CHAIRPERSON: I will put the Committee on record and then ask the legal advisors to do the same. The Committee consists of myself, Andrew Wilson, Chris de Jager, and I trust they will have noticed his status, and Mr Sibanyoni.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, I am P A Hattingh and I am instructed by Mr Schalk Hugo to appear for Mr de Kock.
CHAIRPERSON: When he appears, I gather you have had problems?
MR HATTINGH: Yes Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: You are sorting them out?
MR HATTINGH: Yes, we have sorted them out, he will only be arriving somewhat later.
CHAIRPERSON: But you have no objection to us continuing?
MR HATTINGH: No objection to continuing in his absence in the meantime, Mr Chairman.
MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman, my surname is Rossouw, I represent applicant Douw Willemse.
MR PRINSLOO: Mr Chairman, Harry Prinsloo, I represent applicants number 10, Deetlefs and 12, F J Pienaar.
MS VAN DER WALT: Chairperson, I am Louisa van der Walt, I am appearing on behalf of applicant 9, S J Visser and 11, P J van Dyk.
MR VISSER: May it please you Mr Chairperson, my name is Louis Visser, I am instructed by Wagener Muller on behalf of Mr Chairman, if I may refer to the Bundle, number 3, number 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. Those persons, I don't know whether you want me to repeat their names, it is Ignatius Coetzee, Willem Coetzee, Lodewyk de Jager, Johannes van der Merwe, Marthinus van Wyngaard, Anton Pretorius and Willem Schoon. And if you will allow me Mr Chairman, I understand that congratulations are in order, as you are now joined by an acting Judge on the Panel.
CHAIRPERSON: Nobody representing victims or families or interested parties?
ADV STEENKAMP: No, indeed not, Mr Chairman. I can just maybe put on record that as far as requirements of Section 19(4) is concerned, it is my respectful submission those requirements have been met. No victims in this matter whatsoever, could be traced or identified in this matter. All reasonable steps were taken to locate them, thank you Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Have you arranged who will begin?
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I take it that I will begin, Louis Visser on record. Mr Chairman, some documents have been placed before you and the first document is one that has been placed before you last week, matters then modified Exhibit A "Algemene agtergrond tot amnestie aansoeke". I am told by my Attorney that he has placed fresh copies before you. Judge de Jager has received a fresh copy Chairperson, and just for his edification, may I just mention that the material way in which this new Exhibit A differs from the previous one, is in regard to Swaziland and Mozambique, at page 24 I believe it was, Mr Chairman, yes page 24 to page 30. But other than that it is the document to which Judge de Jager is in fact accustomed. Chairperson, we have drafted also statements of the evidence of the applicants for whom we will appear. You will have a little bundle before you containing all the statements of the applicants. The bundle starts off with a little diagram Chairperson. May I just explain the diagram. This is intended to be a working document Chairperson, perhaps in the sense that it might make it easier for you when witnesses give evidence, with reference to the diagram to tell you where they were at the time of their entry of the house. You will see that there are two diagrams in fact Chairperson, the one is headed "Prior to the Entry" and you will hear evidence that the informer, or rather the agent SWT180 knocked on the door and this pretends to show where the people were prior to their entry into the house and when the door was opened, where they each went Chairperson. It is not necessarily correct, but the witnesses will be able to change that as we go along in the evidence and it is in the hope that it might be of some assistance to you. Chairperson, may the "Algemene Agtergrond" then serve again as Exhibit A before you in this hearing Chairperson, and this diagram of the inside of the Fountains' house, as Exhibit B? Chairperson, we intend to lead the evidence of Willem Helm Johannes Coetzee, Col Coetzee first of all. He was really the one that brought the information to the attention of the other, some of the other applicants Chairperson. We intend to lead him rather fully and thereafter the other witnesses will be in the position to merely confirm his evidence as we go along and that might save time Chairperson. We then call Willem Coetzee, Chairperson, Col Coetzee and may I ask that his evidence be marked Exhibit C? Chairperson, perhaps while we are about it, perhaps one could mark the others as well. The copies in front of you Mr Chairman, are all signed, except for Mr van Wyngaard, the last one, we haven't - to sign his statement, he will do so the moment he arrives. Perhaps if we could mark them, Mr Chairman, Coetzee will then be Exhibit C, Pretorius, Anton Pretorius could he be Exhibit D Chairperson. The following witness will be Col Lodewyk de Jager and may his statement then be Exhibit E. We then turn to Lt-Gen Ignatius Coetzee and that would be F Chairperson, and we then turn to Brig Willem Schoon, whose statement will then be Exhibit G and Gen van der Merwe will be Exhibit H and then van Wyngaard, the last one, Chairperson, Exhibit J with your leave. If you are satisfied Mr Chairman, I will then beg leave to call Col Coetzee to give evidence.
MR SIBANYONI: Your full names please Mr Coetzee?
MR COETZEE: Willem Helm Johannes Coetzee.
WILLEM HELM JOHANNES COETZEE: (sworn states)
MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, you may be seated. Sworn in Chairperson.
EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, you are an applicant in this matter which deals with an incident which took place at or near Mmbabane in Swaziland during 13 - 14 December 1986, during which an attempt was made to murder one Glory Sidibe, MK name September, and during which one Pantsu Smith,
MK Pantsu, Sipho Dlamini, MK Sipho and Buzi Majola, MK Buzi, were murdered, is that correct?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR VISSER: We can find your application in the Bundle of documents or applications, page 21 to 39 and you deal with the incident which is at hand currently, from page 29 to 34, is that correct?
MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Do you confirm the content of your amnesty application which you submitted subject to the evidence which you intend to deliver before the Committee today?
MR COETZEE: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Last week already you have requested an amendment of paragraph 7(a) and (b) of your amnesty form on page 21, or page 22 rather, and where so far necessary, you request that that amendment be brought about so that paragraph 7(a) will read "National Party" and 7(b) "Supporter", is that correct?
MR COETZEE: That is correct.
MR VISSER: If it pleases you Mr Chairman, my attention has just been drawn to the fact that he deals with the incident not at page 29, but at page 23 says my Attorney Mr Chairman, I beg your pardon for the mistake. You have studied the document, Exhibit A, which is the general background to amnesty applications, is that correct?
MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Do you agree in essence with its content in so far as your knowledge?
MR COETZEE: Yes.
MR VISSER: And do you also request that that document, Exhibit A, as well as the evidence embodied therein, be incorporated with your evidence in consideration of your amnesty application?
MR COETZEE: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Would you turn to page 2 and address the Committee regarding your knowledge of the background and circumstances of this particular incident, please Colonel.
MR COETZEE: During 1986 I with the rank of Captain, was attached to the Intelligence Unit of the Security Branch, Soweto. General, the then Brig Ignatius Coetzee, was then the Divisional Commander and the Head of our Unit was our Col Louis de Jager. Since the beginning of the 1980's, I had been involved in the tactical and strategic combat of the terrorist onslaught against the government of that time. I was directly involved in Intelligence gathering regarding the various illegal activities (defection, meetings, terror, murders, etc) of members of the following organisations, the South African Communist Party, the African National Congress.
MR VISSER: Colonel, would you proceed somewhat slower, all of this has to be interpreted.
MR COETZEE: Umkhonto weSizwe, Pan Africanist Congress, Azanian People's Organisation, Department of Intelligence and Security, DIS, Azanian People's Liberation Army, APLA, Black Consciousness Movement. An extensive Intelligence network was established by the Intelligence Unit of Soweto and was maintained and expanded. An extensive network of informers and agents was also established. Various infiltration and penetration oriented informers were handled by me during this period in time.
MR VISSER: Just to clarify this, you refer to informers and agents, what is the difference between an informer and an agent?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, with an informer we refer to those who were not members of the Force, whereas agents were indeed members of the South African Police Service.
MR VISSER: And the reference numbers of informers were SWT because you were in Soweto, SWT with a number?
MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: And the agents were referred to according to what number?
MR COETZEE: RS.
MR VISSER: RS and a number, is that correct?
MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.
MR COETZEE: Emanating from information which had been obtained from above-mentioned informers and various other sources of information, me and my fellow workers carried out the following policing actions among others, arrests, detention, personal searches, home searches, crowd control, Court oriented investigations. The Security Branch was under tremendous pressure to stabilise the ongoing situation of violence. Great numbers of residents and members of the South African Police from Tembisa, Daveyton, Wattville and Actonville were maimed and killed during this period in time, as a result of the revolutionary actions by the liberation movements. Information on regional, provincial, national and international level for the purposes of threat analysis was collected and sent through to Security Head Office. The information which was the area of focus primarily information concerning illegal revolutionary activities of among others the following revolutionary organisations - Umkhonto weSizwe, MK Military Intelligence, MK Special Operations, Department of Intelligence and Security, DIS, Azanian People's Liberation Army, APLA, Azanian National Liberation Army, AZANLA, South African Youth Revolutionary Council, SAYCRO, Congress of South African Students, COSAS, South African Youth Congress, SAYCO, Soweto Youth Congress, SOYCO, South African National Students' Congress, SANSCO and ....
MR VISSER: The final one is a repetition, you may disregard that, that is once again COSAS?
MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Proceed.
MR COETZEE: Since the end of 1981 and the beginning of 1982, information which had been collected by the Intelligence Unit of Soweto and which had been confirmed by other Security Branch offices and Security Head Office, indicated that a large scale infiltration of so-called advance detachments of particularly MK members to the Witwatersrand with Soweto as the primary so-called operational zone, was underway from within the RSA's neighbouring States, including Swaziland. These MK detachments consisted of various cells, Units and individuals who used the geographical location of Soweto and its thousands of inhabitants as shelter in order to plan and execute their acts of terrorism, recruitment of new recruits and intimidation. Over a period, these Units succeeded in obtaining safehouses, establishing stockpiles with weapons of warfare, establishing underground self-defence units, providing military training to recruits, recruiting collaborators and applying collaborators, establishing Intelligence networks which collected consistent information regarding the SAP, the SADF, government institutions, municipal institutions, launching acts of terrorism against identified targets such as Security Forces, council buildings and staff, railway lines, power stations and informants. It was clear that the ANC's people's war strategy was gaining manifestation because military and political action particularly in Soweto, were at the order of the day. Gradually the neighbouring States of the RSA began to enjoy more significance as a springboard for the terrorists and their activities, so too Swaziland played a particular role. In this regard, I refer to the chapter entitled "Swaziland, Mozambique" in Exhibit A.
MR VISSER: That is on page 24, is that correct?
MR COETZEE: Yes.
MR VISSER: Proceed.
MR COETZEE: It was clear that these revolutionary groupings were busy with a total onslaught against the South African government dispensation and that the Security Forces had to establish a total strategy in order to combat the revolutionary onslaught. This led directly to the fact that the South African Police and particularly the Security Branch in conjunction with the South African Defence Force and particularly Special Forces, launched cooperative information actions and in certain cases, operational actions.
MR VISSER: You have now given us the background regarding your information network. Can you tell the Committee about Col Pretorius. Was he someone who had been involved with you in this Soweto Intelligence Service?
MR COETZEE: Yes.
MR VISSER: And was your knowledge also his knowledge regarding these matters?
MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well, continue with the facts.
MR COETZEE: I have been informed that the date upon which the incident took place, was approximately the 13th to the 14th of December 1986. Apparently I was mistaken in my amnesty application with the date, which I stated there, namely the 15th to the 16th of December 1986. During approximately November 1986, a woman was killed and a child was injured in a vehicle by a landmine explosion in the Eastern Transvaal. This incident was but one of various acts or incidents of terrorism which had been committed with explosives during this time, but the incident once again emphasised the urgency of the need for preventative action by the Security Forces.
MR VISSER: Yes, in paragraph 16 you have summarised certain references, let us refer to these as statistics and reference is made to certain explosions which took place. This has been done for the convenience of the Committee because it is actually a reference to what has already been stated on the Further Submissions and Responses of the ANC of the 12th of May 1997, pages 84 and 89, is that correct?
MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Actually it is page 84 to 89 Chairperson. And indeed, this incident can be found on page 89 on the aforementioned Further Submissions and Responses under the date 2 or 4 November 1986, is that correct?
MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well, proceed, it is not necessary for you to read all of that, it is quite obvious in itself.
MR COETZEE: Paragraph 17, during December 1986, Col L. de Jager gave me and Col A. Pretorius an order to attend a meeting with him at the Security Branch in Middelburg, Transvaal. As far as I can recall, I, Col de Jager, Col Pretorius, Brig Schoon, Brig Visser and Colonels de Kock and Deetlefs were present during the meeting. The escalating attacks of terrorism in the RSA particularly in the Transvaal by MK from Swaziland and Mozambique was discussed. Much information was tabled by the members who were present. Due to the extensive Intelligence network which was managed by me and Col A. Pretorius, we had information at our disposal with regard to the so-called Transvaal Military Machinery, which functioned from within Swaziland. We conveyed this information to the meeting. I was among others the handler of SWT180, an informer who is currently deceased. Col Pretorius and Sgt Mkhonza were his co-handlers. SWT180 had smuggled a consignment of weapons of terror in the backseat of his car, to the RSA shortly before the meeting. The weaponry was transferred by SWT180 from Swaziland under the order of the September Machinery under the command of Glory Sidibe, MK September, and was transferred from an ANC MK safehouse which was situated in Fountains, Mmbabane, Swaziland.
MR VISSER: Just with regard to the informer, SWT180, was this an informer who had been recruited or was this an informer who had been infiltrated, what was the situation with regard to SWT180?
MR COETZEE: He was a recruited informer, who already had access to certain individuals.
MR VISSER: And had he already established access to the Transvaal Military Machinery of MK in Swaziland?
MR COETZEE: At a later stage, yes.
MR VISSER: Very well. We have now referred to 1986. At that stage, he had already infiltrated?
MR COETZEE: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.
MR COETZEE: The weaponry had been transported by SWT180 from Swaziland under the command of September Machinery under the command of Glory Sidibe, MK September, and was transported from an ANC MK safehouse situated in Fountains, Mmbabane.
MR VISSER: And as you recall, it consisted of two mini-limpet mines, four F1 defensive handgrenades, one SPM anti-personnel mine and one VZO hand machine-gun with ammunition, is that correct?
MR COETZEE: Yes.
MR VISSER: What happened with this weaponry?
MR COETZEE: It was taken into possession by us.
MR VISSER: Did SWT180 inform you about the weaponry?
MR COETZEE: Yes, he was debriefed very close to the border.
MR VISSER: Who was present when the weaponry was found with him?
MR COETZEE: Col de Jager, Col Pretorius, those were the members who were present, at least I can remember their names.
MR VISSER: Were you present?
MR COETZEE: Yes, I was. I was there as the handler.
MR VISSER: Very well, proceed with paragraph 23.
MR COETZEE: SWT180's order from the MK Machinery was to establish a weapon stockpile in Soweto with the objective of the establishment, training and arming of MK underground units. Col Pretorius and I informed the meeting regarding the information which had been provided by SWT180 regarding the September Machinery. Based upon the information that we had, it was our opinion that the September Machinery was a significant unit which fell under the umbrella of the Transvaal Machinery and operated in and from Swaziland. We addressed the meeting that the September Machinery's structure among others, consisted of the following externally military trained persons, MK September, Glory Sidibe, MK Mzala, MK Pantsu, MK Sipho, MK Buzi and MK Ben. Col Deetlefs confirmed certain aspects of the information and elaborated on the Transvaal Machinery's activities. During the meeting it became clear that the share of the above-mentioned Transvaal Machinery and particularly the share of the September Machinery in acts of terror in the Transvaal was significant. Those present at the meeting, were in agreement that it was of urgent necessity to launch an action against the members of the aforementioned Transvaal Machinery in order to attempt to prevent further attacks of terrorism and the extension of the people's war strategy of the ANC. I believed that such action against enemy bases in neighbouring States, was not only in agreement with the government strategy of prevention of the revolutionary onslaught, but that this was indeed part of my duties as a policeman, that it was expected of me and that consequently it fell within my express or implied authorisation to act as such. Furthermore, I was convinced that Swaziland was an area where with the approval of the South African government and the Swazi authorities, members of the Security Branch could act against revolutionaries who were operating from there.
MR VISSER: This matter is addressed in Exhibit A, is that correct?
MR COETZEE: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Please continue.
MR COETZEE: This plan of action would first have to be submitted to Security Head Office for clearance. In my amnesty application I stated that the plan had to be cleared with the government, but this was my mistake. I accepted that Brig Schoon would obtain the necessary approval. During the meeting, Brig Schoon appointed Col de Kock as the Operational Commander of the action, should it realise. After the completion of the meeting, Col de Kock spoke to me and Col Pretorius and said that until we had received the final order, not much could be planned. He proposed that Col Pretorius and I obtained the precise location of the September Machinery's underground house in Fountains as well as a sketch plan of the rooms of the house as quickly as possible. Col de Kock also wanted to know whether we could trust the relevant informer, SWT180 and we pointed out to him that the informer had been working for us for quite some time and had up unto that time, always provided reliable and correct information. I informed him that Col Pretorius and I could not stand in for the action of the informer during the operation, but that Col Pretorius and I would take full responsibility for the informer.
CHAIRPERSON: Could I interrupt for a moment. Mr Visser, in paragraph 19 on page 5 there is reference to a Col A. Pretorius, here we have in paragraph 31, Col W. Pretorius. Were these different people?
MR VISSER: No, the "W" is a clear mistake, Chairperson, I didn't even notice it and I do apologise for that, it is Col A. Pretorius. Thank you for pointing that out Mr Chairperson. That will be the next witness, yes, Mr Chairman, we do apologise.
