CHAIRPERSON: October, the 7th. We are still busy with Mr Lotz.

GERHARDUS JOHANNES LOTZ: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV LAMEY: (cont)

Mr Lotz, I want to start by putting the versions of the two applicants whom I represent here, what their evidence will be.

Firstly, I think that I have already put it to you that they drove their vehicle themselves from Glenconnor to the point where they met the other persons, and now I am referring to the other members of the Security Branch. So they drove themselves from Glenconnor to Port Elizabeth. That is not your version, is it?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: I am sorry Mr Lamey, who drove the vehicle?

ADV LAMEY: Mr Koole drove the vehicle. Did you hear the statement?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

ADV LAMEY: From that point, that is the point near the Security Branch, which is also close to the railway station, another vehicle was followed right up to the airport and at the airport Captain Venter told them at one stage, just after they had parked in the area, that they had to park a little bit further away from the airport and later Captain Venter told them that they - can't you hear the question?

MR LOTZ: No.

ADV LAMEY: It seems to be a problem Mr Chairperson. Can you hear now? Can you hear me now? I will just repeat my statement to you. At the airport after they arrived there, and parked the minibus, Captain Venter came to them and showed them where they had to park the minibus?

MR LOTZ: That is not how I saw these things happening.

ADV LAMEY: Their testimony is also that while they were standing there, they saw how four to five white men, amongst others, Captain Venter move towards the entrance of the airport building and that at one stage, three persons arrived there and there was movement around these three people and they were then apparently in a normal manner, taken to the minibus and the three people then got into the minibus?

MR LOTZ: That is not true.

ADV LAMEY: They will testify further that from there the vehicle was driven to a forest path nearby?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

ADV LAMEY: At one stage one or two white men, but this time not Captain Venter, I am saying that it is not Captain Venter or Beeslaar, took over the driving of the minibus?

MR LOTZ: Not according to what I can remember.

ADV LAMEY: And from there this person, or a certain white man, unknown to them, drove the bus to Post Chalmers.

MR LOTZ: I was not present.

ADV LAMEY: They will also say that the Pebco 3 were blindfolded at one stage and also handcuffed while on the way to Post Chalmers?

MR LOTZ: I was not present.

ADV LAMEY: Do you know who drove the minibus from the airport to Post Chalmers?

MR LOTZ: No, I do not know.

ADV LAMEY: At one stage as far as they can remember, they arrived at a road blockade?

MR LOTZ: I have no knowledge of this, I never passed through a blockade that evening.

ADV LAMEY: And they will testify further that on their arrival at Post Chalmers, the interrogation was started and the first person who was interrogated was Mr Hashe. MR LOTZ: I am not sure who was interrogated at that stage. I don't know whether he is referring to the time when we had arrived or prior to this. I am not sure.

ADV LAMEY: The persons arrived at Post Chalmers being blindfolded and handcuffed.

MR LOTZ: I was not aware of this.

ADV LAMEY: Mr Hashe was also assaulted.

MR LOTZ: Not in my presence.

ADV LAMEY: After the interrogation of Mr Hashe, one of the other persons were also interrogated.

MR LOTZ: That can be true.

ADV LAMEY: They say that this interrogation did not take very long, and then they went to sleep.

MR LOTZ: That can be.

ADV LAMEY: I am referring to the interrogation of Mr Hashe and this other person. Mr Mogoai says this other person was Mr Godolozi.

MR LOTZ: That could be.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, could my learned friend just clarify one thing. He said then they went to sleep. Who is the they? Is that everybody involved in the questioning or just the askaris or the men from Vlakplaas, if my learned friend wouldn't mind clearing that up, it is not exactly clear.

ADV LAMEY: They were referring to Mr Mogoai and Koole, the askaris.

ADV BOOYENS: I am indebted to my learned friend.

ADV LAMEY: They will testify further that they were not given instructions to guard the Pebco 3. They went to sleep in their minibus and it was not parked directly in front of the garage, so that the people inside could not get out of the garage.

MR LOTZ: As far as I know, the minibus was parked in front of the garage for the specific purpose of guarding these people.

ADV LAMEY: At one stage with your arrival, it was said that one of the persons had to be taken to a cell. Do you have any knowledge of any cells at Post Chalmers?

MR LOTZ: There were cells but nobody was detained in the cells, I am sure of that.

ADV LAMEY: Regardless of the fact that you weren't there all the time?

MR LOTZ: Then I would say that while I was there, nobody was kept in any cell.

ADV LAMEY: Do you know that Hashe was interrogated about an AK47?

MR LOTZ: There was something said about an AK47, but I don't have knowledge about the details.

ADV LAMEY: Was this done in your presence or is it just what you heard?

MR LOTZ: It was not done in my presence, it was something I must have heard.

ADV LAMEY: While you were present there, do you know whether they were interrogated about terrorists, weapons and the Pebco structure?

MR LOTZ: As I said, Lieutenant Nieuwoudt spoke to them most of the time and it was mostly in Xhosa which I could not understand and that is why I withdrew.

ADV LAMEY: Their version is that according to Koole who knew Nieuwoudt, Mr Mogoai does not know who the person was, but there was one of the PE members who was in control of the interrogation and Koole said that it was Nieuwoudt and that he interrogated the people in Xhosa, but it did not only take place in Xhosa.

MR LOTZ: That is possible.

ADV LAMEY: Their testimony will be that the interrogation was continued the next day, once again with Hashe, the next morning.

MR LOTZ: That is possible.

ADV LAMEY: The next morning Hashe said that he was beaten and kicked.

MR LOTZ: Not in my presence.

ADV LAMEY: At one stage he lost consciousness?

MR LOTZ: No, I have no knowledge of this. This did not happen while I was there.

ADV LAMEY: And then he was brought around by throwing water on his face?

MR LOTZ: I have no knowledge of this.

ADV LAMEY: It is said that Hashe was assaulted in such a manner that his face was swollen and that his mouth and nose were covered in blood.

MR LOTZ: I did not see this, not while I was there.

ADV LAMEY: Godolozi was also interrogated that morning.

MR LOTZ: That is possible.

ADV LAMEY: And at one stage a wet bag was tied over his head, do you have any knowledge of that?

MR LOTZ: No. This did not happen while I was there.

CHAIRPERSON: When you were asked that Hashe was interrogated that morning, you said that it was possible. And again when you were asked, when it was put to you that Godolozi was also interrogated in the morning, you said that is possible, but what is your personal recollection?

MR LOTZ: The previous evening and the next day Captain Nieuwoudt did speak to the people. Whether they were together or separate, that is what I am trying to say, he did speak to them.

CHAIRPERSON: What do you mean speak to them?

MR LOTZ: He questioned them, interrogated them in that light.

CHAIRPERSON: But isn't that precisely what Mr Lamey is asking? He is asking you whether it is so that in the morning both Hashe and Godolozi were interrogated?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: So they were interrogated by Mr Nieuwoudt?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Then you shouldn't say it is possible, you should say yes, that is what happened.

MR LOTZ: Yes, Your Honour.

ADV LAMEY: Their testimony will also be that these people were very defiant during the interrogation. I am using my own term now, but the effect was that they were actually defiant and did not give any cooperation? Their testimony will be that one of them said that he would rather die than to cooperate in the interrogation?

MR LOTZ: Those people sat there, and were talking to one another, they were quite at ease. I cannot see that they were defiant. Lieutenant Nieuwoudt spoke to them, and they seemed one hundred percent normal.

ADV LAMEY: You said that you heard about an AK47?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

ADV LAMEY: You did not know how that information was gained?

MR LOTZ: No.

ADV LAMEY: They will go further to say that at one stage Godolozi, Mr Mogoai says that Godolozi was then after the bag was placed over his head, he was taken back to the garage.

MR LOTZ: No, that is not true.

ADV LAMEY: Where Captain Venter requested the bag to be removed?

MR LOTZ: No.

ADV LAMEY: You have no knowledge of that?

MR LOTZ: No.

ADV LAMEY: At one stage the garage door was closed, that is while Captain Venter and Beeslaar and the askaris were outside and they just heard the men screaming inside?

MR LOTZ: I heard nothing to that effect.

ADV LAMEY: Mr Mogoai will say that Galela was screaming continually from one of the cells while he was handcuffed?

MR LOTZ: No.

ADV LAMEY: And then they will also say that late that afternoon, early evening, this barbecue took place?

MR LOTZ: No, that is not true.

ADV LAMEY: Regarding the matter of the barbecue, are you saying this no with certainty?

MR LOTZ: Yes.

ADV LAMEY: Even in view of Mr Beeslaar's evidence or testimony that a braai was held that evening?

MR LOTZ: The braai or barbecue took place that morning.

ADV DE JAGER: You have put it to him that they were locked up in the garage and that screaming could be heard from the garage. Were they all three locked up in the garage or what was the position?

ADV LAMEY: Mr Chairman, I am referring to the version as on page 36 of Mr Mogoai. Just let me find the place and I will tell you exactly what the version is.

It seems as though it was only one person, Mr Godolozi. Only one man who was screaming loudly from inside the garage.

Mr Mogoai also says and - I can just put this to you that Warrant Officer Beeslaar stood next to him and Mr Mogoai at one stage and said that the people of Port Elizabeth could not deal with the situation very well, but that was their problem.

MR LOTZ: I have no knowledge of this.

ADV LAMEY: Their version will also be that they spent a second night in their minibus and that the next morning, they were told by Captain Venter to return to Glenconnor railway station.

MR LOTZ: They only spent one night there.

ADV LAMEY: In this regard I just would like to say to you that Captain Venter's testimony ...

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Lamey, according to your clients, when did Venter and Beeslaar arrive there?

ADV LAMEY: According to my clients Captain Venter and Warrant Officer Beeslaar were there the whole time. With the arrival there and the whole time after that, and after their departure from the old police station the next day, the askaris left first. They were told to leave by Captain Venter and Captain Venter only reached Glenconnor much later.

If you will just allow me a moment to find the passage.

ADV DE JAGER: Can you just assist us. You say that Venter and Beeslaar were there the whole time. If you refer to the whole time, are you saying that they went together from the airport to Post Chalmers on the first evening? Did they drive down in the same vehicle as your people or did they use another vehicle but did they arrive at Post Chalmers at the same time as your clients did?

ADV LAMEY: From the moment of arrival at Post Chalmers Captain Venter and Beeslaar were there, but they did not drive down to Post Chalmers with them in the minibus.

Captain Venter's version regarding the departure of themselves and the askaris is not exactly the same version as my two applicants, but he says the following. I am referring to page 191, that is on page 5 on the paginated bundle where Captain Venter said - I am reading between lines 20 and 30 in the middle - do you have it in front of you?

MR LOTZ: Page 191?

ADV LAMEY: Yes, 191 of the original number of the transcription. Do you have it?

MR LOTZ: Yes.

ADV LAMEY: It is between lines 20 and 30 and it is put in the context of the stage when Venter and Beeslaar were at the old police station. Later that evening I went along with Beeslaar back to Glenconnor and the Vlakplaas askaris joined us that evening or the next morning at Glenconnor. I want to put it to you that as I can understand the context of Captain Venter's testimony, they are talking about the second evening, not the first evening, but the second and that he is saying that that was when they left for Glenconnor but the askaris went to Glenconnor either that evening or the next morning.

MR LOTZ: I see this, but this is not how it happened.

ADV LAMEY: The nett effect of both versions is that they and the askaris were still present there the second evening?

MR LOTZ: No, Captain Van Zyl, Nieuwoudt and I were there the second evening on our own.

ADV LAMEY: I just want to refer you, you said that they left at about twelve o'clock after the braai that morning, is that correct, the askaris?

MR LOTZ: Yes, that is correct, together with Captain Venter.

ADV LAMEY: Lieutenant Nieuwoudt says at page 130, paragraph 20, on the 9th of May 1985, at approximately ten o'clock Captain Venter and the askaris left the police station. Only Captain Van Zyl, Sergeant Lotz and I remained behind and continued with the interrogation.

At approximately twelve o'clock all the persons were present in the lounge together with Captain Van Zyl, Sergeant Lotz and I. You see between the period of ten o'clock that morning and twelve o'clock, you are being involved in the interrogation according to Lieutenant Nieuwoudt, while you say that you went to buy food.

MR LOTZ: I said that I started with the barbecue at ten o'clock that morning, making the fire etc. I went to Cradock prior to this.

ADV LAMEY: What I want to put to you further is that Lieutenant Niewoud says that at ten o'clock the next morning, Captain Venter and the askaris had already left.

MR LOTZ: As far as I know, after we had had the barbecue, they departed.

ADV LAMEY: But the barbecue could surely not have taken place as early as ten o'clock that morning?

MR LOTZ: No, it was afterwards, after we braaied the meat, that is why I said they left between eleven and twelve.

ADV LAMEY: Unless of course as the askaris says that they left the next morning, that they actually slept there for two evenings and they left the second morning?

MR LOTZ: No, they left on the 9th and not on the 10th.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Lotz, the first evening when you arrived, did you have anything to eat?

MR LOTZ: No, it was very late.

ADV DE JAGER: The next morning, did you have an early breakfast or not?

MR LOTZ: No, I then left for Cradock where I went to buy food and thereafter we had a barbecue.

ADV DE JAGER: So you ate the morning - Mr Lamey it is not clear to me, if the testimony is that the braaivleis was held that evening, was there any food eaten before that time?

ADV LAMEY: I can just put it to you that the version of the two applicants is that after their arrival at the predetermined point, on the evening that the Pebco 3 were taken from the airport and before their departure to the airport, Captain Venter told them that they had to go and buy themselves something to eat.

Therefore before the episode at the airport, the two applicants had already had something to eat. I did take instructions regarding the next morning. What they can recall is not exactly precise, but the impression is that something was eaten that following morning in the line of bread, but the braaivleis only took place later that afternoon and there they had something more substantive to eat.

They had tea and bread that morning, that is what they themselves had to eat. Do you have any further comments?

MR LOTZ: No, that is not true.

ADV LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nyoka?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV NYOKA: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Lotz, I will not be long with you because basically you don't recall many things or those that you recall are very, very few or if things happened, they happened in your absence.

Is it correct that you were one of the juniors in this operation?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: At 24 years old?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Is it correct that at all material times before, during and after this operation, you regarded Mr Van Zyl, Mr Du Plessis and Mr Snyman as your seniors?

MR LOTZ: That is correct, yes.

ADV NYOKA: And that you had to obey their commands at all times?

MR LOTZ: Correct, yes.

ADV NYOKA: When there was this gathering of former Securocrats, that is former Security Policemen to discuss this common stance and strategy about the TRC process, were you part of that gathering?

MR LOTZ: May I ask to which meeting are you referring specifically?

ADV NYOKA: We heard evidence from Mr Van Zyl that the people affected met to discuss whether they should accept the process or not before they applied, I am talking about that?

MR LOTZ: Is that the occasion in Pretoria?

ADV NYOKA: Yes.

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: I mean informal gatherings, not formal just informal gatherings?

MR LOTZ: I was present on one occasion in Pretoria.

ADV NYOKA: And you were still a junior in those gatherings not so?

MR LOTZ: Yes, you could put it that way.

ADV NYOKA: Can I conclude that your input, you did not put much - you didn't have much input in that gathering?

MR LOTZ: No, we basically said nothing, I think the former Commissioner and the Advocates and so on, they did most of the talking at that meeting.

ADV NYOKA: Did you apply for amnesty before others did so or jointly with them?

MR LOTZ: We had started discussing it with my legal representatives, Mr Francois van der Merwe after the Motherwell case. That is when we started discussing the matter.

ADV NYOKA: You applied because of the joint decision that people must apply for amnesty, not so?

MR LOTZ: I wouldn't say that. There were rumours that quite a lot of people would apply for amnesty and that some had already applied. And at that stage I hadn't been implicated by anybody and I discussed the matter with my legal representative and he then suggested that I should apply.

ADV NYOKA: Last month you applied for amnesty regarding the Motherwell bombing, here in (indistinct)

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: And you did so despite the fact that you were acquitted of murder here?

MR LOTZ: Yes, correct.

ADV NYOKA: You will agree with me that you were not under any obligation to apply because you had nothing to lose because you were acquitted, but you applied because of the joint decision to apply made by your seniors, not so?

MR LOTZ: I discussed the matter with my legal representative. He said that it would be a good idea to place a full picture before this Commission and therefore I should apply and that I should also testify as to my silence after the incident, and that could have made me part of the group of accused or implicated persons.

ADV NYOKA: I put it to you that you applied because your seniors applied. I put it to you that you had nothing to lose, you were acquitted?

MR LOTZ: That may be so, but my legal representative said I should apply so that a full picture could be placed before the Commission.

ADV NYOKA: And I further put it to you that your presence yesterday and today was determined by your seniors and what you said here yesterday and today, was predetermined by your seniors?

MR LOTZ: No. My name had not been mentioned by anybody during this incident. I discussed this matter with my Advocate and he told me to apply and that is what I did.

ADV NYOKA: Okay. Let's leave that for now. You said in your evidence in chief, you did not know the three Pebco persons when you were told by Mr Van Zyl to be part of this team, not so, you did not know them. All that you knew was that they were Pebco executive members, is that so?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: And that you were not shown any photographs?

MR LOTZ: I saw their photographs in the files that we had in the offices, but that was long before this episode.

ADV NYOKA: But you did not remember them at the time you were told to be part of this team, not so?

MR LOTZ: I am not sure, no, I am not hundred percent sure.

ADV NYOKA: At the airport, on the way and at Cradock, you did not hear their names being called like Mr Godolozi, Mr Hashe, Mr Galela, you did not hear the names being called, not so?

MR LOTZ: Please repeat the question.

ADV NYOKA: From the time that you saw them appearing at the airport, on the way to Cradock and at Cradock, you never heard these people being called by their names like Mr Godolozi, Mr Hashe, Mr Galela, in other words there were no need for them to have been called? Let me put it this way, did you hear their names being called?

MR LOTZ: Yes, whilst I was sitting with Mr Nieuwoudt, he would have spoken to the people and he would have called them by their names. I don't think he would not have used their names.

ADV NYOKA: No.

MR LOTZ: So I would have heard their names whilst Lieutenant Nieuwoudt was speaking to them.

ADV NYOKA: No, I am not talking about your assumption, I am talking about a certainty. Did you as a fact hear their names being called? Don't say he did not do so, but did you hear their names being called?

MR LOTZ: If Lieutenant Nieuwoudt spoke to them, then I would have heard their names being mentioned.

ADV NYOKA: You are not answering my question.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, it comes down to what I told you earlier on. Tell us about your recollection. What do you remember, do you remember hearing their names being called or not?

MR LOTZ: I heard their names, yes.

ADV DE JAGER: Now your answer is you would have heard their names. Now either you heard their names or you didn't or you can't remember whether you heard their names. But if you say that you would have heard their names, then we still don't know whether you actually heard it or not. Or whether you heard it and forgot it.

MR LOTZ: I can't remember whether I heard their names.

ADV NYOKA: Because in your written statement there is no mention of the names of the three Pebco leaders, there is no mention whatsoever. I am not trying to be unfair to you, but you must agree with me that you did not hear the names even if they may have been called?

MR LOTZ: That is correct, we referred to them as the Pebco 3.

ADV NYOKA: And is it further correct that you may have seen them for a very brief periods during the entire episode because you were busy doing this and that, going for errands etc, not so?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: And after the incident, it was only that first time that you saw them, you may have remembered them shortly after the incident and during this 12 year period?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: And if one of my clients, Mrs Monica Godolozi the wife of Mr Godolozi said to me that she went about 1986 to the Alexandra police station and met policemen (indistinct), who said that they were removed by December 1995 to Louis Le Grange Square, you will never dispute that because (a) you never saw those people for a long time, (b) their names were never called, (c) you never saw them as such during the incident, so you will not know who Mr Godolozi, Mr Hashe and Mr Galela are, not so?

MR LOTZ: Those three, known as the Pebco 3, had been taken by us from the airport to that place where they were eliminated. They were not taken away from Post Chalmers.

ADV NYOKA: No, they have got their names, not the Pebco 3, they have got their names.

MR LOTZ: Mr Galela, Mr Hashe and Mr Godolozi.

ADV NYOKA: Now you know them, but you did not know them then.

MR LOTZ: I had knowledge of them, yes.

ADV NYOKA: I wish to put it so ridiculous to the following fact that it could have been other people who were there and as Mr Nieuwoudt was speaking Xhosa you could not understand, he could not even have been speaking about the end plan or politics because you didn't understand what was being said. So it could have been any Tom, Dick and Harry not so?

MR LOTZ: No, he would have known that it was those three people. I am sure he wouldn't have misled me as to the identify of these people.

ADV NYOKA: I am not talking about trust, I am talking about certainty.

In reply to Mr Lamey's question yesterday as to why you only recalled certain things, when giving oral evidence than when you made the written statement, you said it was because you only recalled certain things yesterday. Is it not correct that you applied for amnesty in December 1996?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: And I noted that your written statement was made and signed under oath on the 5th of May 1996, not so?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Is it not correct that before you applied in 1996, during the time the TRC process started in 1995 to December 1996, you had time now to think about the events from the beginning to the end, you had time to think about this event, not so?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: And that between December 1996 when you applied, to May 1997, when you wrote your statement, you must also have very, very, very much applied your mind to what you had to say, not so?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: And now involving in extensive consultation with your legal representatives, between May and November before you testified, you must also have applied your mind about this?

MR LOTZ: That is correct, yes.

ADV NYOKA: What I find strange I calculate roughly a period of 11 months, what I find strange is why it will take one hour for you to remember certain things when you had more than 11 months to think about that?

MR LOTZ: Whilst I am sitting here, lots of things cropped up which refreshed my memory which did not arise during consultations.

ADV NYOKA: So you were more stimulated here than when you were with your legal representative?

MR LOTZ: I won't say that, but a lot of things came out here which did in fact refresh my memory.

ADV NYOKA: Are you not anxious at the fact that here are the victims' families and the other people watching, surely you must be anxious and not remember certain things, than to remember that in the coolness of the office of your legal representative?

MR LOTZ: I wouldn't say that.

ADV NYOKA: I will expect you to remember things within the four walls of a cool atmosphere of your lawyer, than in a hall like this. Not so?

MR LOTZ: No, I wouldn't say that.

ADV NYOKA: Is there anything that you recall today, than yesterday, that you can share with us, maybe the latest that you can share with us that you have since recalled, I don't want to leave any stone unturned?

MR LOTZ: No, there is nothing further.

ADV NYOKA: Is there anything that you were sure of yesterday, that you are not sure of today perhaps?

MR LOTZ: No, not as far as I am aware.

ADV NYOKA: Mr Lamey's lines were not there, they were there, they said there was a braai and there were some drinks. You said that could not have happened.

Some people were braaiing and having drinks, but you did not see those events, the braaiing and drinking, you only mentioned the morning session. They said there were some drinks passed around and a braai being held.

MR LOTZ: Not in my presence.

ADV NYOKA: Is it possible that the braai could have happened while you were doing your errands?

MR LOTZ: No, a braai usually takes quite a length of time.

ADV NYOKA: I seem to think that perhaps some people wanted to braai meat and exclude you as soon as you appeared, they stopped the braai or they had drinks and exclude you as soon as you appeared, because I don't understand why you were excluded? You did not even smell the nice air of braaied meat? Can you comment?

MR LOTZ: No comment.

ADV NYOKA: And when you left, and when the Pebco leaders left the airport to Cradock, you were not in the same car, not so, you had gone with Mr Nieuwoudt to burn the car?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: So you are not able to dispute the fact that they were blindfolded when they left the airport, because you were not in that car?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: So it is possible that they were blindfolded and handcuffed?

MR LOTZ: That is possible.

ADV NYOKA: Thank you for that concession. And you said you did not hear anything being mentioned about the AK47?

MR LOTZ: I think Nieuwoudt or Captain Van Zyl heard it, but I didn't hear it directly from them.

ADV NYOKA: You do not recall many incidents of that day. I understand it was 12 years ago, not so?

MR LOTZ: Yes, that is correct.

ADV NYOKA: But what I find strange you were positive in your written statement and in your oral statement that the day was the 8th of May 1985. How could you have remembered the day, it is one of the things that you could have forgotten?

I know it is common cause now, but it is one of the things that you could have forgotten, the day? Can you tell us how did you remember that well?

MR LOTZ: That will be as a result of the consultations which we had.

ADV NYOKA: Why then did you not say in your statement I do not recall, but it might have been on the 8th of May as you have done before?

MR LOTZ: Perhaps I could have put it like that.

ADV NYOKA: All right. And you said that the three leaders were given coffee in which a sleeping mixture was put, but you cannot remember if you also gave them coffee. How exactly gave them coffee?

MR LOTZ: I am not sure.

ADV NYOKA: Did you see the sleeping mixture being put into this coffee?

MR LOTZ: As I said, I seem to recall that it was Nieuwoudt or Van Zyl who put it in the coffee.

ADV NYOKA: No, did you see it being put, I am not saying who put it, did you see it being put into the coffee?

MR LOTZ: I can't recall.

ADV NYOKA: So it is possible that you never saw the sleeping mixture?

MR LOTZ: That is possible.

ADV NYOKA: Did you participate in this coffee drinking?

MR LOTZ: I didn't drink any of the coffee myself.

ADV NYOKA: So you did not drink the coffee yourself and you did not supply them with coffee, how do you know that it was coffee, not tea or water?

MR LOTZ: I was present there.

ADV NYOKA: No, did you smell coffee in other words? Because you did not partake of coffee and you did not give them coffee, did you smell that was coffee?

