TRC Final Report

Volume 2

Chapter 4

Subsection 11

Conflict with ‘collaborators’

89 The conflict arising from the ANC’s opposition to the homeland policy began in the early 1960s. Some of the violations perpetrated against chiefs and headmen during the 1960s Pondoland revolt were committed in the name of ‘Congress’, even though those involved in perpetrating such acts were not acting as part of any ANC structure, either military or political.

90 At times, pressure on chiefs and headmen came from the side of the government and the community simultaneously. For example, during the Pondoland revolt against the implementation of the Trust Land Act, Chief Mhlabuvukile Faku [EC1670/97ETK] of Isikelo village was accused by his community of “collaborating with whites” and, by the police, of “influencing people to resist the Act”.

91 Acts of violence were perpetrated by members and supporters of the ANC against perceived ‘collaborators’ in tribal structures and in the homelands from the early 1960s. These acts continued through the Commission’s mandate period, claiming many lives. An example of this is to be found in the attacks on members of the Dikwankwetla National Party (DNP) by supporters of mass movements during the late 1980s because of the DNP’s support for the QwaQwa homeland government. Among these cases were the burning down of Mr Mohau Samuel Nthunya’s home [KZN/LMR/012/LB] in 1989 allegedly by ‘ANC’, the stabbing of Ms Tello Maria and Mr Moramang Thaisi [KZN/MT/021/BL] and the burning down of their home in 1989, the burning down of the home of Mr Naferong Jacob Makae [KZN/ZJ/ 086/BL] in 1989 and the petrol-bombing and stoning of the Botshabelo home of Ms Mathabo Adelina Masunyane [KZN/ZJ/089/BL] in 1988, 1989 and 1990. Responsibility for these attacks, which occurred in QwaQwa and in other areas of the Orange Free State, were attributed to ANC supporters, in spite of the fact that the ANC was banned at the time.

Political accountability

92 In the mid-1980s, the number of deaths arising from the ‘people’s war’ rose dramatically. The ‘naming’ of the ANC as a perpetrator organisation during this period is often inaccurate. In some cases, deponents attributed violations that took place before 1990 to the ANC, although few people operated as ANC members during this period. While the perception that the ANC was responsible for such acts is widespread, the ANC cannot be held directly responsible.

93 However, both the ANC and the leadership of the mass movements must bear some general responsibility for atrocities that occurred in this period, committed usually by youths acting in the name of the liberation struggle.

94 When violence spilled over to those who were not ‘legitimate targets’ but who were more easily accessible than armed policemen – such as their families or suspected informers – the ANC dissociated itself from such acts. Youth activists who became involved in acts of violence in the name of the mass democratic struggle must be held individually accountable for their own actions and the consequences of these actions. Yet they acted within a context in which such actions were condoned as being ‘part of the struggle’, both by their peers and by those to whom they looked for direction,.

95 Events in Sebokeng, Duduza and Langa (Uitenhage) in late 1984 and early 1985 illustrate how the cycle of violence started (see Volume Three of this report). Both the ANC and the UDF leadership were ‘caught off guard’ and ambivalent in their response to this initial upsurge of violence in late 1984/early 1985. While the ANC wanted to direct the violence into a possible insurrection, it did not have the underground or military capacity to do so. There is considerable evidence and support for the argument that much of the violence was undirected.

96 On 25 April 1985, the ANC national executive made a call: “Make apartheid unworkable! Make the country ungovernable!”⁴. The destruction of the Black Local Authorities and the pressure put on councillors to resign was seen as an integral part of the making the townships ungovernable. Internally, the campaign was fanned by UDF structures and was the forerunner of the campaign for the building of organs of people’s power. In the process of its implementation, some people became victims of gross violations of human rights.

97 Interventions in undisciplined activities by groups and organisations ‘on the ground’ were often ineffective. Leaders of the ANC and the mass movements did not act decisively, for example, to stop the practice of ‘necklacing’. They were unable to control the youth militia – the amabutho – and those running the ‘people’s courts’ at all times, and sometimes came under threat when they tried to do so. When crowd violence became ugly, few of the leaders of the mass movements – with the exception of some religious leaders – were brave enough to intervene. In many cases, even religious leaders failed to influence the actions of the youth militia.

THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT, IN THE 1980S IN PARTICULAR, LARGE NUMBERS OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS WERE PERPETRATED, NOT BY DIRECT MEMBERS OF THE ANC OR THOSE OPERATING UNDER ITS FORMAL COMMAND, BUT BY CIVILIANS WHO SAW THEMSELVES AS ANC SUPPORTERS. IN THIS REGARD, THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT THE ANC IS MORALLY AND POLITICALLY ACCOUNTABLE FOR CREATING A CLIMATE IN WHICH SUCH SUPPORTERS BELIEVED THEIR ACTIONS TO BE LEGITIMATE AND CARRIED OUT WITHIN THE BROAD PARAMETERS OF A ‘PEOPLE’S WAR’ AS ENUNCIATED AND ACTIVELY PROMOTED BY THE ANC. VIOLATIONS INCLUDING KILLINGS, ATTEMPTED KILLINGS, ARSON AND SEVERE ILL TREATMENT WERE COMMITTED BY ANC SUPPORTERS AGAINST URBAN COUNCILLORS AND RURAL HEADMEN, MEMBERS OF THE IFP AND OTHER PEOPLE PERCEIVED TO BE ‘COLLABORATORS’ OF THE SYSTEM OR ENEMIES OF THE ANC.