MR COETZEE: Paragraph 33 Chairperson, the initial planning was that the participants in the operation itself, would have to get to Swaziland themselves and that we would most probably rendezvous at one of the Holiday Inn hotels. After this, we returned to Soweto and immediately began to make preparations with SWT180 for a visit by him, to the aforementioned September Machinery in Swaziland. We told him that we would visit him in Swaziland. SWT180 was never previously informed regarding the operation. Because Col Pretorius and I had already visited Swaziland on various occasions, SWT180 did not find it strange when we began to make arrangements to visit him in Swaziland.
MR VISSER: That is you and Pretorius?
MR COETZEE: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well.
MR COETZEE: On Friday the 12th of December 1986, Col de Jager informed me and Col Pretorius that the operation had been approved and that we could make the final arrangements to deploy SWT180 in Swaziland and that we had to meet Col de Kock the following day at a certain time, I cannot recall exactly what time, in Swaziland, at a Holiday Inn hotel. The final planning was executed by me, Col Pretorius and Col de Jager. I would enter Swaziland via Nersden border post with SWT180, while Col Pretorius and de Jager would enter Swaziland via Oshoek.
MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, how would you have driven, just indicate to the Committee what vehicles you had or what the situation was with the vehicles?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, Col Pretorius and Col de Jager would enter Swaziland with a vehicle, I myself, would enter with a vehicle at a later stage while SWT180 would enter Swaziland with his vehicle.
MR VISSER: Yes, and this vehicle that he was supposed to enter Swaziland with, was this a vehicle which had been made available for his use every time he travelled to Swaziland?
MR COETZEE: Yes.
MR VISSER: So that the MK could be used to the idea that this was his vehicle?
MR COETZEE: Yes.
MR VISSER: So he would enter the country with that vehicle, which was his vehicle?
MR COETZEE: Correct.
MR VISSER: Proceed.
MR COETZEE: Paragraph 37, Sgt Mkhonza would assist SWT180 in this regard. He had to wait in a vehicle on the RSA side until after the operation had been completed and then return SWT180 to Soweto. The plan was that SWT180's vehicle would be left behind in Swaziland to be retrieved later. This would not create any suspicion if SWT180 and Mkhonza were to be noticed together in a vehicle by ANC members, seeing as both of them were agents or informers. However, we could not take the risk that SWT180 be seen with police members in the same vehicle. I must add that Mkhonza had no knowledge of the murder of the MK members in Swaziland. On Saturday the 13th of December 1986, I saw to it that SWT180 entered Swaziland via the Oshoek border post with his vehicle. I entered Swaziland with my own vehicle and a false passport and later that afternoon of Saturday the 13th of December 1986, joined Col de Jager, Col de Kock, Col Deetlefs, Capt Paul van Dyk, Warrant Officer Freek Pienaar and Sgt Douw Willemse at the kwaLoseni Hotel.
MR VISSER: In Swaziland?
MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct. I must just add Chairperson, kwaLoseni, I may be mistaken in terms of the precise rendezvous point of that afternoon.
MR VISSER: But it was at a Holiday Inn hotel?
MR COETZEE: Yes, as far as I can recall.
MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.
MR COETZEE: Col Pretorius was also already present. Pretorius and I then went to meet SWT180 at a pre-arranged rendezvous point. The rest of the group waited for us at the hotel. During the meeting SWT180 stated that he had met the following members of the September Machinery namely MK Mzala, MK Pantsu and MK Sipho.
MR VISSER: Was this after he had entered Swaziland via Oshoek in his own direction and after he met you, he told you that he had already met these persons, is that what you mean?
MR COETZEE: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.
MR COETZEE: He confirmed that the meeting had taken place at the underground house in Fountains Mmbabane. Furthermore he informed us that the group just wanted him to drive them around to go drinking and had not discussed any underground work with him whatsoever. According to SWT180 it was clear that these persons would come to rest much later that evening and that he would have to return to them, before they became suspicious. SWT180 was once again questioned regarding the precise location of the safehouse and it was put to him that he should possibly indicate the house to us later that evening. A later rendezvous point was then arranged with SWT180. Col Pretorius and I returned immediately to the hotel where we informed Col de Jager and Col de Kock and the rest of the team. We also reported to them that SWT180 could not remain away from the group for very long, and that there had therefore not been enough time for him to indicate the safehouse to us. We also informed them that we had arranged a follow up meeting with SWT180 for later that evening. While we were waiting for the next rendezvous with SWT180, the team at the hotel discussed the operation and among others, our withdrawal after the operation. Col de Kock indicated that we should follow him to near Oshoek, where we would take a detour which would take us through the border fence. General security measures were also discussed on this occasion and it was suggested that we should move around as little as possible so as not to fix any attention on us. During this occasion, I realised from discussions by Mr de Kock and his staff, that other unknown members of Col de Kock's Unit were also in Swaziland.
MR VISSER: That would be with the exception of those that you were involved with there?
MR COETZEE: Correct. Col Pretorius and I later once again left the group in order to wait for SWT180 at the rendezvous point. While we were waiting, he drove passed us with his vehicle full of persons, approximately five. Col Pretorius and I realised that SWT180 was going to be late for our meeting and decided just to wait there. SWT180 arrived much later and reported to us that the September Machinery members had kept him very busy, but that he had dropped them off. He also stated that MK Ben had also been in the vehicle when he drove passed us. SWT180 reported that he had dropped the group off at the safehouse in Fountains and this group consisted of MK Mzala, MK Pantsu and MK Sipho. Furthermore he said that he had been instructed by the September Machinery members to return to their house early the following morning, so that he could discuss operational matters personally with MK September.
ADV DE JAGER: What happened to MK Ben who had been with them in the vehicle?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, later in our statement, we address precisely where MK Ben went after he had been dropped off.
ADV DE JAGER: Was he dropped off with them?
MR COETZEE: Yes. Col Pretorius and I instructed SWT180 to accompany us and to indicate the safehouse in Fountains to us. On the way to the house, SWT180 compiled a sketch plan of the house as per our request. I was convinced that SWT180 at this stage, had begun to suspect that one or other operation regarding the safehouse was underway. I realised that we could not let SWT180 leave our control because it would endanger the lives of our entire team.
