TRC Final Report

Volume 6

Section 1

Chapter 3

Subsection 3

Self-defence units and township violence

26. The Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (the Commission) discussed the phenomenon of SDUs and the various acts of violence their members committed in many parts of the country^{2 9}. It will not, therefore, be elaborated on here.

27. Applications by former members of SDUs presented the Committee with formidable problems. Most SDU applications were hurriedly completed and submitted just before the closing date for amnesty applications.^{3 0} These forms contained only basic information with few, if any, details about the incident(s) for which amnesty was being sought. Most were identical and simply contained general reference to unspecified SDU activities.

28. These SDU applications caused a number of specific difficulties.

29. First, and not unnaturally, SDU members stated in their applications that they had acted in self-defence. On a strict legal interpretation, such conduct is not unlawful and does not, there fore, amount to an offence. As one of the statutory requirements for amnesty is that the applicant’s conduct must constitute an o ffence associated with a political objective, SDU applicants did not qualify for amnesty (see also Chapter One of this volume).

30. Second, given the form of the violence in the townships and the nature of the operations undertaken by SDUs during the early 1990s, applicants frequently could not identify any specific victim(s) of their actions. Incidents tended to involve violent conflicts between crowds of African National Congress (ANC) and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) supporters. Many applicants were unable to say whether or not any person(s) had been injured or killed as a result of their actions in the course of these clashes. They were often not even able to say whether any injuries or deaths had resulted during specified clashes.

31. Third, some applicants (usually convicted prisoners) denied having participated in or even having been associated with the commission of the offence(s) for which they had been convicted and for which they were seeking amnesty. Again, in terms of the Act, they could not be said to have committed an offence with a political objective as required by the Act. Generally the Committee took the view that it was not a court of appeal and that applicants who had been refused amnesty had to seek redress from the courts. The Committee did, however, endeavour to draw the attention of the appropriate government authority to the anomaly of releasing via the amnesty process those guilty of offences, sometimes of a heinous nature, while retaining in prison those innocent of these offences. This is obviously a matter requiring further focussed attention by the appropriate authorities.

32. Fourth, in some SDU cases the Committee found that the applicant(s) concerned had acted against targets without knowing whether or not they were members or supporters of an opposing political organisation or party. Rather, they acted against communities that were perceived to be supporting a rival organisation. This created a potential complication in that the Act required the applicant to have acted against a political opponent.

33. Fifth, the Committee also heard that some SDU applicants had acted during specific incidents without an order from (a) leader(s) of the political organisation or party they represented or of which they claimed to have been a member or supporter at the time of the commission of the offence(s). Again, this complicate d even clearly politically motivated action.

34. Sixth, those ANC-aligned SDU members who had committed acts of robbery ostensibly with the aim of buying arms for their activities could not conceivably be said to have acted in accordance with the general policy of the ANC, which disavowed robbery as part of its policy.

35. Finally, due to the lack of legal representation and advice available to them at the time of the completion of the amnesty application forms, many SDU applicants failed to provide the necessary particularity concerning their actions. These applications were, there f o re, at risk of being refused for their failure to comply with the re q u i rements of the Act.

36. After intense discussions prior to the finalisation of SDU applications, the Committee decided to deal with them at public hearings where the context of the conflict and the activities of the SDUs could be fully ventilated.

37. The hearings helped clarify the political background and context within which these offences occurred through the evidence of witnesses who were part of the leadership of the organisations involved in the conflict. The Committee also benefited from the reports and testimony of representatives of non-governmental o rganisations who had been involved in monitoring the political violence and t rends in the areas where these activities occurred. In evaluating the merits of the applications, the Committee also considered the submissions of the ANC, and subjected applicants to pertinent and probing questions about the ANC’s tactics and policies.

38. H o w ever, although these submissions were generally helpful, they did not always enable the Committee to reach an informed decision on every individual case. It was clear, for example, that it had not always been possible for SDU members to receive a specific order before launching an attack or operation. The areas in question were, moreover, gripped by large-scale, ongoing and indiscriminate violence where the maintenance of law and order had all but collapsed. Testimonies at the hearings depicted a grim picture of day-to-day survival as communities came under attack by clandestine forces, often operating with the tacit approval and even support of the security forces. The East Rand in the early 1990s offered a clear example of this, with young people testifying about their involvement in violent operations in defence of their communities.

39. It was often difficult to draw a distinction between legitimate SDU operations and criminal actions. Local criminal elements exploited the violence and civil strife for their own ends. Some SDUs became a virtual law unto themselves, even acting against fellow SDU members, as was the case in Katlehong in 1992. Other SDU elements launched operations against the express orders of their political leadership.

40. Investigating the involvement of the security forces in the township violence of the early 1990s proved difficult. Lack of investigative capacity on the part of the Committee was one factor; time constraints were another. But the biggest obstacle was the attitude of the security forces themselves. Security force members were reluctant to appear before the Committee to refute allegations about their role in the violence. In many cases, they responded by submitting affidavits or instructing legal representatives to cross-examine those who had implicated them. Rarely did they attend the hearings to present their own version. The result was that, at the end of these hearings, there was little to contradict the strong impression that certain members of the security forces had been involved in acts of violence against communities which had simply sought to defend themselves.

41. It must also be mentioned that, in some of the SDU cases, there was no objective evidence to corroborate the testimonies of the applicants – either because the victims were unknown to the applicant or because they had left the a rea in which the attack occurred. This did not deter the Committee from making victim findings (in terms of section 22 of the Act) in the hope that the victims, once they reappeared, would be able to access the reparations process. There w e re also cases where victims took a conscious decision not to attend the hearings and testify for fear of reprisals by other members of an applicant’s political organisation or party.