TRC Final Report

Volume 2

Chapter 6

Part Part3

Subsection 4

■ FINANCIAL MISMANAGEMENT

35 There is evidence of large-scale fraud and mismanagement of funds of the CBW programme, which is the subject of an extensive investigation by the Office for Serious Economic Offences (OSEO). The Attorney-General provided the Commission with an interim charge sheet that reveals an intention to charge Dr Basson with fraud amounting to R50 million. Because fraud and theft of funds do not form part of the Commission's mandate, and because this is the subject of an investigation by the OSEO, the Commission did not extensively investigate this aspect. It did, however, become clear in the course of our investigations and through evidence given at the hearing that the programme was fraught with financial irregularities.

■ INSTITUTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE CBW PROGRAMME

Military

36 A management committee (beheerkomitee) was established to oversee the management of the CBW programme. It included the chief of the SADF, chief of staff finances, head of counter-intelligence, chief of staff intelligence, the surgeon-general and the project officer (Dr Basson). The management committee had three working groups: a technical working group, a security group and a group responsible for administration and finances. According to documents provided by Dr Knobel (which include a number of minutes from the meetings of this committee), once the front companies were established and running, the committee met once a year to approve the project's budget and as needed in the case of emergencies.

37 The surgeon general acted as project leader, a role that is unclear at this stage. Dr Basson was project officer and apparently reported both to the surgeon general and the head of Special Forces, and variously to the Minister of Defence, chief of the SADF, Minister of Police, commissioner of police and the chief of staff intelligence.

38 Front companies were established to do the work of the programme, with the SADF as the main client. They were also provided with covert funding from the SAMS budget during the earlier period of the programme.

39 No one at the hearing was prepared to take direct responsibility for the programme and responsibility has been passed both up and down. It is the Commission's view that, while Dr Basson was clearly a central figure, several of the people involved in the beheerkomitee cannot deny responsibility. Unfortunately, the exact responsibility for the programme could not be determined.

■ ANALYSIS

40 The CBW programme in the 1980s and early 1990s was ostensibly established for the purpose of providing the country with a defensive capability. By this it was understood that there should be the necessary expertise to understand and to be able to react to chemical and biological threats posed from outside the country's borders. South Africa should also have the capacity to launch retaliatory attacks in the event of CBW agents being used against South Africa's own forces.

41 It was explicitly and repeatedly stated that the intention was not, and never had been, to develop an offensive capacity. Such intent would have been evidenced by large-scale production at factory level, the manufacture of missiles capable of dispersing chemical and biological substances amongst enemy troops (‘weaponisation’) and the training of troops in their use. There would also have been at least limited evidence of the use of such agents in warfare.

42 The exception to this was the express intention of the military to develop crowd control agents. These included standard agents for the purposes of self-sufficiency and novel agents developed through the adaptation of chemicals already in existence. There is also invariably some overlap between defensive and offensive programmes. Although never explained in precise terms, this may be the reason for surplus production volumes.

43 In strict military terms, such a defensive programme would need to be managed in accordance with each of a number of criteria. These would include careful compliance with the criteria of defensive capability, sound and disciplined leadership, careful auditing of financial dealings, compliance with international conventions determining the conduct of such military business and reliable and comprehensive systems of accountability. The Commission's hearings showed that the programme failed to meet each and every one of these criteria. In fact, there was consistent evidence of serious departures from these standards.

44 Despite the fact that the South African CBW programme during the period under review has now been exposed as showing gross aberrations of intent, discipline, actions, command structures, financial dealings and professional relationships, it was highly regarded within the military, which considered it a successful programme. The military command maintained that cognoscenti in the international military community shared this opinion. One of the astonishing aspects that emerged in the hearings was that the professionalism, competence and mystique of the programme were stripped away by the evidence of the very people who participated in it. The hearings revealed a nepotistic, self-serving and self-enriching group of people, misled by those who had a technical grasp of what was happening. They conducted work they deemed to be scientific, but which was underpinned by ideas, suggestions and hypotheses that were bizarre and incompetent.

45 Dr Basson’s evidence was not fully tested at the hearings because of the legal objections he raised with regard to his forthcoming criminal trial. Initially, Dr Basson's legal representatives indicated that they wished to bring a legal challenge to prevent their client from testifying at the hearing. The panel presiding over the hearing ruled, however, that Dr Basson was compelled to testify. This decision was challenged in the Cape High Court. The court upheld the panel's ruling and ordered Dr Basson to testify before the Commission on 29 July 1998, a mere three days before the mandate to hold human rights violations hearings expired.

46 On 29 July 1998, Dr Basson appeared before the Commission without his Pretoria-based legal representatives and asked that the hearing be postponed until they were available. Ultimately, Dr Basson's evidence was only heard on 31 July. Much of the time was spent on legal argument, and the extent of questioning was curtailed.

47 Although Dr Basson gave evidence for almost twelve hours, the Commission would have preferred to have had an opportunity to question him more thoroughly. In the event, many questions were left unanswered.

48 Dr Immelman, who served as director of the scientific research programme at Roodeplaat Research Laboratories during its existence as a front company for the conduct of the CBW programme, submitted an affidavit. A thorough testing of his evidence must now await his cross-examination in court. It is clear from Dr Immelman's affidavit that he was directly responsible for the production of items on the ‘Verkope lys’; that he dealt directly with operatives, and that he is accountable for the scientific content of the Roodeplaat Research Laboratories programme in the years in which he held office — in the mid- and late 1980s and the early 1990s. In addition to the obvious issues of professional culpability, negligence and criminal intent that apply to others as well, it has to be said specifically of Dr Immelman that he allegedly had full knowledge of the activities at the laboratories that were under his control.

49 Inevitably, the CBW programme achieved little of value or of common good. Enveloped as it was by secrecy, threats and fear, opportunism, financial mismanagement, incompetence, self-aggrandisement, together with a breakdown in the normal methods of scientific discourse, the results were paltry. Tens, even hundreds, of millions of rands were squandered on ideas that had no scientific validity. At best, the programme succeeded in producing for manufacture analogues of CR and BZ incapacitants, and in making local arrangements for protective clothing for troops against mass chemical and biological attack. At worst, the programme had criminal intent.