MR VISSER: I beg your pardon, that is a typographical error, will you just scratch the last sentence Chairperson, this is obviously a typing error. Please proceed.
MR COETZEE: Paragraph 48, after SWT180 had pointed out the safehouse to us, we immediately returned to the hotel and instructed SWT180 to wait for us in the vehicle. The safehouse was approximately 20 kilometres away from the hotel. Col Pretorius and I explained the location of the safehouse, the sketch plan and the presence of the September Machinery members in the house, to Col de Jager, Col de Kock and the rest of the team. Because we could not be entirely certain whether MK September would be present in the house that evening, we held a discussion during which we discussed whether or not we would act that very same night or postpone the operation. The following aspects were considered in this regard - due to the fact that SWT180 had arranged a meeting with MK September early the following morning at the house, we suspected that he would spend the night at the house, but we could not be certain of that. It would be too dangerous to wait till the following morning, because then the operation would have to be executed in daylight and by nature of the circumstances, more persons would be moving around, who could observe us. Apparently the MK members had not suspected anything up to that point, but anything could happen the following day. We were also concerned regarding the safety of SWT180. We specifically concealed the planning of what we wanted to do, from SWT180 because one could never completely trust an informer, even though he provided reliable information. We did not know who he would react were he to surmise what we were planning. According to me, he had already become suspicious when he was asked to indicate the safehouse and to set up a sketch plan. Furthermore Col de Kock had illegal weapons and ammunition in his vehicle and the discovery of this by the Swazi police would have created a great problem. It was decided nonetheless to continue with the action that very same night, even though we were not certain that MK September would be in the house. Col de Kock began after this, to establish an operational deployment and deployed members with regard to the various rooms in the house.
MR VISSER: That is incorrect, how should it read?
MR COETZEE: It should read Col Pretorius and Sgt Willemse were appointed to secure the bathroom in the house.
MR VISSER: And what was your job?
MR COETZEE: To see to the informer and to act in cooperation with Col Deetlefs from the Eastern Transvaal.
MR VISSER: Very well, we will deal with that, continue.
MR COETZEE: Col de Kock stated that the planned action could only be executed after SWT180 had obtained confirmation that the relevant September Machinery members were still in the house. I had to ensure that SWT180 would knock on the front door with an excuse for his return, in order to determine whether MK Pantsu, his immediate MK handler, was indeed in the house.
MR VISSER: What was the excuse?
MR COETZEE: That his vehicle had broken down.
MR VISSER: Very well.
MR COETZEE: Should there be a negative reaction to SWT180's knock, we would withdraw.
MR VISSER: Then there is a repetition in that.
MR COETZEE: In order to plan alternative action and to coordinate as such.
MR VISSER: What do you mean by a negative reaction, would that be if it was not clear whether or not there were MK members in the house?
MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct. We drove in a convoy from the hotel to Fountains. As far as I can recall, there were approximately five vehicles in the convoy. It was already late at night, early morning. On the way to the house, Col Pretorius and I explained the situation to SWT180 and discussed the plan of action with him. He was informed that he had to knock on the door and he was also told what to do. It would be highly improbable that MK Pantsu would not be there, seeing as he and the others had been dropped off there late that night by SWT180 and they did not have any transport and the house was situated far away from the town.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, we are now going on to the approach and the attack on the house, Mr Chairman, perhaps it might be a convenient time at this stage, to break at this point and to go on from there, after the adjournment.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well, we will take the short adjournment now.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
WILLEM HELM COETZEE: (s.o.u )
CHAIRPERSON: We got to paragraph 54, hadn't we, we had just finished paragraph 54, page 12.
MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, may we perhaps ask for an indulgence to take off our jackets?
CHAIRPERSON: Certainly, I have said at the commencement of this hearing that the ventilation here is such that if you want to take off your jackets, please do.
MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, and may I make one correction in Exhibit C, at page 8, paragraph 36, the second sentence must read "I would go with SWT180 via Oshoek", not Nersden, Mr Chairman, it is Oshoek in paragraph 36. That much becomes clear in paragraph 38.
CHAIRPERSON: (Microphone not on)
MR VISSER: Pretorius and de Jager went through Nersden, Mr Chairman, and Coetzee and SWT180 went in through Oshoek. In paragraph 36, that is incorrect. It really, in paragraph 36, the Nersden and the Oshoek should just be changed around, Mr Chairman, it has just been pointed out. The last sentence
"... I would enter along with SWT180 via Oshoek and Col Pretorius and de Jager, via Nersden."
Those two have just been swopped around, Mr Chairman, I do apologise for the error. Then it is in order Mr Chairman. As you have pointed out, Mr Chairman, we have reached paragraph 54 and we are going on to paragraph 55, Mr Coetzee.
MR COETZEE: Approximately 500 metres from the safehouse we stopped, we all disembarked, upon which I received the sub-machine rifle fitted with a silencer. As far as I can recall, the weaponry was hidden in a blue coloured minibus by Col de Kock. I cannot recall who handed the weapons over to me. Col Pretorius was armed with a similar sub-machine gun and in a short period of time, we had to ensure that the weapon was in order to shoot with. We approached the particular safehouse on foot. I took up position next to one of the walls close to the front door, along with Sgt Willemse, Col de Kock, Col Pretorius, Col de Jager and SWT180 and waited on SWT180's knock.
MR VISSER: If you have regard for Exhibit B, there are two diagrams of the same house. The first one deals with the situation before the house was entered, is that more or less correct as it is indicated there, the names at the bottom of the first part of Exhibit B?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Very well, please continue.
MR COETZEE: After SWT180 had knocked, someone spoke to him from inside the house, I could hear how the key was turned in the lock. The next moment Col de Kock and de Jager followed by Capt van Dyk entered the house, and shots were fired immediately. The entry of the house took place within a few seconds, no lights were on within the house and we switched on our torches, which was attached to our firearms with sellotape.
