the incident, or was it a long while after the incident? Do you have any recollection?

MR BARNARD: I have no idea when it was.

MS COLERIDGE: And then just after your Section 29, after your detention, you said you made calculations that your needs were about R6 000, but instead you received R12 000, did you actually request the R12 000 or the R6 000?

MR BARNARD: No, what happened was that I was supposed to compile a list of my requirements which totalled an amount of R6 000 and then the attorneys contacted me later that afternoon and told me to come to their offices the following morning and that they had received R12 000. I wouldn't say that it was an instruction but it was suggested to me that I should go on holiday with the rest of the money, and I did so.

MS COLERIDGE: And then Mr Slang van Zyl used your services, how did the two of you make that connection? Did he know that you belonged to the CCB?

MR BARNARD: I think I said so to Mr van Zyl, but our original contact was at the Johannesburg SAP Rugby Club where I had been a member many years previously. We ran into each other there. His wife at that stage, introduced us to each other because I knew her when she was a State Prosecutor and I was a Detective. The two of them later got married. She introduced us and then upon various occasions I telephoned Mr van Zyl and we met in a restaurant eventually and I told him that there could be possible ways in which we could compliment each other. Among others, I told him that much of the CCB's information was updated. He agreed with me. And we also discussed in general.

MS COLERIDGE: So he was never aware of the fact that you worked for the CCB?

MR BARNARD: I think I put it to him.

MS COLERIDGE: At which stage was this?

MR BARNARD: When we had that meeting in the restaurant.

MS COLERIDGE: And then just your instruction with regards to the Lubowski incident, what was your instruction basically, was it just to monitor?

MR BARNARD: From Mr van Zyl?

MS COLERIDGE: Correct.

MR BARNARD: The internal story with regard to Adv Lubowski was only monitoring. As I've testified, at a certain stage I went and felt Mr Lubowski's door myself, because I had worked on him in South West Africa and I was made aware that there was a project which was aimed at killing him and I thought that I should do so while I was busy. I saw him going out to the parking lot later that night, I thought that he would make a good opportunity target, but I never had such an instruction. That is what I reported to Mr van Zyl. He didn't want me to proceed with it.

MS COLERIDGE: Thank you Chairperson, I've no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Lax do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

MR LAX: Thanks, Chairperson.

Mr Barnard, in answer to questions from both Mr Wessels and Mr Bizos, you indicated that apart from the monies from the sale of your house, no other monies of your own were used in any representation of you in any of the legal fora that you've been involved in, is that correct?

MR BARNARD: Yes, apart from the legal counsel who assisted me in my criminal trial. All other investigations, the Harms Commission, the Goldstone Commission, the Webster Post-mortem Inquest, they all paid for it.

MR LAX: I just wanted to be clear where the money for the sale of your house actually went to, which defence was that?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, it was a robbery charge, a diamond robbery in Klerksdorp. I paid for it privately. It had nothing to do with the Defence Force or anything else, and I paid it to that attorney's firm who acted on my behalf in that case.

MR LAX: Now what was your basic at DCC? You told us that you got an increase, but what was your basic?

MR BARNARD: It's difficult to recall but I would say it was approximately R3 500 as a starting salary and then with operational costs.

MR LAX: Okay. Now I want to take you back to your amnesty application form and in particular page 208, your answer to paragraph 11(b). The question is with regard to who gave you orders, etcetera, etcetera, and in 11(a) you say:

and then with regard to the particulars of such, you say:

MR BARNARD: That's correct, yes.

MR LAX: Why didn't you mention anyone higher than Mr van Zyl, at that stage?

MR BARNARD: Sir, I also testified and I was under the impression that Mr van Zyl applied me and that he told that he did not inform anybody else about my involvement in this incident. If I was disinformed concerning this, I do not know. If it was truly the case, I do not know, but I was under the impression that Mr van Zyl never told anyone else about my involvement.

MR LAX: And then finally, with regard to the matter of Boipatong itself, you indicated that some days before that you had knowledge that certain weapons were delivered. You said you got this information at the Three Sisters Restaurant.

MR BARNARD: That is correct, from the Vlakplaas members, but I cannot say that it was used for Boipatong, because I do not know. What I'm saying is that I made an inference, because there were Zulus involved in the Boipatong and I read about this later in the media, that these weapons had to be delivered for Zulus. I made the inference that it could have possibly played a role. If it was true, I do not know, I've got no facts to substantiate it.

MR LAX: Is it correct that what you were told was that the weapons were just being delivered to some Zulus, you didn't know exactly which ones, which ...(intervention)

MR BARNARD: To a Zulu hostel in Tokoza.

MR LAX: in Tokoza?

MR BARNARD: To Tokoza, in the East.

MR LAX: Thank you, no further questions Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Sibanyoni, do you have any questions you'd like to put?

MR SIBANYONI: Only one Mr Chairperson.

Mr Barnard, if a person will say to you you are involving people higher than Slang van Zyl, for example Joe Verster, because of the fact that you are bitter, they didn't help you, what would be your comment?

MR BARNARD: Sorry, I didn't understand your question now Sir.

MR SIBANYONI: If a person may allege that you are involving people like Joe Verster of having given you instructions, for the reason that after your arrest now they are not helping you, what would be your response to that?

MR BARNARD: No, Sir, that is far from the truth. If I wanted to incriminate Joe Verster, I could have done it a day after my arrest, when I was arrested. I was also offered 204 indemnity by the Attorney-General and they say: "If you tell us where your instructions came from, if you play with us, if you make a full disclosure, we will give you indemnity with the Attorney and the investigative team's office. I did not want to give my co-operation, I refused to incriminate anybody else, and since then the Attorney-General's staff and the Attorney-General, Mr Pretorius himself, came to visit me for seventeen times in prison and up until when I started telling the truth here, I did not make any statements. Apart from the fact that I was suffering in C-Max, apart from the fact that I was suffering under the circumstances, I was detained under circumstances, I thought if I make a statement here I will be out of C-Max in a normal jail where I can practise, exercise and play pool and play darts like other people do in jails, and I stuck with what I believed in and I decided not to do it until I came here and explained about Mrs Omar who came to me and I started telling the truth. This what happened with her made me tell the truth here. It's not about incriminating Joe Verster, I said at various opportunities I do not want anybody else to end up in jail and I realised that the evidence that I'm giving here cannot be given in a criminal case. If I wanted to incriminate Joe Verster, I could have worsened it, I could have made more allegations, I could have made a this thick statement that would have shocked the Attorney-General. I do not have to go through all of it again, it's not about that.

MR SIBANYONI: And lastly, if a person will say you have told lies on various occasions before, as a result it would risky to accept what you are saying, what would be your response?

MR BARNARD: Sir, I admitted under oath again today that for 12 years I've been lying. If my evidence will be accepted now, I cannot say. All that I'm saying is that anybody with a little bit of intelligence can see that I've denied that I had anything to do with the Webster incident, I've denied all involvement. I did it to protect the government of the day, to protect the Defence Force and to protect myself. For me the situation is now applicable, the game's over, I do not have to do it anymore. I cannot tell you how I feel after I reconciled with Mrs Omar and after I got rid of all the rubbish, I feel like somebody that was healed from cancer. I'm very satisfied that I did the right thing now.

MR SIBANYONI: You confirm that there's no better truth than you have told before this Committee?

MR BARNARD: Sir, I think a few men can come here and follow my example. I was against the TRC process about telling the truth, you could get anybody else who was more rigid than me in my thoughts, maybe Joe Verster, but I cannot tell you how strongly I would tell others to come and tell the truth here, if they still have the opportunity, after what happened to me here. It is a day and night difference in what I'm feeling now. I know I will go back to my cell. From day one when I decided to give evidence here I did not make myself popular with some of my comrades. It's not about getting amnesty for three-quarters of the things that I was charged with and found guilty of. I cannot get amnesty and I also did not apply for them in terms of the Act and the description of the Act, but it's not about that, it's about reconciliation and suddenly it became really important and what happened here made it important. I agree with you a hundred percent and I cannot tell anybody else to come here.

I was confused at one stage and Mr Calla Botha came to me and I consulted with him and I said to him I do want to do this, but I've got something in me that is very strong and I do not want to testify against anybody else, I do not want to send them to jail. It's still there, it's not gone. I do not want them to open the doors in the morning in C-Max and there's 45 of us standing in a row, it's also not reconciliation. I do not want to send anyone else to jail. I do not want Joe Verster to go to jail, even for one day. Today it's about reconciliation and peace of mind.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Barnard, you told us that when you first heard of the Webster operation, in the same breath an operation against Mr Jay Naidoo was contemplated, but that priority must be given to the Webster operation and you then successfully carried out the Webster operation. Was there any follow-up regarding the Jay Naidoo operation? Was it mentioned again, anything?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, I recruited a source at the Wits University who had a lot of access and who attended certain meetings where Jay Naidoo was involved. He also had access to these meetings. I tasked this person and after approximately a week or ten days he brought back information with regard to an address being the address of Mr Jay Naidoo, 93 Hopkins Street, Yeoville, but I did not do a follow-up afterwards or I was not tasked on it any further. I had to lie low and I could have been used abroad.

CHAIRPERSON: You also told us that in 1984 you were sentenced to an effective 6 year term of imprisonment, you got 20 years but an effective 6 year term for two murders and that you were released towards the end of '87, on parole.

MR BARNARD: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And then also from you narrative it's quite clear that very shortly after your arrest you seriously got involved in crime in the Johannesburg underworld, you ran brothels, you dealt with drugs, you consumed drugs yourself, you were involved in assaults and robberies and all sorts of criminal activities. Was your parole officer just inefficient or had some arrangement been made to keep him off your back? How did you manage to do all this without your parole officer knowing about it?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, I saw the parole officer once every two weeks and afterwards once a month, but I never informed the parole officer that I changed careers. I still had the same telephone numbers, so I misled them concerning this. And then concerning the criminal involvement and the involvement with drugs, it started over a longer period of time, because I was tasked by the system to have contact with these criminals every day and it was a systematic change that happened.

After I was released from prison I was 31 years old and I was so fit and I got a place in the first team in the Roodepoort rugby team and as I became more and more involved in it and I had to prove myself and where people tested me I went overboard. I still cannot believe that I ended up where I did, because I did not take any substances my whole life and then ... There's no-one here who can say I drank a single beer until I became 32, and then suddenly I became a full-on alcoholic and drug addict. It is something that happened to me and that is why I want to become the way I was before.

That is why in C-Max, C-Max did what two rehabilitation centres could not do. I am fit, I live a healthy life and I feel there's a big step towards healing, in that I came here to tell the truth and made a full disclosure. It's not even important if you believe me or not, for myself it's important.

CHAIRPERSON: And then lastly, when you were being questioned by Mr Bizos, correct me if I'm wrong, but my recollection is that you said that when you were here, I think it was in the July session of the hearings, when Verster approached you, spoke to you and said that you must, to use the euphemism used by Mr Bizos, "fix the General" ...(intervention)

MR BARNARD: That was the first sitting.

CHAIRPERSON: The first sitting. And then you were asked well why did you think he said that to you and you said you thought that he wanted you to implicate Gen Webb in the Webster operation, is that correct?

MR BARNARD: That is correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Now why would he have thought that at that stage, because even at that stage you had not made up your mind to come and give the evidence that you have here, and that he was denying the Webster operation and you were denying it, so why did you think that he wanted you now to implicate Webb? How could you have done that?

MR BARNARD: Without implicating myself?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, this is what I believe today, that's what I meant. At that stage I not necessarily believed that. Their versions differed concerning instructions that they gave, but the thing is that we did not agree, myself and Verster. They told me I was like the mafia, I was very staunch. I told Calla Botha that it seems as if Joe Verster's worrying about what I'm going to say here, because now Verster is in a position, he has to go through a cross-examination and he doesn't know what I'm going to say, two weeks later I'm going to come to the front and this is what happened now, I received an instruction from him, and I wanted to pacify him. I went to Calla Botha and told him: "Go to Verster and tell him I will not testify anything about Webster, I will tell this Commission to go to hell" and Calla Botha returned to me and he was very disgusted. He said: "You were so staunch with this guy and he said you can do what you want to". But then he probably thought about it because the next day, after there was an adjournment and they did not take me away, Mr Verster came to sit next to me and then he said to me: no he's received my message and thank you very much and he's got a lot of respect for me, etcetera, but I have to fuck up the General, and he told me to fuck up the General. Immediately afterwards, after Gen Webb came to sit next to me I asked Gen Webb, after I reported to him I will say I did not get the instruction from him because I did not, I got it from Verster, and he told me that he never gave the instruction. And that's how it happened.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you. Are there any questions arising out of questions that have been put by Members of the Panel? Mr Wessels?

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WESSELS: ... some questions at this stage about it, before I've looked at the documents, to save time.

Mr Barnard, you say that you told Gen Webb at that stage that you will not talk about Webster and that you will not incriminate him in it.

MR BARNARD: Yes, I told him I will not testify about Webster that I received the instruction from you, because I did not get the instruction from you. I wanted to calm him.

MR WESSELS: Did you suggest to him that Joe Verster would then have suggested to you to involve Webb in the Webster case?

MR BARNARD: No, I cannot say that.

MR WESSELS: Now Mr Barnard, you say as you are sitting here now, that you are of the opinion that Verster wanted you to incriminate Webb in the Webster incident.

MR BARNARD: Yes, that is what I think today.

MR WESSELS: But if it is so, then it would mean that you will have to come and say that you were involved, you received an instruction. You could not come forward and say that the instruction came directly from Gen Webb, because everybody knew that you did not act in that way. So by incriminating Webb in the Webster case, you also had to incriminate Verster.

MR BARNARD: That is possibly true, yes.

MR WESSELS: Then how can any rational person think that you could incriminate Webb and not incriminate Verster?

MR BARNARD: You are now talking about a rational person, I do not think Mr Verster's a rational person.

MR WESSELS: Yes Mr Barnard, maybe you are making inferences too quickly, which is not founded on anything.

MR WESSELS: Mr Barnard, what did you hear about the weapons that were provided to Zulus just before the Boipatong massacre?

MR BARNARD: Sir, they just told this to me. I cannot really connect it to the Boipatong massacre. The only reason why I'm saying is that, and I have got no facts to substantiate it, because Vlakplaas members were present and they told me that they had to go and pick up weapons and they had to take these weapons to Tokoza in the East Rand and hand it over to the Zulus. Because I was aware of sensitive connections with the Zulus, amongst others, with Themba Khoza and Vlakplaas. I also had an IFP member that handled him who was a former Vlakplaas member and I do not recall specifically why he did not go with them, but they left there to go and pick up weapons and to take it to Tokoza in the East Rand to a hostel where they had to drop it off. Afterwards I heard of the Boipatong massacre in the media and I never ... and I'm also stating it that those weapons were used, it's an inference that I drew.

MR WESSELS: You see Mr Barnard, this is the problem I have with your evidence, you mention an incident and create this impression that certain people were involved in it, for example, that Vlakplaas was involved in the Boipatong massacre on this basis, without having substantiated facts. You are speculating.

MR BARNARD: If I am speculating, then I will say I'm speculating. Like I've already put to you, if there are facts to substantiate it and if somebody told me something directly, I will put it like that.

MR WESSELS: I will put it to you that when you testified about Boipatong in the first place you did not make it very clear that you were speculating about it, like you are doing now.

MR BARNARD: That was intentionally. I've got no problem in accepting it.

MR WESSELS: The criminal elements that you got to commit crimes, you say - was this before the elections in 1994?

MR BARNARD: Yes, it was.

MR WESSELS: And did they indeed commit crimes?

MR BARNARD: Yes, they did.

MR WESSELS: Were you gave them specific instructions about things they had to do?

MR BARNARD: Yes, it was broad instructions, they had to damage vehicles, where the people marched people had to be assaulted, they had to damage shop windows. I gave a specific instructions that where possible they had to target whites, they had to highjack their vehicles and drive with these vehicles to the black townships. We wanted to create a psychosis of fear which will then strengthen the Defence Force in that they can act on that.

MR WESSELS: And did this indeed work?

MR BARNARD: Well the instruction concerning the physical highjacking of people did not happen, but there were reports in the media and it was placed in front of the ANC and certain trade unions who held these marches, that the criminal element in the march had no political connection. There were such reports in the newspapers, where shops damaged, people were injured, vehicles were damaged, etcetera.

