TRC Final Report

Volume 4

Chapter 6

Subsection 6

77 Unfortunately, the NPU denied the FXI researcher access to its documents, insisting that it would make records available only to the Commission itself. Consequently, the Commission’s researcher for the media hearing spent several days at the NPU offices. Although she did not peruse the minutes of every meeting held, she gained an insight into the workings of the NPU from those she examined.

78 Representatives of all South African newspapers attended NPU executive meetings. Representation was usually an editor/general manager and the managing director. The minutes reveal that the NPU was, above all, a business forum. Hence, at times, it seemed as if the deals done with government were conceived mainly to enable the papers to continue making a profit. Negotiations with government were, for example, especially intense before the introduction of television, mainly because of the fear that it would reduce advertising revenue. The main items on the agenda were generally the contracts with paper suppliers and the accreditation of advertising agencies.

79 The liberal English press defended its participation in the NPU and negotiations with government concerning, amongst other things, a statutory Press Council and agreements with government on defence and police matters. It asserted that this was the only way to prevent the government from bringing in restrictions that were even more draconian or even banning their papers.

80 The NPU’s submission argues similarly that its intensive lobbying efforts in the various government forums prevented government from muzzling the press with direct censorship, the formal registration of journalists and other threatened restrictions.

81 The consistent attacks on the English press plus constant threats of closure bear this out to a degree. But the question arises: did the liberal press, by participating in the NPU and constantly responding to government threats, willingly participate in a system which allowed the government to control the flow of information? Furthermore, did their participation give the NPU agreements and negotiations a legitimacy they did not deserve? The manner in which the NPU was viewed by black journalists, for example, shows the contempt in which they held those who allowed the government to dictate the level of press freedom.

82 On its participation in the defence and police liaison committees, the repeated refrain – from the publishing houses and the NPU itself in a submission made after the hearing – was that these committees were seen as a way of improving the flow of information or “keeping the channels of communication open” in an increasingly closed environment. This view has been totally rejected by a number of researchers and writers.

83 Graeme Addison, for instance, wrote a thesis on South Africa’s war. He maintained that the NPU was colluding with the government and that the most senior journalists were aware of this. “News manipulation was the order of the day, and the oft-repeated claim that our press was objective was nothing less than ludicrous.” This was the result of what he referred to as the “gate-keeping” procedures of the press and broadcast stations in their symbiotic relationship with the public relations officers of the SADF.

84 Addison believes the mass media performed as propagandists for the army and government through, amongst other things, the defence agreement between the Minister of Defence and the NPU. The combination of law and agreement pulled the media in line with the government’s ‘total strategy’ of security action and propaganda to defend apartheid. This doctrine was well publicised and no editor was unaware of its implications. By colluding with the system of censorship, the media helped support apartheid.

85 Jolyon Nuttall, a previous president of the NPU who gave evidence at the hearing, served on the liaison committees. He said they discussed mainly matters of policy and principle. He confirmed that defence and police officials used them to brief editors and management on the state of the nation from their perspective. However, he said, most NPU members were alert to attempts to whitewash the situation or to brainwash them.

86 One of the biggest indictments against the Press Council was its ruling against the Rand Daily Mail on the Biko issue. It found the Mail guilty of the government’s accusations of “unfair and malicious comment” when the paper ran a headline saying: “No sign of hunger strike – Biko doctors”. The newspaper was twice brought before the council on charges of printing unsubstantiated facts concerning the Biko case. On both occasions, the Press Council ruled in favour of the government and reprimanded the newspaper.

87 The NPU’s reaction to the banning and arrests of Black Consciousness organisations on 19 October 1977 – Black Thursday – is also worth noting, as the bannings included a number of newspapers which were members of the NPU and a number of editors. NPU documents reflect that an urgent meeting was held on that day and for several days to come. However, perhaps because it involved black papers and journalists, their enthusiasm to pursue the issue with government petered out and nothing appears to come of their initial “indignation”.

88 The second example of the relationship between the media and the state was that of the closure of the Rand Daily Mail in 1985, which was a blow to the progressive forces in South Africa. The conflicting reasons for its closure, hotly debated for a decade, were again discussed at the hearing: was it closed for commercial reasons or was it forced to close by the government?

89 Government operative John Horak said it was important for government that the Mail should not die, based on the argument that South Africa could not be accused of being dictatorial if an internationally recognised newspaper, vehemently opposed to government, continued to exist. Horak blamed the liberal establishment for the paper’s demise and said he knew of campaigns where advertisers were told that, by advertising in the Mail, they would be promoting Communism.

90 Raymond Louw was adamant that Horak was incorrect in his belief that the government did not want the Mail to die. If this had been so, he said, there would not have been a failed attempt by Louis Luyt to purchase the Mail. Furthermore, if this was so, why did the government later ban the Weekly Mail, which had by then gained similar diplomatic value, and the New Nation?

91 Louw believed the owners of the paper were “got at” by the government. It would seem that a special emissary from the Broederbond approached the paper informing it that the government was going to change its policies drastically and that it did not want a newspaper like the Rand Daily Mail around to confront and embarrass it when it made these changes. Louw said he felt that the owners accepted the argument and that it was a political closure. Although any connection has been denied, he felt it was significant that M-Net, soon to be owned by a consortium of newspapers, got its licence in the same month as the Mail was closed.

92 The closure of the Rand Daily Mail left a vacuum that was later only partially filled by the alternative press in the late 1980s. In addition, the Mail’s closure had a self-censoring effect on other English-language papers.