MR VISSER: Did you do this beforehand?
MR COETZEE: Yes, we did Chairperson. Col de Kock shot the person who had opened the door, immediately, and he fell there. It would seem later that this was MK Sipho. Several shots were fired within the house during this entry. Myself, Col Deetlefs, Pienaar and SWT180 moved around the house to a glass door on the side of the house. I did not fire any shots that evening.
MR VISSER: That is also indicated in Exhibit B under the heading "After Entry" if you look on the right hand side of the diagram?
MR COETZEE: That is correct. The shooting was over within seconds, upon which we established that the three persons were fatally wounded. The particular three persons were positively identified by SWT180 as MK Pantsu, MK Sipho and MK Buzi, all members of the September Machinery. The house was briefly searched thereafter and an amount of arms were seized. The precise amount I cannot recall, SZ6, S3 demolition mini-limpet mines, F1 handgrenades and a variety of propaganda material like Mayabuy's, Umzibenzi's, Dawn's and documents of underground military cell structures in Soweto amongst which there was a biography of one Magomotsi Mogodeli, a COSAS member from Diepkloof. This indicated the connection between COSAS and the September Machinery. Col Pretorius took photo's of the deceased persons and the weapons that were found. The photo's were later used to confirm the identities of the MK members.
MR VISSER: How did you do this?
MR COETZEE: By means of identifications and showing the photographs to agents and informers who had access to MK members across the border at that time.
ADV DE JAGER: I beg your pardon. Could you establish their true identities? You had their MK names and now you had photo's, could you then establish their true identities?
MR COETZEE: Chairperson, all that I can remember is that we only confirmed that their MK names and that they were MK members, Chairperson.
ADV DE JAGER: So from the photo's you could not establish who they were indeed, except for the, we have one name here Magomotsi Mogodeli?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson, but this was only an autobiography in which they had referred to Magomotsi Mogodeli which was a newly recruited MK member in an underground cell structure.
ADV DE JAGER: Yes, but I would just like to hear from the Evidence Leader if any of these persons' families have been contacted?
ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, as far as I understand, as far as we could establish, no victims in this matter could be traced at all. Certain steps were taken to investigate this matter, and no information could be forthcoming.
CHAIRPERSON: There was evidence as to their proper names, wasn't there?
ADV STEENKAMP: Yes Mr Chairman.
ADV DE JAGER: Not from the ANC offices?
ADV STEENKAMP: No information could be obtained, Mr Chairman.
ADV DE JAGER: Thank you. I beg your pardon, Mr Coetzee, you may continue.
MR COETZEE: Early the morning of the Sunday, the 14th of December 1986 ...
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, can I disturb for the benefit of my learned friend, page 174, at the bottom of the page they give the proper names.
ADV STEENKAMP: Indeed, thank you Mr Chairman.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, in the Further Responses, sorry the statement to the TRC by the ANC, at page 94, there is a reference under point 16 to a Buzi Majola which appears to be the correct name Chairperson, and not an MK name. It gives a date of the 11th of June 1986, which doesn't make any sense to us Mr Chairman. It may or may not be the same, it seems that it is a little too coincidental that it won't refer to the same name, but it is possible that it refers to the same person.
CHAIRPERSON: It seems odd that the names appear in certain of the affidavits and not in others, it appears also at page 161, at the top of the page, this is Deetlefs giving the names.
MR VISSER: These are the Eastern Transvaal members of the Security Branch, perhaps they could tell us what they know about this, Mr Chairman, it seems to be the same name which was given at page 174 in fact.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR VISSER: Yes, we don't have further information unfortunately Mr Chairperson. Very well, you have referred to Magomotsi Mogodeli and the photo's that were taken and you say that the total operation was completed within approximately 10 minutes?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR VISSER: What happened the next day?
MR COETZEE: Early the morning of Sunday, 14 December 1986, we left Swaziland in a convoy close to the Oshoek border post illegally and before sunrise, reported to Brig Schoon and Gen Ignatius Coetzee at Oshoek border post.
MR VISSER: Did they stay there as far as you know?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson. The weapons which we received from Col de Kock, we returned these weapons after we were back on the RSA side and before I went to Oshoek, I returned SWT180 to Sgt Mkhonza so that they could proceed ahead.
MR VISSER: Was SWT180's vehicle left in Swaziland that vehicle?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Where exactly did you leave it?
MR COETZEE: I cannot recall exactly, but I think we hid it in a place close to the hotel where the public had access to. The found weapons and arms were shown to Brig Schoon and Gen Ignatius Coetzee, Pretorius and I immediately thereafter returned to Soweto. According to media reports, the Swaziland police only became aware of the attack three days after it had taken place. I confirm that Col de Kock proposed to me that evening to kill SWT180, I refused and said that I will be able to handle SWT180.
MR VISSER: Was Col de Kock concerned about the reliability and trustworthiness of SWT180?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson. Col de Kock also wanted to attack another house which was shown by SWT180, because MK Ben would possibly be there at that house, because he and the others were left there late that evening by SWT180 and I was of the opinion that this was too much risk and we were not certain as to whose house it was or who would all be present, and this fell outside our mandate.
MR VISSER: I see there are some diverse problems with this paragraph, what was the situation with MK Ben? Where did SWT180 drop him off?
MR COETZEE: According to my knowledge Chairperson, that particular evening, he was at the house, at the safehouse where we launched the operation. He was dropped there that evening.
MR VISSER: And this other house, what is this that you refer to?
MR COETZEE: This is the residence where MK Ben was present from time to time Chairperson.
MR VISSER: And was there a suspicion that he later that night went there?
MR COETZEE: Yes, because after the operation, he was not present at the house.
ADV DE JAGER: I beg your pardon Mr Visser, the phrase "because he and the others were dropped of there late that night by SWT180, has to be deleted."
MR VISSER: As it pleases you Chairperson, this is totally confusing. It has to be omitted from this paragraph, because MK Ben was left with Pantsu at the safehouse and because he was not present there later, it was accepted that he went to his own residence which was another house, which was apparently pointed out by SWT180. We apologise for that. Please continue.
