Amnesty Hearings

MR VISSER: The next witness is Gen Erasmus. Mr Chairman, may his exhibit be marked Exhibit D, Exhibit D for Delta, Mr Chairman, I wouldn't assume to say Exhibit D for Donkey.

MR SIBANYONI: Your full names Mr Erasmus?

MR ERASMUS: Gerrit Nicholas Erasmus.

GERRIT NICHOLAS ERASMUS: (sworn states)

MR SIBANYONI: Please be seated, sworn in Chairperson.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Erasmus, you are an applicant in this application for amnesty. You have previously given evidence in amnesty applications, amongst others before members of this Committee and amongst others before the Chairperson of this Committee, in the matters of Kondile Mthimkulu, Cosatu House, Khotso House and the incident of Stanza Bopape, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You have also studied Exhibit A, do you agree with the contents of Exhibit A and do you confirm it in so far as you know?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, I do Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you request that that evidence as well as other evidence to which is referred to in Exhibit A, be incorporated in your evidence in the consideration of your application, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You have also completed an application which appears in the Bundle, on page 183 to 193 and you deal with the current incident from page 185 to 188, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm the truth and correctness in so far as your insights go of this document?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, I confirm so Chairperson.

MR VISSER: In your amnesty application, on the amnesty application form, you referred to the amnesty application of Brig Schoon. Mr Chairman, I refer you to page 183 I believe it is, 185 Mr Chairman, where you will find that under 9(a)(iv), the first paragraph. In your document, Exhibit D, you dealt with this incident. Will you please address the Committee with regard to this incident and as to how you referred to Brig Schoon's amnesty application? You may start from paragraph 1 on page 2.

MR ERASMUS: I have read the statement of Brig Schoon and can confirm that during the initial amnesty process, there was great doubt with me and other members of the Security Branch about the honesty of the new government and the unbiasedness of the amnesty process. Several meetings were held by members and were addressed by Gen van der Merwe, the previous Commissioner of the Police in which he attempted to lay to rest the fears of the SAP and to convince them to participate in the amnesty process. Generals van der Merwe and Johan Coetzee received several undertakings from the Chairperson and vice-Chairperson of the TRC on grounds of which many members, including myself, decided on number 99 to liaise application forms for amnesty. Unfortunately the incidents led to the fact that there was not much time to hand in applications before the closing date. I have a clear recollection that Brig Schoon during December 1996, spoke to me with regard to this incident and that he informed me that he would apply for this incident. My recollection is so clear in this regard, that when I wrote my amnesty application, I referred to Brig Schoon's amnesty application on the assumption that he would apply. I am now informed that an error had been, there had been an error in that one incident had been doubled and it seems that there is no application of his, in this regard. I can only testify that Brig Schoon was definitely of the intention of applying for amnesty for this incident.

MR VISSER: We will address the Amnesty Committee later with regard to this, but Gen Erasmus, is it correct that you are a retired General from the South African Police?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And that you amongst others in your period of service, that you were the Commander of Group D at Head Office in Pretoria during 1988, 1989?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: During this incident which we believe took place on the 12th or 13th of February 1989, who was then the Group Commander of C1?

MR ERASMUS: Brig Schoon.

MR VISSER: And as such, Vlakplaas would resort under his command?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And a little further detail, Gen van der Merwe at that stage, was the vice-Commissioner of the police and Gen Basie Smit was then the Head of Security?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You have heard the evidence of Mr Coetzee and Mr Oosthuizen and do you associate yourself with the contents of their evidence in so far as you know?