MR WESSELS: You did not go back to these elements at a later stage to find out from them if they did execute these instructions?

MR BARNARD: Yes, I did, I gave them half of the money before and the other half at a later stage, or afterwards.

MR WESSELS: Yes they wanted to get paid?

MR BARNARD: Yes, it came from the government.

MR WESSELS: And specifically did they report to you, what did they do?

MR BARNARD: Just what I just told you. They damaged vehicles, they damaged shop windows, they assaulted people.

MR WESSELS: Can you just give us more details concerning this?

MR BARNARD: No, I cannot.

MR WESSELS: Like a specific incident or incidents?

MR BARNARD: I did not do research on what shop windows were kicked out, etcetera.

MR WESSELS: I'm not asking you if you did research, I'm asking you if you - what they told you, what A, B and C told you what they did?

MR BARNARD: I spoke to the leaders of the groups, they were the people with whom I liaised. He said he sent people in, they kicked vehicles, as the march passed they kicked out shop windows as my instructions were put to him. People who worked in Stratcom took that information, gave it to the media. There was media coverage, television coverage, radio coverage, it was in the newspaper. I saw it myself.

MR WESSELS: Was this a DCC instruction?

MR BARNARD: Yes, it was.

MR WESSELS: Why didn't you lead this evidence in your evidence-in-chief when you testified about the CCB and the DCC's involvement?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, if you will recall you stopped me and said that we have to shorten the DCC's involvement because the investigation in front of you is not about the DCC. I have made a statement to my attorney, where all these incidents are mentioned and he led me according to that statement.

MR WESSELS: When did you go to the DCC?

MR BARNARD: Two weeks after I was released from Section 29 detention, I went on leave for two weeks and there was then a process of two or three weeks where they recruited me, or the transfer from the one to the other.

MR WESSELS: When was this?

MR BARNARD: Sir, I cannot tell you. I was released five days before Mr Mandela's release under Section 29, I think two weeks later I left on leave and approximately two weeks later I returned and I had the meeting with Witkop Badenhorst and then I joined the Military Intelligence.

MR WESSELS: Was this then in the middle of February 1989?

MR BARNARD: Yes, I think so.

MR WESSELS: In other words you started at DCC at the end of February 1990.

MR BARNARD: I assume so, yes. I cannot specifically recall, but it was shortly after I returned from leave. There was a period of time where things had to be established and I could then be applied.

MR WESSELS: And up until that date you say you were a member of the CCB?

MR BARNARD: Yes I was a member of the CCB up until my release under Section 29 and then the attorneys who acted on behalf of the CCB, told me that the CCB was going to be disbanded and I accepted it.

MR WESSELS: Then I'm just wondering why you say in your amnesty application on page 205 in bundle A, in paragraph (b) that:

MR BARNARD: That is the relevant period.

MR WESSELS: What is the relevant period?

MR BARNARD: The period that covers the amnesty application, then I went over to DCC. Are you trying to say that I did not belong to the DCC?

MR WESSELS: Mr Barnard, you went over to the DCC at the end of February, my questions is why is it restricted to 1989?

MR BARNARD: No Sir, because this amnesty application is about the CCB's involvement.

CHAIRPERSON: I think what Mr Wessels is getting at is, if you mention just the period 1988 to 1989 in paragraph 8(b), why make any mention at all of DKI or DCC in 8(a), if that is not relevant to the period relating to the incidents?

MR BARNARD: I cannot give an explanation, no. I do not know.

MR WESSELS: You do not know who paid in the money at the attorneys for the procedures?

MR BARNARD: Are you talking about the court applications or after my release?

MR WESSELS: Yes.

MR BARNARD: I cannot say who paid it in, the attorneys contacted my father and said that the organisation provided funds and that he had to act as the front and he had to bring the application.

MR WESSELS: I've got no further questions at this stage.

MR BARNARD: I would just like to say that these incidents, the Dullah Omar and Desmond Tutu incidents, this is what I applied for and it's the relevant period between 1988 and '89, while I was a member of the CCB.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but the ...(indistinct - no microphone) of the DCC has got nothing to do with those two incidents.

MR BARNARD: I understand that, yes.

MR WESSELS: Can I just comment on that comment?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, certainly.

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WESSELS: These incidents did not take place in 1988, but it took place in 1989.

MR BARNARD: That is correct, yes.

MR WESSELS: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Any further questions arising out of the Panel's questions? Mr Coetzee, I was going to ask you about re-examination after Mr Barnard's possible recall, but if you have any at this stage, in case he's not recalled after Mr Wessels has seen the documents, do you have any re-examination?

MR COETZEE: Sir, I do not have re-examination at this stage, but however I will reserve that right, depending on what comes out.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Barnard, that then concludes your testimony, however you heard that Mr Wessels will be referring to certain documents and that he has reserved the right to put further questions to you. So it may well be that you'll be recalled again to answer questions put to you, but if that doesn't happen then this is the end of your evidence. Thank you.

MR BARNARD: I understand that, thank you Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAIRPERSON: Mr van Eck?

MR VAN ECK: Mr Chairman, may I suggest that we take the luncheon adjournment now, so we can rearrange our seating this side and start at quarter to two?

CHAIRPERSON: I see it's quarter to one, if we can then take, it will probably be convenient at this stage, we'll take the lunch adjournment through till quarter to two.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you. Mr van Eck.

MR VAN ECK: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I'm calling Mr Botha.

CARL CASTELING BOTHA: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VAN ECK: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr Botha, you are an applicant here before the Committee, you are applying for amnesty, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: How old are you?

MR BOTHA: 39.

MR VAN ECK: Could you tell us briefly, your school career, where did you complete your school career?

MR BOTHA: I matriculated from DF Malan in 1979 and I joined the Police College in Brixton in Johannesburg.

MR VAN ECK: And during that period in time did you come to know Mr Barnard?

MR BOTHA: I had already know Mr Barnard before '79. If my memory serves me correctly, I think that I already met him in 1976/'77.

MR VAN ECK: In what capacity?

MR BOTHA: He had a younger brother who played rugby with me and due to this rugby connection we had contact. As a school pupil I had already worked with him when he was attached to the Narcotic Bureau.

MR VAN ECK: And after school, what did you do?

MR BOTHA: I matriculated in 1979 and then I went to RAU where among others I studied for a B.Ed Degree.

MR VAN ECK: Did you complete your studies?

MR BOTHA: No, I didn't.

MR VAN ECK: Did you maintain contact with Mr Barnard?

MR BOTHA: We ran into each other on an on-off basis.

MR VAN ECK: And when you were at RAU, did you continue with rugby? Did you see Mr Barnard there?

MR BOTHA: I didn't see him there but I did continue with rugby.

MR VAN ECK: And while we are on the topic of your rugby, what other sports did you participate in?

MR BOTHA: I had provincial colours in judo and rugby.

MR VAN ECK: And when you say provincial colours in judo and rugby, could you elaborate on that briefly?

MR BOTHA: I had Northern Transvaal colours in Judo as well as Transvaal colours. I was a champion for a number of years. I played my first provincial rugby match when I was in standard four, I played for the Transvaal Craven Week. Subsequently I played on all the representative teams of Transvaal to the senior level and I played my last match during the Lion Cup Final in 1994, or rather, 1993.

MR VAN ECK: Did you play foreign rugby at any point?

MR BOTHA: Yes I did, I played in France, in Hong Kong and I also went to Israel on a tour.

MR VAN ECK: And after your student days you joined the police.

MR BOTHA: Yes that's correct.

MR VAN ECK: When was that?

MR BOTHA: It was approximately in 1981, in the middle of 1981.

MR VAN ECK: Could you briefly sketch your police career for us.

MR BOTHA: I joined the South African Police as a student in the Security Branch in John Vorster Square. Afterwards I was at the Police College in 1982 and I returned to the Security Branch in John Vorster Square, where I qualified as a demolitions expert. In the middle of 1987 I requested a transfer to Brixton Murder and Robbery, where I was until my discharge in 1988.

MR VAN ECK: And when did you complete the demolitions course?

MR BOTHA: I underwent a course in 1983 and an advance course in 1985.

MR VAN ECK: What did this involve?

MR BOTHA: Among others, the disarming of bombs. During my period with the Security Branch the country was in a state of chaos and it was my task to disarm bombs and other types of explosive devices.

MR VAN ECK: What sort of limpet mines are there?

MR BOTHA: There are two types, the SPM limpet mine which has 950 grams of explosives, then there is the 158 which contains approximately 340 grams of explosives.

MR VAN ECK: Very well, we will return to that later. You requested to be transferred to Brixton Murder and Robbery.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: Is it because they were looking for demolitions experts at that unit?

MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct, that is one of the reasons. It was also a specialised unit which enjoyed much prestige and I wanted to continue my services there.

MR VAN ECK: Before you were transferred, did you know Staal Burger, Chap Marais and Slang van Zyl?

MR BOTHA: No, I did not know them. Coincidentally I ran into them at the scene of an explosion where they were trespassing, and that is how I came to know them.

MR VAN ECK: And after you were transferred to Brixton Murder and Robbery, did you come to know these persons on a more intimate social level?

MR BOTHA: Yes, coincidentally I was with Mr van Zyl and Mr Marais' group, they were established Detectives at Brixton Murder and Robbery.

MR VAN ECK: At a certain point there was movement at Brixton Murder and Robbery, where it had to do with Staal Burger.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: Did you have anything to do with it?

MR BOTHA: No, I didn't.

MR VAN ECK: Later Mr Burger made certain requests to you.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: And we know now and I think it is common cause that it gave rise to the recruitment of members of the police to work at the CCB.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: You've heard the evidence of among others, Slang van Zyl, Verster and Burger and so forth, regarding how the CCB's Region 6 came to be. Do you agree in general terms with that evidence?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I do.

MR VAN ECK: Could you briefly state, if you can recall, in what order you were recruited.

MR BOTHA: Mr Marais was recruited by Mr Burger, after that it was me and then it was Mr van Zyl.

MR VAN ECK: And I think it is also common cause that among others, you had an interview with Mr Verster, there were salary negotiations and certain packages were offered.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: Did you then formally resign from the police?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: And all of you went to work for Mattheysen Bus Services?

MR BOTHA: Yes, that was our front when we were recruited into the CCB.

MR VAN ECK: And it is common cause that during your time at Mattheysen a course was presented.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: It was a Defence Force farm.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: You also attended this course.

MR BOTHA: Correct.

MR VAN ECK: Very generally, what was the nature and scope of that training?

MR BOTHA: The objectives of the organisation were set out in more comprehensive terms, the objectives regarding what we were supposed to promote in terms of our involvement with the organisation. This was discussed at length. Among others, there were also forms that we had to study and everything that was based upon the CCB's plan, we had to examine all these aspects.

MR VAN ECK: You were also informed regarding the various plans that had to be followed, the process of establishment, the use of false names and so forth.

MR BOTHA: Yes, that was the red and the blue plan respectively.

MR VAN ECK: What was your false name?

MR BOTHA: Leon Calitz.

MR VAN ECK: And what was the form of address among the members of the CCB? After you went over to the CCB, what was the form of address among your members?

MR BOTHA: The only person who insisted upon being addressed as a Mister or a Colonel was Mr Burger, the rest were all addressed by their first names, not their false names but their first names.

MR VAN ECK: And during your time at Mattheysen, how did you address Mr Burger?

MR BOTHA: Most of the times as Colonel, sometimes and Mister.

MR VAN ECK: What was your rank when you left Brixton?

MR BOTHA: I'm not certain, I was either a Detective-Warrant Officer or a Detective-Sergeant. I did not study my discharge certificate that closely. I think it was Detective-Sergeant.

MR VAN ECK: Was the CCB a private organisation or what sort of organisation was it?

MR BOTHA: It was a covert organisation which resorted under the South African Defence Force. It was an organisation, once again, which was directly connected to the State, to the government of the day.

MR VAN ECK: Thus you were still in State service but simply in a different organisation.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: You salary, medical benefits, pension, did you still receive these benefits on a monthly basis?

MR BOTHA: Yes, in the form of cash.

MR VAN ECK: We also heard that there were vehicle allowances and so forth, did you receive these?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: And all this money that you received, who paid it out to you?

MR BOTHA: It was primarily channelled through Mattheysen Bus Services, the company for which we worked during our first phase of establishment with the CCB, however, the money came from the Defence Force.

MR VAN ECK: And also the CCB name has a civil connotation, did you ever doubt at any stage that you were busy with anything other than a State institution?

MR BOTHA: Not at all.

MR VAN ECK: We have heard of a cooling off period of approximately six months which had to be undertaken, during which there wasn't much movement.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: And during that six month period, did you visit the former South West Africa?

MR BOTHA: Towards the end of 1988.

MR VAN ECK: And what was the purpose?

MR BOTHA: It was to monitor SWAPO and to see what the current climate in the country was at the time of my visit, and then I had to give a feedback report to my region, to my cell, or to Mr Burger more specifically.

MR VAN ECK: We have heard that presentations had to be made and that approval had to be gained for the South West Africa/Namibia or yours, did you make such submissions?

MR BOTHA: An amount was budgeted and basically by means of an administration submission, a budget was allocated to me.

MR VAN ECK: Can you recall who told you to go there?

MR BOTHA: In all probability it was Mr Wouter Basson or Staal Burger. I must just add that I initiated the whole thing to a great extent, it was during our establishment phase, it was more-or-less a general discussion in the media, the whole question surrounding Namibian independence and SWAPO and so forth.

MR VAN ECK: Just to return to the phase of establishment, what was the plan, what did you have to establish?

MR BOTHA: My blue plan was established in a CC called Cabot International, it was a promotions company which among others, would distribute promotional items bearing company logos.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, could you just repeat the name of the CC.

MR BOTHA: It is Cabot International, Sir, C-a-b-o-t International.

MR VAN ECK: And what would the CC have to do?

MR BOTHA: We had to distribute promotional items for companies.

MR VAN ECK: You went to South West Africa, you went to Namibia at least, you returned, what did you say and what did you do?

MR BOTHA: I returned and during a cell meeting I informed the relevant parties that SWAPO was going to win the election and if we wanted to play any kind of role in South West, we would have to take definite steps in order to be able to do so.

MR VAN ECK: And who were these parties that you informed?

MR BOTHA: Staal Burger and Wouter Basson.

MR VAN ECK: Mr Botha, we are referring to incidents which took place more than 11 years ago, did you keep a journal and file of what you did during these times?

MR BOTHA: No, I didn't.

MR VAN ECK: What was the reaction when you stated that the election would most probably not go as it had been hoped for or planned for?

MR BOTHA: It was not favourably received, among others it was said that perhaps I'd visited the wrong country and that the manner in which I had set it out was not correct and that SWAPO was not going to win the election.

MR VAN ECK: It was also mentioned in discussions that more definite action had to be taken.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: At any point thereafter up to this moment, did you have anything to do with the election there, with any actions there?

MR BOTHA: I did not.

MR VAN ECK: We've had evidence here from Mr Barnard, indicating how he went there and so forth, you personally, were you involved in any way in any matter which had to do with foreign countries?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR VAN ECK: After the six month cooling period, various regions were allocated to every one of you.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: Which region did you receive?

MR BOTHA: I think I should just clarify this matter somewhat more. A region was never rigidly applied, persons would be allocated to a region but that did not prevent us from operating in other regions. The Transvaal region was allocated to me.

MR VAN ECK: The former Transvaal?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: And that stage, when the region was allocated to you, were you still well known in sports circles?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: You were a well known figure.

MR BOTHA: Yes, I was.

MR VAN ECK: Your friend at that stage, Mr Barnard, what was his position?

MR BOTHA: He had just been released from a prison sentence that he had served and he had been working at an insurance brokerage as an assessor, we met each other at a certain point and told each other that we were attached to the same structure, and upon that basis we struck up a friendship.

MR VAN ECK: Let's be more specific. You said that you informed each other that you were attached to the same structure, were these direct admissions or roundabout admissions?

MR BOTHA: I had the feeling that Mr Barnard was trying to recruit me, I had the same idea with him and before we wasted each other's time even further, we told each other where we were working. We had already established a relationship of trust since 1977, I knew that he had been in the police when I was a school pupil. We took each other into confidence.

MR VAN ECK: Did you have any further rugby connections at that stage?

MR BOTHA: Yes, we did, every day we practised together in the gym, we also went jogging together and we also played rugby for the same club.