MR COETZEE: I need to point out further that SWT180 after this operation, had worked for myself and Col Pretorius for quite some time, because of the mentioned operation, we deemed it safer to withdraw him from Swaziland and to apply him in Botswana and here SWT180 once again infiltrated underground MK structures. SWT180 did exemplary work in Botswana in exposing the MK underground structures there and providing information about MK's planned acts of terror. Because of unforeseen circumstances SWT180 was exposed as an informer during an undercover operation in Botswana, he was abducted and taken to Botswana where he was detained by the so-called Mboko of DIS in the notorious Quattro Camp and was tortured as well. SWT180 was one of a number of 32 persons which were released from Quattro and after his release he told me because of his torture, he was obliged to expose the operation in Swaziland to the ANC. He also told me that during his detention in Quattro Camp, he was an eyewitness to various gross human rights violations. The Moshinyani Commission into the activities of Quattro in 1992, 1993 has to be read along with this.
MR VISSER: Would you please tell us what your objectives were and what the circumstances were with this operation? If you would proceed with paragraph 75?
MR COETZEE: This is to provide the background to the Committee. At that stage, beginning with paragraph 75, very well. These actions took place within a war situation where the rules of normal warfare were not applicable. My action was aimed against the supporters of a liberation movement who were the enemy of the government and who managed the revolutionary onslaught from Swaziland amongst others, innocent citizens were killed or maimed and much damage was done to property. In the light of the pressure that was placed upon us in the Security Branch by the political leaders of the time, and the speeches in which it was pointed to the wiping out of terrorists, I apparently - where it was pointed to the wiping out of terrorists, I truly believed that such actions of mine were expected and that my actions fell within the ambit of my expressed or tacit authorisation. My part and involvement in this incident was aimed at combatting the revolutionary onslaught and it was aimed at the protection and maintenance of the previous government and State dispensation and to prevent the land falling into chaos and anarchy. For motivation of my participation in this action, I mention that continually I acted in the execution of my duties in the service of the South African Police and in execution of instructions which I received from senior officers.
MR VISSER: In this particular instance, who would you say approved this operation?
MR COETZEE: It was Head Office Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Please continue.
MR COETZEE: I believe that what I had done, was expected of me as a policeman and that I acted in the execution of my duties as a policeman and that my actions fell within my explicit or tacit authorisation. I request humbly that amnesty be granted to me for any offence or delict committed by me before, during and after this incident in regard to the incident which took place at Mmbabane, Swaziland on or approximately during the 13th to 14th of December 1986, which will include attempted murder of one Glory Sidibe, MK September, conspiracy to murder and the murder of one Pantsu Smith, MK Pantsu, Sipho Dlamini, MK Sipho and Buzi Majola, MK Buzi, transgression of applicable border control regulations or legislature, any illegal act or omission in regard to the possession and use of firearms and ammunition, defeating the ends of justice and or any offence or delict which might emanate from the evidence.
MR VISSER: This Buzi Majola, was this a man or a woman?
MR COETZEE: According to my knowledge Chairperson, it was a woman.
MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, that is the evidence which we wish to present.
CHAIRPERSON: In the light of the discussion last week, are you still asking for amnesty for the murder?
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, we - with reference to our submissions which seem to have found favour Chairperson, we don't. We ask for amnesty for any offence or delict committed in this incident Chairperson, and which is supported by the evidence, with respect. As far as the murder is concerned Mr Chairman, that is included because of the issue of delicts, Mr Chairman, which we know, which we spoke about last week during argument.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, that comes under (f)?
MR VISSER: Yes Chairperson, may it please you Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, Hattingh on record. Mr Coetzee, singular aspects which need to be cleared up with you. As was the case in the incident which we heard last week, did your division once again gather the Intelligence which led to the operation, is that correct?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And as it would seem from your submission, you had comprehensive Intelligence with regard to this person who was involved with the struggle of the past?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And then you say just to clarify Mr de Kock's position, you say there was a meeting during which you and if I speak of you, I do not refer to only you, but during which the Intelligence which you had available, you submitted to the persons present there?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And all agreed that it was necessary that action should be taken against these persons?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And on that occasion, you said Brig Schoon appointed Mr de Kock as the Operational Commander?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And once again, here we have the situation where Security Branches collects Intelligence and Vlakplaas is then brought in to act as the operational arm?
MR COETZEE: That is how I see it Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. And then you also say in paragraph 35 of your submission, you say
"... on Friday, 12 December 1986 Col de Jager told myself and Col Pretorius that the operation had been approved and that we could make the final arrangements."
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: That information that the operation had been approved, was this also conveyed to Col de Kock?
MR COETZEE: I suppose so Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: So according to you, you had instructions from Head Office to continue with the operation?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson, via my immediate Commander, Col de Jager.
MR HATTINGH: But you understood that the instruction came from Head Office?
MR COETZEE: That is correct Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And it was also clear what the operation would entail, namely the elimination of persons in Swaziland?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: At the conclusion of this operation, I don't think you were involved, you did not go to Gen Coetzee's house after the operation?
MR COETZEE: No Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And a few singular aspects where Col de Kock differs from you in certain instances, I am not saying that it might be relevant detail, but just for in case it might be a point of dispute. Can you recall that he, that the plan was that the door of the house would be opened with the help of a heavy hammer?
MR COETZEE: That is possible Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And at a later stage when you approached the house on foot, he decided that SWT180 would knock on the door and pretend that his car had broken down?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: You drove with the vehicles to approximately 500 metres from the house and parked the vehicles there and then continued on foot?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And can you recall that there where you parked the vehicles, that Mr de Kock climbed into the vehicle in which SWT180 was and I suppose you were also in the same vehicle?
MR COETZEE: That is possible Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And then he would say, I don't know if you observed it, but he would say that he could see that SWT180 seemed to him as if he was under the influence of some or other substance and he said that he smelt marijuana in the vehicle?