MR LOTZ: One can see when somebody is busy making coffee, you can actually see that it is coffee.

ADV NYOKA: But coffee and tea, there is no difference, as soon as you put milk?

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, there is a difference.

ADV NYOKA: Maybe Your Worship, I don't drink coffee, I just see coffee. My wife drinks coffee, I drink tea.

CHAIRPERSON: No, there is a big difference.

ADV NYOKA: I put it to you that you are mentioning the coffee part because it is one of the things that were agreed upon that you must make this simple, abduction, airport, Cradock, coffee, sleeping mixture, shooting and burning, that is why you mention the coffee, that is why you are mentioning the issue of the coffee. Any comment?

MR LOTZ: No comment.

ADV NYOKA: Do you agree or don't you agree or do you prefer not to comment?

MR LOTZ: Not to comment.

ADV NYOKA: All right, who produced the tablets that were put into the coffee?

MR LOTZ: As I said it was either Captain Van Zyl or Lieutenant Nieuwoudt, it must have been one of those two, it wasn't me.

ADV NYOKA: Because according to my notes, it may not be accurate. Yesterday you said it was Nieuwoudt.

MR LOTZ: It was Captain Van Zyl or Lieutenant Nieuwoudt.

ADV NYOKA: I am not sure whether I have asked you who put the tablet into the coffee. Assuming that is the question I have asked you, I should now ask you who produced the tablets?

MR LOTZ: Captain Van Zyl or Lieutenant Nieuwoudt had this sleeping powder.

ADV NYOKA: So is it an assumption that a sleeping tablet was used, because you are not sure of it, is it an assumption or did it arise out of consultations?

MR LOTZ: I am not hundred percent certain, it could have cropped up during the consultations. But it was also said that that would be the way in which that would be done at Cradock.

ADV NYOKA: So after they fell asleep, were you not curious to find out hey Mr Nieuwoudt, Mr Van Zyl, how did you manage to make this three asleep, because you were still asleep?

MR LOTZ: That is what I am saying, that was the plan to actually put them so sleep beforehand.

ADV NYOKA: But you did not ask how they were caused to be asleep? You did not ask that?

MR LOTZ: No, because we discussed that beforehand. The plan would have been to put a sleeping draft in their coffee, to put them to sleep.

ADV NYOKA: When was that made now, because what I know is that you were asked to be involved in the abduction and elimination, you are going to go to Cradock. You never said details were discussed with you.

MR LOTZ: Mr Van Zyl would have discussed it with me.

ADV NYOKA: He would have, but you are not sure?

MR LOTZ: No, I am not a hundred percent certain.

ADV SANDI: I am sorry, Mr Nyoka, if I can interpose there for a moment. Are you saying Mr Van Zyl discussed the question of putting this substance in the coffee to make them sleep?

MR LOTZ: It could be yes, I stand to be corrected, I can't remember exactly.

ADV SANDI: I have not verified it in my notes, but as far as I can remember I think Mr Van Zyl said there was no specific discussion pertaining to that issue, this is something he just came up with on his own.

MR LOTZ: Well, then I can't remember, I am not sure.

ADV SANDI: You are not sure that there was a discussion about this tablet?

MR LOTZ: I am not sure, I can't remember.

ADV SANDI: I find it quite interesting Mr Lotz, that generally you are never sure about anything. I thought you just said here there was a plan to put this tablet into the coffee, to make the gentlemen sleep?

MR LOTZ: What I am trying to explain was that when Captain Van Zyl approached me originally, he told me what the plan was to have been. Not the finer detail, but basic framework of the abduction and the elimination.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, the testimony was about a substance, a sleeping substance in a wile. That was the testimony we heard yesterday and the day before, I don't think there was ever a testimony about tablets.

CHAIRPERSON: Does it affect the substance of the question?

ADV BOOYENS: It might be misleading to him.

CHAIRPERSON: We appreciate your correction, but I don't think it affects the substance of the question sir.

ADV SANDI: Carry on, Mr Nyoka.

ADV NYOKA: Do you know the time when you started setting the wood alight for the fire?

MR LOTZ: Which fire are you talking about now?

ADV NYOKA: For the burning of the people?

MR LOTZ: It was dusk, I can't recall the exact time.

ADV NYOKA: And the time when the bodies actually burnt to ashes, do you know?

MR LOTZ: It took approximately six hours. It could have been longer or maybe shorter.

ADV NYOKA: You see, I've got a problem. In all the applications of a similar nature, six hours is the magical hour. Yet, you do not know when this thing happened, but you can remember it was about six hours?

MR LOTZ: Approximately, I may be wrong. But I told my legal representative it was six to eight hours.

ADV NYOKA: What I am saying is that not one of you mentions like seven or eight hours, always six hours, six hours. I put it to you that was discussed that it was six hours. Any comment?

MR LOTZ: I discussed it with my legal representative.

ADV NYOKA: On your own or with others?

MR LOTZ: On my own.

ADV NYOKA: It is coincidental that everyone says six hours, even in other applications, it is a strange coincidence, would you agree with me?

MR LOTZ: Then that must be the way it actually happened.

ADV NYOKA: I put it to you that is not the way it happened. Any comment?

MR LOTZ: That is how it indeed happened.

CHAIRPERSON: How did it happen Mr Nyoka?

ADV NYOKA: Your Worship the Pebco leaders, Mr Godolozi, Hashe and Galela were abducted from the airport and they were taken ...

CHAIRPERSON: No, I was taken about the six hours. I thought the six hours was relative to the burning of the bodies?

ADV NYOKA: Well, we wish to say Your Worship, that that didn't happen like that that day or night.

CHAIRPERSON: The burning of the bodies?

ADV NYOKA: Yes, yes, because they were still alive, according to my instructions ...

CHAIRPERSON: No, never mind when it happened, at some point they were burnt, but you see I am trying to say that you give us the impression that you have a different version as to how the actual burning took place?

ADV NYOKA: No, it is a totally (indistinct) Your Worship.

CHAIRPERSON: I see, but it was put in a way that could have confused.

ADV NYOKA: Oh, sorry, for misleading you. I put it to you that the only things that you claim to remember are the things said by the other applicants, and the key things like the airport, abduction at the airport, going to Cradock, braaiing, sleeping, putting of a sleeping mixture, elimination or shooting and the burning to keep the story very simple and straight forward.

MR LOTZ: It is actually not, it wasn't simple and straight forward from my point of view.

ADV NYOKA: I refer to it as the KISS principle, keep it straight and simple?

MR LOTZ: That was not my view.

ADV NYOKA: You had your whole future, a wonderful future in front of you at 24, why did you not say please Mr Van Zyl, excuse me, I wouldn't like to be involved in this, or asked to be transferred to another police department? Because you didn't even know the man, you were not involved in the facts of what was happening in the township, why did you not do so Mr Lotz.

MR LOTZ: I did it because I associated myself with the fact and I believed that which we were about to do, would be the right thing in those circumstances. That is why I didn't try to make excuses or try to get out of it.

ADV NYOKA: How long did it take for you to reach the decision to be involved because I notice that you were approached on that day in the morning, on the 8th of May? Did you have time to reflect on this, and this impact on your future life?

MR LOTZ: I don't think I had all the time in the world to reflect on the consequences, I took the decision and I went through with it.

ADV NYOKA: And I take it you did not have the time to even ponder about any other alternative, lawful options that could have been taken but your emphasis was on obeying orders from your seniors, not so?

MR LOTZ: That is correct, and I also associated myself with the order.

ADV NYOKA: I like the way you are going ahead, Mr Lotz, you are very much in agreement, I like it.

When you burnt the vehicle, did you tell the Investigating Unit of the TRC, did you show them the spot where you burnt it?

MR LOTZ: No.

ADV NYOKA: Why was that not done, because in other instances the applicants will go to Cradock and show them the Post Chalmers, why was it that it was not shown if at all, this incident happened as it did?

MR LOTZ: They did not ask me to do that.

ADV NYOKA: Did you not venture to do so?

MR LOTZ: If they had asked me, I would have done it.

ADV NYOKA: Okay, fair, fair. Did you ask Mr Nieuwoudt why were you going to this place as KwaZakhele?

MR LOTZ: No.

ADV NYOKA: Were you not curious or were you not under the impression that he may have done something similar before?

MR LOTZ: No.

ADV NYOKA: So you were curious, no one saw you when you were burning the car?

MR LOTZ: No, not as far as I can recall.

ADV NYOKA: Not as far as you can recall? I am sure you were not see, otherwise you would have told us that you were seen? That will be something prominent in your mind?

MR LOTZ: Yes, I believe so. But as far as I can recall, nobody saw us.

ADV NYOKA: Mr Lotz, last night, I noticed when I read your introductory statement background, that you were born on the 25th of December, on Christmas day and I told myself, this must be a lucky man.

MR LOTZ: No, not quite so lucky.

ADV NYOKA: No, I am going to ask you to please now, and you know there are things that you don't recall, that are stated as facts by other people who were there like the assault, I am going to ask you now in the name of the person on whose date you are born, in the name of Christ, to admit that it is possible that the assaults could have happened whilst you were doing other errands? I am asking you in the name of Christ now, are you prepared to concede that?

MR LOTZ: It is not necessary to put it to me in those terms, nobody was assaulted in my presence. There were no marks, no sounds of an assault, no blood or foam or anything like that, not in my presence.

ADV NYOKA: It is possible that they were assaulted whilst you were away, maybe perhaps because as a junior they didn't want you to witness this, not so?

MR LOTZ: The only way I can put it is like this, if those people had been assaulted, or if I had participated in the assault as they allege, then I would have applied for amnesty for that as well. I applied for amnesty for murder and I don't think in that perspective assault is as important or as serious. I didn't apply for amnesty for that, because it did not happen.

ADV NYOKA: No, the reason why the assault is omitted, is obvious. The killing must be seen to be humane, we dealt nicely with them, we took them, slept with them, ate with them, supplied sleeping mixture and ensured they did not know what happened to them?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: What is correct?

MR LOTZ: That we did it in that way?

ADV NYOKA: Humane? I am saying that the intention was to make the story, the concocted story humane. Don't agree with me if you don't understand.

MR LOTZ: No, it is not a fabrication.

ADV NYOKA: It is strange to me that people who were there will say that the three Pebco leaders were assaulted, yet you deny that and they had nothing to lose about that, except that they were involved in the abduction, because they were not involved in the major crime which is murder? Is that not strange to you?

MR LOTZ: I don't know what their motives are in saying that. That is not the way it happened.

ADV NYOKA: Do we have any reason to believe that they have got anything against the applicants that they are incriminating the assault, did they have anything against them?

MR LOTZ: I don't know what their motives are for saying so.

ADV NYOKA: Then it could be strange if there is not even a motive, that motive for them to just falsely accuse you of assaulting.

MR LOTZ: None of those people knew my name, so they didn't tell me that I assaulted those people.

ADV NYOKA: Finally, were you given the gun to shoot or did you venture and asked to shoot?

MR LOTZ: The weapon was given to me.

ADV NYOKA: So if it was not given, you would not have shot?

MR LOTZ: No, I am sure then I would have taken the weapon and shot.

ADV NYOKA: No, all right, you see again, it is in agreement, as a junior you were told to do something and you obeyed, by doing it. Not so?

MR LOTZ: Right from the outset I agreed and associated myself with the entire operation and I was part and took part in the elimination. I don't think it was an order, now it is your turn to shoot, I don't think that is the way one could put it.

ADV NYOKA: What did you hope to achieve by each of you firing a shot with the same weapon instead of one person firing, shooting all three?

MR LOTZ: I don't think there was a specific reason for that.

ADV NYOKA: Was it not perhaps because it was like a game, a shooting game, shoot your own person?

MR LOTZ: It was most definitely not a game.

ADV NYOKA: No further questions, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV NYOKA.

CHAIRPERSON: Another possibility could have been that because it was the three of you, only the three of you, each one had to shoot to make sure that you would all cooperate in a cover up?

MR LOTZ: It is a possibility, I did not think about it in those terms.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Hartle?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS HARTLE: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Lotz, if I can refer you to page 10 of your submissions.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, if I could inconvenience you, maybe we should just take the adjournment now until eleven o'clock.

MR LOTZ: I thought so.

CHAIRPERSON: We will adjourn until eleven o'clock.

ON RESUMPTION:

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Hartle?

GERHARDUS JOHANNES LOTZ: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS HARTLE: (cont)

Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Lotz, I refer to page 10 of your submissions and in particular your response to the question posed at 11(b). Now I may be mistaken, but you did not apply to amend your submissions in respect of who you took your instruction from, is that correct?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: Sorry, am I to believe that you did not or you did apply to amend?

MR LOTZ: No, I did not, no.

ADV VAN DER MERWE: No, it was always the case of Mr Snyman that the initial order emanated from Colonel Snyman.

MS HARTLE: You took your instruction from Van Zyl, is that correct?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: Did you question Van Zyl as to who gave him the instruction?

MR LOTZ: No.

MS HARTLE: Is it correct to say then that you took your instruction and this forms the basis for your motivation in this application, that you took your instruction from Colonel Snyman?

MR LOTZ: The way I could say it is that I drafted this document with the assistance of my legal representative, they had a broader background of the whole incident and that is how Colonel Snyman's name cropped up there.

MS HARTLE: But you heard the evidence of Messrs Du Plessis and Mr Van Zyl, there was a lot of surmising going on about the authority to eliminate the Pebco 3?

MR LOTZ: That is correct, yes.

MS HARTLE: And do you agree that they may have been mistaken in the authority that they had to carry out the operation?

MR LOTZ: I can't speculate about that.

MS HARTLE: Is it so then that you merely placed your alliance on what was informed to you by Van Zyl?

MR LOTZ: Yes, that is correct.

MS HARTLE: You didn't question at all?

MR LOTZ: No.

MS HARTLE: In your application I note that you say that you were married in 1984 and that both your wife and your father-in-law were members of the South African Police Force?

MR LOTZ: That is correct, yes.

MS HARTLE: Are they still members?

MR LOTZ: My wife still is, yes.

MS HARTLE: Were either of them connected or involved in the Security Branch?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: At the time?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: Who is your father-in-law?

MR LOTZ: General Nick van Rensburg.

MS HARTLE: How many amnesty applications are before this Commission in your own name?

MR LOTZ: Three.

MS HARTLE: Which are those incidents, the other incidents?

MR LOTZ: The Motherwell incident, and the Goniwe incident.

MS HARTLE: Now at the time, you were selected for this operation, you were a very tender age, you were a mere babe in the woods? I put it to you that you were perhaps not selected for your experience as such, can you tell us why you were chosen?

MR LOTZ: I don't know, Captain Van Zyl obviously must have had some faith in me that I would comply with the instructions.

MS HARTLE: What was the extent of your experience at that time?

MR LOTZ: Perhaps I can turn to my application, to have regard to the dates.

MS HARTLE: Mr Lotz, I just want to know from you what experience you felt justified the election of you to perform that operation?

MR LOTZ: That is what I am trying to answer. In 1979 I joined the Police Force at the end of that year, I did border duty in Ovamboland for the first time and thereafter in 1981 and 1982 I once again did a stint of border duty with Koevoet and in 1984 I once again performed border duty and the experience which I gained there, could possibly have been the reason why I was selected.

I also did the VIP protection course and other courses.

MS HARTLE: Could it have been your involvement by virtue of your family connections?

MR LOTZ: No. I can't say that.

ADV SANDI: I am sorry Ms Hartle, is your question to the witness not what sort of expertise or skill was required for such a person to be involved in this?

MS HARTLE: I was getting there Mr Chairman in order to clarity that.

You understand the basis for my question Mr Lotz, why would they take you a babe in the woods, one who had six years in the service to perform such a vital operation?

MR LOTZ: I think Captain Van Zyl had faith in me that I would carry out the operation.

MS HARTLE: And on what would he have based that confidence?

MR LOTZ: He knew me.

MS HARTLE: How did he know you?

MR LOTZ: I have known him since the Koevoet days in 1981.

MS HARTLE: Prior to this operation, had you ever killed a human being?

MR LOTZ: It is difficult to say, in Ovamboland I was involved in contact in which people were killed.

MS HARTLE: Mr Lotz, will you please just answer the question.

MR LOTZ: Yes, I have.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Ms Hartle, I am going to ask you to let the witness complete his answer and before you get in, just pause for a second to enable the interpreters to manipulate some machines there, the switch on.

MS HARTLE: I will try Mr Chairman. Mr Lotz, had you ever prior to this operation, killed any South African activists or been involved in the killings?

MR LOTZ: No.

MS HARTLE: In your submissions at page 2, in the second paragraph under SHORT PERSONAL BACKGROUND, you state as follows: the largest part of my career in the South African Police was spent in the Security Branch where I was exposed to the activities such as the detection and tracing and elimination of ANC and PAC terrorists.

MR LOTZ: That was my work.

MS HARTLE: You were exposed to the elimination inter alia?

MR LOTZ: Yes, the detection and when shooting incidents took place when they were killed.

MS HARTLE: When you say elimination, do you mean elimination in the same manner that the Pebco 3 were eliminated?

MR LOTZ: No, it would have been more in the line of trying to arrest them and how could I put it, to try and get them to refrain from their activities.

MS HARTLE: So prior to the Pebco 3 operation, you had not had any experience in the elimination of any South African activists?

MR LOTZ: No.

MS HARTLE: I notice that you too have been boarded on the basis of ill-health?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: Where there any physical injuries which justified that retirement?

MR LOTZ: No.

MS HARTLE: Would that be as a result of stress and anxiety Mr Lotz?

MR LOTZ: That is correct, yes.

MS HARTLE: Now would you agree that that is an extremely young age to be retired on the basis of ill-health?

MR LOTZ: That is correct, yes.

MS HARTLE: And you must have in order to have been successful in your application to be medically boarded, you must have been able to make out a case I suppose for psychiatric illness based on perhaps a post-traumatic stress disorder?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: And in that process, you must have undergone psychotherapy and you must have had lengthy sessions in order to justify the basis for your post-traumatic stress disorder?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: And I would imagine that that stress disorder follows as a result of your involvement in apartheid atrocities?

MR LOTZ: It could be.

MS HARTLE: I am asking you if it is so Mr Lotz?

MR LOTZ: Amongst other things, yes.

MS HARTLE: So would you agree then that you have had extensive counselling, you've had extensive psychotherapy and perhaps even psychiatric treatment?

MR LOTZ: That is correct yes.

MS HARTLE: Arising from these incidents?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: So one would imagine then that you have been forced to call to mind these atrocities, you have been forced to ponder over them, to consider the minute detail of your involvement?

MR LOTZ: No.

MS HARTLE: How else would you have justified your dismissal then on the basis of ill-health?

ADV VAN DER MERWE: Mr Chairman, with all due respect I know my learned friend has got a lot of leeway, but are we not really moving into a field of psychiatric expertise that I venture to suggest that neither the two parties addressing you at the moment, seem to possess?

CHAIRPERSON: You heard the objection or the observation Ms Hartle, what is your response to that?

MS HARTLE: Mr Chairman, perhaps I should rephrase my question, but the point that I would like to carry across is that the witness must have obviously have had an opportunity to recollect the various incidents in which he was involved.

CHAIRPERSON: During the sessions?

MS HARTLE: During psychotherapy and other psychiatric sessions.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, you can ask him that yes, I suppose?

MS HARTLE: Is it so that you have?

MR LOTZ: No, I didn't.

MS HARTLE: I want to put it to you Mr Lotz, that your memory ought not to be so vague as to the events of the Pebco 3 operation as they are?

MR LOTZ: What I have stated here, is what happened.

MS HARTLE: Now, when you gave your evidence, you often used the expression particularly in your evidence in chief, I speak under correction?

MR LOTZ: Yes, that is correct.

MS HARTLE: Who do you stand to be corrected by?

MR LOTZ: It wasn't a reference to anybody in particular, it was just my way of speaking when I wasn't entirely sure of what I was saying.

MS HARTLE: Isn't it so Mr Lotz, that you stand to be corrected by your senior colleagues if you did not tow the line with their submissions to this Committee?

MR LOTZ: I don't understand the question.

MS HARTLE: Isn't it so that you may be corrected by your colleagues if you are not making the same submission as they are, in other words if you are not keeping your version consistent with theirs.

MR LOTZ: If they want to make any amendments or changes to mine, that is their right, but this is my version.

MS HARTLE: And you are satisfied that everything you have told the Commission, both in your submissions and in evidence yesterday and today, is the truth?

MR LOTZ: That is correct, yes.

MS HARTLE: And my learned friend has given you a wonderful opportunity in the name of Christ, to tell the truth here today.

MR LOTZ: That is what I did.

MS HARTLE: Now despite your very vague recollection of events, I want to refer you on page 7 of your submissions, to the fourth paragraph.

I want to ask you why it is that you remember negatives as it were, if you read the first sentence, I can remember that these people as far as I knew, had never been locked up in the cells. Then you skip a sentence, I am not sure where this sleeping draft came from and I can't recall whether I also gave a cup of coffee to any of the deceased. Why are you expressing yourself in that manner?

MR LOTZ: That is the way I can remember it, perhaps I was not quite certain in respect of the facts.

MS HARTLE: Why, if you are already struggling to recall the events of 12 years ago, why are you in pains to tell us what you don't remember?

MR LOTZ: That is what I can remember.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand the question, the question is why should you remember something which did not happen and the impression created here is that somebody must have said to you that somebody says these people were put into a cell and then you said, that did not happen?

MR LOTZ: It could have happened during the consultations that they asked whether the people were locked up in the cells and that I then answered in the negative.

MS HARTLE: Mr Lotz, you testified that what happened the abduction and the elimination of the Pebco 3, is something if I can use the word you said, something happened which should not have happened and at that stage it seemed right to me, or words to that effect. Do you recall saying that?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: Why did you make the comment that it should not have happened?

MR LOTZ: Now, in retrospect, 12 years later and the situation being different in the country, it has changed completely to what it was at the time, there was violence and unrest which reigned at the time 12 years ago. So, now one has a different perspective on what happened to one's perspective at the time of the violence and unrest.

MS HARTLE: Could you at the time you took part in the Pebco 3 operation, justify for yourself your involvement in the elimination of them?

MR LOTZ: Yes, I could.

MS HARTLE: Even though you only had six years experience in the Force?

MR LOTZ: Yes. I think I had been exposed to sufficient activities to be able to do this operation.

MS HARTLE: Now if you will please go to page 4 of your submissions, in the middle of the page. You say that on the 8th of May 1985, Captain Van Zyl approached you and gave you an instruction to form part of a group who were to assist you in operation.

Was that the first time you had been approached by Van Zyl in relation to the Pebco 3 operation?

MR LOTZ: Yes.

MS HARTLE: So if he says that there were discussions two weeks prior to that, in the two weeks leading up to the final instruction given in the morning of the 8th of May, would that be correct?

MR LOTZ: It could be.

MS HARTLE: Did you have discussions prior to the 8th of May?

MR LOTZ: Not with them.

MS HARTLE: Sorry, let me just understand your response correctly. Were there discussions in the two weeks leading up to the 8th of May concerning the Pebco 3 operation?

MR LOTZ: With myself?

MS HARTLE: With you?

MR LOTZ: No.

MS HARTLE: So the first you were informed of it was the 8th of May?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: Was it early in the morning?

MR LOTZ: I can't say with certainty, I am not sure.

MS HARTLE: What was the extent of your briefing prior to the operation? What were you informed?

MR LOTZ: It is as I put it here in my statement.

MS HARTLE: Was there any discussion regarding how a vehicle was to be disposed of?

MR LOTZ: No.

CHAIRPERSON: That morning being the very first occasion that you heard of the intended elimination and being approached for the first time, did you there and then find yourself ready to carry out that kind of operation?

MR LOTZ: Yes, I think I was ready to carry out such an operation.

CHAIRPERSON: And yet you had not carried out that kind of operation before?

MR LOTZ: No, I hadn't.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you not a little bit troubled by the gravity of the operation?

MR LOTZ: No, in the light of what was happening in Port Elizabeth at the time, there was unrest and rioting and violence, people were being burnt to death, schools were also being burnt so viewed in the light of all these circumstances, and also taking into account that the people from these organisations were primarily responsible for that situation and therefore I didn't have a problem with that.

CHAIRPERSON: You didn't even consult with anybody, by anybody I literally mean anybody?

MR LOTZ: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you say to him I am going to think about it, I will give you an answer after five minutes or an hour or two hours, you there and then said fine, I am ready to do as you request?

MR LOTZ: Yes, that is correct. I said I would take part in the operation.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you know the deceased before then?

MR LOTZ: Not personally, I just knew who they were, I knew of their existence and I knew about their activities, but I didn't know them personally.

CHAIRPERSON: Where did you get the information about their activities?

MR LOTZ: It was in the course of my activities, in my job, which at that stage was the detection of terrorists or exiles, people who had left the country and ... (tape ends) of these community leaders and group leaders, so they were primarily responsible for getting people to leave the country and for the recruitment of people to undergo military training abroad.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you have substantial information about each of the three deceased? The extent of their role and the nature of their role?

MR LOTZ: Yes, some of the information which we obtained was to the effect that they had addressed certain meetings and exhorted people to leave the country to go and undergo military training and then to come back to the country after having completed their training.

CHAIRPERSON: But sorry, I thought you heard their names for the first time after they had already been abducted?

MR LOTZ: No, I was aware of their activities. The three people who were to be abducted at that stage, I heard their names the first time on that day.

CHAIRPERSON: All right, I will leave it there.

