TRC Final Report

Volume 3

Chapter 3

Subsection 18

130 The special constables were deployed to the Pietermaritzburg-based Riot Unit 8, a unit that had already gained notoriety during the latter half of the 1980s for its active collusion with Inkatha supporters in the political conflict. The unit was headed by Major Deon Terreblanche (now deceased), described by General Jac Buchner as a ‘military man’ who was very close to Inkatha.¹⁹ Terreblanche was named by Brian Mitchell as the mastermind behind the Trust Feed massacre (see below). He was also named by Daluxolo Luthuli as having provided arms and ammunition to Inkatha, particularly in the Mpumalanga township.

131 Former special constable Nhlanhla Philemon Madlala [AM0174/96] was deployed in Mpumalanga, guarding the homes of various Inkatha leaders. He told the Commission that during the day they would go on patrols (by foot or in lorries) with the Riot Unit. When they came across UDF members they would assault them and tell them to join Inkatha. When they shot someone they would report it to the commander, Sergeant Willem de Wet, who in turn reported it to Terreblanche. Terreblanche would instruct them that they should continue with the killing. At sunset they would return to the homes they were guarding.

132 Mr William Basil Harrington [AM0173/96], a member of Riot Unit 8 from 1988 until his arrest in 1991, told the Commission at the ‘Seven Day War’ hearing that he was told to keep a home-made firearm in his vehicle at all times in case he accidentally shot somebody dead. He should then plant this firearm on the person to make it look like a case of self-defence. Harrington said that, as a result of their working in close association with the Inkatha-supporting special constables, the Riot Unit members naturally sided with Inkatha:

The Specials were all Inkatha members and supporters, and the ANC and UDF were shooting at us. They hated us and the Specials hated them, and I hated them because I nearly died on several occasions as a result of their actions. For that reason, I saw myself as on the side of Inkatha. I was taught by the NP and the chiefs in the Riot Unit that the ANC/UDF alliance was our enemy, that they were terrorists, and as a policeman it was my duty to combat terrorism. The war between us and the ANC was very severe, was intense. To combat terrorism I allied myself with Inkatha.…

I often came upon groups of Inkatha Specials, about between ten and twenty people, at night, where they were on their way to specific areas to attack an ANC home. I then thought it a good idea to convey them in my own vehicle and to take them to such a house or area. I never specifically took part in these raids myself, because my objective was to stand back, to keep my distance, to prevent ANC supporters from running away from this area.

133 Another former special constable attached to Riot Unit 8, Mr Nelson Shabangu [AM3676/96], made twenty-six statements to the Commission in which he implicated members of Riot Unit 8 and the Port Natal Security Branch in as many as fifty killings and several acts of torture. These were just the incidents that Shabangu said he was able to recall clearly. Shabangu was a member of a special subunit established in 1989 to help the CID with arrests. The sub-unit, under the command of Sergeant Willem de Wet, was disbanded in January 1990 following community pressure.

134 De Wet’s unit worked in a large area that included Pietermaritzburg and surrounds, Mpumalanga, Richmond, Greytown, Mphophomeni, Inchanga, Table Mountain and Bulwer. They worked in a clandestine way, using pseudonyms and vehicles with false/changed registration numbers. They generally operated at night and wore civilian clothes and balaclavas when engaged in a covert operation. While the unit injured and killed indiscriminately at times, they targeted mainly UDF activists, who they interrogated, tortured and/or killed. Methods of torture included electric shocks to the body with a dynamo taken from a telephone, suffocation with a car tube, and the ‘helicopter treatment’ described earlier.

ARISING FROM THE NUMEROUS ALLEGATIONS MADE AGAINST HIM, AND IN TERMS OF SECTION 30 OF THE ACT, THE COMMISSION MADE FINDINGS OF MORE THAN SIX COUNTS OF SEVERE ILL TREATMENT, MORE THAN TWENTY COUNTS OF KILLING, SIX COUNTS OF CULPABLE HOMICIDE, TEN COUNTS OF ACCESSORY TO KILLING, TWO COUNTS OF ATTEMPTED KILLING AND TWO COUNTS OF DEFEATING THE ENDS OF JUSTICE AGAINST SAP SERGEANT WILLEM DE WET.DE WET IS HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE PERPETRATION OF THE GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ARISING FROM THESE UNLAWFUL ACTS.

135 The Trust Feed massacre of 1988 provides a window into the operations of the special constables and the SAP in the Midlands during the late 1980s.