MR COETZEE: The observation of the Colonel, I cannot comment on that, but I did not observe it at that stage. It is possible Chairperson, that he may have taken a drink. I believe that he may have taken a drink.
MR HATTINGH: He and the three persons who were killed in the house, moved around that night and only arrived later that evening, later than you expected them?
MR COETZEE: That is so Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Did SWT180 at that stage, not propose that you postpone the operation to another date?
MR COETZEE: I cannot recall Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: But that is Mr de Kock's recollection and then he then took out his firearm and pointed it at SWT180 and said that you will accompany us to this house, otherwise I will kill you right here and now, can you recall that?
MR COETZEE: No, I cannot Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And afterwards you walked to the house where the operation had taken place?
MR COETZEE: That is correct Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: At an earlier stage, in the planning stage you say in your statement, Mr de Kock made some enquiries about the reliability of SWT180?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Was it clear to you as if Mr de Kock had thoughts about to his reliability?
MR COETZEE: That is possible Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And if you could not trust him, this would be a great risk to you?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson, indeed.
MR HATTINGH: You yourself say that you did not completely trust him at that stage?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And that is why it was important for him to establish whether this person could be totally trusted?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And Mr Coetzee, Mr de Kock says that he does not have any recollection after the operation, he proposed that SWT180 be eliminated. He says according to him, that was not necessary. Is it possible that you might be mistaken, that you are confusing it with something he might have said before the time?
MR COETZEE: I may confuse this aspect Mr Chairperson, but on occasion the proposal was tabled. I can however not recall the detail as to how we managed the situation afterwards, Mr Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And you can also not recall in detail as to which time this proposal was tabled?
MR COETZEE: As I have said, according to me, if the proposal was tabled, it was during and with the planning of the operation Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, we have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH
MR ROSSOUW: Rossouw Mr Chairman, I have no questions.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PRINSLOO: Chairperson, Prinsloo. Mr Coetzee, when you refer to the September Machinery, this would be a component of the Transvaal Machinery, it was only a name appointed to September as the Commander of that Unit?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR PRINSLOO: No further questions, thank you Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR PRINSLOO
MS VAN DER WALT: Louisa van der Walt Chairperson. Only a singular aspect, you have testified about the information which you had at your disposal. If I put it to you that there was a name by the ANC, that the Christmas that would follow, large scale acts of terror were planned, which they named and I think it is called in (indistinct) as the Black Christmas?
MR COETZEE: That is possible, I recall that reference was made to such a period of time.
MS VAN DER WALT: No further questions, thank you Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS VAN DER WALT
ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV STEENKAMP
MR SIBANYONI: Mr Coetzee, you say this agent informed you that, that is on page that you refer to, on page 74, I am sorry on paragraph 74, you said that this person, this agent told you that he witnessed some gross human rights violations in Quattro Camp. At what stage did he tell you?
MR COETZEE: After he was released and was back in the RSA, Chairperson.
MR SIBANYONI: Do you remember when was that?
MR COETZEE: Approximately 1992, the end of 1992, beginning of 1993 Chairperson.
MR SIBANYONI: You say he is now deceased, when did he die?
MR COETZEE: I heard Chairperson, that Col Pretorius would be able to give you that information with regard to the time period, I would say approximately nine months ago Chairperson.
MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson, no further questions.
CHAIRPERSON: Just one point I would like to clarify or amplify perhaps. You have told us that you supplied a great deal of information at the meeting?
MR COETZEE: Yes Mr Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Is it correct that part of this information was confirmed by Col Deetlefs?
MR COETZEE: Yes Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: That he also had knowledge of these operations?
MR COETZEE: Yes Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Just one aspect, perhaps with your leave, in re-examination Mr Chairman. Mr Coetzee, did you also have other agents and sources who also supplied you with information with regard to the September Machinery, except for SWT180?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson, and this was also supported by Division Eastern Transvaal.
MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
MR SIBANYONI: Maybe just one question, Mr Coetzee. I see in some instances, a name of an agent is mentioned and in other instances, the name is not mentioned. Where do you draw the line?
MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson, one is a member of the Force and one is a member of the public, Chairperson. In those cases where we refer to names, the particular member at that stage was applied covertly and later placed into the open system and that is why we identify him by his name.
MR SIBANYONI: Like the one we had last week, Finnias Moshualiba?
MR COETZEE: Yes Mr Chairperson.
MR SIBANYONI: The reason why his name is mentioned is that eventually he was placed in the employment of the ...
MR COETZEE: Into the open structures, yes correct.
MR SIBANYONI: Thank you.
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Perhaps we can explain it further, if you will allow me Mr Chairperson. The situation was also the same with regard to askaris, is that not true? Askaris who, after they were applied covertly and were registered as askaris at Head Office, you would in reports refer to them by their names?
MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson.
MR VISSER: And not to members of the public who were recruited as informers?
MR COETZEE: No Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Or not after their deaths because they may have families and that might place these families in jeopardy?
MR COETZEE: Yes.
MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson. Mr Chairman, Commissioner de Jager will recall that in the Nokuthula Simelane matter, this person Mkhonza actually came forward himself and he identified himself in the press, with statements which he made in the press at the time, so there is no need for the witness then to, under those circumstances to try to protect his identity where he, himself, made his identity known.
ADV DE JAGER: The same was the case with Williamson?
MR VISSER: Exactly the same was that, yes Mr Chairperson. Perhaps Mr Chairman, if I may be allowed to add the last aspect, Mr Finnias Moshualiba was in fact an applicant in the incident, so that was also a reason why his identity would have had to be disclosed.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
MR VISSER: May Mr Coetzee be excused under the normal conditions, Chairperson, and may I then call Col Pretorius to give evidence? You will observe Mr Chairman, that much of the evidence in the statements, the amnesty statements in your Bundle, between these two witnesses are identical. We have shortened it with a mere reference, cross-reference Mr Chairman, in order to save time where we could.
ADV DE JAGER: It appeared to me as if the wrong one has been attested to when I said that it was actually with regard to Pretorius and that the two have been switched.
WITNESS EXCUSED