ADV SANDI: I am sorry Ms Hartle, if I can just come in here. Just on this issue, I see that you mention at page 3 a number of incidents of terrorism. It is actually bomb attacks that you refer to which occurred at Constantia Centre, Municipal offices and the law courts. Was anyone of these three gentlemen involved in this?

MR LOTZ: Not directly as far as I know.

ADV SANDI: How were they involved, if in any way? You said not directly?

MR LOTZ: The people who were responsible for those attacks, could perhaps originally have been recruited by these people to leave the country and that was their involvement, if one can take it that far back and which ultimately led to the attack on those premises.

That is the way one could describe or link their involvement.

ADV SANDI: You were speculating in other words?

MR LOTZ: That is correct, but from the questioning of other arrestees, it became clear that they had been recruited by these people to leave the country for training purposes.

ADV SANDI: You did not really have, if I understand you, you did not really have any direct evidence pointing out they had something to do with this?

MR LOTZ: These three cases just mentioned, no.

ADV SANDI: Do you know if they were ever questioned for this?

MR LOTZ: I don't know, I have no knowledge of that.

ADV SANDI: I thought you said your job primarily entailed tracing terrorists?

MR LOTZ: Yes, that is correct.

ADV SANDI: If any investigation was being made regarding such an incident or an incident similar to this, wouldn't you know about that?

MR LOTZ: Yes, their names would have emerged but to have gone to those people in those circumstances, would have been fruitless.

ADV SANDI: When you say fruitless, are you referring to the fact that it was difficult to use informers?

MR LOTZ: No, it is not difficult to use informers, but to get them and to get witnesses to actually testify to that, that would have been fatal.

ADV SANDI: Thank you Ms Hartle, carry on.

MS HARTLE: Mr Lotz, on the morning on the 8th of May, or on the 8th of May when you received the instruction from Van Zyl, were the three Pebco leaders named, did you understand them to be Godolozi, Hashe and Galela?

MR LOTZ: That is correct, yes.

MS HARTLE: And was it very clearly an instruction to you that the three had to be killed?

MR LOTZ: That is how I understood it, yes.

MS HARTLE: So even at that stage you understood that the word eliminate didn't take on or no longer had the meaning that you were accustomed to in the sense of what you said you were exposed to?

MR LOTZ: That is correct, yes.

MS HARTLE: That it actually meant that you had to do something different?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: And you said that you haven't ever personally been involved in such an operation, in the sense that you had to kill someone before, is that correct?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: And you didn't resist the instruction, you didn't question it, you accepted it just like that?

MR LOTZ: That is correct, yes.

MS HARTLE: And I take it you didn't think of the consequences of your actions?

MR LOTZ: I did consider it, but I reconciled myself with the consequences in the carrying out of the operation.

CHAIRPERSON: But you didn't reconcile yourself with the legal consequences? You reconciled yourself maybe with the fact that it might trouble your conscience and maybe cause you some sleepless nights and the like, but surely you didn't reconcile yourself with the possible legal consequences? You did not accept possible legal consequences?

MR LOTZ: At that stage I probably didn't even think about it.

CHAIRPERSON: Because you knew that there would be a cover up?

MR LOTZ: That could possibly be the case, yes. I can't give a direct answer.

CHAIRPERSON: No, you may have to. Then I can say that the operation probably would have been of such a nature that nobody would have known about it. And that is why the bodies had to be burnt at the end of the day.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you knew already at that stage that there was going to be a massive cover up of that thing?

MR LOTZ: That is possible. Yes, the whole operation would probably have been concealed totally.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lotz, you knew that it was going to be concealed?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: Did you personally have knowledge at the time when the instruction was given to you that the three you were to eliminate were activists and that they posed a risk to the government of the day as it were?

MR LOTZ: That is correct, yes.

MS HARTLE: On page 4 of your submissions in the second last paragraph, you say I was informed briefly by Captain Van Zyl, that this operation entailed the elimination of the three management members of Pebco. You don't mention there names and then the next sentence you say according to the explanation, it was clear that these people had been identified by means of the Security Branch's information network, as being people who were directly involved.

I am not going to read the rest of the sentence, it is implicit from that that it had to be explained to you or it had to be justified to you why they were to be eliminated?

MR LOTZ: We had held regular meetings, every morning we would have a meeting to discuss the previous day's events if I can call it that and that is how we knew what the people were actually busy with.

There was input from different quarters and from different people.

MS HARTLE: You see there is a sense in which you needed to be assured prior to your involvement in the operation.

MR LOTZ: Well, I knew what they were busy doing.

MS HARTLE: So was it necessary then to explain it to you?

MR LOTZ: I wouldn't actually say that it was an explanation that was given, because I was aware of what was going on.

MS HARTLE: My greatest wonderment is why they would have selected you for the operation to kill a man if you had had no prior experience of this nature?

MR LOTZ: I don't know. Captain Van Zyl chose me and we carried out the operation.

MS HARTLE: Were you present when the bakkie was destroyed?

MR LOTZ: That is correct, yes.

ADV SANDI: Mr Lotz, whilst Ms Hartle is going through her documents, can I ask were these gentlemen given reasons why they were going to be killed? What I mean is before they were killed, were they given an opportunity to know why they were going to be killed?

MR LOTZ: If I understand you correctly, are you asking whether we explained it to the deceased?

ADV SANDI: In your application, I see that you give a whole background and the reasons why it became necessary in that situation, to eliminate these three gentlemen. Were they given an opportunity to know anything about this and why you are taking the decision to kill them?

MR LOTZ: No, I don't think we discussed that with them. I don't think we told them why we had to eliminate them.

ADV SANDI: For example you did not say there is a number of bomb attacks that are taking place in Port Elizabeth and they have got something to do with that, that is one of the reasons, or this is part of the background for your decision to kill them?

MR LOTZ: If I understand you correctly, you are asking me whether I conveyed to them what the reasons were for their elimination. Otherwise I don't understand your question.

ADV SANDI: That is exactly the question I am asking.

MR LOTZ: No. We told them nothing. I didn't tell them anything.

ADV SANDI: Thank you, carry on Ms Hartle.

MS HARTLE: Thank you. You accompanied Lieutenant Nieuwoudt to the place where the bakkie was destroyed?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: But you followed in a separate vehicle?

MR LOTZ: That is correct, yes.

MS HARTLE: Now, when was that instruction given to destroy the bakkie?

MR LOTZ: It was at the forest path near the airport.

MS HARTLE: Sorry not where, I am asking you where were you when you were given the instruction, when was the instruction given?

MR LOTZ: After the people had been taken from the airport to the forest path, I can't recall the exact time.

MS HARTLE: Were you not a party to the plans in respect of that operation that the vehicle was supposed to have been left on the South African/Lesotho border?

MR LOTZ: I had no knowledge of that.

MS HARTLE: Is there a reason why you haven't included malicious injury to property in the list of offences in respect of which you are seeking amnesty?

MR LOTZ: I am not sure about that. No, we will rectify that.

MS HARTLE: Mr Lotz, it seems that everything will be corrected as we go along, to the extent that you are implicated and your colleagues are implicated. This is the difficulty that the family has with your applications.

ADV SANDI: Mr Lotz, just one question from me. In your experience of tracing and detecting people who are involved in terrorist activities, are you able to recall any incident of terrorism in which in the course of the investigation, it became necessary to question one of these three gentlemen? I am not referring to the incidents you have mentioned in your application, can you recall any incident where in the course of the investigation, you said to yourself, let's go and question Galela or Godolozi or Hashe about this incident? Can you recall any?

MR LOTZ: No. I cannot recall any incident at the moment.

MS HARTLE: Mr Lotz, when were you informed as to the modus operandi which would apply in respect of the elimination of the three, at what stage were you informed as to how they would be killed?

MR LOTZ: It would have been when Captain Van Zyl spoke to me.

MS HARTLE: The first time you heard of it?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: Were the finer details ever discussed with you?

MR LOTZ: I can't remember how fine and specific the details were, but it was that the persons were to be eliminated and thereafter to be burnt.

MS HARTLE: Mr Lotz, you were there, I want to know from you what the nature of your instruction was in respect of how they were to be eliminated? What were the finer details?

MR LOTZ: To shoot the people and thereafter to place them on the pile of wood and to burn them.

MS HARTLE: Was everything else arranged and did you understand that there had been prior discussions between Van Zyl and Lieutenant Nieuwoudt?

MR LOTZ: I believe that this would have taken place, but I was not present when they spoke to one another or when this was discussed.

MS HARTLE: Did you discuss details of how and when they would be shot, in other words was it discussed whether or not it would have to be a humane killing?

MR LOTZ: No, that was not discussed.

MS HARTLE: Was it just a mere coincidence that it happened to be a humane killing, in the sense that they were drugged before they were shot?

MR LOTZ: I don't know whether these were instructions, but that was the way we did it.

MS HARTLE: I am most curious as to the manner in which the final shootings happened. You say in your submission that the persons fell asleep and each of you, I assumed carried one of the Pebco 3 outdoors, is that correct?

MR LOTZ: We did not carry them one by one, we assisted one another.

MS HARTLE: So then each of you carried each person, in other words all three of you carried one of the activists or ...

MR LOTZ: One or two, that is correct.

MS HARTLE: And why did you carry them away from the house?

MR LOTZ: Most probably not to shoot them in the house or in the garage.

MS HARTLE: Why is that?

MR LOTZ: With a shooting there is a great deal of blood involved. It was done near the place where the fire was made.

MS HARTLE: What time of the day was it when they were shot?

MR LOTZ: It was about dusk.

MS HARTLE: Were you not concerned that your actions might be detected outdoors?

MR LOTZ: No, under those circumstances, no.

MS HARTLE: Why is it Mr Lotz, that none of you were sure which one you shot? Who shot who?

MR LOTZ: I am not sure who it was or who I shot. I did speak to Lieutenant Nieuwoudt about this and he said that he shot Mr Godolozi, Captain van Zyl said that he shot Mr Hashe, then I must have shot Mr Galela.

MS HARTLE: Why is it that none of you know Mr Lotz who you shot?

MR LOTZ: Because I did not know, I only heard it here.

MS HARTLE: Mr Lotz, you were there.

MR LOTZ: I know.

MS HARTLE: Why is it that none of you know who shot who?

MR LOTZ: Because I am not going to say that I shot this person, and I didn't shoot him.

MS HARTLE: Mr Lotz, you knew the three persons, you must have known them by name by the time they were shot.

MR LOTZ: This happened 12 years ago. This is how I felt about this, I wanted forget something like this as soon as possible. And that is why I cannot remember with certainty that I shot this person or that person.

MS HARTLE: Mr Lotz, is it no longer on your mind?

MR LOTZ: Unfortunately now I do think about it again, but I would like to eradicate it as soon as possible again.

MS HARTLE: Mr Lotz, it is going to stay on your mind until you tell the truth, because it is only then that you are going to get pardon and release from this.

MR LOTZ: I will have peace after this, because I am telling the truth.

MS HARTLE: After you have told this Commission half truths, you are going to get on with your life?

MR LOTZ: No, it is not half a truth, it is the full truth.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lotz, the question as to why you don't remember the person you shot, is being asked against the context that there is a dispute as to whether these people were shot or not. Some people say these people were not killed by way of being shot, so there is some dispute about that. So it is relatively important, it is a relatively important aspect of the matter.

Now, each of you did not have to remember as to who shot the other two, but I would have thought that if you shot only one person, as it turns out to be the case, surely you remember that one. There aren't many people to remember, it is only one.

MR LOTZ: I know.

CHAIRPERSON: Just one person, you shot one person.

MR LOTZ: That is correct. As I have said, I wanted to - I didn't want to think about it any more, I cut myself, or tried to cut myself off from what happened there, off the events that occurred.

The stories that the other people told that they were not shot there, I was there, I did it, that is why I am applying for amnesty, otherwise I would not have been sitting here.

CHAIRPERSON: One would have thought that at that critical moment of actually shooting one of them, would haunt you for a very long time, not just for 12 years, but for the rest of your life?

MR LOTZ: I am sure that it will.

CHAIRPERSON: And so far of the two of you who were involved in the shooting, you cannot remember which one of the three you shot?

MR LOTZ: I really cannot remember, I cannot.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

ADV SANDI: Mr Lotz, on the same issue, are you actually suggesting here that at some stage after the shooting occurred, you did in fact have this information in your mind, but you decided to wipe it out?

MR LOTZ: I tried, but I was not successful.

ADV SANDI: What did you try to do?

MR LOTZ: The knowledge of what happened there, to get it out of my system if I can call it like that.

ADV SANDI: Is your knowledge of what happened there, does it include - did it include before you wiped it out of your mind, did it include the name of the person you killed?

MR LOTZ: Yes, I tried to eradicate everything, I would not have kept one thing back.

ADV SANDI: Carry on Ms Hartle.

MS HARTLE: Mr Lotz, if you were shown photographs of the Pebco 3, would it help to refresh your memory?

MR LOTZ: No, I don't think at this stage it will.

MS HARTLE: If you carry on, it appears from your submissions that after you had shot the Pebco 3, you then moved them again to the wood, the piles of wood?

MR LOTZ: That is correct, yes.

MS HARTLE: And you then set about pouring diesel over them and the wood?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: And lighting the fire?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: Who did that?

MR LOTZ: I am speaking under correction, I don't think I can remember.

MS HARTLE: Do you want to answer that?

MR LOTZ: I don't have a problem with it, but I cannot recall.

MS HARTLE: It doesn't really matter in the scheme of things who did it, I am just asking you who did it?

MR LOTZ: That is why if I knew who did it, I would have said so, I don't have a problem with this. I can say that I did it, but I am not sure. I cannot remember.

MS HARTLE: Have you ever before, had you ever before that time set alight a human body?

MR LOTZ: No.

MS HARTLE: Had you ever had experience before of this kind of incineration of activists?

MR LOTZ: No.

MS HARTLE: Had you ever before heard of the Security Branch employing such a method in eliminating bodies?

MR LOTZ: No.

MS HARTLE: Didn't it occur to you that it was perhaps a difficult way of eliminating the bodies?

MR LOTZ: That is how I understood it had to be done, and that is how it was done.

MS HARTLE: But you went down to the town of Cradock to go and buy the diesel, if I understand you correctly?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: How did you know what you would need?

MR LOTZ: Captain Van Zyl told me to go and buy it.

MS HARTLE: How much diesel did you buy?

MR LOTZ: I think it was a jerry can full, I can exactly remember how much it was, whether it was ten or fifteen or twenty litres.

MS HARTLE: Where did you get the wood?

MR LOTZ: In the area behind the house there was a dry river bed, where there was a lot of wood, that we carried towards the place where we made the fire.

MS HARTLE: Did you buy any wood in Cradock?

MR LOTZ: No.

MS HARTLE: Surely, it would have taken a huge amount of wood to burn a fire for six hours?

MR LOTZ: We added wood the whole time constantly, more wood was added throughout the evening.

MS HARTLE: I am not going to deal with the several discrepancies between your evidence and that of the askaris, neither am I going to deal with those discrepancies between your evidence and that of the applicants who testified before you, but suffice it to say or rather I should put it to you that my clients' instructions are that you have not told the truth to this Commission.

MR LOTZ: I have told the truth.

MS HARTLE: And you are further aware of the families' submission, or the families' contention that the three could not have been killed on that day, because they were cited elsewhere, at Algoa Park, Louis Le Grange and Alexandra at various stages?

MR LOTZ: Those people could not have been spotted there.

MS HARTLE: Mr Lotz, you know because this has lived with you for so long, you said to the Committee that it is probably never going to be removed from your mind, the memory of these events?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: Now you understand the objective of this Commission, do you understand why you are here, why you have applied for amnesty?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: What are the reasons that you would advance, why you have made this application?

MR LOTZ: In the first place to come and tell the truth.

MS HARTLE: To most probably come and tell the truth?

MR LOTZ: No, to tell the truth. Secondly to be granted amnesty for that which I have done.

MS HARTLE: And what else? What about the families?

MR LOTZ: Yes, I don't know how to put it, to ask them for forgiveness for what I have done.

MS HARTLE: That is an afterthought?

MR LOTZ: No, it is not.

MS HARTLE: Now, Mr Lotz, you are in the early afternoon of your life, you've got several years ahead of you. You have retired from the Police Force.

CHAIRPERSON: Just put the question.

MS HARTLE: As the Chairman pleases.

CHAIRPERSON: And not make (indistinct) statements, like you are considering. He has told us he has retired for medical health, he may die next week. Just put the question without bringing in fact which may just you know, contribute towards the evidence.

MS HARTLE: As the Committee pleases. I put it to you Mr Lotz, that you are going to remember these events for the rest of your life, unless you tell the Committee the truth and that you are not doing so today.

MR LOTZ: I will remember it for the rest of my life in any event. I spoke the truth and I don't think that because I have now spoken the truth, these memories will be erased.

MS HARTLE: Mr Lotz, this is the greatest opportunity you are ever going to have to remove the shackles from your feet, now to tell the truth.

MR LOTZ: I have already done so.

MS HARTLE: I have nothing further, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Brink?

NO CFROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BRINK:

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lotz, to sum up your evidence on certain aspects of the matter, is it correct that your evidence is that you did not see this people at any time with their head covered, be it in the vicinity of the airport or at the place where they were killed?

MR LOTZ: Their heads were not covered.

CHAIRPERSON: You therefore disagree with the people who say that their heads were covered?

MR LOTZ: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you also saying that they were never assaulted? You never saw them being assaulted at any stage?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And they were just interrogated in a very peaceful way?

MR LOTZ: That is correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And the information about the AK47 was elicited in a very peaceful way as well?

MR LOTZ: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Now, I think I must go back to a question which was put to you by Ms Hartle about the diesel and the lighting of the match to start the fire.

Who went to go and buy the diesel?

MR LOTZ: I went to buy the diesel.

CHAIRPERSON: And obviously you came back with it?

MR LOTZ: That is correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And you saw when this diesel was poured onto the firewood?

MR LOTZ: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Now, who did that?

MR LOTZ: I can't remember, I honestly cannot remember.

CHAIRPERSON: But we are talking about the diesel which you yourself bought, which you yourself brought to the scene for a particular purpose and we are talking about a situation where you were personally present where this diesel which you had bought, were being poured over the firewood. You have forgotten as to who did that?

MR LOTZ: I have, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Now, who brought the matches?

MR LOTZ: I can't say, I don't know, I can't remember.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you see when the fire was being lit? I notice that you are keeping quiet for some time. Are you trying to think hard as to who brought the matches?

MR LOTZ: I am trying to recall the whole episode and I really can't remember. If I knew I would have said so. I really cannot remember.

CHAIRPERSON: Who lit the matches?

MR LOTZ: I can't recall.

CHAIRPERSON: Who brought the firewood?

MR LOTZ: I did.

CHAIRPERSON: And assembled it?

MR LOTZ: Captain Van Zyl and myself we gathered the wood into a pile.

CHAIRPERSON: That you remember?

MR LOTZ: Yes, because that kept us busy for quite some time.

CHAIRPERSON: I would have thought really the lighting of the matches was a very critical moment and something which was very drastic. Was it you Mr Lotz, who lit the matches?

MR LOTZ: Maybe I did, I am not sure. If it was me, I would have said so. All I can imagine is that the shock of having shot somebody was actually so overwhelming, that I can't remember what happened afterwards.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you saying that you have even forgotten as to whether it could have been yourself?

MR LOTZ: That is possible, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, any re-examination?

ADV BOOYENS: No thank you Mr Chairperson.

NO RE-EXAMINATION BY ADV BOOYENS.

CHAIRPERSON: You are excused.

MR LOTZ: Thank you.

HAROLD SNYMAN: (sworn states)

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, just before I start with the evidence of Mr Snyman, there are just two aspects that we would like to mention.

Firstly, I have been informed, I must confess I haven't seen it myself, that apparently on the SABC newscast last night, it was alleged by Mr Ntsebeza referring to this incident and also to others, but our interest at this stage is this, this incident, that the policemen were having a braai while the bodies were being incinerated. Now obviously there has never been evidence like this and one finds it unfortunate that responsible people like that, would make statements like that.

It may indeed be that he was misinformed, but on national television which already, these things are already emotion laden as we all know and we can only judge that by the reaction that one gets every now and then, and we wish to record our strongest objection to information like that, especially if it is being telecast on national television. As I say I haven't seen the news report myself, but I have been informed by some of my colleagues here as well as some of my colleagues of my clients, that that is the case.

The second thing is exactly about what is happening in this hearing again Mr Chairman, what I complained about yesterday. There was the word "voetsek" was prominently heard when the previous witness finished his testimony. I must record once again my objection to this behaviour. I call Mr Snyman.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I just respond to that, with regard to the noise from the floor. I think that if words of those nature were indeed used, I would appeal to the audience to please try to restrain themselves and we understand that people's emotions will or may go up in a situation like this in a hearing like this one, but we appeal to the people to please not allow themselves to get out of control.

With regard to Mr Ntsebeza's remarks, I saw that myself actually on TV. We have noted your concern, but I should mention though that it may very well be that he was in a panel where Mr Mamasela gave evidence and I don't know whether he was referring to, I am trying to say that one doesn't know whether he was speaking with reference to the evidence before us, or whether he was speaking with reference to the evidence which was before him which would have been the evidence of Mr Mamasela.

So, while we note your concern, we should bear that in mind, that there is that problematic situation.

ADV BOOYENS: Certainly Mr Chairman. Mr Snyman, your have your application in front of you, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And if you look at page 1, do you confirm the correctness of it?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: On page 2, do you confirm the correctness of that?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, it is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: When did you become Commanding Officer of the Security Branch?

MR SNYMAN: January 1984.

ADV BOOYENS: And when did you retire?

MR SNYMAN: The 30th of June, 1986.

ADV BOOYENS: So is it correct that you have now been retired for about 11 years?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Do you confirm the rest of the particulars on page 2, are they correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And do you also confirm that you are applying for amnesty for the abduction and death of the Pebco 3 on the 8th of May, in Port Elizabeth and Cradock?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Snyman, to start off with, I would like to ask you whether you confirm the contents of the build up to the situation as set out on pages 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of your statement, do you confirm the correctness of those pages or what is contained there?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: As the Commanding Officer of the Security Branch in Port Elizabeth and also before that you were second in command, correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: You dealt with the administration or administrative functions and you also dealt with correspondence?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Now by virtue of your position as the Commanding Officer, you also served on the JMC meetings where you received feedback from the Secretariat of the State Security Council?

MR SNYMAN: Correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Those were meetings which took place on a fairly regular basis, approximately once a month?

MR SNYMAN: Correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Is it correct that there were also certain sub-committees of the JMC, namely the so-called Joint Operational Centre and the Joint Information Centre where you also attended meetings?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you also by virtue of your position as Commander receive information on a daily basis regarding the security situation in the Eastern Cape?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: What would you say or let us first deal with the JMC situation - it is set out in the statement and I am just going to summarise it for the convenience of the people here. The JMC was under the Chairmanship of Brigadier Joffel van der Westhuizen of the South African Defence Force normally and security matters were discussed there, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: At the JMC meetings arrangements were also made for politicians to address you, that is now the JMC, so the people such as Adriaan Vlok, Magnus Malan and so forth would come and address you?

MR SNYMAN: Correct.

ADV BOOYENS: The terminology in current use at that stage, I am referring to 1985, what types of words and phrases were used and what did these discussions centre on as far as the JMC meetings were concerned?

MR SNYMAN: I was aware that during these meetings reference was made in documents to the elimination of hostile leaders and the word eliminate was used fairly commonly at these JMC meetings and as far as I was concerned, that was a phrase you normally used in a war situation.

And in the context of the time, eliminate meant that people should be killed.

ADV BOOYENS: So at these meetings, this was the kind of talk and the type of phraseology used?

MR SNYMAN: Correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Now, was there also quite a bit of emphasis placed on the security situation in the Eastern Cape at these meetings?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, there was feedback from the Secretariat of the State Security Council which was received by the JMC and to the effect that the government was insisting that the Eastern Cape be stabilised and that a solution be found.

ADV BOOYENS: Was that the primary body responsible for that line of function of security?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, it was the Security Branch which had to deal with that primarily. They had to stabilise the situation.

ADV BOOYENS: What was the reaction at the JMC as regards, I mean the sub-committees as well, what was the reaction at the JMC regarding the way in which people expressed themselves or the way in which you did your work?

MR SNYMAN: The line function and the responsibility of the Security Branch was to stabilise the situation at that stage. Now, criticism addressed to us via the Defence Force and the politicians and our own head office, that criticism was trenchant criticism and we often had to listen to criticism of this kind.

This meant that these people were of a view that we weren't taking the necessary drastic steps and actions to solve the problem.

ADV BOOYENS: So, in short what you have just said is that they were obviously of the view that you could do more to solve the problem?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: As the Commanding Officer of the Security Branch, you were the person dealing with matters on the ground?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: The options available to you at that stage Mr Snyman were things such as and I think it has been repeated quite frequently here, but those were the options within the Security Legislation, such as detention without trial under Section 28 or 29 of the Internal Security Act and there were a couple of other Sections dealing with detention.

There was the option to either restrict a person, to place a person under house arrest, these were all the banning orders that we are talking about and then there was another option, namely to charge persons or prosecute them in a criminal court?

MR SNYMAN: Correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Now, if we deal first with criminal prosecutions, was there a problem connected with criminal prosecutions, if so, please explain?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, there were most definitely problems with prosecuting people at that stage because there was total anarchy and ungovernability in the situation, and it was extremely difficult to get witnesses to come and testify in open court proceedings against these people.

ADV BOOYENS: You are talking about anarchy and the fact that this place was ungovernable and that there was difficulty in obtaining witnesses, were these witnesses just not available or were they too frightened to testify or what was the problem?

MR SNYMAN: Sometimes they were too scared to testify and those who did testify, their testimony was so diluted and was so watered down by cross-examination, that the whole case just fell through.

ADV BOOYENS: Then there was the other option of detaining people under the Security Legislation of the time. That was another option. What was the problem there?

MR SNYMAN: Are you referring to banning, banning orders?

ADV BOOYENS: I am referring to detention without trial, Section 29?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, that is correct, when we detained people in these circumstances which reigned at the time in the black townships, it had no effect because then immediately that would lead to further uprisings and violence and boycotts and stay-aways.

ADV BOOYENS: So, it actually did not have the desired effect it rather escalated the violence, rather than caused a decrease in the violence?

MR SNYMAN: Correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And then there was the option of restrictions or banning orders on people, what was the position there?

MR SNYMAN: At that stage banning orders were also not effective because we would see the same results, it would simply lead to further unrest and violence.

ADV BOOYENS: Were the police still able to effectively police the townships?

MR SNYMAN: No. There was total anarchy in the black townships, it was difficult and in fact dangerous to enter those areas even in motor vehicles.

ADV BOOYENS: Motor vehicles or armed vehicles?

MR SNYMAN: At one point we actually had to resort to the use of armed vehicles to be able to enter into the black townships.

ADV BOOYENS: So the legal options available to you were not efficient, they were not effective and they no longer worked?

MR SNYMAN: Correct.

ADV BOOYENS: On the 14th of February 1985 there was a meeting at Cradock is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: You, in your capacity as Commanding Officer of the Eastern Cape, also attended that meeting?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: I don't you to name all the people attending there, but who were some of the prominent names attending the meeting?

MR SNYMAN: Well it was the Minister of Law and Order, Louis le Grange, there was also another Minister, Minister Barend du Plessis. I think he was the Minister of Education at the time, black education.

ADV BOOYENS: He later became Minister of Finance?

MR SNYMAN: Correct. Then there was the MP for Cradock, Dr Morrison, he was also the Deputy Minister at that stage and then also the Commissioner of the South African Police, Johan Coetzee.

ADV BOOYENS: And many other people or only those four?

MR SNYMAN: There were also other people yes. And these people were all involved in the JMC, there was for instance also the Divisional Commissioner of the Eastern Cape Detective Branch.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you have to make a submission of the security situation there?

MR SNYMAN: Correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you explain what the situation was as you experienced it on the ground?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, I gave an analysis of the situation which I obtain at the time.

ADV BOOYENS: You mean at the time?

MR SNYMAN: Yes. I explained what the situation was in the Eastern Cape and that the situation had become ungovernable and that the legal options at our disposal simply did not have the desired effect any more and we couldn't normalise the situation.

ADV BOOYENS: And after you made your submission, did a general discussion of the security situation follow?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And what emerged from this meeting, did you obtain any answers or any practical and useful suggestions?

MR SNYMAN: No. Fact of the matter was that we were criticised for our inability to stabilise the situation.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Snyman, I know that you were only the Commanding Officer, you were not the policemen on the ground at that stage, but what was your impression how far had the situation already developed in the direction of ungovernability and as far as the black townships of Cradock and Port Elizabeth were concerned, who was actually winning the war in these areas?

MR SNYMAN: At that stage, the activists were winning the war or had already done so.

ADV BOOYENS: Or had already won the war?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: All right, so you analyzed the situation and you explained that things weren't working any more and would you say that everybody attending the meeting, was very well aware of the fact that the normal measures were no longer effective?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And then during an adjournment you and Louis le Grange had a discussion?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Can you please tell us what you discussed?

MR SNYMAN: After I made my submission, we had tea and then I had the chance to have a chat to Minister Louis le Grange and as I said earlier, in my submission to them, we discussed the fact that the normal legal methods of policing were not longer effective and the Minister said to me very clearly, Colonel you have to make a plan with these activists in the Eastern Cape.

ADV BOOYENS: So Mr Snyman, that was a statement made by a man who had been very well informed as to the fact that the machinery or the methods which had been put at your disposal, was no longer effective in actually dealing with the situation?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And when he told you that you had to make a plan, how did you interpret that, how did you understand that?

MR SNYMAN: The way I understood it was that because I had said that the existing legal options were no longer effective, my understanding was that these people had to be eliminated.

ADV BOOYENS: Now, Colonel you also or let me put something to you by way of an illustration. Exhibit H My Lord. We could only track down a few documents which were handed in during other matters.

You have already mentioned the fact that there were talk continually about action against enemy forces and regarding the infiltration of these people, is it correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you also on occasion, I am showing you the minutes of a meeting that was held on the 7th of June 1985, it is indicated that you were present on this occasion in the capacity of Commanding Officer of the Security Branch?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: There is only one aspect that I want to deal with at this meeting. Under paragraph 9 unrest is dealt with, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: It is marked Exhibit H, but there is already an Exhibit H.

ADV BOOYENS: I am sorry, then it should be Exhibit J. ADV NYOKA: It should be Exhibit K, the documents I handed in was Exhibit J, Mr Booyens. The documents that I handed in was Exhibit J, this should be Exhibit K.

ADV BOOYENS: I am indebted to my learned friend.

ADV DE JAGER: Okay, Exhibit K would be safe, but which one did you hand in Mr Nyoka?

ADV NYOKA: The document which is similar to Ms Hartle. The document that is similar. I handed it in chambers, the big bundle. (Indistinct), Your Worship, but it was handed in in chambers. This is the one. It is because it was handed in in chambers, so there was no number.

CHAIRPERSON: So the document which Mr Nyoka handed in yesterday or gave to us yesterday, being a copy of an application by Hashe and Hashe against the Minister of Law and Order and another, will be Exhibit J and the document which Mr Booyens is handing in now, would be Exhibit K.

ADV BOOYENS: Thank you. Colonel, this is for illustration purposes, we are aware of the fact that this was a meeting that was held on the 7th of June 1985, so this was after the death of these three, but regarding the things that were discussed, mention is made in paragraph 9 to unrest and in paragraph 10 the possibility of covert activities and it is important that they will establish whether the recce's could be utilised, is that correct?

And the recce's which are referred to, what were they?

MR SNYMAN: As I understood it at that stage, it was a highly specialised task force of the South African Defence Force.

ADV BOOYENS: A combat unit?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Which was mainly used in operations abroad?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Which paragraph refers to this?

ADV BOOYENS: Paragraph 10, on page - we are merely referring to this as illustration. At these meetings were there more such discussions of the actions which were done in a covert manner?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Colonel, the culture and the spirit and the attitude which seemed apparent from that which was discussed in the total security community regarding the resistance against the liberation struggle, how did these people think and feel?

MR SNYMAN: It was often made very clear to us that the Security Branch was the last fort of the struggle to win the struggle and if the Security Branch were to collapse, the government would not be able to continue with its task of governing.

We as police officers therefore had an enormous responsibility to ensure that the government remained in power.

ADV BOOYENS: To refer once again to the Pebco situation, and with regards to the local situation, did you know about the activities of Pebco?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And were you kept informed of the leadership of Pebco?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And as far as you were concerned, what role if any, did Pebco play in the unrest situation?

MR SNYMAN: At that stage we regarded them as the top brain of that organisation, they incited people to the state of ungovernability that we experienced in this area. There was also information that they recruited terrorists to send overseas for training.

ADV BOOYENS: So as far as you were concerned, Pebco was a high priority target, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And the leadership of Pebco and more specifically the three deceased which are related to this application, were they also known to you due to your post as Commanding Officer?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, they were known to me as a result of the files that passed through my hands and the reports that were submitted.

ADV BOOYENS: So as far as you were concerned, Mr Snyman, were these people thus prominent figures and people who created a problem?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: You heard the testimony of Mr Du Plessis, the first person to testify in this hearing, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And do you confirm his testimony regarding the run up to this incident?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: The discussions which took place between you and Mr Du Plessis regarding specifically those activities of the three deceased, over what period of time did this take place and how often?

MR SNYMAN: Each morning we held discussions with the different Branches in the office and these, a great deal of discussions were held about these three specific persons as a result of their activities and the incitement and the inciting of the masses in the black townships.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Du Plessis finally came to you and made a suggestion that these people were to be eliminated, can you remember this?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Was this said in an open meeting or was this done privately?

MR SNYMAN: It was done privately in my office.

ADV BOOYENS: And did you immediately give permission or did you discuss this matter further?

MR SNYMAN: No, there was a great deal of discussion regarding this matter.

ADV BOOYENS: I know it happened a long time ago, you said that you were old and you cannot remember everything so well, but how long would you say did you toy with this idea of eliminating these people before you finally authorised the operation?

MR SNYMAN: I would say that it was after the information meeting held at Cradock, more or less. A great deal of discussion was held about this matter until the operation was finally ...

INTERPRETER: The interpreters are having a problem hearing the speaker.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Booyens the interpreter didn't hear you, maybe you should repeat the last question.

ADV BOOYENS: So it was from February until May am I correct?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Thereafter Mr Du Plessis testified that you, two weeks before the incident, that is more or less the end of April or the beginning of May, gave authorization?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Was this the first occasion on which you ever gave authorization for such an operation?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct. That was not something I did very lightly.

ADV BOOYENS: You say that you did not do it very lightly, or make this decision very lightly, did you feel - let me rather put it this way - why did you feel that you could give this authorization for this operation?

MR SNYMAN: In the first place ... (intervention)

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, there seems to be some problem with my sound system and the sound system of the interpreters there. It goes off in my headphones every now and then as well, so they seem to be having a problem in hearing me, that is why you are not getting full translation.

CHAIRPERSON: I wonder, I don't know, let's just try our best.

ADV BOOYENS: My problem is that I have a TV camera right in front of me, I can't see when the lady is indicating to me that she can't hear.

I asked you why you gave authorization for the operation?

MR SNYMAN: My final decision to authorise the elimination of these persons were done in light of the following facts: The above-mentioned statement of Louis le Grange, then all the statements made by politicians which announced the policy that we found ourselves in a war situation and made us aware that we were the only who could fight this war successfully.

And they continually emphasised the fact that the activities of the activists in the Eastern Cape had to be stopped and when we pointed out that we tried to use the available legal measures, that there was no sympathy, but that the insistence was to take steps.

ADV BOOYENS: Can we just perhaps just finish this little bit and I see it is nearly one o'clock Mr Chairman in any case. Hopefully we will be able to get something through it.

You said that when you tried to point out that the legal means were not successful, was there no sympathy for you, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Then you also had attended many conferences of Commanding Officers at the Security Branch in your capacity as Commanding Officer, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Were there informal discussions held often where they spoke about unconventional methods which were used to deal with activists?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And did you hear that people spoke about people being taken out or eliminated, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Further, at that stage there were also various or several cross-border operations which the police spoke about openly where people were attacked, amongst others in Lesotho where people were killed?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And at least they were overt regarding the cross-border operations, or some of them?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: I don't believe it is necessary to repeat this, but Mr Du Plessis dealt with this, you also heard the testimony regarding the fact that there was very good Security Police contact with the insurgents of the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees ... (tape ends) ... that people who disappeared, that you ever had any enquiries regarding the clandestine sources that you had in order to determine whether these people could be traced overseas?

MR SNYMAN: No.

ADV BOOYENS: Now, we know that the six people including these three disappeared in the Eastern Cape, which we know about now, were high profile figures, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you have any knowledge of the Kondile and Mthimkhulu cases, that they had been eliminated?

MR SNYMAN: No.

ADV BOOYENS: You were aware of allegations which in newspapers were made?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Were there any enquiries about them from Security Police Head Office to use your clandestine sources to pick up their tracks?

MR SNYMAN: No.

ADV BOOYENS: You heard what Colonel Du Plessis said about this, do you make the same deductions?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, may I suggest - I am not going to succeed in finishing this evidence in proper time, may I suggest subject to what the Commission says, this might be an appropriate time to take the adjournment?

CHAIRPERSON: Before we adjourn, I think it is appropriate to go back to the issue which was raised by Adv Booyens after the adjournment or just before this witness started giving evidence with regard to certain statements made by the Head of the Investigative Unit, which were shown or reported on television yesterday.

I think that we have taken note of Adv Booyens' concern and I think we should say that it is not desirable for people in certain positions to express themselves on matters which are still pending, which are still sub-judice.

One hopes that people would not do that if matters are still pending, but we should also add that if that assurance need to be given, we should also add that we will not in any way be influenced by those remarks that were made and we will go on to decide the matter as if such remarks were not made at all, they are not going to influence us in any way.

Did you want to say anything else Mr Booyens?

ADV BOOYENS: Yes, Mr Chairman, just in light of the last remarks, I certainly, if it was at all understood that I suggested that the Committee would be influenced by something like that, that was not at all our intention and I did not suggest at all - the only reason why I said it is I complained about the fact that that type of remark cause to inflame an already volatile situation, that was the only basis. I was certainly not suggesting, and I do not now suggest, that it would influence your objectivity at all, whatsoever.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I didn't understand you to be saying that.

ADV BOOYENS: Thank you sir.

CHAIRPERSON: I just said it just for the purpose of record. I think it is appropriate just to add that kind of remark. We will adjourn then until Monday at half past nine.

CHAIRPERSON: October, the 10th, we are still busy with evidence of Mr Snyman.

HAROLD SNYMAN: (still under oath)

EXAMINATION BY ADV BOOYENS: (cont)

Before the adjournment on Friday, we paid attention to the fact that there has already been something said, or openly there were discussions about cross-border operations where they also acknowledged that activists were destroyed, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Snyman, through the years that you were a member of the Security Branch, there were often allegations in the media and other places of several incidents where there were alleged that the powers of the State were involved with attacks on activists, the killing of activists, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, it is.

ADV BOOYENS: Here is a list that we got from a book, if you could just have a look at it, not on the basis that you personally will have it. We have the first few pages, it is February 1971 to February 1991, but from 1974 to 1984 it gives an indication of quite a number of people who were killed and so forth, many of them were well publicised, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I've got unfortunately only four copies available. I didn't think - I will make one copy available for my learned friends on the other side and three copies for the Commission. It is just a popular publication, but just by way of illustration of the next point.

I think it will be Exhibit L. Mr Snyman, we already discussed the atmosphere that was prevalent, there was evidence from Mr Du Plessis ...

ADV DE JAGER: Sorry Mr Booyens, could you please just tell us where did you get this, what is the origin of this list?

ADV BOOYENS: Chairperson, this was a book written by Jacques Pauw, in the Heart of the War, and it is based on the Harms Commission and what preceded it and it is from page 270. I have the complete publication.

I won't say it has a lot of authority, but some of the cases are in fact well-known and is documented.

ADV DE JAGER: I just want to have the name of the publication.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Snyman, the people who was in the course of time, who disappeared, who were killed and also died in attacks overseas, those were activists, enemies of the State, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, that is.

ADV BOOYENS: And within the culture and the community of the Security Police, I am not referring to a case that you know of yourself, who did you believe was responsible for the death of these people and those who were attacked? Excluding those where the State actually took responsibility, who did you think were responsible?

MR SNYMAN: We thought because the struggle was against the State, that it was executed by the State or by its powers.

ADV BOOYENS: Was it also a factor, you also refer to the political statements, the background related to Louis le Grange, was that also a factor that played a role with you with your eventual decision that this was the policy of the government, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: I know that sometimes allegations were made that some of the people died because of internal political struggles and I think at some stage they also said that in some applications, did you believe it?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, we did.

ADV BOOYENS: Could you just perhaps tell us, I am not quite sure whether we have discussed this with Mr Du Plessis, but you heard Mr Du Plessis' evidence with regard to this case in the Eastern Cape and with regard to some of the people who disappeared without trace, and the evidence concerning the fact that you had very good information to actually pick up the trace of these people in other countries?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: As second in command, you handled the administration and so forth?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you have any enquiries from Police Head Office to ask what does your information say, where are these people?

MR SNYMAN: We never had any feedback from Head Office.

ADV BOOYENS: And your deduction from the above what was that with regard to perhaps the tacit situation from the State with the elimination of activists? What did you think about this?

MR SNYMAN: I thought that the government accepted this without saying anything and there were never any investigation on the ground because of that.

ADV BOOYENS: And in cases where there were investigations, what would you say about the standard of the investigation, was it intensive, you are an old policeman or was it a very low kind of standard - I am referring to that specific time?

MR SNYMAN: I would say it was quite a low standard.

ADV BOOYENS: The culmination of these factors, did it play a role when you agreed to these operations as proposed by Mr Du Plessis?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Snyman, how did you personally feel regarding this instruction, it was an instruction, you agreed as a Commander, the final agreement lay with you, that these people could now be eliminated?

MR SNYMAN: Personally, I had problems with the killing of people, but in regard of what I believed concerning the situation as described by my juniors and then also the policy of the government, I came to the conclusion that the only solution for the situation would be that these three people had to be eliminated and then I subsequently gave permission for that.

ADV BOOYENS: How did the person Harold Snyman feel about giving permission, and how do you feel about it today?

MR SNYMAN: It was a problem, I had problems with my conscience. As a Christian I could not really reconcile myself with such actions, but because of the situation on the ground, I had to give this instruction or give the permission that these people be eliminated.

ADV BOOYENS: How do you feel about this today?

MR SNYMAN: If I have to be very honest, I have to say at that stage we executed the policy of the government and if I think back to these 12 years, or 12 years ago, I would say there was discrimination against a large proportion of the population of this country and therefore we had this terrible struggle on the ground.

ADV BOOYENS: After you gave the order, did you have anything to do with the practical execution, the planning?

MR SNYMAN: No.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you, after you gave authorization to Major Du Plessis, did you have nothing further to do with the operation itself?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you eventually report or received a report from him that the people had been eliminated?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: I think you already confirmed, but just for the sake of completeness, could you just confirm about your political motives in your application?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, those are correct, I confirm.

ADV BOOYENS: If you didn't think that it was in line or in accordance with this policy of the government, would you have given permission, authority for this operation?

MR SNYMAN: No, never.

ADV BOOYENS: As Security Policeman at that time, did you believe that it was the political order of the day and it was often told to you that you were the last line of defence against the onslaught of the activists, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And I refer to the believe of the situation then, did you believe that it was a justified struggle that you had to execute the State's policy?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, at that stage we thought that that were the right steps to do.

ADV BOOYENS: You didn't get any advantage?

MR SNYMAN: No, not at all.

ADV BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV BOOYENS.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Du Plessis?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV DU PLESSIS: Mr Snyman, I don't really want to ask you any questions, I just want to make one or two statements to you.

What I want to put to you and that will be my argument in this case, the evidence that you have given with regard to the meeting that was held on the 14th of February 1985, the Security Council meeting in Cradock, it is on page 21 of your application, it is page 7 of the amnesty application and page 21 of the bundle, if you have a look at the third last paragraph, it says that during an adjournment I had an informal discussion with the Minister of Law and Order, Mr Louis le Grange and he told me that it was expected of us to make a plan with the agitators in the Eastern Cape and if you look at the paragraph just before that, where you say that it was quite clear from these meetings that it was expected of the Security Branch in the Eastern Cape to fight fire with fire.

I want to put it to you that I am going to say in my argument that the action of Le Grange in June 1985, when instruction was given to Brigadier Jack Cronje, Captain Roelf Venter and others, and General Johan van der Merwe with regard to the zero hand grenade incident, fits in with particular pattern with regard to what was expected of the Security Force and I am also going to argue further that it is more than just fitting in, but it does seem as if there is a particular way of instruction that was given by the government at that stage to act against activists in that way.

I am putting this to you, do you have any comment?

MR SNYMAN: I believe that it is the case in light of the discussion that I had with the Minister.

ADV DU PLESSIS: And what I also want to put to you is that I am also going to use it in my argument, you say that in the fourth paragraph from the bottom on that page, that it was expected of the Security Police in the Eastern Cape to fight fire with fire and this corresponds with what Brigadier Cronje and Hechter testified, that that was the instruction they got early in 1986 from Brigadier Victor, to act in exactly the same way in the Northern Transvaal area with regard to the Security Police. Do you want to comment?

MR SNYMAN: If that is the case, then I would agree with that.

ADV DU PLESSIS: May it please you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV DU PLESSIS.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Snyman, your evidence is that you weren't involved with the execution of this operation, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, it is.

ADV LAMEY: Can you remember when before the 8th of May, did you approve this operation?

MR SNYMAN: There were several discussions between Major Du Plessis and myself from that date up to the date that this operation was executed.

ADV LAMEY: Can you recall when the final decision was taken that these three people had to be eliminated?

MR SNYMAN: I can't recall the specific date, but it must have been quite close to the 8th of May.

ADV LAMEY: Did you know when it would occur?

MR SNYMAN: No, the date was not given to me.

ADV LAMEY: Did you get feedback at some stage?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, that is correct.

ADV LAMEY: Can you recall how long after the 8th of May you received the feedback?

MR SNYMAN: I can't remember that well, but it could have been the 10th or any date after the 10th of May.

ADV LAMEY: So you say it is after the 10th of May?

MR SNYMAN: It could have been the 10th of May or any date later.

ADV LAMEY: But not before the 10th of May?

MR SNYMAN: No.

ADV LAMEY: Can you recall how this feedback took place, did you make any enquiries, how did it come about that you got feedback?

MR SNYMAN: The feedback was done by Major Du Plessis who initially came to me with this plan and it was conveyed to me by him without him giving any detail.

ADV LAMEY: So he didn't give you any detail how it was done?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV LAMEY: Did you make any enquiries with regard to detail?

MR SNYMAN: No.

ADV LAMEY: Could I perhaps ask you did you expect that Major Du Plessis would give you feedback as soon as possible after the operation?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, that is correct.

ADV LAMEY: Thank you Chairperson, I don't have any further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you explain that a little bit. What do you mean you wanted him to come and give a report back as soon as possible? Within a few minutes of the incident, within hours?

MR SNYMAN: As I said it was reported back to me and I am not quite sure of the date, but it might have been on the 10th of May.

CHAIRPERSON: I think in all fairness to you, I think I must repeat the question. You see Mr Lamey asked you whether it was expected of Major Du Plessis to report to you as soon as possible after the people were eliminated and you said yes.

Now my question is, how soon after the incident did you expect to get a report? Within a few minutes or within a few hours?

MR SNYMAN: Because I had no knowledge of when the operation was to have taken place, I believed that they would inform me as soon as it had been completed.

ADV DE JAGER: The Chairman wants to know how soon after the operation had been completed, if the operation had been completed at four o'clock the afternoon, by what time that same day or the next day, when would you have expected feedback?

MR SNYMAN: It would probably have been the next day.

ADV DE JAGER: If we continue with this, why not that same afternoon? If it had taken place at four o'clock the afternoon, why would you not have received feedback or expected feedback on that same day?

MR SNYMAN: As I said I was not aware of the day on which the operation was to be executed. I believed that the feedback would come as soon as it had been completed.

ADV DE JAGER: And do you think that two hours or twelve hours or even 24 hours would have been a reasonable period of time for that feedback?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: But which one of the three would you regard as being reasonable?

MR SNYMAN: I won't be able to say because he reported back to me after it had been completed and I believed that it had taken place shortly after the operation was completed.

ADV SANDI: Mr Snyman, just one question from me at this stage. You say when Major Du Plessis gave you the report that the operation was successful, you didn't ask for any details as to how they went about executing the operation?

MR SNYMAN: No, I did not ask for any details.

ADV SANDI: Why was that so?

MR SNYMAN: I said that this was, I had trouble with my conscience in that regard and I accepted that he told me that the operation had been executed. I accepted it like that.

ADV SANDI: Was it not important for you to know those details so that you could work out in your mind the possibility of being detected in all this?

MR SNYMAN: No.

ADV SANDI: Thank you.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Snyman, when you gave the instruction or the authorization for the execution of this elimination, did you tell Major Du Plessis that he had to report back to you as soon as he had completed it, or what were your instructions in this regard?

MR SNYMAN: I cannot remember whether I gave such an instruction, but at that stage I believed that he would report back to me once the operation had been completed.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nyoka?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV NYOKA: Thank you Mr Chairman. Good morning Mr Snyman. Good morning.

MR SNYMAN: Good morning Mr Nyoka.

ADV NYOKA: I respect you Mr Snyman, you are the age, the same age as my father, I respect you. You said that you were a Commander from 1984 to 1986. I am curious to find out why was it such a short span of being a Commander, can you tell me?

MR SNYMAN: I think the reason for that was that in the beginning I didn't participate in promotion exams and I only started studying seriously at a later stage of my life and I was only given those two years as Commanding Officer. I was second in command for a number of years, but I was only Commanding Officer of the Security Branch for two years.

ADV NYOKA: I thought it had something to do with the fact that twice a state of emergency had to be imposed during your reign. I thought it had something to do with that and you resigned because of pressure?

MR SNYMAN: I didn't follow the question very well.

ADV NYOKA: I thought it was because of the fact that the first state of emergency was imposed in July 1985 and then the second one in 1986, and that you resigned because of pressure that you are not doing enough, I thought so?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct. Would you please give me the opportunity to answer. If I think of my career as a policeman, I started with unrest in the year that I married my wife and it continued throughout and I felt at that stage with my age, that the pressure was too much for me and I felt that my family as such had been neglected and therefore I decided to go on pension in July 1986.