MR VAN ECK: He stated that at that stage you were the Captain of the first team.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: And on a daily basis you re-established contact with him.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: Can you recall which region or division was allocated to Mr Barnard?

MR BOTHA: Cape Town.

MR VAN ECK: Were you requested at any point to assist with the testing of certain unconscious members who would be recruited?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I was.

MR VAN ECK: Could you elaborate on that for us very briefly.

MR BOTHA: During January 1989, I went with Mr van Zyl to the Cape for the recruitment of unconscious members. At the time of this visit we recruited Peaches Gordon, among others, I also tried to recruit a Coloured man, but it was unsuccessful. During a follow-up visit we tested Peaches Gordon by means of an exercise which Mr van Zyl devised in order to test his credibility.

MR VAN ECK: Did you assist Mr van Zyl, therefore?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I did.

MR VAN ECK: And was Mr Burger ever in the Cape during that time?

MR BOTHA: During the initial recruitment he was in the Cape.

MR VAN ECK: Mr Marais was not there, he had gone to Natal as far as you were concerned.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: Did you have any further work related contact with him?

MR BOTHA: The only contact we had was purely during cell meetings and where meetings were held with regard to salaries and during our establishment period.

MR VAN ECK: Regarding cell meetings, how regularly did they take place?

MR BOTHA: It is impossible to attach a specific time to these meetings, they took place quite regularly. We gathered together on a regular basis. In our initial time at Mattheysen, we spent time together on a daily basis.

MR VAN ECK: You mentioned a Coloured man that you tried to recruit, could you elaborate on that.

MR BOTHA: I cannot even attach a name to a face, it was a Coloured man who I attempted to recruit at that time in Cape Town. It never materialised.

MR VAN ECK: Did you recruit anybody else in the Johannesburg environment?

MR BOTHA: During April, I once again tried to recruit a Coloured man by the name of Geoffrey, I was successful in my recruitment and we had an arrangement that he would gather information for me and that I would commensurately reward him.

MR VAN ECK: And in terms of this cooling off phase certain names were given to you.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: Which names were they?

MR BOTHA: Bruce White and Frank Chikane.

MR VAN ECK: With the exception that the name Frank Chikane was allocated to you, did you at any stage do anything definite with regard to him?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR VAN ECK: We have heard of certain attempts which were made to kill him with poison ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, just before you proceed Mr van Eck.

You say the names Frank Chikane and Bruce White were given to you, by whom and why?

MR BOTHA: It was during a regional cell meeting, every one of us received names to monitor and to collect information on and then most probably to devise a project on.

MR VAN ECK: What would the project involve?

MR BOTHA: Based upon the objectives of the organisation it would maximal disruption of the enemy, not necessarily the murder of a person, it would depend upon the case and that would lead to our decision regarding any project that may emanate from the information.

MR VAN ECK: Who gave you the names?

MR BOTHA: It was the Co-ordinator, Wouter Basson.

MR VAN ECK: With the exception of the names, did you have any further information regarding these persons?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I did. If I recall correctly I had a photograph and an address.

MR VAN ECK: Just to return to Frank Chikane, we are aware that later attempts were made to kill him, do you have any knowledge of this?

MR BOTHA: None.

MR VAN ECK: Were you involved in this in any way?

MR BOTHA: Not at all.

MR VAN ECK: Was the Frank Chikane project ever removed from you formally?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR VAN ECK: Do you know why any other person continued with Frank Chikane?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR VAN ECK: Were you ever informed whether or not there was a reason, did you ever try to establish a reason pertaining to anything that was done by somebody else?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR VAN ECK: And while we are on the name of Bruce White, did you take any definite action regarding Bruce White?

MR BOTHA: I did, I tried to collect information on him, I identified an address and I conducted observation at this address.

MR VAN ECK: In your amnesty application which was compiled we find that you are applying for the Athlone bomb explosion.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: Which took place on the 31st of August 1989.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: We do not find that any application has been made for Bruce White.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: And also not for Frank Chikane.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: We will return to that later. But at this stage, Mr Barnard indicated that it was his impression that Bruce White had fall.

MR BOTHA: I cannot elaborate on that, perhaps that was his personal impression and perhaps it was also based upon the objectives of the organisation. Our observation at this particular address was for the purposes of collecting information.

MR VAN ECK: We will return to Bruce White later, but this was an incident in which you and Barnard were involved in June 1989, and you were also arrested for it.

MR BOTHA: No, we were not arrested as such, we were asked to report to Brixton for questioning.

MR VAN ECK: And this held certain consequences for you and Mr Barnard, this action with Bruce White.

MR BOTHA: Yes, it did.

MR VAN ECK: With the exception of Bruce White, did you in your division and the Coloured man later, have any success with regard to projects that you executed and so forth?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I did, but there was an advantage and a disadvantage of being known in the region. The advantage would be that one would have greater access with regard to certain places, but the disadvantage was also that due to one's profile one could not hypothetically use another name, it wouldn't work in the particular region where one would be so well known. I did launch further projects, Anton Rosscam.

MR VAN ECK: The Rosscam project, was it registered?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: Was it considered on an in-house level?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: Where was this?

MR BOTHA: At the Ponti Building.

MR VAN ECK: Were any submissions made?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: Were any amounts of money approved for this?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: What would it have involved?

MR BOTHA: The project would have involved the burning of Mr Rosscam's vehicle.

MR VAN ECK: What purpose would this have served?

MR BOTHA: He was quite a well known person and he used his vehicle on a daily basis, and at that stage it was about maximal disruption and we wanted to put him in a position where he could not move about freely, that is why we burnt his vehicle.

MR VAN ECK: With the exception of his vehicle which had to be burnt, were there any other plans pertaining to Mr Rosscam?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR VAN ECK: And was the submission only about the burning of his vehicle?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: And who initially was the subject, or who was the person that would do it?

MR BOTHA: The Coloured man, Geoffrey.

MR VAN ECK: Was this the so-called unconscious member?

MR BOTHA: Yes, he was an unconscious member.

MR VAN ECK: Was that project ever executed by Geoffrey?

MR BOTHA: The project was executed but not by Geoffrey.

MR VAN ECK: How was it executed?

MR BOTHA: Mr Barnard and I decided at a certain point that Geoffrey would not perform to our wishes, that we might have overestimated his capacities and that we ourselves would continue with the project.

MR VAN ECK: Was this in 1989?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: We have heard the evidence of Mr Barnard regarding how you broke into the vehicle and poured the petrol into the vehicle and how the vehicle was burnt, do you agree with it?

MR BOTHA: To a great extent. I'm not certain of the hammer, but to a great extent I would agree with his version.

MR VAN ECK: And if you say not necessarily the 4 pound hammer, is it that you cannot recall it or is it a case of it not having taken place?

MR BOTHA: Yes, it took place, it is just that his recollection is perhaps better than mine, I cannot attach a mass to the hammer as such.

MR VAN ECK: Rosscam was never - or you never applied for the Rosscam incident.

MR BOTHA: No, I didn't.

MR VAN ECK: Who dealt with your amnesty applications?

MR BOTHA: Mr Piet du Plessis from the attorneys firm, David Botha, Du Plessis and Kruger.

MR VAN ECK: We heard from Mr Barnard that he first dealt with other attorneys, did you also have other attorneys before this?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR VAN ECK: Was Mr du Plessis your attorney right through this?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: Can you tell the Honourable Committee why you did not apply for Rosscam.

MR BOTHA: Sir, when we compiled our applications we had a senior attorney, Etienne du Toit, and we were advised that it was not a human rights violation and I therefore do not have to apply for amnesty for this.

MR VAN ECK: Did you accept it as such?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I did.

MR VAN ECK: Did you at that stage have any reason to doubt it?

MR BOTHA: No, I did not.

MR VAN ECK: If you were advised to do something else would you have applied for the Rosscam incident?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I would have.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, just before you get of that incident, Mr van Eck.

You keep mentioning this term "maximum disruption", did you consider yourself personally, that the burning of Mr Rosscam's car constituted maximum disruption?

MR BOTHA: Yes it was motivated on the hand of the specific circumstances surrounding this person. It was also part of the project that it would be a maximum disruption in his life, in the execution of his career, his daily activities and movements.

CHAIRPERSON: Because it would seem it would probably have been nothing more than an annoying inconvenience, I mean he can go and hire a car or borrow a motor car, I mean it's hardly a maximum disruption. I mean his car could have broken down, it wouldn't have been a maximum disruption.

MR BOTHA: As the organisation's objectives read, the disruption could be the breaking of a window up to the killing of a person and this incident was in-between the two. For us it was enough to disrupt him. The project led to this.

CHAIRPERSON: It's just that I'm interested in the term "maximum disruption", you always seem to use the term "maximum disruption".

MR LAX: Sorry, Mr van Eck.

What was your specific object in doing that, in smashing this car up? I mean you've said maximal disruption but that's a euphemism, what was your actual object?

MR BOTHA: Mr Lax, amongst other things, to bring across a message that he is busy with activities that are to the government's detriment and whoever he may then connect with this act would then disrupt him in terms of his personal activities as the SR member of Wits. That was our idea.

MR LAX: So you were trying to intimidate him, to put it plainly?

MR BOTHA: That's correct, yes.

MR VAN ECK: Mr Botha, while we are dealing with this maximal disruption, did this differ from person to person?

MR BOTHA: Yes, it did.

MR VAN ECK: Apart from Rosscam, which was a project that you presented, or maybe not executed in the right way, but it took place in September, did you within Region 6 execute any other projects that you personally made submissions for, held an in-house meeting, got approval for and completed?

MR BOTHA: No, I did not.

MR VAN ECK: At a certain stage you were in a discussion with Mr Barnard who approached you to assist him in an observation of Dr Webster.

MR BOTHA: That is correct, yes.

MR VAN ECK: When did this take place?

MR BOTHA: It was, if my recollection is correct, it was in April of '89.

MR VAN ECK: Did you at that stage know that Mr Barnard worked for the same organisation but just in a different region or in a different capacity?

MR BOTHA: I knew that he was involved in the same organisation, yes. I was not quite sure about his region, but I knew that he was involved in the organisation.

MR VAN ECK: What was in Region 6, what was your relationship with Mr Burger at that stage?

MR BOTHA: Sir, we had a few confrontations that led to certain personal differences or an argument between the two of us. In short, I said we had personality clash. It may seem a bit childish to say that I felt that he did not give me enough attention, but that's what it boiled down to.

MR VAN ECK: If you say that you felt left out, does this mean that you felt that the daily activities in Region 6 were shared with you?

MR BOTHA: No, I did not expect it, but I just got the feeling and it was just a feeling that I personally had, that I was not involved and I did not receive all the advantages.

MR VAN ECK: You were approached by Mr Barnard to assist him in the Webster case, did you know Dr Webster at that stage?

MR BOTHA: No, I did not know him, but I did know that he was a high profile left-wing activist. If I can put it in that way.

MR VAN ECK: What did Ferdi Barnard say to you? It was Dr Webster, and what was the end objective?

MR BOTHA: Mr Barnard approached me in April where he showed me an A4 photograph of Dr Webster, as well as two addresses, together with a file and an investigative journal that we use stating the dates of visits and what occurred there. He, amongst other things, explained to me Dr Webster's involvement in left-wing organisations as well as the recruitment of students for underground structures. He also stated that there was an incident in which Mr Webster was involved in Mozambique and where he disclosed certain information and that he got the instruction to eliminate Dr Webster.

MR VAN ECK: How did you accept this?

MR BOTHA: Once again in context, I trusted Mr Barnard and I do not want to place this outside of, not put it into perspective, but we did trust each other. Apart from our friendship, I believed what he said, he conveyed certain facts to me that correlated with what we did in the organisation and based on what he told me, I made the inference that he did receive approval from the highest level in terms of the execution of this operation and I did not question it.

MR VAN ECK: Was it at any stage necessary for you, whether it was through your action or what Mr Barnard told you, to doubt what he said?

MR BOTHA: No, never.

MR VAN ECK: The activities or the way in which you worked before, was it necessary for you to question that?

MR BOTHA: I verified it by means of a conversation that we had, where he mentioned to me that the in-house and the presentation took place in the Ponti House. He conveyed certain facts to me that made sense, because I was also knowledgeable concerning an in-house meeting and I did not question it, no.

MR VAN ECK: And the Ponti Building?

MR BOTHA: I also did not question that, I was also at the Ponti Building where we drove with one vehicle and he said to me that he attended a meeting, I cannot recall his exact words, where he went into the Ponti Building and I waited downstairs for him.

MR VAN ECK: Did he mention the name Verster?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: We have heard of two Mr Versters, which name did he give you?

MR BOTHA: Joe Verster.

MR VAN ECK: Is this the same Joe Verster who you met in your capacity in the CCB?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: What did he mention about Joe Verster?

MR BOTHA: Mr Barnard said that an in-house was held concerning the operation or project, information that he collected over a period of time and that he conveyed to Mr Verster, as well as his Co-ordinator, Mr Lafras Luitingh, who was unknown to me, who handled him or who served as his Co-ordinator, and he presented the project to Mr Verster and Mr Verster basically gave him the approval with regard to the execution of the project.

MR VAN ECK: Did the name Lafras Luitingh ring any bells?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR VAN ECK: You said that it was a person that was unknown to you.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: Did you receive information that Lafras Luitingh was also involved in the CCB?

MR BOTHA: Mr Barnard presented him as his Co-ordinator, he could have used the word handler, but it's got basically the same profile.

MR VAN ECK: You cannot specifically recall the exact words?

MR BOTHA: No, I cannot.

MR VAN ECK: Did you deem it necessary Mr Botha, to question that which you were involved in with Mr Barnard, to take this up with people in your region?

MR BOTHA: I could not because it was against the rules and with the activities of the CCB, which I accepted, and we also had a very unique situation between myself and Mr Barnard and it would have been impossible to share this with my region or with my cell members.

MR VAN ECK: Would you, for example, have mentioned it to Burger or Basson? What do you think their reaction would be?

MR BOTHA: It would not have been a very good reaction. I think it's an understatement if I put it that way. It would have led to my immediate dismissal.

MR VAN ECK: What do you think would be the results or the consequences if the operation was executed in the elimination of Dr Webster and if you've mentioned this to Dr Webster?

MR BOTHA: Well they would have suspended the operation or the project.

MR VAN ECK: What did you do in terms of the execution of this project of Mr Barnard?

MR BOTHA: Well generally Mr Barnard and myself monitored or visited Dr Webster's house. I think it was three or four times, I would say it was four times. We monitored movements and to see if he appeared and certain opportunities, I think it was the 1st of May 1989 Mr Barnard came to pick me up at my residence in a white vehicle and we again followed the normal routine to the monitoring of the house and the observation that took place there and on that specific day Dr Webster drove past us in a white pick-up or bakkie and Mr Barnard felt that this was the ideal moment to execute the project and he continued and eliminated the person with a sawed-off shotgun. I acted as the driver of the vehicle and that was in general my participation in the project.

MR VAN ECK: Mr Botha we have heard the evidence of how Mr Barnard went to go and practice with somebody else's shotgun were you involved in that preparation?

MR BOTHA: No I wasn't.

MR VAN ECK: Were you involved in the preparation of the shotgun?

MR BOTHA: No I wasn't.

MR VAN ECK: Every time when you went to go and observe the house were you ready, if the opportunity comes up to execute this operation?

MR BOTHA: Yes we were prepared and ready every single time we went.

MR VAN ECK: Did you make use of balaclavas?

MR BOTHA: Yes it was in the vehicle. During the execution of the operation we also covered our faces with it.

MR VAN ECK: Was there any other opportunity in which Mr Barnard could shoot Dr Webster?

MR BOTHA: Not what I know of, not where I accompanied him. I did hear that he did observe the house at other times but not when I was with there.

MR VAN ECK: With Brenda for example.

MR BOTHA: That is correct, yes.

MR VAN ECK: Were you involved in the writing down of the details?

MR BOTHA: No. In short it was his project. I assisted him as a confidante if I can explain it in that way.

MR VAN ECK: After the shooting of Dr Webster were you dropped off at your house and Mr Barnard left with the evidence, do you know what happened to it?

MR BOTHA: No Sir, he just said that he broke the shotgun into pieces. I also again did not question his integrity or in terms of what he told me. Once again we had this trust between the two of us but I would doubt that he held the weapon at his house, for example.

MR VAN ECK: On that specific day there was a lady with Dr Webster, did you see her?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: Mr Barnard told us what his initial attitude was towards this Commission, how he approached this Commission, and his initial attitude was that he is here but he will not cooperate.

MR BOTHA: That is correct. People who know Mr Barnard will know that he's a difficult person to get along with. He's a difficult witness and he is also a person who has got a history as far back as his first detention that he never implicated anybody else.

MR VAN ECK: The reason why I am asking you this is that Mr Barnard explained to us that why at the previous sitting he systematically started changing his attitude towards the Commission to the approach and sympathy that came especially from Mrs Omar and that this resulted into a change of mind and on which he then decided to take this Commission into his confidence.

MR BOTHA: Yes I was party to this and I did observe it and was part of it, that is correct.

MR VAN ECK: Right. It is common cause and I will ask you on this a bit later and certainly you will be asked by other parties concerning this, you were asked about why you denied any participation in the Webster murder. It was put to you that you made a statement to the Attorney General, Mr Pretorius, which included your involvement in the Webster murder.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: More-or-less when was this?

MR BOTHA: It was in February last year.

MR VAN ECK: 1999?

MR BOTHA: That's correct.

MR VAN ECK: In other words it was a long time before Mr Barnard had a change of heart with regards to admitting to the murder of Dr Webster?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, yes. As Mr Barnard testified I visit him on a regular basis in C-Max in Pretoria and at a certain stage I had a conversation in which I told him at a certain stage he will have to draw a line. I am part of the reconciliation process. At the end of the day, apart from the deeds that we committed I also have a conscience and I just want to clear my conscience, and I was approached by the Attorney General, Mr Pretorius, and I told him this is what I feel. I want to do this. And he supported me. And he also said to me that he was not going to open his heart, if I can put it that way, but this is my right to do what I want to, and that is what I then did.

MR VAN ECK: Up to the time when you made contact with Mr Pretorius was Mr du Plessis your legal representative?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: This is now from the beginning of the CCB and the revelations that happened throughout this process?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: During that process while you spoke to Mr Pretorius were you still with Mr du Plessis, as a client of his?

MR BOTHA: Yes Sir. Just before I made a statement I felt that because of ethical reasons it would not be correct to place his integrity in doubt, there would be a clash of interests, I then decided to get a different legal team to represent me.

MR VAN ECK: Is it correct that when you changed your legal team you did not inform Mr du Plessis what the reason was? You did not disclose the Webster incident to him?

MR BOTHA: No I did not.

MR VAN ECK: Is there a reason for this?

MR BOTHA: Sir I had never discussed Webster with anybody, it was a closed book. I saw that Verster and other CCB, I saw how they reacted during my detention and the day after the shooting he asked people if we were involved and that made me realise that this project would not be admitted, either by himself or by any other party. So it was a closed book.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Botha, when you made this statement to Mr Pretorius, was that after the conclusion of Mr Barnard's trial, after he had been convicted of the murder of Dr Webster?

MR BOTHA: Yes Sir, that's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: So why did you elect to make a statement to the Attorney General's office, what was the purpose? Was it just to purge yourself, to come clean in the spirit of reconciliation or was there some other reason as to why you went to the Attorney General in particular, the Attorney General's office?

MR BOTHA: Sir they approached me. I also went to them with regards to another incident that had nothing to do with the Commission's proceedings, and they also asked me to make a statement in this regard. The seed was planted and I started thinking about this and struggling with it and I felt that here's an opportunity to come clean and I just then applied myself to it.

MR VAN ECK: You never applied for amnesty for the death of Mr Webster?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, yes.

MR VAN ECK: The post mortem inquest was held.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: The Harms Commission addressed this.

MR BOTHA: That is correct, yes.

MR VAN ECK: On both occasions you decided not to make known what your role was?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: Did you have any personal knowledge of the instructions given to Mr Barnard? Did you trust his word?

MR BOTHA: Yes I did.

MR VAN ECK: Why did you continually deny your part in it or to tell the truth, why did you lie all this time?

MR BOTHA: Sir I will put it to you again, that it was Mr Barnard's project and that I could not take responsibility for something that he had no protection of. It was very clear that he stood alone. I was a bystander or outsider, somebody who just assisted him in the execution of the project and I could not disclose the project. So that was my viewpoint.

MR VAN ECK: With the Harms Commission and the investigation that took place there who covered your legal costs?

MR BOTHA: It was the Defence Force.

MR VAN ECK: It was after you were arrested in terms of Section 29?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: Did any person with a rank, did they tell you to keep quiet?

MR BOTHA: Yes, during my detention.

MR VAN ECK: Who did?

MR BOTHA: Brigadier Krappies Engelbrecht. He was accompanied by Brigadier van Rensburg while I was detained in Hartebeesfontein.

MR VAN ECK: What was your expectation from the structure of the CCB during the Harms Commission proceedings?

MR BOTHA: Sir it was very clear that during our training it was presented to us that we would get indemnity for the acts that we commit and it became clear to me that we will not get the protection from the generals and staff and that it came from a level above them, the politicians, and we were told that what is on the table now we will talk about and we kept to that.

MR VAN ECK: Did you see how your good friend Mr Barnard was dealt with?

MR BOTHA: Yes I did see how they dealt with him.

MR VAN ECK: Did he say anything to you concerning the Dr Webster incident with regards to disclosure?

MR BOTHA: No Sir, because we saw how Mr Verster and Lafras Luitingh dealt with him it was not negotiable that we would say anything about it. It would have been a very bad reflection on us.

MR LAX: Can I just interject for one second. With regard to the issue of indemnity did you understand that you would get indemnity or was it something different to that?

MR BOTHA: No I think within the context that you are viewing it it is different. During our training it was said to us in no uncertain terms that the organisation would at all times enjoy protection whether it be from the generals and staff, whether it be from the politicians to such an extent that I was brought under the impression and I state this categorically that the State would see to our interests if we experienced any problems. So if I refer to indemnity I say it in the context that we would not be prosecuted.

MR LAX: Does that mean it would be covered up, or the prosecutions would be stopped or how would they get it right?

MR BOTHA: Most probably a combination of the two that you have just mentioned. There wouldn't be any prosecution and most probably there would be a cover-up.

MR VAN ECK: The question will be asked as to why after your detention and arrest you did not go to the people in Region 6 and to Joe Verster and say, but Webster was part of your projects you have to protect us.

MR BOTHA: It would have been denied categorically by Mr Verster. On various occasions through my regional manager and through Nick Nienaber I said that my involvement was of such a nature that it could expose the structure. I was led to understand by Mr Nienaber in no uncertain terms that the situation with regards to Mr Barnard was under control and that it would be pressed in a certain direction in order to bring about his release. Which did not happen.

MR VAN ECK: What was the general feeling regarding you and Mr Barnard's ...(intervention)

MR LAX: Sorry, there was a strange translation that came through there, an unusual name was mentioned, did you mean Barnard, were you talking about Mr Barnard?

MR BOTHA: Yes Sir.

MR LAX: Because a name like Marentol came through.

INTERPRETER: The Interpreter apologises, it was mis-heard.

MR LAX: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: And Mr Botha, just to follow up on Mr van Eck's question, after the shooting of Dr Webster did you consider that to have been a successful operation?

MR BOTHA: Absolutely, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: So what then - we know that your participation was against the rules but the fact that it was a successful operation in the sense that Dr Webster was shot and that the perpetrators had got away without trace, do you think you would have got into trouble even if you divulged your role to your colleagues in the CCB after the event? If you had told them wasn't there a possibility you might have even got a bonus, project bonus?

MR BOTHA: I would like to do that but you have heard Mr Verster's position, there was no way that I would risk it, to take recognition for a project which wasn't mine knowing that Mr Barnard did not enjoy the support that he should have received, according to me.

MR VAN ECK: And to return to the compensation regarding the Webster incident, were you with Mr Barnard at the Hyperama in Roodepoort in the parking area?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: Was it a well-known area?

MR BOTHA: Yes. As Mr Barnard explained we were divided into two and with the vehicle that was three, so we were divided into three segments. It was a well-known meeting place for all of us.

MR VAN ECK: Who met you there and what happened?

MR BOTHA: I went with to meet Lafras Luitingh and for the duration of the meeting I remained in the vehicle.

MR VAN ECK: Did you meet Lafras Luitingh personally on that day?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR VAN ECK: Were you prepared in case anything happened that day?

MR BOTHA: Due to our training we were always prepared especially with regard to observations and weapons and so forth. Mr Barnard told me the reason why he wanted me to accompany him and I acted accordingly.

MR VAN ECK: Was anything given to you subsequently?

MR BOTHA: Mr Barnard felt that the compensation that he received for the execution of the project, which was R15,000, justified paying me an amount of R5,000.

MR VAN ECK: Where did Mr Barnard get the R15,000 from?

MR BOTHA: From Mr Luitingh. He handed it over to him in an envelope and directly from Mr Luitingh he walked back to his vehicle and opened the envelope after we departed.

MR VAN ECK: Was this at the Hyperama parking lot?

MR BOTHA: Yes that is where he received the envelope.

MR VAN ECK: At a later stage it emerged within your relationship with Mr Barnard that there was reasonable dissatisfaction regarding the Bruce White incident. I just want to refer briefly to Bruce White and the reaction of your members there before we return to the Webster incident. What did you and Mr Barnard do with regard to Mr White?

MR BOTHA: We conducted observation at his address of employment in order to obtain further information due to Mr Barnard's incapacity to wait, so-to-speak, due to his impatience, which is probably a better word, he forced the situation into a direction which he shouldn't have and he did that with regard to Mr White's movements with his vehicle where he parked his vehicle and so forth.

MR VAN ECK: Did you take Mr Barnard with to conduct observation at Bruce White's residence?

MR BOTHA: No, at his place of employment.

MR VAN ECK: His place of employment.

MR BOTHA: Yes that is correct.

MR VAN ECK: What was the purpose?

MR BOTHA: To obtain further information regarding his residential address, his vehicle, his profile, who was travelling with him, who wasn't travelling with him and so forth.

CHAIRPERSON: The Interpreter has requested you to please repeat the question.

MR LAX: Perhaps if you just slow down a tiny bit they will be able to hear you more clearly as well.

MR VAN ECK: Was any provision made with regard to the observation of Bruce White that he would fall?

MR BOTHA: No that was premature. Due to the activities of the structure it was a possibility but it was never stated as such.

MR VAN ECK: And you did not apply for indemnity for Bruce White?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: Why not, can you explain that?

MR BOTHA: Once again I do not regard it as a gross violation of human rights according to the stipulations for the Indemnity Act.

MR VAN ECK: Was any observation conducted with regard to Bruce White, or was it just for the identification of a name which was given to you by Mr Basson?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: During your observation there was there any confrontation with the police?

MR BOTHA: Yes, perhaps that is put too strongly, but a situation arose during which the police came to question us regarding our involvement with Mr White.

MR VAN ECK: And as a result thereof you were taken to Brixton Murder and Robbery.

MR BOTHA: They asked us to report there for questioning.

MR VAN ECK: Who questioned you?

MR BOTHA: Two members, but I cannot recall their names. I apologise, I cannot recall their names. They were Murder and Robbery detectives.

MR VAN ECK: Was there a Captain Zeelie who was involved at a later stage?

MR BOTHA: We met him at the Brixton offices, he asked for an explanation, I gave him an explanation, he did not accept it, and on the following day we provided them with a better explanation.

MR VAN ECK: There are two Zeelies, Major Charles Zeelie, the demolitions expert, and Captain Gert Zeelie who was the detective, which one was it?

MR BOTHA: Both are known to me. Mr Zeelie was with Security Branch and Captain Gert Zeelie was with Murder and Robbery in Brixton.

MR VAN ECK: So it's the second one?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: You worked with Gert?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: The following day you gave a better explanation you said.

MR BOTHA: Yes I did.

MR VAN ECK: Where did this explanation originate from?

MR BOTHA: Mr Barnard obtained an explanation regarding a white BMW that we had to take back from a person and that is what I told Mr Zeelie.

MR VAN ECK: What was the reaction of Mr Burger and Mr Verster after it came out that you and Barnard had conducted observation on White together and that your involvement with each other was disclosed?

MR BOTHA: Perhaps that will answer the Chairperson's question better. Due to this incident I was almost discharged. I heard later that it had been recommended for me to be immediately discharged. I said to the rest of the cell members that Mr Barnard was not aware of their existence and anything that was related to that. They accepted it and I was put on ice, so-to-speak, in the regard that I could not continue with my activities despite the fact that I was still receiving a salary I was not operational at the time of this ice period.

MR VAN ECK: And this was seen as a punitive measure against you?

MR BOTHA: Yes, it was embarrassing.

MR VAN ECK: And the fact that you were put on ice was because you were seen by the police or because you were in the company of Mr Barnard?

MR BOTHA: I think it was a bit of both. At that point the organisation had to be protected at all costs and the cut-off point within the cell was not correctly handled and used by Mr Barnard with the execution of this project.

MR VAN ECK: Was your relationship with Mr Barnard, within the context of the CCB, ever approved by the top structure of Region 6?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR VAN ECK: After that day did you do any further work whatsoever on Bruce White?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR VAN ECK: Do you have any personal knowledge regarding whether anybody else did any further work regarding Bruce White after that time?

MR BOTHA: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Just before you move off just one point of clarity, we heard from Mr Maree when he was asked to monitor or get the address of Gavin Evans he didn't even want to do anything himself. He didn't want to go out, he didn't want to be seen, why did you yourself, as a member of CCB, physically monitor Mr White? I thought that was against the rules as well. I thought you always had to have a cut-off.

MR BOTHA: It was against the rules, but once again I was eager, I was much younger than Mr Maree and I didn't have a sub-structure such as Mr Maree had when he made use of Mr van Zyl's. And within the structure I had to achieve, especially in the light of my sentiment that I was being placed at a disadvantage, I had to come out of my corner so-to-speak to show them that I could also achieve.

MR VAN ECK: In other words you wanted to make an impression?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR LAX: Can I just continue in that vein. Both you and Mr Barnard, again in another incident, then did the work yourself after this in the Webster incident, why did you do it then? Did you not learn from this experience?

MR BOTHA: Yes and no. If I had to use terminology, we thought we had got away, and once again we felt untouchable to a certain extent. Geoffrey had not executed the project successfully enough in my opinion and once again I had to achieve. That is why I did it myself. You are referring the Rosscam vehicle?

MR LAX: Yes. And then if I could take it one step even further, in the next chronology of it is the issue of the Early Learning Centre. Again, but this time with Van Zyl, you both do the work yourselves, most of the work.

MR BOTHA: Mr Lax I hear what you are saying, I wouldn't say it was most of the work. I was tasked with activating the mine and at a later stage Mr van Zyl tasked me to detonate the mine. The placement of the bomb was the more important aspect to me, which we didn't do, so we did not place the organisation at a disadvantage with regard to that. The order was carried out and maintained.

MR LAX: Except in this sense that you weren't meant to be at the scene at all and you people were at the scene.

MR BOTHA: Once again it wasn't my project. Mr van Zyl should have taken certain precautionary measures which I supported and that is how we executed the project.

MR LAX: You see the thrust of all these questions is, you guys had rules but you broke them all the time, you didn't stick to them. That's how it seems to me. The only person who appears to have stuck quite carefully to the rules was Mr Maree.

MR BOTHA: I hear what you are saying but simultaneously I must say that the rules perhaps were not that narrowly observed. The execution of projects was a priority for us at that stage given the internal situation of the country and during training it was also stated that we had to ensure that we took calculated risks. Either the project would not be executed or you would do it yourself. That was our reasoning, right or wrong, but I accept what you have said.

MR LAX: Yes. Sorry, we are running quite far ahead, I didn't mean to do that, it was just this principle that I was dealing with.

MR VAN ECK: Thank you Mr Lax. Mr Botha, in the many cell meetings that you attended were your members ever asked why there wasn't any movement, what was going on, why the lack of progress?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: Who put these questions?

MR BOTHA: The regional manager and the co-ordinator, Wouter Basson.

MR VAN ECK: And at that stage had you made any progress with regard to the organisation's objectives?

MR BOTHA: Not to the scope that I would have preferred but we did try.

