TRC Final Report

Volume 1

Chapter 11

Part OtherDepts

Subsection 7

■ SECOND PHASE: TACKLING THE BIG ISSUES

41 The second phase commenced in October 1996 and extended until May/June 1997. In order to be effective, the Investigation Unit had to develop the capacity to corroborate claims made by victims or witnesses, and then to launch a programme of investigative enquiries in each of the regions.

42 Stringent budget cuts made the necessary increases in the staff component difficult, and donor assistance was sought and eventually received. Because state expenditure regulations delayed the receipt of funds, it was not until March/April 1997 that regional offices began to have the capacity to corroborate claims. Once funding was available, regional investigation units were able to identify and employ staff to serve as corroborative assistants. In consequence, the work output of corroboration teams increased, and the Unit could begin to address the tremendous backlog that had developed.

43 The other major component of the Commission's shift in strategy involved the launching of a programme of investigative inquiries. The shift was motivated by the perception that the Commission should get tough on perpetrators and begin to provide answers to the many victims who had expressed a desire to know the truth about their own experiences. To achieve this, the Commission made use of powers granted in section 29¹ of the Act.

44 In November and December 1996, investigative inquiries commenced in each region. In early 1997, regional investigation units developed programmes based on investigations that were being conducted in the regions, as well as on scheduled special event hearings and institutional hearings convened by the regional offices.

45 By embarking on this strategy, the Unit was able to bring significant pressure to bear on potential amnesty applicants and thereby made significant breakthroughs in the Commission's understanding of the nature and extent of gross human rights violations committed during its mandate period.

46 As the Commission began to confront the challenge of delivery to victims and to the public at large, it was forced to resolve a number of key strategic and policy issues. In a similar vein, the Unit was forced to examine its own internal structures in order to determine whether they could be refined and improved.

47 It was at this stage, for example, that the national special investigation team was decentralised, and its members and resources were reallocated to regional investigation units. Regional units became responsible for investigations in their regions and reported results to the deputy director, who had to oversee the integration of material provided and to advise and co-ordinate the ‘re-tasking’ of investigators.

■ THIRD PHASE: AMNESTY AND THE EXTENSION OF THE COMMISSION

48 The third phase began after the amnesty deadline had passed. In August/ September 1997, the chief executive officer, assisted by the executive secretary of the Human Rights Violations Committee, drafted a report and the extent of the outstanding work was assessed. It was established that the committee had received more than 7 500 applications, and that more than 1 500 of those needed to be heard in public. It was at this stage that the Commission decided to approach the government to extend its life until April 1998.

49 The Investigation Unit was under great pressure to ensure that its corroborative work could be completed. The Unit was operating under a policy injunction determined in August 1997 that resources should be allocated to two areas of work: corroboration of statements and amnesty-related investigations. All other work, including the ‘special’ human rights violations investigations, was brought to completion as rapidly as possible.

50 Given these pressures and the obvious need to provide some basis upon which amnesty investigations could be conducted, a reorganisation of the Investigation Unit was proposed and approved by the Commission. Central to this new modus operandi was a far more direct line of communication between investigators and amnesty evidence leaders, as well as clearly defined and specific investigative instructions. To give effect to this, it was decided to allocate a number of investigators to the Amnesty Department to work in small teams to prepare matters for amnesty hearings. The Amnesty Department took over management responsibility for these investigators.

51 At the same time, it was recognised that the de facto regional control of the corroboration teams represented the most efficient way of organising the regionally-based findings process. It was decided to formalise this situation by transferring management responsibility for the corroboration teams to the regional representatives of the Human Rights Violations Committee.

52 The Investigation Unit’s national office was left with a residual function and was responsible for the analysis of information in conjunction with the Research and Information Departments. Provision was also made for the resurrection of a special investigations team, comprising ten investigators (including international experts), to complete outstanding investigations into human rights violations.