ADV NYOKA: All right. As a Christian you accept one of the ten commandments, being that thou shalt not kill and I am sure you must have had problems with that when you authorised the elimination, not so?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct, I already said that it was really a problem with my conscience, a struggle, but if you go back to the Bible there were also people killed in the Bible and at this stage I believed because of the pressure of me and the approval that the government in such a manner was given, that I had to give the instruction to in fact calm down the unrest situation.

ADV NYOKA: Could you not have exercised your other unstated viable legal option, moral option, spiritual option of saying rather than doing this, I would resign? Please shift me to another police department as a Superintendent because you subsequently did that in 1986, that is why I asked you the question, could you not have done that as a Christian Mr Snyman.

MR SNYMAN: That is correct. As I said in my exposition to the Minister that the legal options at that stage, did not work as a result of the situation on the ground.

ADV NYOKA: They did not work because you were there, I am saying that you as Harold Snyman saying to yourself, I am taking my only legal option, moral option, of moving out rather than killing, because you were involved in 1977, eight years ago in the killing of Steve Biko, though it was negligent according to you and that must have bothered you for the next eight years. Why did you not say, I, Harold Snyman, I move myself out of this because I am a Christian?

MR SNYMAN: The consideration at that stage was that there were no other options because legal options at that stage did not work any more and that the situation on the ground, had escalated, many people lost their lives, policemen also could not live in the black townships any more, they had to be removed and they also had to be accommodated at other police stations.

ADV NYOKA: I am not going to labour the point. This government policy to kill, was it documented anywhere because I understand that government policy must be in a document either in a constitution or a law or some official documentation saying that circularise, do this, kill activists. Was it documented anywhere Mr Snyman?

MR SNYMAN: Was it ever documented to kill, I could not follow you precisely?

ADV NYOKA: Precisely, that is what I meant or did you imply that it was government policy by the statements and by the make a plan statement of Cradock?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct. Even because of these documents that we have just submitted, we really thought that the State approved of this in a tacit way because we never received any enquiries or there were never any investigation.

ADV NYOKA: Mr Snyman, as a Regional Commander, it was a duty to ensure that government policy was explicit. You could have phoned Mr Louis le Grange or any government member to say is this government policy to kill, because I am about to kill now. Could you not have done that?

MR SNYMAN: I didn't take it any further after the discussion on the 14th of February with the Minister.

ADV NYOKA: Did you not get back to him to say that I have implemented that make a plan suggestion, I have killed this three Pebco leaders, did you not get back to him to say that?

MR SNYMAN: This was a clandestine operation and there was no feedback given in this regard.

ADV NYOKA: He is someone who started the chain of events and he was your Minister, could you not have trust in him by telling him that you have killed these three Pebco leaders?

MR SNYMAN: We accepted that it had the tacit approval of the government officials, because there was no feedback from them and also no investigation was launched.

ADV NYOKA: It is very strange that if you can get a mandate from someone, but not get back to that someone to say I have implemented your mandate? It is very, very strange.

MR SNYMAN: No, it wasn't strange at that stage.

ADV NYOKA: Is it not correct that in 1977, you stated falsely under oath that the Police were not responsible for the death of Mr Biko?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct. But I think as we have already said during that trial, that was not the truth. It was not the correct story.

ADV NYOKA: Do you remember an application made on the 22nd of May by the children of Mr Hashe, where again in an affidavit you denied that you are responsible for the disappearance of the Pebco 3? You stated under oath?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: There was another one in two months to come, two months later, that is on the 17th of July, a similar one by Mrs Hashe, Mrs Galela and the mother of Mr Godolozi, Mrs Benedida Godolozi? You similarly made a denial, is it not correct?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: That is the third instance you've lied under oath, not so? That was the third instance?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: The fourth and final one was in 1985, after the Cradock four inquest, you also made a falsehood under oath, denying that the Police had anything to do with that, not so?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct at that stage.

ADV NYOKA: Why do you think we should believe you now when you are stating under oath when you lied in four instances, why should we believe you now?

MR SNYMAN: We came to apply for amnesty because the opportunity was given to us. And now we are coming forward with the true story and true facts.

ADV NYOKA: If that is the case, why is it that you did not tell us today of the reasons that you stated in your affidavit in saying that you had nothing to do with the disappearance of the three, because you have not told us that far? Let me make it easier Mr Snyman, is it not correct that in the affidavit you said that the three could have disappeared because of the UDF/AZAPO feud, not so?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Why did you not tell us about that here?

MR SNYMAN: The facts that we have before you now, are the correct facts.

ADV NYOKA: And why is it that you made a last minute application if your conscience, you wanted to be clear with your conscience?

MR SNYMAN: I applied when we heard that the law was promulgated and it was made possible for us to apply for amnesty. Because for the rest of my life, I could not have this on my conscience and therefore I applied.

ADV NYOKA: Is it not correct that you are living in Uitenhage as a pensioner?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Thus, you have all the time in the world to try to seek out the three families and apologise to them off the record, if you are genuine, and reveal to them what you did, could you not have done that being so near and having all the time?

MR SNYMAN: Could you please repeat the question, I could not follow it quite clearly.

ADV NYOKA: The question is that you have all the time to try to find out where the families are to see them off the record and to apologise to them, revealing what you did if you are genuine about apologising? Do you understand now?

MR SNYMAN: I understand, but we were advised by our legal counsel that we should not at this stage take any steps in this regard, but my legal representative on my left side, that he would explain the whole matter.

ADV NYOKA: Did you have problems with that stance?

MR SNYMAN: No, I would not have problems with that.

ADV NYOKA: All right. You were once a District Commander or a Head of a Division at the Security Branch, not so?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Can you tell us what the procedure is that such a Head takes when an enquiry is made to that particular division about a particular matter, what is the procedure?

MR SNYMAN: If an enquiry is made about any case, a report has to be submitted.

ADV NYOKA: Do you make that report independently of other divisions after investigating the facts that are enquired upon, you make your own independent report, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Which reports are you referring to?

ADV NYOKA: I am saying that if a query is made Mr Snyman to your division, do you make up your mind independently by saying this is the response I am giving to this query that is coming to the Security Branch for instance as other divisions are doing, you don't consult other divisions, that is my point? You make your own letter, you make your own report independent of any other division, that is what I am trying to find out?

MR SNYMAN: If we receive a report, it will be handled by the specific desk, for example for that specific race group and if a letter has to be written, it will come through me.

ADV NYOKA: So you write your own letter, independent of other divisions?

MR SNYMAN: It depends what it has to do with. If it is of security importance, we would have answered it.

ADV NYOKA: Yes, in other words you agree with me you write it independently of other outside interference?

MR SNYMAN: It depends who were involved.

ADV NYOKA: The reason why I am asking all this is because when enquiries were made about the Pebco 3, to seven divisions, in both the May 1985 and July 1985 applications, the heads of the seven divisions, responded in letters that were very identical from the first word to the last one.

I will give an example of this. This division were the offices of the District Commander of the Police Port Elizabeth, a letter dated 21 May 1985 by Colonel P.J. Engelbrecht, then the second one is the District Commander of Grahamstown, 21st May 1985, by Major Husselman, the third one was the District Commander of Uitenhage, letter of 21st May 1985, by Lieutenant Colonel Pretorius, the fourth one was the District Commander of Cradock, same date of 21st May 1985, by Major Calitz, the fifth one was the District Commander of Port Elizabeth North, same date of the 21st of May 1985, by Lieutenant Colonel Gerber, the sixth one was yours, on the 21st of May 1985 and finally the Murder and Robbery Branch by Lieutenant Colonel Strydom.

I wish to refer you to Bundle J, page 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 34, those are all the letters I am referring to. They are all identical. The only difference is your letter because it had to include Special Branch and Security Laws and the Murder and Robbery letter which omitted leaders of the SAP, otherwise the letters are all the same. I have a problem with that, if divisions respond independently. I have a great problem with that.

Let me say, I want you to respond briefly to what I am going to say. Firstly all the seven letters were written in different divisions, including cities Port Elizabeth, Grahamstown, Uitenhage and Cradock, yet the letters are identical. Can you tell me how did that happen?

MR SNYMAN: No, the only deduction that I can make is that these people were not detained by any of these police stations.

ADV NYOKA: I beg your pardon? I don't understand your answer.

MR SNYMAN: These people weren't arrested or detained by the different police stations.

ADV NYOKA: No, I understand what they say, but my problem is why are these letters all identical, coming from different divisions, when the head makes his own submission independently of other divisions?

I understand what the contents are saying, but I've got a problem with the identicality of the letters.

MR SNYMAN: I cannot comment on that. They replied to a letter written to them, and the fact was purely that the people weren't detained by the Police.

ADV NYOKA: The second problem that I have is that all the seven letters bore the same date of the 21st of May 1985, whereas they were written in different divisions, and cities. How coincidental that is?

MR SNYMAN: It could be coincidental, but I really cannot recall when this interdict arrived and people replied concerning letters that were sent to them, regarding this particular incident.

ADV NYOKA: The final problem I have is that the said date of 21st of May 1985, was just a day before the application, yet suddenly there was a flurry of letters which are identical? That is very strange again.

MR SNYMAN: I cannot comment on that.

ADV NYOKA: If someone from the floor asked you, one of the Committee members, and you had to write letters about queries, it would be very strange indeed if our letters were identical and just a day before a particular event has to happen, especially as when we are not even in the same city? Would you not agree with me there was an authority from above stating that in a panicky manner, that you must write this letter, dictating that letter?

In other words, there were more than four people knowing of the Pebco 3, there were more than four people knowing of the Pebco 3 disappearance, those police stations knew hence our application says there was not full disclosure. Any comment about that?

MR SNYMAN: The only deduction that I can make is that it was alleged that these people were detained at different police stations and therefore the different offices answered those questions or replied to the question.

ADV NYOKA: But why is the wording identical, that is my point. I have no problem with the response, but why is the wording so uncanningly identical?

MR SNYMAN: I cannot comment on that.

ADV NYOKA: I put it to you therefore Mr Snyman, that you are not telling us the truth about this, you are not telling us who knew, because maybe those persons, whilst they did not have a direct involvement in the killing, they knew who did this but you don't want to mention them in your application. What is your comment about that?

MR SNYMAN: The fact of the matter is as it is put in the application before us, those are the true facts. The fact that they were detained at a police station, that did not occur.

ADV NYOKA: Let's move to the make a plan statement. Can you repeat for me the entire sentence that the late Mr Le Grange said to you to make a plan? What did he say in his own words?

MR SNYMAN: That took place after I did some counselling, during an adjournment for tea, we had tea together and despite of the fact of what I said that the legal options weren't working, the Minister told me but Colonel, you have to make a plan with these agitators in the Eastern Cape.

ADV NYOKA: Did he say that you must kill or eliminate those agitators in making a plan?

MR SNYMAN: I made the inference after we said that the normal legal options weren't working any more and the only inference that I could actually draw from this, was that these people had to be eliminated. And that the politicians would accept this silently.

ADV NYOKA: Why did you not ask him, you were together, the two of you, aside, why did you not ask him Mr Le Grange, just to be absolutely certain, are you meaning that I must kill these activists, just to be sure?

MR SNYMAN: No, I did not ask him, but that was the deduction I made.

ADV NYOKA: Why did you not ask him, why did you not ask him?

MR SNYMAN: I understood it that that was what he implied.

ADV NYOKA: Would you agree with me, if I say that the phrase make a plan, is so broad enough to include both legal and illegal methods or options? It is broad, it is all encompassing, do you agree with me?

MR SNYMAN: I will agree.

ADV NYOKA: Would you further agree with me that even in the context of illegal options, the phrase is broad enough to encompass less drastic methods, illegal methods?

MR SNYMAN: We have already said that the other options did not work and the situation on the ground became more militant, to such an extent that we almost could not execute our work and duties in the black communities.

ADV NYOKA: I will make it easier for you, just to give you three examples of less drastic illegal steps. The first one will include assaulting and torturing activists, burning their houses or motor vehicles or threats through the mail or telephone, could that not have been considered rather than taking out of life?

MR SNYMAN: No.

ADV NYOKA: Why not?

MR SNYMAN: We would not have done that, because perhaps innocent people could also have been injured in such attacks.

ADV NYOKA: All right. Let's just restrict ourselves to assaulting. Only one person will be injured, the victim or target, why did you not consider that one?

MR SNYMAN: No, I never assaulted a person and I would also never tell anyone to assault a person.

ADV NYOKA: So rather than assault, it is preferable to kill, is that your stance?

MR SNYMAN: No, but based on the reports given to me at that stage and the situation that was really out of control, we came to the conclusion that there weren't any other options, other than to eliminate the leaders.

ADV NYOKA: Just be fair to me, is it correct that you never considered assaulting activists? Not so?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: The other less drastic illegal step will be bombing Pebco offices, committing burglary in the offices, removing the documentation just to cripple it so that you can regain the initiative as Mr Du Plessis had said. Could you not have done that?

MR SNYMAN: No, that was not considered.

ADV NYOKA: The other less drastic illegal option, and I am very sorry to say this, will be since these three leaders had wives, to interfere in their marriages by smear campaigns alleging that they were spies or they had affairs. Could you not have done that, just to destroy them and to divert their attention from the struggle. Could you not have done that Mr Snyman?

MR SNYMAN: No, it was not considered.

ADV NYOKA: So in two instances you did not apply your mind properly to the situation before concluding that death is the only alternative, can you agree with me on that?

MR SNYMAN: I based my actions on the information that was daily at my disposal and also what Major Du Plessis had said, that the situation was getting totally out of control.

ADV NYOKA: Since the make a plan statement was made on the 14th of February, to the 8th of May, you had sufficient time to address your mind to all this legal and illegal avenues, not so? More than your mind?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct. We considered other options, but we realised that it would not work.

ADV NYOKA: Would you agree with me that the make a plan statement, even on legal avenues, meant that simply Mr Le Grange was criticising you, he was saying that please Security Branch of PE, pull up your socks, do your work effectively? Could that not have been the meaning?

MR SNYMAN: No, that is not how I understood it, because there was tremendous pressure on us from the side of the government, from the State Security Council side, from the Defence Force and even the opposition and the media, the opposition parties criticised us.

ADV NYOKA: For instance, that could have meant that please instigate the current UDF and AZAPO feud, so that two liberation groups fight against each other and not concentrate on the State, that could have meant that.

It could also have meant that get Pebco executive members to be informers so that their attentions are diverted from the State. Things like those or infiltrating ANC cadres, kill them when you find them with weapons. That could have meant that legally, not so?

MR SNYMAN: The purpose of this organisation was to take over the government of the day. They did everything within their power to in fact get to that result.

ADV NYOKA: When Mr Du Plessis made the submission to you, did he say to you that the Pebco leadership must be eliminated, or did he leave the conclusion to you?

MR SNYMAN: No, he put it to me that they had to be eliminated as he put it in his evidence.

ADV NYOKA: And did you not say look Mr Du Plessis, I am both a Christian and hold a highly responsible position of trustworthiness, I simply cannot authorise that. You didn't do that?

MR SNYMAN: I have already said I had great problems with my conscience in this regard. I would never have done something like this on my own. But because of the situation on the ground, and the whole motivation given to me, it was quite clear that no other alternative existed.

ADV NYOKA: You were involved in the monthly Joined Security Management Centre, monthly meetings, not so?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: When he made that submission, why did you not say to him look wait a little bit Mr Du Plessis, I am involved in the JSMC and it is trying with us Security Branch to reach solutions by legal ways. I can't do that, we can't do that unilaterally. We must do it jointly with the JSMC.

Why did you not stop him from doing that?

MR SNYMAN: No, it was quite clear that there was a lot of pressure from the JMS side and from the State Security Council and from politicians and because we were the first line of defence, they always threw it into our laps that we had to make a plan and that we had to normalise the situation.

So I did not go back to the JMS.

ADV NYOKA: Why did you not tell the JSMC that there was this suggestion and you really think you are going to implement it now, in pursuance of the objective of restoration of law and order?

MR SNYMAN: This was a clandestine operation, and I would not have conveyed it to the JSMC.

ADV NYOKA: But everyone was criticising you, the Minister of Law and Order, the JSMC, Defence Force people saying that you were not doing enough. There was also the politicians' statements that drastic plans must be embarked upon. You had no reason to hide that from them.

You could have said look, my action is in the context of your criticism, of your statements. Why is it clandestine when you are being authorised to do that implicitly?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct. The pressure was of such an extent that we really felt at that stage, that after the motivation that was given to me, that there was no other option or alternative way to normalise the situation.

ADV NYOKA: Right, but why did you not share your sentiment with the JSMC, why did you not do that? Why do you make it clandestine?

MR SNYMAN: As I have already said this was a clandestine operation and I would not have done it.

ADV NYOKA: So you were fearful of being criticised by them if they knew about that, is that what you are saying or suggesting?

MR SNYMAN: I don't know what their criticism would have been, but as I have said previously there was tacit approval of these kinds of incidents, that occurred all over the country, not only in Port Elizabeth.

ADV NYOKA: Is it not correct that when the three Pebco executive members of the first executive of Pebco, Mr Thozamilo Bota, Mona Padela and Palo Chuma were restricted in 1980, a new executive was elected and the executive kept on changing in 1981, 1982, 1983 and then the last one on the 26th of March 1985. Therefore killing certain people would not have been meaningful, do you agree with me?

MR SNYMAN: The Pebco at that stage, was a radical element and we believed that those three leaders were the prominent brain behind the unrest situation in the black areas.

ADV NYOKA: Was there any documentation produced and given to you, justifying that these three were the problem areas rather than the rest of the five executive members?

MR SNYMAN: Reports were given continuously by means of informers and other means that these people were primarily responsible for the situation that we experienced at that stage.

And that terrorists were also sent out of the country through them.

ADV NYOKA: I would like to be in your shoes. Can you tell me what it was about Mr Godolozi, what it was about Mr Hashe and what it was about Mr Galela that made you to take this ultimate step of killing each individual?

MR SNYMAN: I based my decisions on that which was reported by Major Du Plessis and his desk, his people. They were on the ground daily, they monitored this.

ADV NYOKA: So, you did not ascertain on your own about what the role of each individual was before taking such a monumental step of killing? It is not as light as assaulting a person?

MR SNYMAN: Daily reports were given with regard to the activities and the politicisation of the people by this leader group, the Pebco leaders.

ADV NYOKA: But initially you wanted to eliminate the entire Pebco leadership, not so?

MR SNYMAN: The motivation given to me by Major Du Plessis, was that these three people were the prominent leading figures in this organisation.

ADV NYOKA: I wish to put it to you that Pebco worked as a collective cadreship, not one of them was more prominent than others. It was just by chance that you killed those three.

It was only because they turned up due to their own misfortune, at the airport. Any comment about that?

MR SNYMAN: I don't agree. That was not the motivation that was given to me.

ADV NYOKA: And further more, there were further attempts to try to lure other Pebco executive members, Mr Hendrik Fassie for instance?

MR SNYMAN: I cannot comment on that, I was not specifically involved in the operation.

ADV NYOKA: I am very pleased to say that today he is sitting here in the Centenary Hall, alive and kicking. Any comment?

MR SNYMAN: I did not hear your question, please repeat?

ADV NYOKA: No, it was not a question, it was a comment. I am saying I am very pleased to say that he is here in Centenary Hall today, alive and kicking. It is just a comment, do you have anything to say? You don't have to say anything.

MR SNYMAN: No, I don't have any comment.

ADV NYOKA: And you said that you sat every morning with your senior, Brigadier Swart, who was the Regional South African Police Commissioner, not so? You reported to him every day, not so?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Did you share with him the suggestion made by Mr Du Plessis before he made it, or even afterwards, your action that you committed? Did you talk to him the morning after you got the report?

MR SNYMAN: No, I did not convey it to Brigadier Swart.

ADV NYOKA: Are you seriously suggesting Mr Snyman, that Mr Swart was not within the category of a need to know, being your senior and you reporting to him daily? Did you not deem it necessary that it was necessary for him to have known about this?

MR SNYMAN: Because it was a clandestine operation, I did not convey it to him.

ADV NYOKA: So, are you saying that it was clandestine up to your level, you were the ceiling? Not any one above you, to whom you reported daily?

MR SNYMAN: After the incident, the Minister of Law and Order was again at a meeting. He didn't say anything to me and I also did not convey anything to him. And at that stage I believed that they tacitly approved of it.

ADV NYOKA: When the media reported that the Pebco leaders were missing, didn't Mr Swart sitting with you, enquire whether you had a hand in that as the Security Branch? Did he not ask you anything to that effect?

MR SNYMAN: No, he never asked such a question of me.

ADV NYOKA: Did you not even discuss that, the two of you?

MR SNYMAN: No. Reports were made after the interdict, those were the only reports.

ADV NYOKA: You know, what I find strange is that in the same application, both of them, Mr Swart shares the same sentiments or advances the same reasons as to what could have happened to the Pebco 3. He said that they could have disappeared, he agreed with you that they could have disappeared in the UDF/AZAPO feud.

Yet, you say you never discussed that - what a strange coincidence? Any comment?

MR SNYMAN: I really can't recall, but it could be that we discussed it, but I am not sure.

ADV NYOKA: On the 7th of May 1985, a day before the abduction of the Pebco leaders, it was reported in the Herald that Mr Louis le Grange visited Port Elizabeth. Did he visit you as Regional Commander out of courtesy?

MR SNYMAN: No.

ADV NYOKA: Why did he not do that, because he had met you at Cradock and strangely he was here the day before the disappearance and he did not pay a courtesy visit to a head. I find that very strange?

MR SNYMAN: He would have contacted the Divisional Commissioner or the Head of the Defence Force at that stage, but he never made contact with my office.

ADV NYOKA: Did he not make any enquiries as to why these people disappeared after my visit, did he not make an enquiry?

MR SNYMAN: I cannot recall.

ADV NYOKA: So it could have happened, but you cannot recall?

MR SNYMAN: It is possible.

ADV NYOKA: And you said also the JSMC did not enquire and you did not tell them, not so?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Finally, the last aspect Mr Snyman, it is about legal options, the state of emergency was imposed in July, within two months of the disappearance of the Pebco 3.

Do you remember that?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: And in 1960, you were 37 years old and the District Commander in Grahamstown, not so?

MR SNYMAN: No, I never went to Grahamstown, accept in the office of the Divisional Commissioner.

ADV NYOKA: The introduction here is, 1960 DK Grahamstown, what does that mean? DK Grahamstown, does that not mean District Commander in Grahamstown in 1960, your biography?

MR SNYMAN: There is a small error, it says DK Grahamstown, but at that stage I was in the office, at that stage I was a clerk in the office of the Divisional Commissioner for a period of nine months and when our office moved back to Port Elizabeth, I went with the staff of the Divisional Commissioner, to come and work here in Port Elizabeth. I was never at the District Command.

ADV NYOKA: If drastic measures had to be taken, and you had the maturity of age in 1960, to remember the state of emergency, why did you not phone your pal, Mr Louis le Grange and say listen, that make a plan, I think we can make a plan of the imposition of a state of emergency.

This three leaders could have been here today, not so? In other words the state of emergency could have been imposed two months earlier, rather than later?

MR SNYMAN: Do you refer to 1960?

ADV NYOKA: I am saying that I am quoting 1960 because I am saying that you were 37 years old and you will remember the state of emergency of 1960 and its effectiveness.

Surely you could have suggested this to Mr Louis le Grange and said I think that make a plan, I understand what I can do. Why don't you impose a state of emergency rather than I, a Christian, Harold Snyman, killing people. Why did you not do that?

MR SNYMAN: The prerogative for the state of emergency is in the hands of the State President on advice from his Cabinet and the State Security Council and we on the ground level, forwarded all the necessary documentation with regard to the unrest, and they had to take the decision with regard to a state of emergency and not us.

ADV NYOKA: I accept that, but I thought you said you on the ground, the last fort of resistance, had to come with solutions. Surely if you could have said please try the imposition of a state of emergency, it could have been imposed two months prematurely. Just a suggestion, not so?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, it is a suggestion and it is still in the hands of the Security Head Office and the prerogative of the State President at that time.

ADV NYOKA: Why did you not suggest it, why did you not suggest it?

MR SNYMAN: We did not suggest it, we only gave report on what was the situation on the ground and the total anarchy at that stage. It was in their hands to institute the state of emergency.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, can I just step in here. Colonel the question really is, you had the opportunity of meeting with the Minister, you had the opportunity to discuss the situation with him, and he says to you make a plan.

Now, the question is why did you not bearing in mind that you had an experience of effectiveness of the 1960 state of emergency, why did you not go back to the Minister who had shown that he was willing to discuss the situation with you, why not go back to him and say you know, you remember I had a meeting with you and you said make a plan.

But I think that you should consider a state of emergency which of course he would discuss with the Cabinet and eventually it will get to the State President.

MR SNYMAN: I did not consider it at that stage. As I said that I reported with regard to what the situation was like on the ground and we also emphasised the urgency and the seriousness and I still believe it was the prerogative of the State President and his advisors to institute a state of emergency.

ADV NYOKA: I just have four more questions, Your Worship, just four more. Why did you not suggest to the Minister Mr Snyman, that part of the plan will be to declare Pebco an unlawful organisation, why did you not suggest that? It was another legal option?

MR SNYMAN: I did not.

ADV NYOKA: Why not?

MR SNYMAN: I didn't suggest it.

ADV NYOKA: Why did you not do so?

MR SNYMAN: I thought that the Minister and his advisors would do that because it was also done from Head Office and from government side, it was not done from the local office.

I know that at that stage meetings were prohibited.

ADV NYOKA: Why did you not suggest that the only eight executive members of Pebco be removed from this area to a remote area in South Africa, thus to diminish their effectiveness, banishment in other words?