MR VAN ECK: The sentiment of, among others, Mr Burger who threatened to discharge you when it became known that you were working with Mr Barnard, did you ever feel afterwards that you could say that you and Mr Barnard had shot Dr Webster dead?

MR BOTHA: Not at all. I must just add on that point, the contact with regard to Mr Verster was exclusive via the co-ordinator. So it wasn't as if I could call him up and say let's go and have a coffee I want to tell you something. There was a clear cut-off point with regard to any meeting with Mr Joe Verster.

MR VAN ECK: What do you think the reaction would have been if you had said subsequently that you and Mr Barnard had shot Dr Webster dead if it was Staal Burger's reaction where you and Mr Barnard were viewed together observing Mr White?

MR BOTHA: Given the cut-off points which were maintained and the management of the project I could not exclude that they would sacrifice me and Mr Barnard as happened by implication during our Section 29 detention. Rumours were spread that we had been involved in the murder and I believe that it was one of the motivations as to why we were detained in terms of Section 29. So it was my fear that Joe Verster would exonerate himself and Luitingh and apply a so-called cover-up operation and sell Barnard and I out, and I wasn't prepared to take that chance.

MR VAN ECK: It could have led to the death sentence.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: While you were on ice from June until you received the call to assist the organisation again in August, what were you doing?

MR BOTHA: I continued with my blue plan which was Cabot and I continued to try to collect information in my own way, I tried to stay busy. No particular directions were given to me, I simply wasn't allowed to be involved.

MR VAN ECK: Were you still part of the cell meetings?

MR BOTHA: No I wasn't.

MR VAN ECK: Was any feedback given by any person to you regarding what the CCB and Region 6 was occupied with at that stage?

MR BOTHA: No, there were many stories and rumours but there was no official feedback as such.

MR VAN ECK: And at the end of August you received a call to report to a hotel, can you recall this?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: What was your immediate reaction?

MR BOTHA: Once again my eagerness played a significant role. I was anxious to return to the structure, yet simultaneously I felt that I was being drawn in again and that I might be tossed out at a later stage, nonetheless I was eager to assist Van Zyl.

MR VAN ECK: Who phoned you, can you recall?

MR BOTHA: Staal Burger personally.

MR VAN ECK: And who told you there, where you met them there at the hotel, what was going to happen?

MR BOTHA: Generally it was explained to me what was going to occur. It was not my place to make enquiries regarding the project as such. I received an order from my regional manager in co-operation with the co-ordinator and I accepted that Mr van Zyl would inform me more comprehensively on the way to Cape Town. They explained the device to me, but as a demolitions expert it was fairly elementary to understand, and that was the information that I received.

MR VAN ECK: Despite the name of the organisation, the Civil Co-operation Bureau, was there any disciplinary structure within the CCB? One could almost say some kind of rank structure.

MR BOTHA: There was seniority, there was definitely seniority, and the seniors clearly made the subordinates feel subordinate.

MR VAN ECK: If you were told about an instruction could you refuse to execute it?

MR BOTHA: No I could not.

MR VAN ECK: If you were to refuse to execute it what would the consequences have been?

MR BOTHA: I was not prepared to take the risk. It is speculative but I have explained the capacities of the organisation and in the light of this I was not prepared to take the risk of refusal.

MR VAN ECK: You said that you were almost happy to be involved again?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: The planning prior to the bomb incident at the Early Learning Centre, was this ever shared with you, the prior in-house planning, the decisions regarding what was going to be done and so forth?

MR BOTHA: In general terms it was explained to me. We travelled from Johannesburg to Cape Town via car and Mr van Zyl did explain aspects of the operation to me but I was not involved in the planning of it, in the approval of it or anything like that.

MR VAN ECK: Were you involved in the observation and the persons who would have been involved with that?

MR BOTHA: Yes I was.

MR VAN ECK: In what capacity?

MR BOTHA: I had to ensure that the bomb would be detonated. I also had to ensure that execution would be given to the project.

MR VAN ECK: Did you see the bomb in Johannesburg?

MR BOTHA: Yes I did.

MR VAN ECK: What sort of bomb was it?

MR BOTHA: It was an SPM limpet mine.

MR VAN ECK: The small one or the big one?

MR BOTHA: The big one, grey in colour, one kilogram in mass.

MR VAN ECK: Was it the one with the 950 grams explosives?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: The detonator, was this shown to you?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: Was it a standard detonator for this sort of mine?

MR BOTHA: No it wasn't.

MR VAN ECK: What would the standard detonator involve?

MR BOTHA: A standard detonator is an uncontrolled detonator which would lead to an uncontrolled detonation. It is a steel wire which is influenced by temperature and various other factors which would lead to an uncontrolled explosion. The mechanism which was attached to this was a controlled mechanism which we would have control over with regard to time and so forth.

MR VAN ECK: Was there any accuracy in terms of time control in detonation with a standard detonator?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR VAN ECK: Was this subject to variables?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: Were you told why a different detonator was going to be used?

MR BOTHA: Because it had to be a controlled detonation.

MR VAN ECK: Can you recall who said this to you?

MR BOTHA: Mr van Zyl, among others, as well as Mr Basson.

MR VAN ECK: Did Mr Burger have any input into this?

MR BOTHA: Not that I can recall except that he approved the project. I didn't ask any questions. By nature of the situation I accepted that it was approved and that was his major share.

MR LAX: Sorry, why did it have to be a controlled detonation?

MR BOTHA: It had to take place at a specific time.

MR LAX: Did you know why, what was the object of that? Did you know? If you didn't know then say so, but if ...(intervention)

MR BOTHA: At a later stage Mr van Zyl informed me that a meeting would be taking place and that the exclusive purpose of the project would be to disrupt and damage the structure and that fatalities were not a foreseen consequence.

MR VAN ECK: Thank you Mr Lax. You as a demolitions expert had to have realised that that sort of mine could bring about loss of life and damage.

MR BOTHA: Yes, by nature of the situation, although to establish loss of life, in my opinion, another device would have had to be used.

MR VAN ECK: What would you have used?

MR BOTHA: There are various types, this is speculative, but there are car bombs which were available. There were also black widow limpet mines, there were various other options. A limpet per se causes shockwaves and I don't mean that this will not cause loss of life but the shrapnel and everything else related to it is not the ideal mine to use if you want to kill people.

MR VAN ECK: What sort of shrapnel effect would a limpet mine have?

MR BOTHA: The parts of the structure in which it was placed would be affected by the shrapnel, but the shrapnel attached to the device itself is limited.

MR VAN ECK: You saw the mine and then you took it into your possession?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: Was the detonator tested in Johannesburg?

MR BOTHA: Yes it was.

MR VAN ECK: How did you test it?

MR BOTHA: By means of a fake charge it was detonated. Which would not necessarily detonate the device itself but the principles were the same.

MR VAN ECK: Did it work?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: And did you and Mr van Zyl depart for the Cape then?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: Can you recall what your movements in the Cape were?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: Can you tell us.

MR BOTHA: We arrived in Cape Town and went directly to his brother-in-law's apartment where we rested. We met Isgak Hardien at the airport.

MR VAN ECK: If we could just pause for a moment. Did you know Isgak Hardien?

MR BOTHA: No I didn't.

MR VAN ECK: Were you informed what his background was?

MR BOTHA: In broad terms, yes. We met him at the airport where I put the limpet mine in his boot. After I had activated it and that is all up to that point.

MR VAN ECK: What happened with the placement?

MR LAX: Sorry, when you say you "activated" it, what did you actually do?

MR BOTHA: Most probably a better word would be "I armed it".

MR VAN ECK: Could you then explain briefly what this means, what you have just told us?

MR BOTHA: I attached the detonation mechanism to the limpet mine basically to prepare it to activate, to explode.

MR VAN ECK: So the activation doesn't mean that it had been set off already?

MR BOTHA: That is why I used the English "armed".

MR VAN ECK: So these were just final preparations?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: And subsequently?

MR BOTHA: We bought the bags, we put the mine into the bags and placed it in the boot of the car and Mr van Zyl gave certain instructions to Mr Hardien which he executed, and he placed the bomb in the place where Mr van Zyl told him to place it.

MR VAN ECK: Did you ever enter the hall personally?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR VAN ECK: Did you have any input in saying where the bomb should be placed?

MR BOTHA: No I didn't.

CHAIRPERSON: Why not, seeing that you were the expert? Because we know that Mr van Zyl was a layman when it came to mines, weren't you asked what would be the best place - should it be close to the wall; should it be away from the wall; should it be high up; should it be low down, that sort of detail?

MR BOTHA: I expected the question. The in-house was conducted on a very thorough level and I could not deviate from what the plan was at that stage. I was led by the approval which was given and I don't believe that Mr van Zyl would have wanted to deviate from that.

MR VAN ECK: Just in conjunction with that, was it at all possible for you to walk about inside the hall and to find a suitable place yourself?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR VAN ECK: You said that the bomb had been placed, you departed, what happened then?

MR LAX: Sorry, before you go there. Do I understand from your evidence you were present at the in-house and that you heard that kind of detail or did you just arrive there afterwards?

MR BOTHA: Mr Lax the in-house was at a different stage that it took place. This was only the handing over of the limpet mine at the Protea Gardens Hotel, so I did not take part in the in-house itself. They just told me how it worked and the rest of the information, but I was not part of the planning in terms of the placing of the limpet mine.

MR LAX: So do I gather then that you didn't know where it was supposed to be placed and you relied in Van Zyl to follow whatever he had been told?

MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAX: Sorry Mr van Eck.

MR VAN ECK: Thank you Mr Lax. Did you at that stage have any reason to question that what came before or what was done before?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR VAN ECK: They mentioned to you that the bomb had to be placed to your left, Hardien was picked up at a later stage and you returned to the cell.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: Did Mr van Zyl give any instructions to Hardien to see if there were any people in the cell, what was the position?

MR BOTHA: He asked to go and see if there were people ...(intervention)

MR LAX: Sorry, can I just correct something that's going on in the interpretation. The Interpreter is talking about the cell, it's in fact the hall.

MR VAN ECK: Yes, "saal"

MR LAX: Hall, the Afrikaans is "saal" in English "hall".

INTERPRETER: The Interpreter apologises.

MR VAN ECK: Did you go and look at the hall to see if it was empty or not?

MR BOTHA: He gave me the instruction to go and look, yes, what the situation was in the hall. Mr Hardien came out and said some of the managing members or committee members from the Kewtown Youth members were still busy with a meeting and we continued with the observation at the scene.

MR VAN ECK: At that stage was there any reason for you to question the actions of Mr van Zyl or Hardien who formed part of the in-house meeting?

MR BOTHA: No Sir.

MR VAN ECK: Was there at any stage before you handed over the limpet mine or the bomb and it was placed in a bag, did they attach nails to it, wrapped it around the limpet mine?

MR BOTHA: No at no stage did this happen.

MR VAN ECK: Would they have attached nails to it, or if they did what would have been the difference in the effect of this bomb?

MR BOTHA: Well the weight would change and it would also have more shrapnel and it would have caused more damage and it could have resulted in the loss of life or lives.

MR VAN ECK: Did you see if they tampered with this bomb at any stage to - modified in any way before it was placed in the hall?

MR BOTHA: We prepared it up to the final stage when I handed it over to Mr Hardien. No layman would continue tampering with the bomb or would be willing to attach nails with tape to it so I brought it in its final stages of preparation and handed it over and I never saw it again afterwards.

MR VAN ECK: Did you have any knowledge of the pre-planning that took place about who will detonate the bomb?

MR BOTHA: Yes I did.

MR VAN ECK: What did you know about it, who would activate the bomb?

MR BOTHA: According to the knowledge that I had Mr Hardien will detonate it. On the way there, on the way to Cape Town Mr van Zyl and I spoke about it and he expressed his concern about the detonation of the bomb and he decided, because it was his project, that to keep the detonating device with him at all times and that we will observe the scene ourselves to see if the explosion took place and if the limpet mine was placed in the hall.

MR VAN ECK: Did you have any reason to question the decision of Mr van Zyl in that regard?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR VAN ECK: Very well. You are now in the area of the hall. Hardien was sent in. Were reports made to Van Zyl if there were still people in there?

MR BOTHA: Well Mr Hardien came out and he said that the meeting was still continuing and we had to wait a while.

MR VAN ECK: So you waited?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: And we know that the bomb exploded at a later stage, did you specifically take note of the time or what time the bomb had to detonate?

MR BOTHA: What was told to me was that the bomb had to be detonated when there was nobody left in the hall. That's all that was put to me.

MR VAN ECK: It was very clear that there was a front entrance and a back exit, where in relation to the hall were you parked?

MR BOTHA: Sir I cannot recall but I think from where we were parked we could see the parking lot in front of the hall and the hall itself and we also moved on Mr Hardien's instruction concerning the people who left the hall and the vehicles were not there anymore, then Mr van Zyl wanted to detonate the bomb.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr van Eck, Mr Botha I can't recall but were you at the inspection in loco, did you come along to the hall?

MR BOTHA: No Sir.

MR LAX: Have you been there since, during the course of this hearing at all just to have a look?

MR BOTHA: I have never been back there Sir, no.

MR VAN ECK: Have you been there before?

MR BOTHA: No Sir.

MR VAN ECK: Before the evening of the explosion?

MR BOTHA: No Sir.

MR VAN ECK: And you also say afterwards you did not go there either?

MR BOTHA: That's correct.

MR VAN ECK: Did you have any personal discussion with Hardien?

MR BOTHA: Sir no, we were in the same vehicle and we could have exchanged a few words. I acted more as a listener.

MR VAN ECK: Did you have a discussion with him that he should do this or that or was it something that was between him and Van Zyl?

MR BOTHA: Yes it was something that was between him and Van Zyl.

MR VAN ECK: Did you report back at any stage that there were still people in the hall when the bomb was detonated?

MR BOTHA: Mr van Zyl's reaction was that we had to wait.

MR VAN ECK: Did you wait?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: You then decided to detonate it at a later stage?

MR BOTHA: Yes. I sat with Mr van Zyl in the front of the vehicle, they sat in front and they observed the hall and as the people left the hall they could attach certain names to certain people. I think Mr Williams, the other Mr Peter Oliver. I cannot recall any of the other names and Mr Hardien said that well according to him the hall would be empty and then Mr van Zyl decided to detonate the bomb.

MR VAN ECK: Who detonated the bomb? What happened?

MR BOTHA: In short Mr van Zyl attempted to detonate it, he could not detonate the bomb. I took the charge, the sender in my hand and I tried to find out if there was not a problem, maybe with the batteries or something and I covered it up again and I said well I'll try and I detonated it.

MR VAN ECK: Can you recall at that stage how far you were from the hall?

MR BOTHA: I think we were a few hundred metres from the hall. This is now during the observation but we drove towards the back or maybe I should say around the block. I would say we were there approximately 30 or 40 metres from the hall itself.

MR VAN ECK: When the bomb was detonated Mr Botha did you personally see if there were people in the hall?

MR BOTHA: Well as far as I know there were not. What I could see there were no people in the hall.

MR VAN ECK: It's very clear that you heard and saw when the bomb went off, what did you do afterwards?

MR BOTHA: We drove directly to the airport. We went on the highway and we flew back to Johannesburg.

MR VAN ECK: Who met you in Johannesburg, can you recall?

MR BOTHA: Yes it was Mr Maree and Mr Burger.

MR VAN ECK: You now mention Mr Maree's name, was he involved in the arrangement or the planning of this bomb?

MR BOTHA: No not as far as I know.

MR VAN ECK: Do you know why he was at the airport that evening?

MR BOTHA: No Sir I am not sure.

MR VAN ECK: Did you take part in any feedback to Mr Burger with regards to the bomb?

MR BOTHA: Well just that the bomb detonated and my role in it.

MR VAN ECK: Did you receive any remuneration or bonus for the detonation of the bomb?

MR BOTHA: It is so long ago I cannot recall. I know that at a certain stage they did pay out bonuses. If it was done I will accept it and if they did it would be around R3,000, but I cannot recall.

MR VAN ECK: Did they give you any feedback with regards to injuries?

MR BOTHA: Sir, we heard that there were some light injuries and what the nature of it I do not know.

MR VAN ECK: If you talk about injuries can we just go back to your application form where it describes the nature of your act or application. On page 3 there's a question on the application form that is filled in -

and your answer here is "No." You are saying now that you heard that people were injured, why is it that we find this answer in your application form which is contrasting now with your evidence?

MR BOTHA: I see on the following page - "suffered any damage to property", by nature of the situation I knew that the property was damaged so why would I deny it. I do not know, I cannot give you an explanation. Our application was submitted by Botha & Kruger and I have got no explanation for it.

MR VAN ECK: When you submitted this or compiled this application were you led by legal representatives?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: Did you question the contents thereof?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR VAN ECK: You do realise that it's wrong?

MR BOTHA: Yes I do.

MR VAN ECK: Do you know or do you have any knowledge if money was exchanged afterwards?

MR BOTHA: Yes I knew about money that was handed over.

MR VAN ECK: What do you know about it?

MR BOTHA: There was a budget approved for this project. I do not know the specific amounts though, and I do know amounts of money were paid over, I think it was R18,000.

MR VAN ECK: Were you involved in that?

MR BOTHA: No not at all.

MR VAN ECK: Were you involved in, what would be known in layman's terms as a de-briefing session, do you know what happened there?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR VAN ECK: Mr Botha after the incident of the bomb explosion in Athlone were you once again pulled into the structure of Region 6?

MR BOTHA: Yes I was.

MR VAN ECK: To what extent?

MR BOTHA: I continued with my normal activities.

MR VAN ECK: And what did this entail?

MR BOTHA: It was the identification of targets, the description of projects, the initiation of projects and those type of things.

MR VAN ECK: Very well. You mentioned before about Rosscam, you are now back in the structure, but it doesn't seem as if you have really achieved a lot apart from setting off a bomb. Did you do anything else with regards to Rosscam?

MR BOTHA: Yes Sir, I continued to burn out the vehicle with Mr Barnard.

MR VAN ECK: That was in September of the same year?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: Did you give feedback in an in-house meeting that you made use of Mr Barnard?

MR BOTHA: No I did not.

MR VAN ECK: Why not?

MR BOTHA: Once again because of the security break that would be created. I said that Geoffrey, my unconscious member executed the operation.

MR VAN ECK: And Geoffrey was the name that you gave when you made the initial in-house with regards to the Rosscam project?

MR BOTHA: That's correct.

MR VAN ECK: Was remuneration given to hand over to Geoffrey?

MR BOTHA: There was.

MR VAN ECK: What happened to it?

MR BOTHA: It was R5,500 which I shared with Mr Barnard.

MR VAN ECK: After the Rosscam incident did you do anything in the interests of the CCB, anything further?

MR BOTHA: As you can see my visit to the Royal Ascot Hotel, if you can see that as being in the interests of the CCB, yes.

MR VAN ECK: Yes that is what I would like to know.

During that time when you were placed on ice did you keep contact with Barnard?

MR BOTHA: Yes I did.

MR VAN ECK: Was information given to you at any stage concerning a man called Aitchison?

MR BOTHA: Yes Mr Barnard gave me the CV of Ronald or Dolan Aitchison and we attempted or it was my intention to apply him in the structure.

MR VAN ECK: Can you recall when you received this information from Aitchison?

MR BOTHA: If I can recall I think it was in April.

MR VAN ECK: Did you meet Aitchison?

MR BOTHA: No I never met him.

MR VAN ECK: Up until today?

MR BOTHA: Never.

MR VAN ECK: What did you do with what Mr Barnard gave you with regards to Aitchison?

MR BOTHA: Sir before I could do anything about the CV I was placed on ice. I then handed over the CV to Mr Burger and after that I was placed on ice.

MR VAN ECK: What did you say to Mr Burger concerning the CV that you gave?

MR BOTHA: I said it was somebody that I met, this is his CV and it seems to be somebody with certain capabilities and I just gave it to him.

MR VAN ECK: To Mr Burger?

MR BOTHA: That's correct.

MR VAN ECK: What was the reaction on Aitchison, what was Burger's reaction on the information that you gave him?

MR BOTHA: Well he accepted it and he said, well thank you.

MR VAN ECK: Did he say he was going to continue?

MR BOTHA: No I was then placed on ice and at a later stage when I did certain enquiries surrounding this Mr Verster said Aitchison is busy, he's involved and it's a hands-off type if situation.

MR VAN ECK: So you hand over a CV of Aitchison and you never have anything to do with him again?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, yes.

MR LAX: Just for clarity purpose, which Mr Verster told you?

MR BOTHA: Joe Verster. Mr Burger told me that Joe Verster said that he was involved and that we cannot make use of him.

MR VAN ECK: Very well just to prevent any further confusion we heard the name from Mr Barnard of Rich Verster.

MR BOTHA: Yes. I met him once. I cannot really describe him but I did meet him once, yes.

MR VAN ECK: Did he give you any instructions at any stage?

MR BOTHA: No he never.

MR VAN ECK: So if you refer to Verster you refer to Joe Verster?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: Lubowski, have you heard of such a person?

MR BOTHA: Yes I heard that after he was killed, I heard about him.

MR VAN ECK: Did you know if monitoring was done on him?

MR BOTHA: No I did not.

MR VAN ECK: If people had to follow him into Namibia?

MR BOTHA: No I did not know of it.

MR VAN ECK: Did Mr Barnard at any stage mention to you that he monitored Lubowski in Johannesburg?

MR BOTHA: Not as far as I can recall, no. But there is a possibility but I cannot recall it, no.

MR VAN ECK: If I have got my facts right Mr Lubowski was killed on the 13th of September 1989.

MR BOTHA: Yes I think that's the date.

MR VAN ECK: What happened afterwards?

MR BOTHA: A meeting was held where they discussed the death of Mr Lubowski. As I have stated in one of my statements the people who attended was myself, Mr Maree and the other members of the cell also present. There was some nervousness with regards to Mr Aitchison's possible involvement in the death of Mr Lubowski and they told me to lie low. Now that can mean various things.

MR VAN ECK: We will come back to the lying low. Did you make any enquiries, did you ask what is going on here?

MR BOTHA: I did and the connection that I made was that Aitchison was possibly involved without Mr Maree knowing about it and then they wanted to do damage control. I do not think they knew exactly what he did. But just the involvement confused them.

MR VAN ECK: We heard the evidence of Mr Barnard that the two of you went to go and steal a book, a book concerning Aitchison.

MR BOTHA: Yes that was at the Royal Ascot Hotel in Norwood. I heard that Mr Maree had a meeting with Aitchison and they wanted to destroy the evidence.

MR VAN ECK: Who did you send to go and steal the book?

MR BOTHA: I think it was Mr Staal Burger.

MR VAN ECK: Why did Ferdi Barnard go with?

MR BOTHA: It was once again an operation that is impossible to do alone and we assisted each other.

MR VAN ECK: Was this a type of operation where they would be an in-house and an unconscious member involved?

MR BOTHA: It was a spontaneous request and it was just to assist a colleague.

MR VAN ECK: Was there urgency connected to this?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: At the Royal Ascot Hotel, what happened there?

MR BOTHA: Myself and Mr Barnard attempted to get hold of the book. After a certain time or after we struggled we at long last stole one of the books, unluckily it was the wrong one that we did.

MR VAN ECK: Another person Alex Kouvaris appeared at the scene, were you still present?

MR BOTHA: We were leaving at that stage, we were on our way out.

MR VAN ECK: Who is Alex Kouvaris?

MR BOTHA: It is a friend and a colleague of Mr Burger.

MR VAN ECK: Why was it important for you to mention that Mr Kouvaris was there?

MR BOTHA: He was also in the hotel industry and it was very strange that I met him there. It was just such a strange coincidence and I also felt that Mr Burger tasked him to steal the book.

MR VAN ECK: After you were asked to steal the book at the Royal Ascot Hotel were you applied again to do anything concerning the Lubowski project?

MR BOTHA: No, the next day I met Mr Wouter Basson at the same hotel where he told me that I must leave the whole project, and I then did that.

MR VAN ECK: After the Aitchison incident, the stealing of the book at the Ascot Hotel, did you do anything else for the inner circle of the CCB in Region 6?

MR BOTHA: No I was arrested shortly after.

MR VAN ECK: Why were you arrested?

MR BOTHA: Under Section 29 certain allegations were made concerning the organisation and David Webster and I was arrested and detained in Hartebeespoort.

MR VAN ECK: How long were you detained for?

MR BOTHA: Approximately a month.

MR VAN ECK: Did you have access to people while you were under detention?

MR BOTHA: No I did not. I got family members to contact Mr Burger. He ignored the contact and afterwards he did make contact on which my father forced him to apply for my release.

MR VAN ECK: Who provided you with the funds for these applications?

MR BOTHA: It was the South African Defence Force.

MR VAN ECK: Do you know where they paid it in?

MR BOTHA: I think it was paid to the legal representative, Mr du Plessis.

MR VAN ECK: Did any police officer visit you while you were in prison?

MR BOTHA: Yes it was Krappies Engelbrecht and Brigadier van Rensburg.

MR VAN ECK: Did they say anything to you?

MR BOTHA: They just made it very clear to me that I had to keep quiet. They also told me that the consequences, or my inference was that the consequences thereof would not have been favourable.

MR VAN ECK: You made a Section 29 statement, I think it was W/O Derek Carter who was attached to the Brixton Murder & Robbery unit and in this statement or when you made this statement did you tell the truth or what you saw as the truth?

MR BOTHA: No Sir I did not.

MR VAN ECK: Just to pause here for a while, the statement you made was about the detonation of the bomb at the Athlone Centre and Mr van Zyl made certain statements on the grounds of your statement where he mentioned that a lot of it was false and that the detonation device or the switch that resulted in the detonation or explosion was dealt with by Mr Hardien.

MR BOTHA: I can recall that he made the statement but I will say that Mr van Zyl's version is the correct version.

MR VAN ECK: Was this with regards to the detonation of the bomb?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: Why is there such discrepancies in your evidence?

MR BOTHA: I worked in this branch for a long time. I have worked with a lot of Section 29 detainees and I was under the impression and it was so that the statement could not be used against me. So I tried to give as much information as possible without saying too much, if I can put it like that.

MR VAN ECK: Were you released at a later stage?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: According to the interdict after your release what did you do?

MR BOTHA: Sir I was told to lie low for two to three months where I then went to Cape Town with my family and did exactly that. I lay low.

MR VAN ECK: Did they provide you with funds?

MR BOTHA: Yes and amount of R8 or 10,000 was given to me and they told me that they have arranged for a house. I have to go to this place. I stayed there for a while and after that I arranged for my own house.

MR VAN ECK: When were your services suspended?

MR BOTHA: It was when they started down-scaling of the staff in the organisation. I heard that some of my cell members went to DCC. I did not. I continued with a private business, it was insurance and I started working in the insurance environment.

MR VAN ECK: Was there money involved?

MR BOTHA: I think it was approximately R200,000.

MR VAN ECK: Was this used to establish yourself in a private capacity?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: We will come back to Webster's post mortem inquest that followed on that, but did you at any stage take part in any covert operations through DCC?

MR BOTHA: No, not at all.

MR VAN ECK: Were you approached to continue activities in similar organisations?

MR BOTHA: No, not at all.

MR VAN ECK: Mr Botha at the CCB you have already told us that you sometimes felt left out what was your relationship with Mr Burger? Were you a trustee?

MR BOTHA: No I would not say that. I think it came from my days in Brixton. I was a new officer there. They were all established members, the rest of them, Wouter Basson was the heart of the cell with regards to our connection with the rest of the organisation. So I think they also incorporated them in the group and I don't think they saw me as being of any value, not that I feel sorry for myself, but I was the person who had to do the project to the best of my abilities and I think it came from the involvement in DCC. At no stage I did anything that could justify my involvement in DCC. The other members were transferred but I was not asked to transfer.

MR VAN ECK: Very well. In the beginning you stated that you played rugby abroad, what countries did you play in?

MR BOTHA: I said yes I played in France, China, Israel, Wales, various other countries.

MR VAN ECK: Did you make certain requests that you be transferred to foreign countries?

MR BOTHA: I did.

MR VAN ECK: To whom?

MR BOTHA: Mr Burger.

MR VAN ECK: And what was his reaction?

MR BOTHA: He said it was ridiculous.

MR VAN ECK: You have heard the evidence here of Mr Maree that he could go and establish a life in Germany.

MR BOTHA: It was surprising to me, yes.

MR VAN ECK: After an amount of money was paid into your account and you established yourself in your private capacity did you have any contact with the former members of Region 6, for example Slang van Zyl?

MR BOTHA: Because of the workings of the commissions and the post mortem inquest, yes, we did have contact with each other.

MR VAN ECK: Mr Barnard?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: Did you know what role Mr Barnard played?

MR BOTHA: No. Mr Barnard and I went through a phase when we did not see each other very often. I think it was at the stage when he started with the drugs and everything that happened with that and I think the calming effect that I had on him was lost and we lost contact with each other for a period of time.

MR VAN ECK: So you cannot say, or personally know what he did during that time?

MR BOTHA: No. Mr Maree, did you have contact with him?

MR BOTHA: Also on the grounds that I just explained to you.

MR VAN ECK: Why are you here today?

MR BOTHA: Sir first of all because I was given the opportunity to become part of the reconciliation process and by nature of the situation there is a lot of things that I do not feel very good about but that I justify within my position within a State organisation. I am here first of all because I want to make use of this opportunity and secondly, because I want to show that I have got regret and I would like to continue with my life. It is a period of 11 years since this incident took place and in the meantime my personal life went downhill. My connection to the CCB was not very good for my business. I suffered a lot of financial losses because of my involvement in the CCB. So in short Sir, I would like to take part in a reconciliation process. I believe in the new State dispensation and I would like to declare myself willing to take part in this process.

MR VAN ECK: Do you regret what you did?

MR BOTHA: Yes I do.

MR VAN ECK: Did you commit any of these acts out of vengeance towards any person?

MR BOTHA: Not at any stage.

MR VAN ECK: Were any of these acts aimed beyond the political context?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR VAN ECK: Did you draw any personal benefit with the exception of your regular remuneration?

MR BOTHA: With the exception of the amount that I mentioned pertaining to the Rosscam matter, no.

MR VAN ECK: And that which Mr Barnard gave you?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: You have heard the evidence of Mr Barnard and the influence that this whole process had on him, what influence has the process had on you and how do you feel towards the persons who were affected detrimentally by your actions, particularly the bomb?

MR BOTHA: I have seen the effect that it has had on Ferdi Barnard and I would like to say that for similar reasons I was anxious to testify to get the burden off my shoulders as well. I think it was very clear from the beginning what my relationship was with Mrs Omar for example, and the members of the youth who were represented here, and from the very beginning, and I say this within context, I reached out to them, not because I felt it to be out of guilt, but I wanted to reach out and apologise. I had done this before I testified. Briefly I saw what the process had done to Mr Barnard and he was quite a tough nut to crack and this process definitely broke him. So therefore I would also like to express my regret and my remorse unconditionally to those who were involved and to ask for their forgiveness.

MR VAN ECK: Do you share Mr Barnard's sentiments?

MR BOTHA: Yes I do.

MR VAN ECK: Mr Chairman if you can bear with me for one moment. Mr Botha is there anything that you would like to add in terms of the evidence you have given?

MR BOTHA: No, with the exception that in conclusion I would once again like to express my gratitude to the Committee for the opportunity to state my case openly and in so doing to get my involvement in these things out of the way once and for all and to live the rest of my life with a clear conscience and perhaps I could eradicate the scars that the last 11 years have left on my life and resume some sense of normality.

MR VAN ECK: Thank you Mr Chairman I have got no further questions at this stage.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you Mr van Eck. Mr Wessels.

MR WESSELS: Mr Bizos and I will work together for a change.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you going to.....

MR WESSELS: Mr Bizos will start.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you going to start Mr Bizos?

MR BIZOS: Yes if I may. We co-operated to that extent.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: Let me just start, Mr Botha, where you finished off, or almost finished off. You got R200,000 ...(intervention)

MR VAN ECK: Sorry Mr Chairman if I may interrupt, Mr Bizos I apologise for that, my client requests this Committee or this hearing can just adjourn for a very short time.

CHAIRPERSON: We will take five minutes.

CARL CASTELING BOTHA: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: (cont)

You got a package of approximately R200,000 which is approximately five years of your salary, is that right?

MR BOTHA: I did not calculate it like that but the amount is more-or-less correct.

MR BIZOS: Because you got it in advance, capitalised, you really got a value of over R300,000 for less than 18 months almost non-service.