MR ERASMUS: I do so Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Is it also correct that what Mr Oosthuizen testified that during the first week of February 1989, he made a submission to you with regard to the political activities of certain political activists, whom were attached to student organisations?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You mentioned to him, or mention was made that the persons wanted to go to Swaziland in order to establish contact with the ANC MK in Swaziland in order to further the people's war strategy and to entrench and promote this amongst the students in South Africa?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And amongst others, this would also include boycott actions and other focus points for actions which would be discussed in Swaziland by this group of students?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And that they wanted to undergo and receive instant training in the use of weapons and also to smuggle in weapons of terror or to make arrangements that such weapons be sent to the RSA, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Paragraph 16 on page 4 you said that Sansco at that stage was the most important political organisation, which promoted destabilisation, unrest and acts of violence on tertiary education level, was this information which you received from sources and informants and agents?

MR ERASMUS: Yes Chairperson, information was gathered throughout the country and some of it appeared on my desk. Was it also your experience because of this information which was promoted to Head Office, that during this time period 1988 to 1989, there was a serious destabilisation amongst students and specifically on tertiary educational level and that unrest levels increased right throughout the country?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And in the light thereof, you agreed with Mr Oosthuizen as he had testified that it was of import to you from a viewpoint of security, that no such liaison be established between students and MK in Swaziland?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Mr Oosthuizen testified that he orally reported to you, supported by Intelligence notes and profiles and written reports of the leaders of Sansco which was submitted to you, can you today recall any detail thereof?

MR ERASMUS: Not at all Chairperson, I do not recall the detail of the discussion.

MR VISSER: But at that stage when it was submitted to you, were you convinced that it was a matter of utmost importance?

MR ERASMUS: That is so Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You say in paragraph 19, will you please tell the Committee where your part comes about?

MR ERASMUS: Brig Oosthuizen had proposed to me that a controlled covert offensive operation be launched in order, with regard to the political activists who wanted to go to Swaziland. He motivated it in the following manner, experience taught that detention of activists ... (tape ends) ... combating political violence, normal legal options with regard to the detention and arrest of student leaders, indicated that it had an unwanted affect in that the focus point of new activities, for example protest actions and boycotts were established, which increased the intensity of unrest and acts of terror. There was no evidence that the group had already been guilty of any offence which could be proven in order to establish prosecution. Any prosecution which was needed, would make necessary the use of informers and because of intimidation, informers could not act as witnesses and this would endanger their lives. Liaison with Sansco and the ANC had to be discouraged because instant training in weapons and the supply of weapons to members of Sansco could lead to large scale acts of terror and bloodshed. The smuggling of weapons to the RSA, given the fact that at that stage, weapons had already been smuggled from Swaziland by trained terrorists and collaborators, had to be prevented. Given the intensity of political destabilisation with the accompanying unrest and violence which reigned at that stage, I realised that a direct liaison by student political activists with the ANC, in Swaziland, would have far reaching consequences with regard to the increased political de-stability in the RSA. I accorded with Brig Oosthuizen that everything possible had to be done in order to prevent liaison between members of Sansco and the ANC in Swaziland. I undertook to discuss this with Brig Schoon, I will repeat I undertook to enter in discussion with Brig Schoon with regard to the execution of the operation. Brig Oosthuizen later informed me that the political leaders of Sansco planned to travel with a minibus to Swaziland and that innocent persons would possibly be present in the vehicle. He proposed that a vehicle be rented by an informer in order to establish a control and to ensure that the wrong persons not be eliminated. I shared Brig Oosthuizen's concerns and in principle agreed that the vehicle had to be rented. During the course of the day, I discussed the operation with Brig Schoon. We reached a consensus that the operation was necessary in order to combat unrest and violence in the RSA. I ensured Brig Schoon that I had previously asked with regard to the facts and information with regard to the planned visit of Louis Mohale and members of his group to Swaziland, to be controlled and confirmed to ensure that the information was reliable. I was under the impression, I was brought under the impression of the urgency to take a position of possible actions in the matter. I informed Brig Schoon of the information that the members of the Sansco group wanted to form part of existing MK underground structures amongst Cosas to establish MK underground cell structures in the RSA through Cosas, Sansco and Sayco led members. Members of such cell structures would be channelled to the neighbouring countries for military training, to arm cell structures for the purpose of military training, to enter into the armed struggle by attacking police members, so-called traitors and State property, to increase the revolutionary climate. I ensured Brig Schoon that I was convinced that these persons were not to be enticed and that they would go to Swaziland on their own in order to establish contact with MK structures there, in order to receive military training and weapons. The plan of Brig Oosthuizen to supply a vehicle to the group, in order to maintain the trust of the informer, was sketched. I also explained that the informer in this manner would be able to maintain contact with the group when they went into Swaziland. Both Brig Schoon and I agreed that if the group were in Swaziland, they would make contact with MK structures and weapons and training would be received and their movements would be difficult to monitor. We also agreed that the group had to be eliminated as soon as they were in Swaziland. Brig Schoon and I also agreed that in the light of these circumstances, there was no other way out, but to eliminate them. The possibility of arrests, Court directed actions or detention was discussed, but because of reasons mentioned above, we came to the conclusion that that would be no answer to the problem. Brig Schoon proposed that he would take up the operation with Col de Kock. I contacted Brig Oosthuizen and informed him that discussions were held with Brig Schoon and that the planning at groundlevel would be discussed with Col de Kock and then he would come back to me. Afterwards Brig Schoon contacted me to say that they would continue with the operation. I have no knowledge whether Brig Schoon discussed the matter with anybody else. I played no further role in the planning or execution of the operation on 13-02-1989. Brig Oosthuizen contacted me and informed me that the operation was successful and that three persons were killed. With regard to Col de Kock's amnesty application, I wish to point out the following, Col de Kock errs in his recollection that I attended any planning meeting at Vlakplaas. He is correct in his recollection that Brig Schoon and I did indeed hold talks at Vlakplaas with him, Brig Oosthuizen, Col W. Coetzee with regard to the problem which emanated because the Opel Kadett was traced back to the SAP and he is also correct in his recollection about the meeting where the decision was taken how to solve the problem. In so far as Col de Kock notes that he is not certain as to why the persons could not be arrested, I refer to what was said above. At all times I associated myself with the action and my participance in the conspiracy to murder them.