MR SNYMAN: Our previous experience in these cases were that it also didn't work. And it was also not considered at that stage because then there would have been some agitation from people on the ground, locally.

ADV NYOKA: I do not understand why it was not working. You never even tried it in this case.

MR SNYMAN: We did not try it.

ADV NYOKA: Why not?

MR SNYMAN: Because as I said it also didn't work in other cases, it also didn't work with us on the ground. It was a joke at that stage.

ADV NYOKA: Can you tell me of one case where it didn't work, a living example of that?

MR SNYMAN: After 12 years with no records in my possession, I am not able to say that to you.

ADV NYOKA: Are you saying you were banishing thousands of people for you not to remember? Surely you could have remembered one, there were not many people removed in such circumstances? Were you removing thousands of people Mr Snyman?

MR SNYMAN: There were many incidents, but I cannot remember. I don't have records in front of me. After I went on pension, I totally retired. I did not involve myself with these kinds of political situations afterwards.

ADV NYOKA: Let me make life easier for you, during those two years when you were a Commander, 1984 to 1986, did you remove any activists to any other area that you can recall?

MR SNYMAN: No, I cannot recall. Perhaps some of my colleagues could remember that were more in the field, on the ground itself.

ADV NYOKA: Finally, are you saying that detention without trial was not being practised at the time that you were considering the permanent removal from society of the three Pebco leaders?

MR SNYMAN: No. It did not work at that stage because the moment you do it, there was agitation to release the people, there were boycotts and so forth.

ADV NYOKA: I am instructed that there were people in detention at that stage, some of them street committee members and other committee members. How can you dismiss a measure as being useless when you were still implementing it?

MR SNYMAN: It is possible, I cannot comment on that. It is a long time ago.

ADV NYOKA: Restriction, is it not furthermore correct that after the last state of emergency of 1986 to 1989, UDF leadership and Pebco leadership were restricted from six in the morning to six at night, for about three months? Is that not correct?

MR SNYMAN: That is possible, I cannot remember those specific cases.

ADV NYOKA: So despite all that was said about restriction not having the desired legal effects, it was being used although it was useless not so?

MR SNYMAN: As I said I cannot recall cases that my learned friend is referring to. If it was the case, then it must have been.

ADV NYOKA: By the way, we had resigned in 1986, I forgot, you were no longer in the picture at 1989 to be fair to you.

Finally Mr Snyman, the bottom line was that you were against the implementation of the (indistinct), because it was bringing the communism or the SACP, ANC/SACP communist alliance, you were against communism, not so to be brought into South Africa?

MR SNYMAN: The struggle was against communism and the expansionism of it, and it was put quite clearly to us from the politicians' side and at that stage we believed that these people wanted to take over the country and that the government would not allow them to take over and we were the servants of the State.

ADV NYOKA: I wish to close by saying that, I wish to put it to you that the mother of all paradoxes, the situation was that all the draconian legislation, security legislation that was being employed like detention without trial, solitary confinement, the killing of activists were measures that were used by the so-called communist regimes, starting from as far as Russia to post-revolutionary Russia and communist China. The same method that you were using, you were fighting against, you were using. Any comment?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct, we fought against that.

ADV DE JAGER: But the question is or the statement put to you is that you used the same draconian measures as those that were used by communist regimes. You used exactly the same here against them?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, I was only a servant of the State and I had to execute the laws of the State. We didn't make the laws ourselves, we just had to implement and execute it.

ADV NYOKA: So Mr Snyman, you dislike something so much that you ended up liking it, because you used it, not so?

MR SNYMAN: What was used by the Security Branch, was legislation put there by the government and we were the people implementing it whether we liked it or not.

ADV NYOKA: I put it to you that as in the other four instances that I quoted earlier on, you are not telling us the truth and you are hiding certain people who knew about the Pebco 3 and I further put it to you that you are not genuine about apologising, because you have not apologised to the family, having all the opportunity to do so. Do you have any comment?

MR SNYMAN: I have already said that this situation was discussed with my legal counsel on my left hand side, and if he wants to say something at this stage, I will appreciate it because that was the advice given to us by him.

ADV NYOKA: No, I don't want him to testify, you are testifying now. Don't seek assistance Mr Snyman, just answer the question.

MR SNYMAN: I believe that in future there will be an opportunity for us to get to know the family.

ADV NYOKA: No further questions Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV NYOKA.

CHAIRPERSON: We will adjourn for 15 minutes.

ON RESUMPTION:

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Hartle?

HAROLD SNYMAN: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS HARTLE: Thank you Mr Chairman. Are you ready Mr Snyman,?

MR SNYMAN: I am.

MS HARTLE: In what other applications are you involved before this Commission?

MR SNYMAN: I am involved in three applications.

MS HARTLE: Can you please name those?

MR SNYMAN: The Biko case, the Pebco case and the Goniwe case.

MS HARTLE: At the time of the disappearance of the Pebco 3, what was your job description in the position which you held in the Security Branch?

MR SNYMAN: I was the Commanding Officer of the Security Branch, Eastern Province.

MS HARTLE: I understand the position you held, but what were you tasked to do especially, I mean were you charged with personnel, were you charged with troubleshooting, were you charged with liaison specifically, with those in higher positions of authority, what was expected of you in that position at that time?

MR SNYMAN: As Commanding Officer it was my responsibility to take charge of the division.

MS HARTLE: Can you be a bit more specific Mr Snyman, I put it to you that I need to establish exactly what it was that was expected of you in that position in relation to staff, in relation to liaising with persons in higher authority, troubleshooting in security areas, what exactly was expected of you in that position?

MR SNYMAN: Sometimes we went to Head Office where conferences were held, where the situation was discussed, I was responsible for the sessions on the JSMC and control over the whole division.

MS HARTLE: And were you personally aware of what was going on on the ground as it were or did you consult with other officials in order to ascertain exactly what was happening in your area at the time?

MR SNYMAN: No, every morning we held conferences where the security situation was discussed and where reports were made to me and where in turn I reported to the Divisional Commissioner every morning.

MS HARTLE: And who would report to you in this regard?

MR SNYMAN: The different desks at the Security Branch, Eastern Province.

MS HARTLE: And would it be fair to say Mr Snyman, that you based your report in turn, solely on the advice given to you by these officials who consulted with you?

MR SNYMAN: Are you now referring to the security men who were under my control?

MS HARTLE: That is correct, those who reported to you?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct, they reported to me.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, are you understanding my question? I am asking you if the advice given to you by the officials underneath you, was the only information you had concerning the affairs of the Eastern Cape at the time? You didn't have personal knowledge?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: So if the reports of those who served under you, were dubious, you followed such dubious reports? If those reports were exaggerated, you followed that exaggerated reports? Do you understand what I am saying?

MR SNYMAN: I cannot remember any suspicious reports that I received, the received that was received were reports from the events which happened every day.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, is it correct that you had no personal knowledge of what was going on on the ground? That you based your reports to the higher committees, on what was informed to you, what was advised to you by those serving under you?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct. I had a great deal of responsibility that was placed on my shoulders and I had to be led by the information that was supplied by the people of the Security Branch.

MS HARTLE: Who were those persons serving under you on who you relied for your information?

MR SNYMAN: There were different desks.

MS HARTLE: Who are they Mr Snyman?

MR SNYMAN: I cannot recall all the names, but there were desks for white affairs, asian and coloured affairs and black affairs, combatting of terrorism, etc.

MS HARTLE: Any of those persons who advised you and consulted with you in respect of what was going on, are they applicants before this Commission?

MR SNYMAN: There are some of them who are applicants at the moment.

MS HARTLE: Can you name them Mr Snyman?

MR SNYMAN: Major Du Plessis was one of them, Captain Sakkie van Zyl, Captain Deon Nieuwoudt and the other who are appearing together with me.

MS HARTLE: In respect of the Pebco 3 operation, is it correct that the buck stopped with you as it were. If you had not made that decision to eliminate, the three might have been alive today?

MR SNYMAN: That is true.

ADV SANDI: Ms Hartle, can I just interpose for a moment. I want to ask a question which is very related to the one you have just asked, so that we do not come back to this. Can I ask Mr Snyman, if you were told that a certain person because of his or her political activities, was becoming or had become a candidate for elimination, would you go into the trouble of getting the file on such a person and use it and see what sort of person you are getting a report about?

MR SNYMAN: It worked in such a way at the Security Branch that if information came in regarding any person's activities, then that desk would place that file on my desk and I would have gone through it and if there was a letter to be signed, I would have done so.

ADV SANDI: On these three gentlemen, did you ever go through each one's file and see what this person is doing or what he is alleged to be involved in?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV SANDI: Carry on Ms Hartle, I do not want to interrupt.

MS HARTLE: Thank you. In your submissions to this Commission, at page 7 or page 21 of the record, you state as follows in the second last paragraph: This is after your informal discussion with the then Minister of Law and Order, Mr Louis le Grange and after he had informed you that it was expected of you to make a plan concerning the agitators in the Eastern Cape, you said as follows: I understood it and interpreted it that these activists who were under discussion had to be killed as it had already been mentioned at the meeting that the normal, legal options had no solution to offer for the anarchy that was taking place.

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: Now, is it fair to say Mr Snyman, that you surmised that you had authority to carry out the Pebco 3 operation?

MR SNYMAN: As a result of what was submitted to me and the situation at grassroots level, at that stage I thought that it was the right decision.

MS HARTLE: Did the then Minister, Mr Le Grange name Messrs Godolozi, Hashe and Galela?

MR SNYMAN: He did not mention names. He told me that we had to make a plan with the activists in the Eastern Cape and this included Cradock and the whole Eastern Cape Security Branch division.

MS HARTLE: Is that all he said in relation to the Pebco 3, in relation to the Pebco activities?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: Was a statement made in relation to a particular incident or particular incidents which had occurred and which were perhaps discussed at the meetings which you had held, or in your informal discussions with him?

MR SNYMAN: Before I had the informal discussions with the Minister, I had a properly motivated report which I gave to the meeting present that day at Cradock.

MS HARTLE: Was that report in writing?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, it was in writing.

MS HARTLE: Does that report exist today?

MR SNYMAN: I cannot say.

MS HARTLE: What did that report say Mr Snyman?

MR SNYMAN: That report dealt with the unrest situation in the Eastern Cape area.

MS HARTLE: What in relation to the Pebco activists rendered it necessary to eliminate them?

MR SNYMAN: As we have already said previously in our statements and in our testimony, that the situation at grassroots level at that stage, was one of absolute anarchy. It was totally uncontrollable and it is in this form that the report was given to the Minister.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, I am not interested in what submissions your colleagues have made. You have made the decision to eliminate the Pebco 3, I want to hear from you what it was that you considered justified that decision?

MR SNYMAN: That which was conveyed to me by Major Du Plessis, which he had motivated properly and which I saw in the reports which were sent through to me, I based my decision on this, although I said that I was doing this against my will, but I based my decision on that.

MS HARTLE: Mr Du Plessis must have furnished compelling reasons then for you to make that decision. I want to know what those reasons were that were furnished to you?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct. I cannot recall everything that he said in his motivation, but what he did say was as things had been happening at grassroots level, the ungovernability of the black areas, the murders, etc.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, what in relation to the three deceased rendered it necessary for you to make that decision to eliminate them?

MR SNYMAN: Because at that stage they were the leadership who had brought about this situation in the black areas.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, is there any reason why members who served under you such as Major Du Plessis and Captain Van Zyl, wouldn't have been better candidates to sit on those Committees as they had first hand knowledge of what was happening in the area at the time?

MR SNYMAN: Which Committees are you referring to?

MS HARTLE: The security meetings that you attended and to which you refer in your submissions?

MR SNYMAN: It was my prerogative as Commanding Officer of the Security Branch, to submit those reports to JSMC and to Head Office etc.

MS HARTLE: There was ultimately dangers, Mr Snyman, because you could not give first hand information, you never had first hand knowledge of what was happening on the ground?

MR SNYMAN: That statement is not correct. I was informed on a daily basis as to the situation on grassroots level.

MS HARTLE: And the information furnished to you, may have been incorrect or exaggerated, do you agree with that?

MR SNYMAN: No, it was not exaggerated. The proof was there, vehicles, necklaced murders, etc.

ADV SANDI: Can I ask a question Mr Snyman. In the course of the discussion with Mr Du Plessis when he came to see you, did he specifically discuss specific activities by the three deceased, or was this just a general statement that a time has arrived to eliminate these Pebco activists?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct. He sketched the situation as we were experiencing it at grassroots level at that stage.

ADV SANDI: Maybe you didn't get the question clearly. Mr Snyman, did he discuss anything with you specifically about Mr Galela, Mr Godolozi and Mr Hashe?

MR SNYMAN: Everything that he reported to me, was in line with what was happening at grassroots level and he also explained to me that those three people were the leading figures in the situation which was prevailing.

ADV SANDI: What did he say to you Galela for example, Mr Galela was doing?

MR SNYMAN: With respect, Your Honour, at this stage I cannot recall word for word but what was told to me was that what was happening at grassroots level at that stage, and we mentioned a great many incidents that policemen could not even live in their homes in the black areas, they had to be given other housing.

In other words the situation was really ungovernable.

MS HARTLE: You said that Minister Le Grange had informed you that you should make a plan with the agitators in the Eastern Cape. Were other members of Pebco named as being agitators, were they discussed in your meeting with Mr Le Grange?

MR SNYMAN: The submission which was made, was about the unrest in general in the Eastern Cape, which included the Pebco 3, the UDF people as well as the Goniwe 4 in Cradock. The unrest was as a result of their actions and the politicisation thereof.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, was it your personal decision that Messrs Godolozi, Hashe and Galela should be eliminated, rather than other leaders in the Pebco structures?

MR SNYMAN: After the submission of Major Du Plessis we reached the conclusion that these were the three leading figures who in general, were responsible for the situation as we were experiencing it at grassroots level.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, I put it to you that you could not have known at that stage that the Pebco 3 would be at the airport at the 8th of May together?

MR SNYMAN: I have no knowledge of that, I was not involved in the operation.

MS HARTLE: I put it to you that it is absolutely strange that you should say that those three were identified at that stage as the three required to be eliminated and then coincidentally the three of them arrive at the airport, on the 8th of May, together and they are then abducted?

ADV DE JAGER: Was it coincidentally or was it organised? Were they sort of invited to be there, so it wasn't a coincidence, they in fact organised it that they should be there?

MS HARTLE: Mr Chairman, there was mention made of the fact that Messrs Fassie and Mgoi would also have been at the airport on that occasion. Perhaps I can rephrase the question.

Sorry, there was an expectation that five of the Pebco leadership would be at the airport at that evening. You could not have known that at the time you decided to eliminate Mr Godolozi, Mr Hashe and Mr Galela?

ADV BOOYENS: With respect Mr Chairman, I must also object to that question to that. Where does my learned friend get that from? There was a newspaper report attached to Nieuwoudt's affidavit which just referred to that, but nowhere in any of the statements is it stated that that was the intention.

CHAIRPERSON: You say it was only in a report in a newspaper?

ADV BOOYENS: I think there was a newspaper report attached but that is what the Pebco people alleged that they were all five supposed to be there, but none of the applicants have stated that the intention was to get all five of them there. In fact the applicants all along and even from Nieuwoudt, which hasn't testified yet, which was the people involved in the planning, there is no reference that the whole Pebco leadership, all five, would be there.

CHAIRPERSON: Is she not entitled to put to the witness even that version in the newspaper for his comment?

ADV BOOYENS: Yes, but not on the basis that it was stated by one of the applicants.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, certainly yes, if it was not stated by them. But I would rather think that even if it was stated in the newspapers, she is entitled to put that version to the witness for his comment.

MS HARTLE: Mr Chairman, with respect, I never suggested that one of the applicants had said as much. I am referring to the newspaper report at page 253 of the record, which forms an annexure to Mr Nieuwoudt's application.

Perhaps if I could put the question differently Mr Snyman. Messrs Fassie and Mgoi said that they might have been included in the Pebco leadership who arrived at the airport on the 8th of May 1985 and you could not have known at the time that you had the discussion with Mr Le Grange or Mr Du Plessis that you would get an opportunity where those three Godolozi, Hashe and Galela would be at a certain place at a certain time on their own.

MR SNYMAN: I can only comment on what I was told by Major Du Plessis in his report, in which the Pebco 3 were mentioned by name. No other names were mentioned and I am not aware of what happened at the airport.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, you've heard it being put to some of the previous applicants that Mr De Klerk in the National Party's amplified submissions, made on 14 May 1997, in response to the question whether the NP claimed involvement for the killing of the Pebco 3 specifically responded that the killings were unauthorised and mala fides.

How do you clarify that, how do you explain that?

MR SNYMAN: I do not have any explanation for that, nor did I ever listen to Mr De Klerk's report.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, I am putting it to you that this is what he said. That the killings were unauthorised and mala fides. How do you explain that now, with hindsight?

MR SNYMAN: I am explaining it only as I have just testified, that arising from the discussion with the Minister of Law and Order and the later discussions between Major Du Plessis and I, that the decision was made to eliminate these three people.

MS HARTLE: Once you had decided that these three were to be eliminated, how did you advise those serving under you of the instruction?

MR SNYMAN: I never informed anyone. This took place on a need to know basis. It was a clandestine operation and only the people who are involved in the amnesty applications, were aware of that matter.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, what information did you give to those serving under you who were required to carry out the operation? What was the information given to them?

MR SNYMAN: I gave no information to those serving under me. This operation was carried out by Major Du Plessis and others and they in turn, gave the necessary instructions.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, I put it to you that even clandestine operations require some sort of detailed planning to obviate detection, what exactly did you inform Du Plessis, he was to do and how was he to do it?

MR SNYMAN: I did not tell Du Plessis how the operation was to be carried out. He did it on his own initiative. I only gave permission after he had motivated it to me.

MS HARTLE: You must have given some thought to the operation failing? Did you consider that?

MR SNYMAN: That is a possibility.

MS HARTLE: In the other matters in which you are seeking amnesty, was there also a lack of detail with regard to the specific operations? Was it just a decision given by you that a plan had to be carried out, were you also not involved in the practical implementation of those deaths?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: Did you consider that the operation had been a success?

MR SNYMAN: I allowed myself to be led by Major Du Plessis who reported to me that the operation had been a success.

MS HARTLE: In carrying out the operation, what did you hope to achieve on the ground?

MR SNYMAN: I was not involved with the operation at grassroots level.

ADV DE JAGER: That is not the question. The question before you is what did you want to achieve by executing this operation?

MR SNYMAN: The motivation which was given to me by Major Du Plessis and the ungovernability which prevailed at grassroots level, made us arrive at this decision, and he went further with the execution of the operation. I was not involved with it in any way, nor did I have any details about this operation.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, when you make a decision to eliminate persons, there must be a reason in your mind why that was necessary and how it would impact on the ground? In other words did you expect that people would know that the Pebco 3 had been killed and that it would serve as a deterrent? Were you expecting that if the three were simply removed, the leadership element was removed, that there would be less activity on the ground? What did you understand was going to happen if your operation was carried out?

MR SNYMAN: At that stage we believed that the elimination of the leadership, would stabilise the situation because they were the brain power at that stage with the unrest that we were experiencing.

MS HARTLE: And you didn't consider that there would be other leaders to replace those three almost immediately after their disappearance?

MR SNYMAN: That is possible, but at that stage we thought that they were the brain power and they were the leaders who had brought about the situation in the black townships.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, I want to refer you to page 10 of your submissions, paragraph 3(b). In response to the question what your motivation was for the act. You responded as follows as a result of facts in the above-mentioned paragraph, it was essential to eliminate these persons to neutralise the anarchy and the violence that was increasing.

As a result of the elimination of the three leadership figures of Pebco, the organisation was left without leaders and this contributed to the decrease of unrest and violence in the area.

ADV DE JAGER: Are you referring to page 23?

MS HARTLE: It is 24, typed 10 of the submissions, it is page 24, the paginated page 24. Mr Snyman, my emphasis is on the last sentence, it contributed to the large scale decrease of unrest and violence in the area.

Can you please explain that submission?

MR SNYMAN: We believed that after these events the unrest would decrease and we thought that this would contribute to a partial decrease in unrest and violence in this area.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, you say that is what you believed. I am asking you what effect the elimination had in relation to the statement you make there, it contributed. How did it contribute?

MR SNYMAN: There was a decrease in the situation at that stage.

MS HARTLE: Are you at liberty to give us details Mr Snyman, or are you making a bold statement?

MR SNYMAN: It is impossible for me now after 12, 13 years, to say exactly what happened at grassroots level.

MS HARTLE: Isn't it so Mr Snyman, that it stirred up more unrest because the Pebco leadership had disappeared and people were wanting to know what had happened to their leaders?

MR SNYMAN: It is possible, I cannot recall.

MS HARTLE: What was the purpose of giving the Commission the minutes of the special GOS meeting held on the 7th of June 1985?

MR SNYMAN: I do not know which document you are referring to now.

MS HARTLE: It is Exhibit K.

CHAIRPERSON: What is the question?

MS HARTLE: What was the applicant hoping to demonstrate by handing in this exhibit, what is it supposed to prove to the Commission?

MR SNYMAN: It was clear that in the ranks of the Defence Force, plans were made and this is the reason that we handed it. Because these people are highly trained task forces, who are only there for one reason and that is to eliminate people.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, I want to refer you to page 2 of the minutes of that meeting, which were held on the 7th of June 1985, approximately a month after the disappearance of the Pebco 3.

And in particular to paragraph 4(b), under the heading Conflict UDF and AZAPO. Where the minutes state that approximately 200 women went to Rev Makwena and he told them that the violence between UDF and AZAPO will continue until the heads of five UDF people have rolled and then you name them. Edgor Ngoi, Henry Fassie, Mono Padela, Africa Naqolo and Nkoseli Jack.

MR SNYMAN: That is correct, that is the information which came through at that stage.

MS HARTLE: Now this is a meeting which was held approximately a month after the disappearance of the Pebco 3, the abduction of the Pebco 3 rather I should say and at that stage there seem still to have been a major problem on the ground? And there was a suggestion that these five leaders then should be eliminated if one has regard to the terminology employed there?

ADV BOOYENS: No, with respect, my learned friend should read that paragraph again. It has got nothing to do with - these five leaders, when translated this means that informers reported that about 200 women went to Rev Makwena of AZAPO and that he informed them that because of the dispute and violence between the UDF and AZAPO will continue until the heads of the five UDF persons had been taken, namely - it certainly does not indicate that it was part of the elimination by Security Forces.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, what I am putting to you is that even after the abduction of the Pebco 3, the problems continued, the unrest continued. Even after those three leadership had been removed, there was still a suggestion that there couldn't be peace until the other five leaders had been removed?

MR SNYMAN: As my learned friend said, it was at our insistence, it was not said at our insistence and I cannot comment on that story at all. This is a feud that existed between them.

ADV SANDI: Sorry, I think that portion is being contrasted with the last sentence on page 10 which was read to you a short while ago where you said after the elimination of the three, there was a large scale decrease of unrest and as I understand the question, paragraph 4(b) is being put to you to indicate for whatever reason, there was still some unrest in the area even after the elimination of the people, isn't that the question Ms Hartle?

MS HARTLE: That is correct, thank you.

ADV SANDI: She is putting to you that even after the elimination of the Pebco 3 there was still some unrest in the area, it didn't decrease.

MR SNYMAN: That is correct, but as my other friend has said in his testimony that there was a decrease because they were working on grassroots level every day. We described it as a partial decrease.

ADV SANDI: But Mr Snyman, when one goes through this whole document of the minutes of this meeting which occurred a month later after these three gentlemen were eliminated, you do not get the impression here that there is a decrease in the violence.

MR SNYMAN: As I said, there was possibly a partial decrease, but then I believe it was incited again until finally a state of emergency was announced.

ADV SANDI: How long was this partial decrease?

MR SNYMAN: I cannot reply to this specifically.

ADV SANDI: The partial decrease as you called it, lasted up to the time it became necessary to declare the state of emergency, is that what you are saying?

MR SNYMAN: That is possible.

ADV SANDI: Carry on Ms Hartle.

MS HARTLE: Thank you.

ADV DE JAGER: The state of emergency that was announced, was it only valid here in Port Elizabeth or do you know how wide it stretched?

MR SNYMAN: If I remember correctly it was in the Eastern Cape and the Witwatersrand area. I am not quite sure.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, the minutes also suggest that the organisation was not without leaders.

MR SNYMAN: That is possible, I cannot recall when a new Chairman or President was elected. I am not capable of replying to that at this stage.

MS HARTLE: And you never considered in making the decision to eliminate the three, that the leadership would grow up again almost instantly? That wasn't a consideration of yours?

MR SNYMAN: At that stage, those three leaders were the people who had incited the unrest and at that stage it was decided that they were the people who had to be eliminated.

MS HARTLE: Colonel Snyman, would you say the same of the five members names in the minutes of the meeting, that they also stirred up unrest?

MR SNYMAN: I cannot comment on that now. I don't know, I do not have the statistics in front of me and that which was said or done in unrest situation at that stage, I cannot say.

MS HARTLE: Are those names familiar to you, Mgoi, Fassie, Padela, (indistinct) and Mr Jack?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, the names are known to me.

MS HARTLE: Were they a problem, did they pose a problem to the Security Branch?

MR SNYMAN: Most definitely they had files on them and their activities were being monitored.

MS HARTLE: Isn't it so Mr Snyman, that if you had planned to eliminate the three, that it was an absolutely futile decision? The consequence of the elimination was futile?

MR SNYMAN: No, at that stage we believed that this would improve the situation.

MS HARTLE: If you merely believed that it would make it better and it hadn't achieved that result, why do you persist in your application in saying it contributed to the large scale decrease of violence in the area?

MR SNYMAN: It should have been in the reports which were given to me thereafter that in a small or partial degree there had been a decrease in violence.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, this information must have been necessary at the time you drafted this application for amnesty, you must have considered whether or not indeed there was political motivation for the atrocity and you are stating now, with hindsight, that it did contribute to a decrease in unrest and violence or be it partial?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: Do you hold that belief now?

MR SNYMAN: As I said earlier in my testimony we were employees of the State and at that stage we believed that the government did not want to hand over power and activists wanted to take over the country and we believed at that stage, that what we were doing, was correct.

But if I look back now, after so many years, as I have said earlier, where a large portion of the population were discriminated against in this country, then I now think that it could have been wrong.

MS HARTLE: Isn't it so Mr Snyman that you persisted with this allegation in your submissions, because you want to be successful in this application for amnesty, on the basis of the act having been politically motivated?

MR SNYMAN: It was definitely politically motivated. We were in the employ of the State, we had to protect the State and its establishment and structures, we had to keep them in power.

MR BRINK: Mr Chairman, I hesitate to interrupt, but I think with great respect to my learned friend, this has been dealt with at some length and I think it is getting somewhat repetitive and I am a bit concerned about the time that this cross-examination is taking.

MS HARTLE: I will move along. If you look at paragraph 11(b) you say that you have taken the order from none other than yourself? Is that correct? It is at page 24 of the record.

MR SNYMAN: That is correct. I took the decision after I had the informal discussions with the Minister at Cradock and also the submission was given to me by Major Du Plessis with regard to the situation on the ground.

MS HARTLE: Would it not then have been correct to state that your instruction came from Minister Louis le Grange?

MR SNYMAN: It actually also contributed to the decision that we took.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, when the families brought the applications, the (indistinct) applications for their loved ones to be produced, is it so that the Security Branch was embarrassed by virtue of the allegations that they had been seen in Alexandra and elsewhere?

MR SNYMAN: It was that we didn't detain them at that stage and with the facts that we now present to the Amnesty Committee, it wasn't at that stage mentioned.

MS HARTLE: What did you decide to do once the applications were brought? After the first application was brought and there were allegations made that the persons were not dead, but that they had been abducted from the airport?

MR SNYMAN: I am not understanding quite clearly what you are asking?

MS HARTLE: Did you discuss with anybody that?

MR SNYMAN: No.

MS HARTLE: You kept that information to yourself?

MR SNYMAN: We all made statements in that case where we denied it.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, how were operations of this nature kept a secret. What was the policy of the Security Branch in relation to these events in which you had complicity?

MR SNYMAN: As I have said earlier in my testimony, quite a few of these things happened and we assumed that our own Head Office and on Ministerial level, it was tacitly seen, it was a clandestine operation and we didn't report it to Head Office.

MS HARTLE: Did all of those who were involved in the operation take an oath of secrecy that if any of the allegations ever surfaced, nobody would claim to have any knowledge of the events?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, we all took an oath of secrecy.

MS HARTLE: If the Committee would just bear with me for a moment? I have nothing further, thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS HARTLE.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Brink?

MR BRINK: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nolte, I did not refer to you earlier on. Did you want to put any questions on behalf of Mr Van Zyl or is there no need for that?

MR NOLTE: Mr Chairman, no thank you.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR NOLTE.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

ADV SANDI: Mr Snyman, just one or two questions from me at this stage. As I understand this aspect of your evidence, the elimination of the Pebco 3 contributed to bring about what you referred to a partial decrease in violence, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: We believed that at that stage.

ADV SANDI: But later there was an upsurge of violence with the result that a state of emergency was declared?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV SANDI: Now, if that is so, why were the other Pebco members not eliminated?

MR SNYMAN: The submission which was given to me was that only those three people who were the leaders of Pebco, it was only the three of them who were the leaders.

ADV SANDI: We have also been told that one of the things the Pebco 3 would do would be to incite members of the public into committing acts of violence. Are you aware of that?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct, we experienced that on the ground.

ADV SANDI: I have seen from a copy of a microfilm on the file of Mr Godolozi, that he addressed not less than 27 meetings. Are you aware of that?

MR SNYMAN: It is possible that he addressed those meetings, but I am also aware of the fact that later on these meetings were prohibited.

ADV SANDI: You have not thought to furnish this Committee with a tape of maybe one of the speeches of incitement?

MR SNYMAN: It is impossible for me. Since 1986 I am not a member of the South African Police and at this stage I cannot do it, I am sorry.

ADV SANDI: Thank you Mr Snyman, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you discuss what Mr Le Grange told you, with Brigadier Swart at any time?

MR SNYMAN: No, I never discussed it with him.

CHAIRPERSON: If that is how you understood Mr Le Grange that what he was saying was that you could go and kill, shouldn't you have discussed that with Brigadier Swart?

MR SNYMAN: As I have said earlier in my evidence, this was a clandestine operation, it was on a need to know basis and none of the other organisations were informed at that stage.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I am talking about the situation before you actually eliminated these people. Mr Le Grange was supposed to have, according to you, given an approval to go ahead and eliminate these people. At that stage you could have discussed that with Brigadier Swart, because as yet there had been no clandestine operation that had taken place.

If anything, he could have been party to that clandestine operation?

MR SNYMAN: No, I didn't discuss it with the Divisional Commissioner.

CHAIRPERSON: But shouldn't you have done that?

MR SNYMAN: As I have said in my evidence this morning, it was a great problem for my conscience to reach this decision, and I didn't take it further, I didn't report it to the Divisional Commissioner, I didn't report it to JSMC, I didn't go back to the Minister.

CHAIRPERSON: So Brigadier Swart was never told the truth at any stage about what happened to this three people?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: He was your immediate senior, shouldn't you have confided with him about this?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct, he is my immediate senior, but as I said it was a clandestine operation and we didn't do it.

CHAIRPERSON: The deceased were abducted on the morning of the 8th I believe, of May. Did you discuss the operation that morning with Mr Du Plessis?

MR SNYMAN: No.

CHAIRPERSON: I am sorry, I am being reminded by one of the Committee members that the abduction was on the evening of the 8th, so that day the 8th of May, you never discussed the elimination with Colonel Du Plessis?

MR SNYMAN: I cannot really recall with regard to the different dates, but at several occasions this matter was in fact mentioned and at one particular incident the motivation was given, the decision was taken that the elimination should take place.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you know beforehand that these people are going to be abducted at the airport?

MR SNYMAN: No, I had no knowledge of how the operation would be carried out.

CHAIRPERSON: You were referred to a statement by Mr de Klerk to the effect that the killing was unauthorised and mala fide I think. Was Mr Le Grange not in the Cabinet of Mr De Klerk?

MR SNYMAN: I don't know whether he was in the Cabinet of Mr De Klerk, but we based our view on the tacit approval of members of the Cabinet when such events happened and also with reference to the document that was handed in this morning, that no enquiries were made and no investigation was launched.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Snyman, perhaps I can assist you. Mr Le Grange was Minister of Law and Order in the cabinet of Mr P.W. Botha.

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: And Mr Vlok, I think he took over in 1987 from Mr Le Grange.

MR SNYMAN: That is possible, I was already not part of the SAP.

ADV DE JAGER: So he was not in the Cabinet of Mr De Klerk, he was not Minister of Law and Order, he was at that stage Speaker of the Parliament, when Mr De Klerk became President.

MR SNYMAN: It may be the case.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.

ADV BOOYENS: Chairperson, could I perhaps just add for clarity. I had a look at page 240, Mr De Klerk was at that stage the Minister of Internal Affairs and National Education in the Cabinet of President Botha, just to make it hundred percent clear.

You will see that on page 240.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. My impression though is that if the media is anything to go by and it may just be wrong, it may be that P.W. Botha was being wrongly quoted, I can't guarantee that, but the impression which one gets is that his view is that he did not have a policy that people be eliminated.

MR SNYMAN: I cannot comment on that, but as we said that this document that was submitted where these items have been eliminated, there must have been some of those who actually had knowledge of the events in the country.

CHAIRPERSON: Don't you think that you might have misunderstood Mr Le Grange when he said go and make a plan? Did you really think that he actually meant that you could go and kill people?

MR SNYMAN: At that stage, after the briefing and after we had mentioned everything that we had done and the legal options weren't working any more, I could only make one deduction and that is that he actually meant that.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, do you have any questions?

RE-EXAMINATION BY ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, yes. Just to clarify a few technicalities. Mr Snyman, Mr Swart was the Divisional Commissioner, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: We weren't all policemen - was the Divisional Commissioner in command, was he the senior officer in the province in command of all the different divisions, Robbery, Detectives, everything?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: With regard to specific security work, in other words security work, clandestine operations, infiltrations and so forth, did you do it through Swart or Security Headquarters in Pretoria?

MR SNYMAN: Our reports were made to Security Head Office in Pretoria and the only time that we contacted with Swart, was when we had to inform him of the security situation on the ground, on a daily basis.

ADV BOOYENS: He didn't control your security operations, that was done through Head Office?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: He was in a coordinating capacity?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Perhaps there could have been a problem with understanding between you and my colleague on the other side, you said she asked you whether you after you killed these people, whether you took an oath to secrecy and you said we all signed an oath of secrecy. Did you refer to this or was it that one for security? That was before you get this clearance for security situations, you have to sign

an oath that you would not publicise anything that came to your knowledge?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Was there anywhere an oath, where you took a blood oath, with regard to this operation? It would now be you and those involved, the other applicants, did you ever take such an oath?

MR SNYMAN: No.

ADV BOOYENS: With regard to the partial decrease of the violence after the death of these people, is it really possible to give a percentage that it decreased by such a percentage or was it clear from reports that there was a decrease, that you made this inference?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, we actually drew this inference from reports.

ADV BOOYENS: When the state of emergency was announced, two months later, could you determine whether this state of emergency was declared or was it already, were there more violence or was there less violence before these people were removed? Can you in any way recall, we will understand if you can't.

MR SNYMAN: I really can't remember that well, but I would believe that it actually started to escalate and that is why the state of emergency was declared. I am not quite sure about this, it was about 12 years ago.

ADV BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I would assume that your relationship with Mr Swart, Brigadier Swart having been cleared now, I would assume that if you wanted to submit sensitive reports on security matters, you would send it to somebody in Pretoria?

MR SNYMAN: All security reports were sent to our Head Office in Pretoria. It was only in instances where the Divisional Commissioner had to be informed with regard to a meeting, or something in this Division, we would then inform him so that the uniformed side would also be present at such a meeting or such an action.

CHAIRPERSON: I assume you did not inform anybody in Pretoria about this incident, that is you did not tell the truth to anybody about exactly what happened to these three people?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: But the hugh and cry that followed the disappearance of these people, the litigation that followed thereafter, how did you manage to keep the lid on this thing so much so that even the police did not know the truth?

MR SNYMAN: At that stage we believed, as Major Du Plessis said, that after the elimination of these three people and because they waited for another day before the operation was executed to prevent it that anyone would have or get any information about this.

CHAIRPERSON: No, but as I understand the situation, later there were some allegations that you were involved, the Security Branch were involved with regard to the detention and or disappearance of these people, how did you manage to keep everybody fooled as it were?

I mean, the police did not make a breakthrough. The authorities did not really come to know about this? You were the highest person as I see things, you were the highest, the most senior person to know the truth?

MR SNYMAN: If I can remember correctly, one of the people was detained at some stage. I can't remember whether it was Mr Hashe, but that is all that I can remember where they had been detained by the Security Branch.

CHAIRPERSON: Where was he held by the Security Branch?

MR SNYMAN: No, that I can't remember. And the other incident of Mrs Hashe where they alleged that it was through the Security Branch, that was not true, we ascertained that it was through Murder and Robbery and not the Security Branch.

CHAIRPERSON: Where was this person held?

MR SNYMAN: I cannot comment on that, it was done by a different branch.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know what I am talking about, do you know the person that I am talking about? We must not misunderstand one another. I understood you to say that when I asked you about how you managed to keep this thing under the lid, you said there was some, say one of them was detained. I assumed you meant one of the deceased was detained?

MR SNYMAN: No, that must have been before the elimination. I can't remember the facts, but I take it it was before the elimination.

CHAIRPERSON: Let me put this to you, was there a conspiracy on a larger scale than we really are told? Conspiracy to cover up?

MR SNYMAN: No. The elimination of the three we regarded as a clandestine operation on a need to know basis, only those people who were involved, and that was the end of the story.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, let me put it, as far as your version is concerned, the only people who knew, really knew what had happened to these people was yourself, Du Plessis, Van Zyl and Lotz?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Now how did you, just the four of you, how did you manage to keep this - the truth away from everybody, from the rest of South Africa?

MR SNYMAN: We viewed it as a clandestine operation and that is why we didn't even report it to the JSMC.

CHAIRPERSON: But how did you succeed in misleading the police?

MR SNYMAN: Which police are you referring to now?

CHAIRPERSON: Any police in the Eastern Cape, I don't know, perhaps also in Pretoria. People made a noise about this, the fact that these three people had disappeared.

MR SNYMAN: As I said earlier in my testimony, we think it was tacitly approved by the people who knew on Head Office level and also on ministerial level. There were no enquiries, no investigations.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. You may be excused.

ADV SANDI: Mr Snyman, I don't want us to talk at length about your relationship with Mr Swartz. It seems to me that the situation you were facing as you have tried to give the picture, was a matter of concern to everyone in the Police Force, not so?

MR SNYMAN: I couldn't hear the last part.

ADV SANDI: This situation of political unrest in the Eastern Cape, was it not a matter of concern to everyone in the Police Force, including Mr Swartz?

MR SNYMAN: Definitely it was a point of concern.

ADV SANDI: Now, if one of you and in this instance, the Security Police, had taken a further step by way of the elimination of those people who were perceived to be behind the problem, was it not important for someone like Mr Swartz to know even if in vague general terms, that you were doing something about this problem? Did you not at some stage confide in him in vague, general terms about this elimination?

MR SNYMAN: No. As I have said earlier in my testimony it was a clandestine operation and it was on a need to know basis and we did not inform any of the other institutions.

ADV SANDI: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens?

FURTHER RE-EXAMINATION BY ADV BOOYENS: Perhaps just to clarify this question of the detention Mr Chairman. If I can refer you to Exhibit A3. The detention that you referred to of Mr Hashe is that detention before this operation was authorised?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, that appears actually very cryptic as it is, at the third last page of A3 - 02-09-93. According to Section 29(1) and then on the 29th of September he was released because of insufficient evidence?

He was previously also detained and restricted and he had been sentenced, but that is the last one that appears on his record.

CHAIRPERSON: Colonel, thank you, you are excused.

MR SNYMAN: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: We will adjourn until two o'clock.

ON RESUMPTION:

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, would you like to call the next witness?

ADV BOOYENS: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman, I call Mr Nieuwoudt.

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY ADV BOOYENS: Mr Nieuwoudt, please take your application and keep it in front of you. Do you confirm the contents on page 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112 we could perhaps just have a brief look at that. Do you confirm that as being correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: You also refer to different annexures. Those annexures is what you have as proof of the existence of the struggle. You also have added a document that you have also referred to in a different application, with regard to the fact that there has been referred to the elimination of the enemy, the leaders of them?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Perhaps more specifically, that is - we can refer to on page ... (intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I think this noise is really too much now. We just can't hear what the witness is saying, please.

ADV BOOYENS: Page 146, to neutralise leaders of the enemy and to also break their influence. That is the one that you refer to, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, it is Chairperson.

ADV BOOYENS: And then on page 112, more or less in the middle of the page, you refer to the founding of Pebco in the black townships, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, it is.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Booyens, page 146, could you perhaps just give an indication what you are referring to there?

ADV BOOYENS: My apologies Mr Chairperson, if you turn the page, if you look at the previous page, 145, it is an annexure and it is about the objectives and then you have the specific tasks, the action and the responsible department and if you turn over the page, there you will see item number 3.

That is the purpose to neutralise leaders of the enemy and to eliminate the influence and then the task is the next one, to identify the leaders of the enemy and then also determine the places where they have influence and also neutralise or eliminate these leaders.

And it is also identified that the SAP, South African Defence Force will be responsible for that, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, it is.

ADV BOOYENS: Just to place this within the context ... (intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Could you just give an indication, the last column under "h", special remarks, who is the VH, to what does that refer?

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, it is Security Forces, it is an "m" there, it is VM and that is then linking with the Security Forces, has to be avoided.

From page 111, paragraph 20, since the founding of Pebco in 1970, you were involved with the activities and the aims of this organisation?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And if you look at page 21, that is a name that will later become relevant, the first executive of Pebco was Tozamile Botha, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is so.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Botha left the country later on?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Then you deal with the election of the executive during the 1980's, 1980, 1981?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And 29 June 1981, Mr Godolozi who is one of the deceased is elected President?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And on 22 November 1982, he was still the President?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: 20 November 1983 he was still President?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: At the executive elected on the 26th, Mr Hashe is added as additional member?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And at the election of 26 March 1985, Mr Godolozi, Hashe and Mr Galela were once again elected as the President, General Secretary and Assistant Secretary?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And then you deal with the history of what happened later on?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And on page 117 you make the statement since 1983, following ex-ANC members were co-opted to the executive of Pebco and then you mention certain names, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Now this link between the ANC and the Pebco, did they have an influence with the M-plan that you have at the bottom of page 118?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And then you deal with the Regional Management of the UDF?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: On page 119, you deal with the application and the nature of the application?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And then we go to page 120. When this incident took place, you were Lieutenant of the Unit Commander of the information component with regard to Black Affairs. Was it the case that Pebco was one of the affairs that you paid attention to?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Could you just briefly tell us and keep it brief, what was Pebco, what did they do?

MR NIEUWOUDT: They were a community organisation and briefly then, they were the internal structure of the ANC where they politicised the masses and mobilised them and then also the creation of the street and area committees where they were responsible for it.

ADV BOOYENS: That is the M-plan?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, it is. And then they also had certain activities such as consumer boycotts, rent boycotts and different boycotts in general.

ADV BOOYENS: Did they also play a prominent role in the schools?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is true, school boycotts.

ADV BOOYENS: As the situation developed, alternative structures were developed according to the M-Plan?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Now these alternative structures, what did it lead to in the black townships?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It lead to total unrest, the burning of all third tier government buildings, council members were burnt by means of the necklace method, attacks on policemen and several policemen were also killed by means of the necklace method. And all government institutions were totally destroyed.

ADV BOOYENS: Policing in these areas?

MR NIEUWOUDT: The policing was not at all successful. To use the English terms, there were no go areas where the police could not get entry, had no access.

ADV BOOYENS: Were there certain areas where vehicles such as caspers could not get access?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is true.

ADV BOOYENS: And the role it played besides political crime, let's refer to it as ordinary crime?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Some of the vehicles that came in, were plundered.

ADV BOOYENS: Did it increase?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, it increased and cases weren't even reported at the police.

ADV BOOYENS: And at 1984, 1985 would you say that - who was busy winning the struggle in the townships?

MR NIEUWOUDT: The progressive organisation Pebco was busy being notorious in the struggle.

ADV BOOYENS: Now, you heard evidence of the seniors that there was a lot of pressure to normalise the situation?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: You refer on page 121 wrongly to one of the appendixes as JSMC meeting, but it is actually SVR meeting and that is on page 240?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And more specifically you also want to point the Committee's attention to page 242 where the meeting was briefed with regard to the combatting regulations in this situation in South Africa and in paragraph (c) where attention was paid to further boycotts and then specifically paragraph (f)?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Where it is said that agitator leaders have to be removed from the community on a selective way?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And there they already took cognisance of the fact that negative publicity is because of the arrests, must be weighed up against the effectiveness or the purpose thereof and then you refer to the fact that some of the ordinary options, and we have said quite a lot about that, if people want to ask you questions about that, they should, but the normal legal options that were available with security legislation, didn't work?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No.

ADV BOOYENS: The third tier government that was instituted then in the black townships, totally came to a standstill, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: So you also confirm what you said here?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And then you refer to counter action of the Security community by means of the JSMC?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you receive instructions from your Commanders?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: A data base was established and there was a good picture of the people who was primarily responsible for the violence in the Eastern Cape and the ungovernability?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: The extent of violence and anarchy, the idea was to first do that on a legal way, did it work?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No.

ADV BOOYENS: Page 124, you have already made mention of the JSMC. Normally the JSMC would be attended by the Commander or the second in command?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: You were a Lieutenant at that stage?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: You were not in command of a desk, under whom did you work?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I worked under Major Du Plessis at that stage.

ADV BOOYENS: Just to give a bit of background, let's call it a JSMC conference during March 1985?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. It was a seminar.

ADV BOOYENS: Did this deal with all the complaints on not enough cooperation between the different branches, military intelligence, the Security Branch and national intelligence?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Was the purpose of this with regard to the total Security Management Structure, to get the people to cooperate?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Can you remember who were present? I refer to the more prominent figures.

MR NIEUWOUDT: What I can recall is that the Chairperson of that seminar was Brigadier Joffel van der Westhuizen. He was Commander of the Eastern Cape and he was a military man.

ADV BOOYENS: Can you remember if there was a Deputy Minister at that stage?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Adriaan Vlok was present. At that stage he was Deputy Minister of the Police and Defence Force.

ADV BOOYENS: And also Brigadier Swart the Divisional Commissioner of the Police?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, and also heads of different departments?

ADV BOOYENS: Can you recall the language that was used? It has also appeared from the evidence of Colonel Snyman, how did they refer to the supporters of the liberation movements?

MR NIEUWOUDT: We referred to the enemy of the State.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you or did someone there refer to a Naff theory?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is the case. Brigadier Joffel van der Westhuizen, explained the Naff theory to us. This was reflected by means of a wheel, consisting of these different organisations as the spokes and then the rim. The rim of this wheel could not be attacked to because it was strengthened by iron. And he referred to elimination, he then said that you had to take the particular rim and then you would also then destroy all the organisations.

That is what was referred to all these organisations and all their supporters and leading elements and it was those people who had to be eliminated.

ADV BOOYENS: And then on page 124, you deal with paragraph (7) the increase of anarchy and disorder and then also the statements of political leaders?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: These statements of political leaders, did this also correspond with your own political perceptions?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And did you support the government of the day?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: How did you see yourself as a security policemen?

MR NIEUWOUDT: To protect the government of the day and to maintain it, where they wanted to subvert the government, that was our task and our aim and function.

ADV BOOYENS: And then you also deal with what you heard of as to how Du Plessis approached Snyman in paragraph 8 on page 124, and how the decision was taken. It is not your personal knowledge, it is what you heard later on?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Paragraph 12, you make the statement that Colonel Snyman was not involved in the planning and the execution of the operation. Did you at any stage have contact with Colonel Snyman with regard to the planning and the execution of the operation?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No.

ADV BOOYENS: And on page 127, there you deal with the fact that Captain Roelf Venter as well as Beeslaar and the askaris were working in the Eastern Cape.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: What was the purpose of their presence here?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Briefly, as a result of the revolutionary bases that were established in the black townships, and the vacuum that was created within the black community, it was breeding ground for infiltration of terrorists and it was then necessary to get members of the Vlakplaas unit to help with the identification of trained cadres, that is briefly then.

ADV BOOYENS: In other words, they did the work for which Vlakplaas was there and that was identification or that was the perception of enemy forces, they didn't come for the specific operation, their presence was coincidental, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Were you at one stage approached by Captain Van Zyl and informed that they envisaged abducting and murdering political activists Hashe, Godolozi and Galela?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is true.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you become involved in the planning of the operation?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is true.

ADV BOOYENS: The three persons, were they known to you?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: What were their activities, please summarise?

MR NIEUWOUDT: As far as Mr Godolozi was concerned, he was the President of Pebco. Mr Hashe was the Secretary or the General Secretary of Pebco and Mr Galela was the Organising Secretary of Pebco, Assistant Secretary of Pebco.

ADV BOOYENS: Were these three names given to you as having been identified?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is true.

ADV BOOYENS: If you were theoretically in the position yourself and you wanted to harm Pebco, would you have chosen the same people or would you have chosen others, based on your own knowledge?

MR NIEUWOUDT: My own knowledge and if I had found myself in such a position to give such an instruction, then the Chairman, the General Secretary and the Organising Secretary would then be the persons who would form the crux of an organisation.

ADV BOOYENS: Their personal role as activists, was it known to you?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, it was also known to me.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, to interrupt. I do not understand what the witness is saying, or are you clarifying Mr Booyens? His previous answer to your question?

ADV BOOYENS: In a personal role?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, before that one. You asked him if he had any authority, whether he would - what he would decide to do? Do you understand my problem?

ADV BOOYENS: I understand your problem. Mr Nieuwoudt, you say that you would also have chosen the Secretary, the Organising Secretary and the Chairman if you wanted to harm the organisation?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is true.

ADV BOOYENS: Why do you say so?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Because they, those persons in those portfolios they are involved with the direct organisation of the organisation and the execution of all the activities. They were the core of the organisation, those three portfolios, the kingpins.

CHAIRPERSON: Irrespective of who that person was? In other words, are you targeting at the office which the person occupies?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No. If they were the prominent organisation leaders.

