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TRC Final ReportPage Number (Original) 202 Paragraph Numbers 31 to 43 Volume 5 Chapter 6 Subsection 2 Amnesty applications31 Given the difficulties and constraints in accessing information, the Commission relied, to a large extent, on a different form of submission – amnesty applications. 32 In reviewing its efforts to uncover the deeper truth behind the violations of the apartheid era, the Commission frankly acknowledges that much of its success is due to the fact that large numbers of security police members grasped at the possibility of amnesty in exchange for full disclosure. The Commission is not, however, so naïve as to believe that it was this alone that persuaded them to ‘blow the whistle’ on their past actions. The fact is that they would have preferred the cloak of silence. The ironic truth is that what brought them to the Commission was the fullness of the disclosures made by an individual often painted as the arch-villain of the apartheid era – Mr Eugene de Kock. Whatever his motives, the Commission acknowledges that it was largely he who broke the code of silence. 33 It is unfortunate, in the Commission’s view, that a comparable ‘whistle blower’ did not emerge from the ranks of the SADF. Nevertheless, some of the information provided by former members of Military Intelligence (MI) and Special Forces helped the Commission to obtain a clear insight into the role played by the SADF in respect of cross-border target identification and operations, as well as providing a broader insight into the role of the SADF in the formulation of security policy. 34 The Commission received not a single amnesty application from members of the former National Intelligence Service (NIS). Former members of NIS consistently maintained that, although they had provided information about specific individuals and activists and had passed these on to operational units in the SAP and SADF, they were not responsible for the actions that arose as a result. The Commission rejects this position. 35 In line with its overall approach, the ANC and MK leadership applied for amnesty, accepting collective responsibility for the actions of members and operatives. Perhaps because of this, not all MK operatives applied for individual amnesty. This is unfortunate because it denied the Commission the kind of rich and specific detail about individual operations that it gleaned, for example, from Security Branch operatives. The bulk of ANC applications were for the post-1990 period and were received from former members of self-defence units (SDUs). 36 Most IFP amnesty applications were from people convicted of serious crimes committed with a political motive. In spite of pressure brought to bear on convicted prisoners by senior IFP office-bearers, a handful of key members did apply for amnesty, giving the Commission important insights into the workings of IFP hit squads, as well as details and names of senior IFP officials implicated in hit squad activities. 37 Most of the PAC and Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA) applications related to their major period of activity – the post-1990s. Accessing information from role-players38 Aside from submissions, the Commission required ongoing access to documentation and information held by primary role-players. 39 It needs to be stated at the outset that the former state deliberately and systematically destroyed state documentation in an attempt to ensure that a new democratic government would be denied access to incriminating evidence. Hundreds of thousands of classified records – literally scores of tons – were destroyed. Much of this documentation related to the inner workings of the security forces and intelligence agencies, covert projects, informer networks, personnel records of security force members, and material confiscated from institutions and individuals. The destruction of this documentation deprived the Commission and the country as a whole of a rich and valuable source of material for its investigation into the conflicts of the past. (See further Volume One.) 40 With regard to the former security forces, specific personnel were assigned to ‘nodal (liaison) points’ to respond to ongoing requests by the Commission. The SANDF nodal point was staffed entirely by former SADF members. In respect of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), Commission staff were required to go through lengthy procedures of security clearance. Thus, despite the fact that the Act stipulated that the Commission should have access to whatever records and documentation were required, it was, in this respect, subjected to a series of filters and blocks rather than the free and open access envisaged by the Act. 41 Overall, the Commission concluded that the SANDF nodal point, rather than facilitating its work, appeared at times to act as gatekeeper to the SADF’s secrets and military archives for close on two years. Access was granted, in an extremely limited form, only towards the end of the time available for sustained research. Of even more concern to the Commission was the fact that the nodal point appears to have played a similar screening role when channelling the requests of its former members who wished to apply for amnesty. The Commission is aware of at least one case in which a former member of the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB), who in the Commission’s view should definitely have applied for amnesty, was advised not to do so. 42 The Commission is of the view that the role of the nodal point was decided at the highest (present and past) officer level. Appeals to the Minister and Deputy Minister of Defence for assistance bore little or no fruit and led the Commission to conclude that it had erred in not conducting a search-and-seizure raid on the archives. 43 The ANC established a ‘TRC desk’ that was intended to function as a point of reference both for its members and for the Commission. While the Commission is unable to comment on whether it performed a useful service for its own members, the desk was not always helpful to the Commission. To give just one example, not one of the 250 requests submitted by the Commission’s Johannesburg office received a response from the ANC TRC desk. |