MR BOTHA: Yes Mr Bizos I think you are putting it out of perspective. I think it's about the time that I already sacrificed by being in the police and the pain and suffering that I endured on behalf of the State till my discharge.

MR BIZOS: Suffering.

MR BOTHA: I beg your pardon?

MR BIZOS: You inflicted pain and suffering.

MR BOTHA: With respect that's your personal opinion.

MR BIZOS: Wouldn't you agree that victims suffered greater pain and suffering than the perpetrators?

MR BOTHA: From your perspective yes, but just remember I also have a family. I have heard what you have said with regard to my involvement meaning that I must have had a choice to do it or not. I exercised the choice to do it but I did not foresee that I would have to bear this pain and inconvenience. I believed in the hierarchy that brainwashed us. I grew up within a milieu where the apartheid dispensation was the order of the day and perhaps you should incorporate that background.

MR BIZOS: I hear all that. We haven't come to your political motivation yet, we just want to get some facts.

MR BOTHA: I am referring to the ideology.

MR BIZOS: Yes. We just want to get some facts about the money that you got. Did you get the impression that those responsible for paying you the money were paying you in part in order to secure your silence?

MR BOTHA: No, I never experienced it that way.

MR BIZOS: Now you were also visited whilst you were under Section 29 detention by Krappies Engelbrecht and another senior officer, did they threaten you?

MR BOTHA: Yes they did threaten me.

MR BIZOS: For the purposes of keeping you silent?

MR BOTHA: Correct.

MR BIZOS: Did you take the threats seriously?

MR BOTHA: Yes I took it very seriously. If I could explain to the Commission what Brigadier Krappies Engelbrecht showed me, he made like this, or else like that. So that was reason to take it quite seriously.

MR BIZOS: You are saying that he put his finger over his mouth and said or else - by pulling his finger across his throat. Clearly indicating that you would be killed.

MR BOTHA: That I would be silenced, yes, what ever it meant.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Did that have an effect on you?

MR BOTHA: Definitely, I don't know if you have visited anybody under Section 29 detention. I was the average citizen who had never ever been exposed to that class of treatment, so by nature of the situation it had a tremendous influence on me - to this very day. I still experience certain impressions which the cells left on me.

MR BIZOS: Is General Krappies Engelbrecht still around?

MR BOTHA: I accept that he is. I have not had contact with him again. I have seen him now and then in the media but I have no contact with him.

MR BIZOS: Are you still afraid of him?

MR BOTHA: It's not that I was afraid of Krappies Engelbrecht, I was afraid of the system, the structure of the organisation, the individuals who were trained to kill. I was afraid of them. I wasn't afraid of Brigadier Engelbrecht, per se.

MR BIZOS: But did you feel that General Engelbrecht had a hold on those having the power to kill you?

MR BOTHA: There must have been a bond and I am sure that he conveyed messages through people.

MR BIZOS: And did that play any role in your keeping silent?

MR BOTHA: My question to Brigadier Engelbrecht was, how soon will you be able to get me out of here and he remarked that I should keep quiet but they would do what they could, that it wouldn't take longer than six months, if I recall correctly. Six months in there would be like 16 years, and I told him that there was no way that I could stay there for that time. So I indicated that I would keep quiet until I couldn't do so anymore, and the things that I had spoken about were already known. By nature of the situation I had to give detail in order to achieve my release.

MR BIZOS: When did you become aware that Mr van Zyl had already spoken about the Early Learning Centre bomb whilst you were in detention?

MR BOTHA: I was detained before Mr van Zyl, so I didn't have any contact with him. After my discharge I had contact with him, or after my release so-to-speak.

MR BIZOS: How did you know that they knew what had happened that prompted you to speak?

MR BOTHA: I accepted that there must have been a leak somewhere. It is a question for Brigadier Flores Mostert perhaps because he gave me certain facts which were alarming.

MR BIZOS: What facts did he disclose to you?

MR BOTHA: Among others the fact that the bomb had exploded. I couldn't deny it, a bomb had exploded and it was alarming to me the fact that he knew about the bomb or a bomb which had gone off.

MR BIZOS: Did he tell you what Van Zyl had said about it?

MR BOTHA: No he didn't. As I have said I was in detention, I don't know where Mr van Zyl was or who he was speaking to.

MR BIZOS: Now I am concerned about your statement that you believed that statements made under detention would not be admissible, were you forced to make that statement?

MR BOTHA: Let me begin at the beginning. Firstly yes, it is a general fact that Section 20 statements are not permissible but that is the impression that I have, and I worked with Section 29 imprisonments so perhaps I have been mistaken for all these years. By nature of the situation there was pressure on me despite the fact that I didn't get proper meals; that I was deprived of all my freedom; that I could not obtain legal counsel; that I didn't know what was going on outside; that I felt that I was going to be sacrificed; the fact that I begged and pleaded for them to look after Mr Barnard, which was not done. So if I were to make my own inference I asked them to help Mr Barnard but instead of them helping him further possible rumours were spread which established my detention as well. So by nature of the situation it was a form of coercion, it was a grave form of coercion.

MR BIZOS: Yes. But now how would it have helped you if you gave what you have described before the Committee false details in relation to the bomb?

MR BOTHA: Firstly I tried to cooperate, I tried to follow the golden mean in terms of my co-operation with the police to try and achieve my release but also to remain part of the South African Defence Force system, so I tried to say as little as possible with that. I tried to follow the golden mean.

Perhaps I could tell you a tale which would give you clarity regarding the subject. At a certain stage I became so claustrophobic that I felt as if I would do anything to speak in order just to get a visit, that is why I said on a certain day that I would like to clear my conscience, that I was prepared to tell everything that I knew, but that I wouldn't speak to any of them but to the General. They brought the General in by helicopter. He arrived there and he said, "Son can we talk to you, what's your position?". And I said yes General I would like to discuss a few things with you. They took me out of the cells and treated me like a decent well-educated person. They allowed me to have a cup of tea, and then they said, well are you read to speak? I said yes I would like to talk about the food. I would like to talk about my detention; my freedom; and a few other aspects. And they said no we'll change everything for you but let's just talk about the involvement of others, and I said no General I have got nothing to say about that. Naturally he expressed his disapproval and departed, but that hour of escape from those cells bought me another day.

So you must understand when I speak to you of unforced coercion or coercion without any physical pressure which is exerted on the individual.

MR BIZOS: I accept everything that you say in relation to detention without trial, and you are not the first person from whom I have heard it.

MR BOTHA: I accept that.

MR BIZOS: But what I am asking you is this, how would you have helped your situation in describing what happened at the explosion of this bomb at the Early Learning Centre by giving inaccurate detail? And please try and confine your answer to the question.

MR BOTHA: I will try to do so Mr Bizos. You have asked me for a third time, I will give you this answer and see if you find that satisfactory. By nature of the situation they had certain facts. They didn't know what the precise facts were. I gave them a concoction of the truth in order to get myself out of detention. Better than that I cannot do.

MR BIZOS: No but I will assist you to try.

MR BOTHA: Please.

MR BIZOS: If you admitted that you participated in the explosion of the bomb how would it help you to give false details in relation to the manner in which it happened? Try and answer that question please.

MR BOTHA: I will try once again to answer to the best of my ability. I was involved with the State organisation, an organisation which at certain points assured us in no uncertain terms of indemnity, the fact that we would not be prosecuted commensurately I dealt with this decision in the back of my mind and I said things which were not sober during my detention. And for someone who has not been in section 29 detention I cannot explain my behavioural patterns. I can also not sketch my state of mind unless you yourself have experienced it, and I doubt it.

MR BIZOS: You are partly correct, but I have heard enough people describe their experience. Try and answer the question ...(intervention)

MR BOTHA: Then I will accept your sympathy towards my detention as well.

MR BIZOS: Yes, but try and answer my questions. Let's try in another way.

MR BOTHA: Please.

MR BIZOS: If you were involved in Van Zyl and you were involved in the CCB how would it help you, how would it help the CCB, how would it help Van Zyl or any one of you by giving incorrect information in relation to the detail as to how the bomb was exploded?

MR BOTHA: Once again I will give you an answer. I wanted to force the organisation to stay true to their word regarding what we understood about indemnity during our training. I wanted to force them and show them, this is what I know, this is what I can say. So you have to achieve my release now. More than that I cannot do.

MR BIZOS: I will try once again. Why would the truth in relation to the detail once you made the great divide by implicating yourself, the CCB and Van Zyl, why wouldn't the truth have been better rather than false details?

MR BOTHA: Because I was uncertain of the reaction of the organisation. Let me put a hypothetical question to you. Let's say I were to expose all the correct facts. They could sacrifice me. Therefore I dealt according to my state of mind at that point whether it would assist me or not. I did the best that I thought during my detention and I will stand by that.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Bizos, but what you have said in the statement here and what you have said to us now, if you had said what you have said to us now in the statement why do you think it would have been worse than what you said in the statement? I mean because you have told us now that you were roped into this and that you had to push the button and a few details about what happened at the hall. And you've also given a statement where you mention Van Zyl's name, Burger's involvement etc, but it's not the same as what you've told us here. And I think I have the same difficulty as Mr Bizos. It's not like the one is an exculpatory statement and the other inculpatory. They both inculpate yourself to the same extent. So why then fiddle around with facts when it's not going to make much difference. Why do you think this was better to tell the police than what you've told us now? In what specific detailed respect? Take a look at page 5, yes.

MR BOTHA: I tried to keep myself away inasfar as it was possible. I was a detective. I knew the investigative process and I tried to remove myself from the scene. I gave information according to what I thought was best. I tried to protect myself because I didn't know what would emanate from my detention. I didn't know if I would be there for more months. I also allowed myself to be led by the investigating team. I would support the things that they said. When they asked who pressed the detonator I gave them roundabout answers, that is how I led my statement.

MR BIZOS: Isn't the correct answer to my question that you knowing that you have a common interest to get amnesty with Mr van Zyl are anxious to reconcile your statement here by denying the contents in relation to detail in your statement made in detention?

MR BOTHA: I would be prejudicing myself by placing myself at the scene and knowing what happened, therefore I kept with my section 29 statement so that I could remove myself as far as possible from the scene.

MR BIZOS: Did the Attorney General offer you indemnity for your participation in the killing of Webster?

MR BOTHA: Yes Mr Bizos, yes.

MR BIZOS: Has anybody offered you indemnity for the Early Learning Centre if you didn't get amnesty?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Who has?

MR BOTHA: The Attorney General.

MR BIZOS: For this as well?

MR BOTHA: Correct.

MR BIZOS: Which Attorney General did that?

MR BOTHA: Torrie Pretorius from the Pretoria AG office.

MR BIZOS: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that also during 1999, same time as you went and made the statements?

MR BOTHA: That's right, Sir, yes.

MR BIZOS: Now I want to see if I understand your evidence in relation to the purpose of the bomb. Did you say that the purpose of the bomb was told to you by Van Zyl afterwards, that is that he had wanted a controlled explosion?

MR BOTHA: Afterwards when Sir? Let's just clarify that point.

MR BIZOS: That's what you used.

MR BOTHA: No afterwards when, after we left?

MR BIZOS: After the explosion.

MR BOTHA: No, how could that be possible. After we left ...(intervention)

MR MARTINI: Chairperson that's not correct. It wasn't after the explosion. That was not this witness' answer.

CHAIRPERSON: No the question Mr Bizos asked was, did Mr van Zyl tell you that after the explosion, and your answer?

MR BOTHA: Obviously not Sir, no.

CHAIRPERSON: Not.

MR BIZOS: Now I noted that you said, "he told me afterwards what the purpose was for a controlled explosion", did you say that?

MR BOTHA: If I can clarify the meaning of "afterwards", meaning after we left the hotel building, which at the time was a Protea Gardens Hotel, afterwards then. So in other words most probably, in all probability not in the room but thereafter on our journey from Johannesburg to Cape Town he explained to me the essence of the explosion, of the bomb as such.

MR BIZOS: We will get the record in due course and see what ...(intervention)

MR VAN ECK: Mr Chairman if I may just point out here. The evidence was led in Afrikaans and his evidence was in Afrikaans, "hy het my daarna, na ons vertrek dit vertel", I don't know what the translation was ...(intervention)

INTERPRETER: "He told me after our departure".

MR VAN ECK: ...that came through, but that was the evidence in Afrikaans.

MR MARTINI: Well Chairperson I am sure we could play back the tapes, it wasn't so long ago, rather than wait for the record.

MR BIZOS: (microphone not on)...we will return to it. The word "afterwards" was definitely used, I would not have written it down.

CHAIRPERSON: I haven't used the word "afterwards" because I was actually writing quite quickly here, I am not saying that it wasn't used, but my notes right or wrong say, "we travelled to Cape Town by car and Van Zyl explained aspects of the project".

MR BIZOS: We will see what was said Mr Chairman. I want to ask you a number of questions, when the button was pressed wherever it may have been pressed by, were the lights of the building on?

MR BOTHA: Once again my legal counsel in the interim has put the statements that this was 11 years ago. I cannot recall it. So you can ask me that question four times and I still will not be able to remember. I will stand by that, whether the lights were on or off is impossible for me to say. I am not prepared to speculate regarding this.

MR BIZOS: Right. Would you accept the evidence that people were in the building and were injured?

MR BOTHA: Once again it is speculative because I don't know who made the statements. I don't know the integrity of the witnesses. I cannot give you a definite yes or no based on such a vague question. It is impossible.

MR BIZOS: It isn't vague, but you don't accept it on that basis. I will put it on another basis so that you can accept it for the purposes of the subsequent questions Mr Botha.

If there is credible evidence before the Committee that there were people injured, if there is such credible evidence, would you accept that people do not generally sit in the dark in a hall or in an entrance hall, or in a room, or in a passage, they don't sit or stand in the dark, would you accept that?

MR BOTHA: Unfortunately not Sir, no.

MR BIZOS: You don't accept that either?

MR BOTHA: No I can't.

MR BIZOS: Oh I see.

MR BOTHA: It has to do with every person's personal view. What were you doing in that dark room, were you meditating, sleeping, praying, chatting, what were you doing? I don't know what people do when it's light or when it's dark. I cannot tell you.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry but Mr Botha didn't you say you heard later that people were injured?

MR BOTHA: Yes I said that Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: So don't you accept that because you can't remember whether the lights were on, is that the reason why you can't accept it?

MR BOTHA: I am saying Mr Bizos explicitly asked me if I can remember if the lights were on or off. Then subsequently to that he said if I would accept from people being injured that the lights were on. That's the way I understand the question.

MR BIZOS: You are quite serious in the answer that you have given that if people were injured the lights might have been, were probably off, but they were contemplating or they were doing something in which at eight o'clock at night they required no artificial light. Is that your evidence?

MR BOTHA: That's not what I have said.

MR BIZOS: Well what are you saying? If people were in fact injured in that building will you accept that there were people in the building at the time that the explosion went off?

MR BOTHA: I will tell you what I can say. I went on the evidence of Mr Isgak Hardien regarding the fact that there were no persons present at the time of the detonation of the limpet mine. Furthermore I will rely on Mr van Zyl's opinion with regard to the instruction that he gave for the limpet mine to be detonated because it would fit in to the stipulations at the in-house which were given to him. I would have to rely upon that.

MR BIZOS: And close your eyes to the fact that people were injured and that in all probability the lights were on and anyone who had eyes to see must have realised that there may be people in the hall at the time that the explosion went off.

MR BOTHA: That's your opinion Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: No, but you know it may sound a clever answer to you Mr Botha to say that it's an opinion ...(intervention)

MR BOTHA: Not at all.

MR BIZOS: You are telling us that you accept what Mr Hardien said and what Mr van Zyl said because it suits your case but you are not prepared to face any objective facts that may be found to be proved as a throwing doubt on the credibility of Hardien or the credibility of Van Zyl and above all your credibility.

MR BOTHA: I am not saying that I have to fight for my credibility here. I have given you the facts as I have experienced them and I must rely upon the two opinions of those who were involved with me at the scene. I cannot take it any further than that. I don't want to enter into an argument with you. I am telling you that this was my experience of it and I cannot say anymore. If you tell me that the lights were on and you have a witness who can verify this then I will have to say Mr Bizos so be it, that's your opinion. Then I will accept it for what it is worth. But I cannot accept it as having been so in essence.

MR LAX: Sorry Mr Bizos. Mr Botha it seems to me that you are not hearing the question properly. The question is, if people were in there and we know, let's put it this way, you yourself say people were injured ...(intervention)

MR BOTHA: Yes I heard that.

MR LAX: They must have been in the building to get injured.

MR BOTHA: Not necessarily, they could have been most probably - I am not sure, that's why I am not prepared to commit myself to that. They could possibly have been ...(intervention)

MR LAX: Have you see the photographs of the damage?

MR BOTHA: Yes I have.

MR LAX: They could not have been injured on the outside of the building from the nature of the damage.

MR BOTHA: That could have been glass Sir, I have seen explosive scenes where detonation took place where it could have been glass. It could have been a number of factors. It could have been the vacuum of the bomb as such. I am not sure of the injuries as such.

CHAIRPERSON: But it's not a question of committing yourself to whether the lights were on or not because you don't know - you say look I can't remember whether the lights were on or not.

MR BOTHA: That's right.

CHAIRPERSON: Now if somebody comes along let's say whose evidence, who is a very good witness, whose evidence is accepted and says "well the lights were on", now you don't have to commit yourself to that situation. If you can't remember they may well be on. From what you have told us, you said that you were sitting in that vehicle after you went around the block, you came a bit closer and then Hardien, people came out and Hardien mentioned a couple of names and then it was determined that all the people must have left.

MR BOTHA: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And you operated on that. But that doesn't mean that because those people were out that the lights were off.

MR BOTHA: I accept that Sir but ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: There might have been other people, there might have been a watchman there, there might be a caretaker there.

MR BOTHA: I accept what you are saying but Mr Bizos is trying to get me to agree that at some stage I should have foreseen the possibility that there were people - because of the lights that were on, I should foresee the possibility that there were people at that present time in the building as such.

MR LAX: Look that may be the case, that's why I was trying to help you. He is asking you some questions, listen to each question, don't think five questions ahead and then you find yourself getting stuck in a problem that isn't there.

MR BOTHA: I accept that Mr Lax but I did hear the second part of his question, that's why I am reacting the way I am.

MR LAX: Yes but it's all premised on the fact that there were people there, there were people injured. He accepts that you don't remember that the lights were on. He has no alternative.

MR BOTHA: I accept that, but it's all got to do with my credibility now. So if I do admit to what Mr Bizos says it could influence my credibility which I am not prepared to do.

MR BIZOS: Let's carry on. I will ask the questions that I am accustomed to asking and you can give the answers that you want and we will argue at the end whether any reliance can be placed on your evidence.

Now which is the front and which is the back of this building? And in relation to that is the parking ground in front or at the back of the building?

MR BOTHA: In all honesty I cannot remember now at this moment in time. I can't. As I said to you I explicitly took it from the way Mr Hardien and Mr van Zyl conducted them at this specific scene and I've got to go according to that. I did not attend the in loco as ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: We accept that.

MR VAN ECK: Chairperson, Mr Bizos did not let him finish, I think ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: He said he did not attend the inspection in loco.

MR BIZOS: I apologise for that. Yes you did not attend the inspection in loco. Now if in fact there were motor cars in the parking ground, and there is evidence of damage to those vehicles as a result of the explosion, albeit minor damage, would you accept that not all the cars that were parked in what you call the parking ground, had left at the time of the explosion?

MR BOTHA: On the basis that you have put it to me I don't have a choice but to accept it according to your version.

MR BIZOS: Now we are getting somewhere yes thank you. Now has it occurred to you that Mr Hardien, having regard to his background may have lied either to you or to Mr van Zyl in relation to the presence or otherwise of people in the building?

MR BOTHA: The possibility exists, certainly Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: Has it occurred to you that it is possible that Mr van Zyl misrepresented to you what the real purpose of this bomb being put there was, and knowing that you were not in the "voorstudie" he and Hardien requiring your assistance obtained it under false pretences. Did that occur to you?

MR BOTHA: No, Mr van Zyl's integrity is above suspicion to me with regard to that.

MR BIZOS: A gentleman above suspicion.

MR BOTHA: That is your translation.

MR BIZOS: Yes.

MR MARTINI: Sorry Chairperson Mr Bizos shouldn't make jokes of the answers he doesn't like that he extracts under cross-examination. He should keep his comments to himself and argue it, rather than make a snide comment when he extracts an answer which is not favourable to him. Thank you Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: .... that it's not favourable to me in view of the questions that follow and I certainly didn't hear anybody laughing with my question Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Botha if you were told that the purpose of the operation was to kill people, what would you have done?

MR BOTHA: If the pre-study was set out as such and if the instruction had been given as such then I would still have participated in the operation because that was the objective of our organisation.

MR BIZOS: Yes. What was the purpose other than to kill the people that were having the meeting there and belonging to the executive of the Kew Youth Movement, Kewtown?

MR BOTHA: Are you asking what the purpose of the explosion was?

MR BIZOS: Yes, according to Van Zyl and according to you, since you have so much faith in his credibility and honesty and forthrightness.

MR BOTHA: Sir the answer has actually got three legs. Firstly the maximum disruption of the structure as I have explained it before. The second leg would be to send a very strong message to the interested parties that they are being monitored and that there are people who are aware of their activities. The third leg would be that there is a possible connection that could be made to them in that it could possibly be one of their bombs that exploded. And the fact that those involved will know that it is not will create a feeling of intimidation.

MR BIZOS: This is what Mr van Zyl told you?

MR BOTHA: No Sir, this is what Mr van Zyl told me, yes that is correct. This is the reason why we placed the bomb there.

MR BIZOS: Just by the way, was your faith in the honesty and forthrightness of Mr van Zyl not in any way shaken by his denying that he authorised your blood-brother Ferdi Barnard to kill Advocate Omar with a Makarov pistol with a silencer, who do you think is telling the truth, your blood-brother or Mr van Zyl?

MR BOTHA: Sir I am not willing to speculate on something like that.

MR BIZOS: Oh.

MR BOTHA: I think it is not reasonable to ask me or to expect it from me because I do not have the facts available. I was not part of any discussion with regards to Advocate Omar. So you are now trying to pull me in in a way in which I will not go.

CHAIRPERSON: I think it's our function to decide who to believe on that one rather than the witness'.

MR BIZOS: Yes I merely by way of an expression Mr Chairman as to who (the speaker's microphone is not on) - I just want to round it off, you see if in fact Mr Ferdi Barnard is telling the truth, would you accept that Mr van Zyl is capable of telling outright untruths, if?

MR BOTHA: I cannot give you an answer.

MR BIZOS: I am sure not, I am sure not.

Now I want to examine this answer of yours as to what the purpose was, what information was there according to Mr van Zyl or other information that you had these people that you wanted to frighten were guilty of?

MR BOTHA: Sorry can I just interrupt you on that point, I would just like to once again explain to you what my role and responsibility was concerning this incident. I was there in an observation position. I accompanied Van Zyl as an expert in an area of which he knew nothing. I did not make sure that I knew of all of the facts, I went exclusively on the grounds of an instruction that I received from the coordinator and the regional manager and what I observed in the handing over of this limpet mine. I went there exclusively on that basis and I accompanied Mr van Zyl. Once again you said I was not involved in the pre-study, I was not involved in the in-house and that is why I think it is unfair to ask me these type of questions because I cannot answer you with certainty even though I want to, and with respect I am saying this. I pick up a feeling of animosity from you because I am not accepting it that way, but I cannot. I can tell you how I saw the limpet mine, how I handed it over to Isgak Hardien, I can tell you what I observed there and that is my integrity that's on the table here, and it's my opinion about what happened there.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry but Mr Botha all that Mr Bizos asked you is - you said that Van Zyl told you what the purpose of the operation was ...(intervention)

MR BOTHA: That's right Sir, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: ...and that included inter alia to send a message to the people etc.

MR BOTHA: That's right.

CHAIRPERSON: Now all that Mr Bizos is asking is were you aware as to why it was necessary to send a message to those people, was that told to you? After all you probably sat for, I don't know how long it took you to drive to Cape Town, but it's a long drive, you were together a long time, or wouldn't you have asked well you know why these people, why that or? That's all that is being asked.

MR BOTHA: I concede Mr Chairperson. Mention was made ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know what they were allegedly guilty of or suspected of being guilty of.

MR BOTHA: That was mentioned to me, yes.

MR BIZOS: Please answer the question, what were you told these people were guilty of?

MR BOTHA: Amongst other things that there are suspicions that they placed two bombs, I think one at a post office and one at a police station. If I can remember correctly secondly that they wanted to disrupt the elections in their way with certain actions that they wanted to launch that they planned during the meetings that took place at this hall in Athlone, and that it was not forbidden organisation but it was a situation that was created because of a certain pattern of thought. And that would then be the disruption of the September elections. In broader terms that is what he told me.

MR BIZOS: Did he also tell you that they were suspected of having been - not only that they were responsible for the bombs at the post office and the magistrate's court, but also that they were in possession of explosives and arms and ammunition?

MR BOTHA: That's the inference that I made, yes, if he did not tell it to me that would be a possibility, a most likely possibility.

MR BIZOS: So although there were many definitions of terrorism this was a bunch of primary terrorists that were to gather there that evening?

MR BOTHA: I will not say those are his exact words Mr Bizos, in broader terms yes, that's what he said they were busy with.

MR BIZOS: And what was more serious an offence to commit at the time by a group of ten or twelve young people than be in possession of bombs and go and place them at places, probably been aware of other explosives and they were about to explode them. By the way did Mr van Zyl also tell you that Mr Verster had said to him that if another bomb goes off in the Cape he, Verster, would hold Van Zyl personally responsible for that act of terror, did Mr van Zyl tell you that?

MR BOTHA: He could have mentioned it, yes, I cannot recall it though.

MR BIZOS: Did he or did he not mention it?

MR BOTHA: I cannot recall.

MR BIZOS: It's not likely that he would have kept such vital information of such importance to his partner driving what is it, 17 or 1800 kilometres, staying in the same hotel that you would have omitted that dramatic detail?

MR BOTHA: Maybe it was a personal discussion between the two of them that his ego did not allow him to say that and I could have made the inference that his region is out of control.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos when it's convenient we will take the adjournment for the day but only when you get to the end of a point.

MR BIZOS: The best way of making sure that the terrorist activities, I think you would have used the word terroristic activities, of these people was to kill them. What is the good of warning them, kill them, and you've got the maximum disruption in the bag, so-to-speak. There will be no more bombs at any rate from these people that were suspected of having let them off. Why not kill them. Wouldn't that have been in accordance with the policy and principles of the CCB?

MR BOTHA: Mr Bizos it may be so, once again it may be so, but unfortunately I cannot shed light on that. If you have asked me if possibly shouldn't they have been killed but my opinion doesn't mean anything because it wasn't my project. I did not make the recommendation. If you ask me it in 14 different ways wouldn't it have been better and with each one I say yes, it's got no influence on me.

MR BIZOS: Didn't you ask Van Zyl, but why don't we kill these bombers? What is this business of giving them a warning? Terrorists don't require warnings.

MR BOTHA: Even if I did ask the question it would not have been in his capacity to deviate from the plan so what would the purpose have been, so that is why I cannot think I would have thought such a question or waste my time in asking such a question, because that would have been a waste.

MR BIZOS: Well I am going to suggest to you that the project having failed, fortunately for these young people who were not doing any of the things that you suggest, you, Van Zyl and Hardien decided to lessen your intention in order to avoid the consequences and that neither you, nor Van Zyl nor Hardien are telling the truth as to what the purpose of this bomb was.

MR BOTHA: Mr Bizos I can tell you what was told to me if Mr van Zyl had said these are the reasons, I will accept it. I was not informed from the higher ranks what the reasons were I will go on the grounds of what Mr van Zyl said because I cannot stand in for what he said. Mr van Zyl said this must happen and I act accordingly. I drive with them, I activate the limpet mine and I assist him in the detonation thereof. I concede that your summation could be correct, it would not be my place because I cannot say it. That is why Mr van Zyl sat here so that you can ask him that question. I cannot stand in for what was said to him.

MR BIZOS: Did you discuss the purpose of this bomb with Mr Barnard?

MR BOTHA: Sir I could possibly have said that I detonated the bomb. I cannot think that I would have discussed the purpose with him in detail.

MR BIZOS: Let's take it step-by-step. You can't deny that you had a discussion with Mr Barnard about the explosion of this bomb?

MR BOTHA: I can say such a discussion took place, yes.

MR BIZOS: And do you remember what his evidence was?

MR BOTHA: I can recall, yes.

MR BIZOS: I'll confirm it for you. That he told you that Van Zyl had told him that the purpose was to kill these young people. Now, and that in fairness to you you said no, that is not what Van Zyl told me. Has Mr Barnard got that conversation correctly?

MR BOTHA: It's possibly correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Well you can't deny that that is what precisely passed between you and Mr Barnard?

MR BOTHA: If he conveyed it in such a way I would have reacted like such because if it had happened like that Mr van Zyl did not put it to me and he was not informed.

MR BIZOS: You are unable to deny that those were the terms of the discussion that you had with Mr Barnard?

MR BOTHA: I cannot say ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Thank you, that's enough. Now why would Mr van Zyl tell Mr Barnard a different purpose to what he told you as to the purpose of the bomb?

MR BOTHA: Because this organisation was made up of a lot of egos and the one's ego wants to be bigger than the other one's ego so this is my logical summation that he wanted to impress Mr Barnard by saying such a thing. Once again I am speculating, I cannot say.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Why don't you speculate that he may have been telling the truth to Mr Barnard but that he possibly mislead you?

MR BOTHA: But I just conceded that if it happened like that I cannot say it - I can say it possibly happened. I do not think - I cannot see how it can assist you.

CHAIRPERSON: But Mr Botha just on your response on your opinion as to why it was said, don't you think that Barnard would have been more impressed if Mr van Zyl told him that the purpose wasn't to kill, we set off a bomb and we didn't kill, in other words we achieved the object of the operation? Rather than make up a story about trying to kill people and failing. What's that got to do with ego when you are talking about a failure rather than a success?

MR BOTHA: No I differ from you Mr Chairperson. It is about the loss of life, how Mr van Zyl would have liked to have boasted about it. It would have given him larger credibility against a person like Mr Barnard.

MR BIZOS: Did you see Van Zyl regularly after your discussion with Mr Barnard?

MR BOTHA: I would think so, yes.

MR BIZOS: Did you ever ask him what is this nonsense that you told Barnard about our intention being to kill people, did you ever ask him?

MR BOTHA: No I did not.

MR BIZOS: Why not?

MR BOTHA: I do not think he wanted Ferdi to admit to me that he discussed the project with him, so I think Ferdi and Slang had their own relationship and Ferdi and I had our own relationship without Slang knowing what the relationship was.

MR BIZOS: If Mr Barnard had told the truth to you, had told the truth to you and if Van Zyl was speaking the truth you were the exploited expert who was not told the real purpose of the bomb, surely that must have been a matter of great concern that would have influenced your relationship with Mr van Zyl?

MR BOTHA: Sir once again I had to rely on what Ferdi Barnard told me. I cannot interpret it as the truth. I was at the scene, I know what Mr van Zyl told me and I acted accordingly. If he lied to me or not I cannot say, or I cannot stand in for him. I can tell you what he told me and more than that I cannot say.

MR BIZOS: What I would - the last question for this afternoon, if you can, why didn't you do the natural thing with your co-worker in the CCB, "why do you tell Ferdi Barnard that the intention was to kill and why did you tell me that the intention was merely to frighten, why did you play the fool with me, or why are you playing the fool with me?"

MR BOTHA: I did not discuss it Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: You've told us that, why not? Have you any explanation why you did not do it?

MR BOTHA: Possibly because he said it in the confidence of the situation that he did not know what our relationship was at that stage and I did not know what their relationship was like. That's how I did not know about Advocate Omar or that Ferdi Barnard was involved in the baboon incident. And that I stated categorically ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Have you any other explanation because if you haven't I think that I would ask the Chairman's permission to allow me to stop at this stage, have you any other explanation to explain this inconsistent and improbable conduct on your part?

MR BOTHA: That's my final answer.

MR BIZOS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We will adjourn till tomorrow. We mentioned last week the possibility of starting at nine, is that possible, tomorrow? Yes. We will adjourn until nine o'clock tomorrow morning, same venue. Thank you.