CHAIRPERSON: Maybe I don't quite understand.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I am going on, I have asked the question their personal activity, I was going to go onto that. You have already said that you knew these three people personally as regards their personal roles, in other words their prominence etc, can you perhaps elaborate very briefly?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Those three persons were directly involved in inciting the unrest, the necklace murders that were committed and the recruitment of persons as well as the insurgents and the creation of revolutionary bases in the black townships and they were directly responsible for the organising of the unrest which they incited. That is in brief.

ADV BOOYENS: Were they strong leader figures?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Extremely strong.

ADV BOOYENS: So therefore did we have a situation of three strong leader figures in key positions?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is true.

ADV BOOYENS: I hope I have clarified that now. Did you, Captain Van Zyl and Du Plessis, did you then start with the practical implementation of the operation?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is true.

ADV BOOYENS: I accept that it was planning of what, where, when and how to put it simplisticly?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: In the first place to launch the operation, you had to find a method to get hold of these people, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, I am not saying you are going to do that. Please don't ask leading questions on that.

ADV BOOYENS: No, I am not going to. You referred to Mr Botha earlier on, he was a management member?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is true.

ADV BOOYENS: Did he play a role, indirectly in the planning of what was to have happened, how it was to have happened?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, he did.

ADV BOOYENS: Please tell us about it?

MR NIEUWOUDT: The opportunity arose by means of a non-physical source that Mr Hashe had accomplished liaison with Mr Botha, who at that stage was overseas or abroad in Lusaka.

ADV BOOYENS: What was the purpose of the liaison?

MR NIEUWOUDT: To obtain funds from the ANC?

ADV BOOYENS: For?

MR NIEUWOUDT: For Pebco.

ADV BOOYENS: After you had that information, how did the planning progress?

MR NIEUWOUDT: On the instruction of Major Du Plessis, I activated a source.

ADV DE JAGER: You referred to a non-physical source, can you just clarify the difference between a physical and non-physical source?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Non-physical source is a technical source, where the telephones had been tapped.

ADV DE JAGER: To put it in understandable language, you listened in to a telephone conversation?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is true.

ADV DE JAGER: Just keep to the language that we understand please.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Nieuwoudt, please tell us, you have now tapped the conversation or you listened in on the conversation, they were requesting money for Pebco. When you had this information, was any further planning done?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, there was. I activated the source.

ADV BOOYENS: You spoke to a source of yours?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I spoke to a source and instructed him to ... (intervention)

ADV BOOYENS: Yes, to do what with the three people?

MR NIEUWOUDT: The source acted as if he was a member of the British Embassy and said that he wanted to give them money and he arranged a meeting with them to meet him at the airport.

ADV BOOYENS: At that stage, did you already have instructions as to which of the three they were to be?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is true. Mr Du Plessis gave me the instructions.

ADV BOOYENS: What did you tell the source, what did he basically have to say to the people who had to come to the airport regarding the money?

MR NIEUWOUDT: The source was informed that he had to liaise with Mr Hashe and to inform Mr Hashe that he had to bring the President, he himself as well as the Assistant General Secretary, Mr Galela.

ADV BOOYENS: So that was your instruction to the source?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Did the source report back to you at a later stage?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, he did.

ADV BOOYENS: Are you prepared to identify your source?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No.

ADV BOOYENS: As a result of what the source told you, was the operation launched?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is true.

ADV BOOYENS: What was the planning further?

MR NIEUWOUDT: The morning of the 8th, I informed Major Du Plessis and Van Zyl and Major Du Plessis suggested that the members of Vlakplaas be used to execute the arrest at the airport.

ADV BOOYENS: Yes.

MR NIEUWOUDT: And that they had to create the false impression that we wanted to arrest the three deceased.

ADV BOOYENS: It wasn't a real arrest, we know that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Why Vlakplaas?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Because we were rather well known in this area, all the members of the Security Branch up in Port Elizabeth and they had to be met by unknown persons and unknown vehicles in order to abduct or intercept them at the airport.

ADV BOOYENS: Why were they lured to the airport, why didn't you just go and pick them up at their houses?

MR NIEUWOUDT: We could not take action at their homes, as a result of the unrest situation that prevailed at that stage, and they would not possibly have been at their houses, that is how I see it.

ADV BOOYENS: The purpose of the use of the people from Vlakplaas you say was to prevent them from identifying you?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And did you then go to the airport?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I just have one point that I did not mention. That morning when Captain Venter joined us, I handed the photos of the three deceased to him and thereafter we went forth.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you have photos of the deceased?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I did. I had them in their files.

ADV BOOYENS: Were there security files on all three of them?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is true.

ADV BOOYENS: You gave the photos to the Captain. When did Mr Lotz enter the picture?

MR NIEUWOUDT: During the course of that morning.

ADV BOOYENS: If you are speaking of that morning?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is the morning of the 8th.

ADV BOOYENS: What happened further in the planning of the operation?

MR NIEUWOUDT: At that stage, we met at the airport that evening.

ADV BOOYENS: Just say who you are referring to us we?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Captain Van Zyl, Lotz, myself as well as Captain Roelf Venter and Beeslaar and four members of the askaris.

ADV DE JAGER: Where exactly did you meet?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It is in Walmer, near the airport.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, my earphones are making a lot of noise for some or other reason, I don't know. I think Mr Nyoka indicates he's got a similar problem. If perhaps somebody can just look at that. Let us proceed. You met at Walmer, near the airport. What happened there?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I took my own vehicle to the parking area at the airport. Captain Roelf Venter and Beeslaar went with their vehicle to the parking area and they parked. Captain Lotz drove the minibus with the black members of Vlakplaas. He was Warrant Officer Lotz at that stage, he drove the minibus and he also parked near the entrance to the airport. We were in radio contact with the vehicles.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens made a remark about a noise, a certain noise, it is quite irritating. We are catching that noise as well. I am advised though that usually it is as a result of the fact that people have switched on their cellphones and their reception interfere with the system here.

Please switch off your cellphones if you are in the hall, because they interfere with out sound system here. Thank you.

ADV BOOYENS: You were in radio contact with one another, what happened then?

MR NIEUWOUDT: At approximately eight o'clock, 20h00, the three deceased arrived in Mr Hashe's vehicle.

ADV BOOYENS: What was it?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was a light yellow Isuzu bakkie. I informed Lotz that the vehicle was under way and two of the deceased, Mr Godolozi and Galela got out of the vehicle near the entrance, the vehicle which Mr Hashe drove and he went to park the vehicle and at that stage the black members of Vlakplaas, approached them and convinced them to accompany them. They were helped into the kombi.

ADV BOOYENS: If you say the black members of Vlakplaas, you said there were four, was it all four of them or less?

MR NIEUWOUDT: As far as I can recall, they were approached by the four members.

ADV BOOYENS: Were any of the Port Elizabeth Security Branch people nearby where these people were approached?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No.

ADV BOOYENS: Was Venter or Beeslaar close by?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No.

ADV BOOYENS: Where were they approached at the airport, if you can just say more or less?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was before you get the entrance of the departure hall.

ADV BOOYENS: That means outside the departure hall?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, outside the departure hall.

ADV BOOYENS: Except for the four Vlakplaas members, were they approached by any one else, let's call them askaris?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No.

ADV BOOYENS: From what you saw Mr Nieuwoudt, did they grab these people or was there a struggle, how did they control these people? I am referring to the three deceased?

MR NIEUWOUDT: As far as I saw, they were requested to accompany them, this is the askaris, requested them. No violence was used, they were not grabbed, they were just convinced to go with them quietly.

ADV BOOYENS: Where did they move to?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Then they moved to where Mr Hashe had parked. At the airport where the busses now park, that is where Mr Hashe had parked his vehicle, and when he got out, they approached him and he was also - he also accompanied them to the minibus and he got in.

ADV BOOYENS: Since then the airport has changed then?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Then they got into the minibus in which the askaris were, the three deceased, and what happened then?

MR NIEUWOUDT: And then we moved and one of the members of the askaris, I am not quite sure which one, then drove Mr Hashe's vehicle and followed us to a bush path, approximately half a kilometre from the airport where we met one another.

ADV BOOYENS: What was the planning concerning this vehicle, Hashe's vehicle?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Originally the plan was to leave the vehicle near the Lesotho border to create the impression that they had left the Republic of South Africa.

ADV BOOYENS: Was this done? If not, let's just finish with the vehicle, why not?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I think that the member who drove it, mentioned to me ... (intervention)

ADV BOOYENS: That is the askari?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, that the vehicle's clutch and the brakes were not in good working order. I conveyed this to Captain Van Zyl, and he then gave the instruction that the vehicle was to be burnt.

ADV BOOYENS: Did he give you the instruction?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: What did you do with the vehicle then?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I took the vehicle and Warrant Lotz followed me in my vehicle and I drove the vehicle to a rubbish dump in the black township of KwaZekhele where it was burnt.

ADV BOOYENS: As far as you were concerned, what was its mechanical condition?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Extremely poor, it would not even have reached the borders of Port Elizabeth.

ADV BOOYENS: So it would definitely not have reached the borders?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No.

ADV BOOYENS: I don't think we need to give any detail, the vehicle was burnt out by you and Lotz?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is true.

ADV BOOYENS: And what happened then?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Thereafter we departed for Post Chalmers.

ADV BOOYENS: And at Cradock, you and Lotz?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: In whose vehicle?

MR NIEUWOUDT: In my vehicle.

ADV BOOYENS: Where did you meet up with the other people again?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was between Cradock and Post Chalmers where I drove up to them from behind.

ADV BOOYENS: And from there you went to Post Chalmers?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: At what time did you reach Post Chalmers?

MR NIEUWOUDT: If I have to make an estimation, it was approximately between eleven and twelve that evening.

ADV BOOYENS: Tell us, let's start with that first evening, what happened?

MR NIEUWOUDT: The three deceased were kept in the garage. They were given camp beds and blankets. After that I took them out of the garage one by one and kept them in the lounge of the house, not the police station, I want to explain this.

There are two buildings, the police station part with its cells and then there is a house where the Station Commander, which he used a long time ago and we only made use of the house.

I took them to the lounge of the house, where I interrogated them.

ADV BOOYENS: Were you alone when you interrogated them?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Colonel Venter and the askaris and Captain Van Zyl, they were all present. Warrant Officer Lotz was present, they moved in and out, but I was the one who did the interrogation.

ADV BOOYENS: What was the questioning all about?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I questioned them or confronted them regarding their activities.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you try to get information?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you gain anything useful?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No.

INTERPRETER: The interpreter cannot hear at all.

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I questioned them one by one.

ADV DE JAGER: If you had finished questioning the one, where did you take him?

MR NIEUWOUDT: He was taken back to the garage, and then I took the next one. That is how I dealt with each one separately.

ADV BOOYENS: You said that you kept them in the garage, are there cells?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, there are, but we did not have the keys for these cells.

ADV BOOYENS: How far were the cells from the house?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Approximately 50 to 60 metres.

ADV BOOYENS: That was at the police station?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, at the part that was used as a police station.

ADV BOOYENS: You questioned the people in turn. Did any of the other people, you said you dealt with it primarily, but did any of the others also participate and asked any questions?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, on occasion some of them did ask questions to try and clarify a point and then they asked me to clarity the point and some of them put questions to these people.

ADV BOOYENS: Which language did you speak?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mainly I spoke Xhosa and English. But I did not speak Xhosa throughout.

ADV BOOYENS: On page 129, paragraph 18, you say that and I want you to explain "as I speak fluent Xhosa and the three persons were learned persons, it was unnecessary for me to use an interpreter", what are you trying to say there?

MR NIEUWOUDT: What I am trying to say there is that it was not necessary to use an interpreter, if there was a point that I wanted to clarity, I could do it in Xhosa myself.

ADV BOOYENS: Were these three also fluent in English?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Further you mention whom you questioned first, namely Mr Godolozi. How long did the questioning of each individual take more or less?

MR NIEUWOUDT: If I have to make an estimation, it could have been an hour more or less.

ADV BOOYENS: For each or for all three together?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Per person, an hour per person.

ADV BOOYENS: At one stage this questioning ended that evening that evening?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, early the next morning, in the early morning hours.

ADV BOOYENS: And what happened to them then?

MR NIEUWOUDT: They were locked up in the garage and they were handcuffed to their camp beds and the garage was locked. It had no windows.

ADV BOOYENS: Did anyone guard the place?

MR NIEUWOUDT: As far as I can recall, the members, the askaris, the black members of Vlakplaas guarded them because they slept in their bus, minibus in front of the garage. And they guarded them from that point.

ADV BOOYENS: The next morning, did you talk to these people again?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I did.

ADV BOOYENS: At what time?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was approximately at eight o'clock.

ADV BOOYENS: What did you question them about?

MR NIEUWOUDT: What I can recall is that Mr Hashe told me that he had hidden one AK47 at his sister's house.

ADV BOOYENS: And?

MR NIEUWOUDT: And all three of them said that they were prepared to work as informers.

ADV BOOYENS: Let us just clarity this story of informers. You said that all three of them were prepared to become informers?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is true, all three of them.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you ask them or how did it come about?

MR NIEUWOUDT: They volunteered this.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you believe them?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I did not.

ADV BOOYENS: Why not?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I believed that it was a strategy on their behalf that all three would make such a suggestion hoping that I would release them.

ADV BOOYENS: You also told us that you knew these people?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I did.

ADV BOOYENS: Are they the kind that would become informers for the police?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Never.

ADV BOOYENS: As far as the Vlakplaas people were concerned, what happened to them? Were they there the next morning when you awoke?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, they were.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you have breakfast?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: A great deal has been said about a barbecue that was held.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Booyens, I think that the events of that day were very controversial events, and I think it will be a good thing for Captain Nieuwoudt to give his own version without you prompting him in this regard.

ADV BOOYENS: That is fine. I would just like to give a bit of background and have it placed on record. This police station is no longer used, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: You used it previously?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is the residential area, the house at least.

ADV BOOYENS: When you wanted to make food, how could you do this?

MR NIEUWOUDT: We had to make a fire outside, because there is no electricity, no other facilities were available such as pots and pans etc.

ADV BOOYENS: Can you just possibly give us your version of the sequence of events that morning?

MR NIEUWOUDT: As I can recall, we did have something to eat that morning, we did have a barbecue, but I must make it clear, it was not a festive occasion as one would think it to be, where alcohol was consumed.

I would just like to request - I cannot give testimony properly with this noise, please.

CHAIRPERSON: I think it is a legitimate complaint because the witness needs to concentrate on every question which is being put to him, and he must catch every word in every question, because if he misses one word, he may end up giving a wrong answer, and I think he should be given the opportunity to muster his concentration together, please. Yes, Mr Nieuwoudt?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I am very grateful. As I can recall, we had a barbecue that morning, and I want to make it clear it was not a festive occasion as the impression has been created, because no strong liquor was used.

I do not consume any strong liquor, I know Captain Van Zyl's attitude as regards the use of strong liquor in any job situation and I want to make it clear, I want to emphasise it here.

Thereafter, after we had eaten, the members of Vlakplaas under the leadership of Captain Roelf Venter left and then at a later stage, Major Du Plessis arrived. And he also enjoyed some of the barbecue with us and explained to us that the coast was clear, no alarm had been raised and thereafter he left.

ADV BOOYENS: At more or less was Mr Du Plessis there?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I am under the impression that it was approximately twelve o'clock, half past twelve.

ADV BOOYENS: In other words, in the middle of the day?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: How long did Mr Du Plessis stay?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Not very long. If it was half an hour, that is if I have to estimate.

ADV BOOYENS: So he would then have left at about one o'clock, half past one?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: After Mr Du Plessis left, who remained at Post Chalmers?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Captain Van Zyl, Warrant Officer Lotz and myself.

ADV BOOYENS: As well as the three deceased?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Tell us further what happened then, during the rest of the day, the afternoon?

MR NIEUWOUDT: We gathered wood during the course of the afternoon and later that afternoon, they were given coffee into which the sleeping drug, provided by Captain Van Zyl, had been poured.

Later on they slept asleep.

ADV BOOYENS: You refer to late afternoon, more or less what time was that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That was approximately at dusk more or less. They fell asleep.

ADV BOOYENS: I think that this part is also disputed, so you must just say in your own words exactly what happened.

MR NIEUWOUDT: Thereafter they were taken out of the garage, or carried out, one by one. Captain Van Zyl shot Mr Hashe with a .22 calibre gun. He handed the gun to me, after which I in turn shot Mr Godolozi and Mr Lotz shot Mr Galela. We placed all three the deceased on the pile of wood where we poured diesel over them and over the wood. I lit the fire. The bodies were burnt totally after approximately six to eight hours.

The next morning we gathered or raked the ash together, put it into black bags. I had the instruction from Captain Van Zyl to destroy all evidence of what I had done. I took it to the Fish River, just before Cradock, before you enter Cradock. I emptied the bags into the river and we left for Port Elizabeth.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Nieuwoudt, it has been suggested that the people were not killed there, that a long time after that occasion, they had been seen alive on various occasions. Do you have comment on that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: This is absolute rubbish. I deny this very vehemently. On the evening of the 9th, they were eliminated by Captain Van Zyl, Lotz and myself, burnt out at Post Chalmers, after which I threw the remains, the ashes in the Fish River.

ADV BOOYENS: Just a few other practicalities. Where was the Security Branch's offices at this stage, this is during May 1985?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was in Louis le Grange. On the 27th of April 1985 we moved from the Sanlam building, Strand Street to Louis le Grange.

ADV BOOYENS: Just to make it clear for the record. Sanlam building, Strand Street, you say that is near the beach?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, it is directly opposite the railway station.

ADV BOOYENS: But it is close to the sea?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, the railway is on the side of the sea.

ADV BOOYENS: And Louis le Grange?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Louis le Grange is at the Old Mount Road.

ADV BOOYENS: How far, is there a station nearby?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, not a railway station.

ADV BOOYENS: How far is the Sanlam building from Louis le Grange?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Approximately six to eight kilometres.

ADV BOOYENS: Allegations were made, questions were asked that during the questioning, that these people were assaulted. I accept among others by you, or in your presence, what is your comment on this?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I deny this that they were assaulted.

ADV BOOYENS: Can you substantiate this?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I can.

ADV BOOYENS: Let us hear?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I can. I was under pressure from members of the TRC, Mr Chris McAdam and Mr Dumisa Ntsebeza. My legal advisers placed pressure on me to tell me that there were allegations of assaults. I denied this because I did not do this.

And if I had, then I would have applied for amnesty for this. I realised that if I omitted this, then I can prejudice my application, because then I am not telling the whole truth.

I realise that if I say that I did assault them, then I am not telling the truth. I cannot apply for something that I have no knowledge of.

ADV BOOYENS: What is Captain Van Zyl's attitude in this regard?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Even Captain Sakkie van Zyl's attitude with regard to assault, is he is totally against it. And I would not assault people in the presence of strange people whom I did not know.

ADV BOOYENS: Are you now referring to ... (intervention)

MR NIEUWOUDT: The members of Vlakplaas, namely the askaris?

ADV BOOYENS: We heard here that you said that Mr Van Zyl was against it, was he the senior in the operation?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. He was in command of the operational section of the operation, I did the actions under his command.

ADV BOOYENS: Do you confirm basically as far as you have not done it thus far, what you said up to and including page 132?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: If we look at the political objectives what you wanted to achieve, you were a supporter of the then NP government?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is true.

ADV BOOYENS: And also of the party who kept that government in rule?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is true.

ADV BOOYENS: And did you then believe in the policy of the National Party?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I did.

ADV BOOYENS: What was your attitude as regards the political threat coming from the side of the liberation movements?

MR NIEUWOUDT: For the protection of the State dispensation, the National Party, with the purpose to protect it so that they should not be subverted.

ADV BOOYENS: Do you confirm your political objectives as explained on 133, 134, 135 and 136, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: To get back to the situation surrounding Pebco, to make it applicable to the local situation, Pebco, their activities, and why and what their political objective was, you have already told us that the Pebco people were well known to you?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: On a scale of prominence of activists, who were active at that stage, where would you place the three deceased?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I would have placed them at a high level.

ADV BOOYENS: As far as their political activities are concerned, and the degree of success that their political activities had, to possibly subvert the government of day, where would you place that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Also on a very high level.

ADV BOOYENS: As far as you were concerned, were they a threat to the government in which you believed?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: It is also the government in whose service you were?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. And the objective that they wanted to achieve was to subvert the government of the day in violent means?

ADV BOOYENS: If the Commission would just bear with me. Mr Nieuwoudt, did you in other cases where you were involved with assaults, did you make an application?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I did.

ADV BOOYENS: Thank you Chairperson, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV BOOYENS.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nolte, are there any questions from your angle?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR NOLTE: Mr Chairman, yes, just a few questions. Mr Nieuwoudt, when Mr Van Zyl testified he said that you indicated to him on the 8th of May, that at least Mr Hashe would be there, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct. That morning when I gave my input, I said that the source had made contact with Mr Hashe and the impression I got from the source of what Mr Hashe would have said to him was that all three of them would be there.

MR NOLTE: Mr Nieuwoudt, you also testified that Mr Van Zyl was present during interrogation. Was he present during the interrogation the whole time?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, he moved in and out. All the members moved in and out and he wasn't there constantly.

MR NOLTE: And then with regard to the assaults, it will be said that the violent nature of the assaults was of such a nature that you won't do an application for amnesty, do you think it will have an influence on your application?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No.

MR NOLTE: Mr Chairman, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR NOLTE.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Du Plessis?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Nieuwoudt, the first question that I want to ask is do I understand you correctly that your answer does not mean that you in any way say that you have been involved in any assaults?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Do I also understand you correctly what you said at the end that if you had been involved in any way in any assault, whatsoever, there would be no reason for you to place any evidence in front of this Commission for you to get amnesty? Is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV DU PLESSIS: And that if you had been involved with such assaults, that you would have placed it in front of the Commission?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV DU PLESSIS: And that you have nothing to gain if you don't place it in front of the Commission?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Mr Nieuwoudt, you say in your application and you refer to the issue with regard to the compartmentalisation of the operation. Previous witnesses have said that Captain Venter was not informed with regard to the true reason for the operation and that is the elimination?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV DU PLESSIS: So you confirm that they were never informed with regard to the truth?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, they were misled.

ADV DU PLESSIS: And is it correct to say that they were under the impression that the aim of the operation was interrogation?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Can you remember whether it was stated directly to them or was it implied?

MR NIEUWOUDT: If I can remember, it was on the morning of the 8th when Major Du Plessis informed Venter or Captain Van Zyl, I can't remember who said it, but one of them said that the members of the askaris had to arrest the people at the airport for the purpose of interrogation and then hand them over to us for interrogation.

ADV DU PLESSIS: You heard the evidence of the previous witnesses, am I correct, and the other witnesses have confirmed it, that under these circumstances you were never in the presence of strangers for example the presence of the askaris, that you would never assault people within their presence?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV DU PLESSIS: And can I go a bit further, would you have done it in the presence of relatively strangers such as Venter and Warrant Officer Beeslaar?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I won't.

ADV DU PLESSIS: And then also it follows that you would not have informed them about the elimination or that you would have taken them into your confidence?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I didn't.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you think the askaris were not aware of the fact that members of the Security Branch assaulted people? Did you think it would be a new thing for them?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Could you please repeat that question?

CHAIRPERSON: Did you think that the askaris were not aware of the fact that members of the Security Branch assaulted people?

MR NIEUWOUDT: At that stage I didn't think of that, and I don't think so.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you think it would have been a new experience to them?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Sorry, could you just repeat your question?

CHAIRPERSON: Did you think that - you say that you did not want to, you could not assault people in the presence of strangers, especially the askaris. I am asking you did you think that it would have been a new experience to the askaris to see a person being assaulted by members of the Security Branch?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Mr Nieuwoudt, just on the basis of that, is it correct or do I make the correct deduction when I say to you that you would not have done serious assaults in the presence of the askaris, because you did not know them and you hadn't worked with them at that stage?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, it is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: And adding to that, you don't personally have any problems with assault?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No.

ADV DE JAGER: You assaulted people?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: So it wasn't a question that you didn't want to assault these people or that you had some kind of problem with that to assault people during interrogation?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, but I was under the command of Captain Van Zyl, and I knew that he would not allow assaults.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Mr Nieuwoudt, you testified that you caught up with the group of vehicles at Post Chalmers near Cradock?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV DU PLESSIS: And then you went to Post Chalmers?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Who arrived with which vehicle at Post Chalmers?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Captain Van Zyl arrived with his vehicle. The askaris with the three deceased, Captain Roelf Venter and Beeslaar with the Safari Nissan and also myself.

ADV DU PLESSIS: And immediately you started with the interrogation?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Can you remember how long you continued with the interrogation?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was for approximately three hours, about for o'clock that morning.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Did you interrogate each one of them?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I interrogated each one.

ADV DU PLESSIS: And the next morning, did you continue with the interrogation?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV DU PLESSIS: And for how long did you continue with it the next morning?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That was up to approximately the afternoon, at lunch.

ADV DU PLESSIS: That is now besides the time that you ate?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV DU PLESSIS: And in the afternoon?

MR NIEUWOUDT: In the afternoon I also had an interview with them, and I think round about three o'clock the afternoon I ended the interrogation.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Is it correct Mr Nieuwoudt to say that you were in control of the interrogation?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Is it also correct to accept that in the room where the interrogation was done, that you were present the whole time whilst the interrogation was going on?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. I can perhaps also say I also went out to make some tea or whatever the case may be. I didn't sit there the whole time. I don't want to gain the impression that I was there the whole time, busy with the interrogation.

ADV DU PLESSIS: And you also say that the evening when you arrived there, that the askaris were there?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Is it correct to say that the askaris were used inter alia to guard these three deceased in the bus on the way there?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.