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TRC Final ReportPage Number (Original) 243 Paragraph Numbers 1. to 1. 5 Volume 1 Chapter 8 Part Appendix3 ■ APPENDIX 3NORMS FOR DETERMINING SENSITIVITY1. With regard to the norms for determining sensitivity, the principal point of departure is not what security relevant information is or is not, or the security classification of a document, but rather what the norms are that determine what is sensitive and specifically politically sensitive. To determine general valid norms, the following can be considered: 1.1 All information, when compromised, that can lead to the endangering of human lives. This includes Service members/Agents/Sources and Co-workers. 1.2 All information, when compromised, that can seriously damage RSA foreign relations on all terrains or embarrass the RSA. 1.3 All information, when compromised, that could harm the current Government’s bona fides as an honest and open negotiating party/participating party to the political processes of the land. 1.4 All information, when compromised, that would/could damage the image of the Service and the bona fides that its employees are politically impartial, objective, professional and committed to the law and values of the total strategy. Any information that could show that the Service breached the values and norms that exist in a free and democratic community or violated the rights and freedom of individuals, could be considered sensitive. This implies that specific information (especially covert) on the internal political terrain carries a high level of sensitivity. 1.5 Information, when compromised, disclosed or accidentally made known can put unnecessary suspicion on individual Service members’ loyalty, honesty and trustworthiness in a new political dispensation as well as continued employment within the intelligence service/community. |