MR VISSER: You were also a co-decision maker to eliminate them?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: With regard to the legal prerequisites, you have listened to the evidence of Mr Coetzee and Oosthuizen when they informed the Committee that as they saw the matter, these were incidents which took place during a war situation where the normal rules of war were not applicable and their actions were aimed at supporters of a liberation movement, who was the enemy of the State and who wanted to launch a revolutionary onslaught against the State dispensation and caused much damage and injury and deaths, do you agree with that statement?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, I do.

MR VISSER: And the struggle which was fought be police officers and the political struggle, and what they did as they saw as part of their duties as police officials in order to protect and maintain internal security, and also in support of the National Party and the government of the day, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You have previously testified in various applications about pressure which was applied from above, on members of the Security Branch, we won't refer to that again, but consequently you will agree that because of the pressure which was placed on you, members of the Security Branch believed that what they had done, fell within their explicit or tacit authorisation and that it was something that was expected of them, which they had to do, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You did not receive any benefit or reward for your participance in this incident, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you request amnesty from the Amnesty Committee before whom you appear now, for any offence or delict which was committed by you before, during or after the incident, during which Mohale, Mashobane and Shabangu were murdered, close to Mbabane on the 12th or 13th of February 1989?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, Hattingh on record. General, just one aspect, page 7 of your statement, paragraph 36, subparagraph 2 thereof, you say there Mr de Kock is incorrect when he says that you attended a planning session at Vlakplaas, may I ask you the following question, during this period, shortly before, during or after this incident, and the discussions which you were involved with at Head Office, did you during that time visit Vlakplaas?

