TRC Final Report

Volume 6

Section 3

Chapter 1

Subsection 29

AUTHORISATION OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES

322. Increasingly, as time went on, the security forces used unlawful and criminal actions, particularly extrajudicial killings, to respond to the political situation. By n o w, the condonation and tolerance of extrajudicial activity had led to a culture of impunity throughout the security forces.

323. The Commission noted a number of words and phrases in security policy documents, speeches in Parliament and elsewhere in the mid-1980s such as: ‘elimineer’ (eliminate); ‘uithaal’ (take out); ‘fisiese vernietiging – mense, fasiliteite, fondse’ (physical destruction – people, facilities, funds); ‘maak ‘n plan’ (make a plan); ‘uitwis’ (wipe out). Numerous amnesty applicants, including senior personnel, confirmed that they had understood such words to mean killing. Major Williamson told the Committee that he understood ‘these words to have a simple meaning and that is to get rid of, kill, destroy’.

324. Despite this, former Minister Vlok and Generals van der Merwe and Coetzee continued to assert that at no stage did the State Security Council (SSC) authorise any policies that included extrajudicial killing. Indeed they went further, saying that the SSC neither authorised nor recommended any illegal action, although Mr Vlok did concede that certain Stratcom activities approved by the SSC could be regarded as unlawful. They did, however, agree that operatives could have ‘misunderstood’ their intentions. Mr Vlok said, for example, that the phrase ‘destroy the enemy’ could have been understood in a literal sense.

325. This position appears to have been an attempt to support Security Branch applicants in their efforts to gain amnesty while, at the same time, exonerating those in command and political authority. The Commission did not support the arguments put forward by former Minister Vlok and Generals van der Merwe and Coetzee.¹⁰⁰

326. The applications referred to below, which covered a range of violations, involved direct political authorisation:

a In 1982, amnesty applicant General Petrus Johannes Coetzee said he was instructed by then Minister le Grange to assemble a team to strike at the offices of the ANC in London in the United Kingdom, saying that this was ‘the decision of the government’ (Pretoria hearing, 22 February – 5 March 1999).

b In 1985, Minister le Grange allegedly authorised a plan,¹⁰¹ codenamed Operation Zero Zero, to issue hand grenades to a number of young COSAS activists on the East Rand.1 0 2 As a result of this operation, seven youths were killed and eight severely injured when they attempted to detonate the hand grenades as instructed.¹⁰³

c In 1987, Minister of Law and Order Adriaan Vlok authorised the destruction of Cosatu House, national headquarters of the trade union federation, in central Johannesburg. A C1/Vlakplaas team, with assistance from the Witwatersrand Security Branch as well as the technical and explosives sections at Security Branch Headquarters, undertook the operation on the night of 3 May 1987, extensively damaging the building.¹⁰⁴

d In July 1988, Minister Vlok authorised the placing of dummy explosives in several cinemas around South Africa, to provide a pretext for the seizure and banning of the film Cry Freedom about the death of detainee Steve Biko at the hands of the Port Elizabeth Security Branch. This action was undertaken after numerous unsuccessful attempts to force the government appointed Publications Control Board to ban the film. In the words of Mr Vlok, ‘we had walked the legal way … I judged the risk that this film would have and it would be so inciteful that this risk was too big’.¹⁰⁵

e In August 1988, Minister Vlok was allegedly ordered by State President PW Botha to render Khotso House ‘unusable’, but to do so without loss of life. According to Mr Vlok and General van der Merwe, the Security Branch had evidence that arms were stored on the premises and that people with MK links had been seen entering the building. Mr Vlok further testified that, although he had not been given specific instructions to bomb Khotso House, neither he nor General van der Merwe was able to think of a legal way to carry out Mr Botha’s instructions. He said, moreover, that Mr Botha’s injunction to ensure that there was no loss of life led him to believe that Mr Botha was suggesting the use of unlawful means. The operation, conducted by C1 with assistance from the Witwatersrand Security Branch and the explosives section at Security Branch headquarters, took place on the night of 31 August 1988. Following this operation, both Minister Vlok and General van der Merwe were involved in the cover-up .¹⁰⁶

327. The above incidents demonstrate that there was direct political authorisation for clearly unlawful activities that included killing. In addition, evidence was led that a number of cross-border operations had been authorised by the state, and General Coetzee testified to involvement in the 1982 Maseru raid and the 1985 Gaborone raid.

328. Applicants gave further evidence of high-level political authorisation at a meeting of the senior national and divisional leadership of the Security Branch in early 1985. The meeting was addressed by then State President PW Botha who commanded them to bring the security situation under control by ‘whatever means possible’. This was interpreted as authorisation to use unconventional and unlawful methods.

329. One of the arguments presented by representatives of the National Party and certain high-ranking security and intelligence officials is that the CI/Vlakplaas unit was a renegade gang, acting outside of official policy.

330. It is indeed so that higher authorisation was not conclusively established in a number of operations conducted by C1. However, with regard to one matter, that relating to the killing of Mr Griffiths Mxenge in November 1981, the Amnesty Committee commented as follows:

With regard to [Dirk Coetzee], there was no direct evidence to confirm that he acted on the orders of Van der Hoven [Divisional Commander of Port Natal] or Taylor [Section C, Port Natal]. In fact, it is a matter of public knowledge that Van der Hoven and Taylor denied any involvement; they did so during their recent trial in which they were co-accused with the applicants on a criminal charge in respect of this very incident. While there may be some doubt about the identity of the person or persons on whose advice, command or order, the first applicant acted, the fact that he acted on the advice, command or order of one or more senior members of the Security Branch, admits of no doubt; particularly if regard is had to the following:

He knew nothing about Mxenge and had never heard of him;

He was not based in Durban, but in Vlakplaas near Pretoria. It is inconceivable that he would have, on his own, come all the way to Durban to launch an operation of this magnitude;

Being from Pretoria, he must have been given the necessary logistical and other support on the orders of someone who was his superior;

In order to carry out the operation he requested that Joe Mamasela, who was at that time based in the North West area, be brought to Durban. This was done; Mamasela was released and sent to Durban to be part of the squad;

The murder was indeed covered up and the truth did not emerge until later when it was revealed by the first applicant. This give credence to the allegation of Security Branch involvement on a high level as alleged by first applicant;

An amount of three thousand rand (R3 000.00) was paid to the second and third applicants and to Mamasela by the Security Police, for their part in the killing of Mxenge. [AC/1997/041.]

331. The scenario sketched by the Amnesty Committee is, in the Commission’s view, of more general applicability to many of the other killings committed by C1/Vlakplaas.

332. The consistent pattern of violations committed by both C1/Vlakplaas and other regions provides compelling evidence that operatives were pursuing a policy that was widely accepted and broadly authorised. Moreover, considerable evidence was led during amnesty hearings that supported the Commission’s viewpoint that unlawful activity was widely condoned. The Commission bases this viewpoint on the following evidence: