TRC Final Report

Volume 6

Section 3

Chapter 1

Subsection 33

Line of command

367. It can be seen from the above that the unlawful operations for which the Amnesty Committee received applications tended to conform to routine lines of command within the Security Branch and reflected a similar modus operandi across the country. This does not mean that all operations were centrally organised and directed by the SSC or Security Branch Headquarters. Although the overall strategy and planning was authorised at the highest level of the government and the state, under the prevailing culture of impunity many operations were initiated and carried out at the lower levels.

368. Whether operations were politically authorised or initiated at lower levels, they tended to function according to relatively routine lines of command and communication. For example, even in covert operations, those in charge often tended to follow the courtesy rule of informing commanders in whose area such activities w e re to take place, thus widening the circle of exposure and experience and encouraging further activity along similar lines. This was particularly so when the operation was politically authorised or conducted by a Headquarters component.

369.Lower ranks were inducted into covert and unlawful operations via their normal command structures, thus legitimising and normalising such activities. The heightened sense of being at war, combined with the strongly hierarchical structure of the Security Branch, made those who were drawn into such operations feel privileged and honoured.

370. Juniors were often drawn into operations without being aware of their nature or of the individual roles they were expected to play. Thus, for example, Captain Abraham Kendall, Branch Commander of Bronkhorstpruit Security Branch (a branch of Northern Transvaal), testified that he was asked to accompany Brigadier Cronje and Lieutenant Hechter to the house of the Chief Minister of KwaNdebele. While Brigadier Cronje and Captain Kendall were inside meeting the Chief Minister, Lieutenant Hechter placed a bomb under Mr Piet Ntuli’s car. Asked whether he realised that Ntuli was about to be killed, Kendall responded:

<blockquote> I suspected that as Hechter was lying in the back of the vehicle, there would be dirty tricks. If I have to think back thirteen years, I cannot think that I thought that somebody was going to die. I wasn’t part of that Security Branch, within the Security Branch plan, if we have to put it that way, I had never been a member of such activity. I was a small man, who carried small secrets around with me at that stage. (Pretoria hearing, 9 April 1999.) blockquote>

371. Captain Kendall was later transferred to Security Branch Headquarters and applied for amnesty for instructing members of the Eastern Cape Security Branch to throw a petrol bomb at the home of the Revd Allan Hendrickse after he had embarrassed the tricameral parliament by going to a ‘whites only’ beach. Kendall also sought amnesty for his part in the ‘Cry Freedom’ operation.

372. Given the overwhelming evidence in this respect, the Commission concluded that the leadership of the Security Branch and a significant proportion of the military leadership were involved in unlawful covert operations. Former State President FW de Klerk has suggested that such activity was unauthorised and undertaken by groups of renegades or ‘bad apples’. The placing and promotion of personnel suggests that those in charge of the Security Branch were well aware of the existence and effectiveness of covert operations. Officers such as General Gerrit <b>Erasmusb>, Brigadier Nicolaas van Rensburg and Major Hermanus du Plessis, all of whom had a long history of committing abuses, were not only promoted but, by the end of the 1980s, were based at Security Branch Headquarters. Thus, not only were their activities endorsed, but they were placed in a position where they were able significantly to influence and direct security policy from national headquarters.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

373. The purpose of this chapter was to examine the extent to which the amnesty process enlarged the Commission’s knowledge of the human rights violations committed by the state. By employing the ‘carrot and stick’ principle adopted in the founding Act, it was hoped that state perpetrators, amongst others, would take advantage of the opportunities offered by the legislation and, in the process, shed light on state involvement in gross violations of human rights.

374. This chapter has shown that the appeal to self-interest in the legislation was a wise one and that, where perpetrators saw the benefit to themselves, they came forward and applied for amnesty. From these applicants, the Commission and indeed South Africa was able to learn a great deal.

375. Unhappily the former SADF, advised that the Commission could offer them no safety from prosecution for the many violations its members had committed in countries outside South Africa, made pitifully few applications.

376. One of the most shameful aspects to emerge from the amnesty process was the failure of the political leadership to stand by those who committed violations at their behest and in their name. In several amnesty hearings, the disdain, contempt and betrayal of those who had expected better of their leadership is evident.

377. One of the more remarkable strengths of the Commission itself was that it has opened the way for the stories of individual people. The amnesty process continued the work of the Commission by helping to find people who would not otherwise have been found and by helping to lead families to a truth that would otherwise forever have been denied. Without some of these applications, many deaths and disappearances would have remained unexplained.