MR ERASMUS: It is very possible Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And if you had visited Vlakplaas, is it possible that you may have discussed this incident with Mr de Kock?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Chairperson, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

MR BOOYENS: Booyens, no questions, Mr Chairman.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS

MR CORNELIUS: Wim Cornelius, Mr Chairman, no questions.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS

MR NEL: Thank you Mr Chairman, Nel, no questions.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR NEL

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman, Rossouw, no questions.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW

MR BOTHA: Thank you Mr Chairman, Botha, no questions.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOTHA

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN HEERDEN: Thank you Mr Chairman, I've got some questions, van Heerden. I see it is more or less one o'clock, Mr Chairman, should I proceed?

CHAIRPERSON: How long do you think you will be? I think it is seven minutes to one?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Excuse me Mr Chairman, I will then proceed. Mr Erasmus, I have asked this question previously, but I will ask it to you as well, did you know Derek Mashobane and did you know what he did?

MR ERASMUS: I did not know him. The only way I could have known him, was through reports. I did not do any field work myself.

MR VAN HEERDEN: What did you know of him?

MR ERASMUS: All that I can recall at this stage was that he was a student political activist and as it was informed to me by means of the information which was obtained.

MR VAN HEERDEN: And then Portia Shabangu?

MR ERASMUS: I cannot recall Chairperson. Only in the submission that it was said that Mohale and his core group, I cannot recall that this name was given to me.

MR VAN HEERDEN: And then Tabo Mohale?

MR ERASMUS: Tabo Mohale?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ERASMUS: Similarly, I did not know him.

MR VAN HEERDEN: So all that you knew was that these were political activists?

MR VISSER: That is unfair Mr Chairman. The evidence is quite clear that there was a very complete profile on these people, he cannot remember today the witness says, what that was, but at the time, he had no doubt as to what their activities were, so that is not a fair statement.

CHAIRPERSON: (Microphone not on) He said he didn't know the man, there is no suggestion that he did. He has said that he relied on the information supplied to him to say carry on with the operation.

MR VISSER: My point exactly, Mr Chairman.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VAN HEERDEN: May I proceed Mr Chairman? A further aspect which I wish to discuss with you, this was a reasonably complicated operation which was executed in Swaziland. Why was it decided to do it in Swaziland and not for example in South Africa?

MR ERASMUS: Because it was a covert operation Chairperson, and from such an operation, if it had taken place, there would have been large scale investigations, and the other point was to blame this on the ANC, that is why it was done there, and the people were on their way to Swaziland, they were going to Swaziland any way.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Thank you, I have no further questions, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN HEERDEN

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV STEENKAMP

MR SIBANYONI: General, you said the group proposed to have a, to visit Swaziland, to travel on a kombi, was this kombi not an idea of the police, was it the original idea of the group?

MR ERASMUS: As far as I know and I only deal on information which is submitted to me, more of these persons would go and a larger vehicle would be required. I don't know whether it was the idea of the police, all that I know is that it was conveyed to me that this group wanted to go to Swaziland for reasons as I have set out.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: I have two questions which I should have perhaps asked somebody earlier and not left it to you, they may be a little unfair. The first one is, wouldn't it have been better if you were going to eliminate these people, to do so before they had got to Swaziland and had a chance of discussing what was going on with the Umkhonto people there because it appears they had already had one meeting with the Umkhonto people in Swaziland and had arranged another one on the Sunday morning for weapons training?

MR ERASMUS: Chairperson, yes, I concede that is possible that it could have been done, but as Mr Oosthuizen and Coetzee had already mentioned and the evidence which was given by them, the danger of disclosure of the agent was the greatest concern.

CHAIRPERSON: And the second question, did anybody ever tell you that weapons were found in this car?

MR ERASMUS: Chairperson, as far as I can recall, not. I only heard that the operation was executed successfully and that is as far as I know, and what happened afterwards.

CHAIRPERSON: It is now one o'clock, we will take the adjournment. Do you wish this witness to be excused, this applicant, sorry, on the same basis?

MR VISSER: If it pleases you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

WITNESS EXCUSED

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, would you allow me to hand up to you an affidavit by Brig Schoon, in order to support an application which I intend bringing at two o'clock before you, thank you Mr Chairman.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS